This dissertation was completed under the auspices of The Porter School of Environmental
Studies
Environment, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East Examining Peace Park Proposals along Israeli-Arab Borders
Submitted by:
Shahar Sadeh
As part of the requirements for receiving a "Doctor of Philosophy" degree
Submitted to the Senate of Tel Aviv University
February 2016
The work was guided by:
Prof. Dan Rabinowitz, Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Tel Aviv University
Prof. Avner de-Shalit, Department of Political Science,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Gratitude Notes
At the end of this long journey I have many people I want to thank and show my appreciation. First, I want to thank and acknowledge my advisors, Prof. Dan Rabinowitz and Prof. Avner de-Shalit for their wise advice and guidance throughout this process. I want to thank the members of the academic committee, Prof. Alon Tal and Prof. Debrah Shmueli for their thoughtful comments and assistance. I also want to thank the judging committee that reviewed this work, Prof. Nurit Kliot, Prof. Daniel Orenstein and the third anonymous reader who assisted me to improve this work by their thorough review and interesting observations. I want to express thanks to the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace, the Yad Tabenkin Center and the University Institute for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation for supporting my research at its first phases.
I want to thank the Porter School of Environmental Studies for supporting this work, and particularly to Tami Singer-Limor and Arie Nesher for their support and friendship.
I want to thank many friends that supported, listened and advised along this journey: Elana Needle, Moran Diment, Natalia Gutkowski, Neta Lipman(Servi), Sarah Ozaky-Lazar, Eric Abitbol, Josh Fisher, Farah Hegazi, Dana Tabechnik, Lior Lehers and many others. I want to thank my family, parents, grandparents, sister and wonderful daughters. My deepest thank is to Ran, my best friend and husband, who was there every step of the way. I could not have done it without him. Lastly, I want to thank my interviewees, who cared, who acted and who inspired me.
Shahar Sadeh, February 2016
Abstract
The following research presents an analysis of the environment and peace nexus in the Middle East as manifested in repeated initiatives for peace parks along Israeli‐ Arab borders between 1977 and 2011. The research examines the potential of the environment to serve as a catalyst for peace. To a lesser extent, it examines the potential of peace to promote environmentalism. It discusses the political power that was assigned to the environment in those cross‐border initiatives and explores the roles of governmental organizations, NGOs and individuals in promoting them. The study advances the historical narrative of the Middle East, with regards to the environment, by introducing new data on this nexus' manifestation via multiple case studies.
At the center of this work are Peace Parks, which are trans‐boundary protected areas dedicated to the protection of natural resources and to the promotion of peace and cooperation. Growing in popularity worldwide, they serve herein as an analytic‐ thematic tool that allows exploring, studying and analyzing the potential power of the environment in peacemaking and peacebuilding processes between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The study unfolds the history of more than twenty peace park proposals along Israeli‐Arab borders (only one to be fully materialized). It brings to focus two distinct and unique case studies: First, the initiative to establish a peace park in the South Sinai Peninsula, as part of a wider process of Sinai's nature conservation advocacy that followed the Israeli‐Egyptian peace negotiations; and second, the contemporary set of proposals to establish a peace park on parts of the Golan Heights as part of formal and informal Israeli‐Syrian negotiations.
The analytical framework for this research is primarily based on the Environmental Peacemaking writings. These writings are an ongoing augmenting conglomeration of research that draws on fieldwork and case study analyses by practitioners and scholars from various disciplines and is tightly connected to similar learning processes that are undertaken by UN bodies (Conca and Dabelko, 2002; Ali, 2007; Dabelko, 2008; Jensen and Lonergan, 2012). The Environmental Peacemaking
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writings perceive the environment as having inherent characteristics rendering it useful for conflict transformation, cross border cooperation and peacemaking processes. This ability stems from the fact that environmental problems and threats often ignore political boundaries and their resolution requires a long‐term perspective. Consequently, cross‐border environmental projects may serve as a good stimulant for a non‐political cooperation between conflicting parties, while promoting a prolonging dialogue between scientists and environment practitioners that, in its turn, may contribute to peace. Peace parks, an explicit tool for environmental peacebuilding, concretize this notion to a specific set of goals and broaden the multidisciplinarity even further by incorporating issues of livelihood, borders, sovereignty, sustainability, tourism, development and more.
The context for this study is set globally and locally. Globally, in the past three decades transboundary conservation initiatives for the benefits of biodiversity and local communities appeared in significantly increasing numbers and received support, as well as funding, from global agencies. Additionally, along those years a consensus has been growing among policymakers and practitioners arguing that the environment can play a role in the stability of international relations and in catalyzing peace. On top of that, these processes paralleled global developments in borders perceptions that changed from rigid borders to more open and flexible ones.
Locally, the Israeli Arab peace process started in 1977. Initially it hardly included any environmental references but with time the environmental issues were better incorporated into the negotiations. And indeed, throughout the 1990s hopes for a “new green Middle East” were part of the peace process jargon. Hence, during the peak of this process (an era called "the peace euphoria"), many cross‐border environmental plans flourished and environmentalism grew in the region. At the end of the 1990s reality has changed and regional relationships took a turn. The following decade has witnessed the collapse of the Middle East peace process.
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The dissertation is built in three main research chapters. The first provides an overview of the proposals for peace parks along Israeli‐ Arab borders and their related historical context. It examines the park's initiators, rationale and purposes, proposed cross‐border relations, the borders and sovereignty statuses and the relevant international linkages. It discusses the suitableness of the peace park concept to the Israeli‐Arab reality, the role of institutions and individuals in promoting this concept and the border issue as a central motive in it. The second chapter focuses on the efforts to advocate nature conservation at the Sinai Peninsula during the Israeli‐Egyptian peace process between 1977 and 1983. This effort included a peace park proposal. Its main part reveals and unfolds the story of Israeli conservationists positioned in Sinai during the Israeli occupation and their advocacy actions for Sinai's conservation during this period (before and after the Israeli withdrawal). It exposes and discusses direct Israeli‐ Egyptian collaborations regarding Sinai's environmental management and ones that were mediated or performed by international agents. Throughout this chapter developments in Egypt's environmentalism are demonstrated. The chapter's analysis deals with opportunities for environmental and political changes that opened up during this post‐conflict period. It utilizes the Advocacy Network (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Eyal and Buchholz, 2010) and the Environmental Imaginaries theories (Peet & Watts (1996) in:Gilbert, 2010; Davis and Burke‐III, 2011) in addition to the Environmental Peacemaking writings. The third chapter addresses a sequence of proposals for establishing a peace park in the Golan Heights between 1994 and 2009. It does so in conjunction with the area's environmental and political backgrounds. It focuses on the peacemaking and peacebuilding aspirations of the proposals and discusses the political and environmental advantages and drawbacks of establishing a peace park. It also discusses the networks and the individuals involved in the proposals, the environmental discourse and its potential political power. The unique characteristics and the different geographies, time frames and viewpoints of the three research chapters complement each other to provide a
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holistic and wide picture of the peace and environment nexus along Israeli Arab borders.
The Methodology for this research is qualitative. Data was collected from primary and secondary resources as well as from interviews and discussions with key figures involved in the cases. The research focuses primarily on an Israeli perspective and secondarily on an international one. The dissertation addresses a few gaps in knowledge and its scientific contribution lies in historic and analytic /theoretic spheres.
The research advances the environmental historiography of Israel while crosscutting it with regional political processes, which is a relatively understudied arena. Consequently, it provides a distinctive view point to the saturated fields of Middle Eastern history, conflict resolution and peace studies. It provides a new outlook on the Israeli‐Arab conflict and on professional groups participating in its resolution.
The Environmental Peacemaking literature's assumptions regarding the environment role in catalyzing peace are not sufficiently backed up with systematic and empirical research on the ways in which the environment and peace nexus manifests. This dissertation assists in filling this knowledge gap. It does so in two main ways: First, it compliments this literature with supporting case studies which strengthen or provide refinements to its prevailing assumptions. Predominantly, this study discusses the peace parks political value to peacemaking and peacebuilding, which is less explored in the literature when compared with their contribution to nature conservation or to the economy. Indeed, most of the peace park proposals researched herein did not achieve realization. Nevertheless, the study assists in understanding past experience and sets the ground for future inquiries, by describing how, why and who conceptualized and promoted them along Israeli‐Arab borders. Additionally, the Middle East region is hardly explored in this literature
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(with the exception being water issues), especially with respect to the peace park concept.
Second, in different from the prevailing writings on the multiple relations between environment and conflict, this study is focused on the environment and peace nexus. While it does address the potential harmful effects of peace‐ related processes on the environment, it mainly concentrates on the positive effects that arise once opportunities for better environmental management and cross‐border cooperation open during peace times. Moreover, the study refers to multiple stages of the resolution process (before, in the midst of negotiation and after a peace agreement was formally achieved), as part of peacemaking or peacebuilding processes, and provides a wide overview of the subject.
The findings and conclusions of this research are complex and interwoven. The examined cases demonstrate that many groups have recognized the potential of cross‐border environmental initiatives to contribute to peace. Nevertheless, in practice, those initiatives did not hold sufficient political power to overcome political setbacks, and therefore their potential was mostly unfulfilled. Nonetheless, the examined cases do demonstrate a positive and straight forward environmentalism enhancement as an outcome of peace.
Given there is almost no successful model of a peace park in the region, the numerous attempts to promote peace parks reflect positively on the potential scope of this concept and grant it considerable power as a model for future cross‐border interactions. Although appealing, the repeated failed attempts might also indicate that the concept is unfit for the local reality. The research reinforces the observation of peace parks depiction as a popular solution that was embraced by many; however it cannot substantially support or oppose its possible contribution to nature conservation or to peace. Such a model can assist in promoting and catalyzing a positive cross‐border political process and in shifting the environmental discourse towards a regional one. The research also finds that the repeated efforts for establishing peace parks were not
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necessarily idiosyncratic occurrences, but at times they were local manifestations of a larger phenomenon influenced by global trends related to nature conservation, de‐bordering (in certain years) and globalization.
This study demonstrates the multidirectional relations between the environment and peace in multiple stages of the resolution process. While most of the peace park initiatives resulted from the peace process and are a post‐ conflict product, they in themselves aimed at becoming a tool that would reinforce peace once more. The Golan Heights proposals are distinctive in this regard and represent pre‐agreement plans. Those proposals were designed to both influence the peace process itself by being an important part of the peace agreement and to serve as a tool to reinforce peace after its formal attainment. The Sinai advocacy case study demonstrates the full bidirectional effect of peace: The peace agreement between Israel and Egypt brought to a forecast of expedited mass development which imposed new environmental threats on the area. These threats, in their turn, created an impetus among Israeli conservationists to initiate cross‐border activities, such as proposing a peace park establishment, thus creating an avenue for peace reinforcement. Their acts, to some extent, contributed to nature conservation and improvement of the environmental situation in the area which affected cross‐border tourism, and peace.
This work provides supporting evidences and several theoretical modifications to the environmental peacemaking writings. It supports the assumption that the environment can create a platform for cross‐border dialogue. While the literature stresses the need for both civil and governmental support and participation for a success in those platforms, this work argues that the need for the formal‐ governmental one is more crucial. Furthermore, the work questions this platform's effectiveness in overcoming political turmoil. This research reinforces, emphasize
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and further develops the potential role of environmentalists as peacemakers, which have shown to be substantial in these kinds of initiatives. Also, the work strengthen the assumption that an immediate post‐conflict period, which is characterized as unstable (but inherently flexible), is suitable for promoting innovative cross‐border initiatives. Such a period provides a window of opportunities to introduce new principles and practices and rebuild institutions in ways that would otherwise be politically difficult to achieve. On top of that, this work demonstrates and affirms the known tendency among practitioners and institutions to avoid emphasizing politics or the politicized nature of an environmental project. And lastly, the work reaffirms the fact that identification of shared environmental problems and threats produces more cooperative outcome across borders (when compared with jointly working towards positive goals). However, the work points out that this fact might constitute a disadvantage for peace parks establishment since such parks, by definition, are not primarily aimed at solving common threats but rather at jointly working towards constructive objectives. On top of that, while this research supports the aforementioned assumption (evidently the initiatives that had a joint threats are among the most advances ones), it also demonstrates how peace parks might function as a cooperative way to respond to unshared environmental threats.
The last finding is related to the way the environment is conceptualized regionally and its potential political power. Regional environmentalism had developed substantially during the Israeli‐Arab peace process period and was manifested through the many creative cross‐border ideas, among which were peace parks. Those manifestations testify to a general inclination (or to the very least, an Israeli inclination) to grant the environment, albeit instrumentally, power as a locus of cross‐border collaboration. This instrumentalism (using the environment in order to achieve other political purposes) is related to the way the environment is perceived by environmentalists, policymakers and the general public. This work demonstrates the recognition and realization (by policymakers and negotiators) of the place the environment holds in people’s minds, i.e., the decision makers’ de‐ facto comprehension of the public's environmental views as a potentially political VII
driving force, one which may eventually contribute to peacemaking and peacebuilding. The novelty lies in the use, or the potential use, of environmental conceptions for peacemaking purposes. For better understanding the way environmental perceptions were translated into political proposals this work pointes to the way issues of peace, conflict and nature conservation were mediated through other lenses of environmental and national imagination, memory, commemoration and nostalgia. Combined together, in a non‐linear way, these two sets of issues served as part of peace parks rationale, justification and conceptual acceptance.
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Abbreviations
DMZ Demilitarized Zone EEAA Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency FOEME Friends of the Earth Middle East GHPP The Golan Heights Peace Park HLCF Holy Land Conservation Fund IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature JNF Jewish National Fund JRPP The Jordan River Peace Park MK Member of Knesset (Israel parliament) NGO Non Governmental Organization NRA Israeli Nature Reserve Authority RSMPP The Red Sea Marine Peace Park SCG Sinai Conservation Group SEMED the South‐East Mediterranean Plans SPNI Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel TBPA Transboundary Protected Area TEAM Taba‐Eilat‐Aqaba Macro Area UNESCO United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization WWF World Wildlife Foundation
Table of Content
1. Chapter1: Preface 1 1.1. Preamble 1 1.2. Research Rationale, Purpose and Questions 2 1.2.1. Theoretical Context 2 1.2.2. The Research Context – Addressing the knowledge gaps 3 1.3. Primary Research Questions 5 1.4. Research Contribution, Novelty and Importance 6 1.5. Research Development, Design and Methodology 6 1.6. Research Outline 9 1.7. Overview of Overarching Main Findings 11
2. Chapter2: Literature and Theory Review 13 2.1. Environment and Peace – Revealing the Multidirectional Nexus 14 2.1.1. Changing Practices: Incorporating "the Environment" into Security 16 Institutions and "Peace and Conflict" into Environmental Institutions 2.1.2. From Environmental Security to Environmental Peacemaking 19 2.1.3. Environmental Pathways to Peace 22 2.2. Peace Parks 27 2.2.1. Definition 26 2.2.2. Historic Development and Consolidation of the Peace Park Concept 30 2.2.3. Peace Parks Performance 33 2.2.4. Examples of Peace Parks from Around the World 35
3. Chapter 3: Peace Parks along Israeli-Arab Borders: Hopes and Reality 42 3.1. Introduction 42 3.2. Background: The Israeli-Arab Peace Process and its Environmental 44 Manifestations 3.3. Peace Park Initiatives along Israeli-Arab Borders 49 3.3.1. The 1970s (The Peace Park in Southern Sinai) 50 3.3.2. The 1980s 51 3.3.3. The 1990s 51 3.3.3.1. Early 1990s – Beginning of "the Peace Euphoria Era" 51 3.3.3.2. The East Mediterranean Riviera and Dune Park 56 3.3.3.3. The Red Sea Riviera 59 3.3.3.4. The Red Sea Marine Peace Park 61 3.3.3.5. The Arava Peace Park 66 3.3.3.6. Dana-Sheizaf Bi-National Nature Reserve 69 3.3.3.7. Rahma-Gharandal Sands Conservation Area 71 3.3.3.8. The Lowest Park on Earth 72 3.3.3.9. The Jordan – River of Peace 76 3.4. 2000 and Onward 77 3.4.1. The Jordan River Peace Park 77 3.4.2. Alexander-Zaymar Peace Park 81 3.4.3. The Golan Heights Peace Park 85 3.5. Discussion and Summary 86 3.5.1. The Peace Park Concept and Environmental Peacemaking 91 3.5.2. The Role and Motivations of Professionals/Experts 95 3.5.3. Borders and Sovereignty Aspects 97
4. Chapter 4: Sinai’s Nature Conservation Advocacy (1977-1983) 99 4.1. Introduction 99 4.2. Background 100 4.2.1. Sinai Peninsula 100 4.2.2. Sinai under Israeli Regime 102 4.2.3. Following the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Agreement 103 4.2.4. The Israeli-Egyptian Normalization Process and Sinai 105 4.3. Environmental Imaginaries and the Israelis in Sinai – Emotion and Devotion 106 4.4. The Development of Environmentalism in Egypt and the Advocacy Network 108 Theory 4.5. Acting for Sinai, Acting for Nature, Acting for Peace? 112 4.5.1. Cautious Optimism: from Peace Negotiations to the Firsts Withdrawals 112 from Sinai (1978- 1981), Direct and Indirect Actions 4.5.1.1. The NRA 112 4.5.1.2. The SPNI 114 4.5.1.2.1. The Zukei David Field School Proposal 115 4.5.1.2.2. The South Sinai Peace Park proposal 115 4.5.1.2.3. An IUCN resolution for Sinai's conservation 117 4.5.1.3. Developments in Egypt's Environmentalism during the 121 "Cautious Optimism" Phase (1979-1981) 4.5.2. Disillusionment from Peace: Acting in an Indirect Route (1982-1983) 122 4.5.2.1. Sinai Conservation Group – "International Israelis" 123 4.5.2.2. International Agents 125 4.6. Discussion 130 4.6.1. Sinai’s TAN 130 4.6.2. Environmental Peacemaking in Post-Conflict Sinai 134 4.6.3. Additional Agendas in Promoting Sinai's Nature Conservation 137 4.7. Conclusion 138
5. Chapter 5: A Peace Park in the Golan Heights – An Avenue to Peacemaking? 139 5.1. Introduction 139 5.2. Background 140 5.2.1. Geography and Environment of the Golan Heights 140 5.2.2. History of the conflict: Territory, Water and Security 142 5.3. The Israeli-Syrian Peace Process and the Peace Park Proposals 147 5.3.1. The Peace Negotiations: A Brief Background 147 5.3.2. The Golan Heights Peace Park Proposals - An Overview 149 5.3.3. The Golan Heights International Park and the Gan HaShalom Proposals 150 5.3.4. The Golan Height Peace Park/Biosphere Reserve 153 5.3.5. The Nature Tourism Formula, the "Bill Clinton's Reserve" and Lake 154 Tiberius Tourism Area 5.3.6. Jordan Valley Nature Preserve 160 5.3.7. The Park on the Golan 161 5.3.8. The Jordan Valley–Golan Heights Environmental Preserve 167 5.3.9. A Renewable Energy Peace Park on the Golan Heights 169 5.4. Discussion 171 5.4.1. The Merits of Establishing a Peace Park: Israel, Syria and the 171 Environment 5.4.2. Professional Networks, Negotiators and Involved Institutions 174 5.4.3. Environmental Discourse and Its Political Power 175 5.4.3.1. A Change in the Discourse 175 5.4.3.2. Environmental Imaginaries as a Source of Political Power 176 5.4.4. Peace Parks, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding 179 5.4.5. Peacemaking vs. Peacebuilding – the Golan Heights as a Unique 182 Example 5.5. Summary 184
6. Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 186 6.1. Discussion 186 6.1.1. Peace parks along Israeli-Arab Borders 187 6.1.2. Environmental Peacebuilding and Peacemaking – Analytical Insights 191 6.1.2.1. The Lack of Joint Threat Motivation 192 6.1.2.2. An Immediate Post-Conflict Period 193 6.1.2.3. Linking Environmental Activities and Peace 194 6.1.3. Environmentalists in Peacemaking 196 6.1.4. Imagining the Environment and Conserving a Territory 200 6.2. Limitations of the Research and Recommendations for Further Research 205 6.2.1. Methodological Limitations 205 6.3. Recommendations for Further Research 206 6.4. Epilogue 208
7. Bibliography 210
Annexes 1. Illustration of in-work connections of environment, peace and conflict 233 2. The Peace Park in South Sinai / Avraham Shaked and SPNI, 1977 235 3. An Israel-Syria Treaty of Peace: Draft Negotiating Text, ICG, 2002 241 4. The Peace Park on the Golan / Liel and Suliman 242 5. The Spice Route Map, 1977 244
תקציר בעברית
Table of Figures and Illustrations:
Figure 1: Environment, Peace and Conflict Interconnectivity 25 Figure 2: Peace Parks along Israeli Arab Borders - Illustration Map 49 Figure 3: Tourism and Border Crossing Potential 54 Figure 4: Environmental Cooperation and Development Options 56 Figure 5: The Red Sea Riviera/Coral Reef Park, the Mediterranean Riviera and 58 the Lowest Park on Earth Figure 6: the Taba-Eilat-Aqaba Macro Area 60 Figure 7: The Red Sea Riviera 61 Figure 8: Red Sea Marine Peace Park Logo 62 Figure 9: Gulf of Aqaba – Biodiversity and Environment Management 64 Figure 10: Arava Peace Park 68 Figure 11: Dana Sheizaf – Expansion and Linkages 71 Figure 12: Suggested Boundaries for the Dead Sea Biosphere Reserve 75 Figure 13: The Jordan River Peace Park Illustration 80 Figure 14: Jordan River Peace Park – Site Plan 81 Figure 15: Brochure of the Alexander-Zaymar Peace Park 83 Figure 16: Alexander Zaymar River Peace Park Map 84 Figure 17: SPNI – Sinai Nature Conservation Plan 119 Figure 18: The Sinai – MFO Pamphlet 129 Figure 19: The Park on the Golan, Twite Original Pamphlet 1994 152
Table of Charts:
Chart 1: comparison characteristics of peace park initiatives 87
Table of Maps:
Map A: The Disputed Lines - The 1923 international line, the June 4th 1967 line and the 144 DMZ areas Map B: The ICG proposal for the Jordan Valley nature Preserve 161 Map C: the Narrow Options of the Golan Park 165 Map D: Golan Park Options 1-5 166 Map E: Golan Heights Environmental and Energy Peace Park 170
1. Chapter1: Preface
1.1. Preamble
This study analyzes the environment and peace nexus in the Middle East as it manifests in repeated past and present initiatives for peace parks along Israeli‐Arab borders (between 1977 and 2011).1 The work examines the potential of the environment to serve as a catalyst for peace. To a lesser extent, it discusses the potential of peace to promote environmentalism. Furthermore, the study aims at advancing the historical narrative of the Middle East conflict and peace process, with regards to the environment, by introducing new data on this nexus' phenomenon via multiple case studies. It does so while referring and contributing to the Environmental Peacemaking literature.
Peace parks are trans‐boundary protected areas dedicated to the conservation of natural and cultural resources and to the promotion of peace and cooperation. Thos study reveals and highlights the rich history of more than twenty2 peace park proposals along Israeli‐Arab borders, with only one coming to fruition. These proposals represent many different and important efforts for environmental peacemaking and peacebuilding3. This research brings to focus two distinct case studies: First, the initiative to establish a peace park in the South Sinai Peninsula, as part of a wider process of Sinai's nature conservation advocacy that followed the Israeli‐Egyptian peace negotiations; and second, the contemporary set of proposals to establish a peace park on parts of the Golan Heights as a component in formal and informal Israeli‐Syrian peace negotiations.
1 The cases presented stretch over a period that starts with the Israeli‐Egyptian peace process in the late 1970s; followed by the multilateral and bilateral talks between Israel and the Arab world and the Israeli‐ Jordanian peace agreement in the 1990's; and culminates with the efforts to establish peace parks with Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian partners in the 2000s. 2 Peace Parks were proposed in 12 different locations (at times, more than one plan was proposed for the same location). 3 "Environmental Peacemaking" is defined as the diplomatic process (including negotiations, treaties, agreements between policy makers) of brokering an end to a conflict, principally by promoting environmental cooperation and using environmental components in moving towards such agreement. "Environmental Peacebuilding" is defined as the processes of creating ties between former enemies by utilizing environmental measures that promote joint environmental cooperation or the processes of using environmental components in moving towards a sustainable peace. Either process will, in its turn, help the transformation toward more sustainable and peaceful relationships. 1
1.2. Research Rationale, Purpose and Questions 1.2.1. Theoretical Context
The theoretical framework of this research is primarily based on the Environmental Peacemaking writings. The analysis of the different case studies also draws from Advocacy Network Theory (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), Sociology of Interventions (Eyal and Buchholz, 2010) and Environmental Imaginaries (Cohen, 2011; Davis, 2011; Davis and Burke‐III, 2011). It is important to emphasize that the Environmental Peacemaking writings are not an established social theory, but rather an ongoing augmenting conglomeration of writings that draws on fieldwork and case study analyses by practitioners and scholars from various disciplines.4 These writings have been formulated as a new and innovative body of knowledge which is tightly connected to similar learning processes that are undertaken by Unite Nation (UN) bodies. These bodies work on the peace and environment nexus in their various on‐the‐ground activities throughout the past decade.5
Put succinctly, the Environmental Peacemaking writings perceive the environment as having inherent characteristics rendering it useful for peacemaking and peacebuilding processes (Conca and Dabelko, 2002). The ability of cross‐border environmental cooperation to transform conflicts stems from the fact that environmental problems and threats often ignore political boundaries and their resolution requires a long‐term perspective. Consequently, they may serve as a good stimulant for a non‐political cooperation between conflicting parties, while promoting a prolonging dialogue between scientists and environment practitioners (Ali, 2003; Conca, Carius et al., 2005). This platform of dialogue can develop into a broader relationship that may contribute to the end of conflict and promote peace (Carius, 2006; Dabelko, 2008). The concept of peace parks, a specific tool for environmental peacebuilding, is repeatedly addressed in the Environmental Peacemaking writings. As a unique concept that deals with nature conservation, livelihood, borders, peacebuilding, sustainability, tourism, development
4 I.e. environmental sciences, social sciences, international relations, conflict resolution, peace studies, and more. 5 This topic will be thoroughly elaborated on in chapter 2. For more on these field's development please see: (Jensen, 2013). 2
and more, the peace park concept further broadens the multidisciplinarity of the Environmental Peacemaking writings.
1.2.2. The Research Context – Addressing the Knowledge Gaps
The background rationale and purpose of this study are set in a three spheres – historic, analytic and theoretic. Over the past three decades, transboundary conservation initiatives for the benefits of biodiversity and local communities at a global scale appeared in significantly increasing numbers. Several organizations emerged as the primary promoters of such transboundary conservation efforts (e.g. IUCN, EUROPARC Federation, Peace Parks Foundation, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)). Correspondingly, funding agencies have been and are supporting these efforts (Vasilijević and Pezold, 2011).
Furthermore, over the years a consensus has been growing among policymakers and practitioners that the environment can play a role in the stability of international relations and can catalyze peace. To that notion, supportive academic literature has been developing. At the first stage, the literature focused on "environmental security" and explored mainly the environment and conflict nexus and less the environment and peace one (Homer‐Dixon, 2001). In the last decade, a shift has occurred with the emergence of the Environmental Peacemaking literature.
However, the Environmental Peacemaking assumptions regarding the environment’s role in catalyzing peace (as stemming from the "environment knows no boundaries" underlying rationale), are not yet sufficiently backed up with systematic and empirical research on the ways in which the environment and peace nexus manifests. These insufficiently supported assumptions (i.e. this knowledge gap) apply also to the Israel‐ Arab context. A declared and direct peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors began almost four decades ago. During this period, many cross‐border environmental initiatives were proposed, but less than a handful were implemented. Nevertheless, "conventional wisdom holds that environmental cooperation offers one of the best vehicles for building bridges between Arabs and Jews. Slogans put forward… 3
such as "pollution knows no borders"… offer an optimistic prognosis for cooperation… even if they frequently make for better rhetoric than actual coalitions" (Tal, 2002, 362).
This dissertation assists in filling the knowledge gap of insufficient empirical and systematic research on Environmental Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in two main ways:
First, it reveals an unknown history of peace parks initiatives along Israeli‐Arab borders and presents a comprehensive empirical description of it. Moreover, it provides new insights and analytical refinements to environmental peacemaking and the peace park literature. Predominantly, it discusses peace parks’ political value to peacemaking and peacebuilding which is less explored in the literature when compared with their contribution to nature conservation (Stefanick, 2009; Barquet et. al, 2010). As most peace park proposals presented in this study were not realized, their efficiency in promoting or stabilizing peace is not evaluated herein. Nevertheless, the study assists in understanding past experience and sets the ground for future inquiries, by describing how, why and who conceptualized and promoted the peace parks initiatives.
Second, the study contributes to the overall writings on the multidirectional nexus of peace and the environment by relating to both the negative and positive aspects of the nexus. The "negative" causal direction (i.e., harmful effects of peace‐related processes on the environment) usually occur in post‐conflict situations where government capacity tends to be weak, political horizons tend to be short and the will for rapid social and economic recovery (usually harmful for the environment) is common (Bruch, 2009; UNEP, 2010). The "positive" causal direction is twofold. First, as opposed to war times, when environmental issues are perceived as less pressing or critical, in peace time, opportunities for better environmental management exist and are perceived to enhance political stability. Second, environmental projects may serve as an entry point for cross‐border cooperation that might eventually promote a peace agreement or reinforce peace. However, research on the consequences of peace for the environment is lacking (Khagram and Ali, 2006).
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This dissertation relates to both directions of the nexus.6 While most of the peace park initiatives resulted from the peace process, they were designed to be a tool that would reinforce peace ‐ both indirectly by improving environmental management that contributes to regional stability and directly by providing an arena for cross‐border cooperation and encounters. The Golan Heights case study represents an attempt to influence both the formal peace process, by incorporating the peace park component as an integral part of the peace agreement, and the peacebuilding process, by serving as a tool to reinforce peace after its formal attainment. The Sinai advocacy case study demonstrates the full bidirectional effect of peace. The peace agreement between Israel and Egypt brought to the fore a prediction of expedited mass development which imposed new environmental threats to the area. These “negative” threats, in turn, created an impetus among Israeli conservationists to initiate cross‐border activities, such as proposing a peace park establishment in Sinai, thus creating an avenue for reinforcement of peace. Their acts, to some extent, contributed to nature conservation and the improvement of the environmental situation in the area which affected cross‐ border tourism, and peace.
1.3. Primary Research Questions
1. What are the causal directions of the environment and peace nexus as they unfold in past peace park proposals along Israeli‐Arab borders?
2. How does the political power that is assigned to the environment (and mainly to nature conservation) by the "environment knows no boundaries" rationale manifest in the case studies?
3. What is the role of governmental organizations, NGOs and individuals in promoting cross‐border environmental cooperation with the declared (or undeclared) purpose of promoting peace?
6 Understandably, these might work often as feedback loops. For example, regional stability that originates from an ongoing peaceful political situation might create a positive effect on promoting good environmental practices and as a consequence enhance further stability. Alternatively, political stability might create incentives for expedited development projects that would threaten environmental conditions. Those, in the future, may escalate and create political unrest that may threaten regional stability. See elaboration in chapter 2. For illustration of this nexus’ manifestations please see figure no. 1 and appendix no.1 for this nexus’ manifestations as it is developed in this research. 5
1.4. Research Contribution, Novelty and Importance
The scientific novelty of this work lies in the absence of previous research like this and contributes to the historical, analytic and theoretic spheres. First, this research advances the environmental historiography of Israel while crosscutting it with regional political processes, which is a relatively undeveloped field of research (Orenstein, Tal et al., 2013). Consequently, it provides a distinctive view point on the saturated fields of Middle Eastern history, conflict resolution and peace studies. Second, this research utilizes an emerging stream of literature (Environmental Peacemaking) to analyze a segment of environmental politics in the Middle East. This specific analysis is hardly explored in the environmental literature (with the exception of water issues),7especially with respect to the peace park concept. This research analysis refers to the multiple stages of the resolution process (before negotiations, in the midst of negotiations and after a peace agreement was formally achieved), and distinguished between peacemaking or of peacebuilding processes.8 Finally, the research aims at developing locally applied understandings on the potential power and influence the environment holds for peacebuilding and peacemaking processes.
1.5. Research Development, Design and Methodology
Focusing primarily on the Israeli perspective and secondarily on the international one, the data for this qualitative research has been collected by conducting interviews and discussions with key informants involved in the different cases. Key informants were
7 Water and water sharing are the most recognized environmental topics that were substantially researched as part of the conflict and peace discourse. Presumably, some water models have experienced a certain degree of success in promoting dialogue and in proactive peacemaking (Weinthal, 2004; Radis, 2007). 8 This study will rely on the definition used by the UN for peacebuilding and peacemaking: Peacebuilding comprises the identification and support of measures needed for transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships and structures of governance, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. The four dimensions of peacebuilding are: socio‐economic development, good governance, reform of justice and security institutions, and the culture of justice, truth and reconciliation. Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of social and economic development, and promotes activities to contribute to ending and preventing armed conflict. Peacemaking is the diplomatic process of brokering an end to conflict, principally through mediation and negotiation, as foreseen under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. 6
chosen according to the professional position they held during the period of the initiatives development.
Given that Israeli state‐documentation of regional peace‐negotiations is sealed from public view,9 this study’s examination of recent environmental history related to negotiations was achieved mainly through interviews. These interviews generated new knowledge on the peace processes by cataloging perspectives and events that have not been documented elsewhere. Twenty two semi‐structured in‐depth Interviews were conducted with people who took part in the unfolded stories. Those interviewed included Israeli planners, nature conservationists, private entrepreneurs, businessmen, former officials from the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Foreign Affairs Ministry, NGO representatives and international mediators. The majority of the interviewees were Israelis and a few were American. The interviews were performed using the snowball sampling technique and were conducted in a semi‐structured method (Shkedi, 2003).10 Cohen and Arieli noted that snowball sampling was found to be most effective in identifying, accessing and engaging interviewees in post‐conflict research environments (Cohen and Arieli, 2011). I’ve started with a first round of interviews in 2010 with professionals whose names I could generate from written materials or recommendations, and from their interviews I moved to a second round of interviews in 2011. In 2012 I conducted 3 more interviews in the United States (a fourth interview that was scheduled was cancelled as the interviewee past away).
The analysis and content analysis made use of primary and secondary resources from governmental ministries, NGOs, private institutions and archives. Some of the materials used in this research were never publicly released. Data was collected from the Israeli State Archives (under the PM’s office), The Central Zionist Archives, The National Library, The Ministry of Environmental Protection Archives, The Ministry of Tourism Archive, The Nature and Park Authorities Archives, Tik Proyektim private planning offices archive, Moti Kaplan private planning offices archive, and four private collections of Prof. Eugenie Clark, Dr. Bertel Brunn, Mr. Avraham Shaked and Mr. Rafi Benvenisti).
9 This restriction is in place to preserve National Security. Documents are generally opened to the public within 30 years of the end of negotiations. 10 All translations from Hebrew interviews were conducted by this study’s author. 7
The range of written sources consulted was vast and assisted in triangulating and validating the data collected from other sources, specifically the interviews. However, the data used in this study do not provide a comprehensive picture given that most sources were either Israeli or international and did not include Arab sources. Moreover, some of the archives were incomplete11, lost,ַ 12 or unorganized13, especially those of the non‐governmental institutions and of private entrepreneurs that took part in promoting cross border initiatives.14
Methodologically, how is it possible to form research questions based on mostly failed, unrealized or partially realized initiatives? The scientific and methodological rationale that guided this research was mired in the regional political realities, but did not attempt to fill the existing gap between declarations and on‐ground unsuccessful realization of the peace park initiatives, as this was outside of this dissertation's scope and mostly related to regional realities. Guiding the formulation of the research question was a desire to understand the ways in which the peace and environment nexus operated as well as to expose their driving forces and underlying premises. In addition to the will to reveal and portray the initiative.
Accordingly, the research method was inductive. The initially proposed theories, categories and terms did not necessarily fit the findings. This is a common phenomenon in qualitative research, where it is not a prerequisite to built an analytical frame prior to the data collection (Ragin, 1997; Goldthorpe, 2000). Qualitative research does not necessarily follow a linear route, but rather requires a flexibility in design, while the research questions go through a gradual process of change, clarification and reassessment (Platt, 1992). Indeed, clarifying and defining the field and the cases examined proved challenging. However, some researchers claim that the "final realization of the case's nature may be the most important part of the interaction
11 For example, some records and files requested from the Ministry of Environmental Protection were never found or retrieved. I have waited many months for answers from the ministry never to be answered as they’ve moved some of the files that were located in the director offices and could not find them. 12 When trying to find SPNI old records I was told some where thrown away a few years back. 13 In the State Archives, which are spread in several locations, some in industrial zones in the West Bank, documentation was lacking as far as correspondence between NRA and representatives in Sinai is concerned as well as in regard to peace park proposals. The best documents regarding the Sinai case studies were found in private archives of Bertel Brunn (US), Avraham Shaked and Eugene Clark. 14 More about the limitations of this research is detailed in chapter 6. 8
between ideas and evidence" (Becker in:Ragin, 1992, 6), and is a task to be accomplished only once results are in place and the research is completed.
1.6. Research Outline
The work opens with a Theory and Literature chapter which establishes the theoretical foundations for the research, reviews their historical development and discusses the rationale for their use in this research. The chapter reviews the way conceptual changes within the international bodies dealing with nature conservation, environment, conflict resolution and peace brought about action. Subsequently, the chapter explores the theoretical discussion on the environment and peace, and maps some of the relevant characteristics for the analysis of peace parks.
The rationale behind the two parallel discussions (about the theory’s development as well as to the ways it relates to this research) is to clarify the relations between environment and peace as those are reflected in an emerging academic field and literature. This literature is mostly analytical and built upon case by case incremental additions, typically through practitioner‐researcher cooperation.15 The development of a theoretical framework dealing with the environment and peace in connection to practical and on ground activities implemented to achieve peace sets the basis for understanding the development of the peace park concept as well as of its import and implementation in the Middle East.
Chapter Three, Peace Park along Israeli‐Arab Borders – Hopes and Reality, provides an overview of the twenty proposals for peace parks along Israeli‐Arab borders. The beginning of the chapter describes the historical background of the Israeli‐Arab peace process with an emphasis on environmental negotiations. The main body of the chapter presents the peace park initiatives and elaborates on those that are more substantial and developed. This chapter examines the park's initiators, the existing cross‐border
15 A comprehensive new series of 6 edited books incorporating 150 case studies called Post‐Conflict Peacebuilding and Natural Resource Management published recently substantially advances the research. However, the books do not focus on nature conservation in the way this work does. The partnering institutes for this series are: The Environmental Law institute, UNEP, The University of Tokyo and McGill University. See for example: (Unruh and Williams, 2013). For more about this field development please see: (Jensen, 2013). See also: www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org 9
relations, the main purpose of the park (nature preservation, tourism, scientific cooperation, population encounters), the borders and sovereignty status, and the relevant international linkages. Finally the chapter begins a discussion (developed fully later in Chapter 6) on three axes: the Environmental Peacemaking literature, the individual and institutional agents involved in the peace park initiatives, and the issue of borders and sovereignty. The chapter concludes with a chart assembling most of the parks’ features, which provides a visual comparison and permits a comprehensive overview.
Chapter Four, Sinai Nature Conservation Advocacy (1977‐1983), focuses on the efforts to advocate nature conservation at the Sinai Peninsula during the periods of peace negotiation, affirmation and execution between Israel and‐Egypt. As part of these efforts a peace park proposal was put forward by Israeli environmentalists and was transferred to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Egyptian President Sadat. The chapter begins with a background on Sinai’s geography, environment and history with emphasis on nature conservation institutions and the ramifications of the peace process to them and to the area. The main part of the chapter unfolds the story of Israeli conservationists that were living and working in Sinai during the Israeli occupation and their advocacy actions for Sinai's conservation. It is separated into two phases: the "cautious‐optimistic phase" 1978‐1981, when hope for direct relations between Israel and Egypt’s environmental communities existed (during which a peace park was proposed), and the "disillusionment phase" 1982‐1983, which is characterized by a shift towards promoting indirect actions mediated by international agents. The developments in Egypt's environmentalism are demonstrated throughout this chapter. The chapter concludes with an analysis and a discussion, using the Advocacy Network and the Environmental Imaginaries theories in addition to the Environmental Peacemaking writings. While this chapter seems to divert from the work’s main focus on peace parks, it does, in fact, complement the overall delineation of the peace and environment nexus as those manifested during the early days of the Israeli Egyptian peace process. Moreover, it enhances the ability to understand the theory at large as it focuses on several characteristics such as the individual, state and international levels that were part of this history. Moreover, since this case study is chronologically the first 10
among the other peace park initiatives and its beginning is rooted in a very optimistic era, when peace was presented as a viable concept in the region, it also provided us with a nuanced understandings on the transition period between conflict and peace times or the very early phases of post‐conflict period.
Chapter Five, A Peace Park on the Golan Heights – An Avenue for Peacemaking?, addresses a sequence of proposals for establishing a peace park in the Golan Heights. The chapter begins with the geographic and the environmental backgrounds of the area and with a historic description of the political conflict and past peace negotiations. Next, it uncovers and describes the history and the development of the Golan Heights Peace Park proposals. The discussion outlines the advantages and drawbacks of establishing a peace park to each of the States involved and their environment, the networks and professionals involved, the environmental discourse and its potential political power, and a peace park's potential contribution to peacemaking and peacebuilding processes.
Chapter six discusses the different themes raised in previous chapters, provides a holistic and complete overview and concludes the study.
1.7. Overview of Overarching Main Findings
The work presents three main comprehensive and overarching findings.
First, given that there is almost no successful model of a peace park in the region, the recurring manifestation of proposals for such parks grants them considerable power as a model for future cross‐border forms of interaction. Such a model can assist in promoting and catalyzing a positive cross‐border political process and in shifting the environmental discourse towards a regional one. This research also finds that the repeated efforts for establishing peace parks were not necessarily idiosyncratic occurrences, but at times were local manifestations of a larger phenomenon influenced by global trends related to nature conservation, de‐bordering (in certain years) and globalization.
11
Second, this work provides supporting evidence and four theoretical modifications to the Environmental Peacemaking writings: First of all, the work supports the assumption that the environment can create a platform for cross‐border dialogue. While the literature stresses the need for both civil and governmental participation in order for those platforms to succeed, this work argues that governmental participation is more crucial. Furthermore, the work questions the effectiveness of such platforms in overcoming political turmoil. Secondly, the research reinforces and further develops the environmentalists' (i.e. various professionals dealing with nature conservation, environmental policy, management and planning) potential role as peacemakers. Thirdly, it reinforces the prevailing assumption that joint environmental threats motivate opposing sides to cooperate more than positive environmental opportunities do. But, it also shows how unshared threats could drive cooperation as well. And lastly, the work reinforces the claim that the post‐conflict period is suitable for promoting cross‐border initiatives. The findings also emphasize the very early phases of the post conflict period as the most potent for influencing peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts.
The third finding focuses on the way the environment is conceptualized regionally and its potential political power. Environmental management in the region had developed substantially during the Israeli‐Arab peace process period, by pertaining to global processes of enhanced environmentalism. This development was proliferated through the many creative cross‐border ideas, among which were peace parks. Those manifestations testify to a general inclination (or to the very least, an Israeli inclination) to grant the environment, albeit instrumentally, power as a locus of cross‐border collaboration. This instrumentalism (using the environment as a basis to achieve other political purposes, such as cross‐border ones) is debated in the work. During this debate the way the environment is perceived by Israeli environmentalists, policy makers and the general public is illuminated. In addition, reference is made to the ways the concepts of environmental and national imagination, memory, commemoration and nostalgia are merged these processes. The theoretical novelty herein lies in the realization of the assigned political power (by policymakers and negotiators) to the place the environment holds in people’s minds, i.e., the decision makers’ de‐facto 12
recognition of the public's environmental views as a potentially political driving force, one which may eventually contribute to peacemaking and peacebuilding. The research also illustrates the weaknesses of the environmental sphere (managed by different entities, ministries and organizations), in which numerous concrete creative cross‐ border ideas vanished completely when confronted with conflictual political reality.
2. Chapter 2: Literature and Theory Review
This chapter sets the theoretical framework of the dissertation. It is primarily based on the Environmental Peacemaking literature and reviews the literature's development as well as its underlying premises. The chapter opens with a short review of the mutual evolution of theories and practices, mainly by international agencies that deal jointly with peace and environment. This short descriptive background is needed since developments in the conceptualization of environment, security and peace have partially evolved in parallel to on‐the‐ground local processes (e.g., peace park proposals). Further, this chapter discusses the development of the "environmental peacemaking" theory and its premises. Next, the chapter discusses the peace park concept, its historic development, its consolidation among policy makers and funding agencies and its performance. The chapter ends with a short description of three distinctive peace park initiatives from around the world, those demonstrate important factors that will be discussed later in regards to the local case studies.
One terminology clarification should be made. "Environmental peacebuilding" and "environmental peacemaking" are sometimes used interchangeably and are not absolutely defined terms in the field of inquiry.16 For example, the Environmental Peacemaking theory incorporates both peacemaking and peacebuilding practices.17;18 This study will rely on the
16 Another differentiation should be made between a political conflict with environmental drivers, which can be utilized towards environmental peacebuilding or peacemaking processes. And "environmental conflict resolution" process which deals with conflicts caused by environmental factors that are solved by mutual management of natural resources and are mostly aimed at problem solving rather than cross‐border cooperation and peace. For elaboration on this matter see: (Harari, 2007). 17 Several overlapping, interchangeable and not always distinguishable terms exist: environmental peacemaking, environmental peacebuilding, ecological peacemaking, environmental peacekeeping, ecological conflict resolution, and more. Though unintended, one of the environmental perspectives that correspond with the environment and peace theories is bioregionalism, the realization that ecological management must 13
definition used by the UN for peacebuilding and peacemaking.19 "Environmental Peacemaking" is defined as the diplomatic process (including negotiations, treaties, agreements between policy makers) of brokering an end to a conflict, principally by promoting environmental cooperation and using environmental components in stirring towards such agreement. "Environmental Peacebuilding" is defined as the processes of creating ties between former enemies by utilizing environmental measures that promote joint environmental cooperation or the processes of using environmental components in moving towards a sustainable peace. Either process will help, in turn, to advance more sustainable and peaceful relationships between opposing sides. Throughout this work, when quoting or citing sources, terminology would be used as in the original work.
2.1. Environment and Peace – Revealing the Multidirectional Nexus
In the last two decades a substantive international interest and a concurrent body of writing examining the nexus of environment, international security, violent conflicts and peace have emerged. Research has mostly focused around clarifying the multi‐dimensional and complex negative linkages between the environment and conflicts (Weinthal, 2006; UNEP, 2009). Unsurprisingly, conflicts and wars have many environmental impacts (Homer‐Dixon, 2001; OECD, 2005; BICC and Global Monitoring for Security and Stability, 2007; Dabelko, 2008). While the minority of environmental damages that are caused by conflicts are deliberate, aim to demoralize local populations or subdue resistance,20 the majority are collateral of direct or indirect actions.21 Alongside the physical and apparent environmental damages,
be defined by natural delineations such as watersheds and biomes rather than by national or other borders. In this regard, numerous joint environmental commissions between countries and jurisdictions have taken root all over the world for more see: (Khagram and Ali, 2006). 18 This unclarity of terminology exists not only among academics but also among practitioners:"When I use the terminology “environmental peacebuilding” in the halls of the World Bank, people kind of tilt their heads and wonder exactly what that means operationally in implementing projects. As we look at definitional issues, it’s important to explain what that means in terms of field work and how to come up with definitions that translate into the nomenclature of different organizations" (Sandra Ruckstuhl in: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Fetzer Institute, 2011, 65). 19 See above in footnote number 8. 20 Such as polluted wells, crops torched, forests cut down etc. 21 The six principal pathways for direct environmental damage that have been identified are as follows: Toxic hazards from the bombardment of industrial sites and urban infrastructure, A legacy of weapons, landmines, 14
the disruption of state and civil institutions and mechanisms dealing with environmental management and policy coordination contribute to and exacerbate those damages (Conca and Wallace, 2009; UNEP, 2009).22 Environmental issues feed into conflict in different environmental situations (such as in scarcity or in abundance of resources) in three principal ways: the environmental situation can contribute to the outbreak of conflicts, environmental resources can finance and fuel ongoing conflicts and they can also undermine peacemaking. However, preventing the grave environmental effects of conflict on the one hand and the negative ways the environment can feed into conflicts on the other hand, are not the only reasons to incorporate environmental considerations into peacebuilding initiatives. Several international reports have pointed out the need to protect the environment in every phase of conflicts and emphasized that environmental issues can play a positive role in conflict resolution processes (UNEP, 2009; Vasilijević and Pezold, 2011; United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, 2012). Over time, consensus has grown among policymakers and practitioners that "Integrating environment and natural resources into peacebuilding is no longer an option – it is a security imperative" (UNEP, 2009). This notion, that the environment can play a critical role in the stability of international relations and can contribute to achieving security, promoting conflict resolution and paving the path to peace, was also reflected in recent Nobel Peace Prize laureates.23 However, though the positive connection between environmental cooperation, conflict resolution and peacemaking has become more widely acknowledged,24 not enough is known about the optimal conditions for environmental initiatives to take place and to best contribute to conflict prevention, transformation, resolution and
unexploded ordnance, and depleted uranium munitions, human displacement; The use of extractive industries to fund conflict, the loss of water supply, sanitation, and waste disposal infrastructure, directly targeting natural resources, particularly as part of “scorched‐earth” military tactics (Jensen and Lonergan, 2012). 22 Indirect impacts are caused by the disruption of normal socio‐economic patterns, which might entail the liquidation of natural assets for immediate survival income, or the overuse of marginal areas, which can lead to long‐term environmental damage (for example due to internal displacement or migration. Conflicts cause a disruption in various mechanisms of policy coordination, which in turn creates space for poor management, lack of investment, illegality, and the collapse of positive environmental practices (UNEP, 2009). 23 In recent years two Nobel Peace Prize laureates were granted for environmental activities. In 2004 Wangari Maathai, founder of the Green Belt Movement, was awarded the prize. This movement empowers communities worldwide to protect the environment and to promote good governance and a culture of peace. In 2008, a second Nobel prize was awarded to Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for their efforts in promoting awareness of global warming as contributing to world peace. 24 (Conca and Dabelko, 2002; Ali, 2005; Carius, 2006; Akçalı and Antonsich, 2009; Conca and Wallace, 2009; Wehr, 2011). 15
peacebuilding. Similarly, not enough is known about the circumstances that lead environmental cooperation to develop into broader forms of political cooperation and to generate a social and political dialogue extending beyond environmental issues (Carius, 2006).
