ASSESSING EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE in a TECHNICALLY-DRIVEN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATION: an Analysis of Political Appointees at the U S Department of Energy

Home , Abraham Ribicoff, Alphonso Jackson, Benjamin Bristow, Cecil Andrus, Christian Herter, Claude Brinegar

ASSESSING EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE IN A TECHNICALLY-DRIVEN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATION: An Analysis of Political Appointees at the U S Department of Energy

by Albert M. Gallo, Jr.

B.A. in Mathematics, August 1976, Rhode Island College M.S. in Technical Management, May 1996, The Johns Hopkins University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The School of Engineering and Applied Science of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 15, 2011

Dissertation directed by

Thomas Mazzuchi Professor of Engineering and Applied Science

The School of Engineering and Applied Science of The George Washington Uni-

versity certifies that Albert M. Gallo, Jr. has passed the Final Examination for the

degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of February 28, 2011. This is the final and ap-

proved form of the dissertation.

ASSESSING EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE IN A TECHNICALLY-DRIVEN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATION: An Analysis of Political Appointees at the U S Department of Energy

Albert M. Gallo, Jr.

Dissertation Research Committee:

Thomas Mazzuchi, Professor of Applied Science and Engineering, Dissertation Director

Lile Murphree, Professor of Applied Science and Engineering, Committee Chair

Julie Ryan, Professor of Applied Science and Engineering, EMSE Department Chair

Michael Stankowski, Professor of Applied Science and Engineering, Committee Member

Linda Wilbanks, Executive Assistant, Director for IT, Naval Criminal Investigation Service, Committee Member

Dedication

Completing a dissertation is a lengthy, difficult, and solitary journey yet is never made alone. I dedicate this, my latest adventure, to several people who were unaware they were helping and guiding me along the way.

To Grandma Sadie, who believed that if even one human before you has done something difficult, then you can accomplish at least as much.

To my Dad, who taught his children that if a thing is worth doing, it’s worth doing right, but above all, always finish what you start.

To my Mom, who is now teaching her grandchildren that anyone can do anything; it’s only a matter of working hard enough.

To my two sons, who are just beginning their own life’s journeys: may you never forget the wisdom of those who came before and always remember to laugh for journeys are meant to be enjoyed.

Finally, to my wife, who completed the doctoral voyage years before I did, all the while keeping hot meals, car pools and soccer games happening on schedule.

You continue to amaze us all by doing anything you set your mind to and always doing it well.

iii

Acknowledgments

I would like express my appreciation to the following people who provided

me much-needed encouragement, served as role models, or supplied just the

right amount of persuasion to keep me going on this project.

To Tom, my adviser and advocate, who with patience, sincerity and good

humor supported me from the earliest days as I considered and discarded what

must be a record number of potential research topics. Above all, I appreciate

your intellectual curiosity and open mindedness in exploring areas that were

new to both of us.

To Linda, I owe so much to your encouragement and even some occasional blunt feedback. You continue to be an outstanding friend, mentor and colleague,

and I thank you for always being available.

To the Tuesday Gang: Dolores, Al and Bill, my longstanding cheering squad.

Your collected wisdom, experience and unique brand of humor have kept me go-

ing at so many points during this process. You have been both muses and sages

all these years, and I am sincerely grateful.

To my longtime friend Sriram, whose infinite patience, insight and Eastern tranquility counterbalance the frenetic reality of our Western society. I learn something new at each of our all-too-infrequent lunches.

I am also grateful to Frank DiGiammarino of the Brookings Institution and A.

Roy of the CIA, not only for their early encouragement in pursuing this research topic, but also for helping me to see real worth in finding the answers.

To Zoe Dansan, our coordinator of doctoral students and chief magician at the School of Engineering, your ability to unravel every Gordian knot ever devised by the administration while simultaneously keeping Tom in line attests to your superhuman powers. I truly thank you for all your help through the years.

And most importantly, I thank my wife for patiently enduring this multiyear process, for listening politely to things that did not interest you, and for never telling me simply to write faster . . . well, hardly ever.

Now to our next life adventure! Will it be the land of Hamlet or Macbeth?

Abstract

ASSESSING EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE IN A TECHNICALLY-DRIVEN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATION: An Analysis of Political Appointees at the U S Department of Energy

The myth that political appointees who comprise presidential administrations are selected for their outstanding leadership and professional qualifications is followed closely by the one claiming cabinet government is a viable source of policy formulation in the United States. Both PAS (those requiring Senate confirmation) and non-PAS appointees, are given authority over, and responsibility for, the performance of their agencies, but if unsuccessful, to whom are they really accountable? The White House? Congress? or the American Public?

Despite changes in administrations, the turmoil of presidential transitions, and the asynchronous comings and goings of political appointees, members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) play a stabilizing but much less visible role in maintaining the functions of government.

This dissertation analyzes appointees’ leadership effectiveness over the past three decades of the Modern Presidency. Specifically, it investigates those attributes associated with success in leading a technically-driven organization in the public sector – the US Department of Energy. Research data was obtained by

vi surveying permanent SESs who are directed by, and answerable to, the myriad of political appointees who continually enter and exit the federal government.

vii

Table of Contents

Dedication ...... iii

Acknowledgments ...... iv

Abstract ...... vi

Table of Contents ...... viii

List of Figures ...... xiv

List of Tables ...... xvii

List of Acronyms ...... xviii

CHAPTER 1 ...... 1

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...... 4

1.1.1 Origins and Evolution of Political Appointments ...... 7

1.1.2 The Executive Branch and the Appointment Process ...... 10

1.1.3 The High Price of the Status Quo ...... 18

1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PLAN ...... 22

1.2.1 Motivation behind This Research ...... 22

1.2.2 The Nature of the Problem ...... 24

1.2.3 The Problem Statement ...... 25

1.2.4 Approach to This Research ...... 26

1.3 APPROACH TO THE MULTI -DISCIPLINARY LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 28

1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH ...... 29

viii

1.4.1 Uniqueness of this Work...... 29

1.4.2 Contribution of this Work ...... 29

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION ...... 31

CHAPTER 2 ...... 32

2. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEW OF LITERATURE ...... 32

2.1 GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ...... 33

2.1.1 Origins and History of Presidential Appointments ...... 33

2.1.1.1 Early Use and Misuse of Presidential Appointments ...... 34

2.1.1.2 A Neutral and Competent Bureaucracy ...... 40

2.1.2 The Modern Presidency ...... 46

2.1.3 Organizing Presidential Administrations ...... 51

2.1.3.1 Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933 – 1945) ...... 54

2.1.3.2 Harry S. Truman (1945 – 1953) ...... 59

2.1.3.3 Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953 – 1961) ...... 70

2.1.3.4 John F. Kennedy (1961 – 1963) ...... 85

2.1.3.5 Lyndon B. Johnson (1963 – 1969) ...... 102

2.1.3.6 Richard M. Nixon (1969 – 1974) ...... 125

2.1.3.7 Gerald R. Ford (1974 – 1977) ...... 153

2.1.3.8 Jimmy Carter (1977 – 1981) ...... 179

2.1.3.9 Ronald Reagan (1981 – 1989) ...... 202

2.1.3.10 George H. W. Bush (1989 – 1993) ...... 236

2.1.3.11 Bill Clinton (1993 - 2001) ...... 267

2.1.3.12 George W. Bush (2001 – 2009) ...... 301

CHAPTER 3 ...... 330

3. METHODOLOGY ...... 330

3.1 CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ...... 330

3.2 DESIGN OF THE SURVEY ...... 334

3.2.1 Description of the Survey Sections ...... 334

3.2.2 Mapping of Survey Questions ...... 336

CHAPTER 4 ...... 339

4. ANALYSIS of DATA ...... 339

4.1 SURVEY RESPONSES ...... 339

4.2 APPROACH TO DATA ANALYSIS ...... 340

4.3 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF SURVEY QUESTIONS ...... 342

4.3.1 Background Information ...... 342

4.3.1.1 Question #1: ...... 343

4.3.1.2 Question #2: ...... 345

4.3.1.3 Question #3: ...... 348

4.3.1.4 Question #4: ...... 349

4.3.1.5 Question #5: ...... 350

4.3.1.6 Question #6: ...... 351

4.3.1.7 Question #7: ...... 353

4.3.1.8 Question #8: ...... 354

4.3.2 Survey Section 1 ...... 355

4.3.2.1 Question #1: Goals ...... 356

4.3.2.2 Question #2: Direct Experience ...... 359

4.3.2.3 Question #3: Vision and Inspiration ...... 362

4.3.2.4 Question #4: Confidence and Trust ...... 365

4.3.2.5 Question #5: Departmental Mission vs. Politics ...... 368

4.3.2.6 Question #6: Relevant Management Experience ...... 371

4.3.2.7 Question #7: Having Knowledge of Relevant Federal Regulation ...... 374

4.3.2.8 Question #8: Understanding of Agency Plans and Priorities ...... 378

4.3.2.9 Questions #9: Previous Government Experience ...... 382

4.3.2.10 Question #10: Close Ties to the White House ...... 386

4.3.3 Survey Section 2 ...... 390

4.3.3.1 Question #1: Appointees’ Impact on Agencies ...... 391

4.3.3.2 Question #2: Appointee Effectiveness and Performance ...... 394

4.3.3.3 Question #3: Appointee and Careerist Working Relationships ...... 397

4.3.3.4 Question #4: Optimum Number of Appointees ...... 400

4.3.3.5 Question #5: Work Attitude Toward Appointees ...... 402

4.3.3.6 Question #6: Estimate of the Percentage of Appointees Leaving

Government ...... 404

4.3.3.7 Question #7: Estimate of Appointees Remaining in Government ...... 406

4.3.3.8 Question #8: The Most Important Attributes for Success...... 408

4.3.3.9 Question #9: Definition of a Successful Political Appointee ...... 412

4.3.3.10 Question #10: Respondents’ Interest in Political Appointments ...... 414

4.3.4 Summary of Likert-based Questions ...... 419

CHAPTER 5 ...... 420

5. CONCLUSIONS BASED on RESEARCH FINDINGS ...... 420

5.1 OVERVIEW ...... 420

5.1.1 Recap of the Problem Statement ...... 420

5.1.2 Recap of Research Design and Findings ...... 421

5.1.2.1 Findings for H 1 ...... 421

5.1.2.2 Findings for H 2 ...... 422

5.1.2.3 Findings for H 3 ...... 422

5.1.2.4 Findings for H 4 ...... 423

5.1.2.5 Findings for H 5 ...... 424

5.1.2.6 Findings for H 6 ...... 424

5.1.3 Summary of Findings ...... 425

CHAPTER 6 ...... 426

6. CONCLUSION ...... 426

6.1 STRUCTURE AND RATIONALE BEHIND THIS RESEARCH ...... 426

6.2 ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR LEADERS ...... 429

6.2.1 An Organizational Continuum ...... 429

6.2.2 Organizational Stability ...... 430

6.2.3 Leaders and Leadership ...... 432

6.3 FINAL OBSERVATIONS ...... 433

6.4 A LONG -TERM VIEW ...... 436

References ...... 438

Appendix A - Presidents of the United States ...... 473

Appendix B – Chronology and Profile of Cabinet Level Departments ...... 477

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ...... 478

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ...... 481

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ...... 484

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ...... 487

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ...... 490

xii

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ...... 492

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ...... 494

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ...... 496

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ...... 498

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ...... 500

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ...... 501

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ...... 503

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ...... 504

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS ...... 505

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ...... 507

Appendix C – Allocated SES Positions from 1982 – 2006 ...... 508

Appendix D - African Americans Appointed to Cabinet Positions ...... 509

Appendix E – Women Appointed to Cabinet Positions ...... 510

Appendix F – Presidential Electoral Results ...... 511

Appendix G - Legislation Addressing the Presidential Appointment Process ...... 512

H. R. 3137 [106 TH ]: TO AMEND THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION ACT OF 1963 TO

PROVIDE FOR THE TRAINING OF INDIVIDUALS (C ONGRESS , 1999) ...... 512

H.R. 127 [107 TH ]: TO LIMIT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES IN THE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT (C ONGRESS , 2001) ...... 513

Appendix H – Proclamation Signed by Governor George W. Bush ...... 514

Appendix I – Letter of Introduction and Survey Questionnaire ...... 515

xiii

List of Figures

Figure 1-1 Average Time Required to Confirm Top Political Appointees ...... 14

Figure 1-2 Number of Federal Civilian Employees from 1982 to 2006 ...... 16

Figure 1-3 Notional Model of the Hierarchy of the Executive Branch ...... 19

Figure 2-1 Timeline of the Modern Presidency from 1945 to the present ...... 54

Figure 2-2 The Competitive Model (FDR) ...... 58

Figure 2-3 The Formalistic Model (Truman) ...... 68

Figure 2-4 The Formalistic Model (Eisenhower) ...... 82

Figure 2-5 The Collegial Model (JFK) ...... 98

Figure 2-6 Growth in the number of Special Presidential Assistants ...... 138

Figure 2-7 The Formalistic Model (Nixon) ...... 146

Figure 2-8 Average Time to Confirm PAS Appointees from 1960 – 2000 ...... 318

Figure 3-1 Example of 7-Point Likert Response Scale ...... 335

Figure 4-1 Gender Distribution within Sample Population ...... 343

Figure 4-2 OPM Data – Gender Distribution among Career SES from 1990 through 2006.

