DOCSLIB.ORG

Disqualification of Judges and Pre-Judicial Advice

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Disqualification of Judges and Pre-Judicial Advice University of New South Wales Law Research Series DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES AND PRE-JUDICIAL ADVICE GABRIELLE APPLEBY AND STEPHEN MCDONALD (2015) 43 Federal Law Review 201 [2016] UNSWLRS 76 UNSW Law UNSW Sydney NSW 2052 Australia E: [email protected] W: http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/research/faculty-publications AustLII: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/ SSRN: http://www.ssrn.com/link/UNSW-LEG.html DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES AND PRE-JUDICIAL ADVICE Gabrielle Appleby∗ and Stephen McDonald∗∗ ABSTRACT This article explores the circumstances in which a judicial officer may be required to recuse himself or herself on the basis of an opinion provided in the course of practice as a legal practitioner, prior to appointment to judicial officer, particularly where that opinion was on a matter of law only (including the constitutional validity of legislation). We suggest that questions concerning disqualification of judicial officers in such circumstances might be better approached by considering broader concepts of fairness, in addition to asking whether the provision of the pre-judicial opinion gives rise to considerations of apprehended bias. We also explore possible developments of the law to avoid the undesirable situation where the disqualification of a particular judicial officer may depend upon whether one party to the litigation chooses to disclose the existence or the content of advice that it has received. I INTRODUCTION In Australia, judges are appointed from the legal profession. Accordingly, before their appointment most judges will have had a practice in which they will have provided opinions on various legal questions. Given this reality, it is perhaps surprising that little judicial or academic attention has been paid to the question of whether, or in what circumstances, advice provided on questions of law by judges prior to their appointment ('pre-judicial advice') will disqualify them from sitting in a matter in which that question arises for decision. Recent decisions of Justice Stephen Gageler of the High Court not to sit in a number of cases have demonstrated that the current law on apprehended bias and waiver is difficult to apply to the particular issues that pre-judicial advice raises. Where pre-judicial advice has been provided only in respect of a matter of law — for example, where the advice has considered the constitutional validity of legislation subsequently in question before the court — questions remain as to whether and when the judge, or the party to whom the advice was provided, can and should disclose its existence, whether a judge who provided such advice should disqualify himself or ∗ Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Co-Director of The Judiciary Project, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law. We would like to thank Rosalind Dixon, Justice James Edelman, Belinda Baker, Leighton McDonald, Anna Olijnyk, Adam Webster and Sir Anthony Mason for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. ∗∗ Barrister, Hanson Chambers. Adjunct Senior Lecturer, University of Adelaide. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2765694 202 Federal Law Review Volume 43 _____________________________________________________________________________________ herself and, if so, on what basis. Often, questions of whether the provision of pre-judicial advice disqualifies a judge from sitting on a case will need to be determined expeditiously. Moreover, the effect of pre-judicial advice may be most acute in the case of a judge who has been recently appointed, perhaps directly from the legal profession rather than from another judicial office, and who may lack prior judicial experience. The current practice is for questions of disqualification and recusal to be determined solely by the judge concerned,1 although in practice judges may informally consult their colleagues for advice.2 There is some material available to judges that offers assistance in making determinations about recusal,3 but none that specifically addresses the particular issues raised by pre-judicial advice. The relatively common practice of judges declining to sit without providing reasons exacerbates the lack of guidance available. Thus, while it is a question that may arise only relatively infrequently, it is one that merits more sustained attention. This article commences by tracing two controversial High Court cases in which the question of disqualification on the basis of pre-judicial advice arose but was unsatisfactorily resolved: Gageler J's recusal in Unions NSW v New South Wales4 and Callinan J's in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth.5 The article then briefly explains the relevant legal principles that govern disqualification, before turning to an analysis of their application to cases that raise issues concerning pre-judicial advice. We develop an argument that the provision of a pre-judicial opinion on a question of law should not necessarily constitute grounds for disqualification on the basis of bias or even broader grounds relating to fairness between the parties. Provided the law allows the judge to give a public account of this advice or the 'gist' of the advice (and we argue that it does, or should), there is little to distinguish pre-judicial opinions on matters of law from judicial comments in obiter dicta, or extra-judicial writings and speeches that express opinions on the law. We conclude with a brief consideration of the application of the law of waiver of legal professional privilege in circumstances where the existence, but not the content, of a pre-judicial opinion has been revealed. II PRE-JUDICIAL ADVICE IN AUSTRALIA In the last 15 years, disqualification on the basis of pre-judicial advice has arisen twice 1 See further discussion of this practice in Sir Anthony Mason, 'Judicial Disqualification for Bias or Apprehended Bias and the Problem of Appellate Review' (1998) 1 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 21. 