T.V. Paul

THE SYSTEMIC BASES OF ’S CHALLENGE TO THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR ORDER

by T.V. Paul1

T.V. Paul is Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Montreal, . He is the author of Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge University Press, 1994), and co-editor and contributor to the volumes The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (The University of Michigan Press, 1998) and International Order and the Future of World Politics (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1999).

he nuclear nonproliferation a nuclear weapons option for over states emphasize one or more of regime received a jolt in May two decades; South Africa, a state three factors: the regional rivalries T1998, when India announced that had built seven nuclear devices; that India has with and it had detonated five nuclear devices, and Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Be- , domestic politics, or the pre- including a hydrogen bomb. New larus, the three successor states that dispositions of individual decision- Delhi’s archenemy, Pakistan, fol- inherited nuclear weapons upon the makers.3 In this article, I look lowed suit with an announced six breakup of the . Sec- specifically at the nuclear behavior tests just two weeks later. These tests ond, the semi-unipolar post-Cold of India and argue that, although do- were preceded by the test-firing by War international system has given mestic factors may be associated both countries of short- and me- the and its Western with the timing of the 1998 tests, the dium-range missiles capable of de- allies greater power to enforce non- tests are primarily the culmination livering nuclear warheads. The proliferation through coercive eco- of long-term systemic and sub-sys- nuclear behavior of India and Paki- nomic and military sanctions. temic processes that began in the stan presents several puzzles. First, Finally, in an era of 1960s. In other words, the over- the South Asian tests run contrary and economic liberalization, coun- arching cause of India’s nuclear be- to the main trend in nonproliferation. tries are likely to be sensitive to the havior is located in the larger global After the end of the , the adverse effects of international iso- and regional nature of the nuclear di- nuclear nonproliferation regime be- lation on their economies, and thus, lemma facing the country. India of- came stronger, with several erst- they are likely to avoid provocative ten couches its challenge to the while opponents joining the nuclear policies.2 Why have India nonproliferation regime in norma- on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear and Pakistan then bucked the trend? tive and idealistic terms, such as the Weapons (NPT). The notable new Most explanations for the nuclear sovereign equality of states and the adherents included: Brazil and Ar- behavior of the two South Asian need for global disarmament. How- gentina, states that had maintained ever, these rationales mask the real

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 1 T.V. Paul

Indian concern: namely, the nonpro- gime, primarily in terms of the dis- tween them and all the other actors. liferation regime privileges the five crepancy between India’s ascribed The term “sub-systemic” is used for declared states status in the international system and interactions limited to a specific re- (NWS) and perpetuates their domi- its aspiration for a major power role. gional system. A systemic approach nance, while keeping India as an This is followed by a discussion of would explain the security behavior underdog in the global power hier- the 1998 tests. I argue that the tests of a state in terms of its position in archy. The argument here, therefore, are a particular manifestation of the international system and how is that the tests should be seen in the India’s unhappiness with its ascribed this position is affected by the inter- larger context of global power poli- status in the international system, as actions between it and the major tics involving the great powers and well as an effort to correct a per- power actors. A sub-systemic analy- India, especially the fact that the ceived deterioration in its immedi- sis would focus on interactions and former remain unwilling to accept ate geo-strategic security power relationships among the most the latter’s aspirations to join their environment in South Asia. Al- prominent actors within a region.7 ranks. though the aspirations for major A systemic approach posits that This analysis also highlights a power status are held by almost all states placed differently in the inter- larger problem inherent in the cur- Indian political parties, barring the national system will have divergent rent nonproliferation regime. De- Communists who fear provoking security concerns and interests. spite its success with a number of China, it is also true that the Great powers tend to have global countries, the regime has not been Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) covets interests, while the security concerns able to arrest nuclear proliferation this status most ardently and is the and interests of most middle pow- completely. One reason for this is most willing to assert it through mili- ers and small powers are concen- that the regime disregards the long- tary policy. However, because of the trated in a given region. Aspiring term political and military processes underlying systemic considerations, great powers also perceive their se- that affect the global and regional other party governments in the fu- curity as being tied to the larger bal- balance of power.4 Specifically, the ture are unlikely to make radical de- ance-of-power processes occurring NPT envisions no conditions under partures from the BJP’s policy on in the international system, involv- which rising powers could acquire nuclear weapons, although they may ing other established powers. There- nuclear weapons. The problem with slow down the pace of the program. fore, as an aspiring major power, this is that it reflects an underlying India’s nuclear behavior can be un- assumption that power relations in A SYSTEMIC FRAMEWORK derstood better by using a systemic the international system will remain Robert Jervis has identified three approach than by any other prevail- the same and no new great powers characteristics of a systemic ap- ing framework. will arise. This assumption runs con- proach that are relevant here. First, With China and Pakistan as trary to the rise and fall of great pow- outcomes may not be due to the at- nuclear adversaries, however, India ers and power transitions among tributes of actors, because a system also has sub-systemic concerns. Af- them evident in the 500-year history can produce consequences that are ter outlining India’s system-wide of the modern international not necessarily what the actors in- and regional concerns, I will show 5 system. This mismatch between an tended. Second, units are intercon- how they largely account for the inflexible nonproliferation regime nected, i.e., changes in some parts depth of India’s opposition to the and the dynamic of shifting power of the system produce changes in nonproliferation regime and why relations suggests that India should other parts. And third, relations be- they led to the decision to test. Rela- not be seen as uniquely driven to tween any two actors are conditioned tive to these systemic motivations, flout international norms and that in part by the relations between each domestic factors are less salient. In future challenges to the regime of them and other actors in the in- fact, governments belonging to all 6 should be expected. ternational system. In this article, I political parties since 1988—six of In this article, I first present the use the term “systemic” to refer to them in all—had maintained nuclear systemic foundations of India’s op- the larger international system, es- weapons ready to be tested. They position to the nonproliferation re- pecially the power relationships differ mostly on the pace and extent among major power actors and be-

