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Naval War College Review Volume 63 Article 23 Number 4 Autumn

2010 The Grand Strategy of the Mike Markowitz

Edward . Luttwak

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Recommended Citation Markowitz, Mike and Luttwak, Edward N. (2010) "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire," Naval War College Review: Vol. 63 : No. 4 , Article 23. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/23

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Markowitz and Luttwak: The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire BOOK REVIEWS 161

writing style is captivating, and the In 1976, military analyst and historian book meets its stated aim of providing a Edward Luttwak published The Grand popular history of medieval special op- Strategy of the : From the erations. Harari, whether intentionally First Century AD to the Third, advancing or not, demonstrates the importance of a controversial thesis that the empire being able to fight hybrid wars. developed a conscious and consistent strategy of “defense in depth,” based on MARK K. VAUGHN Naval War College lines of frontier forts, backed by re- gional and central mobile armies. In this new work, on the Eastern Em- pire’s grand strategy, Luttwak explains that after the collapse of the Western Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the Empire in the fifth century, Eastern em- Byzantine Empire, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, perors no longer enjoyed this luxury. 2009. 512pp. $35 Faced by endless waves of nomadic In the Western historical imagination, horse archers from the steppes, plus the Eastern Roman Empire, which ruled Sassanid Persia (the persistent tradi- from (now , tional enemy to the east), the empire Turkey) from AD 330 until 1453, has re- could not afford to fight decisive battles ceived mostly disdain and neglect. The or wars of attrition, which would only term “Byzantine” carries some negative deplete the costly, carefully trained im- connotations. One dictionary defines perial army. Trying to annihilate the “byzantine” (lower-case ) as “charac- present enemy would only smooth the terized by a devious and usually surrep- way for the next tribe migrating out of titious manner of operation.” In the Central Asia. The empire’s most natural often-quoted judgment of a Victorian ally was whatever tribe was stacked up historian, “Its vices were the vices of behind the horde currently assailing the men who had ceased to be brave with- Danube frontier. outlearningtobevirtuous....Thehis- The empire developed an “operational tory of the Empire is a monotonous code” that combined shrewd diplo- story of the intrigues of priests, eunuchs macy, careful intelligence, defensive and women, of poisonings, of conspira- siege craft, and well-placed bribery, cies, of uniform ingratitude, of perpet- with military force as a last resort. ual fratricides.” Whenbattlecouldnotbeavoided, The academic study of Byzantine his- Byzantine generals practiced “relational tory, the preserve of a rather inbred maneuver,” a style of fighting based on community, requires mastery of diffi- insight into the strengths and weak- cult medieval Greek, the intricacies of nesses of each enemy. Orthodox theology, and other esoteric TheriseofIslamintheseventhcentury specialties. But in recent years the work represented a deadly new threat, based of a new generation of talented Byzan- on an aggressive religious ideology. tinists has given us English translations With strongly disaffected religious mi- of many long-inaccessible primary norities in its Syrian and North African sources, including an extensive body of provinces, the empire was particularly military texts. vulnerable. Luttwak explains how a

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162 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEWCollege Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 4, Art. 23

succession of warrior-emperors man- soldiers and a practical instrument for aged this threat for almost seven taming uncivilized barbarians. centuries. TheGrandStrategyoftheByzantineEm- A short but sharply argued chapter, pire is a work of solid scholarship, cre- “Leo VI and Naval Warfare,” reviews ative imagination, and practical mili- the very limited surviving texts on tary analysis. It should be of more than Byzantine sea power and provides a lu- antiquarian interest to those who be- cid account of “,” the em- lieve that the present confrontation be- pire’s much-misunderstood “secret tween Islam and the West may become weapon.” a multigenerational conflict. The em- Luttwak’s analysis is particularly sharp pire endured so long because it took on the relation of religion and state- war very seriously, avoided it whenever craft. Unlike in the medieval West, possible, and realistically analyzed the wherechurchandstatecontendedbit- cultures that surrounded it. terly for centuries for dominance, the The book’s only weakness is its maps, Orthodox Church was usually an inte- which are muddy and crudely drawn. gral part of the imperial order: the pa- The reader will benefit from keeping at triarch of Constantinople was appoint- hand a good historical atlas, such as the ed by the emperor and served at his Penguin Atlas of Medieval History. pleasure. Orthodoxy was a source of MIKE MARKOWITZ “cultural confidence” for Byzantine CNA, , Virginia

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