...... 344

Figure 4-3 Years in Government Service by Gender ...... 346

Figure 4-4 OPM Data - Average Years of Government Service ...... 347

Figure 4-5 Number of Respondents Still in Government ...... 348

Figure 4-6 Respondents who had Served as a Political Appointee ...... 349

Figure 4-7 Respondents' Current or Previous Federal Agency ...... 350

xiv

Figure 4-8 Total Number of Federal Agencies Worked ...... 352

Figure 4-9 Number of Political Appointees Worked With ...... 353

Figure 4-10 Areas of Professional Expertise ...... 354

Figure 4-11 Goals as Success Criteria ...... 357

Figure 4-12 Mission Experience as a Success Criterion ...... 360

Figure 4-13 Vision as a Success Criterion ...... 363

Figure 4-14 Confidence and Trust as Success Criteria ...... 366

Figure 4-15 Agency Mission versus Politics ...... 369

Figure 4-16 Senior Management Experience as a Success Criterion ...... 372

Figure 4-17 Knowledgeable with Federal Regulation as a Success Criterion ...... 374

Figure 4-18 Familiarity with an Agency's Plans, Priorities and Challenges ...... 379

Figure 4-19 Prior Government Experience as a Success Criterion ...... 383

Figure 4-20 Close Ties to the Administration as a Success Criterion ...... 387

Figure 4-21 Appointee Impact on Agency Missions ...... 392

Figure 4-22 Change in Appointees’ Effectiveness Over Time...... 395

Figure 4-23 Shift in Working Relationship between Appointees and Careerists ...... 398

Figure 4-24 More vs. Fewer Political Appointees ...... 400

Figure 4-25 Working Preference: Careerists vs. Appointees ...... 402

Figure 4-26 Estimate the Percentage of Appointees Leaving Government before an

Administration Ends ...... 404

Figure 4-27 Estimate the Percentage of Appointees Staying in Government Longer than

the Admin istration ...... 406

Figure 4-28 The MOST Important Professional Attribute for Successful Appointees ..... 408

Figure 4-29 The 2nd Most Important Professional Attribute for Successful Appointees . 409

Figure 4-30 The 3rd Most Important Professional Attribute for Successful Appointees . 409

Figure 4-31 The Top Three Professional Attributes for Successful Appointees ...... 410

Figure 4-32 Agree/disagree with Heclo's Definition of a Successful Political Appointee . 412

Figure 4-33 Percentage of Respondents Who Would Accept Political Appointment ...... 414

Figure 6-1 Notional Representation of Our Research Model ...... 427

Figure 6-2 Notional Model of an "Organizational Continuum" ...... 430

xvi

List of Tables

Table 1: Truman's Inherited Cabinet...... 65

Table 2: Johnson's Inherited Cabinet ...... 119

Table 3: Ford's Inherited Cabinet ...... 171

Table 4: Comparison of the Reagan and Clinton Transitions ...... 282

Table 5: Analysis of Likert Scales in Published Surveys ...... 332

Table 6: Mapping of Survey Questions to Hypotheses ...... 338

Table 7: A 2-by-2 Table Test for Outcomes Independent of Gender ...... 342

Table 8: Respondents' Time Served in Government Service ...... 345

Table 9: Number of Agencies in which Respondents Worked ...... 351

Table 10: Summary of Survey Section 2 ...... 355

Table 11: Results of Research Hypotheses ...... 425

xvii

List of Acronyms

AG Attorney General a.k.a also known as

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics

CBO Congressional Budget Office

CEA Council of Economic Advisers

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CFO Chief Financial Officer

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COO Chief Operating Officer

CSC Civil Service Commission

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DoD Department of Defense

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNC Democratic National Committee

DOE Department of Energy

DOI Department of the Interior

DOJ Department of Justice

DOL Department of Labor

DOS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

EOP Executive Office of the President

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDR Franklin Delano Roosevelt

xviii

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act

FMLA Family Medical Leave Act

GAO General Accounting Office

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

HEW Health, Education and Welfare

IG Inspector General

IRS Internal Revenue Service

JFK John Fitzgerald Kennedy

LBJ Lyndon Baines Johnson

NAPA National Academy of Public Administration

NAFTA North American Free Trade Act

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NHC National Hurricane Center

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPM Office of Personnel Management

PAI Presidential Appointee Initiative

PAS Presidential Appointment with Senate Confirmation

PPO Presidential Personnel Office

RNC Republican National Committee

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

SES Senior Executive Service

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

USDA U S Department of Agriculture

VA Veterans Affairs

WHPO White House Personnel Office

xix

CHAPTER 1

“When a man assumes a public trust, he should consider himself a public property.”

Thomas Jefferson (Washington, DC, 1807)

1. INTRODUCTION

The data show that with the exception of a brief period following the events

of September 11, 2001, Americans tend to be generally skeptical of the quality of both leadership and management in the public sector. Furthermore, an increas-

ing number have expressed low levels of confidence in government’s ability to

meet national needs (Jones, 2007; McGinnis, 2004; Volker, 2003). At the same

time, however, the American public is demanding more efficiency and effective-

ness from the individual Departments, Agencies and Offices that comprise the

Federal Government (Volker, 2003).

Most Americans understand the theory, though not the detailed procedures, by which their national leaders are ostensibly selected and temporarily entrusted with vastly powerful decision-making authority. What the electorate understand less, however, are the ways in which presidents implement management structures at the national level by means of a relatively small but highly influential cadre of hand-picked appointees and an increasing number of not-so-carefully- selected ones – none of whom is elected. Appointees’ profiles, including such things as education, personal background, professional experience, and even income become public information (occasionally before but always subsequent to their selection). Yet in all but a few cases, these individuals are neither well- known nor familiar to the general public prior to their appointments.

The influence wielded by this small group of unknown presidential appointees can be enormous. Collectively, these all-but-invisible, well-connected politicos have the power to affect the lives of every American. Macy et. al . note that at

the height of the Cold War during the Cuban Missile Crisis, “the Executive

Committee of the National Security Council met around the clock . . . [but the]

president was the only elected official in the group” (Macy, 1983). The same was

true when Lyndon Johnson met with top advisers to strategize the Vietnam War

and on countless other occasions throughout every president’s term in office.

When the American public expresses its (dis)trust of the effectiveness of its national government, they almost invariably omit consideration of the appointed layer, which Macy labeled “America's unelected government” (Macy, 1983). Just days before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Presidential Appointee Initia- tive (PAI) 1 published its report, A Vote of No Confidence: How Americans View

Presidential Appointees , which was based on surveys that focused specifically on presidential appointees. It found that Americans believed political appointees were generally more motivated by a desire for influence, professional opportunity, or out personal connection to the man in the Oval Office than they were by a genuine desire to serve and/or improve the country in some way (Labner,

2001).

Presidential appointees are expected to achieve two potentially competing sets of objectives. From the president’s point of view, his appointees must accurately implement his administration’s policies within their agencies; whereas from the public’s viewpoint, all government executives are expected to provide effective management of the various constituent departments that comprise the

Federal Government. These two viewpoints are seldom the same and frequently at odds.

1 The Presidential Appointee Initiative was established in 1999 under a three-year grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts. Its goal was to find ways of encouraging talented citizens to seek and accept presidential appointments and to work for procedural reform leading to a simplified and expeditious appointments process. The initiative was terminated in 2001, but its long term goals are yet to be realized.

Although all appointees are y definition highly political, some have also proven themselves to be effective and successful executives in their appointed positions as well, whereas others turn out to be quite the opposite. This dissertation explores two broad questions: 1) Can we identify the critical characteristics of successful versus unsuccessful presidential appointees?, and 2) Can reasonable predictions be made regarding future appointees’ success based on past experience?

If the answer to either question is yes, the long-term impact could be to increase the effectiveness of, and confidence in, the executive management of the

Federal Government.

1.1 Historical Background

The American system of democracy presumes that election outcomes are decided when a majority of voters selects the most qualified individuals, and, by extension, it is presumed that qualified officials will appoint other well qualified individuals into supporting positions of leadership and policymaking. In theory at least, this is how presidents organize their administrations and implement national policy through a few thousand appointees.

The Founding Fathers, however, never expected that any president would

manage the government directly, no matter how qualified he might be. Accord- ing to the 2008 Congressional publication, Policy and Supporting Positions 2, the president is authorized to make approximately 8,000 full and part-time job appointments across the Executive and Legislative Branches; however, slightly more than 1,100 of the most senior positions, 3 such as Cabinet Secretaries, Dep- uty Secretaries, Undersecretaries, federal judges, etc., require approval by relevant Senate committees (Congress, 2004; Congress, 2008a).

In the 1970s, Hugh Heclo, political scientist and government scholar, characterized political appointees collectively as "a government of strangers" (Heclo,

1977a). This description is based on the fact that every newly-elected President’s executive management team arrives in Washington, for the most part, as virtual

2 Commonly referred to as The Plum Book, this report is published by Congress every 4 years within weeks of a presidential election. It came into existence in 1952, when the incoming Ei- senhower administration requested an official list of positions which the president could fill. Re- sponsibility for its publication currently alternates between committees in the two chambers, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform. The latest publication was released in 2008 and lists all the appointive positions identified by the outgoing Bush Administration.

3 The exact number of appointees is highly variable and difficult to determine. The figure of 8,000 is used in this dissertation since it is the figure cited officially in the latest Congressional publication; however, according to the Presidential Appointments.Org, the total number may be nearer to 10,000 when considering all judicial, ceremonial, State Department and all other part time, non Senate-confirmed positions.

Further imprecision results from the fact that both the White House and the Department of State have the legal authority to expand the number of possible positions as they deem necessary, but the number of full time PAS appointees (those requiring Senate confirmation) in the Execu- tive Branch was placed officially at 1,141 according to the Plum Book published in 2008 (Congress, 2008a) . (See also Appendix C – Allocated SES Positions from 1982 – 2006 )

strangers – not only to politics, national government and the agencies they are

expected to lead, but also to each other. Heclo notes further that thousands of

political appointees come to Washington from positions across the private sector,

yet the majority possesses no prior experience either in public service or politics.

J. Jackson Walter, former president of the National Academy of Public Admini-

stration, described those few with previous government experience as “the ex-

ecutives, lawyers, professors, and financiers who follow the election results back

and forth between the public and private sectors” (Macy, 1983).

How then does a new president assemble a functional team of thousands to

form an operational government? Voters generally believe the unelected layer of

government assembles itself in Washington on Inauguration Day as an intact,

well coordinated management team – one carefully selected by the administra-

tion, fully oriented, and prepared to meet its responsibilities on day one, in other

words, able to hit the ground running.

Quite the opposite is true. Surveys have shown that after several months or

even years, this small group of the well-connected appointees demonstrates

lower rates of effectiveness in executing the primary functions of government

than do the career civil servants for whom they are managerially responsible.

Generally, political appointees “lack technical qualifications and most have little

management expertise” at the level needed for leading large and complex or-

ganizations (Cohen, 1998; Gilmour, 2006; Lee, 2005). Another study conducted by Princeton University analyzed performance data which had been gathered by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and found “that programs managed by career executives fared 10 points (out of 100) better on average than programs overseen by politically appointed executives . . . ”

(Editorial, 2005).

1.1.1 Origins and Evolution of Political Appointments

Historically, all presidents have, to differing extents, relied on groups of handpicked appointees to operate the disparate parts of the Federal Government for which the Chief Executive is ultimately responsible. A president’s success is highly dependent on the effectiveness and reliability of his appointees, but the tenure of individual presidential appointees is highly variable and closely related to both prevailing political factors and the levels of importance (and visibility) ascribed to their appointive positions. The National Institute of Public Affairs found the average tenure for appointees at all levels in the early 1980s was slightly less than 24 months (Macy, 1983), just over two years in the mid 1990s, and only slightly higher during the last year of the G. H. W. Bush administration.

Appointees at the senior-most levels tended to remain slightly longer in their positions than lower level appointees (Mackenzie, 1996). Government scholars

have reported that some tenures have become so short that “the first appointees .

. . often leave before the last appointees are formally sworn in” (Light, 2002);

Light and others have also noted that vacancy rates of “50 to 60 percent . . . in the first year” are becoming the norm (Light, 2002b; MacKenzie, 1996; Raines, 2001).

When George Washington formed the first Cabinet, his challenges were significantly less than those of modern presidents in that he had to accommodate neither extensive legislation, bureaucratic tradition nor precedence. Further- more, he had the advantage of knowing firsthand the intent of the other Found- ing Fathers when it came to asking private citizens to perform public service.

Alexander Hamilton was the first political nominee to be confirmed; his name was submitted to the Senate for its “advice and consent” on September 11, 1789.

Hamilton was confirmed immediately as Secretary of the Treasury, and notification went back to the president the same day.

Despite being handpicked by Washington, Alexander Hamilton believed the

Senate’s role in the appointment process was a required one in that it constituted yet another vital check and balance against the possibility of (future) Chief Ex- ecutives “selecting friends, neighbors, relatives, or other ‘unfit characters’. . .

[who may, in fact,] lack the necessary skills, temperament, or experience” for government appointment (Congress, 1867).

With few exceptions, potential appointees are almost never required by either

the White House or the Senate to demonstrate significant expertise or academic

training that would qualify them for positions in government.4 Nor are appointees necessarily expected to possess significant managerial skills that are directly relevant to the jobs they are being asked to undertake (Cohen, 1998). Over the past two decades, however, there has been increasing concern that the current approach to selecting and confirming the nation’s senior government leaders is failing both fundamentally and significantly (Kassebaum-Baker, 2001a; Light,

2002b; MacKenzie, 1996; Pfiffner, 1999; Raines, 2001); the ranks of appointees have become “. . . far too large, too temporary, and too incompetent” (Goodsell,

2006).

For the most part, today’s presidential appointees tend to be people whose careers, loyalties and backgrounds are rooted neither in party politics nor long- term commitment to public service. Rather, they come and go with the change of administrations and must be replaced even more frequently in between elections

4 Positions such as Attorney General and Surgeon General, however, require that nominees be lawyers and physicians with practical experience, and that they are in good professional standing. In the case of nominees for Secretary of State, Defense and Treasury, suitability and relevant professional experience have traditionally been considered for successful nominations. For Sec- retaries of other agencies such as Labor, Energy, Transportation, Education, and even the VA, requirements have traditionally been set somewhat lower. In all cases, political loyalty remains at least as important, if not more so, than technical, educational or managerial expertise.

(Heclo, 1977a). (See Appendix B for government data regarding the tenures of all cabinet-level appointments. 5)

Several terms describing political appointees and their behavior have come into existence. Heclo and others refer to these transient executives as “in-and- outers” – people who are “not politicians and usually not bureaucrats in the conventional sense” (Heclo, 1977a). Other descriptors include “short-timers [or] short-termers” (Michaels, 1995), “hit and run” appointees (Tomlinson, 1999), and, slightly pejoratively, as “birds of passage” (Maranto, 2005) and even “the

Christmas help” (Michaels, 2005). Such terms tend to highlight the fact that turnover rates for executive appointees are as much as three times greater than those of their counterparts in the private sector (Cohen, 1998; Macy, 1983; Uscher,

2007). According to Maranto, the U S government has become reliant on

“temps” at the top (Maranto, 2005).

1.1.2 The Executive Branch and the Appointment Process

There is growing consensus both inside and outside of government that the presidential appointment process is breaking down. Scholars and observers of government increasingly point to the deeply rooted political characteristics of the

5 See Appendix B for historical data regarding the tenures of Cabinet Secretaries from the official date on which each department was created through the end of G. W. Bush’s administration. Average tenures were calculated for Post WW II period and have been included for comparison with the long term historical trend for those agencies in existence prior to the Second World War.

appointment-confirmation process that have come to define as well as dominate

it (Light, 2002a; Raines, 2001; Williams, 2002). It can hardly be surprising given its origin and purpose. Others, however, contend today’s problems stem from the fact the Founders left no guidance, rather they merely began a tradition that has evolved over the course of centuries (Macy, 1983). As a result, the appointment process continues to be free form, increasingly polarized (Lewis, 2005) and highly polarizing (Grant, 2004).

Nor is the process likely to improve anytime soon. Partisan supporters of the

White House are quick to lay blame on the Senate, ostensibly for employing delaying tactics when conducting confirmation hearings (Maranto, 2005; Williams,

2002). For its part, the Senate simply claims to be acting responsibly and thought-fully in the careful execution of its constitutionally-mandated obligations, warning also that senatorial confirmation, once given, can never be re- scinded after the fact. 6 Only presidents are empowered to remove confirmed ap-

pointees.

6 “Thorough” is Washington speak for “slow” and is a well documented tactic commonly employed in politics; however, the fact remains there are no official, legal or constitutional means, other than the president himself, for removing an appointee once he/she has been confirmed. There- fore, a reasonable amount of prudence on the part of the Senate may be justified.

Congress can not impeach political appointees; its authority is limited to elected officials only. This was the problem faced by Congress with respect to former Attorney General Gonzales, whose professional conduct and ethics were publicly called into question, but whose ultimate resignation was the result of political pressure on the White House. Inasmuch as appointees serve at “the pleasure of the President,” they can only be removed by the Chief Executive.

Over the past ten years, another consensus of opinion has formed regarding

the increased difficulty in attracting the most qualified candidates to serve in

what Benjamin Franklin described as “posts of honor” (Kassebaum-Baker,

2001a). The phenomenon itself is not new, but today’s critics of the process cite

the difficulty as evidence that the process is failing (Light, 2002b; Raines, 2001;

MacKenzie, 1996).