2 There is no formal judicial ethics advisory board, such as exist in some States in the United States, eg, the Colorado State Judicial Ethics Advisory Board, <http://www.courts. state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Committees/Committee.cfm?Committee_ID=15>. 3 See, eg, Melissa Perry, Disqualification of Judges: Practice and Procedures: Discussion Paper (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2001); James Burrow Thomas, Judicial Ethics in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2009); Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal: Principles, Process and Problems (Hart Publishing, 2009); John Tarrant, Disqualification for Bias (Federation Press, 2012). 4 (2013) 252 CLR 530 ('Unions NSW'). 5 (1998) 195 CLR 337 ('Kartinyeri'). Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2765694 2015 Disqualification of Judges and Pre-judicial Advice 203 _____________________________________________________________________________________ in the High Court in constitutionally important and high profile matters. Both cases suggest that the legal principles governing disqualification in these circumstances remain insufficiently developed. On 5 November 2013, seven judges of the High Court sat ready to hear the first day of argument in Unions NSW.6 The case proved to be an important decision involving the application of the implied freedom of political communication to the New South Wales Parliament's campaign finance reforms. As the hearing was set to commence, counsel for the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (an intervener in the proceedings) drew the Court's attention to the fact that advice had been provided by a justice of the Court that, counsel said, 'touched on' the constitutional validity of one of the challenged provisions.7 The opinion was not provided to the other parties in the case. The Court adjourned. More than an hour later, the Court returned. Counsel for the Commonwealth clarified that it had no application to make. No other party made an application, or provided submissions on the issue of whether Gageler J ought to be disqualified from hearing the case. Gageler J then proceeded to give brief reasons for recusing himself. He explained that, in his former capacity as Commonwealth Solicitor-General, he had provided signed legal advice to the Commonwealth Attorney-General that touched on the validity of provisions challenged in the proceedings. Gageler J said that, before the announcement by counsel for the Attorney-General, he had been unable publicly to disclose the fact that he had given the advice. He had previously carefully considered the question of whether the provision of the advice gave rise to any apprehension of bias, but was not satisfied that it did and thus considered that it was his duty to sit as a member of the Court. However, since the existence of the advice, but not the content of the advice, had now been disclosed, he felt obliged to recuse himself 'to dispel any apprehension of bias'.8 In the six months following, Gageler J did not sit on further important constitutional cases. In each case it appears that his reasons for not sitting may have been connected with his providing pre-judicial advice. In Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory,9 in which the Commonwealth challenged the validity of the Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT), Gageler J did not sit. Unlike in Unions NSW, Gageler J provided no reasons for this. It was widely thought that it was because he had previously provided a joint opinion concerning the validity of an earlier proposed civil union scheme in the Territory.10 The Territory had made that advice publicly available.11 In Williams v 6 (2013) 252 CLR 530. 7 Transcript of Proceedings, Unions NSW v New South Wales [2013] HCATrans 263 (5 November 2013), lines 23–30. 8 Ibid, lines 53–77. 9 (2013) 250 CLR 441 ('Same Sex Marriage Case'). 10 See, eg, Jeremy Gans, 'Same-Sex Marriage Hearing Ins and Outs', Opinions on High (online), 3 December 2013, <https://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2013/12/03/news-same- sex-marriage-hearing-ins-and-outs>; Frank Brennan, 'High Court Leaves Same Sex Marriage Door Ajar', Eureka Street (online), 15 December 2015, <http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid=38637#.VbyipEtN3wJ>.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Toohey Legacy: Rights and Freedoms, Compassion and Honour
    The Toohey Legacy: rights and freedoms, compassion and honour Introduction This year is the 25th anniversary of the Mabo decision, in which the late John Toohey played a significant role. It is fitting, therefore, that I commence with a reference to Malo’s Law which was oft repeated during the evidence in that case: Malo tag mauki mauki, Teter mauki mauki. Malo tag aorir aorir, Teter aorir aorir. Malo tag tupamait tupamait, Teter tupamait tupamait Malo keeps his hands to himself; he does not touch what is not his. He does not permit his feet to carry him Towards another man’s property. His hands are not grasping He holds them back. He does not wander from his path. He walks on tiptoe, silent, careful, Leaving no sign to tell that This is the way he took. Malo is the God, in the form of an octopus, who gave the Meriam people the laws they live by. He laid his tentacles down on the Island of Mer, creating the 1 8 tribes of Mer and he gave them the rule that they should not trespass on one another’s lands. Consistently with Malo’s law, I acknowledge that this event is occurring on the traditional land of the Whadjuk People of the Nyungar Nation. I acknowledge their elders and thank them for welcoming us onto this site alongside the Derbal Yerrigan1. Eleanor Roosevelt said that “great minds discuss ideas, average minds discuss events, small minds discuss people”. The focus of this address is upon the ideas discussed by the Honourable John Leslie Toohey AC QC, expressed in his judgments and occasional lectures.