2 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 T.V. Paul

of the program, rather than the goals strategy within the ambit of U.S. economy already ranks fifth in the of it. True, it took the stridently na- hegemony.9 Brazil’s population of world.12 This does not mean that for- tionalistic BJP government led by 165 million is dwarfed by India’s midable problems associated with Atal Behari Vajpayee to make the 967 million (based on 1996 esti- poverty, weak infrastructure, and in- final decision to conduct the actual mates). Other regional states, such ternal divisions do not exist in In- tests. However, India’s basic posi- as Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, dia. But, from the Indian point of tion on nuclear weapons mostly and Pakistan, are all only about one- view, when China achieved its ma- shows continuity due to the systemic fifth as large as India in either popu- jor power status it resembled India compulsions I will now describe. lation or economic size. India, with in economic indicators of develop- its nuclear capability (as attested by ment. Today’s is economi- INDIA’S SYSTEMIC the 1998 tests), a missile capability cally a weak actor as well. These COMPULSIONS (one of the most advanced in the de- examples lead Indian elites to dis- veloping world), a fairly modern count economic power relative to It is important to recognize the army, and rapidly increasing eco- military power. The Indian elite thus unique situation of India among nomic strength, is likely to emerge believes that, even if India gains eco- states in the current international as a powerful actor in the 21st cen- nomic might, without hard military system. India’s conduct represents tury. With the test-firing of the Agni power resources, including nuclear the classic behavior of an emerging missile, with a 2,010-kilometer capability, its proclamations for dis- major power that finds the existing range, India can now reach many armament will not be taken seriously powers seeking to block the entry of vital centers of its adversaries.10 In- by the existing nuclear powers and any new states to their status in the dia is also working on an advanced it will not gain a foothold in the glo- international hierarchy. Major pow- version of the Agni that could hit tar- bal power hierarchy.13 ers in the past have concluded un- gets in and Shanghai. In a equal disarmament with the India still faces a number of decade or so, India is expected to intent to arrest the rise of a potential hurdles before entering the major possess the capacity for interconti- challenger to their dominance. The power league. Historically, war has nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). inter-war naval arms control treaties been the main source of the rise and India is also emerging as a leading between the United States, Britain, fall of great powers. The current state in space technology. Several and , which would have main- members of the great power club indigenously-built satellites have tained the permanent inferiority of were the winners of World War II. been launched during the past two Japan, are a case in point. The Japa- Unfortunately for India, when the decades. By the end of 1998, India nese perceived them as a grave in- world war came to an end, it was still plans to lift off its first commercial justice and began to violate the first under colonial rule. Recognition of launch vehicle, which will carry Ko- treaty even before the ink on it had China’s status was delayed, but rean and German satellites into dried.8 The present-day nuclear China’s willingness to ally with the space.11 These achievements in states are making similar efforts to United States against the Soviet space have increased India’s poten- contain India and keep it at its cur- Union allowed it to regain its U.N. tial for developing advanced mis- rent middle-power rank for reasons Security Council seat. China rein- siles. of power, especially because their forced its major power status with monopoly of the systemic leadership Since its economic liberalization nuclear and missile technology be- role gives them significant advan- began in 1991, India has maintained fore the NPT entered into force in tages. an average five to seven percent an- 1970, and, since 1978, the liberal- nual economic growth. If it can sus- ization of the economy has allowed Among the developing states, In- tain this growth and at the same time Beijing to maintain a healthy level dia seems to be the key state in line alleviate the key problems facing the of economic growth. for achieving major power status in country, it could become a major the coming century. Its closest par- India took over a decade longer economic power by the second de- allel, Brazil, is situated in a geo- to inaugurate the economic liberal- cade of the . According graphically and strategically isolated ization that began in 1991. This lib- to World Bank estimates based on region and has accepted a trading eralization accelerated economic purchasing power parity, the Indian

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 3 T.V. Paul growth, but fundamental problems regime, demonstrating that India’s to China, which Beijing wants to still remain in the Indian economy, exceptional position in the interna- avoid. None of this is to suggest that especially in terms of human re- tional system has something to do India holds no responsibility for the source development indicators. with its ongoing opposition. conflict with its neighbors. But, as India’s dithering in acquiring Nuclear weapons serve some key long as these conflicts continue, nuclear and missile technology af- functions for a rising power. They nuclear capability may remain a key ter the initial demonstrations of ca- provide protection against large- element of security relations in pability also meant some delay. scale overt military intervention, South Asia. Waiting 24 years after the 1974 test such as preventive attacks by the ex- The end of the Cold War put made India susceptible to pressures isting major powers. They offer pro- India’s earlier global strategy in from the nuclear weapon states to re- tection of state borders from direct jeopardy. It lost its key superpower scind its nuclear program. attacks by neighboring countries, supporter, the Soviet Union, follow- From the Indian perspective, the although they have proven to be a ing the latter’s collapse as a state. current system leaders deny India its weak source of compellent power.15 Moreover, because non-alignment legitimate place in the international Since 1971, India has not fought a was a response to Cold War rivalry, pecking order and have no intention war with its neighbors, and some it lost much of its meaning as a of integrating India by giving it a believe that it is nuclear deterrence policy posture when the Cold War leadership role. At the political level, that is preventing interstate war in ended. India’s regional rival, China, they oppose the induction of India South Asia.16 Moreover, nuclear has become accepted as a major as a permanent member of the U.N. weapons could also provide a hedge power despite initial opposition by Security Council, despite the fact against major technological break- the West. India thus feels more iso- that India is home to one-sixth of throughs in conventional capability. lated than ever, a feeling that West- humanity and is expected to be the As a rising power, India seems to be ern policy unfortunately enhances. most populous nation by the second concerned about the revolution in Unwilling to accept the Indian se- decade of the 21st century. They are military affairs that is currently tak- curity dilemma arising from sys- hopeful that international pressures ing place, and it does not want to fall temic and sub-systemic challenges, will force India to scale down or further behind the established pow- especially the nuclear activities of abandon its search for major power ers. That Indian leaders have con- China and Pakistan, the United status. Instead, attempts to freeze vinced themselves of these functions States and its allies have solidified India out have only increased New of nuclear weapons is evident in their their position on the nonproliferation Delhi’s resolve to accelerate indig- code-naming of the testing program, regime. Their stance is that nuclear enous development of its nuclear, “Shakti,” which means “power” in weapons are meant for major pow- missile, and other technological el- the Hindi language. ers only and that no new nuclear ements necessary for a modern, self- India’s strategic environment is power will be allowed to emerge. reliant defense force. The also unique in the developing world. India’s wavering after the tests in nonproliferation regime, aimed at India is engaged in enduring rival- 1974 cost it dearly because it gave arresting proliferation, in fact in- ries with two nuclear states, China the impression that India could be creased the pressure on India to and Pakistan, and it has no nuclear coerced into renouncing its nuclear come out in the open and exhibit a ally to provide a protective umbrella. ambitions. The systemic and sub- capability that was held in the base- These regional adversaries initiated systemic incentives for India to go ment for 24 years. Since even ambi- three of the four wars they fought nuclear have thus only increased guity exposed India to sanctions, and with India. Moreover, China has over time. pressures to sign international arms colluded with Pakistan to build its The Indian opposition to the glo- control agreements could have fore- nuclear forces. Beijing has joined the bal nuclear order has been evolving closed the nuclear option, New Delhi other nuclear powers to contain In- since the 1950s. This opposition so- was forced to clarify its status in the dia and maintain its own preponder- lidified as the nonproliferation re- 14 direction of overt nuclearization. ance in Asia. India could serve as gime became more embedded in No other regional power has shown an effective regional counterweight international security relations. At such a continued opposition to the