Politicians, government scholars, journalists, national think tanks, and even

some appointees themselves agree the procedures for appointing and confirming

qualified citizens to “posts of honor” need to be overhauled if not scrapped and

entirely rebuilt. Appointees themselves have been clear in what they see as major inhibitors to political appointment. Most notable are:

• Low pay (vis-à-vis equivalent positions in the private sector) (Wilson,

1995)

• Personally invasive and embarrassing background checks (Kassebaum-

Baker, 2001b; Mackenzie, 2001)

• The high cost of living in Washington (Maranto, 2005), and

• Family and career disruptions due to relocation (Raines, 2001)

Beyond its inherent structural flaws, the presidential appointment process

has also slowed down significantly and shows evidence of continuing to be over-

strained. Most noticeable is the time required of new presidents to wait for the

12 confirmation of even a simple majority of their nominees has been steadily increasing with each administration (Mackenzie, 2002a). The extended delay in completing the appointment cycle from end to end ( i.e., selecting, screening, vetting, qualifying, formally submitting and finally confirming a nominee) has gone from slightly more than two months during the Kennedy Administration to approximately eight and one-half months under G. W. Bush (Mackenzie, 1996;

Eksterowicz, 2005), which equates to one-sixth of a presidential term.

Shortly after the inauguration of George W. Bush, former Senator Nancy

Kassebaum-Baker testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental Af- fairs warning that unless improvements were made quickly to the process, it might take until November of that year for the Bush II Administration’s team of appointees was fully in place (Kassebaum-Baker, 2001b), let alone governing effectively (See figure 1-1 below). She testified that effective governance was being delayed by the reduced pace of the current appointment process.

Unfortunately, as the appointment process continues to degrade, the number of appointee positions is steadily increasing (Editorial, 2005; Light, 1999;

Congress, 2008a), which further compounds the problem of extended confirmation cycles. By comparison, over the past 20 to 30 years, private sector organizations of all types have devised various strategies to address executive staffing, downsizing (Tomakso, 1987), right sizing (Davison, 2002) and flattening

(Ashkenas et al., 1998) themselves in order to adapt effectively to changing con-

ditions in an effort to maximize organizational efficiency. During this same pe-

riod, however, the various presidential administrations have been inconsistent at best in their efforts to restructure the shape, size and organization of government.

Figure 1-1 Average Time Required to Confirm Top Political Appointees (per Senator Nancy Kassebaum-Baker (Kassebaum-Baker, 2001b)

The Clinton-Gore years saw real downsizing and the beginning of flatter gov-

ernment as evidenced by reducing not only the numbers of civil servants but also by reducing, in real terms, the numbers of government managers 7 (Light, 1999).

The Bush-Cheney administration dropped the “Reinventing Government”

7 In the early 1990’s, Vice President Gore observed that the ratio of civil servants to career managers was approximately 7:1 and sought to thin the supervisor ranks, thereby increasing the ratio and flattening the structure of government. His initiative, known as Reinventing Government, attempted to borrow from the private sector by trying to make the Federal Government more innovative, agile and responsive to the needs of citizens.

14 moniker and promoted “The President’s Management Agenda,” which continued the trend of downsizing the numbers of career civil servants; however, the second Bush Administration actually increased the number of political appointees significantly (Congress, 2006; OPM, 2007) as a means of exerting greater

White House control over the bureaucracy (Milbank, 2004; Mackenzie, 2002a) – a tactic used by various prior administrations with differing degrees of success

(Greenstein, 1994; Lewis, 2007; McCullough, 2001). (See Figure 1-2 below for official data.)

As a consequence, the shape of government was changed by increasing the height with respect to the width of the federal hierarchy. Adding more appointees to the layers of federal management is known as the “thickening of government” (Lewis, 2007; Light, 2004), and runs counter to current organizational and managerial trends in the private sector.

The appointment process is the mechanism by which presidents fill the most powerful, high profile positions such as Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, ambassadors to certain high-profile countries, heads of regulatory agencies, etc., as well as the thousands of other lesser positions. 8 It starts behind closed doors

8 Presidential Appointees requiring confirmation by the Senate are designated “PAS” appointees. These include: Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Chairpersons, members of Boards and Commissions, federal judges, Ambassadors, District Attorneys, U S Marshals, Heads of independent and regulatory agencies, and some Legislative appointees. Originally almost all PAS positions were created by statute; therefore, each require(d) approval by the Senate.

and may not involve the president directly – often by his own choice. Nominees’ backgrounds are scrutinized by White House teams 9, then, after passing this ini-

tial muster, the administration floats the names of PAS nominees publicly. Those

who successfully navigate both the political and public relations wickets are gen-

erally confirmed, almost as a formality, via a simple majority vote by the relevant

Senate committee in open session.

Figure 1-2 Number of Federal Civilian Employees from 1982 to 2006 Source: Office of Personnel Management (OPM, 1997, 2007)

Trend of Civilian Employment (for years reported by OMB from 1982 - 2006)

3,500,000

3,000,000

2,500,000 2,000,000

1,500,000 1,000,000

Employees 500,000

NumberFederal of -

2 4 6 8 0 4 5 6 7 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

DoD Civilians Post Office All Other Agencies

Fiscal Year

Note: Although part of the Executive Branch, the figures reported by OMB do not include statistics for military personnel, CIA, FBI, NSA, DIA, Defense Mapping, TVA, Presidential or vice-presidential personnel or the Federal Reserve Board

9 Senior level appointees are privately vetted, investigated and screened by White House staff in an effort to avoid “political embarrassment.” After passing the internal political checks, their backgrounds are formally investigated by the FBI, CIA, and even the IRS. Finally, names are officially submitted to the Senate, and the appointment process culminates with an appearance before a Senate committee for formal hearing and confirmation.

Nominees requiring this level of scrutiny may receive strategic coaching re-

garding how best to survive confirmation hearings; however, there is no re-

quirement for further preparation to prepare them for their new responsibilities

after successful confirmation. It was not until the Clinton Administration that broad-based orientation to government was first provided.

There still remains no official means of accomplishing an orderly transfer of critical policy information between outgoing and incoming Executive appointees 10 (Light, 2000; Reich, 1997); however, the Legislative and Judicial Branches

approach this matter quite differently. Newly elected members of the House

(Zernike, 2006), the Senate (Congress, 2001) and newly appointed federal judges

(Rothstein, 2006) all receive well-planned orientations in preparation for their

new public responsibilities.

10 This approach is not the one taken by military commanders when transferring critical responsibility, nor is this practiced in the private sector. The Department of Defense strives for smooth transitions via a minimum 30 day overlap between outgoing and incoming Commanding Offi- cers at military bases in order to avoid any disruption to the mission. Private corporations, Not- for-Profit Organizations as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) allocate significant amounts of time and money to avoid any disruption to the organization whenever executive leadership changes.

In the private sector, investors and boards of directors routinely insist, for the long-term good of the organization, on the development of binding provisions to ensure orderly transitions exist as an integral part of succession planning. These requirements are generally written into employment contracts of CEOs, COOs, CFOs, and other senior executives. Another standard element in private employment contracts is the requirement to give a year or more formal notification of intent to leave. This provides private organizations adequate time to seek out, evaluate and train the most qualified candidates in order to avoid any disruption in leadership.

Outside the government sector, all organizations, whether for-profit or not-

for-profit, continually struggle with succession planning and the related issues of

executive stability, long term strategies, the building of cohesive teams and or-

ganizational commitment. This, however, is not the model followed by any

White House in that long-term commitments have never been required or ex-

pected of its executive appointees. The Darwinian nature of executive appoint-

ments, however, ensures only that those who are the “politically” fittest ever

make it to day one of their new jobs. After that, presidential appointees must ei-

ther sink or swim on their own merits.

1.1.3 The High Price of the Status Quo

The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the U S government is the nation’s

largest single employer. 11 It is this group of permanent civil service employees who must adapt to changes in organizational leadership and priorities whenever executive appointees are changed and who still keep the government running on a daily basis.

11 The number of employees in the Executive Branch is approximately 2 million, while employees of the other two branches plus military personnel and postal employees total slightly more than another million. For detailed statistics see Appendix C – Allocated SES Positions from 1982 – 2006 on page 508.)

Figure 1-3 Notional Model of the Hierarchy of the Executive Branch

White House Staff

PAS Appointees Other Appointees

Career SES

Executive Branch

Civil Service Employees (GS)

Other Civilian Employees (i.e. Congres- sional, Judicial, Military and Postal)

Yet despite the size and complexity of American Government, the Executive

Branch employs an executive staffing process whose defining characteristics have long been rejected by organizations in the private sector. Under the presidential appointment model, an administration’s most senior individuals are recruited and selected non-competitively. Loyalty, personal connections, and occasionally political ideology, are more highly valued than relevant experience or specialized training. The vast majority of candidates’ names still comes to the

attention of the White House based on second-hand knowledge and third party

recommendations (Macy, 1983).

When filling positions such as Cabinet Secretaries, administrators and other

presidentially-appointed executives, administrations have, over an extended pe-

riod of time, institutionalized a management model that is somewhat at odds

with the Founding Fathers’ original intent of attracting the most qualified citi-

zens into periods of public service and self-sacrifice (Raines, 2001). What exists

today at the highest levels of government is a staffing process that is burdensome

(Mackenzie, 1996), protracted (Kassebaum-Baker, 2001b; Hogue, 2004; Volker,

2003), and highly politicized (Light, 2000; MacKenzie, 2001; Raines, 2001).

George Washington and the first Senate had only instinct to guide them in

making “appropriate choice(s).” Since those first nominations, qualifications based on expertise, relevant experience, formal training or professional recogni-

tion have not become appointment criteria with even historical precedent. The

current version of the presidential appointment process has been allowed to

evolve to the point where it is complex, cumbersome and almost exclusively po-

litical (Lewis, 2007).

In organizational terms, it is noteworthy that the current process of executive

staffing has no vocal supporters – not the White House, the Senate nor even ap-

pointees themselves. Nor is there any vocal champion of the current process

20 among the general public. Thus, absent consistent calls for change, any attempt at reforming the current procedure has proven inconsistent and ineffective.

There have, in fact, been warnings raised by scholars of government (Bonafede,

1987; Heclo, 1977a; Macy, 1983; Light, 2002), non-governmental experts (Hogue,

2004; Palmer, 2005; Volker, 2003), and even the occasional politician (Kassebaum-

Baker, 2001a) to overhaul the existing appointment process 12 , but even today the singular flaw-ridden process is allowed to continue with a high degree of political inevitability.

Lacking any broad consensus for change, the multiple divergent opinions that exist are academic, having been reduced to both a distraction and an impediment to determining which of the many systemic problems are most critical, how their underlying root causes might be addressed, and what could or should be done to improve the current process. Each incoming administration continues to make its own self-serving but limited adjustments by merely recalibrating the status

12 In May, 2001, the GAO published a report, Presidential Appointments: Agencies’ Compliance with Provi sions of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, GAO-01-701, in response to a request from the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.

The Reform Act was passed with the intention of clarifying the appointment process and setting time limits for allowing PAS positions to remain vacant and limiting the period in which an individual is allowed to serve in an “acting” capacity in lieu of a permanent appointment. GAO’s primary motive for reporting to the Committee was not to drive reform, but simply to provide the Senate with insight into the degree of compliance across all government agencies with existing legislation. Events of September, 2001, however, caused this and several other potential reform-related activities to be pushed to the back burner.

quo within the boundaries of the prevailing political relationship between the Ex- ecutive and the Legislative Branches (Palmer, 2005).

1.2 Overview of the Research Plan

It has been three decades since Heclo identified the phenomenon, "A Gov- ernment of Strangers" (Heclo, 1977a). In his work by the same name, he noted that over the course of every administration, thousands of transient political appointees come to Washington – some with anti-bureaucratic agendas, most planning to get ahead, and some simply hoping to serve. Yet, Heclo notes, "only a few ever appear to succeed . . .," where success is broadly defined as being able to change, or perhaps initiate for the first time, governmental activities in planned and specific ways. Among his many insights, he posed the following rhetorical question that motivated this dissertation: "[W]hy do certain political executives do better than others in leading the bureaucracy?” (Heclo, 1977b).

1.2.1 Motivation behind This Research

There have been a few high profile White House initiatives such as Reinven- tion of Government (Clinton-Gore) and The President’s Management Agenda

(Bush-Cheney), as well as frequent Congressional calls for redesigning (a.k.a.

“fixing”) a range of government processes, yet, despite the passage of more than three decades, Heclo’s question remains essentially unstudied and unanswered.

No White House has ever seen fit to take its own measure of success by assessing the effectiveness of its own appointees.

The group of individuals and organizations having addressed the myriad of aspects of the presidential appointment process is extensive. It includes: journalists (both partisan (Editorial, 2005; Williams, 2002) and non-partisan (Milbank,

2004)), Academics (Gilmour, 2006; Grant, 2004; Lewis, 2007; Michaels, 1997),

Think Tank organizations such as the Brookings Institution and the Heritage

Foundation, former politicians (Kassebaum-Baker, 2001a; Kassebaum-Baker,

2001b) prior cabinet-level appointees (Reich, 1997), and even the Congress itself

(Congress, 1867; Hogue, 2004; Palmer, 2005).

In some cases these dialogues have extended over periods of years, but the focus has been limited almost exclusively to the characteristics of the appointment process rather than on appointees’ performance. None of these advocates for change has ever addressed the core of Heclo's question as it pertains to political appointees’ professional qualifications or their levels of executive effectiveness in their “posts of honor”. The few investigations into appointees have been limited to post facto assessments and analyses and were conducted years after they had left office (Goodsell, 2006; Michaels, 2005). Yet even these studies tend

23 to focus almost exclusively the nature of working relationships between political appointees and the career civil servants whom they are brought in to manage

(Cohen, 1998; Heclo, 1977b; Macy, 1983; Maranto, 2005; Michaels, 1995)

Ours is the first study to investigate those characteristics, both personal and professional, that relate to presidential appointees’ ultimate success during their time in government.

The decision to limit data gathering to one agency was based on three criteria:

• the Department of Energy is large enough that the sample size imparts

significant confidence in results of the survey,

• respondents would be evaluating the same, or similar, appointees, thereby

removing concern for excess variability, and

• having access to a sample population of statistically credible size

1.2.2 The Nature of the Problem

Research into successful job performance, especially in the public sector, is simultaneously context-dependent and highly subjective. Depending on an agency’s mission, success might be narrowly expressed in terms that are financial, medical, organizational, or some other domain-specific terminology. The problem is essentially one of an absence of established success criteria in a governmental setting. Even in those instances where domain-specific standards do

24 exist, the determination and measurement of individuals’ success still remain fundamentally subjective.

It was the subjectivity buried deep within Heclo's question that most influenced the approach and methodology used in this research, i.e., to make the survey instrument highly qualitative and experience-based.

1.2.3 The Problem Statement

This dissertation is an investigation into the following question:

What combination of personal attributes and characteristics, such as education, career experience, training, innate personal qualities, and/or external conditions must political appointees possess in order to be successful as senior government executives? (Heclo, 1977a)

Based on a review of literature and discussions with career SESs as well as academics and practitioners in the field of government and policy, we hypothe- size that:

H1: Successful PAS appointees possess strong leadership and/or managerial

qualifications.

