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K:\Critical Notice\Critnote-Env-Eth-Published Critical Notice of Published Articles in Environmental Ethics Holmes Rolston, III For the books Environmental Ethics: Values in and Duties to the Natural World, Conserving Natural Value, and A New Environmental Ethics: The Next Millennium for Life on Earth see separate files. Van Rensselaer Potter (Bioscience, University of Wisconsin) in "Evolving Ethical Concepts" favorably cites, reviews, and quotes, "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in BioScience, introducing a special issue on the environment, April, 1977, 27:251-253. He also cites "Philosophical Aspects of the Environmental Crisis." Nicholas Rescher (Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh) cites and quotes as "elegantly formulated" an argument used in "Is There an Ecological Ethic?"--"Why Save Endangered Species?" in Unpopular Essays on Technological Progress (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), pp. 79-92 and p. 112. William K. Frankena (Philosophy, University of Michigan) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" as being "very helpful, perceptive, and stimulating" although he critiques it as being too radical. "Ethics and the Environment" (see next entry). Also in the Chinese translation in Zhexue Yicong (Philosophy Digest of Translation), (Journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, Beijing, Issue No. 5 (Sept. 1994):5-10, citations passim. K. E. Goodpaster (Philosophy, Business, Harvard University) also cites this essay as being helpful, but criticizes it as being not radical enough. "From Egoism to Environmentalism." These two essays (Frankena and Goodpaster) are the opening essays in K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century (Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1979). Rolston is quoted and/or cited a dozen times in these two discussions. William K. Frankena (Philosophy, University of Michigan) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" as being an "eloquent and perceptive argument." "The Ethics of Respect for Life," in Owsie Temken, William K. Frankena, Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life in Medicine, Philosophy, and the Law (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 62. Tom Regan (Philosophy, North Carolina State University) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in All That Dwell Therein: Essays on Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), p. 186, p. 236. Robert Elliot (Philosophy, Brisbane College, Australia) cites and discusses "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in "Why Preserve Species?" in Don Mannison, Michael McRobbie, Richard Routley, eds., Environmental Philosophy (Canberra: Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences, 1980), p. 22f. H. J. McCloskey (Philosophy, LaTrobe University, Victoria, Australia) cites and discusses "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in "Ecological Ethics and Its Justification: A Critical Appraisal," in Mannison, et al., Environmental Philosophy, p. 69. (See above.) Stephen R. L. Clark (Philosophy, University of Liverpool) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in "Morals, Moore, and MacIntyre," in a symposium on Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue. Inquiry 26(1983):425-445, citation on p. 445. Genevieve Lloyd (Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra) says that Rolston has "dissected what requirements would have to be met by an ethic that was `genuinely ecological'...which treats the non-human as in themselves the proper objects of moral concern." She quotes "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" several times in this discussion. "Spinoza's Environmental Ethics," Inquiry 23(1980):293-311, citations on p. 301f, 305, p. 308, p. 311. K. S. Shrader-Frechette (Environmental Studies and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Santa Barbara) quotes and cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in Environmental Ethics (Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press, 1981), pp. 18, 24, 27, 43, 44, 56, 98, 99, 153. Don E. Marietta, Jr. (Philosophy, Florida Atlantic University) summarizes "Is There an Ecological Ethic?", quoting from it, as recognizing the possibility of a new approach to environmental ethics. See "The Interrelationship of Ecological Science and Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 1(1979):195-207, passim. Robin Attfield (Philosophy, University College, Cardiff, Wales) cites, critiques, and references "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" several times in The Ethics of Environmental Concern (New York: Columbia University Press and Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1983), p. 66, 156, 164, 182, 201. David R. Biggins (School of Science, Griffith University, Nathan, Queensland, Australia) cites an argument from "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in "Scientific Knowledge and Values: Imperatives in Ecology," Ethics in Science and Medicine (Great Britain) 6(1979)49- 57, citation on pp. 55, 57. Ernest Partridge (Center for the Study of Value and Social Policy, University of Colorado) cites a passage from "Values in Nature" as the heading to his article, "Nature as a Moral Resource," Environmental Ethics 6(1984):101-130, citation on p. 101. He further cites "Values in Nature," p. 126 as making an "eloquent statement" of how personal egos fade in the ecosystemic point of view. Partridge also cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?", p. 105, p. 127, and, extensively, p. 128. Bryan G. Norton (Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" and "Can and Ought We To Follow Nature?" in "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism," Environmental Ethics 6(1984):131-148, citations on p. 132, 135. Also in Susan Armstrong and Richard Botzler, eds., Environmental Ethics: Convergence and Divergence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), pp. 286-289, citation on p. 288. Eugene C. Hargrove (Philosophy, University of Georgia) cites and quotes "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" essay in "The Historical Foundations of American Environmental Attitudes," Environmental Ethics 1(1979):211. J. Baird Callicott (Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point) cites and quotes "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in "Elements of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability of the Biotic Community," Environmental Ethics, 1(1979):72. Also in In Defense of the Land Ethic (Buffalo: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 278. Tom L. Beauchamp (Philosophy, Georgetown University) and Norman E. Bowie (Philosophy, University of Delaware) reference "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" as a selected reading on "Environmental Responsibility" in Ethical Theory and Business (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 581. William T. Blackstone (Philosophy, University of Georgia) cites Rolston's position in "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" as an advanced environmental ethic (which he does not fully share) in "The Search for an Environmental Ethic" in Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death, New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 329, 334. Edward Johnson (Philosophy, University of New Orleans) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in "Treating the Dirt," in Tom Regan, ed., Earthbound: New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 353, p. 362. William Aiken (Philosophy, Chatham College) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" as "an interesting, influential discussion" of an "eco-holism" and quotes from "Can and Ought We To Follow Nature?" as an example of a view of nature that "commands nature by obeying her." "Ethical Issues in Agriculture," in Tom Regan, ed., Earthbound: New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 268, 270, 271, 287. James S. Bowman (Political Science, University of Wyoming) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" as proposing a new environmental ethic, and finds considerable support for such an ethic in surveys of recent public opinion, especially among young adults. "Public Opinion and the Environment," in Environment and Behavior 9(1977):385-416, citations on p. 397, 416. Dieter Birnbacher (Philosophy, University of Essen, Germany) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in "A Priority Rule for Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 4(1982):3-16, citations on p. 10, p. 16, employing the distinction between primary and secondary environmental ethics. Peter Suedfeld (Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia) quotes and discusses "Lake Solitude: The Individual in Wildness" in analysis of the psychological benefits of solitude in Restricted Environmental Stimulation (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), p. 211, p. 479. (Wiley Series on Personality Processes) Paul W. Taylor (Philosophy, Brooklyn College, City University of New York) quotes and cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" in his discussion of William Frankena's criticism of Rolston's position in "Frankena on Environmental Ethics," Monist 64(1981):313-324, citations on p. 321. Peter Miller (Philosophy, University of Winnipeg, Canada) cites "Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?" in "Value as Richness: Toward a Value Theory for an Expanded Naturalism in Environmental Ethics," in Environmental Ethics 4(1982):101-114, citation on p. 103. Peter Miller in the above article also says, "The writings of Holmes Rolston, III are particularly illuminating on psychological and spiritual values in nature," citing "Can and Ought We to Follow Nature?" and "Values in Nature," p. 112. Donald Scherer (Philosophy, University of Bowling Green, Ohio) cites "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" as a "crystalizing article" in formulating subsequent discussion of the nature and
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