    [Show full text]
  • The Supreme Court of Victoria
    ANNUAL REPORT ANNUAL Annual Report Supreme Court a SUPREME COURTSUPREME OF VICTORIA 2016-17 of Victoria SUPREME COURTSUPREME OF VICTORIA ANNUAL REPORT 2016-17ANNUAL Supreme Court Annual Report of Victoria 2016-17 Letter to the Governor September 2017 To Her Excellency Linda Dessau AC, Governor of the state of Victoria and its Dependencies in the Commonwealth of Australia. Dear Governor, We, the judges of the Supreme Court of Victoria, have the honour of presenting our Annual Report pursuant to the provisions of the Supreme Court Act 1986 with respect to the financial year 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017. Yours sincerely, Marilyn L Warren AC The Honourable Chief Justice Supreme Court of Victoria Published by the Supreme Court of Victoria Melbourne, Victoria, Australia September 2017 © Supreme Court of Victoria ISSN 1839-6062 Authorised by the Supreme Court of Victoria. This report is also published on the Court’s website: www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au Enquiries Supreme Court of Victoria 210 William Street Melbourne VIC 3000 Tel: 03 9603 6111 Email: [email protected] Annual Report Supreme Court 1 2016-17 of Victoria Contents Chief Justice foreword 2 Court Administration 49 Discrete administrative functions 55 Chief Executive Officer foreword 4 Appendices 61 Financial report 62 At a glance 5 Judicial officers of the Supreme Court of Victoria 63 About the Supreme Court of Victoria 6 2016-17 The work of the Court 7 Judicial activity 65 Contacts and locations 83 The year in review 13 Significant events 14 Work of the Supreme Court 18 The Court of Appeal 19 Trial Division – Commercial Court 23 Trial Division – Common Law 30 Trial Division – Criminal 40 Trial Division – Judicial Mediation 45 Trial Division – Costs Court 45 2 Supreme Court Annual Report of Victoria 2016-17 Chief Justice foreword It is a pleasure to present the Annual Report of the Supreme Court of Victoria for 2016-17.
    [Show full text]
  • The University of Western Australia Law Review: the First Seventy Years
    1 THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA LAW REVIEW: THE FIRST SEVENTY YEARS MICHAEL BLAKENEY* I FOUNDATION The two oldest Australian university law journals are the UWA Law Review and the Queensland University Law Review, both founded in 1948. In his foreword to the first issue of the UWA Law Review the Hon. Sir John Dwyer, Chief Justice of Western Australia, noting the coming of age of the School of Law in the University of Western Australia, which had been established in 1927 and explained that “now in the enthusiasm of early maturity it has planned the publication of an Annual Law Review of a type and on a scale not hitherto attempted in any Australian University.” The Chief Justice in his foreword identified the desirable objectives of the Law Review. He wrote: It is too much to-day to expect statutory recognition, prompt and adequate, by legislatures almost exclusively preoccupied with economic questions. It is necessary to have a considerable body of informed opinion to show the needs and point the way; and the creation of such a body depends in turn on an explanation and understanding of our institutions, an exposition of the underlying principles of our laws and customs, an examination of their moral sources, a comparison with other legal systems, a criticism_ of applications and interpretations that may appear to be dubious. There is no better mode of achieving such ends than a Review devoted to such purposes, and this first number is a satisfactory step in the right direction. The example set in 1948 by the Universities of Western Australia and Queensland in establishing their law reviews was followed by the University of Sydney in 1953, when it established the Sydney Law Review and in 1957 with the establishment of the Melbourne University Law Review; the University of Tasmania Law Review in 1958; the Adelaide Law Review in 1960 and the Australian National University’s Federal Law Review in 1964.