H2: Successful PAS appointees demonstrated commitment to their agency

and its mission.

H3: Successful PAS appointees have prior experience in the public sector.

H4: Appointees’ success is not dependent on their political connections, in-

terests or activities.

H5: Respondents’ answers are independent of any gender bias.

H6: Answers are independent of the time respondents have spent in gov-

ernment service (high consistency across participants based on tenure).

1.2.4 Approach to This Research

In approaching this research, it was necessary to make certain assumptions as well as to define the sample population to be examined in order to explore the problem as stated above.

We assumed the following:

1. Although influenced by prevailing political events, the presidential ap-

pointment process has been sufficiently consistent over the past three dec-

ades to yield comparable data.

2. Any changes to the appointment process have been gradual and evolu-

tionary rather than revolutionary and have had no significant impact on

appointees’ qualifications, average tenure or performance.

3. Appointees’ success (or lack thereof) comes from the abilities they bring to

government, i.e., their accumulated experience, education and innate

abilities.

4. The problem being addressed is highly interdisciplinary

Implications of these assumptions and their potential impacts on this research

are discussed in the analysis of data section. (See CHAPTER 4.) Assumption #4,

however, was the significant driver in determining the scope and bounds of the

Review of Literature (See CHAPTER 2.)

The expert population identified for this research is defined to be the perma-

nent members of the Senior Executive Service (SES). This population was identi-

fied because of its:

1. years’ worth of collective experience working for and with large numbers

of political appointees,

2. role in performing federal agencies’ functions, often in the absence of

permanent political appointees, and

3. multiple perspectives into the job performance of a range of political ap-

pointees, both successful and unsuccessful, over extended time periods.

To answer the problem as stated in §1.2.3, it was determined to draw on the expertise and years’ worth of experience of permanent career government executives, known as careerists or SES employees, and to draw from their firsthand observations of appointees’ patterns, job effectiveness and general characteristics.

Based primarily in greater Washington, DC, there are thousands of careerists, who are responsible for the day-to-day running of federal Departments, Agen-

27 cies and Administrations, etc. comprising the Executive Branch. The permanent members of the SES corps (also referred to as “careerists”) form the critical inter- face between the career bureaucracy made up of GS employees and changing presidential administrations (Refer to Figure 1-3 on page 19.) The permanent

SES corps provides ongoing corporate memory and continuity of government leadership whenever there are changes in administrations, routine appointee turnover, or an absence of confirmed political appointees. Despite the organizational churn, careerists are obliged to remain professionally focused and apolitical despite the comings and goings of their presidentially-appointed bosses.

The research drew on the target population’s unique experience and firsthand observations of the politically-connected individuals who are placed into positions of government authority for what have become short-term assignments according to the standards of the private sector (Cohen, 1986; Nicholls, 1991).

1.3 Approach to the Multi-disciplinary Literature Review

The interdisciplinary nature of the research problem was recognized early in the planning phase of this work (see #4 in §1.2.4) as was the influence this would have on the breadth of the literature review. Therefore, the Review of Literature

(Chapter 2) encompasses works on Government Studies, Public Administration and Organizational Management in the Public Sector.

1.4 Contributions of this research

Our work draws from a select population of senior career civil servants (the experts), aggregates their collective expertise, and essentially builds a profile of the “successful” presidential appointee based on experience rather than sets of official statistics.

1.4.1 Uniqueness of this Work

Based on an extensive review of literature, direct research, and comments from academic reviewers as well as political specialists, it was determined that this work is unique. This is the first time this problem has been investigated and the first survey based on the SES corps in developing a profile of success among presidential appointees. This work is the only attempt to date at answering He- clo’s fundamental question.

1.4.2 Contribution of this Work

Improved efficiency and effectiveness are survival requirements for all organizations. If better decision support information were available to the primary stakeholders of the appointment process (the White House and the Senate), greater numbers of successful appointees could be placed in executive positions of government. This work is intended be a direct contribution toward that goal.

Whatever future redesign or modifications might be made to the presidential

appointment and confirmation processes, they will likely (hopefully) include

more careful screening for those candidates who have a greater likelihood of be-

ing successful in their government assignment. The stakeholders – presidential

administrations, the Senate, potential appointees and the public at large – all

have vested interests in not only streamlining the selection process but also in

improving its outcomes. The status quo is becoming increasingly unacceptable.

The ultimate outcome of this work offers the potential of being a Win-Win scenario in which the White House, the Senate and especially the appointees themselves would be positioned for more successful and effective leadership, and to do so much sooner than the current 8.5 month process cycle. (Refer to

Figure 1-1 on page 14.)

Given that politicians and their appointees come and go, the greatest long- term benefit will accrue to the American public. Even with a reliable process, there will always remain some degree of uncertainty and subjectivity regarding the wisdom of specific appointments; however, without increasing process reliability, doubt will remain at current levels, and the likelihood of confirming

(un)successful appointees will remain dependent on the intrinsic hit-and-miss nature of politics and the individual appointees.

1.5 Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized in the following manner.

Chapter 1 provides the definition of the problem to be investigated as well as establishing the context and setting forth certain assumptions, which were critical to the investigation itself.

Chapter 2 comprises a comprehensive review of literature. The extent of which was dictated by the interdisciplinary nature of the research undertaken by this work. Areas include: Government Studies, Public Administration and Or- ganizational Management in the Public Sector.

Chapter 3 presents our research Methodology.

Chapter 4 contains the survey data and results as well as a discussion of relevant nonparametric statistics and associated analytical techniques.

Chapter 5 presents our conclusions based on our research findings.

Chapter 6 comprises a summary of this project and perspectives on possible future research.

CHAPTER 2

“There is nothing I am so anxious about as good nominations, conscious that the merit as well as reputation of an administration depends as much on that as on its measures.”

Thomas Jefferson (writing to Archibald Stuart, 1801) quoted in (Mackenzie, 2001)

2. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation leads to the review of two distinct sets of literature. Therefore, the review is organized around the theme of

American History and Government Studies with consideration of relevant sub- areas such as the presidency, public administration, civil service, and the process for making presidential appointments. Following a general chronological order, this section begins by establishing historical contexts and concludes with the current state of these topics as they relate to the modeling of successful presidential appointees and improved management in the public sector.

2.1 Government and Public Administration

Presidents, and consequently their administrations, result from the conver-

gence of established law, political processes, historical precedence, and no small

amount of random chance. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution (Article II,

1787) establishes the means for electing the president and vice president. 13

2.1.1 Origins and History of Presidential Appointments

The Constitution explicitly establishes a president’s authority to make political appointments and is thus indisputable; however, the practical details and potential limitations of this authority were periodically challenged as recently as the first quarter of the 20 th century. A president’s power to make appointments, as with many other elements of U S democracy, is explicitly authorized but

13 As originally written, Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provided that electors to cast their votes for presidents only. Under the rule of simple majority, the presidency would go to the candidate who won greatest number of electoral votes and the runner-up would be named vice president. Under the principle of majority winners, the Founders failed to anticipate either the formation or resulting dynamics of national political parties. Thus, when George Washington established the tradition of serving no more than two terms, he inadvertently set the stage for events of the 1796 election. John Adams, who was Washington’s (incumbent) Federalist vice president, won a majority of electoral votes and, hence, the presidency, but Thomas Jefferson, the Democratic-Republican candidate, became his vice president.

The 1800 election revealed further flaws in the original electoral method when Jefferson and Aaron Burr, who were both from the same party, actually tied for the presidency with 73 electoral votes each. The lame-duck House of Representatives, which was still under the control of the Federalists, was constitutionally empowered to break the election tie. Their selection of Thomas Jefferson was more act of denying Burr than affirming Jefferson’s presidency.

The 12 th Amendment to the Constitution was passed by Congress late in 1803 in anticipation of the following year’s election and was ratified by the requisite number of states by June, 1804. The Amendment modified the original procedure for selecting vice presidents by requiring that electors cast separate votes for president and vice president, thereby precluding any reoccur- rences of the 1796 and 1800 election outcomes.

33 broadly, and somewhat incompletely, defined. Article II, Section 2 of the Consti-

tution grants authority to a president, who:

“. . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con- sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . .” [4]

Article II goes on to create an additional gray area with respect to inter- branch sharing of appointment responsibilities and essentially denies Congress

unlimited oversight control stating that,

“. . . the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” (Article II, 1787)

2.1.1.1 Early Use and Misuse of Presidential Appointments

Although Executive and Congressional authorities to appoint and confirm re-

spectively were explicitly set forth constitutionally, a century and a half of politi-

cal wrangling were required before their boundaries were clearly and finally es-

tablished. The Constitution makes “no provision for the removal of executive

officers . . . [which remains] largely at the discretion of the president” (Congress,

2007). The Founders intentionally laid down the structures for democratic gov-

ernance in broad, and sometimes incomplete, terms to ensure both flexibility and

adaptability by leaving the details of implementation for successive generations.

As a result, inter-branch jockeying for control, which occasionally degraded into

direct confrontation, over the right to terminate political appointments began as

early as Washington’s Administration. Vice President John Adams, in his role as

President of the Senate, cast one of his record number 14 of tie-breaking votes in favor of preserving exclusive presidential control over appointees’ terminations

(Congress, 2008b; McCullough, 2001).

The bitterest confrontation over this issue, however, occurred in the period of political upheaval following the Civil War. With the strong backing of Southern

Democrats, Congress successfully overrode a presidential veto in March, 1867, and passed the Tenure of Office Act (Congress, 1867), which stipulated that appointees were to retain in their positions until such time as Congress confirmed a successor. The Act included a provision whereby a president would be allowed to suspend appointees during periods when Congress was not in session but only in cases of “misconduct in office, or crime . . .” Congress’ intent was to limit presidential use of recess appointments – a contentious issue even today – by requiring post facto Senate confirmation upon its return to session. Andrew John- son, refusing to cede Executive authority on this issue, vetoed The Tenure of Of- fice Act and despite the congressional override of his veto, removed Secretary of

14 In his capacity as President of the Senate, John Adams cast more tie-breaking votes than any other vice president in U S history. Although Adam’s biographer, David McCullough places the count at 31, the Senate Historian places it at only 29. By either count, Vice President John Ad- ams holds this record.

War Edwin Stanton from his position while Congress was in summer recess. 15

Within three days of its return, the House passed Articles of Impeachment against Johnson, who survived removal from office by just a single vote. Con- gress was effectively blocked from interfering in Johnson’s removal of Secretary

Stanton; however, the fundamental issue of authority remained unresolved.

Subsequent presidents complained but never directly challenged the Senate, and

The Tenure of Office Act remained in force for another 20 years until it was re- pealed in 1887 during Grover Cleveland’s administration.

Six decades after Andrew Johnson’s confrontation, Congress, in 1926, used a similar line of reasoning to mount another legal challenge to the Executive’s exclusive authority to remove appointees in Meyers v. United States (Meyers v.

United States, 1926). The case went to the Supreme Court 16 , which, in a 6 – 3 decision, ruled in favor of President Wilson’s right to remove the Post Master Gen- eral without seeking the approval of Congress. In 1931, the Court again clearly and definitively limited Congress’ role to one of advise and consent with respect

15 Under The Tenure of Office Act, presidential authority to remove appointees was limited to periods when Congress was not in session and then only in cases where evidence indicated individuals had acted illegally. The issue was further complicated by the law’s wording that stated Cabinet Secretaries “. . . shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the Presi- dent by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter . . .” Therefore, strictly speaking, Edwin Stanton might not have been entitled to job protection for more than 30 days into Andrew Johnson’s administration since he was originally appointed by Lincoln.

16 The majority opinion in favor of the Executive was written by then Chief Justice, and former President, William Howard Taft.

to unconfirmed nominees only in United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932) 17 by ruling the Senate was not empowered to withdraw its consent “once a nominee had been installed in office” (Macy, 1983).

Washington published his farewell address to the American people in Sep- tember, 1796, thereby removing himself from consideration in the upcoming election. With this one act, he established the tradition of presidencies being limited to two terms. 18 Washington also expressed concern over the formation of

political parties and the battle lines associated with partisan politics, noting that

political parties “ . . . serve to organize faction; to give an artificial and extraordi-

nary force . . . [ and to promote] in place of the delegated will of the nation, the

will of a party . . .” (Washington, 1796). Ferling (Ferling, 2004) states that despite

grave concerns, Washington remained politically neutral during the election of

17 This case centered on President Hoover’s nomination and appointment of George Otis Smith as Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, whom the Senate confirmed on December 20, 1930 by a vote of 38 to 22 (with 35 abstentions). The Presidential Letter of Appointment was officially delivered to the nominee, who accepted and was properly sworn in two days later. When the Senate reconvened after it’s Christmas break, a motion was passed to revoke its previous confirmation, but the President refused to acquiesce to the Senate by removing Mr. Smith, thereby setting in motion another legal showdown between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress could neither interfere with confirmed appointees nor attempt to paralyze the functioning of the Executive by politicizing the appointment process post confirmation.

For a full legal discussion and summary of this case, see http://supreme.justia.com/us/286/6/case.html

18 The 22 nd Amendment to the Constitution was passed by Congress in March, 1947 and was finally ratified by the requisite number of states by February, 1951. The Amendment codified Washington’s tradition of the two-term presidency. This did not apply to Truman and the 1952 election; however, it ensured that presidents thereafter, even in time of war, could never repeat Franklin Roosevelt’s four presidential runs.

1796 allowing democracy to take its natural course. Political neutrality, he be-

lieved, was something all retiring presidents ought to practice and accordingly,

Washington endorsed no candidate. Nor did he exert any other political influ-

ence in what was the first true presidential election 19 that pitted Federalists John

Adams and Thomas Pickney against Democratic-Republicans Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr. As previously noted, the 1796 election resulted in a politically split administration: Adams won the presidency and Jefferson became vice president.

Presidential biographers tend to write about facts and events but often avoid analysis of issues that are politically significant – particularly with respect to executive appointments. Although remembered primarily as the second U S Presi- dent, John Adams has several “firsts” to his credit; he was the first person elected vice president (twice) and, thus, served as the first president of the Senate. He went on to become the first candidate to win a truly competitive election (see footnote 19) , the first sitting president to lose a bid for re-election, the first to see his son elected to the office, and the first (and only) Federalist candidate ever elected to the presidency. Many authors, including Thomas Jefferson, claim that

19 Although other candidates had run in the elections of 1789 and 1792, these were effectively con- tests to decide the vice presidency only, given that Washington’s presidency was a forgone conclusion. As set forth in the Constitution, Washington turned the office over to his elected successor in March, 1796, thereby effecting the first orderly transfer of presidential authority. He had completed the first cycle of the Founders’ vision of American democracy.