The next section will present these conceptual developments and the way they have influenced international environment and security institutions.
2.1.1. Changing Practices: Incorporating "the Environment" into Security Institutions and "Peace and Conflict" Issues into Environmental Institutions
At the end of the 1980s, with Perestroika and the fall of the Soviet Union, two fundamental changes occurred in the way scholars and the international community understood peace and security. First, the concept of security was no longer narrowly conceived in terms of military threats, but rather as incorporating new terms and concepts such as food security, social stability, environmental security and more.25 Second, while political and military issues were still critically important, economic and social threats including poverty, infectious diseases, resource depletion and environmental degradation, were beginning to be seen as significant factors affecting national security (UNEP, 2009). These changes were reflected in the sustainable development discourse which emerged in those years. The 1987 Our Common Future report26 recognized the difficulty of promoting conservation efforts and the way these are halted by the political levels, it also highlighted the interconnectivity of humans, the natural environment and national security (Stefanick, 2009). The report called for fundamentally broadening security definitions to accommodate environmental threats (Dabelko, 2008). However, the following UN conference on Environment and Development
25 One of the earliest examples of this shift was the "Murmansk Initiative", launched by Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1987, in the wake of the Chernobyl accident. The initiative proposed "ecological security" as a top global priority for both bilateral relationships and international institutions (Dabelko, 2008). For elaboration please see D. Scrivener, Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1989) for a discussion of Gorbachev's 1987 Murmansk Initiatives and the Western response. 26 The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development was one of the first substantial international reports that explored ways to address the global ecological state: Our Common Future, 20 March 1987. http://www.un‐documents.net/wced‐ocf.htm 16
(Rio de Janeiro, 1992) did not create a substantial change to the definitions of security. The "Environment, Peace and Security" chapter in the conference’s proceedings did not receive extensive reference and the dialogue over the environment as connected to security issues was not significantly embraced as an arena for international cooperation. Nevertheless, Our Common Future's focus on environment and conflict provided a legitimizing foundation for scholarly and policy interest that produced a solid corpus of analytical work in the following 20 years.27,28
One theoretical development that followed was the "Environmental Security" theory. The theory addresses threats in an increasingly interdependent and environmentally‐degraded post Cold War world. It is predictably policy‐oriented, building itself case‐by‐case with a “Realist” view of security, and is centered on whether and why environmental scarcity, abundance, or dependence might cause militarized conflicts (Khagram and Ali, 2006). Prof. Homer‐Dixon led a major wave of empirical studies, establishing a systematic link between scarcity of renewable natural resources and regional violence.29 Two of the study's main empirical findings were that only under very special circumstances is the environment the solely cause for violent conflicts (Homer‐Dixon, 2001); and that environmental scarcity can contribute, trigger or accelerate violent conflict, primarily in the form of a civil war, insurgency or inner‐state conflicts (Tänzler, Dabelko et al., 2004; Khagram and Ali, 2006).
The Environmental Security theory quickly gained popularity and the idea that conservation measures may reduce the likelihood of violent conflict was widely accepted among the global environmental community. An example can be seen in the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) official adoption of “environmental security” as part of its 2000 annual agenda (Matthew and Gaulin, 2002). Similarly, security agencies and governing bodies had also embraced the theory's basic assumptions. Two examples are the Clinton administration, which created several offices to address environment and security concerns
27 For a specified list of bibliographic items please see reference no. 16 in (Dabelko, 2008). 28 Although the plethora of research continues until today, the reaction to the September 11 attacks set back efforts to address environment and security linkages at the global level (Dabelko, 2008). 29 For more see Homer‐Dixon's research projects: The Project on Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity, and Civil Violence at: http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/state.htm and The Project on Environment, Population, and Security at: http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps.htm 17
(Homer‐Dixon, 1995), and the CIA that declared that adding an environmental dimension to their traditional analysis would enhance their operational abilities (Deutch, 1996).30
International institutes dealing with security (such as the UN, the World Bank and even aid agencies) usually regarded the environment as a realm to be addressed in the post‐conflict and reconstruction phase, as a tool for rehabilitation and reconciliation between former enemies (Bitterman, Lopez et al., 2007; UNEP, 2009). However, even in post‐conflict situations, environmental considerations were not effectively integrated into peacebuilding interventions and typically other humanitarian, economic and political needs31 were prioritized (Conca and Wallace, 2009; UNEP, 2009). Similarly, traditional peace agreements have also failed to recognize the role of unconventional factors (such as welfare, environment, and economic growth) in fostering a meaningful and sustainable peace. This tendency is reinforced conjointly with policymakers and scholars traditional perceptions, viewing those issues as "low politics" (i.e. possessing little impact on national security issues) and underestimating the potential of environmental cooperation in fostering peace (Weinthal, 2006; Dajani, 2011).
Gradually, however, changes did take place. The UN has been executing more preventive steps over environmental conflicts and has addressed environmental aspects of international political conflicts. With time other international development and environmental agencies realized the merits of using the environment as an arena for cross‐ border cooperation. Various organizations and departments that were focused on the environment‐conflict‐peace nexus were established. The leading organizations are the Post‐ Conflict and Disaster Management Branch of UNEP, Greening the Blue initiative in UN peacekeeping operations (DPKO), environmental branches in UNDP and the World Bank, the Environment and Security Initiative32 (ENVSEC), NATO, the Organization for Security and
30 Of note is the popular catch‐phrase "environmental security", sometimes used differently from the above mentioned theoretical meaning, to encompass everything from oil exploration to pollution controls to corn subsidies (Dabelko, 2008). 31 For example demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, supporting elections, restoring order and rule of law as well as opening the economy to foreign investments. 32 ENVSEC is a partnership of the Organization for Security and Co‐operation in Europe (OSCE), Regional Environment Centre for Central and Eastern Europe (REC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 18
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and more. Furthermore, peacebuilding practitioners began utilizing these new environmental pathways to achieve cooperation between affected parties in post‐conflict settings.
2.1.2. From Environmental Security to Environmental Peacemaking
The Environmental Security theory primarily placed the environment as a cause for violence and war, thus associating the environment more intimately with conflict rather than with cooperation (Weinthal, 2006). Gradually, those studies were refined into a more nuanced and qualified direction, which tended to promote a multi‐causal, multi‐level and multi‐actor perspective in which the environmental factors were positioned into broader and more complex frameworks (Frerks, 2007). These frameworks were combined with other social and political variables (such as poverty, inequality, the political situation, state institution functionality). With regards to the feasibility of peace, the Environmental Security literature highlights two key aspects that might decrease the likelihood of conflict (i.e. conflict prevention): reducing the pressure on resources on which people are economically dependent and strengthening the institutional capacities to respond to ecological challenges. In other words, efforts to improve environmental conditions and prevent ecologically‐induced conflicts (regardless of political cooperation), are in themselves a means of addressing the source of conflict and decreasing the possibility of violence.
With time, a need for a conceptual framework that could provide a role for the environment in all stages of conflict, not only as a potential trigger or as a post‐conflict "low politics" factor, increased. This need was met by the introduction of the "Environmental Peacemaking" theory (Conca and Dabelko, 2002). The theory challenged the paradigm of environmental security and suggested a transformation of the concept from the traditional competitive approach to a more relational approach of collaborative environmental problem‐solving: "Our starting point is to stand the core premise of ecological (in)security on its head: Rather than asking whether environmental degradation can trigger broader forms of intergroup violent conflict, we ask whether environmental cooperation can
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 19
trigger broader forms of peace" (Conca and Dabelko, 2002, , p.9). Conca and Dabelko wanted to find whether environmental cooperation could be an effective catalyst in reducing tensions and in generating movement towards peace. Several inherent characteristics of nature and of environmental management shape the foundations of Environmental Peacemaking theory. They are portrayed as important for the enhancement of environmental cooperation which, in turn, can transform and appease conflict situations and thus might be used for peacebuilding:
Primarily, nature’s disregard for political boundaries set the basic rationale for the need to cooperate across borders and to jointly manage, at the very least, shared problems.33 In other words, conflicting parties’ environmental interdependence can serve as an incentive to communicate across contested borders and to develop shared interests and agendas.
Second, environmental management usually requires a long‐term perspective and long‐ term cooperation to reach a solution. Therefore, it can be used as a way to shift the frame of reference from a series of disconnected short‐term interactions to a process which "lengthen(s) the shadow of the future" against which certain bargaining processes take place (Conca, 2001; Reisinger, 2007). Such a prolonged cross‐border dialogue could be nurtured to become a stable pillar in the cross‐border relations. Potentially, a platform of dialogue can be gradually created among participants in order to alter insecurities, distrust, suspicion and divergent interests with mutually recognized rights and expectations, a shared knowledge base and common goals.
Third, management of environmental issues can lead to and can enhance local and nongovernmental participation as well as to extend community building beyond polarizing economic linkages (Conca, Carius et al., 2005). Accordingly, environmental issues may be a stimulant for non‐political cooperation between scientists, environmentalists and negotiators from different organizations, regions and countries thereby fostering bilateral or multi‐national collaboration.
33 As an illustration please see an explanation on ecosystem and landscape corridors (linking various ecosystems) management that recognizes the complexity of a particular habitat and takes a holistic view from the vantage point of an entire landscape (while including multiple stakeholders). In: (Stefanick, 2009). 20
Fourth, environmental management is multidisciplinary by nature in that it calls for the involvement of professionals from various disciplines such as ecology, planning, health, infrastructure, and others. Therefore, leakage and expansion effects might occur when environmentally‐based cross‐border dialogue takes place.
Fifth, environmental issues constitute both “high” and “low” politics34. Normally, ecological issues do not threaten the most contentious issues in the relationship between states, and thus may potentially provide a safe first step for dialogue. Such a dialogue might evolve and contain, with time, both "low" political issues (e.g. birds migration, rehabilitation of rivers) as well as "high" political issues (e.g. water, land), with the first serving as an easier and less contagious or polarized discussion which eventually develops the platform to also include the more complicated issues of environmental politics (Ali, 2007).
Sixth, the individuals working on environmental issues are in many cases inherently drawn towards transboundary and global perspectives (Schoenfeld, 2013). In the past, these perspectives brought longstanding and organic linkages between peace movements and environmental movements around the world (Matthew and Gaulin, 2002). Consequently, environmentalists, planners and scientists were, and are, at times, unofficially ascribed with the role of peacemakers (Ali, 2003; Raak, 2009). Ali (2003) emphasizes that environmental planners in particular "may indeed play a more active role in resolving the overall conflict by bringing to bear their expertise in both the natural and social sciences and their unique position of convergent authority" (Ali, 2003, 171).
Finally, another important feature which does not characterize the environment per se but has to do with political psychology is mentioned in the Environmental Peacemaking writings. It is suggested that the act of seeking cooperative solutions to shared challenges (such as an environmental problems and threats) is psychologically easier for ex‐enemies or conflicting parties, when compared with proactively seeking positive ways to develop cooperation.
34 ”High politics” is usually referred to issues that are vital to the survival of a state such as national and international security; and “Low Politics“ is a concept that covers all matters that are not absolutely vital to the survival of the state (such as welfare, ecology, cultural life etc). Environmental issues while usually perceived as “low politics“ can be related to both. 21
Therefore, an environmental platform of dialogue created around such topics may act as a catalyst for influencing governments towards ending conflicts (Ali, 2007; Dabelko, 2008). On top of that, other parameters relate to conflict resolution in general regardless of environmental issues have also an influential part such as the asymmetry between the sides, a proximity to the state’s center vs. a peripherally location, different law systems etc.
2.1.3. Environmental Pathways to Peace Building on the dynamics of environmental interdependence and the various characteristics specified above, four distinct environmental pathways to peace and confidence‐building are found (see graph no.1). They run along a conflict‐peace continuum that begins in conflict prevention via conflict management, to post‐conflict reconciliation (Conca, Carius et al., 2005; Carius, 2006; Dabelko, 2006). The pathways are described below.
Preventing Conflict. The environment can play a role in preventing conflict that erupts due to the uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources, the destruction of ecosystems, or the devastation of livelihoods based on natural resources. As mentioned above, safeguarding vital resources (by reducing the pressure on them) and strengthening response capacities are the main ways to do so (Carius, 2006). In this pathway, the parties are not necessarily engaged in direct conflict, but their bilateral or multilateral relationships may be tense. Good and sustainable environmental management can undercut the grievances that exacerbate tensions and can constitute a peacemaking strategy (Dabelko, 2006). An example is the Nile River.35 Many researchers were alarmed that the Nile River basin is likely to experience harsh conflict and water wars, given the widespread populations' dependence on its waters. Since the end of the 1990's, the basin’s riparian states have convened the ministerial‐level Nile Basin Initiative to develop a shared vision of sustainable use of those waters. This initiative is a multilevel international initiative that centers on projects of environment, energy, water, agriculture and more. The initiative, not without problems (and while not pertaining to claim that in itself will prevent conflict), is meant to foster trust and
35 Ten countries share the Nile River basin, the world’s longest river: Burundi, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 22
encourage investment and implicitly serves as a mean to prevent conflict predicated on environmental interdependence (Kristin, 2001; Kameri‐Mbote, 2007; Dabelko, 2008).36
A Lifeline during Conflict. During active conflict, lines of communication between the sides are often scarce. Environmental issues can be a productive avenue for dialogue and a lifeline that allows the parties to maintain a consistent channel of communication. When an environmental topic is considered “low politics”, it can serve as a safe area for dialogue. On the other hand, when it is a critical issue that is considered “high politics”, it can be grasped as too important (in the sense of being critical) to fight over, and thus in a different way, promotes a dialogue. In the case of water resources, some examples demonstrate persistent cooperation even in the face of bitter conflict. An well cited example is the case of the Israeli‐Jordanian water dialogue (sometimes referred to as "the picnic table talks") that went on for decades (starting in 1953). Even though the two countries were de‐jure at war between 1948 and 1994, water management representatives from Israel and Jordan met regularly to discuss water issues concerning the two riparian countries. Those meetings served as an unofficial channel for dialogue and for delivering other important messages between the two countries (Wolf, Kramer et al., 2006).
A Role in Peacemaking and Ending Conflict. Innovative environmental management structures and initiatives can sometimes help parties in conflict to find solutions to other (not necessarily environmental) causes of conflict, such as disputed borders. Examples are the Peru‐Ecuador Cordillera del Condor peace park (elaborated below) and the Golan Heights peace park proposals (chapter 5). Both cases show how environmental topics that were conceptualized at the core of peace agreements (but not necessarily at the core of the conflict) enabled (or meant to enable) the materialization of the overall agreement and played an essential part in it.
A Role in Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace. A sustainable and comprehensively environmental management plan is a prerequisite for a lasting peace. Thus, a need to
36 For more see Nile Basin Initiative at www.nilebasin.org
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address environmental issues in post‐conflict recovery phases is critical (Dabelko, 2006). As they offer a key avenue for dialogue and confidence building (as specified above), natural resources are important tools to revitalize post‐conflict development, especially where peace has officially taken hold and relations remain unsettled. Obviously, effective natural resources management could support economic recovery and durable peace, which fundamentally hinges on the development of sustainable livelihoods. On the other hand, poor management of these resources could create new tensions that might speed up the relapse into conflict. In a less proactive way, and by employing a preventive role (against relapse into conflict), there is a need to ensure that environmental and natural resource issues are not treated in isolation and are successfully integrated across a range of peacebuilding activities. Environmental drivers and environmental impacts of a conflict are managed so that tensions are defused, and that natural assets are used sustainably to support stability and development in the long run.
Moreover, sometimes a newly formed peace could have negative outcomes on the environment. In post‐conflict settings (or early peace times) political horizons tend to be short; a preference for short‐term objectives, which are usually harmful for the environment, prevails; and the will for rapid revenues that can help in rehabilitating and stabilizing fragile economies rules (Bruch, 2009). Therefore, a greater need for the protection of nature against destructive development arises. But, in such periods of post war settings government capacity tends to be especially weak, contributing to the malfunction of environmental management (Bruch, Jensen et al., 2008; UNEP, 2010). The peace and environment nexus is depicted in the following graphic. While it is possible to create one element representing “the environment” and draw all the positive and negative lines through it, in this graph they are separated into three different dimensions to better represent some of the connections which appear in theory and more importantly in this work. For a more thorough graphic elaboration please see appendix 1.
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Figure. 1: Environment, Peace and Conflict Interconnectivity 1. Prevention of conflict and of relapse into conflict 2. Lifeline during conflict 3. Peacemaking and ending conflict 4. Peacebuilding and making peace sustainable
In addition to these four pathways the Environmental Peacemaking writings attempt to identify conditions in which the environment would better lead to a political transformation. Conca and Dabelko (2002) argue that seeking peace requires a set of social transformations related both to people's material livelihoods (altering violence and inequality) and to their identity‐based associations (building new identities that are not defined by territorial boundaries). In that way, peace would be a shared collective identity within which violent conflicts become inconceivable. Therefore, a transformation of the definition of "national security" is needed in order to achieve peace. Conca and Dabelko (2002) identify different mechanisms through which environmental peacemaking might occur and developed a two‐ fold pathway towards it. The first, "changing the strategic climate", concentrates on potential improvements in the contractual environment of intergovernmental bargaining by dealing with the immediate problems of mistrust, uncertainty, suspicion, divergent interests, and short‐time horizons that typically accompany conflict situations. Accordingly, minimum levels of trust,
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transparency and cooperative gain among governments must be created. The premise of environmental peacemaking would be to alter these dynamics by utilizing environmental problems and challenges as opportunities for bringing conflicting parties to cooperatively reach a solution (Conca and Dabelko, 2002, 11). The second is "strengthening post‐ Westphalian governance". The focus needs to turn from the dynamics of interstate bargaining into broader patterns of trans‐societal relations, while emphasizing ecological interdependence to deepen cooperation. Transnational coalitions are encouraged as a way to promote new forms of environmental responsibility and peaceful dispute resolution and as a way to alter security‐minded state institutions (Conca and Dabelko, 2002). These two pathways are seen in the peace park examples from around the world (described below), in some of the peace park initiatives along Israeli‐Arab borders and in the Sinai's conservation advocacy case study. This work will discuss the significance of accomplishing changes via these two pathways, the balance between them and the different importance given to them in the Middle Eastern reality.
It needs to be mentioned that in some cases of environmental peacemaking or peacebuilding the declared goal of "peace" is left unstated in order to be able to capitalize on the environment’s cooperation‐inducing characteristics. If explicitly declared as conflict prevention or resolution efforts, processes can be overwhelmed by more contentious issues central to the conflict (Dabelko, 2006). For example, representatives from the security sector, rather than merely from development, environment, health, or energy sectors, are sometimes forced into the discussion if an issue related to "the conflict" is declared to be part of it. On the other hand, if environmental issues are conceived as non‐politicized, they can provide a non‐threatening avenue for dialogue (Dabelko, 2006).
2.2. Peace Parks Environmental peacemaking and peacebuilding concepts are implemented in a range of activities in which natural resources are managed in a calculated way that assumes cooperation as one of its underlying premises. Those contribute to conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and recovery. One concrete model for implementing these concepts is the peace park.
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2.2.1. Definition
Peace parks are first and foremost based on the concept of a Transboundary Protected Area (TBPA). Defined by the IUCN, TBPA is a protected area that spans boundaries of multiple countries, where the political borders that are enclosed within its area are abolished. This includes removal of all forms of physical boundaries, allowing free movement of people and animals within a designated area. A boundary around the area may, however, be maintained to prevent unauthorized border crossing (Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001). The area's constituent parts are managed cooperatively and are dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and natural and cultural resources. A formal IUCN typology37 defines five types of TBPAs: two or more contiguous protected areas across national boundaries; a cluster of protected areas and the intervening land; a cluster of separated protected areas without intervening land; a trans‐border protected area that includes a proposed area for a future park (a transitional stage); a protected area in one country aided by sympathetic land‐use over the border (Global Transboundary Conservation Network, 2011) .
Peace parks are defined more broadly than TBPA and have additional political objectives: "transboundary protected areas that are formally dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity and of natural and associated cultural resources, and to the promotion of peace and cooperation" (IUCN).38 Peace parks are designed to encourage regulated tourism, sustainable development, and goodwill between all neighboring countries. They can play a significant role in defusing political tension and promoting regional security, economic development and stability in the associated eco‐regions (Peace Parks Foundation, website).
Peace parks can be a part of different processes: a cross‐border effort to reconcile a dispute over natural resources, or a trial for a political reconciliation through joint conservation
37 As defined by The TBPA Network, under the auspices of the IUCN and UNEP developed at a workshop organized jointly by IUCN, the World Conservation Union, and the International Tropical Timber Organization in Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand in February 2003. 38 The IUCN played an important role in moving the concept of peace parks forward and established a task force within the World Commission on Protected Areas for this purpose. In 2001 the task force prepared a monograph, which suggested that such TBPA will be used for peace and cooperation, giving a renewed connotation to the term "peace park." 27
efforts. In that way, peace parks can become in themselves catalysts for peace (Clayton, 2004). There are different types of peace parks; some focus on nature conservation, some support various needs of the local population, whereas others use a cooperative process that is focused on a natural resource to respond to bilateral or multilateral goals.
The terminology related to peace parks and TBPAs varies. Wolmer (2003) asserts that: “in the emerging literature, much is made of the subtle differences between Peace Parks, Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs), and Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM), but in essence, these all refer to situations where conservation initiatives straddle national boundaries” (Wolmer, 2003). Barquet et al. (2010) also remark that, "The labels of this type of conservation may vary between TBPA, which is used by the International Union for Conservation of Nature [IUCN]; Transfrontier Park, Transfrontier Conservation Area or Transfrontier Natural Resource Management, as known in southern Africa; or Peace Parks, which is the label that many recent transboundary conservation initiatives have adopted" (Barquet et. al, 2010, 4). Ironically, as mentioned above, sometimes the peace terminology is deliberately neglected from a park's title, even if this definition does apply to its conduct. Institutions may prefer to avoid the politicized nature of the “peace park” term and choose to focus more on current conservation efforts rather than the area's historical conflict (Dabelko, 2006; Darnell, 2010). An example is the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park that while is defined and serves as a "peace park", purposely omits the word peace from its title.
In this work "Peace Park" will adhere to the abovementioned definition which combines the processes of nature conservation and peacemaking39. However, the broad spatial typology of and the de‐facto flexibility in TBPA and peace park definitions will serve the author of this work to justify an inclusion of several peace park proposals along Israeli‐Arab borders that do not necessarily fall under the formal definition of peace parks. Around the world, as in Israel, small tracts of land hosting a monument to commemorate a lasting peace or other
39 This work uses the term peace park and uses other terms interchangeably according to the original cited source. 28
memorial sites, are sometimes called peace gardens40 or "peace parks" (Yaar/Hurshat‐ha‐ Shalom in Hebrew). One of the more famous examples for such a park is the Hiroshima Memorial Peace Park in Japan. Gough (2000) claims that the generic label "peace landscape" is often applied unthinkingly to very different symbolic and political spaces (he provides as examples, two parallel inaugurated peace spaces: a nature reserve in the West Bank and Lady Diana memorial garden (Gough, 2000)). In Israel, mainly along the Israeli‐Egyptian border, several small groves are named "peace parks", commemorating the peace between the two countries. These types of parks/gardens are not included in this research as they don't strive to promote nature conservation along with cross‐border cooperation.
Since a peace park is a par excellence border construct, some discussion on borders is needed. Political borders function as physical and psychological barriers for interactions between neighboring countries and assist governments to control the movement of people, goods, services, social and economic processes between countries (Gelbman, 2008; Gupta and Dada, 2011). Borders,41 which are politically contested constructs, are the result of the past history of a state, its power struggles and can be subjected to ongoing political changes. The nature of borders, either in their traditional role as barriers or as bridges and loci for cross‐border encounters,42 is flexible and can undergo changes in different political settings. Since the fall of the Soviet Union (with some setbacks after 9/11 that brought a refocused attention to rigidly controlled borders) borders are becoming more flexible and permeable and less significant as physical barriers (Newman, 2012).43 This directional change coincides with this work's explored path wherein a rigid boundary transforms, or is challenged to be transformed, into a "frontier" where formerly‐divided groups of people can
40 Peace garden in a designated public space that is planted, decorated and dedicated to the promotion of peace. Most peace gardens are tiny in scale (in comparison to TBPA) and reflective in their nature (Gough, 2000). 41 Although many terms exist, the term "boundary" has become more common when referring to the line of the physical contact between states, while "frontier" or "border region" are used regularly to refer to the zone on either side of the boundary (Wolf, 1996). 42 Since the beginning of the 1990's borders as places for interaction were extensively researched. Please see: (Newman, 1996; Newman, 1997; Newman, 2002; Lin, 2005; Newman, 2006; Newman, 2006; Zimmerer, 2006; Taylor, 2008; Arieli, 2012). 43 As part of the growth in processes of economic globalization and information cyberspace that created new forms of territorial organization and virtual communities, the traditional security discourse has also been challenged (especially as the increased use of long‐range ballistic missiles which strike at the heart of a country's population centre have rendered many of the traditional defensive functions of a land boundary meaningless) (Newman, 1997). 29
interact. Peace parks are in essence a cross‐border formation that simultaneously refer to a given border and challenge its existence by aspiring to eliminate its physical manifestation. The way the peace park concept has developed, globally spread and accepted is tightly connected to the conceptualization of borders.
2.2.2. Historic Development and Consolidation of the Peace Park Concept
Founded in 1932, the Glacier‐Waterton International Peace Park united parklands in the United States and Canada. This first international peace park was established as a symbolic celebration of the peaceful relations between the countries and served to unite two protected areas.44 Since then, from the Balkans to the Korean demilitarized zone, transboundary regimen for managing parks and natural resources grew in popularity and are being utilized to foster cooperation between countries with a history of conflict all over the globe (Ali, 2007; Darnell, 2010). The concept of TBPA, affected by the post‐soviet era new conceptualization of borders and of security, has expanded rapidly since the end of the 1980s. In April 2007, the IUCN performed a global inventory of TBPAs45 and identified 227 TBPA complexes incorporating 3,043 protected areas or internationally designated sites, spanning over a total area of 4 million square kilometers (Besançon, Lysenko et al., 2007).46 Adjoining protected areas (that are divided by a political border, either with a physical boundary or without) are present along 113 countries worldwide, and in many cases even if not officially declared as a TBPA, cross‐border relations between conservation bodies exist
44 While this park is widely regarded as “the first peace park” prior to its establishment, other examples of cross‐border park/forest cooperation existed. Quinn writes that "The notion of peaceful and collaborative arrangements for protected areas that meet along jurisdictional boundaries has been with us for a long time. For example, before the end of the eighteenth century the King of France and the Prince‐Bishop of Basel negotiated a Treaty of Alliance to protect wildlife and managed forests along their shared border (Chester 2006). More formal arrangements between designated protected areas were enacted in the early twentieth century, for example, a framework for border park management between Poland and Czechosovakia in 1925 (Thorsell and Harrison 1990) leading to Pieniny International Landscape Park in 1932, the creation of Albert National Park spanning the colonial states of Ruanda‐Urundi and the Congo in 1925 (van der Linde et al. 2001)" in (Quinn, Broberg et al., 2012). 45 It was implemented by the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP‐WCMC). http://www.tbpa.net/tpa_inventory.html. The 2007 TBPA List incorporated both TBPAs that fit entirely into IUCN definition (confirmed international cooperative or sympathetic management through legal or other effective means) and internationally adjoining protected area (IAPA, following the Mittermeier et all., 2005) that may still require development of collaborative efforts or further formalizing of ongoing cooperation (Ibid). 46 The distribution of TBPA across the continents is (approximately): North America ‐ 32%, Central and South America – 30%, Europe – 4%, Africa – 20%, Asia – 12%. The exact figures can be found in the global inventory (see the link in the former footnote). 30
(Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001). Out of those defined TBPAs, 135 areas were classified as peace parks in 2005; which, as mentioned, consisted of several different types of TBPAs.47,48
The peace park concept, as a specific modified form of TBPA, has gained international support across time. In 1997, the IUCN's World Commission on Protected Area (WCPA) conference was convened "in the common conviction that transfrontier and transboundary conservation areas can be a vehicle for international cooperation, biodiversity conservation and economic development" (Declaration of Principles (WCPA) in: Phillips, 1997). The released declaration called on the international community to encourage states to promote these efforts in order to achieve greater peace and stability around the world. Since, the IUCN has promoted peace parks as a tool to enhance regional cooperation for biodiversity conservation, conflict prevention, resolution and reconciliation, and sustainable regional development (Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001). In the year 2000, as part of a movement that was gaining momentum, UNESCO's Man and Biosphere Program published recommendations for establishing and running Transboundary Biosphere Reserves49 as a preferred tool for cross‐border management of ecosystems (Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001, appendix 4). At present, practically all international conservation organizations embraced the TBPA/peace park concept and, consequently, their formation is being seriously considered in countries with ongoing disputes (Barquet et. al, 2010).
Alongside the protection of biodiversity, establishing peace parks demands the development of long‐term economic strategies that recognizes the value of the peacebuilding processes and of the environment in a sustainable way. Therefore, peace parks are also connected to the ongoing development discourses and are not exclusively discussed in conservation forums.50 Consequently, peace park initiatives have received
47 A geographic division of peace parks between the continents showed that: 5% are located in North America, 15% in central and South America, 33% in Europe, 25% in Africa and 15% in Asia (Kliot, 2003). 48 Two new and modified definitions exist for Transboundary Conservation and Development Areas and Transboundary Migratory Corridors. Those will not be part of this work. For more see (Vasilijević and Pezold, 2011). 49 While not a TBPA specifically, it shares many related underlying premises. 50 If carefully developed, peace parks have the potential to help countries meet one of the international community's current agenda: the United Nation's Millennium Development Goal number seven, addresses sustainable development and aspires to reduce the loss of biodiversity http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml 31
widespread support and funds not only from environmental and conservation agencies but also from development agencies such as: the UN, the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), KfW German, Development Bank, the French Development Agency and more (Darnell, 2010).51
Another source of support for transboundary conservation is its incorporation into international environmental treaties. Many countries that are in a conflict/post‐conflict period are also parties to international regimes and multilateral environmental agreements. Those environmental treaties could serve as yet another framework to foster and enhance collaboration between countries. One such treaty is the Convention on Biological Diversity, that includes transboundary conservation projects as part of its working programs (Ali, 2011b). In 2004, based on the recognition that ecological systems defy political boundaries, a decision was taken by the parties to the convention stated that: “The establishment and management of protected area systems in the context of the ecosystem approach should not simply be considered in national terms, but where the relevant ecosystem extends beyond national boundaries, in ecosystem or bioregional terms as well. This presents a strong argument for and adds complexity to the establishment of transboundary protected areas… beyond the limits of national jurisdiction… to establish and strengthen regional networks, Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs) and collaboration between neighboring protected areas across national boundaries, with a target to establish and strengthen… other forms of collaboration … and improving international cooperation.”52
Following the above mentioned changes, which support the peace park concept, conservation professionals aligned in a wide array of partnerships to promote this international conservation ambition (Ali, 2011b). Consequently, the international community has embraced the peace park concept not only as an abstract idea but also has backed it with functional frameworks and financial support.
51 See for example the long list of supporting funds of the Peace Park Foundation: www.peaceparks.org 52 UNCBD COP 7 Decision, Kuala Lumpur, 2004, pertaining to Protected Areas (Overall section II, point 8) as cited in: (Ali, 2011b). 32
2.2.3. Peace Parks Performance
The establishment of peace parks is challenging from both the environmental and political points of view. Analyses performed on specific case studies portray a generally optimistic picture of the role peace parks have in stabilizing relations, and particularly, in promoting ecological goals (Sheppard, 1999; Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001; Ali, 2007; Vasilijević and Pezold, 2011). The literature presents several characteristics for the successes of peace parks (some "manuals" were even produced to serve as examples (Phillips, 1997; Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001)) and stresses that success substantially depends on pursuing an integrated, coherent and sustainable approach to the protection of nature. From a social perspective the literature emphasizes that local inclusion and regional integration should be tackled simultaneously (Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001; Ali, 2007). The role of civil society groups and political parties is emphasized as essential for intensifying dialogues with local authorities and communities and for understanding the specific regional and national conditions for a park's successful materialization. For peace parks to fulfill their conflict‐ prevention and resolution potential, importance should be placed on integrating both local leadership and communities' needs into the overall process through a joint dialogue. Otherwise, a new set of local conflicts could arise (Tänzler, Dabelko et al., 2004; Vasilijević and Pezold, 2011).
The literature specifies many operational challenges related to cross‐border coordination: Unequal resources for conservation efforts that can cause tensions between both sides (Sandwith and Besancon 2010 in: Vasilijević and Pezold, 2011); Cultural and religious differences that might be exacerbated by language barriers; Different levels of economic development that can deepen by unequal and expensive costs of conservation across borders; Differences in the levels of professional standards between the protected areas can demotivate staff; and more. However, there is not enough comprehensive comparative research with regard to "peace performance" or the success of conflict prevention of peace parks (Ali, 2007; Stefanick, 2009; Barquet et. al, 2010). A comparative case evaluation and analysis by Ali (2011b) employed an ethnographic methodology and analyzed the peacebuilding potential of transboundary conservation projects (some were peace parks). It concluded that the donor community, the host governments and the international 33
organizations all had an important role in catalyzing lasting cooperation and that they should serve as mediators and provide diplomatic leverage. However, the efficacy of peace parks, according to Ali, is often limited by weak leadership of donors and host governments and by the need to resolve different issues before instituting conservation plans (micro conflicts, demarcating the area, access to the area and more) (Ali, 2011b). Another work that tried to assess the political role of TBPA (not specifically peace parks) in diffusion of conflicts (i.e., their "peace performance") was done by Barquet et al. (2010). This quantitative systematical research found no evidence that TBPAs are associated with more peaceful co‐existence between neighboring countries, at least not in short span of time. Nevertheless, since peaceful relations manifest in many different ways, the study concluded that "further systematic analyses on how environmental cooperation contributes to peace‐building are necessary, given that the role of transboundary conservation in conflict resolution is not clear cut" (Barquet et. al, 2010, 21). Additionally, contrary to their peaceful purpose, peace parks could also easily end up being catalysts for conflict. For example, when peace parks are established in economically disadvantaged regions in which communities rely on natural resources for their survival and livelihoods (and those are being declared for conservation) conflicts may arise. In addition, although peace parks can contribute to conflict prevention or resolution, they are not always the easiest answer for existing problems. For example, in some cases separate administrations for adjacent protected areas have proven more useful than joint ones (Tänzler, Dabelko et al., 2004). When cooperating across borders a mutual understanding of what is a "protected area" and specifics about its operation needs to be in place, as these types of understandings are set in relation to broader social, cultural and economic forces (Hammill & Besançon, 2007: 25). The concrete and real benefits of the transboundary cooperation need to be articulated in an understandable way in order for cooperation to succeed (Vasilijević and Pezold, 2011). It is important to mention other roles that protected areas have historically had in spurring national conflicts that might still be a source for conflict (Beinart and Hughes, 2007; Ali, 2011). Protected areas can symbolize legacies of imperial domination. In some African countries, for example, armed park guards have been used with the excuse of promoting conservation (Wilshusen et al., 2002 in: Barquet et. al, 2010). Therefore, some of these
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countries incorporated the term "Transfrontier Conservation Area" instead of "Protected Area" that may evoke emotions and memories of exclusion (Phillips, 1997).
The utility of cross‐border interactions, in the form of peace parks, to conflict and post‐ conflict border regions is far from being fully explored or answered in the literature. This work will show that in the Middle East conflict (which is, in part, officially in post‐conflict phases, but mostly and de‐facto an ongoing conflict situation), the peace park concept was (and might be in the future) appealing to policy and decision makers that were searching for ways to create a new arena for cross‐border interaction and regional development. Many categories that were discussed herein will be further expanded in following chapters. These include the international community, ecological importance, civil society, local communities, individual entrepreneurs, border status, security issues, regional stability, tourism, conflict status, western values and involvement, developmental agencies, funding agencies, UNESCO, colonialism and post‐colonialism.
2.2.4. Examples of Peace Parks from Around the World
Developed below are three outlines and key ideas of well cited peace park examples from around the world. The description of these will assist in understanding a possible materialization of peace parks, contrary to the case studies analyzed, in this work which are un‐materialized examples. They would also serve to better understand situations in which a peace park serves as part of post‐conflict peacebuilding, ongoing conflict mitigation process or pre‐agreement peacemaking attempts and the various political processes that are related to them. The examples were chosen in order to highlight and balance the case studies researched and discussed in this work. One example, La Amistad Peace Park, represents an existing park which was established post‐conflict and is focused on peace building. This peace park can be correlated or compared with many of the examples developed in this research; the second example, Cordillera Del Condor Peace Park is an existing peace park that was part of a peacemaking process. This park can be compared with the Golan Heights historical trials to include a peace park component as part of the official negotiation process; and the last one, Siachen Peace Park proposal, is an ongoing initiative and should
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be compared with the ongoing developing parks researched in this work and will also showcase the state of mind of different actors that are involved in peace parks promotion.
La Amistad Peace Park between Costa Rica and Panama (established in 1979), is a case which represents a post‐conflict environmental peacebuilding process. Established in 1979, La Amistad Peace Park between Costa Rica and Panama is one of the more significant peace parks in the world. Located on a past conflict border zone with high ecological importance, the peace park is a consolidation of two protected areas from both sides of the border. This border region was actually a source of past conflict between Costa Rica and Panama. The conflict was officially settled in 1921, but the following decades were still characterized by distrustful relations. At present, Costa Rica is one of the most peaceful and democratic of the Latin American countries and does not have a state military. However, Costa Rica is surrounded by regional instability: Panama (to the South) experienced many conflicts related to access to its isthmus and to U.S. intervention in the region; while Nicaragua (to the North) had instabilities connected to its inner national conflict (Sandinista). Costa Rica chose a path of positive active peace to stabilize its borders. Eschewing militarized borders, Costa Rica opted instead to take a proactive role at maintaining friendly border relations with Panama by leading the negotiations to establish La Amistad as a transboundary park and stabilizing the area.
La Amistad Peace Park is notable for its biodiversity, and for being one of the first transboundary parks in the world with the peacebuilding process as one of its active goal. The Peace Park is comprised of two protected areas (of Panama and Costa Rica) and creates the largest protected area of mountain ecosystems in Central America (and is also nested within a transboundary biosphere reserve (Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001 )). The ecological importance of this region to the global community has helped attract funding for biodiversity projects, sustainable development projects, and conservation projects drawing the attention of international NGO's. A portion of the park was even decreed a UNESCO World Heritage site (in 1983) which has helped to globally popularize the peace park concept (Darnell, 2010). Once established, the peace park has been a continuous source of
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cooperation between the two countries and remained as such even when political tensions have escalated (due to failed trade agreements and relationships with the United States).
The park's proven stability was demonstrated by the ratification of the park by both countries in 1992 and by its continued success as a tourist draw. There have been no border disputes or irresolvable political hurdles, and the park has helped to create a stable border on the periphery of regional instability. Costa Rica's peace park's experience, additionally includes the Sia‐Paz peace park on its northern border with Nicaragua, which provided high level of stability that positively influenced the entire region (Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001 ; Darnell, 2010).
Cordillera Del Condor Peace Park between Ecuador and Peru represents a case of Environmental Peacemaking. The park was established in a Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] which is located in the Cordillera Del Condor, an area that crosses the border of Peru and Ecuador and has a high level of biodiversity which includes many endemic species. The border between the countries, which cuts across this area, was a continuous source of territorial conflict for over 150 years (the most recent eruption of violence was in 1995). An agreement signed in 1995 committed both countries to troop withdrawal from the disputed zone and was overseen by four guarantor countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States53.
In those years, in parallel to state‐level negotiations, indigenous residents (with claims to the land in dispute) that were working with local NGO's, decided to campaign for a peace park, and with time conservation groups became very active in lobbying for it. Some of these groups, such as Conservation International (CI), were actively involved in biodiversity fieldwork even before the resolution of the conflict and worked closely with the military. Therefore, gradually, they were able to convince army officers about the collective importance of conservation and its instrumental use for conflict resolution. In November 1997, the Declaration of Brasilia was signed, in which the two nations agreed on issues of commerce, navigation, border integration agreement, development and security. However,
53 For an elaboration please see: (Simmons, 1999). 37
they did not agree on demarcation of land borders. Tensions arose again in August 1998 as Ecuadorian soldiers spread inside Peru and the Demilitarized Zone.
To prevent further escalation, with pressure from conservation groups, and with US assistance through satellite mapping technologies and mediating, the two sides were able to arrive to an agreeable border demarcation. The terms of the new peace agreement contained a number of innovative features, such as special sovereignty areas, special navigation rights, and a declaration that "both countries will establish an ecological park on either side of the border, where unimpeded transit would be guaranteed and no military forces would be allowed" (Ali, 2011b, 28). Hence, "it was the first formal effort in which conservation groups were actively involved in international conflict resolution, and the resultant peace treaty included explicit mention of conservation measures as part of the overall resolution of the conflict" (Ali, 2007, 9). Chiefly, it was the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO – an intergovernmental organization promoting the conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests) who pressured the international community and assisted in making the ecological‐environmental component in this peace agreement substantial. In the year 2000, CI and ITTO partnered with local conservation groups in Ecuador and Peru and with the Chimu indigenous communities to establish a bioregional management regime. A few years later, the two separated parks merged into one cross‐border managed peace park, "the Condor‐Kutuku Peace Park" (Barquet et. al, 2010).
Having long been a region of intense poverty in both countries, the park assisted in altering this situation. It has attracted substantial international funding to support various projects related to development and conservation, which provided additional options for collaboration between the two nations. "The fact that the area contains important biodiversity was a key factor which has helped lever additional support for impoverished communities living in the same area" (Ponce, unknown).
While the overall armed conflict has stopped, and the biodiversity conservation yielded positive outcomes, implementation of various features of the peace agreement remains
38
unfulfilled and the full scope of a functional “peace park” has not been executed (Ali, 2011b). The project has problems related to the indigenous communities (resenting conservation efforts due to a basic disagreement about land‐rights vis‐a‐vis the sovereign states), to regulating extractive industries in the area, to border crossing and to travel procedures in the area. However, there is a feeling among practitioners that "biodiversity conservation has helped to create a climate of greater confidence between states and peoples, and to resolve some conflicts among peoples" (Ruth Elena Ruiz, Fundacio Natura in:Ali, 2011b).
The Siachen Peace Park Initiative between India and Pakistan is an ongoing developing proposal. The proposal seeks to address a current territorial conflict that dates back to the national division between the states and is connected to an area of the Siachen Glacier. The glacier has altitudes greater than 20,000 feet, where extreme weather conditions are prevalent. The Siachen Glacier territorial conflict between India and Pakistan “might be thought of as just another low‐intensity border war— were it not being fought between the world’s two newest nuclear powers. Their combat over a barren, uninhabited nether world of questionable strategic value is a forbidding symbol of their lingering irreconcilability” (Bearak, 1999).
Siachen, known as the “Third Pole”, is the world’s highest glacier outside the North and South Poles. The Siachen Glacier region, covering less than 1000 square miles, lies between the Karakoram and Zaskar mountain ranges at the junction of Pakistan, India, and China. It is high altitude is home to world class mountaineering sites like K2 ‐ the second highest mountain in the world (Kemkar, 2006). This territorial dispute between India and Pakistan dates back to the national division between the two states. Pakistan and India have both claimed the entire Siachen area. With battles regularly occurring at altitudes greater than 20,000 feet, the Siachen Glacier is the “world’s highest battleground” (Kemkar, 2006, 55) . Neither nation had a military presence in the area until 1984, but since then the countries have been fighting over the area. Estimates are that Pakistan and India may each have over
39
10,000 soldiers encamped on the Siachen, operating in an extreme climate. Several rounds of negotiations to solve the conflict took place and failed.54 On April 7, 2012, an avalanche killed over a hundred Pakistani soldiers and brought the Siachen question back to the news cycle. Unlike Kashmir (the more famous territorial dispute between the countries), the Siachen Glacier does not have a native population to voice an opinion about sovereignty preference.
The Siachen is a unique, fragile ecosystem that is caught in the middle of a tumultuous political conflict. The estimated 20,000 troops perched on the Siachen require thousands of tons of food and supplies to be flown and parachuted to them each year. Indian army officials have described the Siachen as “the world’s biggest and highest garbage dump" (Kemkar, 2006), as the Siachen lacks natural biodegrading agents, so metals and plastics simply merge with the glacier as permanent pollutants, leaching toxins into the ice. This waste eventually reaches the Indus River, affecting drinking and irrigation water, which millions of Indians and Pakistanis depend on. 55 The Siachen area has experienced large‐ scale loss of plant and animal diversity as a result of the conflict.56
A proposal for a Siachen Peace Park incorporating nature conservation, science and mountaineering sports was raised several times since 1994 by local and international civil society actors (Briniger and Marshall, 2007). The proposal suggested creating a transboundary protected area with a centralized joint science center that would encourage and enable demilitarization and disengagement from the area even prior to an official peace agreement. Accordingly, the borders inside the park would not be delineated. Neither side would relinquish their historic claims of sovereignty to the area, but would place all such claims in abeyance for the higher purpose of science and the protection of nature (Ali, 2012). Existing military outposts could gradually disarm and transition into lending logistical support for conservation management. Soldiers might serve as park rangers and as peacekeepers. Hence, the military presence would be replaced with a national scientific
54 Since 1997, the countries have been engaging in ongoing dialogue (the “Composite Dialogue”). 55 As water has become scarcer in the region, a dispute over utilization of irrigation water and rivers has lately arisen. For more see: (Thorson, 2009) 56 The glacial habitats of ibex, brown bears, cranes, snow leopards, and many other species are threatened. The World Wide Fund for Nature has designated the area as one of 200 areas “critical to global conservation.”(Kemkar, 2006). 40
mission.57 Visitors from either country would be able to enter the area without being able to cross over into the other country beyond the protected area’s borders. The park would create a joint zone of visitation from both sides of the border. Both countries would share equally any economic revenues as means of operationalizing the resolution of the conflict. Encouraging negotiators to use environmental protection and scientific reasoning to promote a resolution for the Siachen conflict would not only enhance cooperation on nearly apolitical terms, but sustainability to the whole area.
The proposal has found support58 in several institutions in both countries and in many other parts of the world. Among supporting groups are: Sanctuary Asia (advocacy group), National Geographic Society, Friends of the Mountains, The International Institute for Peace through Tourism, World Wildlife Fund – Pakistan, World Wildlife Fund – India, IUCN – World Conservation Unit, UNEP ‐ World Conservation Monitoring Centre, the International Karakoram Science Project, American Association for the advancement of science (AAAS), Himalayan High Ice Symposium, Global Land Ice Measurement from Space (GLIMS, supported by NASA), and the University of Nebraska (Briniger and Marshall, 2007).