    [Show full text]
  • Newsletter-Vol09-Issue01-April 2018.Pub
    MURDOCH LAW NEWSLETTER Vol. 9, Issue 1, May 2018 www.murdoch.edu.au/School-of-Law/ Inside this issue: Dean’s Award Ceremony 2 Community Engagement 11 Distinguished Alumni 6 Indigenous incarceration 14 Law Café Series 16 Retirement of Professor Neil Mcleod 7 New Colombo Program - Travel to India 19 Planning Symposium 8 made possible A Word from the Dean Habemus EBA! The Enterprise Bargaining process has finally come to a conclusion and it would seem that the finalizaon of the actual agreement is only a formality. This brings and end to a long process with considerable challenges on all sides. Let us not forget that a lot of people put in a lot of work to bring this to what looks to be a good end and thanks to all of them. The “good end” is the perfect segue to talk about the rerement of Professor Neil McLeod. Neil was a fixture at this Law School almost since its incepon and in the best possible sense an academic of the “old school”. Now, of course, some will say the world in general and the academic world in parcular are changing and “old school” is out and change is in. Really? Depends on what one wants to look at. Yes, there is the internet and the various new generaons of students, x, y, z, millennials and what not. But at the end of the day all knowledge and understanding enters the brain through ears and eyes and at the end of the day it is intensive engagement, reading, thinking and discourse that makes a good graduate, a good professional and a good academic and that kind of intensive engagement creates the ability to think crically and analycally.
    [Show full text]
  • Overview Report: Selected Writings of Dr. Natalie Skead
    Overview Report: Selected Writings of Dr. Natalie Skead I. Scope of Overview Report 1. This overview report attaches selected writings by Dr. Natalie Skead. II. Journal Articles a. Appendix A: Natalie Skead, “Drug-trafficker property confiscation schemes in Western Australia and the Northern Territory: A study in legislation going too far” (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296. b. Appendix B: Natalie Skead and Sarah Murray, “The Politics of Proceeds of Crime Legislation” (2015) 38:2 UNSW Law Journal 455. c. Appendix C: Natalie Skead, “Crime-Used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the Northern Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?” (2016) 41:1 The University of Western Australia Law Review 67. d. Appendix D: Natalie Skead, Tamara Tulich, Sarah Murray and Hilde Tubex, “Reforming Proceeds of Crime Legislation: Political Reality or Pipedream?” (2019) 44:3 Alternative Law Journal 176. III. Submission to the Review of the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) e. Appendix E: Sarah Murray, Natalie Skead, Hilde Tubex and Tamara Tulich, Submission: Review of the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA). 1 Appendix A Natalie Skead, “Drug-trafficker property confiscation schemes in Western Australia and the Northern Territory: A study in legislation going too far” (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296. Appendix A Drug-trafficker property confiscation schemes in Western Australia and the Northern Territory: A study in legislation going too far Dr Natalie Skead* Combating drug-related crime is a key focus of proceeds of crime legislation in Australia. Despite this clear focus only three Australian jurisdictions have introduced confiscation provisions levelled specifically at those involved in drug-related crimes: New South Wales, Western Australia, and the Northern Territory.
    [Show full text]
  • The Toohey Legacy: Rights and Freedoms, Compassion and Honour
    57 THE TOOHEY LEGACY: RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, COMPASSION AND HONOUR GREG MCINTYRE* I INTRODUCTION John Toohey is a person whom I have admired as a model of how to behave as a lawyer, since my first years in practice. A fundamental theme of John Toohey’s approach to life and the law, which shines through, is that he remained keenly aware of the fact that there are groups and individuals within our society who are vulnerable to the exercise of power and that the law has a role in ensuring that they are not disadvantaged by its exercise. A group who clearly fit within that category, and upon whom a lot of John’s work focussed, were Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. In 1987, in a speech to the Student Law Reform Society of Western Australia Toohey said: Complex though it may be, the relation between Aborigines and the law is an important issue and one that will remain with us;1 and in Western Australia v Commonwealth (Native Title Act Case)2 he reaffirmed what was said in the Tasmanian Dam Case,3 that ‘[t]he relationship between the Aboriginal people and the lands which they occupy lies at the heart of traditional Aboriginal culture and traditional Aboriginal life’. A University of Western Australia John Toohey had a long-standing relationship with the University of Western Australia, having graduated in 1950 in Law and in 1956 in Arts and winning the F E Parsons (outstanding graduate) and HCF Keall (best fourth year student) prizes. He was a Senior Lecturer at the Law School from 1957 to 1958, and a Visiting Lecturer from 1958 to 1965.