38 another of Adams’ firsts was his (ab)use of presidential appointment authority for political purposes during his final days in office: specifically, he filled 26 lifetime appointments to circuit judgeships, which had just been created by the lame-duck Federalist Congress. Ferling , in one of two biographical works focused on Adams, states the outgoing president was working hard to clean up any pending issues in the waning hours of his administration by filling these positions – an entirely legal act – and that there was no personal malice intended toward his successor (Ferling, 1992). McCullough, in another biographical work, also reduces these homestretch appointments to a bureaucratic non-issue on the part of Adams (McCullough, 2001); however, he demonstrates through subsequent correspondence between Abigail Adams and then-President Thomas Jef- ferson, that the latter had taken the issue of appointing the “midnight judges” as a personal affront rather than simply his predecessor’s legal, if not “extreme,” use of presidential appointment authority. 20 Diggins on the other hand down- plays this issue entirely and takes an analytical approach to events between Ad- ams and Jefferson in considering another of Adams’ final appointments (Diggins,

2003): that of Secretary of State John Marshall to be Chief Justice, which, Diggins

20 Although two of the judges appointed by Adams in the last weeks of his presidency were relatives, no objections were raised on that basis. Rather, both McCullough and Ferling state that objections at the time were politically based along party lines since all midnight appointees were Federalists, whom the lame-duck, Federalist-controlled Congress rushed to confirm prior to Jef- ferson’s inauguration. A year later, after the Democratic-Republicans had taken control of both Congress and the White House, these positions were abolished, and the “midnight judges” became immediately unemployed.

39 asserts, turned out to be one of the outstanding achievements of the Adams

Presidency 21 , with effects reaching into the 21 st century.

2.1.1.2 A Neutral and Competent Bureaucracy

Although the Constitution empowers a President to appoint Ambassadors,

Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, other Officers of the United States, etc., the Founders provided no clear guidance when it came to staffing the government’s bureaucratic ranks. An apt characterization of government’s process for the first 100 years of the Republic can be summarized in two words: Partisanship and Patronage. Several authors (Feltzenberg, 2001; Mackenzie, 2001; Wilentz,

2005; Lee, 2005) ascribe the institutionalization of presidential patronage to An- drew Jackson and the Spoils System. Maranto (Maranto, 2005) states that Jack- son consciously decided to employ partisanship and patronage in the 1830s, rather than personal connections or merit, as the basis for staffing the bureaucracy in order, as Jackson himself stated, to “break up the permanent Washington

21 John Marshall, who was a distant relative of Thomas Jefferson, served briefly as Secretary of State under Adams before his nomination and unanimous Senate confirmation to be Chief Jus- tice. By his choice, Marshall served out his term as Secretary of State and only assumed the position of Chief Justice on the day of Jefferson’s inauguration.

Diggins suggests the consequences of Adams’ appointment of Marshall to the Supreme Court are visible even today. As the longest serving Chief Justice (1801 – 1835) in the court’s history, he instituted the practice of handing down a single majority opinion of the court, accommodated the dissenting point of view in written form, and established Judicial Review , i.e., the Court’s authority to rule on the constitutionality of legislation passed by Congress ( Marbury v. Madison, 1803) . It was the Marshall Court that cemented the balance of power among the three Branches of the government.

establishment.” Wilentz (Wilentz, 2005) observes that Jackson did not originate

this specific (mis)use of the federal hiring process as a means of gaining control

over the ranks of civilian employees; rather, he simply extended to the national

government a practice that had been occurring as a matter of course at the state

and local levels dating back to the presidencies of Washington and Adams. Po-

litical bosses at the local levels recognized early on that the prospect of jobs with

secure incomes was a highly effective means of securing votes. Mackenzie

(Mackenzie, 2001) states, however, that somewhat “less than a quarter of all ap-

pointees . . . [were actually] dismissed to make way for Jacksonian spoilsmen.”

Even though Maranto estimates as many as a third of all career incumbents were

swept out of office at any one time, he goes on to claim that “. . . on the federal

level, the spoils system got a bum rap” when compared to the excesses occurring

at the local level (Maranto, 2005). Ferrara and Ross (Ferrara) recount Jackson’s justification at the time – namely, that the spoils approach to staffing the national

government would preclude the establishment of a class of “governing elite” that

was characteristic of European monarchical governments.

For the greater part of the 19 th century, Pfiffner (Pfiffner, 2000) writes, “staffing [the ranks] of the federal government was largely conducted by presidential administrations on the basis of political loyalty,” thereby establishing the Spoils

System as the de facto national standard for hiring. Michaels (Michaels, 1997)

asserts that as a matter of simple practicality, this staffing approach was doomed

to become decreasingly tenable over the long haul due to the increasing complex-

ity of the country itself resulting from rapid westward expansion Thus, as the

nation grew, the national government was forced to do so as well. Along with

record rates of growth, a pattern of semi-synchronous disruptions in bureau-

cratic functions due to significant turnover of personnel at all levels of the federal bureaucracy resulted from a combination of the spoils system, national elections,

and the short or truncated presidencies that define much of the national govern-

ment during the 19 th century. 22

There were sporadic attempts to reform the process of staffing the federal bu-

reaucracy – including a significant initiative that passed Congress in 1871, to

which President Grant responded by merely authorizing a study of possible

guidelines relating to civil service reform. Unfortunately, it wasn’t until the as-

sassination of James Garfield a decade later by Charles Guiteau, a frustrated

seeker of patronage and self-avowed Stalwart 23 that sufficient Congressional im-

22 In the 32 years between Jackson’s leaving office 1837 and the start of Grant’s 1 st term in 1869, a total of eleven men assumed the presidency. During that period only Lincoln was elected twice, but served less than a month of his 2 nd term before being assassinated. In a 32 year span approximately a century later, from 1932 to 1964, only five men became president and formed new administrations.

23 The Republican Party was fiercely divided over the issue of Civil Service reform. The Stalwart wing of the party advocated the retention of spoils and patronage as a victor’s political right while the more moderate Half-Breeds favored reform. Garfield was a compromise candidate from the reformist camp, who narrowly beat out, among other candidates, former President Ulysses S. Grant in his attempt at a third nomination. To maintain party unity, Garfield selected as his running mate Chester A. Arthur, who came from the Stalwart wing of the party. After

petus existed to pass The Pendleton Act in 1883. With this legislation, Congress

mandated the creation of a bipartisan Civil Service Commission (CSC) and

charged it with implementing a merit-based system to replace the entrenched

Jacksonian staffing model. The National Archives and Records Administration

states that when this law went into effect in 1884 “only 10 percent of the govern-

ment’s [then] 132,000 employees were covered . . . [as compared to the] more

than 90 percent” of today’s 2 million civilian employees who are covered.

Ronald Johnson cited in (Brook, 2000), takes the long view rather than a reac-

tive one stating the motivation behind passage of The Pendleton Act was truly to

depoliticize the bureaucracy and serve the public interest by ensuring that future

civilian employees would only be “hired on the basis of merit, promoted within

the [orderly] framework of civil services rules . . [and explicitly prohibited from being ] . . . involved in political campaigns . . .” Congress’ two-fold intent, ac-

cording to Pfiffner (Pfiffner, 2000), was to establish a bureaucracy based “on abil-

ity rather than partisan affiliation and [to ensure] that there would be no partisan

interference with merit system personnel decisions.” Michaels (Michaels, 1997) believes The Pendleton Act has even broader political implications in that it both

Garfield’s assassination, President Arthur surprised both supporters and opponents when he signed The Pendleton Act in 1883 thereby effectively ending the Stalwart vs. Half-Breed schism within the party.

“strengthened the separation of powers and furthered the development of the

administrative state.”

Another six decades were to pass before the civil service was finally and offi-

cially grounded in the principle of “neutral competence” with the passage of The

Hatch Act 24 in 1939. This legislation prohibits federal employees from involvement – whether voluntary or involuntary – in any partisan political activity.

Hugh Heclo (Heclo, 1999b) points out that in theory, bureaucrats who are both neutral and competent should consistently be able to provide their “. . . cooperation and best independent judgment of the issues to partisan bosses . . . and do so for a succession of partisan leaders.” Unfortunately, Post World War II administrations, most notably those of Nixon, Carter and Reagan, and Bush II have tended to complain that a “neutral” bureaucracy is a non-responsive one despite its competence. Starting with Roosevelt’s, all administrations have explored various ways of managing, influencing, utilizing and, at times, even intimidating career civil servants.

Michaels (Michaels, 1997) theorizes that the separation of powers may, para- doxically, be one of the root causes of the non-responsiveness so often bemoaned by modern administrations. Notwithstanding the six decades that passed be-

24 It is mandatory that today’s federal employees take annual ethics training courses, a major component of which includes legal guidance on the interpretation of, and penalties for breaching, the requirements of The Hatch Act. Another component of this training addresses the general topic of political neutrality by federal employees – both in and out of the work place.

tween enactment of the Pendleton and Hatch Acts, the combined effect was that

Congress, with the requisite backing from the Courts, established clear limita-

tions on the Executive’s ability to manipulate the professional bureaucracy for its

political advantage. Since initial passage of The Hatch Act, there have been two

significant legal challenges; however, in both instances, the Supreme Court has

sided with Congress reaffirming both the legality and desirability of maintaining

a politically neutral bureaucracy .25 With the benefit of hindsight, however, it should be noted that what was initially perceived as a bounding of prerogative might better be viewed as having liberated chief executives from burdensome administrative activities thereby enabling them to focus more clearly on what their presidencies could become.

The Founders never articulated a conscious design for a permanent national bureaucracy, but centuries of political evolution along with periodic assistance from the Legislative and Judicial Branches ultimately gave shape to the career- based layer of government. The formation of a (theoretically) apolitical bureaucracy where the roles, rules and relationships between the permanent (bureau-

25 The 1 st Amendment right to free speech served as the basis of United Public Workers v. Mitchell in 1947 and also in Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers in 1973, which challenged the legality of The Hatch Act. Both cases were unsuccessful in Supreme Court.

For a full legal discussion and summary of United Public Workers v. Mitchell , see http://supreme.justia.com/us/330/75/case.html

For a full legal discussion and summary of Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carrier , see http://supreme.justia.com/us/413/548/case.html

45 cratic) and transient (elected or appointed) layers of government are well-defined and respected remains just that: a theoretical goal. Cohen and Eimicke (Cohen,

2002), in describing public service at the state and municipal-level administration, point out that as a practical matter public sector managers must struggle continuously to balance needs on one hand to protect government employees from arbitrary or politically-motivated actions with their responsibility, on the other hand, to discipline as needed employees for poor performance. West

(West, 2005) provides a comprehensive discussion of the history and challenges in making neutral competence work in the federal workplace. For a scholarly analysis of neutral competence at the Bureau of Budget during FDR’s administration, see the case study of Dickinson and Rudalevige (Dickinson, 2004).

2.1.2 The Modern Presidency

Presidential scholars agree the Modern Presidency, with its characteristic increase in Executive authority, assertiveness and control, is rooted in the administration of Franklin Roosevelt (Rozell, 1997; Burke, 2000a; Pfiffner, 1999a;

Michaels, 1997), although individual examples of expanding presidential power can clearly be found in the earlier administrations of Teddy Roosevelt and

Woodrow Wilson. The authority of the presidency grew in fits and starts from

Washington’s through Hoover’s administrations, but from FDR’s forward, “the

46 office and its power have grown steadily” (Cronin, 2003). Starting with FDR’s second term, the power shift along Pennsylvania Avenue, away from Congress toward the White House, has been relatively continuous if occasionally subtle.

As a result, the de facto institutionalization of significantly more powerful modern presidencies has occurred (Abshire, 2001). Consequently, other shifts resulted from modifications made to the bureaucratic structure of office of the president; these take the form of increased presidential controls over policymaking as well as the staff support needed for fully directing the processes of selecting and screening thousands of political appointees – all of whom ultimately impact the permanent bureaucracy, Congress and, to some extent, even the Courts.

When Franklin Roosevelt came to the presidency in 1933, the country was in the depths of the Great Depression: millions were homeless, the national banking system was imploding, farming and food production were in crisis, and neither President Hoover nor his administration nor the Congress had been successful in stopping the three year downward slide. 26 It was within this context that

Franklin Roosevelt set about organizing his administration in ways that turned

26 October 29, 1929 is commonly referred to as Black Tuesday, the day the stock market crashed. In fact, this was the third of four trading days over which the New York Stock Exchange lost 40% of its value. President Hoover spent much of 1930 and 1931 issuing reassuring statements saying the worst was over, and that the country had turned the corner. On November 8, 1932, FDR won the presidency in a resounding victory taking 42 of the 48 states based on promises of reform and recovery.

out markedly different from the traditional and somewhat simpler ones of his

predecessors.

FDR’s style and approach to the presidency were direct. His strategy was to

drive rather than respond to or accommodate either the Congress or political

parties. Burke (Burke, 2000a) states Roosevelt “…was creative in his proposals to bring the nation out of depression, crafty in his dealings with Congress, and re-

assuring in his building public of support.” Hoover described him as “a chame-

leon on plaid” (Rubenzer, 2004). Burns asserts that as a new president “FDR en-

tered the office with no set program or even a definite philosophy;” rather, he

relied on instinct, flexibility and pragmatism in determining what worked

(Burns, 2001) – this in order to deliver on his campaign promises for “action, and

action now.” LBJ said Roosevelt “was the only person [he] ever knew – any-

where – who was never afraid” (Rubenzer, 2004).

Roosevelt redesigned the presidency and in so doing raised the country’s lev-

els of respect for and expectations of the Executive. With his activist approach to

government and direct communication via radio addresses, Roosevelt the presi-

dent “became the most visible landmark on the political landscape standing for

the Federal Government in the minds of many Americans” (Greenstein, 2004;

Alter, 2006). Naturally, by involving the presidency in both the formulation

and execution of policy, “pressures mounted to increase the size and profession-

48 alism of the president’s staff” (Milkis, 2008), but the political conditions were not entirely right until after his landslide reelection in 1936, at which time he named a blue ribbon Committee on Administrative Management, to evaluate and rec- ommend improvements for organizing the White House more effectively. The

White House organization that Hoover handed over in 1933 had consisted of thirty-seven people, only nine of whom held professional rank and three were secretaries “assigned to handle appointments, press, and correspondence. . . .The government Roosevelt inherited had neither the structure nor the personnel to deal with the most serious economic crisis in the nation’s history” (Hess, 2002).

FDR’s first term was, for the most part, taken up with domestic crises, but he instinctively recognized that unless the Executive were overhauled, the traditional configuration would be “inadequate to meet the needs of a vast, growing industrial nation destined to become a global superpower” (Bonafede, 1987).

The Committee on Administrative Management, also known as the

Brownlow Committee 27 , unequivocally concluded that “…the President needs

27 Louis Brownlow headed the three member committee. Brownlow had a distinguished career in public administration, having named by Woodrow Wilson as Commissioner for the District of Columbia in 1915. Later, in the 1920s, he went on to serve terms as City Manager in Petersburg, VA and Knoxville, TN. In 1931, he was named Director of the Public Administration Clearing House at the University of Chicago – a post he held until his retirement in 1945. His seven vol- ume diary covering the period from November, 1933 through December, 1936 is held in the Special Collections Research Center at the University of Chicago Library. The other committee members were Charles E. Merriam, professor and researcher of Political Science who had also served as an advisor to President Hoover, and Luther Gulick, a specialist in Public Administra- tion from Columbia University.