57 India and Pakistan currently cooperatively manage contiguous parks together in a non‐conflict area: the Indian Kutch Desert Sanctuary and the Pakistani Rann of Kutch Wildlife Sanctuary. 58 Some have expressed objections to the park, see for example: (D. Banerjee, PR. Chari et al., 2005). 41
3. Chapter 3: Peace Parks along Israeli‐Arab Borders: Hopes and Reality 3.1. Introduction
This chapter uncovers and analyzes the previously undescribed history of many different attempts to enact environmental peacemaking and peacebuilding along Israeli‐Arab borders. Specifically, it is focused on the history of peace park initiatives along Israeli borders with Syria, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Territories. The cases presented span four decades and start with the Israeli‐Egyptian peace process in the late 1970s. Focusing on the Israeli perspective and utilizing the Environmental Peacemaking writings, the chapter examines these attempts to conserve nature as a means to promote peace, security and prosperity in the region.
Throughout this chapter, a broad definition of peace parks is utilized, however, it is not one based on the intention of complete inclusivity (i.e. not every nature reserve along the border that is named "the peace forest/park/garden" is considered a peace park). Only those park proposals that were aimed at encouraging cross‐border cooperation and nature conservation are included. Most of the presented peace park initiatives greatly differ from the prevalent peace park model given their relatively small and unpopulated areas. Thus, many of the known issues and challenges related to peace parks’ establishment became irrelevant. Therefore, a comparison between these non‐materialized proposals to other examples from around the world is incomplete. All of the cases researched herein, except one, did not progress beyond the development stages and never materialized. Their examined characteristics are:59 the park's initiator and developer; the existing cross‐border relations; the main purposes of the park (nature preservation, tourism, scientific cooperation, population encounters, peace building); the borders and sovereignty status; and the relevant international linkages.
59 As opposed, for example, to the IUCN set of best‐practice guidelines that refers to existing parks: Identifying and promoting common values; Involving and benefiting local people; Promoting coordinated and cooperative activities, planning and agreements and more (Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001). 42
The chapter provides an overall picture of the peace park initiatives.60 It is a challenge to analyze the reasons for the parks non materialization, and equally hard to assess the effect they might have had on peacemaking/peacebuilding. The parks’ collective failure, or non materialization, could be blamed or attributed primarily on external factors. At the same time, to delineate the political reality as the only source for this “failure” is incomplete and imprecise. Therefore, in some cases, this author points to some "successful" characteristics that, at the very least, were most likely not the ones to cause the failure of the initiatives, but at the same time they did not lead to the creation of peace parks.
The chapter begins with a short historical background of the Israeli‐Arab peace process and how environmental issues were included and represented during the process. The chapter’s main topic is a chronological61 overview of 14 peace park initiatives along Israeli‐Arab borders. It focuses and elaborates on the more substantial and developed parks (two exceptions are the South Sinai Peace Park and the Golan Height Peace Park proposals, discussed in later chapters) but also lays out all the other minor proposals. While some proposals are insignificant in terms of developing relationships or innovative concepts, including them as part of the overall description is important as it serves to formulate the conceptual acceptance and recognition of the peace park rationale as important. In addition to the parks’ depiction, a complementary description of several cross‐border environmental initiatives that build on the peace park rationale, but are not such parks per se, is included and assists in portraying the peace park proposals as part of a larger phenomenon. The concluding discussion analyzes the efforts to initiate peace parks along three axes: discussion based on the Environmental Peacemaking literature and parameters; discussing individual and institutional agents, and discussing borders and sovereignty issues.
60 It does not provide an elaborated description of each of the proposals and doesn't linger over the specifics. 61 The Golan Heights proposals and the Jordan River Peace Park proposal are located and discussed as part of the "2000 and onward" proposals. The proposals are examined from their roots and initial proposals which were started in the mid‐1990s. 43
3.2. Background: The Israeli‐Arab Peace Process and its Environmental Manifestations
Since Israel’s establishment in 1948 it has been in an almost constant state of war with its Arab neighbors and with the Palestinians. Active wars broke out in 1948‐9, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982‐3 and 2006. Several periods of violent clashes between Israel and the Palestinians took place in 1987‐1991, 2000‐2005, 2008‐2009, 2012 and 2014. The commencement of the peace process between Israel and the Arab world was marked with the bold diplomatic initiative of Anwar Sadat, the late Egyptian president, took, in accepting Israel's invitation to a dialogue in 1977. This led to the 1978 Camp David Accords and to the Israel‐Egypt peace treaty in 1979.62
It took another decade and substantial changes in global politics for the Israeli‐Arab Peace Process to resume. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War had reshaped the basic political order of the Middle East. This led to a reassessment of the geostrategic positions held by both Israel and the Arab states. In October 1991, a conference was convened in Madrid to initiate direct talks between Israel and the Arab World. Following this conference, direct bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors (Syria and Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority) started as well as multilateral talks between Israel and the Arab world on key regional issues. Those issues were refugees, regional security and disarmament, economic development, water and the environment.63 While the bilateral talks focused on ending past and ongoing conflicts, the multilateral talks, which constitute an integral part of the peace‐making process, strove to build the future of a stable Middle East (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994). Their goal was twofold: to find solutions to key regional problems and to serve as a confidence‐building measure to promote the development of normalized relations among the Middle East nations.
62 For more see: (Quandt, 1986; Stein, 1999). 63 For more see: (Peters, 1996; Kaye, 2001; Ross, 2004). 44
The bilateral talks were held with the Palestinians, Jordanians and Syrians, some led to signed agreements, and a few are described below:
The first were the Oslo Accords in 1993. The agreements were signed between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (later to become part of the Palestinian Authority64). Gradually, steps towards a liberated Palestinian state were taken (with several interim agreements aimed toward forming an autonomic governance), but those agreements were never concluded.65 The Oslo and the interim agreements with the Palestinians included environment and water sections (some were specified in Annexes). Also, joint environmental committees such as a Joint Electrical Subcommittee, a Joint Committee of Experts on Nature Reserves, an Environmental Experts Committee and a Palestinian Environmental Protection Authority (PEPA), and a Water Committee were established.66
The second was the Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel signed on the 26th of October, 1994. In addition to a water agreement, an environmental agreement was incorporated and ratified as part of the peace treaty (Annex IV). Other joint committees that dealt with the environment, development and water issues were established as part of this process.
And finally, the peace negotiations with Syria started in the early 1990s and have been on and off the regional agenda in accordance with alternating governments and regional politics. After the year 2000, several rounds of indirect negotiations took place without achieving any interim or final agreement (see an extensive background in chapter 5).
In the first half of the 1990s, the environment had become an arena for cross‐border cooperation which was manifest in various plans, initiatives and summits. This change was influenced by "the peace euphoria era" (as those years are often named), but also by global changes and by the Rio convention in 1992 (Israel Environment Bulletin, 1995c; Schoenfeld,
64 Governmental responsibility transferred from Israel to the PLO, including education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism and, later, agriculture, statistics, energy, labor, local government, postal services, trade, industry and the environment. A complex, multi‐tiered administrative system was devised in order to split and share responsibilities between the parties within the West Bank. 65 For more see (Beilin, 1999; Ross, 2004; Sher, 2006). 66 For more see (Schoenfeld, 2013). 45
2013).67 Many of the cross‐border environmental initiatives that were initiated during this era constituted part of the regional plans for economic development, mostly as an accompanying part of tourism developmental plans. For example, between October 1993 and April 1994, Israel, Jordan and USA took part in a Trilateral Economic Committee, which produced the Integrated Development Jordan Rift Valley program (endorsed by the World Bank), that included many environmental features and accorded high priority to the protection of nature (Israel Environment Bulletin, 1995d). Other examples are the Middle East and North Africa Economic Summits, wherein all the Middle Eastern countries along with donor countries, civil society and private entrepreneurs presented their plans for a new (peaceful) Middle East (Kliot, 1997). 68
An important diplomatic environmental declaration was the Bahrain Environmental Code of Conduct for the Middle East from 1994. This official document was a result of the multilateral environment working group meetings.69 Utopian in nature, it bonds environment, society and peace in a unique and progressive way. The declaration emphasizes the importance of cooperation and of responsible and sustainable utilization of the shared environment. It stresses that, "A comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible" (Multilateral Negotiations of the Middle East Peace Process ‐ The Working Group on the Environment, 1994). After declaring joint principles, the paper suggests guidelines for regional enhancement of such processes (i.e., legislation, capacity building, awareness promotion and more), calls upon the countries to coordinate their environmental policies
67 Jordan's official position to the Environmental Multilateral discussion group that gathered in May 1992 declared "This meeting comes coincidentally only a couple of weeks before the greatest environmental conference that man has known [the 1992 Global Summit in Rio, S.S]. But the fact that both these discussions are concerned with the environment is no coincidence. There is a growing realization by all of us who share this planet that we must work hard, and work together, at reversing systemic damage that we have been doing to our environment”. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan Delegation to Middle East Multilateral Peace Talks, The Environment Working Group, Tokyo, May 18–19, 1992, Position Paper. As cited in : (Kaye, 2001). 68 The first was convened in October 1994 in Casablanca, Morocco. The following (1995) conference in Amman focused on "Peace as business", the third (1996) conference was held in Cairo and the fourth and last was held in Doha (1997). 69 This was coordinated and headed by Japan. It is published in the Israeli Foreign Affairs website under the peace process documentation www.mfa.gov.il 46
and actions70 and to establish a regional framework for environmental cooperation. On the whole, although the regional and bilateral environmental negotiations were generally conceptualized and grasped as "low politics", these dynamic activities produced official papers. In some cases, these papers were even followed by politically historic events for the region. For example, the first‐ever visits of Israeli Ministers to Tunisia and Bahrain took place as part of the environmental multilateral dialogue (Israel Environment Bulletin, 1995a). However, despite the positive atmosphere, many concrete actions never materialized.
During the first few years of the peace process, civil society organizations and private entrepreneurs did not play a significant role in initiating cross‐border environmental cooperation. In fact, most of the developmental activities were driven by the government. Over time, with the support of outside funding agencies and states, civil society groups’ involvement grew and took a variety of forms. An operating premise emerged to link civil society groups (academics, NGOs, bureaucrats and technicians) and create new settings to bring Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, and others together (Chaitin, Obeidi et al., 2004; Cohen, 2011; Schoenfeld, 2013). Several joint environmental NGOs, policy and research centers were developed.71 According to Schoenfeld (2013) "The attention given to environmental issues in the political agreements created an intersection between the Israeli peace movement and the Israeli environmental movement. Those at this intersection had the opportunity to reach out to Palestinian and Jordanian partners" (Schoenfeld, 2013, p.339). A multitude of environmental NGOs (not only joint/bi‐national ones) cooperated to achieve a better environmental reality and peaceful relations during this period (Chaitin, Obeidi et al., 2004).
A re‐heated and violent phase in Israeli‐Palestinians relations started in 1997. It heightened in 2000 with the outbreak of the “Second Intifada”, which affected the region and
70 In the fields of: water, desertification, marine and coastal environment, waste management and air quality. 71 Among them were: the Israel‐Palestine Center for Research and Information, EcoPeace / Friends of the Earth Middle East, the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, the Palestinian‐Israeli Environmental Secretariat (PIES). For elaboration see (Schoenfeld, 2013). 47
deteriorated Israel’s relations with Egypt, Jordan and the rest of the Arab world. Joint projects and different kinds of cooperation were slowed down or stalled all together, and the whole area suffered a general stagnation in cross‐border relations. The Israelis unilaterally pulled out of the Gaza strip in 2005. The latest rounds of peace negotiations (in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2013‐2014) did not achieve substantial progress in resolving the conflict.
48
3.3. Peace Parks Initiatives along Israeli‐Arab Borders
Figure no. 2: Illustration Map – Peace Parks along Israeli Arab Borders
49
3.3.1. The 1970s The Peace Park in Southern Sinai was proposed shortly after the Israeli‐Egyptian peace talks began in 1977. This proposal was put forward before the peace agreement was signed and before the Israeli pullout from the Sinai Peninsula took place.72 Devised by Israeli conservationists who lived and worked in Sinai on behalf of the Society for the Protection of Nature [SPNI] an Israeli NGO; the proposal called for: establishing a 12,000 km2 park to secure the area’s unique surroundings; responsible development (mass development and mass tourism was predicted once peace was achieved); and creating joint research and management to enhance peace.
"We think that such a project, in which both Egypt and Israel would participate, could be a successful way to demilitarize the region and, furthermore, could be a wonderful expression of peace and co‐operation… We suggest it be called the Peace Park"
(emphasis in the original, Shaked, 1977).
Although southern Sinai was about to be transferred to the Egyptian authorities, the proposal hoped to establish a bi‐national authority with international representatives that would jointly manage the park. The proposal was sent to the Egyptian president Sadat but was not acted on. A similar, though undeveloped, suggestion was raised a few years later by Cornellia Hann Oberlander, a Canadian landscape architect (Hann‐Oberlander, 1979a). Oberlander sent her proposal to colleagues, diplomats and to the Canadian PM, but once again, the plans remained on paper only (personal interview, March 27 2012). Nevertheless, in actual fact (and in contrast to the rest of Egyptian territories), Israelis were exempt from a visa requirement to enter Sinai. This special visa exemption73 was set up in order to promote tourism that is mostly based on Sinai's natural assets. In practice, this mechanism created a weakened Egyptian sovereignty in order to promote cross‐border tourism, which goes hand in hand with parts of the peace park rationale.
The Sinai case will be thoroughly developed in chapter 4.
72 Sinai, an Egyptian area, was occupied by Israel between 1967 and 1981. 73 As one outcome of the peace agreement. 50
3.3.2. The 1980s During the 1980s no peace park proposals were made. Anecdotally, however, a 1987 Jewish National Fund74 [JNF] fundraising event with the participation of Ms. Jehan Sadat (wife of assassinated Egyptian President) collected funds for an "International Peace Park in the Negev desert, on the border between Israel and Egypt… a ‘people to people,’ rather than a ‘government to government'… a symbol of hope for peace in the Middle East" (Hartocollis, 1987). The organizers envisioned the park as an anchor for development in the Negev desert, encouraging tourism and Israeli settlement in the area. This park was to be inaugurated on the tenth anniversary of the Peace Accord between Israel and Egypt, in 1989. The park proposal was not substantially promoted by the JNF, nor established.75
In the area initially suggested for this peace park (Ezuz‐Nizana, Israel) several forests were planted to commemorate the Israeli‐Egyptian Peace. Some were named "the peace park/grove", and all were unilaterally Israeli. In addition, a large scale environmental monument by the Israeli artist Dani Karavan named “The Ways of Peace (Netivei ha Shalom)” were situated in the area. The Ezuz area example illustrates how the notion of an international park with peacemaking purposes was yet again raised even in an epoch characterized by detachment between Egypt and Israel.
3.3.3. The 1990s 3.3.3.1. Early 1990s – Beginning of "the Peace Euphoria Era" The commencement of a regional peace process brought with it a great deal of optimism. This optimism culminated in cross‐border initiatives, which were mostly motivated by economic and developmental rationales. Some initiatives, albeit to a minor extent, directly addressed tourism and environmental topics. As peace and stability are usually analogous
74 The JNF is currently defined as a Jewish environmental NGO but has a greater agenda that deals with land and settlement development. In the past was dealing also with land acquisition for the Jewish People. For elaboration please see: www.jnf.org. Though a non profit organization, the JNF‐KKL is highly connected to governments and is very much aligned with state policies by its conduct. 75 No information could be retrieved from KKL‐JNF about this park. Zeevi Kahanov, the then JNF USA‐ representative (personal communication, November 18, 2010), said that no cross‐border relations existed with Egypt in any environmental regard (Kahanov, personal communication, November 18, 2010). 51
with flourishing tourism76, expectations for economic gains from the peace process to the tourism industry were higher than for any other service industry in the region. Expectations rose for the idea of a "unified regional travel and tourism industry [that] could transform the area into a global super destination. The Holy Land in particular has unique tourism potential…" (ESCWA‐UN, 1998). Many were hoping to turn this potentiality into reality. Indeed, as predicted, the first years following the Madrid Convention were characterized by a growing influx of tourists to the area.77 Noticeably, growing tourism has mostly negative environmental effects, however, this was not yet substantial at the time (Frumkin and Achiron‐Frumkin, 2002).
Tourism, along with nature conservation and peacebuilding, is one of the driving mechanisms to establish peace parks. As will be demonstrated, flourishing tourism’s revenues, account for one of the peace parks driving forces in the region. The regional peace process brought forth various cross‐border environmental initiatives proposed by governmental officials, private sector entrepreneurs, academics, and NGOs. Many of the initiatives were supported and funded by the international community. An interesting example was "the corridor talks" period, which occurred prior to the official signing of the Israeli‐Jordanian peace treaty. Zeev Tamkin, a planner who participated in several cross‐ border initiatives, reported that at the time ideas and projects related to the environment and tourism started to sprout and included initial plans for peace parks. He also mentioned that during that era governmental representatives78 from both sides of the border had a tight cooperation with the U.S. Park Authorities, and professional groups were created in full secrecy (Tamkin, personal interview, December 27, 2010). A main motivation for these projects was to create regional tourist‐economic ties. This motivation went hand in hand with the "New Middle East" agenda of Shimon Peres, who was then Israel’s Foreign Affairs minister. Peres envisioned that peace would be created through regional economic
76 For the debate whether tourism is a generator of peace or simply the beneficiary of peace please see: (Litvin, 1998). 77 This included new crowds from previously unfrequented countries. An example is a revival of the Muslim pilgrimage trade, with visitors coming from a number of countries with large Muslim populations including India, Indonesia, Malaysia and more. 78 Led by Mr. Yossi Vardi, a private entrepreneur and a senior advisor on civilian and economic matters to Prime Minister (PM) Rabin. 52
cooperation inducing regional prosperity. Parties participation would then be incentivized to keep the stable relations (Peres and Naor, 1993).79
Many of these projects and initiatives were focused on border zones. "Our thought was to change the border zone from a separating zone to a zone of partnership. A space where joint action and different kinds of initiatives take place" says Valerie Brachia, a former deputy director general of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (Brachia, perosnal interview, February 11, 2011). The Jordan Rift Valley, which sets the natural and the political border between Israel and Jordan, was the focal point of many developmental plans between the two nations. In 1995, the Harza Company, an American development consultancy firm, was selected to initiate planning for the area (ESCWA‐UN, 1998). It produced a comprehensive work on developmental options for Israel and Jordan in the Jordan Rift Valley80. The entire valley, from the Red Sea to the Northern triangle border with Syria, was envisioned as a single tourist zone with many development projects (Harza, 1997).
79 Alleson, I., J. Levin, et al. (2013) claim that "broadly, the Oslo Accords were guided by what can be characterized as a neo‐functionalist approach to peacebuilding. Among their varied facets, neo‐functionalist theories emphasize the importance of technical and economic cooperation that can serve as a mechanism to indirectly bring groups closer over time (Haas 2004). Neo‐functionalist theories posit that we should see greater likelihood of peaceful exchange in technical and economic spheres precisely because they lack the controversy of high politics (Adler and Crawford 1991). Moreover, technical cooperation is said to breed peaceful exchange through ‘positive spill‐over effects‘ (Haas 2004)" (Alleson, Levin et al., 2013, 18, p. 18). 80 The work was funded by the Italian government and hosted by the World Bank. 53
Figure no. 3: Tourism and Border Crossing Potential. From: (Government of Israel, 1994).
54
In that era of optimism, several plans sharing the conceptual foundations of peace parks were developed. Some envisioned cross‐border desert safari areas while others promoted cross‐border walking and driving trails along natural, biblical and archeological sites of importance (Leitersdorf and Tamkin, 1993, see the original map attached in appendix no. 6; Genesis Fund, Jewish Agancy et al., 1994). Those plans accurately reflected the enthusiasm and the new optimistic way in which the region was envisioned, and the way in which borders were grasped as open and flexible. The Negev in Peace Era was one of these grand plans. It intended to unite and link nature reserves and biosphere areas in Jordan, Israel and Egypt,81 and combine them with the historic Incense and Spice Route,82 in order to enhance tourism and research ((Leitersdorf and Tamkin, 1993; Government of Israel, 1997) Please see original map in Annex 6).83
Some of the regional plans intended to create environmental, tourist and economic ties between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and involved Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli governments. Towards the second Regional Economic Summit (Amman, 1995) which focused on "Peace as Business" (Kliot, 1997), a document called Regional Environmental Cooperation and Development Options was produced by the Israeli government (see Figure no 4).84 Two grand regional developmental plans that contained a cross‐border nature park component were declared and adopted as projects for development: the South‐East Mediterranean plans (SEMED) and the Taba‐Eilat‐Aqaba Macro area (TEAM)85 (Please see Illustration in Figures 6 and 7 below).
81 Ein Yahav‐Machtesh Ramon in Israel with Wadi Dana in Jordan and North Sinai in Egypt. 82 A declared UNESCO World Heritage site since 2005, the Spice Route was a Nabatean trade route that led from India, Somalia and Arabia to the coasts of the Mediterranean via Wadi Rum and the Negev and Sinai deserts. In the first century thousands of camels laden with perfumes and spices made their way along this road. To protect and service them the Nabateans built fortresses, the remains of which can still be seen. 83 Interesting to note that in the past, until 1948, the whole area (Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza) was considered a joint tourism and pilgrim destination (ESCWA‐UN, 1998). 84 The options that were presented were of a preliminary nature and were presented for study. for more see the Israeli foreign affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.il/ 85 These two plans were promoted by the EU. 55
Figure no. 4: Environmental Cooperation and Development Options (1997, Government of Israel and Ministry of the Environment).
3.3.3.2. The East Mediterranean Riviera and Dune Park was an element in the SEMED plans. This plan was developed by Israeli, Egyptian and Palestinian Authority tourism and planning offices86 and involved private planning firms as part of the process. In the initial phases of conceptual development, the plans proposed a joint development along the Mediterranean coast, starting from Ashkelon (Israel) through the Gaza Strip (Palestinian
86 Under the Regional Economic Develop Working Group. 56
Authority) and south to the Bardawil lagoon in north Sinai (Egypt). The tourist development, envisioned marinas, hotels and restaurants, included a long shared promenade and alongside them it included several cross‐border desert tourism areas and a natural Dune Park to be duplicated in several areas (Government of Israel, 1997). In this proposal, the park was one more component in strengthening cross‐border cooperation. The fact that the park was envisioned as separated parallel parks on both sides of the border does not disqualify it from being classified (if it were to be materialized) as TBPA, since it falls under one of the IUCN definitions as specified above.87 The plans were never taken into a comprehensive planning phase and as other cross‐border developmental plans, did not materialize.
87 A cluster of separated protected areas without intervening land. 57
Figure no. 5: The Red Sea Riviera/Coral Reef Park, the Mediterranean Riviera and the Lowest Park on Earth. Taken from Programs for Regional Cooperation (Government of Israel, 1997).
58
3.3.3.3. The Red Sea Riviera was part of the above mentioned TEAM plans and appeared in several publications during the 1990's. It was located at the northern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba, where Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia meet and where strategic interests, remarkable scenery and endangered unique marine life were all coupled together. The TEAM plans were to establish a free tourist‐zone in the area in order to attract foreign and local tourists. The plans included a trilateral coral‐reef park and a desert park (Rozenblum, 1995). Not surprisingly, given that the partnering states to this program: Egypt, Jordan and Israel, were officially in peace relations, TEAM plans were more developed88 than SEMED ones. The Red Sea Riviera’s planning process involved many actors and interested parties in addition to respective government offices: researchers, NGOs, the World Bank, Global Coral Monitoring Reef Network, local councils and local communities. However, this trilateral program did not get the approval of the Egyptian government and the projects shifted towards an Israeli‐Jordanian focus. This shift was also propelled by the newly signed peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. This treaty brought a new special agreement for Aqaba, Jordan and bordering Eilat, Israel (in 1996). This agreement stipulated Israeli and Jordanian cooperation on several issues, including: environmental management, flood management, energy and natural resources, etc. (Government of Israel, 1997). The agreement also called for the establishment of a Special Tourism Zone in the region, a bi‐ national Special Economic Zone, and a bi‐national Red Sea Marine Peace Park.
88 Included different environmental‐planning maps, species‐diversity maps etc. 59
Figure no. 6: the Taba‐Eilat‐Aqaba Macro Area (includes designated areas for a Marine Peace Park).
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Figure no. 7: The Red Sea Riviera. From (Government of Israel, 1994).
3.3.3.4. The Red Sea Marine Peace Park (RSMPP) is the only peace park proposal that was fully executed along Israeli‐Arab borders. Declared as part of the Israeli‐Jordanian peace treaty (The White House, 1994), this plan's overarching goals were to foster trans‐boundary cooperation and to enhance conservation and sustainable use of the coral reef ecosystem in the Gulf of Aqaba. The objective of the park was to promote collaboration in studying, managing, promoting awareness and protecting the joint ecosystem. Threats to the marine wildlife ecosystem were many and served to push this cooperation forward. Those included 61
sport fishing, commercial fishing, fish farms, shipping of oil and other hazardous materials, wastewater and solid waste disposal, industrial development, tourism and more.
Figure no. 8: Red Sea Marine Peace Park Logo
The established cooperation was a partnership between resource management institutions, governmental agencies and marine research institutions in Israel and in Jordan. The cooperation was facilitated by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In contrast to other peace park proposals, this initiative was defined as a three‐year project (1999‐2001) and funded by USAID/MERC. The RSMPP stretched over 10 non‐sequential kilometers: three included the Coral Reef Reserve in Eilat and seven included the then newly established Aqaba Marine Park (1997). During those 3 years, the staff of the involved institutes participated in cooperative management routines (such as regular and repeated joint monitoring cruises), meetings on both sides of the border and in the US, and other educational activities (joint workshops, tours etc). Though not officially a part of this project, the Egyptians did participate in several meetings and were kept informed (Perevolotsky, personal interview, January 25, 2011). The peace park establishment allowed Israel and
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Jordan to develop and implement a long‐term research and monitoring program of their joint ecosystem.
An example of this cooperation's success is related to the “Anti Fish‐Farms Struggle”: During the years following the Israel‐Jordan peace agreement and through 2002, existing fish‐farms (cages) operating on the Israeli side of the border posed a threat to the Aqaba‐Eilat marine life. This threat brought a heated scientific and public debate that included a campaign of Israeli environmental bodies that called for the cages’ removal. Within this scientific debate, the Israeli Eilat institutions were pushing for the cages’ removal89. As part of this ongoing struggle, and in order to pressure the Israeli government, Israeli farms owners threatened to relocate the cages to the Aqaba area. This announcement forced an immediate cooperation between the Eilat and Aqaba marine institutes. It also brokered a Jordanian announcement that such an action would never get approved (Genin, 2013).
89 For more about this struggle please see www.tzalul.org.il 63
Figure no. 9: Gulf of Aqaba – Biodiversity and Environment Management (Includes the RSMPP designated areas). From (Government of Israel, 1997).
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In 2002 the 3‐year funded phase ended. However, some cooperation continues through present day.90 An Israeli long‐term national monitoring plan for the Gulf area and an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Israeli and Jordanian environmental ministries to protect the Gulf and ensure continued cooperation was signed in 2003 (Foreign Affair Ministry, 2003). From a more subjective perspective, the leading scientists agree there was an improvement in nature conservation and research integration, as well as in data monitoring data, data backed management decisions and in improving communication between the scientific institutes (Crosby, Al‐Bashir et al., 2002). Put succinctly, it "was very successful in improving international relationships while also conducting excellent science" (Crosby, 2007). However, scientific achievements and improved management of the joint ecosystems were not the only declared targets of the RSMPP. While those were successfully promoted, the public educational component of the peace park was much less so. Though several public awareness events occurred as part of the project, they were unilateral and did not include a reference to the partners across the border. The second phase of the project, which was meant to be focused on outreach and public education, did not attain funding.
Moreover, during the execution phases (and in contrast to the planning phases) the harsh political reality in the region (the Second Intifada) hovered over the project. "There was a lot of politics involved that overclouded cooperation… for example, most of the encounters were held in Jordan because issuing visas for the Jordanians [to enter Israel S.S] was very problematic" said Dr. Reuven Ortal, an Ecologist from the Nature Reserve Authority, who was one of the Israeli leaders of the project (Ortal, personal interview, October 10, 2010). Furthermore, the communal, societal and public aspects of the project were not clear enough and the overlooking of the political issues was deliberate. Therefore, the scientific cooperation did not evolve substantially into a political one, argues Dr. Avi Perevolotsky, who was the Chief Scientist of the Nature and Parks Authority in Israel, and the second Israeli to lead project (Perevolotsky, personal interview, January 25, 2011). Dr. Michael
90 Routine joint marine scientific/monitoring excursions take place, joint research is conducted and policy reports are published. See for example the 2010 "Red Sea ‐ Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program ‐ Inception Report" June 24, 2010. It was done in cooperation of: Interuniversity Institute for Marine Science in Eilat (IUI) Israel, Marine Science Station in Aqaba (MSS) Jordan, Israel Oceanographic and Limnological Research (IOLR) Israel, Prof. S. Monismith (Stanford University) California, USA. 65
Crosby, the American lead scientist of the project, confirmed that the scientists tried to avoid political discussions. He related that the project involved a lot of "human diplomacy" from his side, especially during the intense days of the Second Intifada, and that though substantial community pressure was put on the participating planning parties, politics was deliberately kept out of the room (Crosby, personal interview, July 16, 2012).
When trying to preliminarily assess91 the project’s impact on the regional political reality, a complex picture unfolds. In addition to creating long‐term cross‐border scientific relations, the amelioration of the degrading environmental situation, due to the project, might have contributed to the enhancement of tourism, resulting (in accordance to the literature) with enhanced local stability, a crucial component for maintaining peace. However, despite its name, the concept of a peace park was not entirely fulfilled herein. First, its strategic role in peacebuilding was essentially different from terrestrial peace parks, since human populations cannot meet in a marine park (Ali, 2007, 338). Second, this park was mainly created for scientific cooperation92 and did not fully fulfill its stated public benefit component. Similar to other fields of cooperation between Israel and Jordan, here too, the political reality and the inner‐Palestinian factor in the Jordanian population (a large percentage of the Jordanians are Palestinians in origin and oppose any type of normalization of relations with Israeli) made it difficult for cooperation to flourish above the minimum (Arieli, 2012).
3.3.3.5. The Arava Peace Park was proposed at the Southern Jordan Rift Valley, located north of the Gulf of Aqaba.93 The Arava area was envisioned in the regional development programs as a region that should be,
91 Though this work is mainly descriptive and analytic, given RSMPP is the only materialized peace park some preliminary assessment was conducted. 92 Prof. Genin, one of the leading scientists in the interuniversity institute for Marine Sciences in Eilat, said that the interest of individuals in the project might have conflicted (in a way that had nothing to do with cross border cooperation, per se): their scientific interests and career decisions did not necessarily goes hand in hand with promoting regulation related to nature conservation. Thus, projects that were built on cooperation between institutions that simultaneously promote policy making and pure scientific research, might suffer from problems of participating scientists’ interests (Genin, 2013). 93 This is where the natural border between Israel and Jordan is overlapped by the political one. 66
"Developed around specific tour routes, activities and unique vacation themes, similar to the wine route in Europe. Open borders will facilitate the development of the continuous series of scenery, animal and plant life, where the tourist may begin vacation in one country and end up in another…" (Government of Israel, 1997).
The Arava Peace Park was a unilateral Israeli initiative proposed by the JNF/KKL and supported by PM Rabin’s office and later by PM Netanyahu’s office. Collaborators were Israel’s Land Authority and the local City Councils of Eilat and Eilot (Nahmias and Kaplan, 1996). The plan proposed development of a 10 square kilometers (km2) cross‐border park, connecting several areas between Jordan (Petra & Wadi‐Rum) and Israel (Nabatean cities) that would be jointly managed by the two countries. It was written and sketched as a draft to be further developed through a joint dialogue with Jordanian partners. This later phase was never executed.
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Figure no. 10: Arava Peace Park (Nahmias and Kaplan, 1996, 7)
Emphasizing the benefits of combining environmental issues, tourism development and cross‐border relations, the plan encompassed different tourist attractions and meant to become not only one of the largest projects in the area, but "a symbol of neighborly relations between former antagonists… [to] serve as a physical and cultural bridge between
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two countries… [and] would give expression to the new ties now being created between Israeli and Jordanian peoples" (Nahmias and Kaplan, 1996, 4).
At the core of the peace park the planners envisioned an area that included a double‐topic theme park spanning both sides of the border: "The central attraction in the park's core would be the fact that it is a territory common to both Israel and Jordan, with a unique and exceptional international status"(Nahmias and Kaplan, 1996). A second topic addressed by the theme‐park was the desert and its human livelihood. Different exhibitions and facilities were suggested, such as on desert agriculture, solar energy facility, an open geological museum and more.
3.3.3.6. Dana‐Sheizaf Bi‐National Nature Reserve was a proposal to expand and unite the Jordanian, Dana and Israeli, Nahal‐Sheizaf nature reserves in the Arava/Araba region. These two reserves are separated by the border and a 12km‐wide strip of non‐ protected area. The proposal's goals were to expand and juxtapose the reserves, to integrate and strengthen the reserves’ management, to recover threatened species and re‐ introduce extinct ones, and to develop eco‐tourism. These actions were meant to help in "furthering the peace process… benefit both local people [Bedouin tribes living inside the reserve, S.S.] and wildlife" (Harza JRV Group, 1997, 9). This peace park proposal (in its non‐ politicized terminology) appeared in several Israeli governmental developmental plans for the region during the 1990s. On behalf of the respective governments, the Harza International Company published a specified prefeasibility study (Harza JRV Group, 1997) that mapped the area and looked into the geographic, environmental and social aspects of expanding and uniting the reserves (see Figure 11 below). The intended executing agencies were the Jordanian Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (governmental), the Israeli Nature Reserves Authority (NRA, governmental) and the SPNI.
A joint reserve with an expanded ecological range would have various benefits and would help mitigate some of the area’s environmental threats. An example of threat mitigation
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was illegal hunting and the pressure this hunting had on the carrying capacity of the area made by Bedouin cattle herds grazing there. By providing alternative grazing areas as part of the reserves’ establishment process, some of this pressure would have decreased. The joint reserve could have eased concerns that were raised about mass tourism‐induced development (Kliot and AbuRoken, 1999). Other justifications were that a joint reserve would help in fighting proposals of extractive industries in the area, delay plans to construct a dam at Wadi Fidan (Government of Israel, 1997), further development and protection of archeological sites and promote clearing of minefields along the border area (Harza JRV Group, 1997).
This ambitious proposal aimed to literally lift the border between the countries and was very innovative in this regard. The planners recognized this and referred to this aspect: “the initial and possibly greatest problem faced by the concept of Bi‐national Reserve is the border itself. The degrees of difficulty… reflect the progress of the Peace Process" (Harza JRV Group, 1997). The park proposal never materialized because of the deterioration of the political atmosphere as a result of the escalation of the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict, and because local pressure was placed on the Jordanian workers (of Palestinian origin), not to cooperate with their Israeli colleagues (Kliot, 2003).
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Figure no. 11: Dana Sheizaf – Expansion and Linkages. From: Harza JRV Group (1997). Jordan Rift Valley Integrated Developmental Study ‐ Prefeasibility studies for selected projects
3.3.3.7. Rahma‐Gharandal Sands Conservation Area Mentioned in the Regional Environmental Developmental programs of Israel and Jordan (Government of Israel, 1997; Harza, 1997), this undeveloped and non‐materialized plan was intended to preserve the only remaining extensive area of sand desert in Wadi Araba/Arava.
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The plan was to extend the Jordanian Sand Reserve Wadi‐Araba Sabkah (salt flat) southward to reach and connect with the Israeli Hai‐Bar Wildlife Reserve in order to create a bi‐national reserve covering the distinctive environments. The Regional Plans mentioned another project in the area which aimed to develop a desert tourism center in Gharandal‐Jordan (which had archeological remains of a Roman/Nabatean antique site) that would facilitate cross‐desert tourism activities in the region. This desert center was to be a “twin‐center” of an already operating desert tourism center in Israel (Government of Israel, 1997).
3.3.3.8. The Lowest Park on Earth was the most comprehensive and famous proposal for a trilateral park, planned for the Dead Sea region.94 The Dead Sea is shared between Jordan (on its eastern shores), Israel and the Palestinian Authority (on its western shores). The proposed peace park referred to all the surrounding areas of the Dead Sea and incorporated many existing natural and cultural existing sites. The plans were designed to promote tourism to the area and included natural, archeological, religious (mainly pilgrimage), spa, health and leisure features. The plans were extremely detailed and specified visiting places, visitor centers, day and night attractions, land and marine transportation, accommodations and more. Complementary projects suggested conducting joint research, creating a joint database, hosting international conferences, etc. (Foreign Affair Ministry, 1997). The plans emphasized developing cooperation, sharing knowledge and dividing fields of activities between the countries. Essentially, the project was designed to encourage each tourist to visit the entire circumference of the sea. As a result, all three riparian entities, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, would benefit from the park's existence. In order to encourage tourists to cross the borders, a special (easy) two‐day visa to enter Israel/Jordan was suggested (Tamkin, 1994). Planned tourism packages referred to the park as one integral unit (disregarding national borders), and all sites were to share a common logo, maps, leaflets, etc. Admittedly, an intentional blurring of borders was a part of this plan and mutual gains were the real engine of cooperation.
94 423m/1,388ft below sea level. 72
The proposal was first developed by the Transboundary Parks Sub‐group assembled at the Expert‐Level Meeting of the US‐Jordan‐Israel Trilateral Economic Committee (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994).95 Israeli representatives came from the tourism and environmental authorities and from "Tik‐Proyektim", an Israeli planning firm that coordinated this effort. Jordanian partners came from various local authorities and governmental ministries and were headed by Dr. Raez Faiz. Both groups worked in collaboration with the American Parks Authority.96 Mr. Rafael Benvenisty, an economist and advisor to the Israeli Ministry of Regional Cooperation said "At the beginning, the Jordanians did not like it because of the normalization97 it represented… they didn't want problems with the Palestinians" (Benvenisti, personal interview, February 6, 2011). Zeev Tamkin who headed the Israeli team reported, "At the professional level a great understanding was reached between the Israeli and the Jordanian delegations in regard to the goals and actions that needed to be taken in order to promote a park... At the formal level, the Jordanian delegation abstained from consolidating a joint statement. Its reasons for this abstention is the negotiated territories between Israel and the Palestinian Authority at the North of the Dead Sea"(Tamkin, personal interview, December 26, 2010). Once Palestinian representatives, led by Nabil Shaat the Minister of Planning, joined the Lowest Park on Earth working group (Hani Abu‐Dayyeh, 1996), things moved more smoothly. However, although funds from foreign governments were allocated for the development of the park, political problems interfered. At the time, Israel’s government changed, and the new regime refused to sign the plans at a ministerial level. Signing the agreement could have been precedent making by elevating Palestinian sovereignty claims on these territories even prior to a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the PA. Hence, the project reached a dead‐end and the Master Plan for the park was never drafted (Tamkin, personal interview, December 26, 2010).
The proposal was first presented to the public in the 1995's Amman Summit and has since appeared repeatedly in many Israeli developmental plans.98 Yet, the proposal remains
95 Convened prior the peace agreement and as a part of its preparation phase. 96 A joint study tour to the States hosted by the American Parks Authority took place in 1994 to jointly learn about existing parks and develop regional plans (Tamkin, 1994). 97 A process of normalizing ties with Israel which is criticized by those posing it will postpone or hinder the solution to the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict. 98 Lately, expressed in the 2008 Israeli TAMA‐13 plans, http://www.deadsea‐tma13.co.il/. 73
stalled at the first planning phase. In contrast to other Israeli‐Jordanian peace park initiatives that were indirectly affected by the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict, in this case, Palestinians are riparian to the Dead Sea and no planning processes could proceed before the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict was resolved.
Nevertheless, a few years later, there was an attempt to declare the Dead Sea area a UNESCO recognized biosphere reserve. This attempt was led by the Israeli‐Palestinian‐ Jordanian NGO, Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME). This initiative envisioned the creation of a trilateral management authority responsible for developing a regional master plan and coordinating national development patterns to achieve optimum benefits to the Dead Sea Basin as one unit (FOEME, 1999). It gained some official support within Israeli governmental ministries (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Tourism and Ministry of Science Culture and Sport), the Palestinian Ministry of Environment and also from local municipalities (Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian ones). Although planned as a collaborative effort, this initiative did not advance due to the same political reasons mentioned earlier. An UNESCO official explained: "as you are well aware, political endorsements will be needed at a further stage before such an official nomination can be sent to UNESCO" (As written by UNESCO Director Division of Ecological Sciences, Bridgewater, 2000).
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Figure no. 12 ‐ Suggested Boundaries for the Dead Sea Biosphere Reserve (FOEME, 2002). 75
3.3.3.9. The Jordan – River of Peace The Jordan River, located in the Jordan Valley, importance is rooted in the history, religion and culture of the region. The river holds various symbolic meanings for people inside and outside the region. In the Jordanian‐Israeli peace process the river was a source of hope for both sides. It was referred to as the “Valley of Peace,” by the late Jordanian King Hussein and as the "Peace Corridor," by Shimon Peres (at the time, the Israeli Minister of Regional Cooperation), where joint economic projects would flourish.99 The Jordan River became a locus for many environmental, cultural and religious tourism plans, among them were several cross‐border park initiatives. Rehabilitation of the Jordan River, which was, and still is, highly polluted and depleted, was the basis for all the suggested projects.
The bi‐national "Jordan Rift Valley Park/Nature Reserve" was proposed as part of the Israeli Programs for Regional Cooperation. It suggested a reserve that would stretch along 100 km of the Jordan River from the Sea‐of‐Galilee in the north all the way to its drains into the Dead Sea in the South (Government of Israel, 1997; Government of Israel, 1998).100 This proposal took advantage of the lush landscape of the DMZ across parts of the border zone. As in other DMZs or former war‐zones around the world, "the river's inaccessibility to the public… impacted favorably on the river banks, leaving them relatively immune to the intense development projects... The special serpentine route and marl slopes separating the two sections of the river valley have given rise to natural and landscape values that are unique to the area"(Government of Israel, 1997). Accordingly, infrastructure for eco‐tourism was planned as part of the park. A network of hiking paths, enabling access to the waterways, and view‐points of the area's flora and fauna and a reconstruction of adjacent archaeological sites was planned. This grand plan, as others, remained on paper.
99 For more please see (Arieli, 2012). 100 Though riparian are Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, the reserve was referred to as bi‐national. In earlier versions of these developmental plans, the park was mentioned as part of the Jordan Rift Valley Cultural Heritage Park, which was much more extensive in scope and was Trilateral. 76
3.4. 2000 and Onward Although planning began for several of the 1990s proposals, besides the RSMPP, none were executed. The deteriorating regional political situation brought to stagnation in cross‐border cooperation.
3.4.1. The Jordan River Peace Park [JRPP] is a 2015 ongoing effort led by Friends of the Earth Middle East, to combine two adjacent areas along the Jordan River into a joint peace park: the Al‐Bakoora/Naharayim area (Jordanian side), known as "the Peace Island". The island name commemorates the peace agreement between the two countries signed there. This area is at the junction of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers101 (and near the triangle border point with Syria) where the remains of the Rutenberg power‐station, the first hydroelectric power‐station in the Middle East, are located.102 The second area, on the Israeli side, is the Jeser‐Al‐Majama/Gesher area, at the historical Jordan River crossing point where the remains of Roman, Ottoman and British bridges are found.
Until 1994, the "Peace Island" was a borderland territory divided between Israel and Jordan. In the 1994 Peace Treaty between the States, sovereignty was transferred to Jordan and the physical border was marked on the branch of the river, west of the island. Despite official Jordanian sovereignty, the "Island" enjoys special status, exempting Israelis from obtaining an entrance visa to visit the site (based on Sinai's visa arrangement precedent mentioned above). Through a long‐term lease, Israel has temporary land rights on the Island. And indeed, the island’s lands are being cultivated by the Kibbutzim in the area, which are also the tours’ operator on site. In accordance with the 1994 peace agreement, the site has been developed as a tourist destination, symbolizing a new age of peace and collaboration between the two countries. The island is mutually run by the Israeli Kibbutz, Ashdot‐Yaakov,
101 For years it has been a place of strategic importance on the Syrian–African Rift. In April 1948, when the Israeli‐Arab war started, this was the first settlement to withstand an attack by the Arab Legion. In May of that year, it was also the focal point of an Iraqi attack on Israel (Gelbman, 2008). 102 A unique agreement with the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan was reached in 1927. It enabled Pinchas Rutenberg, founder of the Palestine Electric Company (PEC), to build the company’s main power station at Naharayim (which means two rivers, referring to the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers). The agreement gave the PEC (which later became the Israel Electric Corporation), rights to use land under Trans-Jordanian control. As part of the project three dams were built and, in 1932, the Naharayim plant began supplying electricity to both sides of the border, until it was blown up in 1948 (Gelbman, 2008). 77
and the Jordanian border‐police. The tourist site features the landscape of the juxtaposed rivers, the above mentioned historic and archeological components, an old British police station, historic Hejaz railway tracks and an old khan (caravanserai) from the Middle Ages (Gelbman, 2008). Since March 13, 1997, when seven Israeli girls on a school field trip to the site were shot dead by a deranged Jordanian guard, the site also featured a commemorative area.
The Peace Island was first mentioned as a potential site for a cross‐border park in the regional plans as a site that combined environmental and cultural features (Government of Israel, 1996; Harza, 1997). The plans centered on developing tourism (which was not necessarily environmentally sustainable), on refilling the old Naharaim Lake (an artificial lake that was part of the old hydroelectric power plant) and on promoting attractions and tourists facilities along its shores. Those included a promenade, boating facilities, a water amusement park, beaches and more (Government of Israel, 1997). As other plans, this too did not materialize.
Years later, in 2005, FOEME began developing a peace park proposal for the peace island area, proposing to combine it to the Jeser‐Al‐Majama/Gesher area.103 According to Elizabeth Yaari, FOEME’s project manager, the main impetus for the proposed park came from local mayors on both sides of the Jordan Valley (Yaari, personal interview, January 12, 2011). The municipalities of Muaz Bin Jabal (Jordan), the Jordan Valley Regional Council (Israel) and Beit Shean Regional Council (Israel) signed an MOU that aims "to create the peace park that would restore pride of place to the river valley and create new opportunities for the local populations" (FOEME, 2011). The activities of the park’s development were coordinated by FOEME, involved local authorities and both states’ Ministries of Tourism, Environment, Foreign Affairs, Regional Development and Agriculture (Yaari, 2011). The park has gone through a primary planning phase in collaboration with international academic bodies and was accompanied by international publicity that assisted in fund raising. The proposal for the site’s development was first and foremost based on the mutual rehabilitation of the
103 FOEME also planned developing another peace park at "Kaser el Yehud" baptism site north of the Dead Sea. They decided to drop this project since "things were too complicated for us, as an NGO, since the current tourist site is run by Israelis in the middle of Occupied Territories" (Yaari, 2011). 78
river. It aimed to establish a peace park that would combine the natural habitat (emphasizing the ecological theme of bird migration given the intention to re‐flood the artificial lake on the site), with the cultural and historical heritage of the site. Ultimately, creating a unique eco‐tourist attraction is their goal. According to the plans, the park would include four gates, a visitor center and nature trails connected to the cultural heritage sites (please see Figures no. 13 and 14). Citizens from both countries would be able to enter the site without a visa and could also stay overnight in designated eco‐lodges (which would be the rehabilitated homes of the power plant workers). As mentioned above, the Jordanian portion of the proposed park's area already enjoys a special sovereignty status that could assist the progress of declaring the park's territory as a joint one.
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Figure no. 13: The Jordan River Peace Park Illustration. www.foeme.org
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Figure no. 14: Jordan River Peace Park – Site Plan. From: Jordan River Peace Park Draft Pre‐ Feasibility Study. www.foeme.org
3.4.2. Alexander‐Zaymar Peace Park is another ongoing effort currently developed by the municipalities of Emek‐Hefer (in Israel) and Tulkarm (in the Palestinian Territories). Over the last 14 years, these communities have successfully cooperated in rehabilitating and restoring their shared Alexander/Zaymar River. The project's leaders realized that "we were 81
dealing with something more extensive, not merely with environmental hazards… [but with] regional cooperation" (Brandeis interviewed in: Rinat, 2008). Thus, according to Amos Brandeis, the lead Israeli planner, they decided “to stop talking only of problems and start thinking of opportunities” (Brandeis, personal interview, November 1, 2010). The planners settled on creating a joint park along the river banks. While being unaware of former local/regional initiatives for cross‐border parks, they "Googled" this idea. They then contacted the Peace Park Foundation (based in South Africa) and invited its CEO, Prof. Willem Van Riet, to consult with them. Two cross‐border workshops followed, one including the communities' mayors and the other was a planning workshop that included German, Israeli, Palestinian and South African planners. Those workshops led to a basic plan for a peace park and the production of fundraising materials (see Figures 15 and 16 ‐ brochure and map below).