    [Show full text]
  • Honouring Pro Bono Lawyering
    2348 Honouring Pro Bono Lawyering The Victorian Bar Pro Bono Committee Reception in honour of the pro bono commitments of members of the Victorian Bar Melbourne, Victoria 2 April 2009. The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMB THE VICTORIAN BAR PRO BONO COMMITTEE RECEPTION IN HONOUR OF THE PRO BONO COMMITMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE VICTORIAN BAR MELBOURNE, VICTORIA, 2 APRIL 2009. HONOURING PRO BONO LAWYERING The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG* SAVED FROM A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE One of the worst misfortunes that can befall a person in judicial office is to be an instrument of the miscarriage of justice. I know, because it happened to me. It is something I have to live with. In 2006, a bundle of appeal books landed on the desk of my chambers in Canberra. They concerned an appeal by Andrew Mallard. Special leave having been granted, Mr. Mallard was challenging orders of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia. Those orders had rejected his petition for the exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy, in respect of his conviction of murder more than a decade earlier. Very thorough submissions were filed on Mr. Mallard’s behalf by pro bono Counsel, Mr. Malcolm McCusker AO QC and Dr. James Edelman, members of the Western Australian Bar. As I read the papers, aspects of the case seemed *Justice of the High Court of Australia (1996-2009) 1 familiar. And then my attention was drawn to the fact that a decade earlier, Mr. Mallard had sought, and failed to obtain, special leave to appeal from an earlier panel in the High Court.
    [Show full text]
  • 2018 Winterton Lecture Constitutional Interpretation James Edelman
    2018 Winterton lecture Constitutional interpretation James Edelman Introduction In Molière's The Bourgeois Gentleman, Monsieur Jordain is learning from his philosophy tutor. His tutor explains the meaning of prose. Monsieur Jourdain asks his tutor, "When I say, 'Nicole, bring me my slippers, and give me my nightcap,' that’s prose?" His tutor replies, "Yes, Sir". Monsieur Jourdain responds, "By my faith! For more than forty years now I have been speaking prose without knowing anything about it".1 George Winterton was not like Monsieur Jourdain. The depth of his work was due to his awareness of the history and the philosophy of the language in which he was speaking. My late, and very dear, friend Peter Johnston2 was part of a small group of exceptional public lawyers whose members included George Winterton. Occasionally, after an off-the-cuff opinion from me, he would say, "I think George has written something about that". In his usual polite way, he was directing me to a far more sophisticated exploration of the history or theory of the issue by George Winterton. The area of law about which I will speak this evening is one about which George Winterton had thought deeply. That area is the interpretation of constitutional words. Although my focus is upon a basic dimension of interpretation of words in a written Constitution, I want to draw out the strands of an approach that has been taken by many judges in Australia and to explore its theoretical foundations. The approach is far from the only approach to constitutional interpretation. But it is useful to explore its foundations, and to see if it can be justified, because it is one that has been taken expressly by many judges and practitioners.
    [Show full text]
  • 2003-2004 DPP Annual Report
    DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA A N N U A L R E P O R T 2003-2004 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS NORTHERN TERRITORY FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR YEAR ENDED 30 JUNE 2004 Printed by the Government Printer of the Northern Territory 2 Director of Public Prosecutions Northern Territory Rex Wild QC 43 Mitchell St Darwin NT 0800 Telephone (08) 8999 7533 30 September 2004 Facsimile (08) 8999 7821 GPO Box 3321 Darwin NT 0801 Australia The Hon Peter Toyne MLA Attorney-General Parliament House State Square DARWIN NT 0800 Dear Attorney-General ANNUAL REPORT 2003-2004 In accordance with the requirements of section 33 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act, I submit to you the Annual Report on the performance of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the period 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004. This is the fourteenth Annual Report of the Office since its establishment in January 1991 and the ninth since my appointment in February 1996. This year’s Report does not include the various statements of guidelines issued and published pursuant to section 25 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act. They had been published in each previous Annual Report following the date of their respective issue and implementation. New or amended guidelines will continue to be published in the Annual Report, but existing guidelines will be available on the ODPP website (www.nt.gov.au/justice/dpp) or on request. It is hoped that the information contained within the Report and on the website in respect of the Office will advance public knowledge of its operations and its role in the criminal justice system.