49 help,” which led to Congress’ approving and funding the creation of the Execu- tive Office of the President (EOP). According to Milkis and Nelson (Milkis,

2008), the committee envisioned a new organizational structure “ . . . staffed by loyal and energetic presidential aides” handpicked by the president and completely independent of both, political bosses and even the bureaucracy to be the most effective organizational construct. In addition to establishing the EOP, the

Bureau of the Budget, which was the predecessor of today’s powerful Office of

Management and Budget, was transferred from inside the Department of the

Treasury and integrated into the expanding purview of the White House itself

(Greenstein, 2004). It was the Committee’s other recommendations, however, strongly championed by FDR, that set off a political confrontation between Con- gress and the Executive that continued until the third year of Roosevelt’s second term. The first controversy was over the complete reorganization “… of the more than one hundred agencies then in existence [which were to] be integrated into twelve major departments . . . under the authority of the president” (Milkis,

2008), and second was to have “the functions for the Civil Service Commission transferred to the White House” (Hess, 2002; Burke, 2000a). FDR won the first political battle and the right to consolidate the fragmented organizational structure in a more logical way. Had he also prevailed on the Civil Service issue as

well, he would have succeeded in effectively nullifying The Pendleton Act and

significantly threatening the spirit of The Hatch Act.

2.1.3 Organizing Presidential Administrations

Roosevelt established a political dynamic that turned out to be as far reaching as any laid down by the Founders – one that has been a significant issue for all

Modern Administrations. With the passage of the Reorganization Act in 1939,

Congress handed the Executive a blank check in the form of a vague law to be implemented on the honor system. Warshaw states, “The responsibilities of the

White House staff and even their titles would be left totally to the president,” and FDR shrewdly chose to increase the numbers on his staff who would help him define policy and shift that role away from the Senate-confirmed cabinet officers (Warshaw, 1996). Warshaw also believes this formed the basis for the competitive dynamic that exists between every president’s White House Staff and the Cabinet.

Presidential management styles and the ways in which they organize their administrations have been studied from several perspectives. Grant (Grant,

2004), Greenstein in (George, 1998a), and Rubenzer and Faschingbauer

(Rubenzer, 2004) state that presidential personalities are an often overlooked when trying to understand the subtlety and significance of differing organiza-

51 tional structures across various administrations. Grant argues that the combination of presidential personality and major current events, such as economic crises, significant challenges or wars, can shape an administration’s characteristics as well as its modus operandi (Grant, 2004). While historians examine presidential facts, events and actions and impute long-term significance, cognitive psychologists such as George and Stern in (George, 1998b) claim that executives’ preference for processing information is more revealing when it comes to why administrations come to be organized in specific ways. Renshon (Renshon, 1998) suggests that such analysis can serve prior to elections as a useful basis for comparing candidates and predicting the tone of their presidencies.

Burke (Burke, 2000a) asserts each successive administration learns the cumulative lessons of its predecessors when it comes to furthering the institution of the presidency. The uniqueness of each, he claims, is related as much to a president’s personality, quirks and managerial skill as the political considerations and trade offs offered by his most trusted White House aides. According to political scientists Cronin & Genovese (Cronin, 2003), presidents use their cabinets in one of three ways:

• to discuss issues and problems informally as informational exchanges or

brainstorming,

• as an opportunity for focused consideration of specific issues leading to

grounded positions that are used for final decision-making, or

• for summit-like discussions of strategic policy initiatives, which been

honed via department reviews with alternatives and dissenting positions

fully noted.

Eisenhower was the only modern president to implement the second option.

While Carter started out following in Eisenhower’s footsteps, he modified his approach and fell in line with Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Reagan,

Bush and Clinton, who all opted for the first construct. There is no record of any president at any point in our history having implemented the third choice

(Cronin, 2003).

Presidential preferences, whether consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly, determine the ways in which cabinet selections and other appointments are determined, White House staffs are organized, and entire administrations are conducted. Among the modern presidents, external political pressures in the form of Congressional or political party influence have played a greatly diminished role in determining how the executive branch is configured. Origins of the current process used for presidential appointments process originated with the Modern Presidency, evolves with the immediate needs presidents, and is intertwined with the formal development of the White House staff. Today’s

53 presidential appointments process and the bureaucratized staff structure within the White house are the cumulative consequences of the choices and tradeoffs made by the individuals occupying of the Oval Office.

Figure 2-1 Timeline of the Modern Presidency from 1945 to the present

FDR dead, 04/45

Gerald Ford dead, 12/06 Ronald Reagan dead, 06/04 Richard Nixon dead, 04/94 Lyndon Joh nson dead, 01/73 Harry Tr uman dead, 12/72 Dwight Eise nhower dead, 03/69 H. Hoover dead, 10/64 JFK killed, 11/63

Tr u- Eisenhower JFK LBJ Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush Clinton G.W. Bush Obama ma n I

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

2.1.3.1 Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933 – 1945)

Although Franklin Roosevelt was elected to his first term in November, 1932, he did not actually assume the presidency until March 4, 1933. 28 On the day be-

28 On January 23, 1933, Georgia became the 36 th state to ratify the 20 th Amendment to the Consti- tution. This amendment reset the end of a president’s term to noon on January 20 and those of

54 fore and throughout the course of the day of Roosevelt’s inauguration, a nation- wide run on the banks occurred. Within the 48 hour period of March 3 – 4, $500B in liquidity was drained from the US banking system by individuals and businesses, and records show that more than $730B had already been withdrawn the week before (Editorial, 1933). On Saturday, March 5, which was his first full day in office, FDR called Congress back into emergency session from its four-month recess to begin dealing immediately with the nation’s economic and banking crises and an unemployment rate approaching 25%. Despite the fact he did not have a set of fully developed plans when he arrived in Washington (Greenstein,

2004; Alter, 2006), in purely political terms, his taking strong and immediate action contrasted sharply and favorably with Hoover’s failed laissez- faire approach.

With only days on the job, he instinctively recognized the combined political and legislative opportunity afforded him. Between March 5 and June 15 when

Congress adjourned, Roosevelt successfully pressed for passage of a broad range of legislation including: the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission,

Public Works Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Civilian

Conservation Corps, as well as expanded regulatory authority for the Federal

Senators and Congressmen to noon on January 3, thereby shortening the government’s lame duck period. The Amendment did not become effective until October of that year; thus, FDR’s second term, and those of all subsequent presidents, have begun and ended on January 20.

Trade Commission, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Agricultural Ad- justment Administration. Roosevelt’s legislative sprint and his skill at mustering bipartisan support (Greenstein, 1994) occurred in the short period from March 9 through June 16, when Congress adjourned for the summer. Referred to as “the first 100 days” of his presidency, Roosevelt had unknowingly put “a new standard in place for all future presidents to measure themselves against” (Alter,

2006).

In 1935, with the political advantage of a solidly Democratic Congress, Roo- sevelt entered a period that has been defined as FDR’s “Second 100 days” (Burns,

2001). It was then that he delivered fully on his promised of a New Deal with the passage of The National Industrial Recovery Act and the Wagner Act, which later evolved into the National Labor Relations Act. Entering the third year of his presidency, Roosevelt’s legislative crown jewel, however, was signing the So- cial Security Act.

Franklin Roosevelt’s personal and political styles were consistent: expansive, personable, confident, more than a little freewheeling, and highly determined, but above all he enjoyed the thrill of the political game. These same descriptors

apply to the management style he showed over his long tenure in the White

House. Bonafede in (Michaels, 1997) states that FDR “was disdainful of formal

chain-of-command structures, and … insisted on personally controlling the reins

56 of the executive branch.” Maurice Latta “who had been at the White House since the 1890s, said Roosevelt was secretary of every department, and his cabinet officers really were [the] undersecretaries” (Ferrell, 1996). Raymond Moley, who served as one of FDR’s senior policy aides and assisted in organizing his first cabinet (Alter, 2006) stated the president seemed to follow “neither a well- defined purpose nor an underlying principle” in selecting the cabinet (Hess,

2002). The resulting cabinet included liberals, conservatives, a progressive Re- publican and the first woman ever to be appointed to cabinet rank. In 1935 Roo- sevelt nominated a total of 51 individuals to positions requiring Senate confirmation – including judicial assignments (Light, 2002).

Roosevelt was completely at ease with discord and disagreement believing that, when managed correctly, it would produce beneficial results and actually meet his executive needs (George, 1998b; Greenstein, 2004). He knew instinctively how to blend just the right amount of charm and manipulation to advance a cause (Donovan, 1996); and when and how to orchestrate stressful and even confrontational situations among his staff and cabinet by assigning the same task to multiple people, “which put him in the position of judge of everyone’s performance, so that officials often competed to win his favor” (Winter, 2002). He once confided to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins that he believed, “A little ri-

57 valry is stimulating. It keeps everybody going to prove he is a better fellow than the next man. It keeps them honest…” (Doyle, 1999; Hess, 2002).

Figure 2-2 The Competitive Model (FDR) 29

As President, Roosevelt adhered consistently to a competitive model of management and made it work successfully in administering both an expanding

White House staff and a growing number of cabinet appointees. George and

Stern (George, 1998b) characterize the Competitive model as one in which:

• Competition and conflict are deliberately encouraged via overlapping

and/or ambiguous assignments,

• Ranges of responsibility are vaguely and/or redundantly defined,

29 This diagram appears as figure 6.1 in Presidential Personality and Performance , edited by Alexander and Juliette George, and is included here with the publisher’s permission.

• The president directly solicits advice and information from cabinet offi-

cers’ staffs,

• Competing advisers are forced to bring policy problems to the executive

for resolution (i.e., advisers hold only limited authority), and

• The president, partially to avoid overload, selectively declines to settle in-

tracabinet debates, insisting that subordinates work it out and then pro-

pose resolution(s).

Roosevelt demanded much of himself physically, intellectually and politi-

cally, and he expected no less of those who worked for him. He expanded the

Office of the President, laid the foundation for a focused supporting staff struc-

ture, and occupied the presidency longer than any other president.

FDR served from March 4, 1933 until his death on April 12, 1945. During his

time in office, he made a total of 25 cabinet-level appointments including naming

the first woman, Frances Perkins, to a cabinet position. (See Appendix E –

Women Appointed to Cabinet Positions on page 510for the complete list.)

2.1.3.2 Harry S. Truman (1945 – 1953)

Presidential Style & Personality:

Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, clinical and forensic psychologists, conducted a groundbreaking investigation using 120 experts to assess presidential personality

(Rubenzer, 2004). In classifying and predicting presidential job performance, they found that Washington, Truman and Eisenhower scored highest in the area of Ethics on the Job; while Nixon, Harding and Grant were judged the least ethical. Criteria included:

1. Self-discipline: Avoiding vices in office,

2. Compliance with the constitution and current laws,

3. Adherence with appropriate rules and procedures,

4. Avoiding exploitation of other nations or groups of people, and

5. Avoiding unethical behavior

Harry Truman had gone to the 1944 convention intending to nominate another senator for the vice presidency (Donovan, 1996); Roosevelt, however, needed a running mate who would not split the party. His then one-term vice president, Henry A. Wallace, had proven too liberal for the national political mood at the time, and the other serious contender, Senator James Byrnes, was a conservative southern senator who was highly unpopular with the labor unions

(Truman, 1997; Greenstein, 2004). Thus, Senator Truman of Missouri was a last minute compromise merely because FDR perceived him to be non-problematic and sufficiently acceptable to the electorate.

Harry S. Truman was the antithesis of the patrician Roosevelt in almost every way: a plain-talking, highly practical, everyday man from the Midwest, whose

60 approach to politics was always direct bordering on the blunt rather than smooth and calculated (McCullough, 2003). Truman not only lacked an Ivy League pedigree, but he is also the only the 20 th century president not to have attended college (Pika, 2005). He had been a late comer to local politics and certainly never aspired to the presidency.

Late on the afternoon of April 12, 1945, Harry Truman was instructed to go quickly and discretely to the White House. He suspected the president had, perhaps for security reasons, come back to Washington unannounced (Truman,

1997). At the White House he was met by Eleanor Roosevelt, who informed him that the president was dead. After reflexively asking what he might do for her, she responded, “Is there anything we can do for you? For you are the one in trouble now.” (Leuchtenburg, 2001)

Presidential Transition:

There was no transition from Roosevelt’s to Truman’s administration. Harry

Truman came to the office with no preparation, no agenda and no support staff

(Donovan, 1996; Ferrell, 1996). More precisely, perhaps, the Presidency came to him after only 82 days as the new vice president. During that time Truman had met with Roosevelt only twice outside of cabinet sessions (Milkis, 2008;

Leuchtenburg, 2001), and even though World War II was coming to a critical turning point, Roosevelt had, in characteristic fashion, withheld vital information

61 from his vice president. Truman was barely aware of the existence of the United

States’ top secret nuclear weapons program known as the Manhattan Project

(Donovan, 1996; Greenstein, 2004; Alter, 2006; Grant, 2004) and had been left in the dark as to what discussions and agreements had been made with Churchill and Stalin at The Yalta Conference more than a month earlier (Greenstein, 2004).

Vice President Truman inherited the presidency as well as his predecessor’s intact administration, which included an established White House staff, seasoned

Cabinet Secretaries and incomplete plans for post-war recovery.

If anything can be said of Truman’s First 100 Days, it is that he spent the time having to learn what everyone around him already knew and deciding how best to organize his administration. He was forced to train on the job by spending the first month in intense briefing sessions with FDR’s appointees and military experts.

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

Within minutes of taking the oath of office, Truman met with the cabinet secretaries, all of whom had assembled at the White House for the hasty swearing in ceremony, and asked them to remain in their posts for the sake of the country

(Truman, 1997) . He barely knew any of them, and in the case of Edward Stettin- ius, he had not even met the Secretary of State before that night (McCullough,

2003; Leuchtenburg, 2001) . Truman assured them all there would be no whole-

sale changes in replacements, but he was clear in his expectations: they were to

speak their minds freely and feel comfortable disagreeing with him in meetings, but they were expected to support him fully once decisions had been made

(Truman, 1997).

Truman knew that in order to be successful he needed to structure his ad-

ministration very differently from that of his predecessor – most especially in the

way in which the cabinet operated. He believed a “… cabinet is not merely a col-

lection of executives administering different governmental functions but a body

whose combined judgment the president uses to develop fundamental policies of

the administration” (Cronin, 2003) – much the way a corporate board of directors

supports a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Michaels, 1997). In his appointments

diary for May 18, 1945, Truman relates how he conveyed his expectation to the

Cabinet Secretaries:

I told the Cabinet members a story about President Lincoln – when he was discussing the [emancipation] proclamation – every member of his Cabinet opposed him … they voted No – that is very well, [but] the President voted Yes – that is the way I intend to run this.” (Truman, 1997)

A review of Truman’s inherited cabinet (see Table 1) reveals some of the secretar-

ies had worked with Roosevelt, and each other, for more than a decade. 30 They knew their jobs, the administration, and the bureaucracy far better than the new president did. Above all, Truman knew he needed to establish his own leadership in order to make the presidency his rather than Roosevelt’s fourth term

(Hess, 2002). Unlike Roosevelt who generally worked around the Secretaries as much as he worked with them, Truman determined to work intensively with the cabinet as a whole. Toward that end, Truman “held weekly cabinet luncheons as well as formal cabinet meetings” at the White House (Donovan, 1996).

Greenstein states Truman was more direct in dealing with his appointees, but he also presumed that “cabinet secretaries battled for their departments’ programs and constituencies … So he too conducted serious business outside the formal cabinet meetings…” (Greenstein, 1994).

The cabinet secretaries found it very difficult to adjust to the realities of change brought about by the unexpected presidential transition (Leuchtenburg,

2001). Casual examination of Table 1 below reveals that ten months into Tru- man’s presidency only two of Roosevelt’s cabinet appointees were still in their original jobs.