The park is designed as a cross‐border green corridor along the stream that includes public parks, hiking trails, rehabilitation of forests, creation of "green basins" and more. It would be jointly managed and would include visitor centers and educational activities. The project’s declaration statement speaks of "A park for all the people who live along the river; Local cooperation, simultaneously across boundary" and wishes "to function as one in the future" (Alexander River Restoration Project, 2009). The organizers acknowledged the negative impact of the on the ground political reality on implementation of the initiative. Accordingly, the Israeli head of the project declared that he wanted to “keep it local", referring to himself as a planner, not a peacemaker (Brandeis, personal interview, November 1, 2010).
Currently, the project is seeking funds and has received some governmental support from the Israeli Ministry of Regional Cooperation (Hamisrad Lepituach Hanegev ve Hagalil) for general planning. Brandeis mentioned that "the first‐phase planning would include only the Israeli side, in which we will work on rehabilitation and development of Schem (Nablus) River… I stand in contact with our partners in Tulkarm, however I do not know if this would be done in cooperation" (Brandeis, personal communication, July 12, 2013). The difficulties of joint cross‐border planning under a conflict situation would be discussed in chapter 6.
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Figure no. 15: Brochure of the Alexander‐Zaymar Peace Park
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Figure no. 16: Alexander Zaymar River Peace Park Map.
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3.4.3. The Golan Heights Peace Park (GHPP) Israel occupied the Syrian Golan Heights area during the 1967 war and since has populated and annexed it. The area has an outstanding global significance in terms of biodiversity and has become a favorite recreational area for Israelis. Peace park proposals for different segments of the area were suggested several times in the last two decades. Those proposals aspired to assist both sides to compromise on core issues of the conflict such as sovereignty, security, borders and water allocation while enabling the Israeli population an avenue to continued visitation of the area.
Proposals were raised by environmentalists, policy makers and negotiators in official and unofficial negotiations. Some proposals were initiated simultaneously, but mostly were not directly connected to one another (Twite, 1994; Brown, 1995; Ron, 1998; ICG, 2002; ICG, 2007; Liel and Soliman, 2007; Greenfield‐Gilat, 2009; Hof, 2009). The repeating premises and elements in the different peace park proposals were: a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and placing the area under Syrian sovereignty in its entirety, demilitarization without repopulation of civilians, continued flow of natural streams to the Sea of Galilee, the application and enforcement of nature reserve conservation standards across the park's area, Israeli entry visa exemption, and establishment of joint or collaborated management of the park.
The various GHPP proposals were fundamentally different from all of the aforementioned peace park initiatives since they represent pre‐agreement104 initiatives, as opposed to post‐ conflict ones. The suggested park aimed to directly promote official conflict resolution on the national/diplomatic level. The parks’ initiators hoped the park would act as a tool to create a framework for facilitating compromise on the core disputed issues: demilitarization, border delineation and water allocation. This compromise would be coupled with a detailed normalization process to enhance peace between the nations. Thus, nature conservation served herein primarily as a means to an end: ending conflict.
104 The proposals were raised in the midst of the active conflict between Israel and Syria. In contrast to the Palestinians, with whom Israel has no peace but had a dialogue and prior interim agreements, with the Syrians there was and there is still a cease‐fire status. Past negotiations were never concluded. 85
Another incentive for establishing a park on the Golan Heights was its potential to influence and increase Israeli, and to a lesser extent Syrian, public support for the peace agreement. The park would have enabled Israelis continued access to the Golan Heights nature reserves and to the entire Sea of Galilee circumference. This continued access could have ameliorated the psychological hardship of losing sovereignty over the area and the evacuation of Israeli settlements. Syrians would have been granted recreational access to the Sea of Galilee, an important psychological boost for them (International Crisis Group, 2007).
The Golan Peace Park proposals are discussed in great detail in chapter 5.
3.5. Discussion and Summary
This chapter unveiled the unknown history of peace park proposals along Israeli‐Arab borders and provided a wide overview of the many distinctive proposals that were raised. A full comparison chart of the peace park proposals is provided in chart no. 1. While there are almost no successful models of peace parks in the Middle East, many different agents initiated this concept several times in the past. In this author's opinion, this signifies and pinpoints the appealing nature of the peace park concept. Also, peace parks are granted considerable power as a model for future cross‐border interactions. The inquiry and study of this history hold insightful lessons especially in light of successful peace parks worldwide and the concept’s international support. However, given the unsuccessful realization of the vast majority of the aforementioned proposals, the question of whether this concept is realistic and appropriate to Israel's border remains not fully answered.
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Chart no. 1: comparison characteristics of peace park initiatives ** All the initiatives that are mentioned in this study are presented herein regardless of their impact, scope or level of development***
Park Year Location Scope Sovereignty Planned Proposing Joint/ one Declaration of Peace Park's routines, Funding Involved other and cross‐ Management and involved sided/ intentions building/ projects and communities border status institutions external Peace technicalities and proposal making Individuals The Peace 1977 South Sinai 12,000 km2 Egyptian bi‐national SPNI / Israeli Ecological Peace Entrance fee, N/A, the Local Bedouin * was Park in authority with Avraham conservation, building developing plan tribes; sent to Southern international Shaked peaceful villages for proposed International Sadat Sinai representatives. relations, workers and that funding and national demilitarization tourists inside the will be tourists park's area, shared various tourist between the enterprises governments (hiking, diving and , the UN and more). international bodies. South Sinai 1979 South Sinai N/A Egyptian Israel and Egypt Cornellia Hann Outside Ecological Peace N/A N/A N/A Was International Oberlander, proposal, conservation, building sent to Park Canadian Canadian good relations Canadia Landscape through joint n PM architect management The Ezuz JNF 1987 Ezuz‐Nitzana 2 km2 Israeli N/A JNF Outside/ Peace Peace N/A JNF, N/A park proposal area Israel Israeli commemoration, building estimate: 5 and the (next to (missing population Million $. Negev area Egyptian details**) encounters, border) development of the area The East 1995 North Sinai Not specified Israel, Joint with the EU, Local Joint with EC Tourist Peace Tourist features N/A N/A Were Mediterranea (Egypt ) – Gaza Palestine, European Governmental support, as development building along the beach first n Riviera and (Palestine) – Egypt. Commission agencies part of larger with Joint Nature and separate raised in Dune Park Israel No specifics support development reserves/parks connected Dune Cairo about border plans for parks Econom elimination (SEMED) strengthening ic cross‐border Summit cooperation The Red Sea 1995 Egypt‐Jordan‐ Not specified Israel, Jordan, Tri‐national Respective Within tourist Trilateral coral‐ Peace Nature Riviera ‐ Israel Egypt. government plans of TABA reef park and a building conservation Trilateral No specifics offices, development desert park maps and Coral‐Reef about border researchers, al plans. EC within tourism preliminary Park and a elimination NGOs, the assistance. developmental materials were
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Desert Park World Bank, plans. General produced under Global Coral declaration of the general Monitoring enhanced tourist planning. Reef Network, cooperation Did not reach a local councils developing phase and local of the park communities. component The Red Sea Jordan‐Israel over 10 non‐ Jordan‐Israel. Bi national Respective Joint To foster trans‐ Peace Joint monitoring, USAID/MERC Coopera Marine Peace sequential Marine resource boundary building joint research, tion Park kilometer reserves, no management cooperation and joint study proceed need for border institutions, enhance programs. No in
elimination/ governmental conservation and public certain
alteration. agencies and sustainable use participation/edu respects 1994.
2001 marine of the coral reef cation beside until ‐ in research ecosystem some unilateral today 1999
institutions, public awareness long in US National events. after declared Oceanic and the
first Atmospheric funded
Administratio phase Was Established n ended. The Arava 1996 Jordan‐ Israel. 10 km2 (with Jordan, Israel. Bi national JNF/KKL, Israeli To serve as a Peace Connecting N/A N/A Peace Park Southern the core of The core area Israeli PM proposal physical and building nature reserves, Jordan Rift 0.5km2). of a the park office, Israel cultural bridge establishing a Valley (Arava) will enjoy joint‐ Land Authority between two joint theme park sovereignty, and the local countries, with educational will lay in a City Councils promote centers, museums expansion of of Eilat and conservation, and more. the border and Eilot tourism and will be peace borderless. Dana‐Sheizaf Israel/Jordan 760 km2 Specified lifting Bi national Respective Joint work Ecological goals, Peace expand and unite 1.9Milion $ Local Bedouin prefeasi Bi‐national Arava area the physical government tourism and building Jordanian Dana tribes; bility Nature border to allow and HARZA cooperation. and Israeli Nahal‐ International study Reserve crossing of international Sheizaf nature and national was animals. company. reserves in the tourists conduct Jordanian Arava/Araba ed. Royal Society region. for the Conservation of Nature, the Israeli Nature Reserves Authority SPNI. Rahma‐ 1997 Israel Jordan Not specified Lifting the Bi national Governmental Appeared in Tourism, Peace extend and N/A Gharandal border programs Israeli ecological, building connect the
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Sands governmental archeological Jordanian Sand Conservation development Reserve Wadi‐ Area al regional Araba Sabkah plans (salt flat), with the Israeli Hai‐Bar Wildlife Reserve The Lowest 1995 trilateral park – Not specified Borders will not Tri‐national Governmental Regional Cooperation Peace Extremely Initial plans Local regional Park on Earth (since Israel, Jordan, be lifted. ministries and development through Tourism, building detailed plans were funded councils were appear Palestine However agencies, al plans. archeology, specifying visiting as part of part to the ed discussions on ministries, Trilateral nature places, visitor the regional planning. repeat more crossing local councils, planning, conservation and centers and developmen edly in points took American international more. attractions. tal plans. many place. Parks support Complementary Donor Israeli Authority, projects Countries develo suggested joint were pment research, joint supporting al database, and plans). more The Jordan 1994, Israel‐Jordan along 100 Israeli and Appeared in Governmental Ecology, tourism, Peace eco‐tourism, N/A N/A Rift Valley 1997, (in a km of the Jordanian. Non regional plans and culture, building waterways, view‐ Park/Nature 1998 preliminary river, from specified about developmental Harza reports cooperation points, hiking Reserve version it was the Sea‐of‐ physical border options planning paths, trilateral) Galilee to issues – Israeli archaeological the Dead Sea administration sites
The Jordan 1994, Israel and "the Peace Special Joint Bi‐national Currently: Joint Ecology, tourism, Peace In 1994: artificial Local regional River Peace 2005‐ Jordan Island" Israeli and FOEME – with development culture, building lake, cross‐border councils and Park ongoin and the Jordanian. support and cooperation environmental kibbutz are part g Jeser‐Al‐ Special status participation and cultural park. to the planning. Majama/ of the Peace of local and Tourism Gesher area Island to be national development 8 km2 extended. ministries and Promenade, offices. boating facilities, a water park, In the past beaches. appeared in in 2005: regional Rehabilitation of developmenta the river, l plans restoration of sites (historic and archeological), ecotourism, bird watching. Alexander‐ 2008‐ Israel and Unspecified Israeli and Separated and Local Joint Ecology, tourism, Peace Public parks, N/A Local Zaymar Peace ongoin Palestine Palestinian, No coordinated communities development cooperation building hiking trails, communities Park g lifting of with partial rehabilitation of were the borders at support from A park for all the forests, creation initiators.
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current phase ministries, people who live of "green basins", Peace Park along the river; educational foundation Local center and more. cooperation, simultaneously across boundary The Golan 1994, Israel and Syria Various sizes Syrian Different Mostly Joint Ecology, tourism, Peacemaki Parks, educational N/A Not involved in Heights Peace 1998, from a few sovereignty. suggestions, unilateral cooperation, ng and centers, joint planning. Park – Set of 2002, hundred Some proposals including proposals, land Peacebuildi research, joint Various proposals* 2004, meters to a mentioned no international some management, ng water committee situations in (repeating 2009, third of the borders reality. representation discussed water and nature implementatio elements) 2009 Golan during official management, conservation n Heights and track II demilitarization, committee, (evacuation/res negotiations nature renewable energy ettlement). conservation
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3.5.1. The Peace Park Concept and Environmental Peacemaking The Environmental Peacemaking writings place two conditions on environmental actions to successfully affect political realities. The initial implementation of these conditions can be found in the most advanced peace park proposals. First, the Strengthening of Post‐ Westphalian Governance, i.e., enhancement of cross‐border linkages between different civil society actors (NGOs, local municipalities and scientists), took place and theoretically could have intensified over time in several of the described initiatives. Second, Changes in the Strategic Climate among the States did occur. Cross‐border planning processes included agents from different governmental ministries and institutions that cooperated amongst themselves as well as with local communities, academics, foreign actors and global institutions. This cooperation, had it been realized and developed, could have fostered trust and strengthened peace between the governments. The partial fulfillment of both conditions is noticeable in the RSMPP, the Dead Sea peace park and the JRPP initiatives. In other cases, initial steps of creating networks and influencing officials' conduct can be detected.
Although most of the discussed initiatives were part of the general "peace euphoria" era, many confidence and trust issues between Israel and its neighboring countries were not resolved even years after peace was signed. For example, when Harza's grand comprehensive environmental developmental plan for the Jordan Valley was launched, an Israeli Foreign Affairs delegate reported that at the event, Jordanians were complaining about Israel's lack of information‐sharing and transparency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997). And indeed, evidently, in internal discussions about the way Israeli Ministries should cooperate with Harza it was said "though we committed to help Harza in collecting research data… we did not commit to transfer sensitive information or one with a strategic importance to the state of Israel" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mr. Arbel), 1996). Assuming this mind set was prevalent one can suppose that it had a negative effect on the parks’ development processes. It seems that environmental projects did not create a substantial change in the strategic climate, and suspicion and lack of trust continued. Of note: the quoted personnel were not environmentalists but diplomats.
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The Environmental Peacemaking literature foresees the development of a platform of dialogue as part of cross‐border environmental projects. A dialogue that can eventually affect the political reality (Conca and Dabelko, 2002). Given the early stages of most of the peace park initiatives, it is doubtful that a substantial platform of dialogue was created. Therefore, the initiatives likely had neither a peace promoting effect nor a spillover effect on other arenas of cooperation. However, when examining environmental projects that did materialize, wherein a platform of cross‐border cooperation was solidified, it is still hard to identify a meaningful impact on political realities. For example, research that analyzed Israel and Palestine’s joint hazardous waste management, an undoubtedly essential environmental cooperation, showed that even when a solid platform of dialogue and cooperation developed and endured for years, political prioritization (e.g. in the form of security and territorial issues) derailed cooperation in many technical spheres (Alleson, Levin et al., 2013). Notwithstanding, this kind of environmental cooperation in which a shared negative threat is managed is more likely to succeed.
The Environmental Peacemaking literature highlights the fact that the identification of shared environmental (negative) threats is psychologically more effective at producing cooperative outcomes than focusing on joint positive opportunities (Conca and Dabelko, 2002; Ali, 2005). Hence, peace parks generally suffer from this "psychological deficiency", as they are not primarily aimed at solving common threats but at instead jointly working towards positive goals. Undoubtedly, any nature conservation effort is in fact a response to a general or a specific "negative threat" in the form of unsustainable development, loss of biodiversity and more. In the examined cases, the RSMPP, the JRPP and the Alexander‐ Zaymar parks had a specified "joint‐tangible‐threat" as a declared motivation to join forces: "Without acute environmental threats that the Jordanians were stressed about, it is possible that the dynamic was different. Their willingness to go deep into the matter came also from this fear" said Avi Perevolotsky in regards to the RSMPP (Perevolotsky, personal interview, January 25, 2011). The Alexander‐Zaymar cooperation began because the communities needed to rehabilitate their shared river. Similarly, the ongoing JRPP initiative was declared as first and foremost a concrete step towards rehabilitating the Jordan River (FOEME), thus
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relying on the shared “negative treat" that should enable easier first steps towards cross‐ border cooperation.
However, balancing between environmental aspirations and political ones is a complicated and delicate task. Neither the Alexander‐Zaymar initiative, which strives for better cross‐ border cooperation, nor the RSMPP emphasized their peacemaking efforts (although both were named peace parks). This is in accordance with the global experience that practitioners and park managers prefer not to pronouncedly bring the conflict into the project (as elaborated in chapter 2). In both cases a mutual environmental threat served as an initial motivation for a joint action, the political conflict was not targeted directly and cooperation persisted in a successful way. On the other hand, although the ecological performance of these projects might be significant, their political effect or their "peace performance" are limited, and might be confined to those individuals or communities that take a direct part in the process. In both cases, issues of sovereignty and borders were not part of the discussions which made them, in a way, easier to manage.
In contrast, the JRPP, which was also founded on the basis of solving a joint environmental threat and creating joint opportunities, loudly declared its peacemaking aspirations. Therefore, despite its steady growth in terms of public support, its path to implementation was carved slowly. While the ongoing JRPP's political effect remained unknown, the question regarding which sort of peace parks tactics (focusing on ecology or emphasizing political aspirations) would affect nature in the best way also remains unanswered.
Nonetheless, it can be clearly seen and it is not surprising that the proposals that achieved the most progress were the ones that were planned and developed in cooperation, such as the Lowest Park on Earth, Dana‐Sheizaf Bi‐national Nature Reserve, RSMPP, the JRPP and the Alexander‐Zaymar Peace Park. For each of these parks, a joint regional team was set up and regional dialogue that included local communities and councils was initiated. The rest of the proposals were either unilateral initiatives (Arava, South Sinai and some of the GHPP initiatives) or were part of regional developmental plans. These plans did not necessarily included a substantial cross‐border dialogue, at times were too grandiose and pursued
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incompatible goals (Kliot, 1997) or included proposals that were hastily suggested and briefly sketched (Tamkin, 2010).
Carius (2006) claims that in political practice, environmental cooperation hits a ceiling when it is confronted with foreign and security policy considerations that it cannot address. Indeed, excluding the GHPP, all the other peace park proposals were created only after some official governmental dialogue existed between the sides and the window of opportunity opened. But, once this window was closed due to regional instabilities, projects that could not overcome the political reality were halted or abandoned. This sheds light on the uniqueness of the GHPP proposals since "using conservation measures as a direct means of resolving an armed conflict is the most consequential use of environmental peace‐ building, yet this approach is still in early stages of global acceptance" (Ali, 2007). The GHPP proposals represented a viable option for environmental peacemaking that incorporated realistic policy solutions. These solutions tried to break the "ceiling" of security policy considerations by creating the de‐facto integration of environmental issues into "high politics" and addressing the conflict holistically, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5. Nevertheless, "Skeptics will still argue that cooperation on environmental issues…will not translate into a larger resolution of the conflict" (Ali, 2007, 338). The described initiatives may also lead to a conclusion that the potential of peace parks in peacemaking is limited and weaker than their acclaimed role by the literature and by global supporting institutes. While this might be true, making such a claim based on the collected case studies might be biased, since the process by which peace parks can play a positive role in peacebuilding is premised on a series of steps105 that were not properly taken herein. Only in the more advanced stages when such initiatives are realized and when compromising them would cause significant losses to the respective parties, can peace parks’ role as regional and political stabilizers be assessed.
As elaborated earlier, during the 1990's, political stabilization and peace were envisioned, planned and promoted according to an economic rationale that was pushed by the regional leadership. "Regional Economic Integration" was one of these leaders’ ultimate goals, emphasizing "the creation of a regional community of nations with a common market and
105 Implementation steps are specified in (Ali, 2007, p. 340). 94
elected centralized bodies, modeled on the European community" (Government of Israel, 1994). Many peace park proposals were envisioned and planned as part of regional plans. While peace parks have several economic features, the proposals discussed in this work have hardly presented a well‐elaborated economic rationale.106 One might be inclined to claim that under the framework of such an "operationalized" peace process, a peace park that does not demonstrate an economic vision cannot prevail. Since many other cross‐ border initiatives that were simultaneously developed, economically sound, and eventually did not prevail either, this author asserts that it was not the parks' lack of economic sustainability that stalled their creation.
3.5.2. The Role and Motivations of Professionals According to the Environmental Peacemaking writings, environmentalists and planners inherently hold a cross‐border perception that makes them more suitable for cross‐border environmental cooperation. For instance, planner Tamkin declared "This concept [of peace parks, S.S] is almost trivial to me. It is a great tool for development and conflict moderation" (Tamkin, personal interview, December 27, 2010). Indeed, relying on regional agendas, environmentalists were the ones who developed and promoted the majority of the above‐ mentioned initiatives. The initiatives were driven by different development, tourism, ecological and political agendas.
However, an effective impact on peace, as elaborated above, can only happen once a transition from environmental to political cooperation occurs. The question is, could (and can) those professionals (each in their institutional capacity) lead such complex political projects, involving borders, sovereignty and sometimes security aspects, in the harsh political reality of the Middle East? At least in Israel, the willingness of environmentalists to take a political stand even regarding environmental issues that confront security institutions is limited (Sadeh, 2007). On top of that, enthusiastically pursuing cross‐border projects might impose a personal toll of professional or social stigmatization, a risk that might affect employment or create other social tensions (Schoenfeld, 2013). Moreover, many of the
106 For a critical and interesting debate on the connections between peace parks and a Neoliberal perspective see: (Büscher, 2013). 95
above mentioned projects were governmentally driven, thus ascribing less power to independent decisions of individuals. Exceptions are the GHPP proposals that were promoted mainly by politicians or policy makers, who grasped the park as part of the political resolution, and its environmental aspects instrumentally (as will be further demonstrated).
On top of that, individuals act according to their institutional constraints and motivations. By and large, the Israeli government’s main impetus was to create cross‐border relations and border‐zone developments in order to enhance regional stability by creating economic ties. NGOs motivations were primarily nature conservation, accompanied with a great will for peaceful cooperation. However, this dichotomy is not unequivocal since many of the initiatives were jointly‐promoted by governmental and non‐governmental agencies. And, some were created in collaboration with private firms that had different motivations. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the sequence of peace park proposals reflected changes in the balance between government and civil society in Israel that occurred over the years.
Professional and institutional motivations are not enough to drive and explain individuals' possible impacts on peace. While environmentalists have a professional tendency to work across borders, they too, as individuals, need to go through a change of their perceptions on conflict as a prerequisite for an environmental project to affect peace (Ali, 2007, 110). In many of the examined cases, cross‐border relations were inconsistent, infrequent and complicated (if they at all existed). At times, even when cross‐border encounters did take place, there was a tendency to ignore the political conflict in order to limit inner‐group tensions (as mentioned by the heads RSMPP (Crosby, personal interview, July 16, 2012)), to create facts and projects "on ground" and to get the "wheels of peace" rolling and the tourism revenues flowing (Tamkin, 2010). Different stages of environmental development, cultural perceptions and language barriers further complicated the dialogue.107 Therefore, it is doubtful if the cooperation was sufficient to allow such a perception‐changing process to occur.
107 For example, "both in Jordan and in Egypt there isn't a culture of nature excursions. The Egyptians were sure that our hikes [Israelis touring Sinai's mountains, S.S] were with espionage purposes… the structure and the language are different, it was hard to develop the dialogue" (Perevolotsky, personal interview, January 25, 2011). 96
3.5.3. Borders and Sovereignty Borders, border‐crossing and sovereignty issues are at the core of the peace park concept, as it is supposed to create an interstitial space where border‐area expansion allows human encounters and animal migration. Throughout the Israeli‐Arab peace process, mainly during the "Peace Euphoria Era", when borders were discussed and agreed upon, cross‐border or open‐border ideas flourished. Some claim that initiatives raised at that time emerged prematurely, especially with regards to the Israeli‐Palestinian relations. "In order for environment to ‘know no borders‘ there is a need for set borders… before ’expanding the pie of gains’, basic things needed to be agreed upon… as long as the sovereignty issue was not solved with the Palestinians, we could not discuss nature reserves", said Dror Amir, former assistant director‐general of international relation in the Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection (Amir, 2010, personal interview, November 19, 2010). Although integral to the peace park concept, statements about the border status, sovereignty and visa‐regimes were not emphasized in most of the proposals. It seems that almost none of the abovementioned initiatives truly aspired to diminish sovereignty and create an ex‐territory where nature s the ruler.
Nevertheless, in the more advanced proposals the border issue was discussed, even if it was not resolved108: In the JRPP proposals an expansion of an already existing area of diminished sovereignty between the borders was suggested with the intention of reciprocality – i.e., that the park would be set on both countries lands. In the Lowest Park on Earth initiative, there was a stated will to create more border‐crossing activities that would demand more crossing points, but there was not an expressed will to eliminate borders' physical existence all together. In the Arava Peace Park initiative the plan was to build and rely on the "non‐ sovereignty" or "joint sovereignty" status of the park's joint‐core as a unique feature that would add value to the visitors' experience. The RSMPP did not relate to any physical borders because those do not exist undersea. The Dana‐Sheizaf was the only proposal which clearly expressed the need to lift the border. In the GHPP proposals, the sovereignty issue
108 During the 1990's some concrete actions to open new cross points along the Israeli‐Jordanian border as part of these proposals took place, some were in an advanced stages of bureaucratic procedures (Tamkin; Benvenisti, 2011). 97
was clear and the exact borderline along the lake's edges was intentionally blurred by the park so the conflict on its delineation might be avoided. The Sinai's park proposal was to be under Egyptian sovereignty without questioning of any border issue.
The Golan Heights and the Sinai proposals are unique in the sense that the parks were planned to be located solely on one country's land and under its sovereignty (without any reciprocality), whereas the environmental issues would be jointly managed. These two park proposals highlight a critical point, discussed in later chapters. One can look at peace parks initiatives as re‐colonizing tools. I.e., designed for spaces to be shortly withdrawn‐from or those previously under Israeli control. Other proposals that involved Palestinian territories (The Lowest Park on Earth, Alexander‐Zaymar and the Sand Dune Park along the Mediterranean coast) could also be viewed as such.
As elaborated in chapter 2, considerable changes in the global perceptions of borders took place during the examined period. These changes were reflected in the park‐proposals' development. If, after the fall of the Soviet Union during the 1990s, opening borders was de‐ rigueur, then after 9/11, "the previous perceived notion of a “borderless world” has been replaced by a more careful, contextually sensitive, and historically contingent point of view in which “de‐bordering” and “re‐bordering” are seen as two sides of the same coin" (Lin, 2005, 557). Accordingly, but also influenced by regional realities that changed after the year 2000, the newest and ongoing peace park initiatives (Alexander‐Zaymar, Golan‐Heights, JRPP) did not aspire to open and remove borders as the 1990s proposals did. But these proposals did address human interactions and the lifting of borders as wishful hopes.
To conclude, this chapter provides an overview of the rich history of peace park initiatives along Israeli borders. At times, some initiatives were portrayed as apolitical, aimed at nature conservation and tourism promotion. But in fact they were political in their incorporated cross‐border views and peace optimism (perhaps even naïve and unrealistic). They used a creative and hopeful language in describing their work as a cornerstone in building peaceful relations and in creating a physical and conceptual bridge between the nations. Chapter 6 will discuss and further analyze these themes.
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4. Chapter 4: Sinai’s Nature Conservation Advocacy (1977‐1983) 4.1. Introduction
On March 26, 1979, an historic peace agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel. According to the agreement, Israel was to withdraw entirely from the Sinai Peninsula (henceforth Sinai) and Israelis that were living in Sinai were to be evacuated from it. The agreement did not refer to the environment or to nature conservation.
This chapter elucidates a previously unexplored set of relations and an unknown piece of history in the heavily‐researched arena of the Israeli‐Arab conflict. It shows that in the first years following the Israeli‐Egyptian peace negotiations and agreement (1977‐1983), despite the alienation and disconnection characterizing the formal relations between the countries, the peace process served as a catalyst for the development of environmentalism in Egypt. As part of this development, Israeli environmentalists, assisted by and working in parallel with international environmentalists, advocated Sinai's nature conservation with partial success. A peace park proposal was part of their efforts.
In those years, certain circumstances and conditions originating from peace (such as a tendency to "Egyptianize" Sinai as a re‐conquering act in a demilitarized space), coupled with other global environmental trends, created a spillover effect that pushed forward the emergence of Egyptian environmentalism.109 This resulted in improved environmental management and conditions in Sinai which contributed to local and regional stability, and therefore further consolidated the peace. Specifically, conserving Sinai's nature, which soon constituted a key component and impetus of Israeli tourism in Sinai (now “international tourists”), enabled the existence and continuation of one of the only arenas for Israeli‐ Egyptian's cross‐border relations.
This chapter examines why, how and by whom those actions were performed, what can be learned regarding the peace and environment nexus in post‐conflict settings and on the possible role of environmentalists as peacemakers. It focuses primarily on the Israeli
109 A discursive remark must be stressed: when writing about environmentalism/environmentalists in this chapter, one must remember that the described case took place starting at the end of the 70's. Thus, more accurate terms could have been conservationism/conservationists. However, I chose to use the term environmentalism because these actions eventually contributed to the emergence of Egyptian environmentalism that exceeded nature conservation purposes. 99
perspective and secondarily on the international one. The chapter begins with an extensive background section, describing various aspects of Sinai’s geography, environment, geopolitical history and status, with an emphasis on nature conservation institutions, the peace process and its ramifications to the area. The following part contains the case study. This section begins with the description of Israeli environmentalists' emotional conception of Sinai and their self‐nominated role as its guardians. The environmental imaginaries theoretical concept is being utilized in order to better comprehend the transition from feelings into action. Next, a brief background on global and local processes leading to changes in Egyptian environmentalism between 1978 and 1983 is provided. The chapter continues with the description of the advocacy for Sinai's conservation in two phases: a "cautious‐optimistic phase", when hopes for direct relations between Israeli and Egyptian environmental communities existed, and a "disillusionment phase", which is characterized by a shift towards indirect actions mediated by international agents. . Throughout this section, developments in Egypt's environmentalism are demonstrated. This chapter ends with an analysis and a discussion, utilizing two strands of theories: the advocacy network theory is used to integrally analyze the complex local, regional and global activities and the participating individuals. The Environmental Peacemaking writings are utilized in order to discuss the environmentalists' impact, their potential role as peacemakers and the general manifestation of peace and the environment nexus in this post‐conflict setting.
4.2. Background 4.2.1. Sinai Peninsula
"The reward of the Sinai is the solitude it brings, the sense of smallness against vastness, the suspension of time against eternity… the spectacle that no lens can catch... It is the conjunction of history, wilderness and bewitching grandeur that casts the spell (Shipler, 1981, 21).
Sinai's pristine nature constitutes the starting point for this chapter’s story. Alongside it, the area's historic, geographic and geostrategic contexts are of importance. The Sinai Peninsula extends over 61,000 km2, from the Mediterranean Sea coast to the Gulf of Suez and to the
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Gulf of Aqaba (the Red Sea). It is comprised of three geomorphologic areas: a mountainous south, with peaks reaching 2500m; a vast central plain; and a northern Mediterranean sandy coast. Both seas are of high commercial importance, because and in the Suez Gulf substantial quantities of gas and patrol are extracted.
Throughout history, Sinai acted as a land bridge, linking Africa and the Middle East. This was the traditional route of the Exodus through which the Israelites purportedly reached the Promised Land (passing through Mount Sinai). Likewise, it was the path by which Islam arrived in Africa. Thus, Sinai holds a special place in the history of Christians, Jews, and Muslims. However, Sinai became a popular tourist destination not so much because of its historic importance but mainly due to its natural splendors, "Rich in pastel cliffs and canyons… startling green oases, the desert meets the sparkling sea in a long string of secluded beaches and vivid coral reefs" (Shipler, 1981, 21). The peninsula encompasses a combination of unique wildlife and landscapes of desert and dramatic mountains, beautiful coral reefs and magnificent oases.
Sinai's northern border was set in 1906 between Israel (then the Ottoman Empire) and Egypt, and after WWI it was recognized as an international border. The 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt adopted the international border, except along the Gaza Strip, which remained under Egyptian sovereignty. From its western/southern side, Sinai is divided from the Egyptian mainland by the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez. As a frontier province, at the junction of Africa and Asia, Sinai has always been a strategic buffer between the Nile Valley and Egypt’s eastern neighbors. In many respects, however, the Suez Canal remains the "real" eastern border of Egypt in mainland‐Egyptian eyes, with Sinai seen as a semidetached region whose territorial status is defined by geo‐strategic circumstances. This calls Sinai’s Egyptian national and cultural identity into (Dayan Center, 1980; International Crisis Group, 2007). Not only for Egyptians, but also for many Israelis, Sinai is perceived as an ex‐territory, and is not seen as a part of the "Real Egypt" (Uriely, Maoz et al., 2009). However, being the heart of the Egyptian‐Israeli frontier and sharing a border with Palestinian Gaza, renders Sinai extremely strategic value to Egypt, Israel, Palestine and other groups from outside the region (International Crisis Group, 2007).
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4.2.2. Sinai under Israeli Regime
Sinai was taken under Israeli control in the 1967 war110 and provided Israel with a valuable strategic hinterland. Similar to the current status in West Bank (and the Golan Heights until 1981), Sinai was not annexed to Israel but was held under military governance. In 1968, a civil administration was established to address the local Bedouin tribes and new Israeli settlers living in the area.111 In the following years, several Israeli settlements were built, mainly along the eastern shores of the Gulf of Aqaba and the west‐northern Mediterranean shores (Rafah area, southern of Gaza Strip). Around 7,000 Israelis lived there.
Under Israeli rule, the Sinai Peninsula gradually became an important source of tourism income. Prior to that, revenues from the area were related to extraction of oil and other minerals (Ben‐Shahar, Fishelson et al., 1989). Tourism developed along the Aqaba coast and in the southern mountainous region. Israel's Nature Reserve Authority,112 which was responsible for developing and maintaining parks throughout Israel, started operating in Sinai intensively, due to the growing flow of tourists. The governmental interest, represented by the NRA, was to develop tourism without damaging the ecological balance of the desert. By a special legislative action, the nature conservation laws of Israel were extended to Sinai and were enforced by nature reserve rangers (Lavie, 1990, 67). These rules applied for Israeli settlers, tourists and Bedouin residents alike. Between 1967 and 1982, the NRA declared 98% of the Gulf of Aqaba coastline, extensive parts of the Suez and the Mediterranean coasts, mountain areas, and Lake Bardawil as “Protected Areas”, with stringent conservation rules (Sowers, 2007; (Gardner, 2000:51) in:Gilbert, 2010). As part of these efforts, in addition to Israeli workers, Bedouins were hired by the NRA as guides, rangers and guards in nature reserves and in archeological sites (Lavie, 1990).
The NRA was not the only environmental body working in Sinai. The Society for the Protection of Nature, an Israeli NGO, operated three field study centers and residential
110 Sinai was also conquered by Israel in 1956 and was retrieved in 1957. 111 Israeli authorities applied the state social services to the Bedouins and committed to their wellbeing: introducing primary education and healthcare services, involving Bedouins in the workforce etc. 112 Later to become and renamed the Nature and Park Authority. 102
facilities ("field schools") in Sinai.113 These centers’ main activity was to organize and lead specialized ecological tours for Israeli and Western tourists. The centers also conducted extensive research on geology, botany, zoology, anthropology and nature conservation. These centers, and particularly the Zukei David Field School near the St. Catharine monastery, published numerous research papers on the area's habitat and inhabitants.114 In addition to the NRA and SPNI, other Israeli and international scientists researched Sinai's nature, wildlife, marine‐life, topography, archeology and more.115
4.2.3. Following the Israeli‐Egyptian Peace Agreement
The Israeli‐Egyptian Peace Agreement was signed on March 1979. It placed Sinai at the center of negotiations and of the normalization process between the states. The whole Peninsula was declared demilitarized and a Multinational Force of Observers was created to patrol parts of it, starting on April 25, 1982. A major implication of the agreement was the full evacuation of Israelis from all the Sinai areas. While protest existed, the pullout process (executed in three phases over 3 years) was relatively smooth since the peace process was backed by Israelis’ public support. Locally, South Sinai's withdrawal was carried out with the evacuees' support, while north Sinai areas were evacuated in the face of local protest.116
Israelis were not the only local population in Sinai. Before the 1967 Israeli occupation of Sinai, Bedouins, who do not consider themselves Egyptians, lived there, "the vast desert's relationship to Cairo was as remote as Alaska's to New York City" (Foreign Desk, 1982), sovereignty was loosely exercised and Sinai was under Egyptian military administration (International Crisis Group, 2007). After 1982 and with the Israeli withdrawal, Egyptian policy has focused on 'Egyptianizing' Sinai, which became an issue of reconquest and
113 One near Santa Caterina in the southern mountain region, one at Naama/Sharem Al‐Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba coast and one near Yamit/Rafah city on the Mediterranean. 114 For more see Zukei‐David field‐school (in Hebrew) in Israel National Library: http://web.nli.org.il 115 For example, departments from Tel Aviv University, Hebrew Jerusalem University, Israel Oceanographic and Limnological Research and more. 116 This protest was supported and reinforced by an anti‐peace agreement group coming from within Israel. In contrast to the current political situation in the West Bank, and although the ruling party in the parliament was right‐wing and Nationalist, the mass public was in favor of the peace agreement and did not posses any religious/nationalistic feelings towards Sinai. 103
national affirmation (International Crisis Group, 2007). One of the ways for Egypt to regain sovereignty and power (in a demilitarized area) was through civilian affairs such as nature conservation, tourism and settlement development. During its years of occupation, Israel’s environmental impact on the Sinai Peninsula was relatively small (Homa, 2007). After the withdrawal things have changed rapidly. Within a year, more than one hundred development plans for the Sinai area were put out to tender (Foreign Desk, 1982; Sowers, 2007). The plans encouraged immigration from the densely populated Nile Valley and ambitiously aimed to settle up to five million Egyptians in Sinai (Gilbert, 2010). The new residents were to create a human "buffer zone" between Israel and the Egyptian mainland. This was encouraged in order to "prevent history from repeating itself and to transform a marginal place of dubious loyalty into an orderly province, peopled with good Egyptian citizens" (Gilbert, 2010, 175). Tourism was seen as a major employment opportunity. Therefore, the area required development of new settlements in attractive tourist locations. These resettlement plans were only partially realized because the majority of Sinai's 'new settlers' were short‐term male migrant workers who left the area once the tourist season ended.
Not surprisingly, such mass tourism development was harmful for the environment. All the developmental plans required Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) approval, but in practice, environmental awareness and enforcement were almost nonexistent until mid‐ 1980. Thus, environmental rules were widely ignored or interpreted with the general goal of attracting foreign investors to the area (Shackley, 1999). In contrast to the poor enforcement of environmental laws, the visibility of law‐enforcement officers in Sinai, despite its demilitarized status, was high and included police, tourist‐police, border‐guards and secret‐police.
The development of Egyptian nature reserves, which were first declared in Sinai in 1982, may possibly be seen as connected to the aforementioned tendencies (“Egyptianizing”, developing and controlling the area in new ways). These reserves can be regarded as a mechanism to transform a wild open‐space into an organized and nationally‐controlled one, "camouflaging authoritarianism while facilitating control" (Gilbert, 2010). Military retirees
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who were appointed to the top managerial positions in the EEAA and the National Conservation Sector,117 as well as the declaration of Protected Areas in strategically sensitive border zones near Sudan, Israel, and Libya served to bolster this idea (Sowers, 2007; Sowers, 2013). Additionally, Sinai's conservation agenda could be viewed as yet another way to control and assimilate non‐pastoral Bedouins, while allegedly combating environmental degradation (Gilbert, 2010).
4.2.4. The Israeli‐Egyptian Normalization Process and the Sinai During the months following the peace agreement, Egyptian spokesmen reiterated their commitment and readiness to establish normal ties with Israel. These declarations were not followed by actions (Dayan Center, 1980; Dowek, 2001). In fact, Israel and Egypt held conflicting views with regards to the desired volume of their bilateral transactions. Israel has sought to maximize the degree of normalization and expand the scope of economic relations; Egypt, in contrast, was interested in minimizing it (Ben‐Shahar, Fishelson et al., 1989, 16). In the absence of the flow of trades in goods and services, increased investments, and movement of people the peace treaty turned into an empty and fragile shell. Consequently, the Israeli public became increasingly skeptical and the regional political atmosphere was less optimistic. The peace was soon characterized as a "cold peace", one which is absent of both violence and trust (Podeh 2007). After October 1981, with the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Israeli war with Lebanon (1982), the last remaining feelings of optimism quickly faded away. These states of mind and state of affairs applied also to Israeli environmentalists, as is demonstrated below, who after a period of optimism, felt that they could not create normalized ties with their Egyptian colleagues.
Nevertheless, although tourism exchange between Israel and Egypt’s mainland was low118 (Sultan, 2011), the Sinai continued to be perceived as an ex‐territory and formed a "bubble
117 Egyptian protectorate division. 118 In the year 2010, prior to the Arab Spring revolt, 2800 Egyptian tourists visited Israel yearly, and accounted for less than 0.01% of overall tourists (about 3.5 million a year). In the same year, more than 200k Israelis visited Egypt, accounting for less than 5% of the outgoing tourism. Given the land border, this is a very low ratio of tourism. It should be mentioned that for the ordinary Egyptian visiting Israel, it is not only expensive, but requires a registration and special permit (the "yellow note") from the Egyptian security authorities. These do not promote Israel as a tourist destination (Sultan, 2011). 105
of serenity" in the tumultuous regional reality, where both tourists and hosts were protected from tensions existing between their nations (Uriely, Maoz et al., 2009).119 In order to further promote Israeli tourism to the area, and in contrast to other Egyptian territories, a special visa‐exemption for Israelis entering the Sinai was established. Israeli enthusiasm for using the Sinai as a recreational space continued for many years but was dramatically affected by the terror attacks of 2004‐2006 (CBS, 2011)).120 Currently, several years after Sinai's terror attacks and after Egypt's second revolution (2014), things are far from being stable. Sinai is perceived as a "wild west" where Egyptians lost control "transforming the peninsula into a theatre for the region’s competing new forces… Groups antithetical to the old order have found a haven" (Pelham, 2012). Revolting Bedouin groups, terror cells, traffickers of humans, drugs and arms, actions against the gas pipeline between Egypt and Gaza and other criminal activities are all presently thriving. Naturally, tourism is suffering yet another decline.
4.3. Environmental Imaginaries and Israelis in Sinai – Emotion and Devotion
The feelings and constellation of ideas that groups of individuals living and working in a common place develop about a given landscape (usually local or regional) can be called Environmental Imaginaries (Davis, 2011). It can also be defined as a "system of meaning and representation which organizes (people's) natural worlds and establishes ways people are socialized" (Peet & Watts (1996) in: Gilbert, 2010). This socialization process can include narratives of the environment and of ways of acting in the context of struggles for the stewardship of the environment (Cohen, 2011). Such Environmental Imaginaries concerning Sinai's nature can be regarded as a fundamental basis which promoted the actions of the epistemic community gathered around its conservation. Thus, understanding individuals' feelings towards Sinai’s environment is valuable for explaining their actions.
119 During the first years of the agreement, Israeli tourists travelled to see Egypt’s antiquities. In contrast to these short lived excursions, Sinai's Israeli tourism flow continued for many years. In the year 1980, with signing the peace agreement, 12,000 Israeli tourists went to the Egyptian mainland. The number tripled two years later but declined with the rocking terror occurrences (Ministry of Tourism (Israel) Statistical Department in: Ben‐Shahar, Fishelson et al., 1989). 120 In 2004 almost 400,000 tourists went into Sinai (terrestrial crossing in Eilat). Since then the numbers have been e in decline, with only 179,000 entries in 2011. 106
Israeli environmentalists living in Sinai under the Israeli regime were deeply connected to the area. Hilik Magnus, then the head of NRA in Sinai, recalls:
"The effect of the environment on those who were living in Sinai was enormous… The interaction with the desert… the vast dimensions led to an intensive interaction with the place … the transitions and contradictions are sharp and intense, alongside there is softness, you feel like you are a part of the life cycle… the nature was the essence of the place... dictating the atmosphere and the people's mentality"
(Magnus, personal interview, April 19, 2012).
Since leaving Sinai and repatriating back into Israel, Magnus refuses to visit Sinai, saying "I know how heaven looks, I was there. We lived the sky and the water… It was my home and this is how I want to remember it" (interviewd in: Menahem and Shporer, 2010). Edna Gourney, an ornithologist that worked in Sinai said "the first time I arrived at the High Mountain121 I felt at home, a spiritual bond, a very deep one... I cannot really explain why this place was so unique… there were intense energies there" (Gorney, personal interview, December 9, 2011). Those feelings were not exclusive to Israelis. Ms. Cornellia Oberlander, a famous Canadian landscape architect testified that "once in Sinai I felt like home, a deep sense of belonging" (Hahn‐Oberlander, personal interview, March 27, 2012). Similar to others, this feeling constituted her motivation to act on behalf of the areas’ conservation and propose a peace park plan.
Leaving Sinai was not an easy task for most Israelis. When the peace talks started between the States, one young Israeli guide from the Zukei David Field School wrote to her family "we are here in Santa [Catharina], following with great excitement the last days’ events… Though we could not see Sadat arrival [to Israel S.S] on television and just heard it on the radio. Here, far, and somewhat isolated, many questions and hopes arise, one of them is "and what about Santa?"(Idit Gal, November 1978 in: Rabinowitz, 1992). Avraham Shaked, the Director of Zukei David Field School on the eve of the final withdrawal recalls:
"…and then I realized that’s it. We are doomed. We are leaving. It was like being someone who was sentenced to death… Until the last moment he believes something
121 In the mountainous South Sinai area. 107
will happen... Rationally, I left Sinai after always knowing it will happen and believing it should happen, and I accepted it once it happened. Emotionally it felt like dying. Until today I call my current life "a life after death"… this was the most important place in my life, in our lives… These years were a huge catalyzing force to everything that happened until today… The Sinai period connects us [group of ex‐Sinai's field school workers S.S]… I think that in one way or another many of us are still "stuck" in this story" (Shaked, personal interview, February 10, 2011).
Edna Gourney also believes that "for me and for many others, Sinai is an unresolved issue… that is why we hoped that we could do something about it… we wanted so much to stay and work there" (Gorney, personal interview, December 9, 2011).
Once Israeli‐Egyptian peace negotiations started, this group translated their feelings into actions. They were supportive of peace and were ready to pay its price, which personally meant leaving their work, home and beloved desert, with the hope of returning in the future as visitors. Dan Rabinowitz, who formerly worked at the Zukei David Field School, recalls: "Our intentions were good. None of us thought of the continuation of Israeli influence in Sinai or about our personal benefits. We had an optimistic, maybe naïve, hope of peace and of warm cooperation in which the Egyptians will welcome our advice (Rabinowitz, peronal interview, November 5, 2011). Avi Perevolotzky, founder of the Zukei David Field School, remarked: "We – especially those who were close to the environmental subject and originated from the same field school – had a dream, an illusion, and a plan that we could create continuity to our work with the Egyptians. It was not achieved. Its post‐mortem is also ideological" (Perevolotsky, personal interview, January 25, 2011). This "environmental Imaginary" of Sinai, shared by Israelis and, to some extent, by foreign conservationists, led to action.
4.4. The Development of Environmentalism in Egypt and the Advocacy Network Theory
Before the 1980's, Egyptian environmentalism was underdeveloped and almost non‐ existent. Awareness for nature conservation was rare and activities were confined to a few
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scholars.122 In the years following the Israeli‐Egyptian peace agreement, Egyptian environmentalism developed significantly. Judicial, governmental and civilian foundations for environmental activities and research were created and connections with the global scientific community strengthened. These developments were a result of several processes, one of which was Israeli environmentalists' advocacy process to promote nature conservation in Sinai (elaborated below).
The development of Egypt's environmentalism has not been adequately researched. Environmental activities during the 1960's and 1970's took place mainly in the form of minor regulatory initiatives, with no enforcement capacities, dealing primarily with public health issues.123 Only in the 1970s, environmental protection began to emerge as a distinct domain of policymaking and was influenced by an ongoing debate over the environmental side effects of constructing the High‐Dam, at Aswan. Extensive research by Sowers (2013) delineated substantial developments in Egypt's environmentalism as occurring mainly after the mid 1980s. Sowers emphasizes the years following the Israeli‐Egyptian peace agreement as a time of formalistic and authoritative developments in the field of nature conservation. However, she indicates that funding for these developments came a few years later. Sowers writes extensively about the development of Protected Areas during this period and relates this development to a coalition of forces that was influenced by the Israeli‐Egyptian peace process. Some of this coalition’s members were directly working with Israelis. However, Israelis are not mentioned by Sowers or by her quoted sources. This disregard for Israelis’ part in these developments by Egyptian sources (either forgotten or silenced) is not surprising given the cold relations between the States and the general tendency to avoid any acknowledged contact with Israel.