4 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 T.V. Paul

this point, a brief historical discus- in the 1962 Himalayan border war. cially as they are called upon to undertake not to sion of India’s approach towards the India claimed that China occupied manufacture or acquire nonproliferation regime is necessary 14,000 square kilometers of disputed nuclear weapons for their to elucidate the systemic arguments territory. When the Chinese test oc- own defense.20 further. This discussion will clarify curred, Indian Prime Minister Lal Although India cited the norm of why the tests of May 1998 were Bahadur Shastri sought nuclear sovereign equality of all states while mostly a product of this long-term guarantees from the major powers. arguing against the treaty, New dynamic. When this failed, Shastri authorized Delhi’s paramount reason for oppo- a limited peaceful sition was self-interest. India did not INDIA AND THE GLOBAL program that could be converted into want its own nuclear option con- NONPROLIFERATION a military program if the situation strained. The Indian opposition to REGIME warranted.19 Shastri’s successor, the treaty solidified after 1971 when, Indira Gandhi, after initial reluc- during the final days of the At independence from Britain in tance, continued the program. War, the Nixon admin- 1947, India became a staunch pro- istration sent the U.S.S. Enterprise ponent of . Following the Chinese nuclear into the Bay of Bengal, hoping to India’s first prime minister, testing, the nuclear powers began force a cease-fire. The arrival of the Jawaharlal Nehru, made several pro- negotiations on the NPT. India was warship convinced India that, with- posals for nuclear disarmament at favorable to the conclusion of a non- out sufficient deterrent and defen- the and other inter- discriminatory treaty, but later be- sive capabilities, it could be the national fora. India was an active came a strong opponent of the NPT, target of hegemonic intervention. member of the U.N. Eighteen Na- believing that the nuclear powers Indira Gandhi’s decision in 1974 to tion Disarmament Committee that wished to maintain their monopoly conduct a nuclear test was likely due negotiated nuclear and conventional and that the treaty was primarily in part to this perceived challenge disarmament before the superpow- aimed at curtailing the nuclear aspi- by the United States. ers began the bilateral arms control rations of non-nuclear weapon process.17 The proposals India made states. Indian opposition thus re- In fact, the clearest sign of India’s included a standstill agreement on flected systemic considerations. The opposition to the NPT was its May nuclear testing and a non-discrimi- major concern was that the treaty 1974 test of a nuclear device at natory nonproliferation treaty. India created two classes of states: those Pokhran, in the Rajasthan desert, the signed the 1963 Partial Test Ban that had tested a nuclear device be- same test range where the 1998 tests Treaty in the hope that the treaty fore January 1967 and those that had were conducted. Indians dubbed the would lead to further nuclear disar- not done so by that date. The treaty test a peaceful nuclear explosion mament. Nehru articulated pro-dis- would not only legitimize the (PNE), although there is hardly any armament policies in different world nuclear capabilities of the five states difference between a PNE and a fora, as he believed that the nuclear that had conducted such tests, in- militarily useful weapon. The Indian arms race between the superpowers cluding China, but would prevent In- test galvanized further international was heading towards a global war.18 dia from developing a nuclear efforts at nonproliferation. Accord- weapon capability, even if a major ing to one U.N. official involved in With China’s nuclear test in 1964, nuclear threat arose. Prime Minister NPT negotiations, “it breached the the Indian position on nuclear weap- Gandhi stated in the Indian Parlia- walls of the ‘nuclear club’ and once ons changed dramatically. Although ment that India refused to sign the again raised the specter of the Nth China was acquiring nuclear weap- 21 NPT on the basis of: Country problem.” ons to obtain major power status and enlightened self-interest and India continued to maintain its to prevent nuclear coercion by the considerations of national United States or the Soviet Union, security…. Nuclear weapon opposition to the NPT through the the Chinese action nonetheless al- powers insist on their right 1970s and 1980s, while keeping its to continue to manufacture own nuclear weapons option open. tered India’s immediate strategic en- more nuclear weapons. This vironment profoundly. China had is a situation that cannot be However, available reports indicate defeated India just two years earlier viewed with equanimity by that New Delhi did not develop a non-nuclear countries, espe-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 5 T.V. Paul nuclear weapons arsenal until the ject to progress in nuclear disarma- cision to veto the draft CTBT, and late 1980s, despite having proven its ment, but they did not carry the then not to sign the treaty after it had capability in 1974.22 The decision to day.26 This treaty outcome gave ev- been approved by the United Na- build a weapon force occurred after ery indication to India that the tions, received broad international two developments: Pakistan’s suc- nuclear weapon states were keen to condemnation. cess in acquiring enrich- maintain their monopoly rights for Notably, signed the treaty, ment capability and subsequently a a long time. From the Indian point and Pakistan agreed to do so if India weapons capability (announced by of view, “disarming the unarmed” also signs it, which shows that A.Q. Khan in January 1987), and the had become the main value of the among the new nuclear states only failure of Prime Minister Rajiv NPT, rather than genuine global India was truly concerned about the 27 Gandhi’s 1988 Action Plan aimed at nuclear disarmament. systemic implications of the treaty. convincing the nuclear weapon The NPT extension did include a The Indian fear was that, once it states to achieve nuclear disarma- commitment to complete the Com- signed the treaty, it would forever 23 ment in a time-bound fashion. prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) be constrained from testing and thus There was also evidence that the the following year. However, in unable to verify its nuclear capabil- Reagan administration was turning 1996, India was almost alone in op- ity, especially the reliability of its a blind eye to the nuclear weapons- posing the CTBT.28 The stated In- .30 Unless the related activities of Pakistan in or- dian objections centered on two existing great powers gave up their der to continue using the country as issues: (1) the proposed treaty was nuclear weapons, this would prevent a conduit to supply military and eco- not linked to a time-bound frame- India from ever joining their ranks. nomic aid to the Afghan Mujahideen work for elimination of nuclear India also wanted the five nuclear 24 forces fighting the Soviet Union. weapons, and (2) it allowed labora- weapon states to declare a timetable Indian intelligence agencies report- tory-type or sub-critical tests, which for elimination of nuclear weapons edly received evidence of increased meant that the five nuclear powers before it committed to a nuclear test Pakistan-China nuclear collabora- would be free to continue building ban because, once it signed the tion. Rajiv Gandhi thus authorized their arsenals. India also viewed the treaty, it would lose a bargaining the weaponization project, despite treaty’s entry-into-force provision as chip with which to influence their 25 his anti-nuclear orientation. Open a clever way to tie its hands. This disarmament policies. nuclear testing was still not in the provision stated that the treaty would cards, however, until further inter- come into force only when all 44 THE 1998 TESTS national and regional developments states with at least one Domestic and ideological factors took place that affected India’s se- reactor—including the three thresh- did play some role in India’s move curity concerns and until the nation- old states, India, Israel, and Paki- to go overtly nuclear. The final de- alistic BJP came to power. stan—had signed and ratified it. cision to test was made by the coali- This, according to India, would en- tion government led by BJP-head THE NPT EXTENSION AND courage pressures on New Delhi to Vajpayee, which came to power in THE CTBT NEGOTIATIONS sign away its sovereign right to keep the March 1998 elections. The BJP its nuclear options open and thereby In the second half of the 1990s, has been a long-standing proponent increase the possibility of future co- two events that were related to the of India’s acquiring nuclear weap- ercive sanctions if India did not nonproliferation regime further ag- ons. Under its previous incarnation, comply.29 From the Indian perspec- gravated the Indian sense of griev- “Jana Sangh,” the party had declared tive, the nuclear weapon states con- ance against the world nuclear order. its intention to make India nuclear ceived of the treaty more as a The first was the indefinite exten- ever since the 1964 Chinese nuclear nonproliferation tool than as a dis- sion of the NPT in May 1995, largely tests.31 But, until 1996, it was always armament measure. The seasoned as a result of pressures exerted by in the opposition, except for a short Indian diplomat, Arundhati Ghose, the United States and its allies. Some interregnum as a coalition partner in forcefully presented New Delhi’s non-aligned signatories of the treaty the Janata party government of case before the Geneva negotiating sought rolling extensions for 25-year Morarji Desai from 1977 to 1979. periods, with further renewals sub- forum. Nevertheless, the Indian de-