30 Henry Wallace had served as Secretary of Agriculture from 1933 to 1940 and then as vice president from 1941 to 1945. FDR felt the ticket would be stronger with a noncontroversial running mate, so Truman was substituted as a running mate. In return for stepping aside, Roosevelt named Wallace to be the Secretary of Commerce.

Table 1: Truman's Inherited Cabinet

Department Appointed by FDR Served Appointed by Truman Served Treasury H. Morge nthau 01/01/34 – F. Vinson 07/23/45 – 07/22/45 06/23/46 State H. Stettinius 12/0 1/44 – J. Byrnes 07/03/45 – 06/27/45 01/21/47 War H. Stimson 07/10/40 – R. Patte rson 09/27/45 – 09/21/45 07/18/47 Navy J. Forrestal 05/19/44 – (Navy Depar tment 09/17/47 merged into DoD) Justice A. Biddle 08/26/41 – T. Clar k 06/17/45 – 06/26/45 07/26/49 Post Office F. Walker 09/10/40 – R. Hann egan 05/08/45 – 05/07/45 12/16/47 Interior H. Ickes 03/04/33 – J. Krug 03/18/46 – 02/15/46 12/01/49 Agriculture C. Wickard 09/05/40 – C. Anderson 06/30/45 – 06/29/45 05/10/48 Commerce Henry A. Wallace 03/02/45 – A. Harriman 10/07/46 – 09/20/46 04/22/48 Labor F. Perkins 03/04/33 – L. Schwelle nbach 07/01/45 – 06/30/45 06/10/48

In his diary, Truman speaks bluntly and discusses each secretary as well as

the conditions of his (or her) departure. For Truman’s opinion of various secre-

taries and appointees see his unsent letter to Jonathan Daniels 31 in (Truman,

1997) .

31 Daniels served briefly as FDR’s press secretary starting in 1945 and stayed on to serve Harry Truman in that capacity. In an unsent letter dated February 26, 1950, Truman writes:

“There was Stettinius, Sec. of State – a fine man, good looking, amiable, cooperative, but never an idea old or new; Morgenthau, block head, nut – I wonder why FDR kept him around. Maybe you know. He fired himself from my cabinet by threatening what he’d do to me under certain circumstances. Then there was Stimson, a real man – honest, straightforward and a statesman sure enough. Francis Biddle, attorney general – you make your own analysis… Miss Perkins, Sec. of Labor, a grand lady – but no politician … Henry Wallace, Sec. of Com-

Ferrell (Ferrell, 1996) states even “Roosevelt in his last year had admitted [the cabinet] was an inadequate group” but he was “too ill to do much about it … even if so inclined.” On May 23, 1945, just six weeks into his presidency, Truman held a routine press conference, in which he announced the resignations of At- torney General Biddle, Secretary of Labor Perkins, and Secretary of Agriculture

Wickard. See Doyle for a verbatim transcript of this press announcement (Doyle,

1999).

According to Neustadt in (Donovan, 1996), Truman functioned as his own chief of staff, which was feasible since at its peak, the total White House staff never exceeded thirteen. The president held morning staff meetings where he gave the instructions of the day similar to the management approach he had learned as an artillery commander in World War I. Truman was the only president who met personally with his staff on a daily basis throughout his entire time in the White House (Patterson, 2000) and, thus, was completely accessible to staff and Cabinet Officers .

merce, who had no reason to love me or to be loyal to me. Of course he wasn’t loyal. “Honest” Harold Ickes who was never for anyone but Harold would have cut F.D.R.’s throat – or mine for … a headline – and did. Agriculture’s Wickard, a nice man, who never learned how his department was set up….but, Jonathan, there was not a man in the list who would talk frankly at a Cabinet Meeting! The honest ones were afraid to, and the others wanted to fool me . . . Poor Forrestal … never could make a decision.” (Truman, 1997)

Jones asserts Truman had three cabinets (Jones, 2005): one he inherited from

Roosevelt, the one he replaced FDR’s with, and finally one wholly his own after the 1948 election. In assembling the second, intermediate cabinet Truman drew heavily from the ranks of “sub-cabinet and ambassadorial talent” cultivated during FDR’s presidency (Jones, 2005), and after that he “sought people long on experience in the departments and even chose a career bureaucrat to supervise the

Post Office” (Hess, 2002) – a plum appointment that had gone traditionally to a well-connected politico or even the chairman of the national party.

FDR began architecting the Modern Presidency early in his first administration, and its permanence was assured by the time of his death; however, speciali- zation of White House Staff by functions originated with Truman (Burke, 2000a;

Hess, 2002; Pfiffner, 1999a). As late as the middle of the 20 th century, slightly more than 100 cabinet and subcabinet appointees connected the president to the permanent bureaucracy (Weko, 1995). The first White House personnel office was established under Truman’s staffer Donald Dawson and performed two basic functions:

• to establish an orderly process to support presidential staffing, and

• to compile and maintain a list of names of qualified candidates for ap-

pointment (including those of career civil servants) (Bonafede, 1987;

Macy, 1983).

Truman’s Management Model:

As President, Truman adopted the “formalistic” model of managing his cabi-

nets. (Compare Truman’s Formalistic Model below to FDR’s Competitive Model on page 58.)

Figure 2-3 The Formalistic Model (Truman) 32

George and Stern (George, 1998b) characterize this model as one in which:

• Vital information flows directly from cabinet officers and advisers to the

president,

• Each cabinet officer is viewed as a “functional expert”

• Each cabinet officer receives and synthesizes information from his subor-

dinates,

• The president respects the formal channels of communication,

32 This diagram appears as figure 6.2 in Presidential Personality and Performance , edited by Alexander and Juliette George, and is included here with the publisher’s permission.

• Joint policy analysis and problem solving between cabinet officers is dis-

couraged (peer-to-peer communication),

• President seldom (if ever) goes around cabinet officers to subordinates,

• President takes responsibility for final recommendations and all out-

comes.

Summary:

Perhaps because of the sudden and unprepared way in which he came to the

Oval Office, or simply because his sense of orderliness made it seem right, Harry

Truman took on responsibilities and set presidential precedents that are still observed decades later. Congress passed legislation creating the National Security

Council (NSC), and thereby mandated that the president coordinate national security policy, foreign policy, intelligence gathering and defense policy (Pika,

2005). Truman saw this as an infringement on presidential prerogative, but in

1949, he opted to ensure greater continuity of government by having vice presidents “made a statutory member of the National Security Council … [and unlike his own experience as vice president, they] receive full national security briefings” (Milkis, 2008) as a routine part of their responsibilities.

He also assumed the responsibility for assisting his successor with the transition of presidential power, thereby establishing another precedent. According to

Laurin Henry in (Kumar, 2003d) he felt, “…the outgoing President is expected …

to establish a pattern of conduct for his entire administration.” Truman also

mandated that each cabinet-level Agency report its activities in support of the

transition to the incoming administration (Smith, 2007).

On election night, President Truman sent a telegram to the new President-

elect inviting him to meet in Washington to:

“…discuss the problems of this transition period, so that it may be made clear to all the world that this Na- tion is united in its struggle for freedom and peace.” (Truman, 1953)

Although he used his cabinet officers to help him formulate decisions, his in-

dependent personality was such that all decisions were ultimately his own

(Ferrell, 1996; McCullough, 2003). He was not easily swayed or led by anyone, and despite the way in which he came to the Oval Office, “Truman became an effective president, though his popularity” never matched FDR’s (Cronin, 2003).

Harry Truman served from April 12, 1945 to January 20, 1953 and made a total of 23 cabinet-level appointments while in office.

2.1.3.3 Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953 – 1961)

Presidential Style & Personality :

Dwight Eisenhower is the only modern president to enter the White House having held no elective office previously and the first to run as a Washington

outsider (MacKenzie, 2002b). More importantly, however, he was revered as a

national War Hero, and when considered together, these attributes supplied the

welcomed reassurance to the nation as it entered the Cold War period of the

1950s. Eisenhower’s campaign was largely based on repudiating Truman’s

handling of “Korea, Corruption and Communism” at a time before Senator Joe

McCarthy had succeeded in whipping the national mood into a generally para-

noid, hyper-patriotic frenzy. Even at the height of the Senate’s investigations,

Rubenzer and Faschingbauer state that Ike was still “reluctant to confront Sena-

tor McCarthy, whom he privately detested” (Rubenzer, 2004). Ambrose details

the extent of Eisenhower’s dislike of Joe McCarthy and his indirect method for

dealing with both the senator and the investigations he conducted (Ambrose,

1990). His rejection of McCarthy’s political intrusiveness notwithstanding, it was

President Eisenhower via Executive Order 10450, who first mandated FBI back-

ground checks be conducted on all appointees and White House staff

(MacKenzie, 2002b; Raines, 2001) – a requirement that not only still exists today, but was significantly expanded by the George. W. Bush five decades later. 33

33 In addressing the War on Terror, George W. Bush ordered that successful FBI investigations be required as a condition of employment for the 2,000,000-plus civil servants who make up the the Executive Branch. The Bush directive was further extended to include the additional millions of non-civil servants who provide services to the US government under private, corporate contracts. Individuals must agree to these checks in order to be permitted to work under any federal contract. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) - 12 was issued by G. W. Bush on August 27, 2004 and has been in force since 2005.

Literature regarding presidential personality reveals unexpected characteristics deeply embedded in Eisenhower’s makeup. Greenstein, an unabashed ad- mirer of Eisenhower, presents an image of the kindly gentleman who gently guided the nation for eight years – a trusted, wise and knowing father figure; however, based on recent archival research, Alexander and Juliette George disagree with Greenstein’s spin. They note Ike’s makeup contains several of FDR’s attributes, and far from being “an apolitical military man . . . [or merely] naïve about the art of governing,” he actively pursued goals using calculated indirec- tion by working through others (George, 1998b). Renshon states the popular

1950s image of political artlessness actually freed Eisenhower to operate occasionally in a Rooseveltian manner when it served his purpose (Renshon, 1998).

What emerges from the Georges’ and Renshon’s analyses is not an image of

Greenstein’s gently guiding “invisible hand” (Greenstein, 1994), but rather one that was covertly manipulative. In a later work, however, Greenstein does hint obliquely at a less than innocent trait in Eisenhower saying he considered the presidency in somewhat British terms in that a president’s role is one in which

“the chief executive is a national unifying figure . . . highlighting his status as head of state and masking his prime ministerial actions” – somehow being

“above it all” while at the same time being a driving force “behind it all”

(Greenstein, 2004).

Milkis and Nelson also describe Eisenhower’s style as one “… in which Ike

exercised power behind the scenes while presenting to the public an image of de-

tachment from Washington’s political machinations” (Milkis, 2008) and cultivat-

ing “an image of being above politics” (Pika, 2005). Ambrose points out that, in

transitioning from general to president, Eisenhower’s outward style may have

changed but not his fundamental personality (Ambrose, 1990).

Presidential Transition:

Planned transitions of power between presidents date only from 1953, when

Eisenhower succeeded Truman (Kumar, 2003d), who, as noted earlier, estab-

lished the courtesy that outgoing presidents take an active role in ensuring

smooth and orderly transfers of power between successive administrations.

Prior to the 1952 election, Truman directed that the CIA brief both the Democ-

ratic and Republican candidates – a tradition which is still followed today (Lau-

rin Henry in (Kumar, 2003d)). Despite certain post-election difficulties, which

some historians assert are inevitable when there is a change of party (Brauer,

1986), Eisenhower was generally pleased with “how smoothly the transition had

gone” and wrote Harry Truman a personal note of thanks within days of the in-

auguration (Perret, 1999).

Transition planning by supporters of the future president had actually started before election day, when some of Eisenhower’s high-powered party backers had

retained a New York management consulting firm “to study the appointments

process, the nature of the positions available and lists of potential nominees,” af-

ter which specific individuals were interviewed and screened by Ike’s most

trusted confidants for verifying “the right political and executive standards”

(Bonafede, 1987). The Truman White House was unable to provide Eisenhower a

comprehensive list of positions to which the incoming president could make ap-

pointments. Therefore, Congress responded to his request by developing the first

list of such posts – the publication has become known as the Plum Book. (See

footnotes #2 on page 5 and #3 on page 5 for further details pertaining to the con-

gressionally published list, Policy and Supporting Positions ).

Within hours of winning the election, Eisenhower’s instinct to organize and implement quickly became apparent. He named his senior presidential assistant and budget director before going to bed on election night and announced his cabinet choices a couple of weeks later before leaving for a personal review of the military situation in Korea (Greenstein, 2001). In the case of John Foster Dulles, whom Ike knew and respected, there was very little doubt he would be named

Secretary of State, but the selection for Treasury Secretary was an entirely different matter. George Humphrey was a wealthy industrialist and “fiscal conservative with impeccable Republican credentials” but someone Ike had never even met (Perret, 1999); however, party officials backed him so firmly that Eisenhower

chose to accommodate them. Ambrose states that, in naming his appointees and

staff, unlike other modern presidents, “Eisenhower did not pick a single old

friend” (Ambrose, 1990) or family member. 34

Polsby, asserts that the nature of the cabinet a president assembles foreshad- ows the essential characteristics of an upcoming presidency [quoted in (Jones,

2005)]. Ike’s final cabinet choices included “eight millionaires and a plumber” 35

indicating, perhaps, he had transitioned “from Main Street to Wall Street” during

the course of his professional life. It is noteworthy that, contrary to expectations,

not a single appointee came into the Eisenhower cabinet with any prior adminis-

trative experience in government at any level (Ambrose, 1990). Such a homoge-

neous profile among cabinet appointees contrasts sharply with selections made by subsequent presidents – even those considered socially conservative; how-

ever, it is not inconsistent with the times, since Eisenhower’s administration pre-

34 Eisenhower’s son, John, was a graduate of the U S Military Academy at West Point who ultimately reached the rank of Brigadier General before retiring from the Army and being appointed Ambassador to Belgium by (President) Richard Nixon. During his father’s administration, then- Major John Eisenhower served as Assistant Staff Secretary to the chief military adviser at the White House, General Andrew Goodpaster. Since this was a military assignment, John Eisen- hower was not actually part of the Eisenhower White House.

The president’s brother, Milton S. Eisenhower, was frequently consulted by the White House on matters of International Affairs, but he never served officially in his brother’s administration. Milton Eisenhower served as president of Penn State University from 1950 – 1956, after which he became president of The Johns Hopkins University serving from 1956 – 1967.

35 Martin Durkin, head of the AFL plumber’s union, was named Secretary of Labor. Ambrose asserts he was chosen because the “Republicans anticipated trouble with organized labor … over the Taft-Hartley Act … [he was also] the lone Democrat in the Cabinet and the only Catholic.” (Ambrose, 1990)

dated by more than a decade what is now considered the height of the Civil

Rights Movement.

On the way home from his fact finding trip to Korea, Eisenhower became the

first President-to-be to convene a meeting with his cabinet nominees (Greenstein,

2001; Perret, 1999). Eisenhower was convinced he should gather the disparate

cabinet nominees early in order to build and train them as a team (Burke, 2000b;

Greenstein, 1994). These tram formulation activities occurred by early Decem- ber, leaving more than six weeks until the inauguration (Greenstein, 2004).