Egyptian environmentalism was also influenced by other global changes and the new “wave” of environmentalism of the 1980s. This "wave" reframed environmentalism as an action of safekeeping the natural world from human‐induced degradation. In March 1980,
122 A vivid example is Dr. Abu Zeid, the Egyptian director of reconstruction and development for Sinai, saying "there is no need for nature reserves. In this area [Sinai, S.S.], there are no forests" (Rabinowitz, 1982). 123 Accordingly, international aid to Egypt during this period increasingly focused on health, agricultural modernization, and irrigation and water resources (Sowers, 2013). 109
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), WWF and UNEP launched a joint conservation strategy, recognizing that "the separation of conservation from development… is at root of current living problems"(Joanne Omang in:Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 125). Another influencing part of this process was the newly developing UNESCO World Heritage system,124 which attracted developing countries participation by changing the balance between development and environmental protection. This "was thus largely dependent on the contingent transformation of political or geopolitical interests and on their dialogical convergence" (Kowalsky, 2011, 83). Apparently, this shift was reflected in changes in Egypt's politics and its international interests.
The 1980s "wave” of environmentalism was generally characterized by mobilization of local communities in defense of their local environments, participation by women and traditionally marginalized groups, involved struggles for socio‐political and economic reforms, and mostly being rurally based (Haynes, 1999). Unlike many countries that were part of this "wave", where environmental concern started from "grassroots" movements, in Egypt it was the state, supported by the scientific community, that first demonstrated interest in environmental issues. Gomma (1997) claims that changes were due to a governmental will to promote sustainable development and to become a role model for developing countries, plus the growing willingness of foreign donors to provide financial support for environmental projects in Egypt (Gomaa, 1997). This support, according to Sowers, flowed in due to Egypt's normalization of relations with Israel (Sowers, 2013, 31).
This work suggests modifications to Gomma's claim about Egypt’s governmentally driven environmentalism. It argues that nature conservation activities related to Sinai that influenced Egypt's environmental activities, were mostly promoted by nongovernmental actors. These actors operated primarily behind the scenes and provided support for the governmental activities. Therefore, the state‐level changes were influenced by a regionally‐ inclined and particularly‐timed nongovernmental activism. In contrast to Gomma, Hamed (2005) claims that changes in Egypt's environmentalism during that period were a "by‐ product of several internal and external forces, including governmental and nongovernmental efforts, academic leaders initiatives, lobbying, environmental minded
124 The IUCN acts as its environmental branch. 110
politicians and the outcry of influential individuals" (Hamed, 2005, p. 37). This work takes Hamed’s argument one step further and claims that in its inception, this movement was not only a byproduct of the external forces which were brought to the fore due to the peace process, but was partially promoted by Israelis and their international colleagues.
These global and local processes were bound together and the environmental community's scientists and activists were their main promoters. As this work shows, Sinai's conservation advocacy was a result of several processes that involved many individuals working from within and outside the region. In order to thoroughly examine these collective actions, with emphasis on Israeli and foreign individuals, this research will use Sociology of Interventions and the epistemic communities concept to frame the analysis. Sociology of Interventions describes the ways new ideas and their carriers penetrate and influence international relations (Eyal and Buchholz, 2010). An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy‐relevant knowledge within that domain. And, whose members share principled beliefs and values (Haas, 1992; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). These “are channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Epistemic communities can also be one form of Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), which are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms. They include actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services. TANs often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalists understanding of their interests (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Sinai's changing status drew a coalition of overseas organizations and individuals to popularizing its unique ecological attributes and to advocate for its protection (Brunn, 1983; Sowers, 2007). This TAN's efforts (thoroughly discussed below), had a spillover effect and contributed to a wide spectrum of environmental agendas inside Egypt. Parts of this TAN were comprised of Israeli environmentalists formerly working in Sinai. The following sections will present their actions.
111
On a different note, the network of Israelis working in Sinai was not necessarily representing the Israeli environmental movement at large, which was much more state‐oriented at the time (Greenspan, 2015), and in its early formation phases.125
4.5. Acting for Sinai, Acting for Nature, Acting for Peace?
4.5.1. Cautious Optimism: from Peace Negotiations to the First Withdrawals from Sinai (1978‐ 1981), Direct and Indirect Actions
The Israeli‐Egyptian official track of peace negotiations did not include environmental or natural resources teams (though Dan Perry NRA's general‐manager attended the negotiations (Perry, 2010)). Nevertheless, Israeli environmentalists were mostly optimistic about the chances for future cross‐border cooperation on nature conservation. Both the NRA and the SPNI acted to advance this goal.
4.5.1.1. The NRA In 1979 an official communication channel between Dan Perry and Hassan Hafez, the Egyptian vice Minister of Agriculture was established.126 During that year, a few official meetings were held between the two sides. In June, the Israeli deputy PM Yigael Yadin wrote to the NRA: "In a conversation I had with the Egyptian Minister of Culture, Dr. Hassan Mohamed Ismail, he suggested theirs and our representatives to meet in order to transfer knowledge about nature conservation in Sinai…" (Yadin, 1979). As a result, in December of that year, the NRA hosted a 5 day study‐tour for conservation professionals. Participants included Egyptian Prof. Ali Maher, (who later became the leader of the Egyptian Society for the Protection of Nature and Natural Resources‐ ESPNNR), other Egyptian academics, South Sinai governorate representatives, Egypt's American embassy scientific attaché Ms. Sagebiel, and the worldly known American ichthyologist, Prof. Eugenie Clark.127 They
125 For more see: (Yishai, 1979; Tal, 2002; Orenstein, 2004; Greenspan, 2015). 126 Dan Perry reported that on the same day that the Camp David agreement was signed he met Mr. Hafez by coincidence in an international convention on nature conservation (Perry, personal interview, October 19, 2010). 127 All the participants that arrived from Egypt were driven in Sadat's family cars (Clark, personal interview, July 15, 2012). 112
exchanged information and toured nature conservation sites that were soon to be transferred to the Egyptians, including SPNI's field schools. As Goren (1979), one of the NRA representatives remarked "It was successful… though no official authority for nature conservation exists in Egypt… We were under the impression that the Egyptians are interested in further cooperation" (Goren, 1979). Unfortunately, this impression did not last long.
During those early negotiations, NRA knowledge and data was being transferred to the Egyptians by a middleman named Dr. Bertel Brunn, an American ornithologist.128 He voluntarily promoted nature conservation in the Middle East. Brunn was among the founders of and acted as the representative of the Holy Land Conservation Fund (HLCF), originally formed to raise American funds for the benefit of Israel's conservation needs.129 Over time HLCF changed its mission statement to: "the HLCF have long held that conservation, like control of contagious disease, cannot be effectively limited to one country if it is to succeed… demands regional cooperation. Hence, we have devoted considerable effort to encouraging other Middle Eastern nations" (Andrews, 1983). Brunn, having close relations with several Egyptian scientists, mediated Israeli‐Egyptian relations:130
[We] served as an informal link between the interested parties… concerns about conservation in Sinai as well as specific proposals have been transmitted between Egypt and Israel. Informal meetings in neutral areas…131 have been arranged, as a result of which agreement on many issues has been reached" (Brunn, 1980d).
The HLCF engaged in transferring knowledge and data, assisting academic institutions, assisting in establishing NGO (inclusive of providing technical equipment), proposing national legislation and local regulations in the governorates of Sinai, meeting with journalists and creating international links for governmental and nongovernmental institutions (Brunn, 1980; Brunn, 1980a; Brunn, 1980b; Brunn, 1980c).
128 Brunn, was a neurologist in practice, and has published several books, among them "Common Birds of Egypt" in 1985. 129 Primarily the Hai‐Bar conservancy. 130 He visited the area 12 times between 1978 and 1983. 131 Also outside of the region. 113
Just before the withdrawal and in order to gain firsthand knowledge, Brunn toured Sinai with Israeli guidance and met with high‐ranking Israeli environmentalists.132 When touring Bardawil Lagoon (north‐west Sinai) with Gen. Avraham Yoffe (then the head of NRA), he wrote: "During the ride… I discussed with him what the Israelis were willing to do as far as nature reserves in Sinai are concerned. They will turn over what they have developed there, especially as far as Bardawil, St. Catherine and the Red Sea coast are concerned. They are also willing to lease their rangers in Sinai for training of Egyptians" (Brunn, 1978‐1983, Oct 26 1978). However, a year later Gen. Yoffe wrote to him "Our link with the Egyptians is very weak and practically non‐existent" (Yoffe, 1979). Two years later, in 1981, the frame of mind was less optimistic than it had previously been. In June (shortly before Israel's withdrawal completed), Hilik Magnus wrote:
"After our withdrawal the Egyptian will rule this space. According to my meetings with their representatives, they have no awareness for nature conservation… it is our duty to take care of them [Sinai's wonders, S.S] also in the future… I came up with a plan in order to enhance awareness for nature conservation among Egyptians…We will act to create research plans and research activities of international agencies… We will guarantee that these scientists will continue to take care… will pressure the Egyptians… we will disseminate materials and former surveys that we conducted" (Magnus, 1981, , emphasis added).
It appears that when Magnus proposed his plan he was not aware of parallel actions taken by both NRA and SPNI (Magnus, personal interview, April 19, 2012).
4.5.1.2. The SPNI
The SPNI personnel proactively tried to create direct cooperation with the Egyptians. Elaborated below are three examples: the first two reflect the environmentalists’ naïve and optimistic view regarding cross‐border cooperation. The third reflects disillusionment with cooperation hopes, inducing the shift towards activities which required mediation by the international community.
132 Brunn worked closely with the NRA, but was also connected to the SPNI. 114
4.5.1.2.1. The Zukei David Field School Proposal The first case is a mostly unknown initiative which, if materialized, could have substantially boosted cross‐border environmental relations and would have most likely contributed to the reinforcement of peace. It began with a letter that was sent from the Zukei David Field School staff members to President Sadat,133 asking him to allow the Israeli staff to continue their present work on site even after the Israeli withdrawal (Sagi, 1979a; Sagi, personal interview, February 2, 2011). This proposition was formally discussed in the official track of negotiations, with partial SPNI representation (Shaked, personal interview, February 10, 2011). During these talks an understanding was reached, that "irrespective of the timetable for general normalization… Israeli instructors and students would remain at the Zukei David Field School, working in collaboration with their Egyptian colleagues from the Suez Canal University" (Dayan Center, 1980). While this decision was made public, apparently, the pledge was given to the Israelis only verbally by Sadat, during his visit to Haifa in 1979. Since nothing formal was put on paper or signed, the agreement was taken off the negotiation table "the negotiations were run by the army… we were forgotten" (Shaked, personal interview, February 10, 2011). This pledge was publically announced in the press (AP, 1979; Erez, 1979), yet, it was not included in the final official papers nor was it honored.
4.5.1.2.2. The South Sinai Peace Park Proposal A second optimistic initiative suggested declaring South Sinai as an international peace park (under Egyptian sovereignty). The proposal was written by Avraham Shaked and other SPNI conservationists. It called for creating a 12,000 km2 park to secure the area’s unique surroundings, given the predicted mass‐tourism. The proposal rationale explains: "Despite the economic opportunities offered by Sinai, we hold that the region’s greatest potential lies in its development for tourism purposes. Even as a tourist attraction, however, it must be developed in a way that will assure the protection of its exceptional qualities, rather than create another common 'popular tourist attraction' ‐ constantly spoilt and polluted" (Shaked, 1977). SPNI conservationists suggested creating an Israeli‐Egyptian joint research and management team for the park, in order to strengthen peace:
133 It was delivered via Dr. Butris Ghali, the Egyptian Foreign Minister. 115
"We therefore propose the development of Southern Sinai as a park – a large nature reserve. We think that such a project, in which both Egypt and Israel would participate, could be a successful way to demilitarize the region and, furthermore, could be a wonderful expression of peace and co‐operation between the Israeli and Arab nations… We suggest it be called the Peace Park" (emphasis in the original, Shaked, 1977).
In addition, the proposal suggested a bi‐national park management authority with international representatives. "The Authority should be a joint Egyptian‐Israeli body, subject to Egyptian law, but completely independent in the execution of all policy regarding the planning, development and management of the park. The guidelines for the authority should be tourist development while preserving landscape and nature… At an advanced stage of the peace process there will be no military presence whatsoever within the park boundaries" (ibid). The proposal was specified and elaborated on the issue of budget, the park's international relations, developmental guidelines inside the park, suggested roads, additional projects and more (see the entire proposal in appendix number 2). This proposal was sent to President Sadat, but did not come to fruition.
In 1979 a similar idea was raised by Cornellia Hann Oberlander, a Canadian landscape architect, who suggested that South Sinai should be managed as an international park (Hann‐Oberlander, 1979a; Hann‐Oberlander, 1979b). Oberlander's proposed idea, which was very preliminary and included just a short rationale, was sent to several international landscape‐architects, Canadian diplomats and to the Canadian PM Tudor. Tudor replied that it's "too late" for such an idea. Oberlander was discouraged and abandoned the cause (Hahn‐Oberlander, 2012, personal interview, March 27, 2012).
These two park proposals suggested the creation of a de‐facto weakened Egyptian sovereignty (demilitarize the entire area and to leave its management to a joint international committee) in order to promote cross‐border tourism and nature conservation. In an area which was just reclaimed and in a political atmosphere
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characterized by distrust, these proposals seemed unrealistic. Nevertheless, as explained in Chapter 2 and as will be shown in the Golan Heights chapter (number 5), peace parks specifically aspired to harness nature conservation for conflict resolution, while blurring borders and sovereignty issues. Interestingly, the Sinai's special visa‐exemption for Israelis created a de‐facto weakened Egyptian sovereignty in order to promote cross‐border tourism, and thus partially corresponded with a peace park rationale.
4.5.1.2.3. An IUCN Resolution for Sinai's Conservation
The third initiative that SPNI proactively tried to implement actually materialized. This initiative was less inspired by peace, but was pragmatically designed to promote nature conservation. Its goal was to achieve an IUCN resolution concerning Sinai's conservation in the Annual Congress meeting in 1981. The underlying assumption was that such a resolution would enhance Sinai's appeal to global institutions that would, in turn, invest in its conservation. The IUCN is a UN body that is comprised of States (represented by governmental agencies) and NGOs. This structure enabled the SPNI, an affiliated organization, to interact directly with Egyptian officials.
This interaction with officials was smoother than expected. During that time, two high‐ ranking Egyptian environmentalists, Dr. Mostafa Tolba and Dr. Mohamed Kassas, headed two of the world's leading environmental agencies. “While I was president of the IUCN [1978‐1984], my colleague Mustafa Tolba was at the head of UNEP… these were years when two Egyptians played an important and efficient role on an international level” (Kassas interviewed in: Sarant, 2010). Naturally, their high‐ranked international positions substantially helped in advancing environmentalism and environmental awareness within the Egyptian government, scientific community and civil society. Interestingly, both of them were also political figures in Egypt: Kassas was appointed member of the Shura Council134 in 1981, while Tolba, President of the Egyptian Academy for Scientific Research and Technology, served in his early career as the Minister of Youth (Sowers, 2013, 24).
134 The upper house of Egyptian bicameral Parliament. 117
In May of 1979, Yoav Sagi, SPNI CEO, wrote a personal letter to Professor Kassas, describing SPNI's work in Sinai, attaching the SPNI's plans for Sinai's conservation (see Figure 17 below) and urging him to declare large parts of it as Nature Reserves:
"…we formulated our conception of the planning guidelines for the use of this area. Our considered opinion is that the most suitable way to maintain the character of most of Central and South Sinai is to declare large parts of it as Nature or/and Wildlife Reserves… we are much concerned that the work we have done will not have been in vain when this region returns to Egyptian sovereignty... We therefore turn to you, both in your capacity as the President of the IUCN of which SPNI is a member and as a respected Egyptian citizen who undoubtedly can influence the official bodies in Egypt to act… We enclosed a memorandum that sets forth in details the SPNI's conception for the future planning of Sinai, and the actions that the fulfillment of these conceptions require… will be pleased to supply all other available information…we welcome every possible cooperation...Permit me to conclude with the hope that the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will lead to real peace for the benefit and well being of all the people in the region…" (Sagi, 1979c).
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Figure no. 17: SPNI – Sinai Nature Conservation Plan (Avraham Shaked private archive).
In contrast to expectations, no response was received to SPNI's attempts to directly contact Egyptian representatives. Thus, a few months later, Sagi wrote to the Sierra Club, an American NGO promoting nature conservation. In the letter, Sagi attached SPNI’s conservation proposal for the Sinai area and asked for their help with mediating the process. The letter expressed SPNI's difficulty in contacting the Egyptians: "Being now engaged in the process of returning the Sinai Peninsula… Unfortunately there is no direct way we can pass our ideas on to the Egyptians. As they avoid, at this stage, any kind of direct cooperation with Israelis… Your attitude and support is thus very important… As the matter is politically a very delicate one I must stress the need for discreet and carefully coordinated action" (Sagi, 1979b). The Sierra Club took up the gauntlet and replied: "We have an office at the United Nations and it might be possible to get the area designated as 119
part of the World Heritage Trust system. Here's what information I need…" (Eber, 1979). In time, while correspondence between SPNI and the Sierra Club continued, the Sierra Club’s international department approached other United States organizations about supporting conservation efforts in Sinai, including the State Department. They also approached Kassas directly expressing their concerns for conservation of the Sinai and specifically "the consequences of any major development in this [St. Catherine] site" (Scharlin, 1979) which they hoped would be enlisted as a World Heritage site. Ron Eber, of the Sierra Club reported "The Sierra Club office at the UN is now deeply involved in the Sinai issue… we have contacts at the highest levels… Kassas… has been open to our suggestions... Our National Park Service is now advising the Egyptians on how to conserve Sinai" (Eber, 1980). In addition to these efforts, in June 1981, Dan Rabinowitz, an Israeli member of the Sinai Conservation Group (discussed below), who formerly worked at the Zukei David Field School, met with Prof. Kassas in Gland, Switzerland, to discuss Sinai's conservation. As a result, Kassas, who recognized that Rabinowitz was an Israeli, commissioned him to write a report for the IUCN as part of their effort to turn St. Catherine area into a World Heritage Site (Rabinowitz, personal interview, August 15, 2012).
In October 1981, the IUCN adopted the general resolution calling on member commissions to provide financial and technical assistance to Egypt in order to conserve designated areas in Sinai:
Urging members of IUCN and its Commissions to offer assistance to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt in the preparation and implementation of a conservation strategy for the Sinai peninsula and surrounding area; calling upon governments and non‐governmental organizations to provide on request from the Arab Republic of Egypt, additional support and technical assistance as may be appropriate; and suggesting that consideration be given by the Arab Republic of Egypt to submission, to the World Heritage Secretariat at UNESCO, of areas for consideration as World Natural Heritage sites, in particular the high mountain area
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surrounding St. Catherine's monastery, and the coral reef ecosystem of Ras Muhammad and its surroundings (IUCN, 1981).135
After the IUCN meeting Sagi reported:
"We were active in the acceptance process of Sinai's resolution… was brought up by the Sierra Club (we avoided directly submitting it ourselves fearing this could raise objection by the Egyptians). We formulated the resolution… [and] developed it better with advice from the Egyptian delegates, with whom we made direct contact… Our past comprehensive planning for nature conservation in Sinai was passed to all the interested parties, and may serve as a basis for the general plan that the Egyptians were asked to prepare" (Sagi, 1981).
During the IUCN meeting, Sagi also made personal connections with Hassan Hafez, head of Egypt Wildlife Conservation, and Ali Maher, head of ESPNNR.136 These Egyptian scientists, along with others, were promoting the Sinai Conservation resolution as part of their own agenda. They were "acutely aware of the national security and economic imperatives driving the Egyptian government’s plans to develop the Sinai… focused their efforts on coordinating with international conservation networks to bring outside pressures on the political leadership" (Sowers, 2013). Kassas himself commented on the resolution, saying “This was ironic…at the time, in 1981, we had no Protected Areas. We had only laws under the Ministry of Agriculture protecting some specific species” (Kassas interviewed in: Sowers, 2013, 102).
The 1981 resolution exemplifies the mutual effort taken by Israelis and Egyptians, supported by the International epistemic community, to protect Sinai's nature. This resolution brought the subject of Sinai's conservation to the forefront of the international conservation community and encouraged its involvement. An example is a June 1982 meeting of interested US groups that "was inspired by the IUCN resolution" (Brunn, 1982), and included representatives from Friends of the Earth, WWF, HLCF, State Department, Smithsonian
135 The IUCN evaluates natural sites nominated for World Heritage Status by UNESCO, a status well pursued by "developing countries [that] use it as a jump‐start of develop their tourist economies"(Kowalsky, 2011) Only in 2002 was St. Catharine nominated as a World Heritage site, Ras Mohammad is still on the IUCN Tentative List. 136 Both were mentioned several times by international and Israeli agents as focal points for collaboration. Maher also participated in the 1979 NRA tour mentioned above. 121
Institution, National Wildlife Refuge Association, Sierra Club, and Office of Coastal Zone Management.
4.5.1.3. Developments in Egypt's Environmentalism during the "Cautious Optimism" Phase (1979‐1981)
Between the years 1979‐1981, Egypt's environmental institutions and mechanisms gradually developed. One channel of development was the advancement of the Egyptian scientific community, which was supported by several international groups. Those groups assisted in developing academic research, donating equipment and financing tours and study‐abroad programs.137 Several academic environmental programs were initiated by universities, contributing greatly to environmental awareness and to the development of environmental practices that followed (Gomaa, 1997; Hamed, 2005). Another channel was the introduction of the first buds of environmental laws, authority and institutions. In 1979 the Egyptian Wildlife Service (EWS) was formed under the Ministry of Agriculture. Two years later, the EEAA was established to coordinate the work between different governmental ministries and to produce an official environmental policy. However, the decree specifying the EEAA responsibilities was issued only years later, in 1985 (Genena, 1996). After the first Wildlife Office was formed in North Sinai Governorate in 1981, a 1983 Presidential Directive called for establishing Wildlife offices across all of Egypt's governorates and enabled locally based environmental enforcement (Brunn, 1983). These local decrees for nature protection138 pushed forward environmental legislation and later led to the first Egyptian comprehensive environmental law (law No. 102 for Nature Protection) which was enacted in 1983.139 The last channel of development were the Environmental NGOs, which constituted a new force in Egyptian politics (Hamed, 2005), and were greatly supported by the scientific community. Several of them specifically advocated for nature conservation in Sinai. Among
137 E.g. in 1980, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in cooperation with HLCF trained twenty‐three veterinarians as rangers and wildlife managers (According to Perry they recruited an Israeli environmentalist as one of the guides (Perry, personal interview, October 19, 2010). The Sierra Club along with the National Park Service also led training in Egypt. They created a 3‐seminar series on Conservation Area Planning and Management during March, May and June of 1980 (National Park Service, 1980). 138 For example banning hunting and fishing in sensitive locations. 139 http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxweegy.htm 122
those NGO's were, the Arab Office for Youth and the Environment, The Ornithological Society of Egypt, Birds of Egypt, Friends of the Red Sea.
4.5.2. Disillusionment with Peace: Acting in an Indirect Route (1982‐1983)
When Israel completed its third and final withdrawal from Sinai, the political reality had changed substantially. In April of 1982 the NRA transferred its operating sites to Cairo University personnel: "we handed over to the Egyptian administration our settlements, sites, facilities, written materials… we wanted everything to be strictly organized" (Magnus, personal interview, April 19, 2012). In June 1982, only six weeks after the First Lebanon War started, it became a major obstacle for a peaceful relation between Israel and Egypt. Egypt retracted its Ambassador from Israel and openly called for Israel's isolation in the world. Nonetheless, for months after the pullout, the NRA and the SPNI were still working to promote nature conservation in Sinai. Disappointingly, in the following years, hopes for direct cooperation declined, resulting in a shift of Israeli efforts towards indirect actions, predominantly mediated by international actors. These actions were mainly focused on nature conservation and less on peace promotion.
4.5.2.1. Sinai Conservation Group – "International Israelis"
The Sinai Conservation Group (Henceforth: SCG) was a voluntary group established in November 1980 in London. This group intended to generate interest in Sinai's conservation among environmental groups outside Egypt and to enhance the Egyptian conservation bodies’ capacities. It was established by three young Israelis (Rabinowitz, Shaked and Gorney mentioned above) who previously worked in the Zukei David Field School and in the NRA. They joined forces with a British partner, Gerrard Mathews, who was a student of Human Environmental Studies in London. The SCG aimed to utilize their comprehensive knowledge, working experience and information service for Sinai’s nature conservation. The group established direct contact with a few Egyptian scientists (and in some stages even tried to establish a joint SCG‐Egyptian association (Matthews, unknown)), Bertel Brunn from the HLCF, WWF, Sierra Club, IUCN and other international organizations. Operating from
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England enabled them to transfer knowledge that was produced by them or by other Israelis to Egyptian individuals and agencies that were otherwise reluctant to cooperate with them. Thus, the SCG could be viewed as an inter‐agent, allegedly from outside the Middle East, but actually and unmistakably part of it: Israelis acting as foreigners. Their actions were mainly nature conservation‐oriented, rather than peace‐oriented, although in terms of their personal beliefs they were all firmly pro‐peace.
The SCG succeeded in producing and generating concrete actions. For example, in his capacity as President of WWF, Prince Philip (H.R.H the Duke of Edinburgh) planned to visit Egypt in February of 1982 to discuss nature conservation projects in Egypt and in Sinai. The SCG were approached to help with the trip preparation. They provided the prince with a list of suggested meetings, action points and recommendations for implementing a conservation strategy in Sinai (Matthews, 1981). In August 1981, Mr. Rabinowitz personally briefed the Prince in Buckingham Palace (Rabinowitz, personal interview, November 5, 2011). In addition, in early 1982, on behalf of the SCG, Mr. Rabinowitz met in Egypt with the foreign embassies representatives, the governor of South Sinai, NGO's, conservationists and academic institutions (Rabinowitz, 1982). This led to a meeting in London between SCG and representatives of Dames and Moore, a U.S based company commissioned to provide the preliminary environmental data necessary for planning Sinai's development, which concluded with the hiring of Rabinowitz as a consultant for their projects (Weissberg, 1982).
Two of SCG’s ideas can be viewed as direct "peace and environment" initiatives. First, they suggested forming a joint association with Egyptian conservation bodies that would be based in London. The Sinai Conservation Association aimed "to locate, translate, collate, publish and produce materials, and engage in other activities, for the purpose of facilitating efforts and initiatives to promote and practice nature conservation and environmental protection in Sinai including the Red Sea reef ecosystems" (Matthews, unknown). Obviously, such association would have revealed the nationality of the group’s individuals. Second, they suggested guiding Egyptian environmental personnel by creating a task force to work and train the Egyptians “The "Anwar E‐Sadat Green Corps"… spark the imagination of those sympathetic to Sadat and the peace process he created. It certainly complements suggestions already expressed by Mrs. Sadat that a peace school be developed at the
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[former] SPNI field school in Sharm E‐Sheikh in memory of her late husband and the "ongoing" peace process" (Matthews, 1982). Both these proposals, much more political in nature, did not materialize whereas other actions taken by the SCG had more influence.
4.5.2.2. International Agents
Much of the abovementioned work could not have been formulated without the help of international agents present in Egypt. A significant agent for promoting Israeli‐Egyptian relationships was the US Embassy. During the early 1980's, the US Embassy in Cairo encouraged normalization and peace activities between Israel and Egypt. Ms. Stephanie Sagebiel, the Embassy's Science Officer and a marine biologist by training, was a key figure in promoting Sinai's nature conservation. Different actors (both Israeli and American) referred to her as being an invaluable ally of their activities, someone who was personally involved in helping “the cause” despite her official position’s restrictions which instructed her to "facilitate non‐governmental agencies and organizations, but cannot represent them per‐se" (Sagebiel, 1981). One example of her personal involvement was joining the 5‐day NRA‐field‐trip mentioned above in 1979. Sagebiel, who referred to herself as "a diver and environmental enthusiast"(Sagebiel, personal communication, December 8, 2011), acted mostly from a diplomatic position and not a scientific one, was a substantial part of Sinai's TAN and enabled different activities to materialize.
Another individual involved during this time, was the ichthyologist Dr. Eugenie Clark. Dr. Clark worked at the Red Sea since the 1950's and was in close contact with many leading scientists in Israel140 and in Egypt (Clark, 1977). Clark, supported by the American Embassy, paved her way to high‐ranking Egyptian political figures, while promoting the establishment of the Ras Muhammad Marine National Park. She had a close relationship with the Sadat family, whose love of nature, diving, and for the Sinai was well known141:
140 Especially with the Marine Station in Eilat and the Hebrew University. 141 For example, the Egyptian Society for the Protection of Nature and Natural Resources, a new NGO operating in those years, was established under the patronage of the First Lady, Mrs. Sadat (Brunn, 1980a, Appendix IV). 125
"President Mohamed Anwar El‐Sadat… wishes to express his personal interest in the cause of protection of nature… Wars and political struggles may have caused Egypt to give less than the necessary attention to her responsibility toward its natural heritage; but as peace prevails … [Egypt] will put her strategy for conservation of nature in its proper place"
(Sadat Speech, 5 March 1980, in: Brunn, 1980b, , appendix II).
Dr. Clark contacted Gamal Sadat (President Sadat’s son, who was a diver), to whom she "explained the dangers to the reefs… and lack of conservation programs when Ras Muhammad will return to Egypt" (Dec 8 1979, Clark, 1979‐1984). According to Clark, Gamal had recruited his father, who promised to issue a Presidential decree regarding Ras Muhammad marine nature reserve, but was assassinated before having the opportunity to do so (Clark, personal interview, July 15, 2012).
In another attempt, Clark personally addressed President Mubarak in a letter "to help in preserving Egypt's most magnificent and threatened underwater treasure", urging him to issue a Presidential decree "to insure saving it in time” and emphasized that ”It cannot wait for your National Park system to be set up "(Clark, 1982). This attempt came about after the International Conference on Marine Science in the Red Sea, attended by both Israelis and Egyptians scientists in 1982 (Al‐Ghardaqa Conference, 1982). Clark was also in close contact with Sayed Marei, Deputy PM under the Sadat administration, who helped establish the society for the conservation of Ras Muhammad, and assisted Clark and her colleagues in lobbying the Egyptian parliament. The New York Times reported Clark’s efforts: "Influential group of Egyptian and American environmentalists including Eugenie Clark… Helen C. Vanderbilt, philanthropist… Allison Halaby, stepmother of Queen Noor… Farkhonda Hassan, a member of Parliament and professor of geochemistry at American University of Cairo… have lobbied the Egyptian and United State governments" (Miller, 1983).
These actions concluded with Egypt's enactment of its first conservation legislation, the 1983 Law 102 for Natural Protectorates, which empowered the government to create national preserves. It was followed by a decree declaring the first Egyptian Protected Area, Ras Muhammad National Park. This law contained several remarkable provisions when
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compared with subsequent environmental laws, and reflected the access and involvement that the coalition of conservation scientists had obtained in drafting it (Sowers, 2013). This coalition also "played a crucial role in formulating national environmental institutions… and this success, however, was not easily replicated"(Sowers, 2013).142
It is not surprising that Dr. Clark and others focused on a Protected Areas declaration as a main environmental activity during those years. Protected Areas were seen by local and international conservationists as the most practical way to conserve biodiversity in the face of rapid real‐estate and tourism development. And so, the first 3 Egyptian Protected Areas were designated in the Sinai, reflecting not only the international and regional interest in the area, but also the confluence of interests mentioned above between sovereignty and demilitarization in a post‐conflict era. Since then, 30 Protected Areas have been declared all around Egypt, covering almost 15% of its land and marine areas (EEAA, 2012).
Another dedicated international agent previously mentioned was Dr. Brunn. In addition to his trips to the area (1978‐1983) in which he directly and indirectly transferred messages and information between Israelis and Egyptians, he collected and promoted media coverage on Sinai's conservation. Between 1980 and 1989 he produced a pamphlet called the "Sinai newsletter" that was published in cooperation with the Sierra Club. This pamphlet reviewed current developments in Sinai, such as nature conservation legislation, institution building, NGOs activities, the establishment of Protected Areas and more. This avenue of Brunn’s work advanced the information flow within Sinai's TAN. Complementary work by Brunn was the training of the Multinational Force of Observers for conserving and safekeeping the environment where they were deployed. As Brunn stated, this environmental training was the first of its kind143: "This, I believe, is a historical first for an occupying and peacekeeping
142 A related example took place in 1984 when Dr. Kassas and H.R.H The Duke of Edinburgh sent a joint appeal to the government requesting that Gebel Elba, a Red Sea coastal area, be granted protected status. Sowers writes "The Gebel Elba petition itself was the culmination of earlier work done by a range of international, Egyptian, and Sudanese scientific teams under sponsorship of the World Wildlife Fund" (Sowers, 2007). Quite possibly (and even though Israelis are not directly mentioned here by Sowers) the SCG efforts with HRH (mentioned above) and actions done by Dr. Clark to promote marine conservation have contributed to this action in a substantial way. 143 Only in June 2009, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the UN have first dedicated a specified Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions. For more see: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/environment/approach.shtml 127
force" (Brunn, 1978‐1983, March 11 1982 ). During May 1982, Brunn stayed with the Multinational Force of Observers personnel for several days and gave lectures. As a result of this encounter, Brunn produced educational materials for the forces including a brochure called, "The Sinai, Fragile Crossroad between Continents – Help Protect It!", providing information on the area's natural environment and specifying "Do's and Don'ts".144
144 In November 1983 General Fredrik Bull‐Hansen of the peacekeeping forces was honored by the HLCF for his contribution to nature conservation (Brunn, 1983). 128
Figure no. 18: The Sinai – MFO Pamphlet (Brunn, 1983).
At the end of 1983, the involvement of Israelis in Sinai's conservation declined. The withdrawal had long ended, Egypt exercised full sovereignty and the Israeli‐Lebanon war
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was prolonged and this further rocked the unstable relations between Israel and Egypt. Moreover, prior years' activities started bearing fruits and to some extent Egyptian environmentalism stood on its own feet.
4.6. Discussion This chapter deals with a unique period of time, when environmentalists, in different alignments and compositions of international and regional cooperation, successfully promoted nature conservation in Sinai, and to a lesser extent, peace in the Middle East. Varied, yet entwined circumstances contributed to the materialization and partial success of their actions. Among these factors are a deep devotion of Israeli environmentalists to Sinai, the timely global institutions' emphasis on conservation, the US agenda to promote and support Israeli‐Egyptian cooperation, the Egyptian motivation to promote environmentalism and development in Sinai, the personal involvement of dedicated international conservationists, the Sadat family’s dedication to nature conservation and more. This empirical description has normative implications, despite the fact that it is only partial and focuses on the "outsiders" to the contested area. The accounted events are analyzed along two main theoretical lines: the Advocacy Network theories and the Environmental Peacemaking writings. Both assist in discussing the role of individuals and the connections they form in promoting environmentalism and peace in post‐conflict settings.
4.6.1. Sinai's TAN
Clearly, a picture of a group dedicated to a place and to a set of values unfolded. Mostly, the different participants145 did not coordinate their actions nor did they often collaborate. Therefore, the idiosyncratic nature of this group does not stem from a coherent action but from the individuals comprising it. They cannot be generally described as "activists", but rather as professionals, in different stages of their careers, acting upon themselves and essentially committed to Sinai's safekeeping. Although they represented or were linked to known organizations, mostly there was no public or constituency that appointed them to
145 As explained, the Egyptian environmentalists were not researched in this work. 130
perform such actions. For example, SPNI's environmentalists in Sinai did not necessarily coordinate their actions with the central headquarters in Tel‐Aviv.146 Similarly, the NRA headquarters were sometimes unaware of local cross‐border actions in Sinai. An important note is that some of the above mentioned individuals were young motivated environmentalists rather than accredited scientists (as most of them became over time). Thus, at times their actions were naïve and unprofessional: "personally I was unsophisticated about politics and interests… I entered with my sandals to the American Foreign Affairs Ministry… looking back, we did a tremendous work and I can't believe today how we did it" (Shaked, personal interview, February 10, 2011). In contrast to the Israelis' characterization, Egyptians pursuing Sinai's conservation were mainly the academic elite assisted by international institutes, and were not necessarily personally connected to Sinai's area. As far as this research can tell, they did not share an "environmental imaginary" of Sinai as a motivation for their acts.
The Sinai advocacy case study demonstrates the critical importance of motivation that goes beyond self‐interest,147 of people working towards normative change while seeing a collective need as more important than a private one. However, it is hard to ignore a paternalistic and colonialist undertone in some actors' declarations and aspirations. This case took place in a post‐colonialist setting,148 which, similar to other undeveloped/developing countries where nature conservation practices were developed, promoted implementation of Western knowledge and practices (i.e. recolonized by Western values)(Adams and Mulligan, 2003; Beinart and Hughes, 2007). Specifically, "The creation of national parks – which are essentially human activity control or exclusion zones – is an approach to environmentalism that follows a model generated in spacious North America"(Foltz, 2005). This model was, as mentioned, reinvigorated by the IUCN/UNESCO discourse. Moreover, some would claim that after being decolonized from Israeli rule Sinai has been recolonized not only by the implementation of Western values, but also by the Egyptians. Prior to the Israeli occupation Egyptians were not present in the area, and Sinai’s authentic nature‐safeguards were the native Bedouins.
146 Some of SPNI's leading personnel tended to see the Zukei David Field School guides as "delusional guys" (Rabinowitz, personal interview, August 15, 2012). 147 For more on this line of thought see: (Mansbridge, 1990). 148 A theme that was not developed as it is outside the scope of this work. 131
Sinai's conservation activities need to be viewed as a joint action and as a conglomerate of individual actions simultaneously. The different interests pursued, as the different actions taken, did not necessarily accumulate into one path, but rather enhanced some trends and acted in parallel for the same cause. The group of individuals pursuing that cause, along with their recruitment of international institutions and colleagues, can be called a TAN. Given that this research takes interest in the inner network connections and their regional significance in addition to the tangible on the ground accomplishments of Sinai's TAN, the Decentred Theory (Bevir and Richards, 2009) and the Sociology of Interventions Theory (Eyal and Buchholz, 2010) might be useful frameworks for exploring these dynamics. The Decentred Theory analyzes the making and the remaking of networks through the ability of individuals (politicians, bureaucrats, non‐governmental actors and citizens) to create meanings and actions that are inspired by their subjective beliefs and experiences, as opposed to their ‘objective’ agent‐position. The theory implies there is no comprehensive account of network governance and no necessary logical or structural process determining the form networks take, or whether they succeed or fail (Bevir and Richards, 2009).
Sinai's TAN, made up of environmentalists in different careers stages, locations, nationalities and interests, framed nature conservation in Sinai as its main cause. Peace was never declared an objective. Their work was not structured, and at first glance, it seemed they were working "bottom‐up". However, given they had no public support and directly approached their colleagues in the Egyptian and global epistemic community, it would be more accurate to describe them as an intermediate group working "top‐down" and "bottom‐up" simultaneously. The Sociology of Interventions writings suggest that instead of focusing on particular social types of involved intellectuals (and their "above"/"below" work‐pattern); it is more useful to analyze the movement by which knowledge and expertise are mobilized to inform interventions in the public sphere. The different actions of this process took place in "an interstitial domain of expertise, where the boundaries between these worlds are blurry" (Eyal and Buchholz, 2010). In the examined case, most of the devoted actors were part of civil society groups (though not necessarily representing those groups' agendas) more than acting from a pure academic viewpoint. This "intervention" was
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performed by an uncoordinated, decentralized TAN. The TAN framed an idea, disseminated past and present data and information and inserted it into local and international policy debates. Consequently, expertise were "mobilized to inform interventions" (Eyal and Buchholz, 2010) and influenced particular domestic political issues.
This TAN's effort had a spillover effect and contributed to a wide spectrum of environmental agendas inside Egypt. A clear example of such a spillover showcasing the TAN’s success is the fact that procedural changes regarding nature conservation in Egypt started from Sinai's governorates, and not from the capital. In Sinai's governorates, on the ground nature conservation efforts took place, decrees were issued (as seen above in regards to Brunn’s and Clark’s efforts) and offices dedicated to the subject appeared and preceded their appearance elsewhere (later to be followed nationally).149
However, this TAN differs in two aspects from the common definition of advocacy networks. First, it lacked an appeal to the public. Based on the generally accepted assumption that in those days the Egyptian public, the "shareholders," was not tied to Sinai's nature,150 this network addressed only knowledgeable individuals and institutions. Relatedly, the Israeli public, once pulled‐out of Sinai, would not have seen the area as its own. Second, the way in which information developed and flowed through the network, which is a main characteristic of TANs, was only partially mutual and to some extent intentionally disguised. The question is, given these differences, was this TAN influential? The influence of advocacy networks is measured by four aspects: issue creation and agenda setting, influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations, influence on institutional procedures and lastly the influence on policy changes and on state behavior (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). In all but the last criterion, this network had an impact. State behavior, which is measured not only by official procedural acts (initiating laws, decrees, institutional building etc.), but also by essential acts (i.e. enforcement and financial support), was not as successful. The new institutes suffered from lack of enforcement power, financial support
149 As mentioned above the first Wildlife Office was formed in the North Sinai Governorate in 1981, a 1983 Presidential Directive called for establishing Wildlife offices across all of Egypt's governorates and enabled locally based environmental enforcement (Brunn, 1983). 150 The direct Egyptian public that lived on site, the Bedouins, was not part of the decision makers and was not approached by the TAN in this regard. 133
and professional human resources (Genena, 1996; Hamed, 2005). Thus, their de‐facto effect on environmental defense was limited. Existing criticism argued that the proliferation of environmental bodies in Egypt was enabled since they were considered a relatively safe form of organization and their ability to mobilize popular constituencies or affect policy was minimal (Sowers, 2007).
TANs are distinguished by a set of shared normative commitments. Here, the commitment was clearly to Sinai's nature conservation. Nevertheless, one cannot disregard the fact that in many cases (even in indirect actions like the IUCN's resolution), Egyptians were aware of Israeli involvement. Thus, while focused on nature, this TAN acted as a space for diffusing tensions and to some extent promote peace by bringing people together and working jointly towards shared goals. Besides Ms. Sagebiel, all the participants in this network were not official diplomats nor appointed politicians. They acted in an international arena under the "peace umbrella" at times when the term "peace" still possessed an optimistic vision among the region’s nations. Therefore, in addition to describing the groups' nature conservation actions and accomplishments, a characterization of their role as "peacemakers" will follow.
4.6.2. Environmental Peacemaking in Post‐Conflict Sinai
In a post‐conflict setting (as the Sinai case represents),151 environmental and natural resources management had proven crucial for effective peacebuilding and recovery (Weinthal, 2006; Bruch and others 2009, as cited in:UNEP, 2010; Unruh and Williams, 2013). In this setting, political horizons tend to be short and the will for rapid revenues that can assist in rehabilitating and stabilizing fragile economies trumps. Thus, a preference for short‐ term objectives (usually harmful for the environment) is common (Bruch, 2009). For this reason, a greater need for the protection of nature against destructive development arises. But, in these periods, government capacity tends to be especially weak, contributing to the malfunction of environmental management (UNEP, 2010). However, "the immediate post‐
151 The peace‐agreement ended direct hostilities between the nations but did not end the conflict between them. Thus, the post‐conflict situation on ground can be looked at differently as an ongoing conflict, therefore ascribing different roles and abilities to the different actors. 134
conflict period provides a window of opportunity… to rebuild and transform the institutions that are related to the restoration, management, and allocation of natural resources in ways that would otherwise be politically difficult to achieve. Capitalizing on early opportunities is particularly critical if the economy depends primarily on natural resources…" (Jensen and Lonergan, 2012). Though Sinai's nature is not the sole or even the major economic resource of Egypt, it had played a part in Egypt's plans for rehabilitation and development after Israel's withdrawal. This post‐conflict era proved to be an opportunity to create an institutional transformation in the environmental field, and the opportunity was seized.
In the post‐conflict period, Sinai served as a peace‐arena for the two newly‐reconciling states. For Egypt, it was a demilitarized land for an unarmed reconquering; for the state of Israel it was a land needed to be let go, and for Israeli environmentalists it was a land that needed to be kept safe. These needs resulted in Sinai's nature conservation advocacy, referred to as an environmental cooperation rather than "peace action" by both sides. However, as demonstrated above, a positive connection exists between environmental cooperation, conflict resolution and peacemaking (Conca and Dabelko, 2002; Ali, 2005; Carius, 2006; Ali, 2007; Akçalı and Antonsich, 2009; Bruch, 2009). These writings emphasize the platform of dialogue that can be created among environmentalist and can replace distrust, suspicion and divergent interests with a shared knowledge base and common goals. As part of this process, environmentalists and scientists are "naturally" or essentially ascribed with peacemaking roles (Matthew and Gaulin, 2002; Ali, 2003; Raak, 2009). Acting from both states, assisted by international colleagues, the role of the environmentalists in Sinai's case as promoters of a cross‐border platform of dialogue is clearly seen. Carius claims that an effective impact on peace can only occur once there is a transition from technical cooperation to political cooperation (Carius, 2006). In early phases, direct unmediated dialogue between Israeli and Egyptian environmentalists took place. It was "technical" and non‐politicized. It did not last long, both because of the national conflict that overcast it and because substantial changes in the inner Egyptian political sphere were needed (forming environmental institution and legislation). However, changes in this environmental political sphere (establishing a Ministry, laws etc.) that took place in following years did have an impact on direct cross‐border Israeli‐Egyptian relations. Most of the environmental
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cooperation that did take place in this period was mediated by international agents or institutions. Those changes had, however, an indirect impact on peace, as will be elaborated below.
Aside from highlighting a story about devotion to nature that transcended political borders, this research also points out the Israeli environmentalists' weakness and lack of political power to directly influence the peace process: "there wasn't any real connection between environmentalists to politicians then in Israel; thus it was impossible to really bring it to the front of negotiations" (Perevolotsky, personal interview, January 25, 2011). This disassociation, that might also be related to some of the environmentalists early career stages, resulted in good initiatives being not only dissolved and unrealized (i.e. sustaining the Zukei David Field School staff under Egyptian sovereignty), but at time ignored altogether (i.e. the peace park initiatives). Nonetheless, this weakness in regard to political state institutions does not directly reflect on the environmentalists' role as stewards of nature and as peacemakers, which is visible in the unfolded case study. The Israeli environmentalists' ability to transform a reality of separation, detachment and withdrawal into an articulated and concrete sequence of valuable actions could be explained by their environmental imaginary. Refining this concept into the peace and environment discourse would assume that in a post‐conflict setting, environmentalists who had lived or worked in a transferred area, as opposed to outsiders or new to the area environmentalists, could better pursue cross‐border environmental cooperation and strive for non‐national land conservation.152 Moreover, the significance of the opportunity window that opens in post‐ conflict settings can be seen once more. In those unstable times, when peace was being negotiated, signed, and before the geostrategic relations stabilized, the environmentalists' contribution both to nature and to cross‐border relations was most effective. Their limited political power was relatively enhanced and an open ear to their demands was found. From various reasons, after the peace agreement was settled, space was separated and borders were demarked, the will and possibility to act declined.
152 It is probable that in the eyes of the involved individuals, this intervention's outcome is perceived less positively. De‐jure, nature conservation in Sinai received governmental attention and de‐facto, real implementation was problematic and insufficient. 136
In order for environmental cooperation to contribute to peace or conflict transformation, changes are required both in the political sphere, i.e., creating governmental ties built on trust, transparency and cooperative gain, and in the public sphere ‐ involving, strengthening and empowering local communities, creating new coalitions and involving new actors from local and international civil society (Conca, 2001; Conca and Dabelko, 2002). However, when looking at environmental cooperation and the resolution of larger political conflicts we must also consider endogeneity ‐ the direction of causality (Ali, 2007). Is environmental cooperation a result of conflict mitigation, or is it leading to conflict reduction itself? Sinai's conservation actions, and, to a lesser extent, regional direct cooperation, represent examples of both: Resulting from the peace process, nature conservation was a focal point to cross‐border cooperation, which created a chain of events that enhanced Sinai’s environmental state. This, in turn, promoted peacebuilding153 by contributing to the continuity of the Israeli flow of tourism to Sinai, one of the only vivid cross‐border activities between the countries. Furthermore, an improved environmental situation is known to enhance local and regional stability (Carius, 2006; UNEP, 2009), thus the ameliorated environmental conditions in Sinai might have contributed to peace once more.