6 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 T.V. Paul

When Vajpayee was prime minister ber 1995, under Rao’s Congress possible to guarantee: for 13 days in 1996, he ordered government, but the test was called by keeping the n-option notionally open nuclear tests, but his government did off at the last minute after pressure and simultaneously press- not last long enough to carry through from the United States. Frank ing for global disarma- the decision. In 1998, the BJP had Wisner, the U.S. ambassador to In- ment…. However, after the NPT was extended in per- in its electoral platform a strong pro- dia “showed [satellite] photographs petuity, it was apparent that nuclear message, and it called for to top Indian officials in a success- the big powers had no inten- India to exercise the weapons option ful effort to persuade them not to tion of shedding their 32 nuclear arsenal. The moral- if the national interest warranted test.” Rao, however, left instruc- izing tone of India’s stand doing so. The BJP has also been a tions with the scientists to be ready on disarmament may have strong advocate of India’s achieving for tests within one month of receiv- held currency earlier but be- a major power role in world politics, ing notice. His successors, Deve came meaningless after 1995. To compound this ir- and it believes a nuclear capability Gowda and Gujral, did not change relevance, the CTBT tacitly would help India achieve such a role. this state of readiness.33 Thus, the sought to make the nuclear Beyond its ideological world-view, testing idea was never completely club a pre-entry, closed shop.35 the BJP also seems to have perceived given up. Non-Congress coalition possible electoral support for going governments under the premierships The two treaty developments con- nuclear. of Gowda and Gujral had contin- vinced BJP leaders that the nuclear weapon states have formed a cartel However, the BJP could not have ued the plans for testing and were waiting for the opportune moment. and are determined to improve their prepared a nuclear testing program nuclear capabilities while prevent- from scratch, barely seven weeks In interviews after the tests, Gujral said that, since Rao’s time, the ing new members getting into the after gaining power. In fact, the or- club. In a written statement before der for nuclear tests was given on nuclear “file was on our table all the time.”34 the Indian Parliament on May 27, April 10, 1998, and the tests oc- 1998, Vajpayee placed “the onus of curred on May 11 and 13, only one Why did the BJP government India’s nuclear tests on the nuclear month after the government gave the show such urgency in conducting haves who had over the decades green light. Thus, the BJP clearly nuclear tests? Systemic and sub-sys- stubbornly refused to negotiate any only completed a program for which temic considerations were para- treaty to dismantle the nuclear previous governments had prepared mount, and domestic considerations weapon stockpiles.” To Vajpayee, the way. Although domestic and were secondary, though not totally India had exercised restraint, but ideological considerations played a irrelevant. Although almost all po- during the 1980s and 1990s “a part in the BJP decision, they only litical parties desire to make India a gradual deterioration of our security had influence because long-term major power, it is the BJP that holds environment occurred as a result of systemic considerations had already such views most dearly and consis- nuclear/missile proliferation.”36 brought India to the brink of testing. tently. The party has also been a According to Jaswant Singh, a se- Reports suggest that, since 1988, strong advocate of a nuclear deter- nior foreign policy advisor to Prime successive Indian governments rent, for its conception of security Minister Vajpayee, with its indefi- maintained a nuclear bomb and the emphasizes military instruments of nite and unconditional extension, the testing range in Pokhran in order to power. The indefinite extension of NPT has now become “unamend- conduct a test on short notice. There the NPT and the possibility that the able.” This meant the “legitimization have been six governments headed CTBT would enter into force after a of nuclear weapons” was also “irre- by various political parties since the September 1999 Review Conference versible.” “India could have lived time of Rajiv Gandhi. They were led caused concern among all the major with a nuclear option but without by: V.P. Singh, Chandra Shekhar, parties, but these international devel- overt weaponization in a world P.V. Narasimha Rao, H.D. Deve opments were especially alarming to where nuclear weapons had not been Gowda, I.K. Gujral, and A.B. the BJP. As one Indian commenta- formally legitimized. That course Vajpayee. India even came to the tor puts it, until the NPT extension was no longer viable in the post- verge of testing a device in Decem- and conclusion of the CTBT, Indian 1995 world of legitimized nuclear policymakers assumed that it was