    [Show full text]
  • 08 August 2016 Clarion 160725.Pages
    CLArion No 1608 – 01 August 2016 Email newsletter of Civil Liberties Australia (A04043) Email: Secretary(at)cla.asn.au Web: http://www.cla.asn.au/ Stand by for justice over stolen wages Civil Liberties Australia is aware of a major legal case, to be launched this month, seeking to claw back possibly more than $1 billion in wage payments NOT made to Indigenous people in Australia. For years, Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in Queensland and other jurisdictions have been denied the wages due them for work they did for government and other bosses dating back beyond 100 years. They were subjected to a racist “protection” regime, where money they earned was paid to a “Protector of Aborigines” who, in most cases, protected the revenue flow to government coffers rather than provided relative benefit to the Indigenous people, individually or as a group. The Queensland and other jurisdictions – particularly WA and the NT – have proposed various compensation schemes over the years, but usually offering a pittance of what is due to those who literally slaved away without pay. Soon there will be a chance real dollars, in today’s value terms, might flow to rightful recipients. For the situation in WA, see: http://tinyurl.com/j5qwkuf PHOTO: Children branding cattle on a government station in the Kimberley, WA, in the 1910s. – State Library of WA Little sense in ABS approach to the census The national census will be held this month. You are free to decide whether you will be civilly disobedient by not giving your correct name on the census papers, or online – the government may take action against you if you do that, and you may be liable for a sizeable fine.
    [Show full text]
  • Temporary Judicial Officers in Australia
    Temporary Judicial Officers in Australia A Report Commissioned by the Judicial Conference of Australia May 2017 Associate Professor Gabrielle Appleby University of New South Wales Associate Professor Suzanne Le Mire University of Adelaide Professor Andrew Lynch University of New South Wales Professor Brian Opeskin University of Technology Sydney Corresponding author: Andrew Lynch <[email protected]> Temporary Judicial Officers in Australia TABLE OF CONTENTS Terms of Reference .............................................................................................. iv 1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 2. Legislative Overview of Temporary Judicial Officers .................................... 3 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 3 2.2 Appointment............................................................................................... 4 2.3 Eligibility .................................................................................................... 5 2.4 Duration of term ......................................................................................... 8 2.5 Renewal ...................................................................................................... 9 2.6 Mandatory retirement age ........................................................................ 10 2.7 Outside work ...........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • ANNUAL REPORT 2016-2017 © High Court of Australia 2017
    HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA ANNUAL REPORT 2016-2017 © High Court of Australia 2017 ISSN 0728–4152 (print) ISSN 1838–2274 (on-line) This work is copyright, but the on-line version may be downloaded and reprinted free of charge. Apart from any other use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part may be reproduced by any other process without prior written permission from the High Court of Australia. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the Manager, Public Information, High Court of Australia, GPO Box 6309, Kingston ACT 2604 [email protected]. Images by Adam McGrath Designed by Spectrum Graphics sg.com.au iii High Court of Australia Canberra ACT 2600 30 November 2017 Dear Attorney In accordance with section 47 of the High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), I submit on behalf of the High Court and with its approval a report relating to the administration of the affairs of the Court under section 17 of the Act for the year ended 30 June 2017, together with financial statements in respect of the year in the form approved by the Minister for Finance. Section 47(3) of the Act requires you to cause a copy of this report to be laid before each House of Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after its receipt by you. 2016–2017 Yours sincerely Andrew Phelan ANNUAL REPORT REPORT ANNUAL Chief Executive and Principal Registrar of the High Court of Australia Senator the Honourable George Brandis QC Attorney-General Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600 CONTENTS PART 1 Chief Justices and Justices PREAMBLE 2 of the Court 16 PART 2 Administration of the Court 17 CHIEF JUSTICE’S OVERVIEW 4 Appropriations and Spending 19 PART 3 The High Court Building 19 OVERVIEW OF THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 PART 4 THE WORK OF THE Establishment 9 COURT IN 2016-2017 20 Functions and Powers 9 A.
    [Show full text]