4.6.3. Additional Agendas in Promoting Sinai's Nature Conservation
Several local and national political agendas were guiding the Egyptian government and the Egyptian environmental community. On the one hand, Egypt's desire to regain sovereignty in a DMZ, to enhance its presence in remote areas and to transform the "ex‐territory" perception of Sinai was achieved partially through the nature reserves designation. "The existence of Taba Protected area… with no designated staff or annual budget, abutting the Israeli border at Eilat… is richly suggestive of purpose beyond saving wildlife" (Gilbert, 2010). On the other hand, Israeli‐designated Protected Areas that existed in Sinai prior to the withdrawal made the Egyptians sensitive to international criticism about the environmental costs of future development in the area (Sowers, 2013). On top of that, the conservation agenda was supported by foreign funding which also guided its development. Alongside
153 For Peacemaking vs. peacebuilding definitions please see above the theoretic chapter. 137
these political agendas, environmental agendas were also pursued. While not undermining the environmentalists' achievements, "discursively, Egypt’s conservation experts worked to make international concerns a viable domestic policy choices by emphasizing the developmental benefits of Protected Areas" (Sowers, 2013, 102). Meaning, they strategically coupled larger political concerns with the environmental agenda. Kowalsky writes that the production of cultural value (such as nature conservation) follows communicative and strategic paths which make sense only in light of the historical events so as to make the concerns of some groups resonate with the public at large (Kowalsky, 2011). In the presented case it seems that changes manifested by being embedded in and resonating with several sets of publics and different values and interests ‐ locally, regionally and internationally. In reality, the declaration of Protected Areas could be viewed as following one public's value while serving another's strategic path.
4.7. Conclusion This chapter illuminated a part of an untold story of the Israeli‐Egyptian relations and the environmental history of the Middle East. Predicting Sinai's status if Sadat was not assassinated or the Israeli‐Lebanese war would not have interfered with the consolidation of peace is impossible. One can speculate, though, that Sinai’s environmentalists could have contributed not only to nature conservation, but directly to peace and cross‐border relations. The described actions planted seeds that possibly bore fruits, yet those surely cannot be directly traced back to them, especially given the multilayered and accumulative nature of these processes.
This chapter demonstrated how a TAN can be self‐organized, decentered, and successful in creating meaning and in mobilizing the international community. It contributes to the literature of environmental peacemaking in post‐conflict situations by highlighting the window of opportunities which open and the environmentalists' potential role in promoting peace. More explicitly and in an unconcealed level, it also tells the story of people passionate about their surroundings, wanting to keep it safe and whole.
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5. Chapter 5: A Peace Park in the Golan Heights – An Avenue for Peacemaking? 5.1. Introduction
This chapter describes and analyzes the idea of establishing a peace park in the Golan Heights, an idea that was repeatedly proposed in the last two decades as a novel avenue for resolving the Israeli‐Syrian conflict. This idea was conceptualized at official, unofficial and track II negotiations, as well as in independent policy papers. It was proposed by negotiators, policy makers, researchers and environmentalists. Mostly, the park was primarily designed to assist in resolving the conflict between the two states, while nature conservation served as a means to ending conflict. The peace park was viewed as a tool which would enable both sides to compromise on some of the core issues of the conflict, such as sovereignty, security arrangements, border delineation and water allocation. Although instrumentally in essence, the use of the environment in these proposals is what enabled this unique framework of conflict resolution. This instrumentalization highlights the potential role for the environment in peacemaking processes.
The GHPP concept is a comprehensive one and involves environmental and political aspects. It includes issues of population and repatriating refugees, demography, regional and local development, sovereignty, security, nature conservation, inner and cross‐border tourism, demilitarization, border demarcation, water allocation, water quality and more. Under a conflict resolution process, these issues are entwined and inseparable for a disconnected discussion, compelling an "all or nothing" holistic approach for the negotiations.154 What differentiates the GHPP initiatives from the rest of the aforementioned cross‐border initiatives is that they first and foremost represent efforts of environmental peacemaking and only secondarily of environmental peacebuilding. The aim was impacting the unresolved national conflict, in addition to assisting in sustaining and consolidating peace in a post‐conflict phase.
154 Such an approach assumes an agreement is an entire package inside which trade‐offs and bargain between different parts can be made. 139
This chapter reveals, compiles and examines the GHPP proposals and the phenomena of their recurrence. It examines the rationale of each proposal, the impetuses of their promoters, and analyzes how those differed between actors. It assesses the role of the environment in the Israeli‐Syrian conflict and postulates the environment’s role in a (putative) resolution process promoted by a peace park. The chapter begins with a short geographic and environmental background on the Golan Heights area, followed by historical background of the conflict. The third section sketches the chronology of the proposals. It elucidates the differences between the proposals, the evolution of the peace park concept, its consolidation, its proponents, and the way the environment was referred to in the proposals. This section also briefly delineates the chronology of the negotiation process in parallel to the peace park initiatives. The discussion addresses the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a peace park on the Golan Heights for each of the states and for the environment. It attends to the involved networks and professionals. It also highlights some trends with regard to the environmental discourse and to the potential political power embodied in environmental imaginaries. Moreover, it discusses the proposals and their possible contribution to peacemaking and peacebuilding. The discussion ends with a brief comparison to other peace park proposals along Israeli borders and to some relevant peace parks in the world.
5.2. Background
5.2.1. Geography and Environment of the Golan Heights The Golan Heights is a high‐altitude (the average altitude is 500m) basaltic and mostly‐rocky plateau diversified by volcanoes. It spans on an area of 1,800 km2, approximately 1,200 of which are under Israeli control (Degani and Inbar, 1993).155 It is located between Mount Hermon in the north, the Yarmouk River in the south, the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee in the west, and the Raqqad Wadi to the east. The Golan Heights borders Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. The area drops from the 2,743m on Mount Hermon to below sea level (‐210m) at the Sea of Galilee on its south west side. In its western slopes, rivers stream
155 Figures vary between references due to differences in measuring the "natural" Golan to the political/national Golan. 140
down from east to west or south‐west (only a few are perennial), and in between there are many waterfalls, pools and natural reservoirs. The Golan Heights is a sparsely populated area. During the 1967 war, the Golan Heights were emptied of most of its 100,000 Arab inhabitants who abandoned the city of Kuneitra and the 200 farms and villages scattered on the Golan (Kipnis, 2005). Today, within the Golan Heights territory there are 32 Jewish settlements housing 20,000 people and a similar number of Syrian nationals/Druze156 who are concentrated in five northern villages (ICG, 2007).
The Golan Heights hold important natural values. The area demonstrates a place of unique beauty with an outstanding global significance in terms of biodiversity. It encompass habitats and species of three different bio‐geographic zones: parts of the Great Rift Valley, the Mediterranean and desert habitats (Degani and Inbar, 1993; Ron, 1998). 157, 158
The Golan Heights are a key source of water for Israel. The Banias/Hermon River which flows into the Golan Heights and is one of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee's three tributaries. Smaller amounts of water flow into the sea by way of intermittent streams coursing down from the Golan Heights. And finally, there are also intermittent streams flowing from the south of the Golan Heights into the Yarmouk River, which provides water to the Jordanian state. The Golan Heights waters are valuable as drinking water, for cultivation and grazing areas, all of which are part of Israel's agricultural sector159 (ICG, 2007). Moreover, the Golan Heights area is also ideal for renewable wind energy, an unrealized potential (Greenfield‐Gilat, 2009). Today, several Israeli firms are operating small wind‐farms and plans to establish 3 more farms consisting of 150 turbines are being promoted.160
156 Who are residents of Israel but mostly did not receive its citizenship156, thus are classified by the state as having "unclear citizenship" status. 157 The vegetation in the Golan is Mediterranean and diverse. There are woods and forests, swamps and wet habitats, grasslands and semi‐desert areas (Livne, 1989). 158 For more on the physical geography and environment of the Golan ‐ including natural landscapes, geomorphology, soils, animals and vegetation – and on the of history of human settlements see (Degani and Inbar, 1993). 159 Its 100 km2 of cultivated land supply 40% of Israel’s exotic fruits, pears, beef and wines for export. Cows, which in the rest of the country are densely packed, roam freely. 160 Environmental bodies claim that those should go through an environmental assessment given the dramatic implications on the landscape and the danger they pose on birds and bats. 141
The Golan Heights area serves as a popular tourist destination. With its unique nature and open landscapes, replete with gorges, waterfalls and at times, snow‐capped mountains, it became a favorite recreational area for most Israelis and hundreds of thousands visit annually (ICG, 2007; Hof, 2009). More than twenty nature reserves and parks that cover about 17% of the area have been established and are operated primarily by the NRA (Livne, 1989). Archeological sites are scattered around the area and include several Jewish heritage ones.161 However, despite these sites religious importance, they do not play a major role for the majority of Israeli Jewish population’s affinity for the area (Newman, 1999). Other popular tourist attractions are war memorials, war zones, and historical remains of battles, etc (Gelbman, 2008). Consequently, recreational and natural attributes are merged with historical ones and create a unique relation between Israelis and the Golan. Sagie (2011) observed, "The Golan Heights are engraved in our collective minds in more than one way… places that were mentioned in a context of killing and animosity got another interpretation of peace and tranquility after the Israeli settlements… The nature and landscapes… The Israelis see the Golan Heights as… a small piece of "abroad", no doubt many have emotionally attached to those views, like what happened in Sinai" (Sagie, 2011, p.139 author's translation).
5.2.2. History of the Conflict: Territory, Water and Security The Israeli‐Syrian conflict began in the 1948 war (prior conflicts in the area existed since colonial times), when the Syrian army crossed the agreed international border.162 Syria, then, conquered lands in several areas and reached the shores of the Sea of Galilee. With signing of the Armistice in 1949, Syria withdrew to its former positions and three demilitarized zones (DMZ) were created west of the former border (1923 international line, see Map A). In the following years the cease‐fire was violated by both sides on numerous
161 "The Golan Heights falls within the biblical boundaries of the Land of Israel. Prophets during the First Temple period (930‐586 BCE) mention the residents of the Bashan region – the biblical Golan – as part of the Israelite nation. In the late 5th and 6th centuries BCE, the Golan was settled by Jewish exiles returning from Babylonia. During the Second Temple period (520 BCE‐70 CE) Jews resided in that area. Jews continued to live in the Golan until after the end of the Talmudic period (6th century). The Katsrin synagogue and many other archeological findings testify to a flourishing Jewish presence in the Byzantine period as well" (Inbar, 2011). 162 In 1923, in Mandate times, Britain and France drew the international boundaries of the region between Syria and mandate Palestine. 142
occasions (clashes over Israeli settlements and over water infrastructure works that included trials to divert the flows of the Sea of Galilee tributaries took place inside and outside the DMZ's163,164). Until June 4th 1967, Syria controlled the northeast part of the Sea of Galilee and the eastern bank of the Jordan River.
In the 1967 war the Israeli army occupied the Golan Heights (see Map A). Since then, the UN refers to the area as the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. It condemned the 1967 territorial gains and issued Security Council resolution 242, which calls for an Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories.165 The reason for the outbreak of war was not primarily the issue of water166. However, in those times, with much of the Israeli water supply being dependent on water originating from outside its international borders (2 of the 3 the tributaries of the Jordan River originate in Lebanon and Syria), the securitization of water seemed inevitable. Therefore Israel depicted its occupation of the Golan Heights not solely for strategic reasons, but for control of the headwater of the Jordan River ((Wolf, 1996 p.19) and (Neff, 1994, p.30) in: Dajani, 2011).
163 "By the early 1950s, Arab states were discussing organized exploitation of two Northern sources of the Jordan‐‐the Hasbani and the Banias (Stevens 1965, 38). The Israelis also made public their All Israel Plan, which included the draining of Huleh Lake and swamps, diversion of the northern Jordan River and construction of a carrier to the coastal plain and Negev Desert‐ the first out‐of‐basin transfer for the watershed” (Naff and Matson 1984, 35) in (Wolf, 1996). 164 For more on the DMZ and the history of the Kirad Bedowin inhabitants please see (Rabinowitz and Khawalde, 2000). 165 It also called for a termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area. See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/242(1967) 166 Although water was not the casus belli for war it was an important one as in those days as the Israeli army was bombing the Syrian sites and machineries of the works on the diversion of the Jordan River tributaries. In 1964, Israel began withdrawing water of the Jordan water for its National Water Carrier and Jordan completed a major phase of its East Coast Canal. In November 1964, the Arab states began construction of their Headwater Diversion Plan to prevent the Jordan headwaters from reaching Israel. The plan was to divert the Hasbani into the Litani in Lebanon and the Banias into the Yarmuk where it would be impounded for Jordan and Syria by a dam at Mukheiba. The diversion would cut by 35% the installed capacity of the Israeli Carrier, and increase the salinity in the Sea of Galilee. In several occasions in 1965, Israeli tanks attacked the diversion works in Syria. The final incident, including both Israeli tanks and aircraft on July 14, 1966, stopped Syrian construction, effectively ending water‐related tensions between the two states. See elaboration in (Wolf, 1996). 143
Map A: The Disputed Lines : The 1923 international line, the June 4th 1967 line and the DMZ areas. Taken from: (Greenfield‐Gilat, 2009).
On October 6, 1973, the "Yom Kippur"/"October 1973" war broke out, during which Syria unsuccessfully attempted to retake the Golan Heights. Ever since the 1974 Israel‐Syria Separation of Forces Agreement the border between the sides has been relatively quiet.167 Evidence for this state of affairs is the low and simple 130km fence that was built shortly
167 As observed by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), excluding 2013‐2016 random occasions related to the Syrian civil war. 144
after the 1973 war and was not upgraded for many years, until recently.168 In 1981, less than a decade after this war, Israel extended its law to include the Golan Heights. De facto, this meant an annexation of the area. In 2010, three decades later, the Israeli Parliament passed the "Referendum Law" that obligated a general public referendum for any disengagement from sovereign land (such as the annexed Golan).
Over the years, Syria's clear, consistent and stable demand has been the return of the entire Golan Heights to its sovereign control. The territorial aspect of this conflict is tightly connected to water, border and security issues. Full Syrian control of the Golan Heights would directly influence the water balance in Israel. The Golan Heights supplies Israel with 25‐30% of its water needs. The Sea of Galilee is Israel's primary natural reservoir that provides water to Israel’s dense population centers through the National Water Carrier (Ha'movil Haaretzi). Since water is one of Israel's most scarce resources, and securing a water supply is one of its highest priorities, Israel is concerned that a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights would give Syria the ability to extract, deplete or contaminate its vital water sources (ICG, 2007). These could potentially be of major concern if the Syrians return fully to their positions before June 4, 1967, and occupy the northeast shore of the Sea of Galilee and the eastern bank of the Jordan River. On top of that, in the case of a withdrawal, the repatriation of Syrian settlements (situated upstream) might influence not only water quantity but also water quality.169 While these water resources are vital to Israel’s hydrological balance, they are much less so to Syria’s (Hof, 2009).170,171
As can be seen, the territorial conflict is tied to water. In the last two decades of negotiations, the main obstacle for a resolution was the disputed area between the 1923 international borderline and the June 4th 1967 line. More specifically, over the exact
168 As a reaction to the current unstable situation in Syria. 169 Such settlements might send household and industrial waste water down into the upper Jordan River, the Sea of Galilee, and the Yarmouk River. 170 Although other parts of Syria have substantial water shortages, pumping water from the Jordan Valley springs to Damascus would acquire unreasonable costs (Hof, 2009). 171 It is worth mentioning that with the new intensive sea desalination along Israel’s Mediterranean shores, this balance is changing once more and Israel’s reliance on the Sea of Galilee waters is declining. 145
location of the border line on the northeast shore of the Sea of Galilee.172 Although small in size, this challenging area carries a significant and strategic position involving water access, sovereignty173 and control.174 Different agreements, from Mandate times and onward (1923, 1926, and 1949), differ in the way they relate to the water issue. Of note, the June 4th, 1967 line has changed significance with time. Due to mass pumping of water and some drought years, the Sea of Galilee is not as large as it was in June 1967. This “shrunken” status was raised in the past as a characteristic that might permit the parties to finesse the most controversial aspect of the line in question. Comparing Syrian positions from June 4th, 1967, with the present size of the sea, might allow the sides to accommodate (not without difficulties) the “June 4th boundary” with the idea of keeping Syria off the water (Hof, 2009). As will be elaborated below, the peace park proposals tried to solve the conflict by providing an alternative to June 4th, 1967 line’s deadlock, through changing and challenging the traditional balances between sovereignty, control and usage rights.
One of the major justifications for Israel’s continued holding of the Golan Heights are security and military needs. A widely held perception in Israel is that the Golan Heights are a strategic asset to Israel's security. The slopes are seen as a buffer and as the best defense line against a conventional military attack from the east (Inbar, 2011).175 Mt. Hermon, at the north of the area, is considered "the eyes of Israel", allowing a great outlook towards Damascus. Currently, with new technological developments and in an age of rockets and
172 According to the 1923 border line between Mandate Palestine and Syria, the Sea of Galilee, including a 10‐ metre wide strip of beach along its north‐eastern shore, is part of mandate Palestine. North of the sea, along the Jordan River, the boundary was drawn between 50‐400 meters east of the River, keeping that stream entirely within mandate Palestine. Nevertheless, the land partition agreement (1926) granted Syrians water usage rights (fishing and drinking water purposes). However, throughout peace negotiations and in various declarations, the Syrians insisted on a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, down to the June 4th 1967 line (the territorial status of the 1949 cease fire), which would allow Syrian access to the Sea of Galilee. Israeli leaders have stated their demand of keeping the Syrians off the Sea of Galilee's water and their intention to withdraw along the international border line of 1923. The partition lines are in an ongoing debate. For elaboration see: (Hof, 2009). 173 Another substantial claim made by Israel is that all the borders with its neighbors are based on the international mandate agreed borders thus so should be this one. 174 Actually Sagie, who headed the negotiations in the year 2000, reports in his book that a solution for this matter has been achieved between the teams but was not concluded and signed (Sagie, 2011). 175 In the past, areas of Israel adjoining the Sea of Galilee basin had been vulnerable to Syrian shelling from atop the Golan scarp (ICG, 2007). On top of that, maintaining control over the area enables a better defense for Haifa Bay strategic area. For more on the military and security advantages of the Golan Heights see: (Inbar, 2011). 146
missiles, the value of territorial control has depreciated and is now considered a strategic anachronism (ICG, 2007). Therefore, the security argument is in question: “From the point of view of military requirements, we could reach an agreement with Syria by giving up the Golan”, said Lt. Gen Moshe Yaalon, former IDF chief of staff (13 August 2004. as cited in: ICG, 2007). Others say Israel is better off without holding the Golan because the benefits of deeper defenses would be outweighed by the safeguards of a peace agreement that would create a wide DMZ (ICG, 2007). Another former IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Amnon Shahak, observed that a Syrian embassy in Israel is more important than an early warning station, (A. Kaspi (1993), as cited in: Inbar, 2011). However, advocates of the Golan Heights’ holding respond that these are simplistic and unestablished slogans about the decreasing value of territory and topographical assets, and that "the design of Israel’s northeast border should not be shaped by ephemeral current technologies" (Inbar, 2011).
It must be said that water and territory (that are justified by security terminology) are not the only security aspects that are keeping the countries in an ongoing conflict situation. Israel perceives Syria as an active participant in an indirect war against it, through its relation with Iran, the arming of Hezbollah and by supporting militant Palestinian groups.176 Though hostile, the Golan Heights as a front between Israel and Syria has been relatively quiet for more than three decades. In terms of peace, however, this fact might have had a boomerang effect, since it reinforced the claim that the Golan Heights are the security barrier that needs to be retained (ICG, 2007).
5.3. The Israeli‐Syrian Peace Process and the Peace Park Proposals
5.3.1. The Peace Negotiations: A Brief Background Though unresolved, the Syrian‐Israeli negotiation track has been characterized as being "relatively simple and straightforward" when compared with the Palestinian negotiation
176 For example, in January 2011, the Israeli press reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu relayed a message to Syrian President Bashar Assad, saying that on the condition that Syria agree to abandon its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, he would be ready discuss Syria's demand for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights (Ravid, 2012). 147
track (Hof, 2009). During the 1990's it was assumed that an arrangement with Syria on the Golan Heights could be much more acceptable by the Israeli public than an agreement with the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza. Although public opinion polls in Israel routinely show that 70% of the respondents oppose returning the Golan Heights to Syria under any circumstances,177 media sources and past negotiators reported that the closing of a deal with Syria (in both 2000 and 2008 rounds of negotiations) was within reach (Hof, 2009; Sagie, 2011). The various rounds of negotiations (direct, indirect and track II negotiations178), while not finalized, brought the parties closer to a resolution.179 The main stumbling block remained the disagreement about the border line between the lines of June 4th 1967 and the international border of 1923.
Former Israeli Prime Ministers (Rabin, Peres, Barak, Olmert and Netanyahu) agreed to the “Land for Peace” formula, in regard to the Golan Heights (Inbar, 2011). However, a major discrepancy existed between actions of Israeli political leaders, or their proxy, and their declarations. Publically, they have reiterated their commitment to secure Israeli sovereignty on the Golan Heights, but on the other hand, sent messages expressing their willingness to discuss a full withdrawal from it. Some argue that the failure to reach an agreement via negotiations can be attributed to the leadership of both parties and their unwillingness to "go the extra mile" (Ross, 2004; Sagie, 2011).180 However, the leadership was not the only obstacle. The interests and conceptualization of the end‐goals of the negotiating sides were too different. While Syrian leaders have demanded the full return of the Golan Heights with no preconditions, Israeli leaders have generally insisted on Syria's cut off of its support for Hezbollah, the abandonment of its alliances with Iran as well as consent to a full normalization of relations with Israel. For example, "Israelis, in Barak’s mind, needed to see immediate evidence that this would not be a peace on paper only, but one that heralded genuine reconciliation and acceptance of Israel by Syria" (ICG, 2002). The issue of "land for
177 For repeating polls please see the peace index http://www.peaceindex.org/ 178 For more on Track II negotiations please see the Peacemaker's Toolkit at: www.usip.org 179 For more see: (Ross, 2004; Indyk, 2009; Rabinovich, 2011). 180 For a study that argues that the “Land for Peace” paradigm with Syria entails great military risk and may invite aggression, while the potential political dividends of a peace treaty are limited, please see: (Inbar, 2011). 148
[real] peace" formula is crucial in order to understand the relevance of the peace park proposal and its potential for the resolution process of this particular conflict.
5.3.2. The Golan Heights Peace Park Proposals ‐ An Overview The proposals for GHPP were raised by different entities over the years. Most of them were not proposed by environmentalists, nor were environmentalists a part of their development. Rather they were conceived by negotiators, politicians, policy makers and Think Tank researchers. While there are many recurring elements in the proposals, some elements gradually evolved over time. Notably, while some initiatives specifically referred to establishing a peace park, others did not, but rather spoke of a normalization process. This process description included elements which in later rounds of negotiations appeared in a comprehensive way as integral parts of a park.
Above all, the park was designed to serve as a formulation to aid in tailoring a political resolution and a way out of the seemingly intractable June 4th 1967 complication while simultaneously addressing the core issues of the conflict. Hence, in all the proposals the park's designated area has implications on the access to fresh water sources, as it covers several of the natural parks and reserves that adjoin the most water‐sensitive areas that would be returned to Syria (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010, 151). The park was meant to assist in accommodating the various interests of the two sides: Syria could have gained full sovereignty over the Golan Heights and restored national pride, while Israel could have gained peaceful relations, a demilitarized area, assured water needs and water quality, and maintained a supportive public. Both sides could have enjoyed economic benefits, an improved international status and a better environmental situation.
Another motivation that drove these initiatives was public support. Initiators believed that a peace park component might reshape the Israeli, and to a lesser extent the Syrian, public opinion regarding a peace treaty and to lessen the reluctance to make “painful” waivers. Explicitly, a park would allow Israelis to continue having access to the Golan Heights nature reserves and to the entire Sea of Galilee circumference, while Syrians would be granted
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recreational access to the Sea of Galilee. These factors were expected to have strong positive psychological effects on both publics, facilitating the acceptance of the agreement (International Crisis Group, 2007).
The next section reviews chronologically seven proposals for a peace park in the Golan Heights and delineates developments in the negotiation process between the two sides.
5.3.3. The Golan Heights International Park and the Gan HaShalom Proposals
In 1991 peace negotiations began in Madrid. These negotiations included, for the first time ever, Syrian‐Israeli direct discussions on a resolution to the conflict. Talks continued inconsistently for five years (under PM Shamir and later under PM Rabin), with little progress in resolving the main issues of borders and water rights. However, an understanding of the need for inclusiveness grew among negotiators: "peaceful relations, security arrangements, and withdrawal would be tied together in a sequence of steps" (Ross, 2004, 145). PM Rabin declared that “The depth of the withdrawals will correspond to the depth of peace” (Yediot Aharonot, 1993). The negotiators developed a scenario to link "what the Israeli wanted – peace – and what the Syrian wanted – withdrawal" (Ross, 2004, 149).181 After PM Rabin's assassination in November 1995, PM Peres in his short term in office, and President Clinton tried to revive hopes and made an effort to push forward this track of negotiations. However, they were not successful. During this 5 year period of negotiations, the concept of a peace park was raised:
The first peace park proposal was published in 1994 by Mr. Robin Twite, a retired senior official of the British Council who suggested "The Golan Heights International Park – a Way Out of a Deadlock".182 Twite recalls:
181 Comprehensiveness also meant that "the agreement between Israel and Syria should not be limited only to them, but should be the key to broader peace between Israel and the region" (Ross, 2004). 182 The plan proposed won an award from the Institute for Social Inventions, London, as "one of the most imaginative, feasible and potentially transformative schemes" in the year 1994/1995. 150
"The concept at that time was that the Golan would return to Syrian sovereignty but that much of it would be recognized as an international park or an enclave, which would be accessible to Syrians, Israelis, and other nationals of the Middle East and elsewhere. It would be controlled by an international commission, specifically created for this purpose, which would be comprised of representatives from Syria, Israel and a selected United Nations agency" (Twite, 2009).
Twite produced a detailed paper183 outlining his proposal for the management of the park as well as its advantages to all parties. The plan proposed that the park would cover most of the Golan Heights' area (besides some eastern areas and the town of Quneitra), under Syrian's de‐jure sovereignty, that the borders of the park would be fenced and that there would be entry points established on both its Syrian and Israeli borders. The whole area would be demilitarized and a specially formed UN force would maintain order within it (Twite, 1994; Twite, 2009). The plan presupposed Israelis' love for the area, substantial global funds and the will of both sides to fully cooperate in peace times. Twite presented the peace park idea to the Israeli foreign ministry, to peace activists and to people in academia (Brown, 1995; Twite, personal communication, January 11, 2013).
183 It included some developmental features, mechanisms of entering, residing and living in the park's area and more. 151
Figure no. 19: The Park on the Golan, Twite Original Pamphlet 1994.
In those years another Golan Heights park idea was briefly mentioned in a news article and was proposed by Mr. Hari Ringer. "Hari Ringer… an eco‐visionary… [that] has been working on what he calls Gan HaShalom, the Garden of Peace. In his vision of an international park on the Golan, there would be wind‐generated energy, pesticide‐free agriculture, and an eco‐ friendly university specializing in "conflict resolution and environmental peace studies". According to Ringer, the park would be "a symbol to the world… This peace has to be based on sharing" (Brown, 1995).
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Mr. Ringer shared his idea with the Israeli foreign ministry but did not receive any response (ibid).184
5.3.4. The Golan Height Peace Park/Biosphere Reserve In 1998, Dr. Tamar Ron, an ecologist working for the NRA, published a paper calling to establish a peace park in the Golan Heights, based on a "biosphere reserve" concept. In this paper she wrote about the Golan Heights suitability to becoming a peace park. Unlike other proposals that followed, this proposal was primarily based on an ecological rationale:
"Despite its relatively small size, the Golan Heights is an area with outstanding global significance, in terms of biodiversity… [it] encompass habitats and species of three different bio‐geographic zones… a variety of unique freshwater habitats, and spectacular landscapes. The biodiversity of the Golan is currently threatened by human development, pollution, disturbance, and even poaching...
Any political arrangement in the Golan Heights that will not secure biodiversity conservation aspects may be detrimental to the survival of the unique and rich biodiversity of the Golan, and thereby adversely impact global biodiversity…
A peace park in the Golan Heights can provide the required framework to allow for a peaceful solution for the conflict between Israel and Syria… It will require, of all of the politicians involved, creative thinking and open mind. The whole area will have to be developed in the concept of a “biosphere reserve”, with an overall planning, allowing for several levels and types of human occupation and utilization… Only people living of tourism and other sustainable, and preferably non‐consumptive, use of resources, within the framework that will be agreed, could then live in the Golan" (Ron, 1998).
Ron proposed the idea as early as 1994, inspired by both Oslo's optimistic atmosphere and by a Golan‐Wolves project she was a part of. She developed the idea through dialogues with
184 Mr. Ringer’s details, nor other materials related to this suggestion, were successfully retrieved. Therefore, this remains as yet another (minor) example that showcased the prevailing concept of parks as a way to promote peace and reconciliation. 153
ecologists, zoologists, botanists and geographers from universities and from the scientific desk of the NRA. She finalized her proposal in 1998 and then discussed it with "whoever was willing to listen" (Ron, personal communication, December 8, 2012). Within the NRA, Ron's colleagues were divided between those who supported the concept (based on its environmental reasoning) and ones those who opposed it (for political reasons). Ron recalls discussing it with several Members of Knesset and policy makers. She mentioned that "the same idea was raised in parallel by different individuals from different professions without being aware of one another, and it took many forms… Nowadays this idea seems almost "science fiction" but political state of affairs is temporary by nature, and the global ecological importance of the Golan will always prevail" (Ron, personal communication, December 8, 2012).
During the summer of 1998, at the same time Ron raised her idea, secret private talks between Mr. Ronald Lauder (acting as PM Benyamin Netanyahu’s proxy) and President Assad took place, but didn’t make any substantial progress.185
5.3.5. The Nature Tourism Formula, the "Bill Clinton's Reserve" and Lake Tiberius Tourism Area Between 1999 and 2000 the United States mediated direct talks between Israeli and Syrian officials in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. Even though the parties made rapid progress and Syria showed uncharacteristic flexibility and eagerness to conclude a deal (Ross, 2004, 561), the negotiations collapsed in March of 2000. Reportedly, differences between the sides were reduced to a few hundred meters inland from the Sea of Galilee (ICG, 2007).
Despite their failure, the 2000 negotiations went into great detail, and substantially elaborated on the envisioned normalization process between the two States. Uri Sagie, one of the Israeli negotiators wrote that "The Syrians were open to negotiate on a formula that
185 During a few weeks Mr. Lauder went back and forth between the leaders. This effort concluded with a ten points principles for a basic agreement but was not taken further because of the lack of political power on the Israeli side to push such process further (Ross, 2004, 511). 154
covered and included all the components of an agreement at once: territory, geography, topography, security, water and the two States’ ethos" (Sagie, 2011, author translation, 72). As part of this round of negotiations, a modest formula for a peace park (not named as such) was suggested. Sagie reported that the Israeli negotiating team, inspired by tourism models in Sinai and on Jordan's border,186 came up with an idea to plan a model for constructing relations between the two states. The model’s underlying principles were: differentiating between sovereignty and actual control, and assuming differences in both sides’ interests regarding the normalization process (Sagie, 2011, 73). The team assumed a successful plan was dependent on components such as border regime, mobilization, traffic and transportation, commerce and economics, the status of Israeli settlements, the scope of the Syrian resettlement and more.
Among Sagie's team’s suggestions for the normalization process were components directly related to a peace park concept187:
A fenceless border, to be patrolled by a joint Israeli‐Syrian‐International team Transfer of Israeli settlements, without their demolition, with the intention that some would serve as tourist villages and some would be used to accommodate international personnel overseeing the agreement's execution Tourism mitigation for Israelis ‐ i.e. exempting visas, payment in Israeli currency (Shekels), Hebrew signposts on roads and in tourism sites Establishing a joint tourism administration for the area; continuance of Israeli research on archeological sites; Joint declaration and demarcation of landscapes and nature reserves' conservation Joint administration to explore new development projects and their cross‐border environmental implications Exchange of agricultural knowledge Free trade zone and inclusion of subsidies for joint developmental projects such as wind farms, nature / religious / archeology tourism, extreme sports and more.
186 Based on a precedent set in Zofar and the Peace‐Island area on the border between Israel and Jordan. 187 For the entire normalization section in these negotiations see: (Sagie, 2011) and (Ross, 2004). 155
"In order to promote such a model without intimidating the Syrians we thought to address tangible objectives… that will not create a Syrian fear from excessive Israeli domination in the Golan. We thought of highlighting the benefits for the Syrian side… and the importance of such steps for the Israeli public opinion" (Sagie, 2011, 75). The Israeli team demanded that most of the Golan's water continued to flow into Israel, while preserving its current quality. At some point, a proposal to anchor the Israeli aspiration to the greater Sea of Galilee Water Basin was suggested. This provided yet another justification to try and prevent any Syrian resettlement in the Golan Heights (Sagie, 2011, 153).
While not specifically addressing or utilizing "peace park" terminology, Sagie declared that:
"Our vision was even greater... we wanted to reach a situation in which after the peace signing, any Israeli citizen could go and travel the Golan without a need for a passport… under Syrian sovereignty. An even more creative idea, tested later by Patrick Seale was to turn all the north‐eastern part of the Kinneret… to a nature reserve under Clinton's patronage. The "Bill Clinton's Reserve" will allow anyone to enter its area as long as they are not carrying weapons. The idea might seem a bit imaginative, but when I first brought it up with Dennis Ross during the secret meetings in Washington he thought it was very interesting" (Sagie, 2011, 126).
David Shatner, a water and borders expert who was working closely with Sagie recalled:
"As I remember there was an unsolved problem relating to the north‐eastern part of the Kinneret… the Syrians obviously did not agree to give up their sovereignty there and we feared from Syrian settlements in that area, from agricultural crops production and herds of sheep and cattle… This was in addition to the ethos problem: Israelis were convinced that they should be freely able to tour the entire circumference of the Kinneret… Then I came up with a suggestion that was accepted by the head of our team [Sagie, S.S] who "sold" it to the Americans: let's declare Emek Batiha [northern‐east part of Sea of Galilee S.S] as the "Clinton Park"… it would operate by the Americans and would incorporate American nature conservation
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standards (that will prevent any pollution and specifically water contamination), These standards will ease Israeli concerns… we thought this proposal was appealing. Indeed, the Americans were fascinated by it, and I was told that "not only them" [commas in original]" (Shatner, personal communication, December 28, 2012, author's translation).
According to Shatner, the original goal of the park's concept was very limited and two‐fold: maintaining the quality of the water flowing into the Sea of Galilee by applying conservation rules and environmental standards to the area, and allowing Israelis access to the full sea perimeter in order to ease public opinion about the overall agreement.
At the same time, another proposal was raised by Mr. Patrick Seale, a British journalist who was close to the former Syrian president Hafez al‐Assad and served as his official biographer. Seale suggested a "Lake Tiberius Tourism Area" (Seale, 2000).188 He published an article explaining the idea by emphasizing six points:
"As everyone knows by now, the main obstacle to a Syrian‐Israeli peace agreement is a dispute over the ownership of a few hundred meters of land on the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberius . Because of this dispute, President Hafiz al‐Assad and Prime Minister Ehud Barak are in danger of missing a truly historic opportunity… So close, and yet so far. Seeing that the gap between the parties is relatively small, can a "creative" formula be found that will satisfy the vital interests of both sides and allow peace talks to resume ?
The ideas advanced below could perhaps provide the outline of a compromise solution...
1. Israel would have exclusive sovereignty over the lake [meaning the lake water S.S], while Syria would have exclusive sovereignty over the northeastern shoreline. 2. Syria would undertake not to pump water from the lake, pollute the lake, divert streams flowing into the lake, or cause ecological or environmental damage to it. Israel
188 In response to a claim that Seale’s proposal was a Syrian one, he responded: "You should also know that Syrian officials did NOT leak to me 'valuable details of their negs with Israel' which formed the basis of my Hayatarticles. My sources were Western. The proposal to break the deadlock over the north‐eastern corner of Lake Tiberias by making it into a joint tourist site was my own. The Syrians shot it down‐‐before the Israelis did" (Seale, as quoted in: (Young, 2005)).
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would undertake to give Syria access to the lake for fishing ,swimming, and other related activities. 3. Citizens of both countries and foreign visitors would have free access.... 4. Neither country would establish police or customs posts or security checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the lake… the whole area of the Golan and the lake would be demilitarized. 5. The United Nations… would be responsible for security in the joint tourist zone. It would monitor agreements reached and encourage the development of normal peaceful relations. 6. Syria and Israel would set up a joint water commission…”
Seale concluded with the hope that his proposal could serve as a framework for cooperation and a symbol of hope for the future. It would also "help persuade public opinion in both Syria and Israel of the peaceful intentions of the other side" (Seale, 2000). Seale’s initiative was publicly launched a few weeks after the failure of the Israeli‐Syrian negotiations and two months before Hafez al‐Assad died.189
Worth of notice, before publishing his paper, Seale was traveling back and forth and delivered messages between Jerusalem and Damascus. The former MK Silvan Shalom, a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, said in a parliament meeting: "Seale met with me… he came directly from Damascus, he told me that Assad… will never give up his sovereignty there, but he is willing to turn it [the disputed land in the northeast shore of the Kinneret] in to a Casino Hotel's area, like in Taba190" (Israeli Parliament (Knesset), 2000). Clearly, the term "park" (as the terms "reserve" or "tourism zone") when not specifically defined, are open to many creative interpretations that are not necessarily related to nature conservation.
As it appears, in the year 2000 all the "ingredients" for a peace park proposal were already on the negotiating table. Since the ingredients were connected to the normalization
189 Assad's death was followed by acknowledgment of "Seals' plan" by the Israel's Minister of Justice (Mr. Yossi Beilin), who called upon Syria to use it as a basis to get back to table of negotiations (Nana News, 2000). 190 To Taba area in Egypt, where a casino used to operate, Israeli tourist could enter without a visa. 158
process, they were not properly addressed, nor significantly tied to the political issues, and were therefore not grasped as factors essential to the resolution process. Seale’s proposal (that could have been well influenced by Sagie's team proposal to the Americans) was quite similar to the subsequent peace park proposals, although its scope and aspirations were relatively limited.
In the year 2000, the Israeli environmental authorities’ conducted preliminary work on a possible Israeli‐Syrian peace agreement and its environmental consequences. This work was not part of the negotiation process itself (as Ministry of Environmental Defense’s representatives did not participate), and was done unilaterally and without a cross‐border dialogue. Ms. Valerie Brachia from the Ministry said: "We realized that what was most painful for us [the Israelis when thinking about the withdrawal from the Golan Heights, S.S] is the disability to visit the nature attractions which are so loved by the Israelis. Thus, we were thinking how to produce something that will enable those visits… we did not think of it in terms of cooperation... it was totally different from the conceptualization and the work that was done vis‐à‐vis the Jordanian border" (Brachia, personal interview, February 11, 2011). Thus, the Ministry produced a background paper on legal aspects of an environmental resolution between Israel and Syria, including a chapter on peace parks (Tal and Advisory committee, 2000).
Similarly, the NRA did not participate in any of the official talks (Vardi, personal communication, January 20, 2011). Interestingly, it did produce a paper on the Golan Heights environment in the case of a withdrawal. The paper stressed the importance of the area’s preservation and emphasized that "there is a need to guarantee unlimited and full access to these sites and nature values for tourism and leisure and for scientific research" (Oron, 2000). Another paper that was sent to the negotiating team, demanded the maintenance of the nature reserves and archeological sites statuses as part of any agreement (including wildlife and other natural assets), according to international conservation standards. It also suggested establishing an international administration (that would include Israel) for control and enforcement of environmental laws (Oron, 2000).
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5.3.6. Jordan Valley Nature Preserve
In 2002, the International Crisis Group research center,191 spearheaded by Prof. Fred Hof, produced a policy paper that offered a solution for the stumbling block of Israeli‐Syrian negotiations: the Sea of Galilee's northeast shore and the Jordan River water resources. The paper contained a draft "peace treaty" in which the "Jordan Valley Nature Preserve" was proposed as a way out of the entanglement (see appendix number 3 and map B).192 The Preserve, to be located on the Syrian side of the boundary and under Syrian administration, aimed to assist in safeguarding the water resources of the Jordan Valley and facilitate mutual access to its area. According to the plans, this preserve would extend eastward from the border to an elevation of zero meters above sea level (the Sea of Galilee is more than 200 meters below sea level). The Preserve would be free of permanent residents except for the resettled town of Al‐Hamma and Syrian conservation and law enforcement personnel. Visitors from Israel would be free to enter and have full access to the Sea of Galilee circumference, which is "an important psychological boost for Israelis who have enjoyed such access for the past 35 years and who would probably oppose a treaty barring them from the lake’s northeast shores. In return, visitors from the Syrian side would be granted recreational access to the lake, an important psychological boost for Syrians who enjoyed access to its waters before the creation of Israel" (ICG, 2002). The approach that was taken in this proposal to the water issue complements the territorial arrangements. The basic operating principle was that water resources below and to the west of the Golan plateau flowing naturally into the Sea of Galilee would, with limited specified exceptions, continue to do so. This proposal set the ground for Fred Hof's and USIP 2009 proposal, elaborated below.
191 http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 192 A detailed elaboration can be found in the full treaty under ARTICLE II – International Boundary, section number 6. 160
Map B: The ICG proposal for the Jordan Valley nature Preserve (based on elevation zero line). From: (Greenfield‐Gilat, 2009b).
5.3.7. The Park on the Golan
Between 2004 and 2006 a secret set of Track II negotiations took place between Israeli and Syrian teams. They were supported by Turkish officials in the first phase, and mediated by Swiss officials in a second. These teams were headed by Ibrahim Suleiman, a Syrian‐
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American businessman,193 and Alon Liel, a former director general at the Israeli foreign ministry and involved other experts.194 Meetings between the teams were carried out with a notification process to senior officials in the Syrian and Israeli governments.195 The first phase negotiators produced a "non‐paper",196 and its first draft was marked August 29, 2004 ((Liel, personal interview, January 9, 2011) see in full in appendix no. 4). In the second phase, a dialogue and a "map exercise" followed and was supported by the Norwegian government (Aronson, personal interview, December 10, 2012).
The peace park concept, according to Liel, was raised by the Syrians, and served as a major component in the understandings reached between the two sides. The negotiators tried to reach a framework that included coordinated points linked to a broader conceptual agreement that would not include specified border delineations or maps production. The park’s detailed description highlighted the normalization process and substantially elaborated on some administrative processes, permits, living and working conditions in the park's area.197 In contrast to other proposals, it discussed the evacuation of Israelis from their current settlements and their possible future employment within the park’s borders. Furthermore, in this proposal, the peacebuilding process was slightly more elaborated. It did not, however, concern itself with nature conservation and environmental matters besides commenting on the need to safeguard them:
"The park on the Golan will be designed as a nature reserve, under Syrian sovereignty, stretching on about one third of the Golan Height territories…
193 Who is originally from the same village as Assad. 194 From the Israeli side, participants in the talks were Uzi Arad (former PM foreign advisor and current Head of the Israeli National Security Council), and in later stages, General (ret.) Uri Sagie (former head of the IDF Military Intelligence directorate and a major player in the 2000 negotiations). 195 The Swiss mediators insisted that the Israeli government be made aware of the negotiations and that nothing will be signed (Liel, personal interview, January 9, 2011). The European mediator and the Syrian representative in the discussions held eight separate meetings with senior Syrian officials, including Vice President Farouk A Shara, Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, and a Syrian intelligence officer with the rank of a "general." (Eldar, 2007). 196 A document of understandings that is not signed and lacks legal standing. 197 The existing protocols are still under secret status and could not be viewed. 162
Israeli citizens will be allowed entry to the park, no visa required… Israeli citizens currently living on the territory to be defined in the future as the park land, and who own economical, tourist, or agricultural businesses will be able to continue operating their businesses and even hold on to their business ownership…
The supervision and safeguarding of the park will be carried out by Syrian nature reserve officials …
Both governments, with the cooperation of the international community, will make special efforts to turn that park into a tourist attraction… The planning will take into account long term ecological and environmental considerations as well as certain historical, political and humanitarian sensitivities on both sides...
The spirit of the park should be the spirit of reconciliation between the two peoples. It will reflect the wish of both countries to co‐exist in peace and to maintain maximal economical and tourist cooperation for their own sake. Top businessmen and economists…will act as an advisory team.
The water flow in the park will be controlled in a way that will guarantee that Israel will keep on receiving the same quantities of water…
The evacuation of the Israeli population living on the territory of the park will be carried out within 5 to15 years… Aside from park personnel, Syrians will not be allowed to establish permanent residence on park territory.
The park territory entirely will be a buffer zone free of weaponry…"
(Liel and Soliman, 2007).
Jeff Aronson, an American who participated and mediated the negotiations stated that "The major challenge facing us was not an environmental problem as we understood it, but a political and a territorial problem, so to the extent that environmental issues were present they were just [used]… as a way of increasing the attractiveness of the park idea" (Aronson, personal interview, December 10, 2012). No environmentalists nor geographers took part in
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the negotiations nor were any consulted "We, none of us are environmentalists as such, it really wasn't a critical factor in the overall idea of devising solution to what we saw was primarily territorial strategic conflict" (Aronson, personal interview, December 10, 2012). According to Aronson, obtaining international interest and support was another incentive into promoting the park's concept.
In the second phase, maps based on professional GIS work were produced (see below map number C and D). There were five park options created, ranging from a very narrow and small one on the edge of the territory in dispute (at the northeast part of the Sea of Galilee, maps 1 and 2), to an extended one incorporating Katzrin city, Mt. Hermon and most of the rivers and nature reserves in the area.
"Some of the options were a territorial expression of attractiveness in a sense that people will want to come to the park if it had some territories included in it. For example some of the Nahal's (rivers) that are going from the foothills into the Kinneret itself in the couple of the options were included to increase the park's environmental and tourist sort of value" (Aronson, personal interview, December 10, 2012). These maps were not publically published, but were handed to Fred Hof once produced (Liel, personal interview, January 9, 2011). Other normalization components related ideas about the park, such as turning Katzrin city into an international environmental college to be located within the park’s area, were discussed, but not finalized or published (Liel, 2011).
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Map C: the Narrow Options of the Golan Park (unpublished, Alon Liel’s private archive).
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Map D: Golan Park Options 1‐5 (unpublished, Alon Liel’s private archive).
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Through much of 2008, Israeli and Syrian diplomats198, assisted by Turkish mediators, discussed ways to end the conflict. During that year, Israeli PM Olmert sent a message to Syrian President Assad, indicating that Israel would be willing to withdraw from the Golan Heights as part of a comprehensive peace treaty (Ynet news, 2007; Heumann, 2008). The negotiations were sincere, but were halted due to the Israeli‐Gaza clashes at the end of 2008 which was followed by the fall of Olmert's government.
5.3.8. The Jordan Valley–Golan Heights Environmental Preserve
In 2009, a special report named Mapping Peace between Israel and Syria was published by USIP.199 It included a peace park component named "the Jordan Valley–Golan Heights Environmental Preserve". The report was written by Fred Hof, who immediately after its publication became a senior US diplomat and deputy of George Mitchell, the peace envoy to the Israeli‐Syrian track negotiation. Later, Hof was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Special Representative on Syria. Hof is a well‐known expert on Israeli‐Syrian relations. "We cannot separate Hof the researcher from Hof the Diplomat. Hof presented his research publicly in the Capitol Hill weeks before entering his new job… what we are actually looking at is a quasi‐formal American peace proposal" (Misgav, 2010). Hof's report, though not very innovative in comparison to the former ones,200 created the de facto international mainstreaming of the idea of a peace park.
Hof suggested creating a "Jordan Valley–Golan Heights Environmental Preserve" under Syrian sovereignty. This concept was an elaborated version of the 2002 ICG paper (see above), that "has attracted considerable attention since 2002” (Hof, 2009). He argued that
198 The Israeli team included PM Olmert's chief of staff, Yoram Turbowicz, and his chief foreign policy adviser, Shalom Turgeman. The Syrian team included Riad Daoudi, a legal expert in the Syrian Foreign Ministry, and Sami Taqi, the head of a think tank in Damascus considered close to the government. 199 United States Institute of Peace is an independent center created by Congress to prevent and mitigate international conflict without resorting to violence. www.usip.org 200 In the report, Hof referred to the previous 2004‐2006 Track‐II peace park proposal and offered his view in relation to some of the points that were raised there, such as weapon control, the entrance fees to the reserve and the length of visitations. 167
this preserve could be "a gesture Damascus might consider making to ameliorate Israeli concerns about a new boundary in the Jordan Valley" (Hof, 2009). In this proposal Hof did not suggested specific borders and did not include a map. He claimed that this preserve would facilitate peace by producing five specific results. According to him it would:
(1) “Grant Syria the boundary it desires on the basis of full Israeli withdrawal from lands it acquired by force in 1967,
(2) Safeguard water resources vital to Israel’s economy while according Syria access thereto,
(3) Provide Israelis with unencumbered access to the circumference of the Sea of Galilee and perhaps up into parts of the Golan Heights,
(4) Provide an environment where Syrians and Israelis might interact informally and peacefully, and
(5) Give the parties a post‐treaty signing opportunity to implement successfully something of substance as the broader implementation phase of their mutual commitments unfolds over time" (Hof, 2009).