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 7 T.V. Paul weapons.”37 forced this trend. These fac- dent critics of Indian nuclear behav- tors made it necessary for us The post-Cold War security man- to take a closer look at ex- ior, even though China has been par- agement by the U.N. Security Coun- ercising our nuclear op- tially responsible for that behavior tion.39 cil and the unwillingness of its five through its nuclear buildup since permanent members (P-5) to induct The BJP was also deeply con- 1964, deployment of missiles in Ti- India as a permanent member also cerned about the Pakistan-China bet, and continued support of resulted in an Indian perception that nuclear and missile collaboration. Pakistan’s nuclear and missile pro- it needed to achieve hard power re- Despite its adherence to the NPT and grams. As one Indian analyst puts sources, such as nuclear weapons, in obligations not to transfer weapons it: the pressure by China on India to order to obtain respect from the and materials to non-signatories, sign the China had been steadily helping to NPT marks the assertion of members of the nuclear club. A China’s status as the sole former chief of the Indian Air Force build up Pakistan’s nuclear and mis- recognized nuclear weapon articulated India’s desperation: sile capabilities since the 1980s. This power in Asia. It opens the assistance included components for door for expanded coopera- We’re not being recognized tion with the U.S. on non- by world powers. A lot of a uranium enrichment plant, M-11 advanced countries are not proliferation issues. And backing a seat for India in missiles, and other missile finally, the international re- parts.40 On April 6, 1998, Pakistan action to the South Asian the Security Council, even nuclear tests may have though India deserves it in test-fired the Ghauri intermediate- every way. We are a democ- given China the opportunity racy, we have economic range ballistic missile (IRBM), to gain a long-term say in which could reach most major In- the management of South strength, and we contribute Asian affairs.42 resources and peace keepers dian cities. The missile is reportedly all over the world to help the Moreover, the Clinton U.N.38 based on a North Korean design, but China may have helped in transfer- administration’s deep engagement From the Indian perspective, the ring technology and materials as with China seems a powerful signal CTBT was further evidence of the well. China’s purpose appears to be to New Delhi of an impending stra- nuclear weapon states’ interest in to contain India by perpetuating the tegic realignment involving its re- keeping their capability in perpetu- India-Pakistan adversarial relation- gional adversary and the hegemonic ity, because the treaty allowed labo- ship so that India’s main focus will power. New Delhi especially resents ratory tests and miniaturization of remain on Pakistan. The BJP-led what it perceives as a softening of weapon systems. The addition of a government is especially sensitive to U.S. criticism of Chinese aid to clause that all countries with at least larger Chinese containment efforts Pakistan.43 The United States has one had to sign the and has come to see China as India’s been attempting to engage China treaty before it came into force also number one potential threat in the with the hope of avoiding another gave the impression that a para- 21st century.41 Cold War, but from India’s perspec- mount goal for the NWS was to con- tive, any realignment involving China’s recent turnaround on strain India from testing and China and the United States would nuclear issues, such as signing the developing nuclear weapons. Ac- dramatically affect the balance of NPT and CTBT, is ironic. All the cording to K.C. Pant, the head of a power in the region. Such a shift arguments about international ineq- task force set up by the BJP govern- could adversely affect India’s secu- uity that China used in the 1960s to ment to look into the functions of a rity calculations. This, again, under- justify its nuclear weapon tests are proposed National Security Council: lines the fact that systemic changes the same ones India is now assert- our hope that the NPT Re- involving great power relations af- view meeting would con- ing. But China has become an ac- fect the choices of aspiring great centrate on accelerating cepted nuclear weapon state, and, for nuclear disarmament did powers as well as middle powers that reasons of self-interest, China does not materialize. In fact this are not on friendly terms with the conference ensured that the not want to see India emerge with great powers. nuclear weapon states re- nuclear weapons and achieve the ca- tained their arsenals while unleashing nuclear apart- pability to target key Chinese cities. In the wake of the Indian tests, a heid on the rest of the world. China has been one of the most stri- spate of newspaper articles raised the The CTBT further rein- question: does China pose a military

