Thirty-Seven

JUNG AND PLATO ON

Martha C. Beck

My purpose here is to juxtapose Carl G. Jung’s theory of the human soul with the view presented in two of Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedrus and the Sympo- sium. Both Jung and Plato emphasize the importance of the unification of the conscious and unconscious part of the self, or thought and instinct. In Jung’s terms, the achievement of an integrated Self first requires recognizing the shadow side of , which contains both good and evil instincts. Art, religion, , and inspiration are the ways the self becomes aware of repressed instincts. The unconscious part of the Self also includes a feminine side in men, called the anima, and a masculine side in women, called the ani- mus. Both the shadow and animus/anima can be brought from the immature instincts of adolescent sexuality to progressively higher stages of maturity and integrity, a process Jung calls “individuation.” The most common way to achieve this is through conversation with someone who has already achieved the highest level of maturity, an “individuated” Self. Socrates, as described in the Phaedrus and the Symposium, is what Jung would call a completely individuated Self. Plato gives his readers literary images of the process of development from adolescence to the individuated Self. The Phaedrus dialogue represents a young man, Phaedrus, who is torn between two adult males, Socrates and Lysias, who want to befriend him. Phaedrus is wrestling with his shadow side, as shown by the image of a cha- rioteer driving two horses, a well-bred light horse and an uncivilized dark horse. Socrates will teach him how to put the light horse, representing the best human instincts, in control. Lysias would have him give in to the worst instincts and put the dark horse in control. The Symposium recounts Socrates’ long-ago conversation with the mage Diotima, who gave him the image of the ladder of love and taught him to integrate his anima into his whole . Her guidance enabled him to progress from adolescent preoccupation with beautiful physical bodies to a love of beauty in itself. In Man and His Symbols, Joseph L. Henderson, a colleague of Jung, de- fines the shadow and its relationship to the conscious ego as follows:

The shadow cast by the conscious mind of the individual contains the hidden, repressed and unfavorable (or nefarious) aspects of the person- ality. But this darkness is not just the simple converse of the conscious ego. Just as the ego contains unfavorable and destructive attitudes, so the shadow has good qualities—normal instincts and creative impulses. 324 MARTHA C. BECK

Ego and shadow, indeed, although separate, are inextricably linked to- gether in much the same way that thought and feeling are related to each other. (Jung, 1964, p. 118)

Despite this linkage, the ego remains “in conflict with the shadow . . . Before the ego can triumph, it must master and assimilate the shadow” (ibid., p. 121). It is difficult for the ego to master and assimilate the shadow because, according to Jung, the unconscious sends its signals mainly through dreams, which are difficult to interpret. Marie-Louise von Franz, another colleague of Jung, claims that in the unconscious, “All the contents are blurred and merge into one another, and one never knows exactly what or where anything is, or where one begins and ends” (ibid., p. 173). In Plato’s Phaedrus dialogue, Phaedrus is making the transition from youth to adulthood. Two older men, Lysias and Socrates, offering to tutor Phaedrus, have quite different ideas about the nature of passion and its rela- tionship to reason. Each man’s life is governed by his view. Lysias assumes that sexual passion is irrational. He is sexually attracted to Phaedrus and wants to have an affair with him. Instead of revealing his real motives and instincts, however, Lysias tries to convince Phaedrus that they should have an affair precisely because Lysias is not in love with him. Lysias promises not to be overly passionate, but to conduct the affair in a most reasonable way. He says to Phaedrus:

I should not be refused what I ask simply because I am not your lover. Lovers, when their craving is at an end, repent of such benefits as they have conferred, but for the other sort no occasion arises for regretting what has passed. (Plato, 1973a, 231a)

Socrates points out to Phaedrus the underlying view of love that Lysias assumes, “when irrational desire, pursuing the enjoyment of beauty, has gained the mastery over judgment that prompts to right conduct . . . it is the strong pas- sion called love” (ibid., 238b–c). Socrates’ description of the kind of relation- ship that develops from such passions fits well with Jung’s view of unhealthy human relationships:

Now a man who is dominated by desire and enslaved to pleasure is of course bound to aim at getting the greatest possible pleasure out of his beloved, and what pleases a sick man is anything that does not thwart him, whereas anything that is as strong as, or stronger than, himself gives him offense. . . . he will not, if he can avoid it, put up with a favo- rite that matches or outdoes him in strength, but will always seek to make him weaker and feebler . . . All those defects of mind and more in