Hof remarked that "While there are many approaches to the creation, size, purpose, and functioning of such a preserve, the one suggested in this report would be based on existing parks and reserves created by Israel during the occupation, which would be transferred to and administered by Syria" (Hof, 2009). The chosen parks and reserves that were included in the preserve were those that adjoined key water resources and offered the prospect of easy, yet circumscribed, access to visitors from Israel. Hof suggested taking the strip of coastline along the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, adjoining it to several existing parks and reserves and incorporating the existing road network to enable access. He specified inclusion of some of the Israeli facilities: the Yehudiya Forest Nature Preserve, Majrase Nature Preserve, Gamla Nature Reserve, Park Hayarden (Jordan Park) and the Hermon (Banias) National Park.201 He also suggested the current site of Katzrin city as the location for the preserve/park’s headquarters and other facilities for visitors: "the place
201 For full explanations about each park and its role in the The Jordan Valley–Golan Heights Environmental Preserve see www.usip.org 168
where Syrian and Israeli officials, environmental experts, and archaeologists meet to flesh out the physical and operational details of a the Preserve" (Hof, 2009).
Similar to previous proposals, the suggested park would be free of permanent residents (with some exceptions). Hof emphasized the peacebuilding aspect of the park: "In addition to mitigating Israeli concerns about the return of sensitive territories and providing a venue for informal people‐to‐people contacts… give the parties a good platform for practical bilateral cooperation even as the ink on a peace treaty is drying, allowing for a constructive, confidence‐building start to the implementation phase of the withdrawal process" (Hof, 2009).
5.3.9. A Renewable Energy Peace Park on the Golan Heights
In 2009, a research paper authored by Yehuda Greenfield‐Gilat and published by USIP suggested a Renewable Energy Peace Park on the Golan Heights as an important component to be included in a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. This paper builds on Hof's work and claims that a Renewable Energy Peace Park presents options that increase the acceptability of the park’s concept to both parties, and provides measures to sustain the agreement in future years since "mere nature preserve will not suffice" (Greenfield‐Gilat, 2009). The proposal included renewable energy components as part of the peace park: a wind farm, scientific facilities, research institutions and power plants that would generate inherent benefits to the peace treaty. Greenfield‐Gilat argued that this peace park would be self‐sustained, economically profitable and would contribute to both regional peacemaking and to environmental sustainability.
Greenfield‐Gilat suggested using high wind potential territories in the park for wind energy plants and an academic center for research and development (R&D), alongside the nature reserves. These would enable Syrians and Israelis to work together by generating knowledge and earning money for both countries. Katzrin city would be transformed into a tourist overnight hub and the academic R&D center site. Greenfield‐Gilat proposed three options
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for the park's layout. The three options demonstrate trade‐offs between benefits and complexity. The first option, the Golan Heights Environmental Peace Park, dealt only with the nature reserves and predicted that establishing a joint industry might have created too many complications for an already fragile Israeli‐Syrian cooperative relationship. The second alternative was the Golan Heights Environmental and Energy Peace Park (Map E below), which was the most complicated option, yet more sustainable in the long run. It encompassed two areas of nature reserves and one adjacent area of energy production. The third alternative was the Golan Heights Environment and Energy Peace Park: Limited Version, which was similar to the previous one but designated two different areas for tourism and for the energy industry.
Map E: Golan Heights Environmental and Energy Peace Park, containing the energy fields and the two main nature reserves (Greenfield‐Gilat, 2009).
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Between the years 2010 and 2011 indirect talks between the sides, mediated by American envoys Dennis Ross and Fred Hof took place (Ravid, 2012). The talks were abandoned in 2011 with the outbreak of the revolt in Syria.202 The content of these talks was not made public. However, given that for one and a half years Hof propelled the Syrian‐Israeli channel and met with numerous Syrian and Israeli officials who were previously involved in peace talks between the two States (Ravid, 2012), one can assume that the proposed peace park was discussed in these meetings.
5.4. Discussion
As demonstrated, the concept of a peace park in the Golan Heights was proposed several times over the years, in various forms and by different agents. Proposals incorporated benefits for both sides, aiming to create a "win win" situation. As it appeared in negotiations and in policy papers, and in contrast to other peace park proposals and initiatives along Israeli‐Arab borders, the GHPP proposals were first and foremost a tool designed to help solve a territorial‐strategic conflict. Additionally, they incorporated elements of environment, economy, water, demilitarization, unsettlement, normalization activities and peacebuilding.
5.4.1. The Merits of Establishing a Peace Park: Israel, Syria and the Environment The different proposals for establishing a peace park offered advantageous options to the interested parties, to the region and to the environment. Israel could have obtained several strategic assets, in addition to peaceful relations: An internationally recognized border secured by a declared DMZ; Assured water supply from the Golan streams and from the Sea of Galilee with maintained quality due to non‐resettlement inside the park's area (therefore avoiding risks of pollution, contamination and depletion); Full access for its citizens to the sea’s circumference and to nature reserves reinforced with an ongoing (non‐sovereign)
202 As in former rounds of talks, PM Benjamin Netanyahu also relayed a message to Syrian President Assad, saying that he would be ready to discuss a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, on the condition that Syria agrees to abandon its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah (Ravid, 2012). 171
presence of Israeli nature authorities inside them, and a normalization process which included economic merits. Those achievements might have provided Israel with a more marketable agreement for its citizens, one that might have relieved some of the emotional difficulties involved with a withdrawal. Syria could have achieved a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, full sovereignty on its land, which was its central prerequisite demand. In addition, other "peace gains" could have followed, such as economic benefits and global public support.
Mutually, a park aimed at nature preservation, sustainability and cooperation would have enhanced both countries' prestige within the international community, stimulated international support and foreign investment (Greenfield‐Gilat, 2009), and might have generated economic benefits for both Syria and Israel that could have assisted in consolidating and sustaining peace.203 Cross‐border collaboration on nature conservation and regional development could have affected local border communities. A peace park would have provided a place for formal and informal people‐to‐people contacts, and granted the parties with a platform for practical cooperation.
Certainly, a peace park needs to be not only politically viable, but also environmentally sustainable. First, given the high ecological significance of the area, any creation of nature reserves, or maintenance of existing ones, could have been "good news" for the environment, especially if those reserves would have maintained high international standards. Second, under a park provision, with an Israeli withdrawal, no infrastructure (roads, sewage systems, water and other kinds of infrastructure) would have been removed and no settlements would have been demolished inside the park's area. Those were to remain intact for future Syrian usage. Their reassignment to Syrian authorities was aimed to prevent unnecessary expenditure and alleviate the economic, environmental and emotional
203 Obviously, in a macro‐view other economic gains would be created by shifting security funds allocations towards other national needs. 172
costs of uprooting and demolishing, and, in later phases, rehabilitating and rebuilding.204 Third, it is reasonable to assume that as part of a peace process, massive minefields that are scattered through the Golan Heights (and cause continuous harm to the environment by polluting the land and water sources) would have been cleared and restored.
Moreover, cross‐border management of an environmental unit may be more sustainable, reduces duplications and could result in better biodiversity conservation. Such management naturally involves cooperation among scientists, environmentalists, environmental authorities and the international community. As described in previous chapters, past experience showed that the international community supports joint projects which foster cross‐border cooperation and manufacture revenues for all. Taking the ecological rationale one step further could have brought regional environmental cooperation, one that was not substantially tested in the past and that was only a mere dream in the short euphoric era during the 1990's.205
Transboundary cooperation on both water and nature conservation in the Golan Heights could have generated direct and indirect economic benefits (ecotourism revenue, economic growth and poverty reduction) for both local communities and the respective governments.206 The proposed peace parks were designed to become a tourist attraction that incorporates nature, culture, history, research and development. An illustration for such incorporation of themes (not mentioned in any of the proposals) could be related to currently existing Israeli War Memorial tourist sites. Once the Golan Heights area would have been transferred to Syria, these sites could have been converted into Peace Commemoration sites. For example, the summit of Mount Bental is "located in the north of the Golan Heights at the foot of a volcanic mountain, and offers a spectacular panoramic view of Syria, Lebanon and north‐east Israel… The extensive Israel Defense Forces bunker
204 On the different economic, social and emotional costs of demolishing settlements based on the 2005 Israeli pullout from Gaza see: (Sheleg, 2003; Tsiddon, 2006). 205 As demonstrated in the opening of chapter 3 above. 206 It is important to mention that the idea of a park was hardly presented to Israeli local communities that currently reside on the Golan Heights and would possibly be evacuated in case of a peace agreement. 173
system located there has been turned into a tourist attraction. On the site are tank and weapon remains… which have been recycled in part as works of art…[one can learn S.S] a history of the borders and battles in the Golan Heights" (Gelbman, 2008). In a new political setting such sites could have been transformed and thrived as symbols of peace. As previously mentioned, in many places around the world (as in Israel), the term "peace park" has been used to describe memorials sites.
5.4.2. Professional Networks, Negotiators and Involved Institutions
The idea of a peace park on the Golan Heights was proposed by different individuals and had several "founding fathers" (and one mother), many of which claimed to be the first to come up with the idea. It is possible, as previously shown in Chapter 3, that this idea came up independently more than once. However, it is more likely that ideas were passed, at least partially, through dialogues among colleagues and informed individuals and later on grew their roots in new grounds. Therefore, the 1990's "visionaries" (Robin Twite and Tamar Ron) who suggested ideas that were generally not acceptable and perceived as "imaginative" (sometimes even by their initiators), planted seeds that, in time, might have matured in a dialectic way and infiltrated subsequent proposals. Generally, those initial and partially‐developed ideas were introduced by individual acts and not in an organized or a politically‐oriented manner (though these proposals were distributed to policy makers and politicians). As of 2000, the peace park idea was raised by negotiators themselves as well as by supportive advisors or environmentalists. Though the way in which these first proposals spread was nonlinear and is not fully traceable207, some of their nuclei are found in later proposals. Hence, given this flow of ideas, it is likely that a connection or a channel for information flow existed between professional environmentalists to the political levels. Also, albeit marginal, the Israeli government environmental authorities contribute their perspective to the negotiations in 2000.
207 For example, when approaching Mr. Hof to be interviewed about the way he came to think of a park's idea he preferred not to comment. 174
Different professional interests and motivations existed in the environmental and the political domains with regards to the peace park concept. Policymakers and negotiators saw the environment and the park concept as an instrumental tool or framework that would enable a political change, whereas environmentalists saw it as a way to maintain the environmental status quo and prevent dramatic ecological changes. Should a peace park ever materialize in the Golan Heights, various interested parties, institutions and professionals (local, regional and international) might join the process. On top of local institutions, international conservation and environmental agencies could take part in promoting, mediating and executing the peace park proposals, especially given the growing support for such parks in the world.
Furthermore, establishing and managing a peace park is a multidisciplinary task. Such a task calls for the involvement of many professionals, researchers, environmental protection agencies and different governmental bodies. Those bodies might be related to international tourism, renewable energy, agriculture, education, border control and more. Thus, a park could create a multilevel, multidisciplinary cross‐border platform for dialogue and mechanisms involving many participants. Those, in turn, would promote peace, both before and after a peace agreement is signed.
5.4.3. An Environmental Discourse and its Political Power The underlying assumptions of the GHPP proposals revealed two important and novel themes that highlighted the environment's potential role in political processes.
5.4.3.1. A Change in the Discourse The peace park is a framework agreement for executing territorial and political changes. A shift of the political discourse is needed for executing those changes. The Environmental Peacemaking writings recognize that using the environment is constructive for shifting such discourse. This author finds that this shift in the discourse might be useful not only for cross‐ border efforts but rather for inner political ones, at least on the Israeli side. Those changes,
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would eventually allow shaping the debate, or reconstructing it, in the way that would contribute to peacemaking.
The environment and the Golan Heights' nature, as the basic underlying rationale for the peace park's framework, were used here to concretize the discourse of space, sovereignty and territory in order to turn it into a tangible discourse of land use and land management. This is achieved by using or applying terms of nature conservation, nature reserves, ground and soil, water, infrastructure, tourism and more. The terminology of territory is blurred or dimmed by dealing with its on‐ground implications and related processes, and equivalent or parallel terms are brought into the discussion. Moreover, this shift in discourse, specifically utilizing land‐use discourse, brings to a discussion on sovereignty vs. de‐facto territorial control and usage, in a way that these two are not necessarily seen as bound and overlapping, and creates room for creative approaches.
5.4.3.2. Environmental Imaginaries as a Source of Political Power In the eyes of Israeli negotiators, the suggested Golan Heights peace parks were the means to frame a solution which would wrap land, water, territory and demilitarization issues together without allowing Syrian refugee resettlement in water‐sensitive areas. This framing would have offered a more acceptable peace‐package to the Israeli public. However, there is more than meets the eye. These alignments of strategic interests and political considerations demonstrated how much nature and landscapes, separated from their territory’s historic and strategic aspects, played a role in the various negotiations and proposals, despite their instrumental conceptualization and their use by the negotiators. This can be observed in two ways:
First, a part of the park's underlying principle was the continuance of Israeli nature‐based tourism. The tourism practice, barring economic value, was not only (potentially) politically powerful (as explained above and demonstrated in the Sinai case study), but is usually not considered in the initial phases of peace negotiations.208 Therefore, the importance of
208 For example, it was hardly mentioned in the 1990's rounds of negotiations (Ross, 2004). 176
nature and of the environment as a driving force for political peacemaking processes is reflected in these plans. The need for the Israelis public support for the withdrawal approval as well as in the implementation phase can both be exercised through the environmental imaginary of the Golan Heights.
Second, the stagnated features of conservation might serve as source of attraction, which would result in political outcomes. A peace park on the Golan Heights would not have a dramatic effect on the landscape, but rather preserve the current spatial situation. The settlements, roads and infrastructure were planned to remain intact (some of the proposals specifically mentioned signposting in Hebrew), no new populations were planned to be settled or resettled inside the park, and the nature reserves and tourist attractions would have continued running. "Features of the border landscape, such as welcome signs, flags, passport controls and customs buildings, add intrigue and fascination to the crossing experience" (Medvedev, 1999 in: Gelbman and Timothy, 2010). These symbols are significant because they mark the transition between places and cultures and between social, economic and political systems (Gelbman and Timothy, 2010). Thus, intact and unchanged views in the Golan Heights, coupled with the identified Hebrew signposting, should decrease the border crossing experience for Israeli tourists and enhance their sense of recognition and familiarity. These, in turn, may increase Israelis’ impetus to continue visiting the area and encounter cross‐border interactions, thus contributing to peacebuilding. However, it should be kept in mind that the shared Israeli "environmental imaginary" for the Golan Heights, which is portrayed in the peace park proposals as an underlying mechanism which might enable Israeli's acceptance of a withdrawal, could also achieve the opposite result. Such an imagination, when coupled with nationalistic and ownership feelings, may compromise the resolution process. In other words, this love for the area could well serve to justify its enduring occupation.
Hence, from the Israeli point of view, the peace park has a triple role in conservation: of nature, of current spatial arrangements (at least partially) and of nostalgia and memory. Respectively, the peace park serves to answer the motivations of environmentalists, politicians and the Israeli public. Such a "stagnated" park – one that aims to keep the
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memory and experience similar to the present situation – could potentially serve as the basis for a positive psychological impact on the Israeli public opinion during the domestic “marketing” phase of a peace agreement. On the other hand, from the Syrian point of view, this "stagnated" approach (though possibly enhancing many new local and regional processes) might well be viewed as a lingering occupation or as a demand for weakened sovereignty in more than one sense. It could also raise criticism that nature conservation herein is used, as it has been historically used, as means to appropriate land (Beinart and Hughes, 2007; Ali, 2011) and as another way of new‐colonialism in which exclusion zones are justified by Western environmental values (Foltz, 2005).
Rabinowitz writes that "environmental transformation is one of the most convincing manners in which territorial control can be created, advertised and consolidated" (Rabinowitz, 2004). This author adds "and vice versa", preventing a landscape transformations can also have meaning in terms of territorial control. Herein, the peace park is a political construct that aims to prevent environmental transformation, in the name of nature conservation. However, since it is coupled with several strategic interests its outcome is a political process in which the sense of non‐ownership and non‐control could be enhanced in Syrian eyes. This state of blurred‐sovereignty, for specific contested area, is intentional according to some of the proposals (for the sake of the Israeli visitors), but might be well problematic from a Syrian point of view which acted chiefly in the name of territorial retake.
To conclude, the theoretical novelty here lies in the comprehension of the assigned political power (by policymakers and negotiators) to the place the environment holds in people’s minds. I.e., the decision‐makers’ de‐facto recognition of the public's environmental imaginaries as a political driving force, one that eventually can contribute to peacemaking and to peacebuilding. At the same time, these environmental imaginaries could serve on opposite directions in political mobilization, one towards peace and the other towards existing stagnated reality.
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5.4.4. Peace Parks, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding
Environmental peacemaking is considered useful and successful when an environmental project positively affects the political reality. Hints for possible materialization of the two parallel pathways discussed by Conca and Dabelko (2002) i.e. changes in the strategic climate and strengthening "post‐Westphalian” governance, and the ways by which a peace park would feedback to influence these pathways, can be observed in the un‐materialized GHPP proposals. Establishing a peace park could have created a diverse network of professionals and multilayered civil society cooperation. In addition, it would have created an ongoing mechanism in which governmental agencies could have gathered and managed "high‐end" and hard issues (such as national security or water security) alongside "soft" issues (like establishing nature reserves) in a way that could have diffused tensions and enhanced trust. However, when cooperation on nature conservation is confronted with foreign and security policy considerations that it cannot address, it is mostly unsuccessful. The different proposals for the GHPP were presented by their proponents as viable options for environmental peacemaking. While not pretending to provide a solution for the whole conflict, they were built as realistic policy solutions that comprehensively answered those considerations and went far beyond forming a de‐facto integration of environment into "high politics". A GHPP would have served as a framework for executing political objectives: creating a unique sovereignty regime in a DMZ with creative management for nature and water issues while simultaneously blurring and delineating borders. Furthermore, the regional aspects of resolving this conflict (both from environmental and from political points of view) could have been diverse, ranging from water regime, tourism and infrastructure developments to weapon control.
While realistic, the proposals’ objectives were very ambitious, especially with regards to the complex reality of the Israeli‐Arab conflict. Ali (2007) writes that "Using conservation measures as a direct means of resolving an armed conflict is the most consequential use of environmental peace‐building, yet this approach is still in early stages of global acceptance" (Ali, 2007). The park's idea was not a focus of the last direct formal negotiations in 2000.
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Clearly, it was an important part of the track‐II governmental‐notified negotiations and to policy papers subsequent to them during the years 2004‐2009. The park’s role was uncertain regards to the last two rounds of indirect talks between 2008 and 2010. However, the recruitment of Hof, one of the leading proponents of a park in the Golan Heights, to the U.S. Diplomat administration can be seen as a step towards global recognition of the peace park's concept, therefore making it even more relevant to the Middle Eastern reality.
The "nature in service of peace" idea, and specifically the peace park concept, does not always receive experts’ full attention. Some experts tend to conceive it as idealistic or a naive notion, as "low politics" and as fit for "tree huggers" (Ali, 2010; Ali, 2011). Here too. In general, when confronted with the term "park" (instead, for example, the terminology of framework/formula), many experts and researchers of Middle East politics tend to dismiss or diminish the Golan Heights peace park's idea as "low politics", as a problematic or as an undeveloped idea.209 Furthermore, in fact, not much was written in the academic literature about the GHPP proposals. Prof. Eyal Zisser, leading Middle‐East historian, whose research is focused on Syria, made two interesting negating remarks about the park concept (Zisser, 2010). First, Zisser claimed that the park concept, though essentially positive, was only needed in the pre‐agreement phase, as a tool to create Israeli public support for the peacemaking process. According to him, the park becomes useless after this phase has ended (Zisser, 2010). This author finds Zisser’s remark as valid, especially given the possibility that this kind of comprehension of a "park" was, and still is, common among negotiators and proponents of an agreement. However, this author believes this remark is based on narrow understandings of the park's concept and of nature conservation, sustainability and peacemaking. The Golan Heights park, in contrast to most of the peace parks around the world that are usually aimed for post‐conflict phases, is aimed at contributing to the peacemaking process and to peacebuilding during the post‐conflict phase. According to Zisser's perspective the peace park was suitable for the post‐conflict phase as much as any other cross‐border project or tourist development (Zisser, 2010). This
209 For some illustrations please see the videos from the conference: "Peace‐parks on Israel's borders: The Syrian case study from theory to reality" on: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SlVvBINsgAM and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tzxHKn7rKh8 180
narrow comprehension of the park's role misses or neglects two important points: the first non‐resettlement inside the park, which has ramifications on water security and on the landscape, as a long‐term aspect of the agreement that would be executed in the post‐ conflict phase. Second, it does not leave space for constructive peacebuilding processes in the form of cross‐border interactions of experts or of tourists within the park's area.
Zisser's second remark was that the Syrians would not approve of a peace park perceived by them as a Western imported invention that stands against their long resentment of the West's dictations. Interestingly, Zisser pointed out one hypothetical possible solution,210 which was that of reciprocality: adding an Israeli territory component to the park so that it would spread over both countries territories and would manifest more equity (Zisser, 2010). Such a component was not suggested or discussed in the proposals, although a peace park by definition suppose to be a TBPA and enhance equity. Nonetheless, the IUCN definition for TBPA elaborates on five different spatial options (specified in chapter 2). "Two or more contiguous protected areas across an international boundary" is what most people visualize when they think of a TBPA. But two other options could also apply to the Golan Height peace park if it was to be a cross‐border park. One alternative is to form "a cluster of separated protected areas without intervening land" (Global Transboundary Conservation Network, 2011), which is separated geographically but share a common ecology. The second option is to form "a protected area in one country aided by sympathetic land use over the border", to which Ali (2007) adds that "sometime there will be no realistic expectation (or perhaps no need) for protected areas on both sides" (Ali, 2007, 8). Reciprocality of any sort was certainly missing in all the GHPP proposals and could have been one way to enhance Syrian feelings of equity, fairness and the general sense of a cross‐border joint initiative (rather than only a joint environmental management on Syrian territory).
210 While not claiming to support it, just for the sake of the discussion. 181
5.4.5. Peacemaking vs. Peacebuilding – the Golan Heights as a Unique Example
The GHPP proposals differ greatly from all the other initiatives along Israeli‐Arab borders. Four important aspects are emphasized, all of which are related to the fact that the Golan Heights proposals resembled first and foremost a trial for environmental peacemaking:
Timing: In contrast to most of the aforementioned initiatives along Israeli Arab borders, which were predominantly post‐conflict ones in which an agreement, interim agreement211 or at least an ongoing dialogue between the states existed, the GHPP initiatives were pre‐ peace ideas, planned before or as part of an ongoing formal negotiation. In some of the initiatives no formal dialogue existed amongst the sides and it was a one‐sided/third party (i.e. Think Tank) idea. In others, some kind of dialogue existed, mostly informal, between the sides to enable preliminary negotiations. However, in all cases the aim of the park was to serve as a mechanism in the negotiating and implementation processes.
A dual purpose of environmental peacemaking at first base and environmental peacebuilding at second base: The GHPP aimed to enable a solution for the Israeli‐Syrian conflict. This was a peacemaking activity, intended to carve a path to an official "End to the state of belligerency" by signing a peace accord between the States. But, by providing a territorial framework within which easy Israeli civilian access would be permitted and encouraged, where Syrian‐Israeli people‐to‐people contacts might take place and through which a normalization process encompassing cross‐border interactions would be promoted, this park inherently meant to serve as a peacebuilding tool.
Involved public and communities: An integration of a peace park concept into the peace agreement was supposed to assist with marketing the political solution to the Israeli general public. Since public opinion was vital for a GHPP approval (by a general referendum), the development of the concept included aspects of mass public psychology. According to the park’s advocates, the Israeli public as a whole was expected to favor the peace possibility. This means that the public would have preferred to enjoy the Golan Heights’ area under Syrian sovereignty over losing the opportunity to end the conflict (and
211 In contrast to the Palestinians, with whom Israel has no peace but has existing dialogue and prior interim agreements, with the Syrians no formal agreement was ever signed as part of the peace process.
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would have voted accordingly). One outcome to this public involvement aspect, is that by contrast to other peace park proposals along Israeli‐Arab borders that were hardly visible and generally unknown to the public (if at all, they were scarcely mentioned in the news as cross‐border tourism‐developmental projects (Ben‐Zaken, 1995; Rozenblum, 1995)), the Golan Heights peace park's complicated concept received more media exposure, especially during times of negotiations.212
Another involved entity was local communities. In other proposals local communities were hardly mentioned or mentioned as one of the parks' beneficiaries. In the GHPP proposals, two distinctive groups, with somehow different roles, fall in a complicated way under the category of local community. One was the Israeli future evacuees which currently live in the park’s area. This group will not be considered a local community once peace would be signed. Another local community, in absence (though might be considered more indigenous), is the 1967 group of Syrian refugees who are originally from within the park’s area, who, according to the proposals, would be prevented from resettling in it. The evacuation, non‐resettlement and prevention of any local community inside the park's perimeter are part of the park's justifications. Future groups that might be considered as "local communities" of an established peace park would be those communities living outside the park's periphery, who might be its direct beneficiaries (as in other parks that hold tourism enterprises etc.).
The park's advocators: In contrast to most of the peace park proposals along Israeli borders, the Golan Heights proposals were initiated by politicians and policy makers and not by environmentalists or environmental authorities.
212 For examples see (Globes news, 2000; Eldar, 2007; Oren, 2009; Misgav, 2010; Sadeh, 2010). 183
5.5. Summary
Political changes in the Israeli‐Syrian relations are fundamentally related to local, regional and global contexts: Iran and its nuclear bargaining with the United Nations Security Council; the state of affairs between USA and Turkey; the effect of the "Arab Spring" revolutions; water crisis in the Middle East, are all relevant factors. Obviously, current affairs in Syria obscure the future, as its inner insurgencies continue and armed militias from different origins are trying to overthrow Assad’s regime. While these groups have not yet referred to Israel, to the Golan Heights or to the general geostrategic situation, a new regional reality in which the Golan Heights might pose a new role is being formed. While this lack of stability in the near future pushed peace negotiations away from the current political agenda, it is possible that future negotiations will be based on previous ones. In such case, some pillars of negotiations are likely to remain similar. From the Israeli perspective, the need for a set border, for security (in its various ever‐changing definitions influenced by technology and geostrategic reality), and for water security are constant. Furthermore, the Israelis’ affection for the Golan Heights nature is a constant too. Thus, the peace park concept might still provide a valid tool for future negotiations.
Given that in the Israeli‐Syrian peace process, most of the parameters, terms and demands were long known to both sides, than in essence "Peace is not the problem, peace process is" (Zisser, 2010). The challenge was, and still is, to negotiate these "known parameters" in a way that would conclude in a peace agreement. Dajani (2011), one of the proponents of a GHPP concept, argued that this park could be appropriate mostly for the post‐conflict phase. While citing others she claims:
"A peace park is not the panacea to the conflict existing today between Israel and Syria. Within a context of comprehensive peace agreements such a project can ameliorate the concerns of both parties and provide a platform for confidence building and a way to overcome the problem of sovereignty in this particular area… may help to promote communication and cooperation as an early part of the peace process, building confidence and ultimately improving transboundary relations after reaching a peace agreement" (Dajani, 2011).
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Though Dajani stresses that nature conservation might be a component in a peacemaking process, she claims that "in the case of the Syrian‐Israeli conflict, the environment might support post‐conflict peace‐building measures together with the more conventional peace‐ building tools" (Dajani, 2011). Similarly to Dajani's view, in the past, environmental issues were largely viewed as confidence‐building measures within the Israeli‐Arab peace process, and not as critical issues that need to be resolved as part of the political solution (Feitelson and Levy, 2006).
Contrary to Dajani, and based on the discussed findings, this author reckons that a peace park, once grasped and conceived in its holistic sense (i.e., not limited to mere "green" nature conservation or to water aspects) could enable the mixture and accumulation of many components that should be dealt with in an inclusive territorial framework. Such a framework might provide a platform that will provide a key for releasing the deadlocked conflict and take part in the negotiating phase.
The GHPP proposals situated environmental issues (including water) proactively as part of, and connected to, the core issues of the conflict resolution. These proposals demonstrate that the environment, at least in the eyes of some negotiators and policy makers, was grasped as a potential source of mobilization for public support. Thus, and though this hypothesis was never really tested, the environment is situated here in a unique position, both as a source of political power (through public support) and as a physical space that will allow the compromise to take place.
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6. Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 6.1. Discussion
This work analyzes the environment and peace nexus as it manifested in past proposals for peace parks along Israeli‐Arab borders and in environmentalists’ actions related to the Sinai Peninsula in light of the peace process between Israel and Egypt. The work’s contribution is twofold. First, it reveals and describes the history of distinctive attempts of environmental peacebuilding and peacemaking initiatives, which provides a new outlook on the Israeli‐Arab conflict and on groups of professionals participating in its resolution. Second, it analyzes and discusses case studies by utilizing the Environmental Peacemaking literature's framework. It compliments this literature with supporting case studies, with reinforcement or with modest refinements to its prevailing assumptions.
The research focuses on examining the potential of the environment to serve as a catalyst for peace, and, to a lesser extent, the potential of peace to promote environmentalism. The examined cases demonstrate that various groups have recognized the potential of cross‐border environmental initiatives to contribute to peace. Nevertheless, in practice, those initiatives did not hold sufficient political power to overcome political setbacks, and therefore their potential was mostly unfulfilled. The examined cases show a positive and straightforward enhanced environmentalism as an outcome of peace. However, both of these findings are not simply explained and are intermediated by various factors. The study reveals a nuanced picture wherein peace and conflict resided simultaneously in different intensities, where the environmental initiatives were positioned within a broader socio‐ political setting that enabled them to initially flourish but simultaneously brought to their collapse. The study demonstrates and discusses at what periods were initiatives progressing and also discusses the initiators’ motivations (environmental imaginaries, post‐ colonial conceptions, pure ecological rationale, political reasoning etc). Finally, it discusses what, based on all of these examples, can be said on the potential power and influence the environment holds in political processes.
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6.1.1. Peace Parks along Israeli‐Arab Borders
At present, a successful environmental cooperation between Israel and its neighbors is rare. A successful model of a local peace park is even more so. The numerous attempts to promote such parks reflect positively on the potential scope of this concept and grant it considerable power as a model for future cross‐border interactions. Although appealing, the repeated failed attempts might serve to indicate that the concept is unfit for local realities. This author argues that the unfolded chronicle of peace park proposals needs to be viewed as a set of independent proposals and as a conglomerate of initiatives in unison. The different interests pursued, as the different actions taken, do not accumulate into one coherent narrative, but rather highlight a phenomenon and its accompanying motivations. While these were not idiosyncratic happenings, albeit not connected, they mostly appeared during a period that was influenced by relevant global trends of de‐bordering, cross‐border nature conservation and regionalism (e.g. the establishment of the European Union and NAFTA), and by a change in the position of the global community with regards to conservation and environmental issues (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Sandwith, Shine et al., 2001; Kowalsky, 2011). Locally, this period was characterized with a public state‐of‐mind that looked forward to a new, more open, Middle East, and allowed these kinds of proposals to flourish. A vivid example that demonstrates these trends’ interaction is the Lowest Park on Earth initiative that envisioned a regional model that disregarded borders in its development, combined trilateral governmental efforts with local communities ones, was supported by the American NPA and was funded by foreign governments and the EU.
Very apparent in this work is the gap, or the tension, between the vision, intentions and declarations of peace park initiatives and their collapse and unsuccessfulness. Since writings and literature on non‐materialized projects (which mostly, in this work, cannot even be called "failures") is lacking, the decentred theory (Bevir and Richards, 2009) observations, elaborated in chapter 4, might be useful herein and assist in understanding
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the significance of this chronicle of uncoordinated but essentially connected actions.213 The theory deals with the making of networks and emphasizes the ability of individuals (politicians, bureaucrats, non‐governmental actors and citizens) to create meaning and actions that are a result of their subjective beliefs and experiences (as opposed to their ‘objective’ agent‐position). The theory implies that there is no comprehensive account of network governance and no necessary logical or structural process determining the networks’ form, success or failure (Bevir and Richards, 2009). As shown, the repeated trials for establishing peace parks were directly related to individuals' subjective allure and embracement of the peace park concept, which also translated into different institutional actions. These uncoordinated and decentralized (and unsuccessful) actions have accumulated and created a momentum that can be called a "network" of peace park trials. It is reasonable to assume that this "network", built on stand‐alone proposals, had several inner connections since it involved players and stakeholders' that were at times related to more than one such process.214 While this "network" had no actual governance and a minor practical impact, it nonetheless represents a phenomenon of meaningful actions that reflects and reinforces a joint rationale and motivation shared by planners, conservationists, politicians and developers.
On the other hand, the diversity of these disconnected attempts might imply that the peace park concept lacks a coherent rationale and can accommodate any kind of cross‐ border project, ranging from being part of an unsustainable grand developmental project to a genuine nature conservation and peace promoting one. The late Nelson Mandela, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the founding‐father of the Peace Park Foundation said: "I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which does not agree with the peace park concept as we see it going into fruition today… [that] can be embraced by all… peace parks are a building block in this [peace, S.S] process… potentially in the entire world" (Nelson Mandela, 2001).
213 While this work did not pertain to utilize a network‐actor theory, it does provide a potential basis for such exploration. 214 For example, since several proposals were raised during the multilateral and bilateral negotiations and in the regional economic summits of the 1990s, which were multi players and stakeholders' processes, it is plausible that the seeds for later recurrences were planted. 188
The peace park concept was indeed embraced by the international community and was positively portrayed in related literature. However, not everyone shared this all‐embracing global optimism: "I am concerned more with why actors in the conservation community feel that they must portray transfrontier conservation so jubilantly…why others… believe that peace parks are "the global solution". Transfrontier conservation areas are not simply promoted they are presented as the new telos of conservation…" (Büscher, 2013). This dissertation reinforces the observation of the peace park depiction as a popular solution that was embraced by many; however it cannot substantially support or oppose its possible contribution to nature conservation or to peace.
The RSMPP, the only implemented peace park discussed in this study, did catalyze professional processes of policy making (regulation) as well as joint ecological system monitoring, and therefore directly contributed to nature conservation. It also, to a minor degree, created scientific research cooperation among the two corresponding marine institutes. From this, one can rightfully deduce that the peace process, through the peace park declaration, development and implementation, influenced regional environmentalism. Nevertheless, a peace park is supposed to also function as a catalyst agent of peaceful relations that might create spillover effects on the region. It seems that the RSMPP did not have a substantial spillover effect on other cross‐border cooperation arenas, aside from the concrete actions of marine conservation and scientific cooperation. It did not, in essence, tackle sovereignty or territory issues, nor did it require any border delineation (which is a politically challenging process). Since sovereignty issues were not debated or needed to be discussed, its raison d'etre as a peace park that promotes reconciliation on a given territory was minor to begin with. Moreover, this peace park did not promote Israeli and Jordanian populations’ encounters. Although it led policy changes in the realm of nature conservation, its success cannot serve as an ideal example of a substantial political change.
The other (unfulfilled or ongoing) peace park initiatives could not provide lessons on their potential catalyzing or spillover effects. It seems that the described initiatives had little, if any, influence on regional and local political processes. The only assumable spillover effect that originated from them, as mentioned, is their conceptual revelation and circulation
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among informed individuals. However, Ali (2005) emphasizes that the impacts of environmental cooperation in peacebuilding must be examined over a long period of time, and that the process should be considered as nonlinear and as a complex series of feedback loops (Ali, 2005). Hence, it is possible to view the history unfolded herein as one of these "feedback loops", and only time might reveal its full impact. Also, it is difficult to assess and measure215 the direct impact of individual peace promoting program on a specific peace process, given that such programs are characterized by short‐term successes with frequent setbacks and by related impacts that tends to occur only after a time lag (Carius, 2006).
Although similarities exist, the peace park proposals are distinctive from one another in many respects: the initiation process, their approach to reciprocity between partners, the role of local communities, the targeted audiences, sovereignty and border issues, development approaches and more. The only two repeated constants in all of the initiatives were the promotion of nature conservation and of peace. While different variables (such as environmental imaginaries, location of the park or the political situation) might have well influenced their development process, the variable that made the most difference was their peacemaking vs. peacebuilding aspiration. This influenced or was derived from the politicization of the whole project and its ambitions. A second important variable was the border issue. While this work did not ascribe to borders theories, given that it focuses on par excellence border constructs, the peace parks, this calls for reference to the subject. Despite their essential challenge of borders' physical existence and their aspirations to serve as encounter zones (which expand the mere dividing lines of a border), peace parks have developed in accordance with global changes in borders perception. During the last three decades those perceptions shifted from rigid borders to more open and flexible ones. Nevertheless, while peace park proposals might partially embody and reflect these global trends, border delineation processes between Israel and its Arab neighbors do not align with these phenomena. More than six decades after its establishment, Israel's borders, which are perceived as central factors to national security, are not yet finalized or internationally recognized. The expected movement towards more
215 Evaluation methods available so far focus largely on assessing compliance with project objectives, i.e. the short‐term, direct impacts of projects and are not geared towards assessing the more broad‐based impacts (Carius, 2006). 190
permanent and closed borders (which is in fact the case on some fronts), is not necessarily the rule. Rabinowitz claims that "Israel’s main territorial corpus is still highly anomalous, moving steadily away from the ideal of a stable wall that might provide security and peace" (Rabinowitz, 2012, 311). One can claim that the peace park concept might suit this anomaly, as it challenges borders and borders' perceptions in more than one way. Peace parks are planned to create diminished sovereignty inside their territory. Or, to the very least, to promote sovereignty disconnected from de‐facto territorial control and usage so that these two are not necessarily bound and overlapping, thus making room for creative approaches. As demonstrated, while border issues were intentionally disregarded in some of the proposals, others addressed them directly – as a possible source of interest and symbolism (as in the Arava Peace Park proposal), as a source of potential problems due to its contingency with the political reality (as can be seen in the Dana‐Sheizaf Reserve initiative), as a locus of mutuality (the Jordan River's proposals) or as a dividing line that could be blurred by a peace park establishment (the GHPP).
6.1.2. Environmental Peacebuilding and Peacemaking – Analytical Insights
The various case‐studies showcased different entry points to peacebuilding and peacemaking activities (but were mainly focused on post‐conflict settings) and were analyzed by using the lens of Environmental Peacemaking writings. Both pathways to environmental peacemaking and peacebuilding, i.e. changing the strategic climate and enhancing post Westphalian relations (Conca and Dabelko, 2002), were shown to be important for the execution of initiatives and for their potential influence on political realities. However, this author found that creating changes in the “strategic climate” was more significant both for implementation and for impacting political realities. This work showed that even when the ground was ripe for bold cross‐border initiatives and funds were already allocated, as long as the official governmental state of affairs was not yet set, initiatives did not prevail (e.g. the Lowest Park on Earth). Mostly, peace park initiatives did not emerge prior to an initial governmental dialogue. Hence, a general "climate", i.e. a political state of affairs which allowed for cross‐border dialogue to take place, was required for this kind of initiative to tackle political entities and create changes in the Strategic
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Climate. These two "climate" cycles are not identical but corresponding, as the former relates to the general political state of affairs among the parties' leadership and the latter to the opportunity of an environmental endeavor to affect and alter this situation. The relations amid these two "climates" varied between environmental peacebuilding efforts to environmental peacemaking ones. The former, as most of the cases studied in this work represent, requires a general positive strategic climate to be established before it can retackle it in a second level of relations. Meaning, enhancing and broadening participation of groups within the official state dialogue (e.g. planners of different ministries participating in the dialogue of a park's development process and establishing good working relations and trust) is necessary. The latter, an environmental peacemaking effort, tackles directly the non‐amiable strategic climate as well as the non‐existing dialogue between the states, and tries to create one through a joint environmental enterprise. Obviously, such activities call for the support and engagement of many civil society groups and create opportunities for cooperation. Explicitly, it strengthens post‐Westphalian governance while enabling the governmental one. The civil society activities, in their turn, might enhance various cycles of peacebuilding among different groups.
The Sinai's advocacy case study demonstrated how environmental actions (mostly with no declared peacebuilding agenda), supported and at times brought local and national policy changes in Egypt. Over time, these actions strengthened local civil society and supported its international outreach (i.e. post‐Westphalian governance), which ultimately assisted the advocacy. The overall outcome enhanced nature conservation efforts and had an indirect contribution to the peace between the States. However, this work does not claim that the environmental initiatives brought a change in the strategic climate between the states, at least not directly.
6.1.2.1. The Lack of Joint Threat Motivation
The Israeli‐Arab conflict, as well as its possible resolution, generates many environmental challenges and complications (Frumkin and Achiron‐Frumkin, 2002; Frumkin and Ahiron‐ Frumkin, 2003; Feitelson and Levy, 2006; Isaac and Hilal, 2011; Palatnik and Hmaidi,
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2012).216 Some of the peace park proposals aimed to address part of these environmental realities. Identification of shared environmental problems and threats produces more cooperative outcomes, since it is psychologically easier for conflicting parties to join forces when compared with the identification of joint positive environmental opportunities (Ali, 2007; Dabelko, 2008). However peace parks, by definition, are not primarily aimed at solving common threats but rather they are established in order to promote joint work towards positive goals. This might constitute a deficiency in peace park promotion (when compared to other cross border environmental project) in the sense that an established connection between the sides might be weak as they are not forced or feel obligated to cooperate (see chapter 3). In the examined cases, the RSMPP, the JRPP and the AZPP had a direct and joint tangible threat as one of their declared main motivations; In the Sinai Advocacy case study the expected developmental projects that would have followed the peace agreement created an unshared (unilateral) environmental threat (as it was affecting only the Egyptian territory). However one sided, this threat was the impetus to the proposed peace park, which was followed in later stages by the accounted advocacy. In the GHPP proposals the threat to the quality and quantity of water flowing into Israel served as a main motivation for the proposals.
While this research supports the assumption that a joint threat might produce more cooperative outcome (and evidently the initiatives that had such threats are among the most advanced ones), it also demonstrates how unshared threats might serve as a motivation (to the opposing side) to promote a collaborative effort and how a peace park can serve as a cooperative way to respond for those unshared environmental threats.
6.1.2.2. An Immediate Post‐Conflict Period provides a window of opportunity to establish security, consolidate peace, introduce new principles and practices and rebuild institutions in ways that would otherwise be politically difficult to achieve. Among them are those related to restoration, management, and allocation of natural resources (Jensen
216 Some of the environmental implications of the conflict resolution process are those of changing land uses in ecologically important locations (army camps, new settlements), refugee repatriation processes which involved mass development, air and soil pollution, fencing and walling that fragment open land and prevents animal (as human) movement, deforestation and afforestation, population growth, refugee camps, and more. 193
and Lonergan, 2012). This research reinforced this claim. When the Israeli‐Arab peace process started, it created a rush towards cross‐border initiatives that included peace park proposals, some of which were presented at the negotiation table even before a peace agreement was officially signed (e.g. the Lowest Park on Earth, Red Sea Marine Peace Park and South Sinai Peace Park). The Sinai advocacy case study neatly demonstrated how in unstable times when peace was being negotiated, signed, and before the geostrategic relations stabilized, environmentalists' limited political power was relatively enhanced and allowed their contribution to the nature conservation agenda and to cross‐border relations were more effective. For various reasons, after the peace agreement was settled, lands were separated and borders were demarked, the environmentalists’ will and their potential to act further, declined.
Nonetheless, it may be said that in many regards the post‐conflict phase, during which most of the initiatives were proposed, was only a de‐jure post‐conflict one, since in reality the Israeli‐Arab national conflict was (and still is) far from being settled. Hence, these initiatives could be seen as premature trials. A change was observed in more recent initiatives, proposed after 2000. These were less naïve and more realistic, and thus applied a gradual and more cautious conduct in their aspirations, declarations and planning.
6.1.2.3. Linking Environmental Activities and Peace
Environmental cooperation can be overwhelmed when directly linked to peace or conflict resolution activities and can be contested by other issues that are connected to political conflicts (Dabelko, 2006; Darnell, 2010). This is definitely the case in the Israeli‐Arab reality. For example, it is not surprising that even limited environmental cooperation such as coordinated hazardous waste management between Israel and the Palestinians, wherein peacemaking objectives were not declared, suffered difficulties and did not attain its goals.217 There is a genuine difficulty to environmentally cooperate across borders within a
217 For example, research done on an implemented trans‐boundary hazardous waste management process, which was a component of the Oslo Accords, showed that stable cooperation ended up under‐delivering on declared objectives. The parties were unable to fully decouple their environmental concerns from political differences and had a hard time in moving from policy to practice due to institutional constraints and failed joint managerial frameworks (Alleson, Levin et al., 2013). 194
broader context of political instability, especially regarding a pre‐existing regional conflict. When addressing issues related to the Israeli‐Arab conflict (even within Israeli borders), Israeli environmental civil institutions218 might be reluctant to engage in upfront political endeavors that could be related to national security issues due to fear of marginalization and of political retribution (Sadeh, 2007)219. The same applies to Israeli environmental state institutes, which are known to be weak when confronted with strong narratives such as national security (Parag, 2005). Accordingly, as this work demonstrates, practitioners and institutions preferred, at times, to avoid emphasizing the politicized nature of a project and to leave its peacemaking and peacebuilding aspects unstated, even when a project was named a "peace park" (example are the AZPP, RSMPP and Dana‐Sheizaf). The Sinai advocacy case study also demonstrates how environmental proposals that embraced the political reality and added a peacebuilding component to them were not successful or even seriously considered.220 This state of affairs opens the door for global environmental institutions to lead the way. Such institutes were essential in supporting peace parks around the world and in the region (and took part in promoting the RSMPP, Lowest Park on Earth and Alexander Zaymer Peace Park).
In all probability known challenges for peace parks establishment existed in past local trials examined in this work. Such challenges might have been unequal resources for conservation actions, asymmetrical levels of economic development, professional standards and trained personnel, harsh feelings about the conflict, cultural and religious differences, language barriers and more (as elaborated in chapter 2). It is important to emphasize that in addition to these known challenges that apply to any cross‐border environmental cooperation, specific and particular difficulties exist in trying to cooperate across Israeli‐Arab borders (on environmental issues as on others). Primarily, the prolonged Israeli‐Palestinian conflict overcasts all types of cooperation with Arab countries. The anti‐normalization stance is an acknowledged and widespread public
218 NGOs, local and regional councils and other civil society groups. 219 Even the regional environmental NGO Friends of the Earth Middle East, operated in a complicated environment and preferred not to tackle too politically complicated initiatives (such as their own abandoned idea to create a peace park in Kasser el Yahud, located inside the West Bank area (Yaari, 2011)). 220 The South Sinai peace park proposal, the Zukei David field school proposal and the Anwar al Sadat green corpse initiative are examples. Obviously, this is not to claim that their stated peacemaking purpose was the only or the main reason for their non‐materialization. 195
position in the Arab world that opposes normalization of relations with Israel as long as the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict is not fully resolved. Furthermore, the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict presents "technical" difficulties in the form of movement restrictions (inside the West Bank, from the West Bank into Israel as well as from and to Jordan), which complicates cooperation and makes Israeli‐Arab encounters not only unpleasant at times, but non‐ reciprocal.221,222 Alongside political and personal pressure on individuals, which are added barriers for cooperation,223 social, political224 and "technical" constraints made the development of an environmental platform of dialogue, which is first and foremost based on human encounters, very challenging (Abitbol and Schoenfeld, 2009), and environmental projects and partnerships became increasingly problematic and isolated.
6.1.3. Environmentalists in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Processes
This work explores and discusses the role of individuals in promoting the nexus of environmentalism and peace. It complements the Environmental Peacemaking writings that positioned the platform of environmental dialogue at the center of the peacebuilding process but lacked sufficient elaboration on individuals’ roles and motivations (Wolf, 2014). In this research, many of the accounted initiatives may be called "sporadic", in the sense that they were mostly uncoordinated with one another. An exception is the Sinai advocacy case study which represents a sequence of actions performed by individuals that while they were not fully coordinated and mostly de‐centralized, formed a Transnational Advocacy Network, or, an Epistemic Community.