8 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 T.V. Paul

threat to India? Some argue that the gional player to be offset by powers from becoming too strong.47 Pakistan. This is a very so- China-India border is stable along phisticated Chinese chal- They tend to form concerts to pre- the line of control, established after lenge to India and not a vent the emergence of rising pow- the 1962 War, and that China does crude military threat.45 ers. They are especially not include India in its defense Thus, New Delhi perceives the uncomfortable with middle-ranking planning.44 Since the 1980s, China Chinese threat to India as both sys- powers acquiring nuclear weapons and India have made serious efforts temic and sub-systemic in nature. In because such acquisitions would to improve bilateral relations. A the sub-systemic sense, it is the constrain their capacity to intervene number of top-ranking official vis- changing balance of power in Asia, militarily in regional theaters.48 But its by both countries, a relaxation in favoring China, that is causing con- unlike the past, when war was an ac- the military situation on the border, cern to India. While India sees China ceptable method of statecraft, in the and increased economic ties be- as the state with which it should aim nuclear age, war has become an un- tween the two countries had im- to catch up and a potential and ac- acceptable means of system change. proved Sino-Indian relations to some tual threat, China sees India as a po- Economic coercion has become the extent. But, even when relations tential challenger that can be preferred alternative. However, in- were improving, China accelerated contained through alignment with its dependent-minded regional powers its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan regional rival, Pakistan. The United will resist efforts to contain them. in an effort to contain India. Thus, States’ elevation of China into the This is again a systemic imperative, the Chinese policy towards India key state for obtaining nuclear non- because without autonomous capa- could be characterized as simulta- proliferation in South Asia has in- bilities, they are likely to be domi- neous engagement and containment. creased India’s security fears; nated, directly and indirectly, by the According to Indian defense analyst Indians view Chinese foreign policy existing great powers. A state that K. Subrahmanyam, the Chinese as part of the problem and not the perceives it has potential great power threat to India is at present not di- solution. status is most adamant when it rect but indirect: comes to resisting treaties that are India as a neighbor of China meant to arrest its progress towards is bound to be affected by IMPLICATIONS FOR THE the inevitable turbulent tran- FUTURE that goal. sition accompanying the The nuclear powers are likely to emergence of China as a In the wake of the nuclear tests in global power in the 21st cen- South Asia, the P-5 nations have continue demanding India’s uncon- tury…. Sun Tzu’s advice— accelerated their efforts to maintain ditional adherence to all the treaties the best victory was one and arrangements designed to main- gained without fighting a their monopoly rights. In meetings war—may be what Chinese in Geneva and London, following tain their superiority. But India’s leadership is following vis- the Indian and Pakistani nuclear nuclear capability is a fait accom- à-vis India. If China can pli, which it is unlikely to give up transfer nuclear and missile tests, they declared that “India and technologies to Pakistan Pakistan do not have the status of without a substantial global move to- and thereby countervail In- NWS according to the NPT.” They wards disarmament. The present dia, there is no need for major power attempts to contain and China to pose a threat to In- sought to get India to restrain its ca- dia. China can continue to pability and adhere to the discrimi- isolate India are unlikely to work. be friendly with India, but natory regimes it has so vehemently These efforts may slow down the at the same time lock India 46 Indian drive, but they will simulta- in a nuclear standoff with opposed. This position of the great Pakistan. It can also treat powers is largely based on systemic neously increase India’s resolve to both Pakistan and India in considerations. Great powers tend to achieve self-sufficiency in military the same category as re- capability. No disarmament treaty or gional powers, not in the oppose the arrival of a new great same class as China, which power, until they are forced to ac- regime that has failed to take into is a global player. … cept the newcomer through war or account the security interests of the China’s ambition is to re- major diplomatic changes. They of- great powers or rising great powers place the U.S. as the pri- has functioned effectively.49 The mary hegemonic power in ten follow polices of containment Asia and in that perspective and “satellization” to stop regional 500 years of the modern interna- China looks at India as a re- tional system powerfully attest to the