221 Political in nature, movement restrictions on Palestinians operate in the name of "security". Amongst them are checkpoints and temporarily sieges on Palestinian territories and bans of crossing the dividing lines/borders for both Israelis and Palestinians. Those restrictions complicate or prevent personal contact and meetings. Also, mounting difficulties on Jordanians wishing to attain a visa to enter Israel creates the same result. 222 As mentioned in the RSMPP case study, mostly Israelis were the ones to cross the border into Jordan and not vice versa. 223 This pressures exist within Palestinian and Jordanian societies against individuals who are cooperating with Israelis or are participating in joint programs and create fears of being professionally and socially stigmatized (Schoenfeld, 2013). 224 Essentially, a political gap exists. For example Chaitin et al reported that Palestinians do not see the point of talking about the environment without talking about the Israeli occupation, whereas the Israelis tend to see the discussions on the conflict as a detour from talking about the environment (Chaitin, Obeidi et al., 2004). 196
Many of these unconnected initiatives were promoted and driven by committed environmentalists. In essence, whilst environmental activism is primarily local and takes place within national boundaries (Schoenfeld, 2013) environmentalism inherently draws people towards transboundary and global perspectives, a feature that, according to the literature, is supposed to facilitate cooperation across borders.225 Indeed, it seems that sometimes "the best hope for success in overcoming these [cross‐border environmental, S.S.] challenges likely rests within civil society, specifically conservationists and their allies on both sides of the border for whom wilderness integrity is the highest priority" (Stefanick, 2009). Accordingly, and not surprisingly, known historic connections exist between environmental groups and peace movements (Matthew and Gaulin, 2002). These connections existed and still exist in the Middle East, however, this work did not explore them directly. This study's analysis of individuals' actions was completed to answer one main query: their possible and, if applicable, their actual contribution to peace. The results showed time and again that personal commitment was an important factor in promoting the initiatives (several interviewees mentioned that ambitious and grand projects lay in the hands of enthusiastic individuals "that could take it and lead it as his [theirs] life‐mission" (Perevolotsky, personal interview, January 25, 2011)). Ms. Brachia, who headed the planning and policy division in the Environmental Protection Ministry, commented on the planning division’s work, which was essentially political and apparently self‐aware: "we thought of ourselves as the agents who brought down the peace from the politicians to the people. We saw the parks as a concrete way for citizens to enjoy the fruits of peace". She also observed the environmentalists' easy and collegial bonding: "coming to the table of negotiation… quite fast the table changed and instead of Israelis vs. Jordanians we were sitting environmentalists vs. developers" (Brachia, personal interview, February 11, 2011). However, this was not enough for the initiatives' success. Although a professional platform of environmentalists' dialogue was created on some occasions, the political decision‐makers were the ones to shape and constrain its outcomes from striking roots and influencing the reality on the ground.
225 The alliance formed between Israelis and Jordanian environmentalists during the multilateral peace negotiations (mentioned in chapter 3) is one example. 197
Kaye (2001) writes about the role of experts in the multilateral Environment and Water dialogue between Israel and the Arab World. On the one hand she claims that "the most significant mechanisms that assisted in achieving this result, were the increased interactions among regional participants—including the participation of technical experts—which fostered common understandings"(Kaye, 2001, 177). At the same time she stresses that:
"both the Water and Environment working groups made considerable progress and were able… to sustain cooperation during periods of significant setbacks… these groups also faced problems that often slowed and limited the progress that could be made. While technical experts played a critical role in both groups… the political decision‐makers shaped and constrained the groups’ development, not the reverse… regional commitment to technical cooperation had to be developed... The source of this commitment to cooperation was often political" (Kaye, 2001, 182).
Kaye's conclusion is relevant to the peace parks account, especially since many of the governmental participants in the multilateral discussions also took part in the bilateral ones (where most of the proposals were suggested). The professionals or technical experts, as Kaye refers to them, who developed the initiatives, were constrained by political realities and decisions. While these realities initially served to motivate the professional groups to create and foster cross‐border projects, they also eventually prevented the projects’ execution.
Clearly, a gap of professional motivations and actions existed between the environmentalists and the political levels. Generally, policymakers and negotiators utilized the environmental issues and the peace park ideas more instrumentally as a tool or a framework that would enable them to achieve political, economic or social goals. Environmentalists, on the other hand, saw peace parks primarily as a tool to achieve environmental and ecological goals. Obviously, environmentalists were influenced not only by their professional commitment to nature conservation but also from changes in regional and global environmental politics. Interestingly, the sequence of peace park proposals also reflects changes in the balance between government and civil society in Israel.
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At the end of the 1970's and early 1980's, conservationists from within the state environmental institutions226 proposed the initiatives. While the environment was not part of the official agenda of Israeli‐Egyptian peace negotiations, enthusiastic environmentalists from different parts of the globe interacted as part of the Sinai Advocacy. They were motivated by the optimistic political atmosphere and the possibility to interact across borders as well as by global trends of conservationism that promoted the concept of Protected Areas.
During the 1990's, environmental issues were part of the regional peace process and environmentalists were empowered and motivated to develop their cross‐border thinking. They were also influenced by the new "intersection between the Israeli peace movement and the Israeli environmental movement… [they] had the opportunity to reach out to Palestinian and Jordanian partners" (Schoenfeld, 2013, 339). Moreover, environmentalists from all sides were influenced by the newly established global commitment to environmental cooperation (which started at the Earth Summit in Rio, 1992). This brought to relevancy, a plethora of ideas and initiatives, as well as actual encounters of government officials, private entrepreneurs, and other civil groups. During these years, governmental ministries, both directly and through outsourcing to private planning offices, were the ones who primarily, but not solely, promoted peace parks as part of the regional political agenda. When asked about the primary initiators of cross‐border environmental projects (politicians, NGOs, environmentalist or private entrepreneurs) Judge Elyakim Rubinstein, who chaired the Israeli delegation to Jordan's peace‐talks, replied: "I think it was both sides. We, the governmental administration, were in a "visionary ecstatic" regarding cooperation… it was an era of great will, therefore whoever came up with ideas – the ideas were discussed" (Rubinstein, personal communication, January 26, 2011). Thus, nongovernmental groups participated in different capacities and assisted the governmentally driven initiatives. International groups had a role as external advisers (NOAA, American National Park authorities, Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network); Local NGOs originated or developed proposals (SPNI, KKL/JNF); Local authorities and regional councils took part in some of the initiatives (in the Arava, the Lowest Park on Earth, RSMPP
226 Israel's NRA and the SPNI. In those years SPNI was heavily based on governmental funding and was very pro‐state (mamlachti) in its conduct. 199
and Dana‐Sheizaf proposals), as well as several academic institutions (in the Lowest Park on Earth, JRPP, RSMPP). At the end of 2000, with the commencement of the Second‐ Intifada, the Israeli government de‐facto departed from the peace path, leaving the stage for civil society initiatives. Although, as said by state bureaucrats, there was no official order to stop the cooperation, "Everything just trickled to a halt" (Livne and Brachia, personal communication, May 2, 2012). Accordingly, NGOs and private entrepreneurs took the lead in the promotion of peace parks (JRPP, Alexander‐Zaymer and several proposals for the GHPP).
Again, individuals' actions were motivated not only by their professional or institutional position, but also by their personal devotion and affiliation, i.e. their environmental imaginaries, to a specific territory. These conceptions are discussed in the next section.
6.1.4. Imagining the Environment and Conserving a Territory
The imagination, perception and depiction of a given environment and its ecological attributes are significant factors in drawing forces to work towards its conservation, especially since not every threaten ecological setting receives the same attention and consideration from outside groups (Ponce, unknown). Chosen locations for conservation, in their turn, influence a wider social process. In other words, ecological factors might be important for leveraging support and fundraising for non‐ecological needs.227 An example is the ongoing Jordan River Peace Park initiative in which rehabilitation of the Jordan River as an internationally‐cared‐for "hot spot", coupled with a unique ecological habitat (featuring bird migration, renewable hydro‐electric energy and more),228 set the basis for drawing international conservation forces. These forces (and their funds) might eventually provide the foundations for not only environmental but also political cooperation across borders that in time could alleviate social conditions in surrounding communities. Therefore, the perception of a territory is an important element in these kinds of peace promoting activities. The way it is being imagined by environmentalists is especially
227 See for example (Ponce, unknown). 228 While not disregarding its other symbolic cultural‐historical‐political features on site. 200
important given their potentially substantial role as peacemakers. In order to understand the way the environmental perceptions can translate into political reality, this work combines issues of peace, conflict, nature conservation and the environment with terms of environmental imagination, memory, commemoration and nostalgia. Mixed together, in a non‐linear way, they serve as part of peace parks rationale and justification as well as in their conceptual acceptance by the affected populations.
The concept of Environmental Imaginaries was raised to provide an explanation for individuals' motivations to act in certain ways towards environmental conservation. Environmental Imaginaries is defined as the feelings and constellation of ideas that groups of individuals living and working in a common place develop towards a given landscape (Davis, 2011). In other words, it refers to a direct human connection to the natural world, which is not dictated or processed through a national prism, but is more primordial and intrinsic. Therefore it can potentially create a disregard of national borders and to different sorts of political behaviors. Although, in practice, this work mostly referred to Israeli individuals’ behavior, Environmental Imaginary might be regarded as "supra national". The “supra nationalist” way, or just the pure disregard to borders in terms of an affiliation to a given territory, was seen in the Sinai Advocacy that included interactions between conservationists that had no national affiliation or claims towards the territory. The understanding of the emotional connection of a group to a given landscape or territory also emerged in the way foreign policy makers acknowledged and applied this concept instrumentally as a social‐psychological driving force in the GHPP case study. Hence, an environmental imaginary is different from a national imaginary, even when both relate to the same territory.
The Israeli national imaginary, or its nation‐building narrative, is tightly connected to nature and the land in addition to the landscape's biblical and modern history. Both the biblical and modern history repeatedly portray human‐nature relations (De‐Shalit, 1995).229 One might claim that during the 1990s the peace park proposals were in accordance with a new national narrative, which included an imagination of the "new green Middle East" as it was
229 For example draining of the Hula, afforestation enterprises to “green the desert” and more. 201
promoted by Israeli governments. However, those governments, were pretty much in line and in accordance with the prevailing ethos in local environmental history which is that of development (De‐Shalit, 1995; Tal, 2002), even if their new plans were named “green”. Still, the actions of environmentalists who participated in these initiatives (that could have eventually confront developers if the initiatives were to progress, as was implied in Ms. Brachia’s quote above), can represent a new phase in local environmentalism. A phase in which environmentalists, on the one hand, envisioned an “untouched” nature and were holding romantic and ethnocentric views of the environment, but on the other hand acknowledged and were aware of the political power that might be allocated or related to these initiatives. Thus, this new phase possessed a more modern and nuanced perception of environmentalism. This slightly fuses the acceptable partition of environmentalism development in Israel230. However, this author does not claim that this revised comprehension was de facto impactful. As Orenstein, Tal et al. wrote, “Israel’s contemporary environmental movement may not yet be ready to grapple with the pressing questions of war, occupation, poverty, and equitable distribution of resources” (Orenstein, Tal et al., 2013). The same can be said about the possibility of environmentalists’ promotion of peace parks.
The two types of conceptual affiliations to a given territory (national and environmental) can be added with at least two more types of conservation processes that might enhance or interfere in the way they are conceptualized and formed: a physical/ecological conservation (i.e. biodiversity, landscape, soil etc), and the conservation of a wide range of memories or commemorations of peace, conflict or, at times, of territorial domination. In conjunction with these "stagnated" conservation features231, dynamic ones of development (of joint projects, tourism or of nature rehabilitation) and of change (of national relations, of borders and more) are also present.
Conservation of a contested national site raises the issue of past territorial domination. In this work, the issue of past territorial domination applies mostly to Sinai and the Golan
230 For more see: (De‐Shalit, 1995; Schoenfeld, 2004) 231 Although nature conservation might include a more active approach to the land, which includes restoration, reintroduction of species and more, this might also create a spatial change. 202
Heights proposals, to some extent to Lowest Park on Earth initiative,232 and to lesser extent to the other proposals. The Israelis’ Environmental Imaginary of these areas, as purely nature‐based as it may be, cannot be disconnected from the fact that these areas were or are occupied territories. These territories might be simultaneously being "Imagined" by their former residents (who might well portray it in a different way given that the space was altered during the years). Undoubtedly the conservation, or not, of a territory could have both a political and a national meaning: "environmental transformation is one of the most convincing manners in which territorial control can be created, advertised and consolidated" (Rabinowitz, 2004, 10). Maintaining a territory intact, as a stagnated memory, especially in a space that is loaded with national reminiscences (such as former battlefields) has enormous political meaning, even if it is portrayed as a "green" and non‐ political activity.
Therefore, peace parks, which on their face ascribe to nature conservation, might hold double political objectives and sometimes even contradicting roles of conservation and commemoration: of peace (that may well bring up memories of conflict and war), and of a given territory’s nature (that may revive national feelings and memories of territorial domination). Nevertheless, conflict and peace are not necessarily mutually exclusive233 and may reside simultaneously in the dynamic of transboundary relations. These times could be characterized by varying intensities of co‐existing conflict and cooperation (on environmental issues and others) and of different commemoration aspects (Mirumachi and Allan, 2007; Martin, Rutagarama et al., 2011). These issues of memory and affiliation to a given land, combined with past territorial domination, directly relate to the prevailing criticism on peace parks as new forms of colonization by Western values (Adams and Mulligan, 2003; Beinart and Hughes, 2007) as was briefly explored in the chapters.
232 The Lowest Park on Earth proposal, although highly detailed on issues of tourism development did not deal with the evacuation of Israeli settlers from the north‐west side of the Dead Sea shores. 233 Various definitions exist for peace and conflict. Obviously, environmental conflict can exist inside a system of peaceful political relations, but environmental cooperation can also exist, to a certain degree, alongside an ongoing political conflict. Please see chapter 2 for "environment as a lifeline during a conflict”. More on the differences between environmental conflict resolution and environmental peacebuilding please see (Harari, 2008). 203
In summary, the cases analyzed in this work reveal two complementary tendencies, both of which credit the environment with political power. First, is using the environment instrumentally as a stepping stone to reach socio‐political (of peacemaking, peacebuilding, demilitarization, upholding refugees resettlement etc), socio‐economic (mainly tourism and development), and concrete ecological goals. Second is pertaining to a joint or an individual environmental imaginary which might serve as an unmediated motivation to promote political actions. The novelty herein lies in the realization of the assigned political power (by policymakers and negotiators) to the place the environment holds in peoples’ minds. In other words, the innovation is the de‐facto recognition of the public's environmental imaginary as a potential political driving force, one that can contribute directly to peacebuilding and peacemaking processes.
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6.2. Limitations of the Research and Recommendations for Further Research
Different aspects limit the scope of this research, its findings and conclusions. Some are methodological constraints and some relate to the examined theme and its major joint characteristic: non realization.
Several recommendations for further research follow.
6.2.1. Methodological Limitations
A snowball sampling methodology was used to find interview subjects. These interviews were intriguing and revealed unexpected facts. However, snowball sampling is limited in scope, potentially leading to partial and incomplete data collection. Since some of the collected data relates to events that are more than 30 years‐old, its corroboration was not always complete. Records on cross‐border environmental dialogue were not always found in archives. Some of the archives themselves were disorganized and incomplete. As many years have passed, a recall bias of retrospect was likely present for the interviewees. Recall bias includes the inability to recall details, selective memory recall, and a tendency to glorify the past or their part in it.
Trying to analyze the "happening that eventually did not happen" is methodologically challenging. Most of this work looks into a vacuum, in the sense that great energy was put into developing initiatives that remained in their initial phases. It describes the initial and mostly premature phases of the initiatives, with the RSMPP being the only exception. The richness of non‐materialized creative ideas is impressive, and remains as such given the disability to fully analyze which of the many optimistic proposals could have been realized and which is just intriguing on paper. Speculating on successful development of these ideas is no less problematic and thus was hardly attempted. This harsh reality of unrealized projects also impacted the eagerness of interviewees their failed or unsuccessful experiences. At times, respondents refused to address the subject at all. Likewise, there is a “publication bias” as not much is written about unfulfilled projects and unrealized plans.
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One last methodological and personal reflective note: for the past decade, this author was researching and embedded in both the Israeli peace camp and the environmental movement. This frame of reference might have biased this research. The author’s personal experience may have interfered not only in the way materials were approached and interpreted, but also in some of the interactions with interviewees.
6.3. Recommendations for Further Research
This work is mostly a unilaterally‐told story which was examined almost solely from an Israeli point of view. Further complementary research could explore the Arab perspective on some of the presented case studies. On a different scale, a complementary comparative analysis, that might neutralize some of the political factors presented in this research, would be to create an outlook on domestic Israeli trials of environmental cooperation and peacebuilding between Jews and Arabs.
The work is focused on the overall picture of past peace park initiatives, and therefore did not provide the initiatives’ finer details. Further historical research may fill in the knowledge gaps and create a more accurate image of cross‐border environmental history of the Israeli Arab peace process. Understanding the dynamics of each case study requires a more in depth data collection methodology, and an integrated understanding and analysis of both cooperation and conflict as a consequence of concurrent social and environmental conditions. Furthermore, economic and political analyses that co‐occurred with the consideration of developmental plans were mostly outside the scope of this work. A complementary study of this sort might add interesting and insightful analyses to the picture of cross‐border environmental cooperation.
Further analysis might also be done through other theoretical lenses and by other disciplines. The most obvious would be border studies that could use the examined cases and develop discussions on peripheries, bordering and de‐bordering processes, liminal
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spaces,234 interstitial space235 and more. Possible fields of inquiry include studies on peace tourism, eco tourism, international relations, conflict and peace studies, peace impact assessment and more.
Finally, while this work discussed aspects of imagination as a vehicle to actions, it did not discuss the most imagined reality, peace. The inquiry did not ask or answer the question of "what is peace" or what is a "peaceful outcome" of a joint environmental project.236 Much optimism was ascribed to the environment both as a tool for promoting peace and as an arena that would gain from the peace process itself. In reality, this optimism created a bias in the way the "peaceful environment" was grasped. Alongside the positive rush towards cross‐border initiatives, the peace process had foreseeable negative environmental implications that were hardly discussed. Even throughout seminal environmental research237 that examined the Israeli‐Arab conflict resolution and specified various impacts238 that the peace process might pose on the environment (including a massive flow of tourism that could harm ecologically important areas), this negative impact stayed on the margins of discussions. Further research could explore this aspect of the discussed era in conjunction with the investigated cases.
234 "Liminal space: a category that includes no‐man's lands, no‐go areas, places of worship sanctified by more than one religion, mixed communities situated on deeply divided political frontiers, and other contested and divided locations" for more see (Rabinowitz and Khawalde, 2000). 235 Situated in conflicting border regions (which are usually located far from national centers and often suffer from infrastructure deficits and an image of remoteness (Arieli, 2012)). 236 In the literature of peace and conflict resolution, differentiation exists between "negative peace" that is defined as a stable state of affairs and the absence of violence and war, to "positive peace" when former enemies establish a positive and fruitful relationship in which they cooperate on different issues that are beyond military ones (Galtung, 1984). In the environmental peacemaking writings, the peace that is being imagined is a "positive" one, connecting the two sides through the environmental medium and not complying with mere conflict and violence avoidance. 237 (Frumkin and Achiron‐Frumkin, 2002; Frumkin and Ahiron‐Frumkin, 2003; Kliot, 2003; Feitelson and Levy, 2006). 238 Such as land use in ecologically important locations (army camps, new settlements), refugee repatriation process which may involve mass development, air and soil pollution, fencing and walling that fragments open land and prevents animal (as well as human) movement, deforestation and afforestation, population growth, refugee camps, etc. 207
6.4. Epilogue
This is an epilogue written in gloomy and cynical period of the Israeli‐Arab peace process. Even merely mentioning most of the past peace park proposals seems macabre. However, herein I try to provide some optimistic viewpoint with regards to the peace park idea; therefore it may well be read as naïve, unrealistic and eccentric. However, this is the nature of an epilogue –to be personal, and therefore, unapologetic.
When I started this work seven years ago the reality of the Israeli‐Arab relations was as complicated as ever was. However, the trajectories of the conflict (even if unknown), were more easily discussed and analyzed. At the time, a round of mediated governmental negotiations took place between Israel and Syria. With the beginning of the "Arab Spring", and even more so after the civil war in Syria, Israeli‐Arab relations were reshuffled. The future seems evermore obscured and those concerned first with security loudly express their concerns, and easily capture public attention. Israeli relations with the Palestinians also appear as stagnated as it can be following several rounds of inconsequential negotiation attempts and increased violence. Things with Jordan are more quiet than amiable. Which means that the on the ground situation seems the furthest it can be from regional cooperation or the opening of borders. Both the southern and the northern Israeli border fences are being upgraded239 and a general toughening in Israeli border reality is actively taking place.240
Nevertheless, three factors may allow the peace park concept to remain relevant for a distant regional future. The first is the ongoing instability characterizing the region. In the course of history the balance between different interests protracting the Israeli‐Arab conflict has developed and changed to include elements that were not initially fundamental to it. But, this statement goes both ways, so that new developments could continue to change the equation of interests to exclude elements that are central to the conflict at present, some could directly relate to establishing a peace park. For example,
239 Those are also influenced by a new refugee reality in the region. 240 For example in the North, in response to the ongoing fighting in Syria which brought an increase in the volume of attempts to penetrate the border, plans call for placing dozens of new information‐gathering sensors along an electrified fence and laying mines along parts of the border. The army's assumption is that the deteriorating situation in Syria is likely to lead to an increase in terrorist activity near the border (Cohen, 2012). 208
technological innovations in weaponry and military systems make the demand for wide range DMZs less important; growing rates of water desalination change the hydro‐balance of the area and more.
Second, from the environmental point of view, while the need to conserve nature in the region did not decrease over the years, environmental awareness and practices had steadily increased throughout the region. This fact enhances the legitimacy of including environmental topics in the conflict resolution processes.
Third, regional realities are influenced by global attitudes and great intellectual and political powers are globally invested in the pursuit of a resolution to the Middle East conflict. Simultaneously, though unrelated, the global conservation community is enthusiastic regarding the concept of peace parks.
In closing, the fact that peace park proposals were brought up and initiated so many times in the past testify to a general inclination (or to the very least, an Israeli inclination) to grant the environment, albeit instrumentally, a positive power as a locus of cross‐border collaboration. While it is unlikely that this work's findings on past regional experience will directly contribute to a change in regional reality, they might be of interest to the community that explores those changes and to future negotiators. It is possible to assume that some of the peace park proposals basic foundations highlighted in this work will stay relevant in different post‐conflict scenarios.
One last personal note, the path this research has taken had some unpredicted turns and detours, which included interviews and conversations with fascinating, thought‐provoking, dedicated and inspiring individuals. Although initially the research was designed to examine the peace and environment nexus from an actuality perspective it significantly evolved and expanded to include the history of the peace park concept along Israeli‐Arab borders. In the course of this journey I came to learn about optimistic actions, some of which seem irrational or hopeless, that were taken by dedicated environmentalists with great passion. I found their passion not only intoxicating but reassuring.
209
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Appendix 1: Illustration the Connections between Environment, Peace And Conflict as those appear in this work’s case studies
Nature conservation 7 Peace Post- conflict Peace Parks along Sinai’s Israeli-Arab Advocacy borders Conflict*
Enhancement of good environmental practices Environmental Degradation Golan Heights Peace Park 1. Promotes peacebuilding between professionals even prior to an agreement and between the people once the park is established. 2. Contributes to the peacemaking process between the governments. 3. The threat of environmental degradation that was foreseen due to development that followed the peace agreement created an impetus for environmentalists to protect nature and act across borders. 4. Enhancement of joint cooperation and best practices. 5. Peace Parks are set to promote nature conservation and to allow cross-border migration. 6. Promoted the establishment of nature reserves and protected areas. 7.1. Peace parks contribute to regional stability by creating joint incentives, strengthening of cross-border professional ties and enabling the people’s encounters. 7.2 A peace process encourages the promotion of joint peace parks. 8.1 Peace created the impetus to act and enabled cross-border dialogue. 8.2The advocacy’s result, enhanced environmentalism, assisted in conserving Sinai’s nature that Israelis were drawn towards thus it has contributed to cross-border tourism, i.e. the peacebuilding process. 9. Promoted joint environmental units and establishment of new ones within less developed environmental authorities.
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10. Contributed to an institutional change that included legislation and academic and national institutions establishment. 11. Secures the continuation of existing protected areas, avoids demolition of existing infrastructure and settlements and prevents development. ** This scheme illustrate some of the in-work network of connections and do not represent the full range of connections elaborated in the work, especially since all the post-conflict peace parks were combined under one element. Moreover, some inner-connections between cases are not represented.
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Appendix 2: The peace park in South Sinai / Avraham Shaked and SPNI, 1977
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Appendix 3: An Israel-Syria Treaty of Peace: Draft Negotiating Text, ICG, 2002
Under the ARTICLE II – International Boundary, section number 6:
In order to facilitate good neighborly relations, the Parties agree that the following special provisions shall apply to land and water resources in close proximity to their common boundary:
(a) A Jordan Valley Nature Preserve (hereinafter “the Preserve”), covering Syrian territory within the Jordan River Valley up to an elevation of zero metres above sea level, shall be established under Syrian administration. Within the Preserve all permanent human habitation, except for Syrian residents of Al-Hamma and Syrian conservation and law enforcement personnel and their families, shall be excluded. Syria shall refrain from establishing border and customs posts within the Preserve.
(b) The Preserve shall be accessible to visitors from both sides without restriction, except for Syrian rules and regulations within the Preserve designed to protect the ecology of the Jordan River Valley and to maintain law and order.
(c) Irrespective of the placement of the boundary, access by motor vehicles from Israel to roads and highways lying within the Preserve shall not be impeded. In order to ensure the timely provision of emergency services to motorists and other visitors within the Preserve, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and the Israeli Magen David Adom shall establish a joint Emergency Services Centre at a location mutually agreed by the two organisations within the Preserve in the vicinity of Kinneret/Lake Tiberias. The Parties agree that the Emergency Services Centre shall be empowered to summon appropriate emergency assistance from either Party. The Parties further agree to provide emergency medical assistance to visitors within the Preserve solely on the basis of medical exigency, without regard to the nationality of any person requiring emergency medical assistance.
(d) The recreational access of Syrian citizens to bodies of water adjacent to the boundary shall likewise be unrestricted, except for Israeli rules and regulations for Kinneret/Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River pertaining to boat safety, fishing and the like.
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Appendix 4: The Peace Park on the Golan
Draft – Sep.2007
The park on the Golan will be designed as a nature reserve, under Syrian sovereignty, stretching on about one third of the Golan Height territories, on the western zone close to the Kinneret (Sea of Galilee).
Israeli citizens will be allowed entry to the park, no visa required, from morning to evening, for tourist, ecological or humanitarian purposes, as agreed to by both sides.
Israeli citizens currently living on the territory to be defined in the future as the park land and who own economical, tourist, or agricultural businesses will be able to continue operating their businesses and even hold on to their business ownership on the condition that it is approved by both governments and if the nature of their business is not contradictory to the spirit of the park.
The supervision and safeguarding of the park will be carried out by Syrian nature reserve officials who will be partially armed with personal weapons only. Entry for tourist purposes will entail payment of fees. Authorized workers, whether Israelis or Syrians, will hold a permanent entry permit. Other routine operational regulations will be set by the park management in accordance with the Syrian Parks Authority.
Both governments, with the cooperation of the international community, will make special efforts to turn that park into a tourist attraction which will appeal to the citizens of all countries and will draw tourists from all over the world.
Initial planning of the park will be carried out by a leading international team. The planning will take into account long term ecological and environmental considerations as well as certain historical, political and humanitarian sensitivities on both sides. The international team will make recommendation to both parties on the exact location of the park. The two governments will be asked to approve the park area before detailed planning starts.
The spirit of the park should be the spirit of reconciliation between the two peoples. It will reflect the wish of both countries to co-exist in peace and to maintain maximal economical and tourist cooperation for their own sake. Top businessmen and economists from all over the world will act as an advisory team to the Syrian authorities in order to ensure that the park will eventually yield profits and will not need long- term governmental subsidization.
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Both parties aspire to reach a situation in which appropriate existing infrastructures in the park will continue to function after the sovereignty is restored to Syria.
The water flow in the park will be controlled in a way that will guarantee that Israel will keep on receiving the same quantities of water from the Golan sources or through the Golan as at the time the agreement is signed by both parties.
The evacuation of the Israeli population living on the territory of the park will be carried out within 5 to15 years from the date the agreement is signed by both parties. Aside from park personnel, Syrians will not be allowed to establish permanent residence on park territory.
The park territory entirely will be a buffer zone free of weaponry and visitors will not be allowed to bring in weapons. Citizens holding guns will be required to deposit it at certain entry posts.
Every transgression of park regulations will be dealt by the park authorities. When juridical process is required it will be handled by Syrian authorities if it concerns Syrian citizens and foreign tourists. The agreement on the juridical aspect will be discussed in details by both parties at the time of signing the accord.
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Appendix 5: The Spice Route. The Petra-Gaza Spice Road – Taken from: Programs for Regional Cooperation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Prime Minister Office, Government of Israel (1997).
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העבודה נכתבה במסגרת בית הספר ללימודי הסביבה על שם פורטר
סביבה, בניית שלום ועשיית שלום במזרח התיכון:
בחינת הצעות לפארקי שלום לאורך גבולות ישראל ומדינות ערב
חיבור לשם קבלת התואר
"דוקטור לפילוסופיה"
מאת שחר שדה
העבודה מוגשת לסנאט של אוניברסיטת תל אביב
פברואר 1026
העבודה נכתבה בהנחיית
פרופ' דן רבינוביץ, החוג לסוציולוגיה ואנתרופולוגיה, אוניברסיטת תל אביב
פרופ' אבנר דה-שליט, החוג למדעי המדינה, האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים
תקציר
עבודת מחקר זו מנתחת את יחסי הגומלין שבין סביבה ופעילות סביבתית לקידום שלום במזרח התיכון, כפי שאלו באו לידי ביטוי בנסיונות להקמת פארקים של שלום לאורך גבולות ישראל בין השנים 1977 - 2011. העבודה בוחנת את הפוטנציאל הטמון בנושאי הסביבה לשמש כזרז בתהליכי שלום ובאופן משני את הפוטנציאל הטמון בתהליך שלום לקידום סביבתנות. העבודה דנה בכוח הפוליטי שניתן לסביבה באותן יוזמות חוצות גבולות ובוחן את תפקידם של ארגונים ממשלתיים, ארגונים בלתי ממשלתיים ופרטים בקידומם. עבודת המחקר מקדמת את ההיסטוריה הסביבתית ואת הנרטיב ההיסטורי של המזרח התיכון בהתייחס לסביבה על ידי הצגת מידע חדש אודות הקשר שלום-סביבה והתגלמותו במספר רב של מקרי חקר.
העבודה מתמקדת בקונספט פארקי שלום (peace parks), שהינם איזורי טבע מוגנים חוצי גבולות שמטרתם שימור טבע וקידום יחסי שלום. קונספט זה, שזוכה לתמיכה ופופולאריות גוברת בעולם, משמש בעבודה זו ככלי תמטי-אנאליטי המאפשר לסקור, ללמוד ולנתח את הפוטנציאל הטמון בסביבה עבור תהליכי עשיית ובניית שלום (environmental peacemaking and peacebuilding). המחקר חושף ההיסטורית ודן במעל עשרים יוזמות להקמת פארקי שלום לאורך גבולות ישראל (מתוכם רק אחת יצאה לפועל) שקודמו על ידי משרדי ממשלה, ארגונים לא ממשלתיים ויזמים פרטיים. הוא מתמקד בשני מקרי חקר עיקריים וייחודיים: האחד, היוזמה להקים פארק שלום בדרום חצי-האי סיני, שהיוותה חלק מתהליך רחב של פעילות לשמירת טבע באיזור כפועל יוצא של תהליך השלום הישראלי-מצרי. השני, רצף יוזמות להקמת פארק שלום ברמת הגולן כחלק מתהליכי משא ומתן רשמיים ולא רשמיים בין ישראל לסוריה.
המסגרת האנליטית למחקר מבוססת בעיקרה על על כתבי עשיית שלום באמצעות הסביבה (Environmental Peacemaking), ספרות תיאורטית מתהווה שעומדת על הקשר בין סביבה ליישוב סכסוכים ,Conca and Dabelko, 2002; Ali, 2007; Dabelko, 2008; Jensen and Lonergan) (2012. ספרות זו מתפתחת ברובה על בסיס מקרי-חקר ועבודת שדה של חוקרים ממגוון דיסיפלינות, וקשורה בטבורה לתהליכי חקר ולמידה דומים המתבצעים בקרב ארגוני האו"ם. כתבים אלו מניחים כי לסביבה מאפיינים אינהרנטיים שהופכים אותה ליעילה עבור מיתון סכסוכים ופתרונם וכן עבור שיתוף פעולה חוצה גבולות ותהליכי שלום. אפיונים אלו נובעים מהעובדה כי לרב בעיות ואיומים סביבתיים אינם נעצרים בגבולות פוליטיים וכי הפתרון להם דורש תהליך ופרספקטיבה ארוכי טווח ושיתוף מומחים ממגוון דיסיפלינות. כתוצאה מכך, פרוייקטים סביבתיים חוצי גבולות יכולים לשמש כתמריץ טוב לשיתוף פעולה א -פוליטי בין צדדים יריבים גם כיוון שבמהלכם דיאלוג ארוך טווח עשוי להתפתח בין אנשי סביבה ומומחים שונים. דיאלוג זה, בתורו, עשוי לתרום לשלום. פארקים של שלום, ככלי ספציפי של עשיית שלום באמצעות הסביבה, מיישם וממחיש תפישה זו על ידי מטרות קונקרטיות העוסקות בניהול הטבע ומרחיב את הרב-דיסיפלינריות על ידי עיסוק בנושאים של מחייה, גבולות, ריבונות, קיימות, תיירות, פיתוח ועוד.
ההקשר למחקר זה גלובלי ולוקאלי כאחד. בעשורים האחרונים יוזמות שימור טבע חוצות גבולות שמטרתן הגנה על המגוון הביולוגי לצד טיפוח קהילות מקומיות הפכו נפוצות והן מקבלות תמיכה ומימון מסוכניות בינלאומיות. במקביל, לאורך השנים, גבר הקונצנזוס בקרב קובעי מדיניות ומומחים שונים שטוענים כי נושאי הסביבה יכולים להיות בעלי תפקיד ביציבות יחסים בינלאומיים ובקידום שלום. יתרה מכך, תהליכים אלו מקבילים להתפתחויות גלובליות שחלו בתפישה של גבולות, אלו השתנו מגבולות נוקשים ובלתי חדירים ליותר גמישים ופתוחים. מקומית, תהליך השלום בין ישראל למדינות ערב החל בשנת 1977. בתחילתו, הוא כמעט ולא כלל התייחסות לנושאי הסביבה אך עם הזמן אלו תפסו נתח משמעותי יותר בתהליכי המשא ומתן ובמהלך שנות התשעים תקוות ל"מזרח תיכון חדש וירוק" היוו חלק מלקסיקון תהליך השלום. לפיכך, בשיא התהליך (תקופה המכונה "אופוריית השלום"), תוכניות סביבתיות חוצות גבול שגשגו. בסוף שנות התשעים חל מפנה ביחסים האיזוריים ובעשור שלאחר מכן קרס תהליך השלום המזרח תיכוני.
מבנה העבודה מתבסס על שלושה פרקי מחקר עקריים.
הפרק הראשון מספק מבט -על אודות הצעות השונות לפארקי שלום בגבולות ישראל והקונטקסט ההיסטורי -פוליטי הרלוונטי להן. הוא פורט עבור כל אחת מההצעות את הרציונל, המטרות, ההיקף, המעורבים, והאופן בו נושאי הגבולות והריבונות עולים בהן. הוא דן בהתאמת קונספט הפארקים למציאות הישראלית -ערבית, בתפקיד המוסדות והפרטים שעסקו בקידום הקונספט ובנושא הגבולות כמרכזי לו.
הפרק השני מתמקד בנסיונות לקידום שימור טבע בחצי -האי סיני, שכללו הצעה לפארק שלום, במהלך השנים הראשונות לתהליך השלום הישראלי מצרי (1977-1983). חלקו המרכזי חושף את סיפורם של סביבתנים ישראלים שהוצבו בסיני משך שנות השלטון הישראלי ואת פעולותיהם להמשך שמירת הטבע בסיני בתקופה האמורה (לפני ואחרי הנסיגה הישראלית מסיני). הפרק דן ביחסים הישירים שהתקיימו בין סביבתנים ישראלים למצריים וביחסים העקיפים והמתווכחים על ידי סביבתנים וגופי סביבה מהעולם. לאורך הפרק מוצגות התפתחויות בסביבתנות המצרית שהתרחשו באותן שנים. ניתוח הפרק עוסק בהזדמנויות הסביבתיות והפוליטיות הקיימות במצבי פוסט -קונפליקט והוא עושה זאת באמצעות שימוש בתיאוריית רשתות סינגור ( (Advocacy (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Eyal and Buchholz, 2010 Networks) ודמיון סביבתי (Peet & Watts (1996) in:Gilbert, Environmental Imaginaries) (Davis and Burke‐III, 2011 ;2010) בנוסף לתיאוריות עשיית השלום באמצעות הסביבה. הפרק השלישי מתייחס לרצף של הצעות להקמת פארק שלום ברמת הגולן בין 1994-2009 ומציב אותן בקונטקסט הפוליטי והסביבתי הרלוונטי. הוא מתמקד בשאיפות לבניית שלום ולעשיית שלום הגלומות
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בהצעות אלו ודן ביתרונות ובחסרונות הסביבתיים והפוליטיים הנובעים מהם, ברשתות ובאינדיווידאולים המעורבים, בשיח הסביבתי ובכוחו הפוליטי.
המאפיינים היחודיים לכל אחד מפרקי המחקר, הגיאוגרפיות, מסגרות הזמן ונקודות המבט השונות משלימים זה את זה ומספקים תמונה הוליסטית ורחבה של הזיקה הרב כוונית שבין סביבה לשלום כפי שבאה לידי ביטוי משך השנים לאורך גבולות ישראל.
מתודולוגיית המחקר איכותנית ולפיכךל הוא נשען על חומרים ראשוניים ומשניים ועל ראיונות עם אנשי מפתח המעורבים במקרי החקר. הפרספקטיבה המרכזית למחקר היא ישראלית ונשענת על מקורות ישראליים, ומשלימה אותה פרספקטיבה בינלאומית.
התרומה המדעית של העבודה ממוקמת בספירות היסטוריות ואנליטיות, והיא עונה על כמה פערי ידע.
ראשית, היא תורמת להיסטוריוגרפיה של הסביבה במזרח התיכון בחיתוך רוחב עם תהליכים פוליטיים. כתוצאה, נוצרת נקודת מבט ייחודית בשיח הרווי אודות ההיסטוריה, הפוליטיקה ונסיונות יישוב הסכסוכים במזרח התיכון ופרספקטיבה שונה על קבוצות מומחים המעורבות, או עשויות להיות מעורבות, בהתרת הקונפליקט הישראלי-ערבי.
שנית, הנחות היסוד של ספרות עשיית השלום באמצעות הסביבה בנוגע לתפקיד הסביבה כזרז לתהליכי שלום אינן מגובות דיין במחקר אמפירי שיטתי אודות הדרכים בהם הזיקה בין שלום לסביבה באה לידי ביטוי. עבודה זאת מסייעת במילוי פער ידע זה בשתי דרכים עיקריות:
האחת, בהרחבת הקורפוס במקרי חקר אשר מחזקים או מחדדים את הנחות היסוד של הספרות. בעיקר, המחקר דן בחשיבות הפוליטית של פארקי שלום לתהליכי שלום שהינה סוגייה שאינה מטופלת דייה בספרות (בניגוד, לדוגמא, לתרומת פארקי שלום לשימור טבע או לפיתוח תיירותי). על אף שרב יוזמות הפארקים המוצגות לא יצאו לפועל, המחקר, באמצעות הבירור אודות כיצד, מדוע, מתי ומי קידם ותכנן פארקים אלו, מסייע בהבנת נסיון העבר ומניח את היתדות להבנת מקרים נוספים בעתיד. בנוסף, ספרות עשיית השלום באמצעות הסביבה כמעט ולא עסקה באיזור המזרח התיכון (מלבד בנושא המים), בייחוד בהתייחס לקונספט פארק השלום.
השניה, המחקר ממוקד בזיקה שבין סביבה ושלום, בניגוד למיקוד ולכתיבה הרווחת אודות הקשר שבין סביבה וסכסוך. הוא אמנם מתייחס לנזקים פוטנציאליים לסביבה כתוצאה מתהליכי שלום (בייחוד בהתייחס לחצי-האי סיני) אך בעיקר מתמקד באספקטים ובהזדמנויות החיוביות לניהול סביבתי משופר ולשיתוף פעולה חוצה גבולות כתוצאה מהם. זאת ועוד, המחקר מדגים תהליכי בניית ועשיית שלום
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באמצעות הסביבה בנקודות זמן שונות ביחס לתהליך יישוב הסכסוך (לפני, במהלך מו"מ ולאחר חתימת הסכם שלום) ומספק תמונה רחבה אודות היבט זה.
ממצאי ומסקנות המחקר מורכבים ושלובים. המקרים הנבדקים מראים שקבוצות רבות הכירו בפוטנציאל של יוזמות סביבתיות חוצות גבולות להשפיע על השלום ופעלו לקידומן. אף על פי כן, בפועל, יוזמות אלו לא היו בעלות כוח פוליטי מספק על מנת לגבור על מכשולים פוליטיים ולכן הפוטנציאל שלהם נשאר ברובו לא ממומש. למרות זאת, המקרים, ובראשם מקרה חצי -האי סיני, מורים על ההשפעה הישירה והחיובית של השלום על פיתוח סביבתנות.
בהתחשב בכך שמודל מוצלח של פארקי שלום באיזור המזרח התיכון אינו בנמצא, הישנות החוזרת של יוזמות אלו על ידי שחקנים מגוונים משקפת ומאירה חיובית את הפוטנציאל הנרחב של הקונספט ומעניקה לו כוח כמודל עתידי ליחסים חוצי גבולות. עם זאת, הכשלונות החוזרים יכולים להורות על כך שהמודל אינו מתאים למציאות האיזורית. המחקר מאשש הבחנות קודמות אודות קונספט הפארק כפתרון פופולארי שמאומץ על ידי רבים בעולם לחיזוק יחסים חוצי גבולות. עם זאת, המחקר אינו יכול לתמוך, לשלול או להעריך את התרומה האפשרית של פארקים מסוג זה לשימור טבע או לשלום. בנוסף, המחקר מוצא שההצעות החוזרות להקמת פארקי שלום לא היו תופעות אידיוסינקרטיות אלא, לעיתים, היו מופעים לוקאלים שקשורים בתופעות רחבות יותר ובטרנדים גלובליים של שימור טבע, הסרת גבולות (de-bordering), וגלובליזציה.
המחקר מדגים את הזיקה הרב-כוונית בין שלום וסביבה (מי משפיע על מי) בנקודות זמן שונות ביחס לתהליך פתרון הסכסוך. בעוד שרב יוזמות פארקי השלום נבעו כתוצאה מתהליכי השלום עצמם והינן תוצרים שלאחר (פוסט) קונפליקט, הן לכשעצמן כוונו להוות כלי שיחזק ויתמוך בשלום בשנית. הצעות הפארקים ברמת הגולן הן ייחודיות במובן שהן מייצגות תוכניות קדם -הסכמיות שמוצעות כחלק מהפתרון לסכסוך המדיני ולא לאחריו. הן מיועדות הן לשלב התהליך עצמו (שלב עשיית שלום) והן לאחריו כאמצעי לחיזוק השלום (שלב בניית השלום). מקרה החקר של סיני מציג את הזיקה הדו כיוונית המלאה של השלום והסביבה: הסכם השלום בין ישראל למצרים הביא לתחזיות פיתוח מואץ (תיירותי ואחר) שהשיתו איומיים סביבתיים חדשים על האיזור. איומים אלו, בתורם, יצרו תמריץ בקרב סביבתנים ישראלים ליצור שיתופי פעולה חוצי גבולות שתרמו הלכה למעשה לשינוי בסביבתנות המצרית ולשימור טבע בסיני. בין הצעותיהם היתה גם הצעה לפארק שלום בדרום סיני, שלכשעצמו יועד לחזק את השלום. תוצאות פעולותיהם, ברמה מסויימת, תרמו לשימור טבע ולחיזוק הסביבתנות באיזור אשר השפיעו באופן חיובי על המשך תיירות חוצת גבולות בין המדינות, ולפיכך על השלום.
העבודה מספקת תמיכה, הוכחות ומודיפיקציות תיאורטיות למספר הנחות יסוד המופיעות בספרות עשיית שלום באמצעות הסביבה. היא תומכת בהנחה שסביבה יכולה לייצר ולהוות פלטפורמה לדיאלוג חוצה גבולות. בעוד שהספרות מדגישה את הצורך לשיתוף ויצירת אמון הן בקרב הרמה הממשלתית והן בקרב
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קבוצות אזרחיות על מנת שפלטפורמות שכאלה תצלחנה, מחקר זה מוצא שהרמה הממשלתית -פורמלית היא קריטית להצלחת יוזמות. יתרה מכך, העבודה מטילה ספק באפקטיביות של פלטפורמה זו לגבור על זעזועים פוליטיים. העבודה מאששת, מדגימה, מדגישה ומפתחת את תפקיד אנשי הסביבה (מומחים שונים העוסקים בשימור טבע, מדיניות, ניהול ותכנון סביבתי) כמקדמי שלום (peacemakers). בנוסף, העבודה מאששת את הנחת הספרות כי תקופת הפוסט-קונפליקט מתאימה במיוחד לקידום יוזמות חוצות גבול ייחודיות. תקופה זו, שמאופיינת כלא-יציבה פוליטית, מספקת חלון הזדמנויות להצגת עקרונות חדשים ולקידום פרקטיקות חדשניות באופנים שהיו קשים ליישום פוליטי בתקופה אחרת, יציבה יותר. זאת ועוד, העבודה מחזקת ומדגימה תופעה ידועה בקרב מוסדות ופרטים הנוטים להמנע מהדגשת אספקטים פוליטיים או להמנע מפוליטיזציה של פרוייקטים סביבתיים, הגם שבמוצהר מטרתם קידום מטרה פוליטית. ולבסוף, העבודה מאששת את ההנחה שזיהוי בעיות ואיומים סביבתיים משותפים מביאה לנכונות גבוהה יותר ולפרודוקטיביות בשיתוף פעולה חוצה גבולות, זאת לעומת פעילות משותפת למטרת פרוייקט פוזיטיבי (שאינו מבוסס על אלמנט בעייתי שיש צורך במניעתו). עובדה זו מהווה חסרון עבור הקמה ופיתוח פארקי שלום בשל העובדה שאלו, בהגדרה, אינם מכוונים לפתרון בעיות ואיומים אלא לשיתוף פעולה שמכוון למטרות פוזיטיביסטיות. בעוד שהמחקר תומך בהנחה האמורה (ואכן היוזמות שכללו במטרותיהן טיפול בבעיה סביבתית היו בקרב המתקדמות יותר), הוא גם מדגים כיצד פארק שלום עשוי להוות דרך משותפת להתמודדות עם איום סביבתי חד-צדדי (שאינו משותף).
התובנה האחרונה מתמקדת באופן בו הסביבה נתפשת בקרב הציבור ובקרב מקבלי החלטות ובפוטנציאל הפוליטי שטמון בכך. סביבתנות איזורית התפתחה משמעותית בתקופת תהליך השלום של שנות התשעים ובאה לידי ביטוי באמצעות מיזמים רבים חוצי גבול, בהם יוזמות פארקי השלום. מופעים אלו מעידים על נטייה כללית (או לכל הפחות נטייה ישראלית) להעניק לסביבה, הגם שאינסטורנמנטלית, כוח כמוקד לשיתופי פעולה חוצי גבולות. אינסטרומנטליזם זה (השימוש בסביבה במטרה להשיג מטרות פוליטיות שונות), קשור לאופן שבו הסביבה נתפשת על ידי סביבתנים, מעצבי מדיניות והציבור בכללותו. עבודה זו מדגימה את ההכרה (של מעצבי מדיניות ומנהלי מו"מ) במקום אותו תופשת הסביבה בתודעת הציבור. במילים אחרות, העבודה מורה על ההכרה של מקבלי החלטות בתפישות הסביבתיות של הציבור ככוח פוליטי פוטנציאלי, כזה שעשוי לשמש ולתרום לתהליכי בניית ועשיית שלום. החדשנות העולה כאן מצוייה בשימוש, או בשימוש הפוטנציאלי, של תפישות סביבתיות לצרכים פוליטיים של קידום שלום. על מנת להבין לעומקה את הדרך שבה תפישות סביתיות תורגמו לעשייה פוליטית, העבודה מצביעה על שימוש בנושאים מתווכים. נושאי השלום, הקונפליקט ושימור טבע עובדו פעמים רבות דרך פריזמות של דמיון סביבתי, אתוס לאומי, זכרון, הנצחה ונוסטלגיה. עיבוד זה אינו מייצר יחס ישר בין הנושאים, אולם במשולב הם שימשו חלק מהרציונל, ההצדקה והאימוץ הקונספטואלי של פארקי השלום.
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