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 9 T.V. Paul fact that new great powers emerge sulting from the election and ideol- 8 On a comparison between the inter-war naval treaties and the NPT, see Paul, “The NPT and periodically only to find that the sys- ogy of the BJP. Unless the existing Power Transitions in the International System.” tem has closed its doors against great powers can find a way to make 9 A natural question arises why India has not them. India is on the threshold of the nonproliferation regime more adopted a trading state strategy similar to Japan and Germany. The major difference between the such a situation. The best course for flexible and dynamic, systemic pro- two defeated powers of World War II and India the major powers is to make efforts cesses are likely to lead to more is that the United States, especially through the to take into account India’s per- cases like India’s in the future. nuclear umbrella, guarantees their security, while India has no serious ally to rely on. Following ceived security interests and to inte- their defeat, Germany and Japan were also forced grate it into the international order to adopt a low-profile military policy by the vic- tors, i.e., the allied powers. India initially fol- before it becomes a thoroughly dis- lowed a low-profile military policy, but the satisfied state and a system conflicts with Pakistan and China, especially the challenger.50 Now that it has tested defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, changed the Indian defense policy to a more assertive one. nuclear weapons, India has ex- India also chose a non-aligned policy and an pressed its willingness to join the autarkic economic policy largely for systemic rea- CTBT and the proposed fissile ma- sons, i.e. out of desire to maintain as much au- tonomy as possible in an international system that terial cut-off treaty if certain condi- 1 I thank Baldev Raj Nayar for his useful com- Indian leaders generally view as unequal and tions are met. Similar to its ments. adversarial. For an excellent account of India’s 2 predecessors in the nuclear club, Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of strategic dilemma, see Ashok Kapur, “Indian Nuclear Restraint,” International Security 19 Strategy: The Dilemmas about Enmities, the Na- now that India has obtained its (Fall 1994), pp. 126-69. ture of Power and the Pattern of Relations,” in nuclear capability, it is willing to 3 For a domestic politics explanation, see Scott Yogendra K. Malik and Ashok Kapur, eds., In- D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weap- dia: Fifty Years of Democracy and Development stop others from acquiring the same. ons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” Inter- (New Delhi: APH Publishing, 1998), pp. 341-71. national Security 21(Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86; 10 India is yet to induct the missiles into its forces, India’s challenge is mostly di- for a decisionmaker-level explanation, see Peter as it needs at least two dozen more tests. Only rected against the global nuclear re- Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear three tests had been conducted through June 1998 gime, especially its chief Proliferation,” Security Studies 2 (Spring/Sum- (Far Eastern Economic Review, June 11, 1998, mer 1993), pp. 192-212. p. 20). component, the NPT. The NPT, as 4 Further, states involved in enduring rivalries and 11 The Times of India, June 15, 1998, p. 10. structured currently, is likely to fail protracted conflicts find the possession of nuclear 12 World Bank, World Development Report (New in the long run, because it attempts weapons advantageous. The lack of simultaneous York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 188. efforts to resolve long-standing conflicts, espe- 13 Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” to freeze power relations in interna- cially among those states without a great power Foreign Affairs 77 (September/October 1998), tional politics indefinitely. This runs ally, is another reason why the regime has been pp. 41-52. ineffective in arresting some states’ nuclear am- 14 “In the last three decades, the global nuclear contrary to the forces of change that bitions. order kept punishing India through an ever ex- are characteristic of the modern in- 5 For an elaboration of these arguments, see T.V. panding regimen of sanctions and technology ternational system. The fault-line Paul, “The NPT and Power Transitions in the In- denial, because it was considered a proliferation ternational System,” in Raju G.C. Thomas, ed., risk. Unwilling to make up its mind about nuclear thus lies in the very structure of the The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: Pros- weapons and clearly define its status, India had treaty. At the global level, the treaty pects for the 21st Century (Houndmills, UK: to relentlessly oppose every single international offers no room for new great pow- Macmillan, 1998), pp. 56-74. nuclear arms control agreement” (C. Raja Mohan, 6 Robert Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplo- “Nuclear Politics-III: Signalling Nuclear Mod- ers emerging with nuclear weapons. matic History,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Di- eration,” The Hindu, May 27, 1998, p. 13). At the regional level, the treaty at- plomacy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 15 On the limitations of nuclear weapons as a 212-44; Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complex- source of power, see T.V. Paul, “Power, Influ- tempts to forestall regional powers ity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: ence and Nuclear Weapons: A Reassessment,” from gaining nuclear weapons. Me- Princeton University Press, 1997). See also Ken- in T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. dium-sized states in high conflict neth Waltz, Theory of International Politics Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited: (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 64. Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International zones are likely to see value in the 7 A regional sub-system emerges as a result of Order (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan deterrence and potential equalizer regular interactions among two or more proxi- Press, 1988), pp. 19-46. 16 role that nuclear possession pro- mate states in a given region (William R. Thomp- Former Indian Army Chief, General K. son, “The Regional Sub-System: A Conceptual Sundarji, has been a strong advocate of the vi- vides. Any threat of use of nuclear Explication and a Propositional Inventory,” In- ability of nuclear deterrence in India-Pakistan re- weapons by the present nuclear ternational Studies Quarterly 17 [March 1973], lationship. See his “India’s Nuclear Weapons pp. 89-117). See also David Lake, “Regional Se- Policy,” in Jorn Gjelstad and Olav Njolstad, eds., weapon states will only increase the curity Complexes: A System Approach,” in David Nuclear Rivalry and International Order (Lon- perceived need for nuclear posses- Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., Regional Or- don: Sage Publications, 1996), pp. 176-81; see sion by non-nuclear weapons states. ders (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania also Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” In- India’s tests are not an aberration re- State University Press, 1997), pp. 45-67.

10 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 T.V. Paul ternational Security 20 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 79- of the nuclear weapon states, which appeared to 42 C. Raja Mohan, “China Takes the Hard Line,” 114. believe that the conference had secured their po- The Hindu, June 4, 1998, p. 11. 17 On these earlier negotiations, see Alva Myrdal, sitions in power for the foreseeable future” 43 In response to the statement by the P-5 in The Game of Disarmament (New York: Pantheon (Arundhati Ghose, “Negotiating the CTBT: Geneva on June 4, 1998, asking India and Paki- Books, 1982). India’s Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarma- stan to forgo their nuclear weapons, an Indian 18 On India’s early disarmament efforts, see J. P. ment,” Journal of International Affairs 51 [Sum- Foreign Ministry statement said that the five na- Jain, India and Disarmament: Nehru Era, Vol. I mer 1997], pp. 247-48). tions “are not unaware that one of the most seri- (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974). 28 For a comprehensive discussion, see T.T. ous threats to our security has arisen because of 19 Shyam Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb Poulose, The CTBT and the Rise of Nuclear Na- the non-observance of the obligations they have (Sahibabad: Vikas, 1979), pp. 54-69. For the early tionalism in India (New Delhi: Lancers Books, undertaken under the NPT,” and they have de- nuclear debate, see also Ashok Kapur, India’s 1996). clined to take any action to address a serious “vio- Nuclear Option: Atomic and 29 On the Indian objections to the treaty, see lation of a treaty provision to which all of them Decisionmaking (New York: Praeger, 1976); T.T. Ghose, “Negotiating the CTBT,” pp. 239-61, and were a party” (Kenneth J. Cooper, “India Accuses Poulose, ed., Perspectives of India’s Nuclear Dinshaw Mistry, “Domestic-International Link- Powers of Nuclear Transfers,” The Washington Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978). ages: India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Post, June 6, 1998, p. A14). 20 “Debate on Foreign Affairs,” Lok Sabha, New Treaty,” The Nonproliferation Review 6 (Fall 44 Kenneth J. Cooper and Steve Mufson, “Nuclear Delhi, 5 April 1968, reprinted in India and Dis- 1998). Cloud is Cast Over India’s Relations with China,” armament: An Anthology of Selected Writings 30 According to Indian analysts, the 1974 tests The Washington Post, June 1, 1998, p. A14. and Speeches (New Delhi: Ministry of External produced only limited data and further tests were 45 K. Subhramanyam, “Understanding China: Sun Affairs, 1988), pp. 176-77. necessary to prove beyond doubt the reliability Tzu and Shakti,” The Times of India, June 5, 21 William Epstein, The Last Chance: Nuclear of the nuclear weapons force (Amitabh Mattoo, 1998, p. 7. Proliferation and Arms Control (New York: The “Enough Scientific Reasons Seen for Conduct- 46 For the resolutions of these meetings, see Craig Free Press, 1976), p. 285. ing Tests,” India Abroad, May 15, 1998, p. 10). R. Whitney, “Top U.N. Members Urge India and 22 See Gaurav Kampani, “From Existential to 31 Vajpayee, who was a member of the upper Pakistan to End Arms Race,” The New York Minimum Deterrence: Explaining India’s Deci- house of the Indian Parliament, Rajya Sabha, had Times, June 5, 1998, p. A8. At the Geneva meet- sion to Test,” The Nonproliferation Review 6 (Fall declared in 1964: “The answer to an atom bomb ing on June 4, 1998, foreign ministers of the five 1998). is an atom bomb; nothing else” (quoted in Manoj permanent members called on India and Pakistan 23 The Action Plan called for nuclear weapon Joshi, “Nuclear Shock Wave,” India Today, May to end all further tests, adhere to the CTBT un- states to cease the production of nuclear weap- 25, 1998, p. 14). conditionally, negotiate the FMCT, and not ons and weapon-grade fissile materials, the con- 32 , May 25, 1998, p. A3. weaponize or deploy nuclear weapons and mis- clusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and a 33 Raj Chengappa, “The Bomb Makers,” India siles. convention outlawing the use and threat of use Today Webpage, June 22, 1998 (http:// 47 George Liska, “The Third World: Regional Sys- of nuclear weapons, and a halt to transfers of www.india-today.com/itoday/22061998/ tems and Global Order,” in Robert E. Osgood et weapons, delivery systems, and weapon-grade fis- cover.html). al., eds., Retreat From Empire? (Baltimore: Johns sionable materials. In return, non-nuclear weapon 34 Quoted in India Abroad, May 22, 1998, p. 10. Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 226; Baldev states would promise not to acquire nuclear weap- The nuclear testing was approved by an over- Raj Nayar, “A World Role: The Dialectics of Pur- ons. Further, multilateral negotiations were to be whelming majority of the Indian public. In a pub- pose and Power,” in John W. Mellor, ed., India: initiated for the conclusion of a new treaty, which lic opinion poll after the first round of tests on A Rising Middle Power (Boulder: Westview would eliminate all nuclear weapons within a time May 11, 91 percent of those polled in cities sup- Press, 1979), p. 119. period of 22 years. See Rajiv Gandhi, “A World ported the tests while 82 percent expressed sup- 48 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Proposal Presented port for India building a nuclear weapon force York: Press, 1977), p. 50; at the U.N. General Assembly, Third Special Ses- (The Washington Post, May 18, 1998, p. A13). T.V. Paul, “Great Equalizers or Agents of Chaos? sion on Disarmament, New York, June 9, 1988, Interestingly, despite the high level of public sup- Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Emerging reprinted in India and Disarmament, pp. 280-94. port, the BJP could not capitalize on it on the International Order,” in T.V. Paul and John A. 24 See T.V. Paul, “Influence Through Arms Trans- electoral front, as in several by-elections in as- Hall, eds., International Order and the Future of fers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relation- sembly seats spread around 13 states, it did not World Politics (Cambridge and New York: Cam- ship,” Asian Survey 32 (December 1992), pp. make any major gain, but in fact lost its advan- bridge University Press, forthcoming 1999); 1078-92. tage in some states (“Tests Fail to Boost BJP’s Ashok Kapur, “New Nuclear States and the In- 25 K. Subrahmanyam, “Politics of Shakti: New Poll Fortunes, The Hindu, June 7, 1998, p. 9). ternational Nuclear Order,” in Paul, Harknett, and Wine in an Old Bomb,” Times of India, May 26, 35 Joshi, “Nuclear Shockwave,” p. 16. Wirtz, The Absolute Weapon Revisited, pp. 237- 1998, p. 4. 36 The Hindu, May 28, 1998, p. 1. 61. 26 On the negotiations, see Tariq Rauf and 37 Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” pp. 44- 49 As Robert Jervis contends, security regimes Rebecca Johnson, “After the NPT’s Indefinite Ex- 45. tend to emerge and persist only if the great pow- tension: The Future of the Global Nonprolifera- 38 Quoted in Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, “New ers want them (“Security Regimes,” in Stephen tion Regime,” The Nonproliferation Review 3 Delhi’s View: A Push for Respect,” Boston D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes [Ithaca: (Fall 1995), pp. 28-41; Joseph F. Pilat and Charles Globe, May 13, 1998, p. A1. Cornell University Press, 1983], p. 176). W. Nakhleh, “A Treaty Reborn? The NPT after 39 The Times of India, June 6, 1998, p. 13. 50 According to Baldev Raj Nayar, India can al- Extension,” in Thomas, The Nuclear Non-Pro- 40 Tim Weiner, “U.S. And China Helped Paki- ready be characterized as a semi-challenger to liferation Regime, pp. 41-55. stan Build Its Bomb,” The New York Times, June the international order (“India: A Limited Chal- 27 “It was not just the indefinite extension of an 1, 1998, p. A6. lenger?” in Paul and Hall, International Order unequal treaty that troubled India, but also the 41 Defence Minister George Fernandes in an in- and the Future of World Politics). fact that no real balance was struck to bind the terview in May 1998 cited China’s activities in nuclear weapon states in the way the non-nuclear Burma’s Coco Islands off the coast of India and weapon states were bound. …More serious was expansion of military airfields in Tibet as evi- the international reaction to the NPT extension: dence of the emerging treat (Manoj Joshi “George anger on the part of many leading non-aligned in the China Shop,” India Today International, countries and the obvious triumphalism of some May 18, 1998, p. 12).

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 11