One Hundred Days:

The hundred day assessment did not work in favor of the Eisenhower ad-

ministration. Even as president, Eisenhower lacked the politician’s interest in it,

yet, some of the press still engaged in comparing Ike to FDR. One wrote:

“The memory of Franklin Roosevelt’s voracious sei- zure and joyous exercise of presidential power twenty years earlier contributes to a companion illusion of a man who slipped into the White House by the back door on January 20, 1953, and hasn’t yet found his way to the President’s desk.” (Joseph Harsch, Washington Correspondent, (Milkis, 2008))

During this high-profile period, Eisenhower focused on assembling a modi-

fied command structure that was to become his organizational framework. In-

stead of following the “political path” and sending multiple legislative initiatives

to Congress (Greenstein, 2001), he chose to lay the organizational groundwork

that would serve his eight-year administration.

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

Once in office, Eisenhower continued to translate a lifetime of military com-

mand experience into organizing the Executive Office (Bonafede, 1987; Hess,

2002). Eisenhower established clear assignments and a strict chain of command

for the White House staff to follow, “[b]ut he did so without formal titles, or-

ganization charts” or other official trappings (Pfiffner, 1999a). Eisenhower wrote

of himself:

“For years I had been in frequent contact with the Ex- ecutive Office of the White House, and I had certain ideas about the system, or lack of system under which it operated . . . it was inconceivable to me that the work of the White House could not be better systema- tized than had been the case during the years I observed it.” (Eisenhower’s memoirs quoted in (Doyle, 1999; Jones, 2005))

Doyle states Eisenhower was not only highly confident in his own ability to bring greater efficiencies to the White House, but also highly disparaging of the ways in which both Roosevelt and Truman had managed their White House organizations – both directly and personally rather than through aides, surrogates or other dedicated staff, which followed his military training (Doyle, 1999). Ac-

cording to Greenstein, Eisenhower possessed “. . . a gift for organizational lead-

ership, including choosing people who were well-suited for their jobs, or finding jobs to match their qualities” (Greenstein, 1994). This was a key factor in build-

ing a strong management support structure.

The well-ordered operational environment that characterized Eisenhower’s

administration started at the very top where “[h]e surrounded himself with a

staff secretariat in charge of the flow of papers to and from the Oval Office… [as

well as a] secretariat in charge of the machinery of cabinet meetings” (Hess,

2002). As a tactical executive, Ike “… wanted staff duties sharply defined [for

maximum efficiency] … and staff assistants got together before entering the

president’s office … and [organized information around] common points rather

than offering choices as Truman would have operated” (McCullough, 2003). Ei-

senhower was a highly experienced and highly disciplined leader “with a sophis-

ticated sense of how to organize the collective …” activities of complex organiza-

tions (Greenstein, 2001).

A clear example of creating focused roles and responsibilities can be found in

White House staffer, Maxwell Rabb, whose assignment it was to serve as secre-

tary of the Cabinet. Ike forced the formalization of cabinet meetings onto the

Secretaries by introducing prepared agendas, making presentations for discus-

sion, and producing official minutes (Grant, 2004). Rabb’s responsibilities were

to clear a formal agenda with the president before the weekly cabinet meetings

occurred, and afterwards he “… held a parallel meeting with the undersecretar-

ies to ensure actions and follow-up” of all agreed-upon issues actually took place

(Doyle, 1999).

Eisenhower “had a strong distaste for personnel matters” (Macy, 1983) con-

sequently, he “created the office of special assistant to the president for personnel

management” (Bonafede, 1987) – a permanent part of today’s White House or-

ganizations. This position was designed to deal with lower level and replace-

ment appointments, which Ike considered to be a staff rather than an executive

function. Eisenhower, a strong believer in delegation from the top, gave the Sec-

retaries significant leeway in staffing their departments (Bonafede, 1987); how-

ever, they were required to draw from a pool of pre-vetted candidates who also

had the right political pedigree (Greenstein, 2004). In the search for potential ap-

pointees, Robert Hampton, assistant to presidential aide Sherman Adams, states

in (Bonafede, 1987), “We got the names of nominees from the Republican Na-

tional Committee, members of Congress, Cabinet officers, and … [even] political

groups.”

Eisenhower in Relation to his Cabinet:

Patterson defines Cabinet government as an arrangement “in which each agency [led by an active secretary] manages its own affairs with the president

79 acting as general supervisor”; however, he asserts it “is shibboleth, not reality”

(Patterson, 2000). Eisenhower’s, however, is the one administration that came closest to achieving it (Hess, 2002). As a general, Ike’s direct observations of cabinet meetings during the Roosevelt and Truman presidencies had convinced him of the need to “ride herd” on the cabinet and to establish formal procedures for making it function effectively (Ambrose, 1990). In his memoirs, Eisenhower recalled the history of past administrations “recorded much cabinet bickering, personality conflicts, and end running, tale bearing, and throat cutting”; thus, as president, “Eisenhower was determined to change this behavior” (Burke, 2000a).

According to Preston, Ike had the managerial ability to engage his Cabinet in frank debates without seeming to cut off discussion or giving the impression that decisions were foregone conclusions (Preston, 2001).

Cabinet meetings were faithfully held on a weekly schedule for the eight years of Eisenhower’s presidency (Greenstein, 1994), but he did not want the secretaries to gather around the table simply listing their department’s needs”

(Burke, 2000b). What he wanted was something quite different: they “were to think like statesmen, not salesmen” (Perret, 1999).

In dealing with the cabinet secretaries, Eisenhower rejected the approach FDR had confided to Labor Secretary Frances Perkins. Ike stated:

“I do not believe in bringing them in one at a time … being impressed with the most recent one you hear … You must get courageous men of strong views and let them debate with each other.” Eisenhower quoted in (Greenstein, 2002)

Eisenhower utilized the cabinet secretaries as both a deliberative body to facilitate and communicate across the administration (Pfiffner, 1999a) and to learn what he needed in order to make executive decisions (Hess, 2002). Specialized decisions were often discussed in private with trusted confidants; however, in all cases, final decisions were made by the president only (Doyle, 1999). Eisenhower really worked at making cabinet government succeed as a consultative body; there were “… ten in the first 80 days [of the administration], and an average of thirty-four per year over the course of his presidency” (Greenstein, 1994).

Eisenhower’s Management Model:

“No …[modern] president has entered the White House with as much organ-

izational experience as Dwight D. Eisenhower” (Jones, 2005). Yet, even though

“Eisenhower rejected Harry Truman’s informal staff system and installed an or-

derly chain of command” (Pfiffner, 1999a), he actually modified and extended

Truman’s formalistic management model through the creation of new senior and

special aides’ positions. Former governor, Sherman Adams, was named to fill

the most important post, which carried the official title of Assistant to the Presi-

dent. Functionally, however, he served as Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, but, Doyle

81 states, the new president avoided using this title “because he thought politicians might think it sounded too military” (Doyle, 1999). Adams stood between the president and the White House staff on both the organizational chart and in reality. His major duty was to buffer the Oval Office from direct accessibility by other staffers, and in some instances, even by cabinet secretaries – a transgression of protocol that, according to Eisenhower, had come to characterize Roosevelt’s and Truman’s administrations (Greenstein, 1994).

Figure 2-4 The Formalistic Model (Eisenhower) 36

George and Stern (George, 1998b) characterize the Formalistic model as one in which:

36 This diagram appears as figure 6.3 in Presidential Personality and Performance , edited by Alexander and Juliette George, and is included here with the publisher’s permission.

• All the features of Truman’s Formalistic model are the same, plus a Chief

of Staff who buffers the president and prepares recommendations for the

president’s consideration,

• Protects the president from distractions and potential information over-

load

Summary:

Eisenhower’s concept of the role of the cabinet evolved after years of managing large, complex military organizations; thus, his expectations were very different from those of his predecessors. Roosevelt would have chaffed at the formality and structure Eisenhower brought to the White House, and, correspond- ingly, Eisenhower could never functioned amidst the chaos that Roosevelt found so exhilarating and creative (Hess, 2002; Leuchtenburg, 2001). Although Secre- taries were encouraged to discuss policy matters openly, Eisenhower never engaged in personal debates “because they did not fit into his view of effective leadership” (Preston, 2001).

While not in existence officially until the Nixon administration it was Presi- dent Eisenhower who effectively created the position of the first civilian staff chief in the expanded hierarchy that now defines the Office of the President

(Watson, 2004). The post of Assistant to the President was specially created by

Eisenhower as a full time assignment for his handpicked aide, Sherman Adams

(Bonafede, 1987). At the end of Truman’s administration, the cabinet comprised

the President and secretaries of the executive departments, but Eisenhower ex-

panded it by conferring cabinet-rank on his vice president, the ambassador to the

UN, the director of the Bureau of Budget (predecessor of today’s OMB) and the

director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (Civil Defense). In addition, Ike

also conferred ex officio cabinet status on Adams (his de facto chief of staff)

(Cronin, 2003) as well as Adams’ deputy (Patterson, 2000).

The Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study (Rubenzer, 2004) ranks Dwight Ei- senhower low psychologically for neuroticism and very high on both conscientiousness (98 th percentile) and strength of character (89 th percentile) and describes him as “well rounded . . . shrewd . . . optimistic . . . reliable” but occasionally capable of displaying a hot temper which, for the most part, was kept in check by conscious determination and practiced self-control. There is strong agreement across the literature that, probably as a consequence of a lifetime’s military experience, the Eisenhower White House was the most organized and methodical of the modern presidents (Doyle, 1999; Pfiffner, 1999a; Rubenzer, 2004; Greenstein,

2004; Hess, 2002).

From the Eisenhower administration through today, the role and influence of

White House staffs have steadily risen (Patterson, 2000; Watson, 2004) generally

84 at the expense of cabinet secretaries who have become increasingly limited in their abilities to influence or even gain access to presidents (Cronin, 2003).

The Eisenhower administration marks the beginning of the continuous expansion of the Office of the President (Patterson, 2000; Watson, 2004). By the time he left office, the White House staff consisted of fifty presidentially- appointed professionals plus their support personnel (Hess, 2002). Among Ei- senhower’s permanent contributions to today’s presidential staff are “a special assistant for national security, a congressional relations office, [multiple, dedicated] staff secretaries to coordinate paperwork coming into the White House, . . . a special secretary for the cabinet . . . and several special assistants” (Jones, 2005).

According to Hess, it was Eisenhower’s introduction of a Chief of Staff that changed the Presidency from a personally-directed structure to one that is bu- reaucratically organized (Hess, 2002).

Dwight Eisenhower served 2 full terms, from January 20, 1953 – January 20,

1961 and made a total of 21 cabinet-level appointments while in office.

2.1.3.4 John F. Kennedy (1961 – 1963)

Presidential Style & Personality :

The Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study found Jack Kennedy to be one of the most extraverted of the modern presidents – along with the two Roosevelts and

Bill Clinton. JFK also scored quite high for openness to new thinking and ideas, but he was ranked as the low on personal character just ahead of Clinton, Nixon and Lyndon Johnson and the 3rd lowest among modern presidents for conscientiousness. These factors were successfully counterbalanced by his energy, optimism and adaptive problem solving abilities (Rubenzer, 2004).

John F. Kennedy was born to privilege and raised in an environment that ac-

tively blended business, politics, and personal achievement. He was pushed by

his father not merely to compete but also to succeed in all things. Joseph P. Ken-

nedy, Sr. was an early and active supporter of FDR, who, in 1934, appointed

Kennedy to be the first Administrator of the Securities and Exchange Commis-

sion and, later to serve as US Ambassador to England in 1937. The elder Ken-

nedy’s drive to be accepted by the Protestant social establishment of Boston

(Maier, 2003) and, perhaps more importantly, to be seen as highly successful

were unquestionable values with which Jack and his siblings were raised

(Reeves, 1997).

Unfortunately for Ambassador Kennedy, it was the combination of his politi-

cal inexperience, over zealousness and the lack of political sensitivity that caused

him to fall from favor with both Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in the early

days of World War II. Consequently, in 1940, he was recalled to the US never to be directly involved in national politics again (Leuchtenburg, 2001). Yet despite

86 his own failures, the highly-driven, self-made patriarch remained determined that the Kennedys, both individually and collectively, would achieve national recognition – the ultimate proof of which would be to see a Kennedy in the

White House. Such was the environment in which Joe and Rose Kennedy raised all the Kennedy children.

As the second of nine children, Jack became competitive at an early age, not only with his siblings, but also with himself as a means of meeting his parents’ high expectations. Furthermore, as the second son in a rapidly expanding family, he was continuously forces to find ways to adapt and stand out (Rubenzer,

2004; Gilbert, 2002). Young Jack was generally considered an intelligent child with greater amounts of academic potential than he managed to demonstrate

(O'Brien, 2005). The problem was that he simply “lacked motivation and maturity” despite an IQ score of 119 (Reeves, 1997), and although he was an avid reader of both history and current events, Jack remained academically undisciplined and unimpressive.

While Rose Kennedy genuinely worried about her children’s training, both religious and academic, father Joe worried about more earthly things such as social connections, personal recognition and their ultimate acceptance into society’s elite circles (Maier, 2003). Young JFK never managed to distinguish himself as either an outstanding student or an athlete at any of his many exclusive schools,

which included The Canterbury School, Choate Academy, Princeton and Har-

vard (O'Brien, 2005). Older brother Joe Jr., member of the class two years ahead

of Jack at most of these schools, excelled both in the classroom and on the athletic

field.

All the Kennedy children were “taught from birth to be vigorous, self-reliant,

and assertive and to believe that ‘Kennedys don’t cry’” (Gilbert, 2002). Dinners

in the Kennedy home were always lively events supervised by Joe Sr. as he

guided their often heated conversations toward politics, world affairs and per-

sonal achievement, “while [any] discussion of money was taboo” (Brauer, 1986).

As a Kennedy, Jack learned at an early age the necessity of being competitive, the

importance of winning, and, as one of nine siblings, various ways in which to

stand out from a crowd positively – traits that he manifested throughout his life.

“Work hard, play hard and achieve much” was the unquestioned philosophy by

which he lived life. Years later, E. B. White described then-President Kennedy as

awaking each day and being “torn between a desire to improve the world and a

desire to enjoy it . . .” (Sorensen, 2008).

After the death of his older brother in World War II, Jack became the focus of

Joe Kennedy’s vicarious political ambitions (Maier, 2003). John Kennedy was elected to Congress in 1946 by winning a seat in a “safe” Massachusetts district and went on to the Senate in 1952, where he remained for eight years. Yet, dur-

ing his 14 years on Capitol Hill, he never distinguished himself legislatively in

either chamber, nor did he attain a place in the senior ranks of the party leader-

ship. Robert Dallek writes that everything in JFK’s early political career must be

viewed within the context of his long-term objective for the Oval Office, saying

that in those early days, “[Kennedy] thought less about the uses of power than its

acquisition” (Dallek, 2003). Remaining non-controversial and not standing out

during the Eisenhower administration – specifically during the McCarthy era 37 – may have been part of Kennedy’s strategy for long-term success.

Much has been made of the similarities between JFK and FDR. Both entered the White House as young, handsome men born to privilege and possessed of an

Ivy League pedigree. Kennedy shared yet another very personal trait with FDR: namely, his having to deal with significant health issues. Both men found it necessary to cope privately with ever-increasing physical debilitation in order to maintain their political careers. Obviously, either man could have lived a financially secure and comfortable existence, yet each chose a life in the glare of national politics – a choice that required them to devise ways to hide, overcome, or simply ignore the extent of their physical conditions. Whereas Franklin Roose-

37 Some of Kennedy’s critics have pointed out the he “happened to be” in a hospital for back problems on the day the Senate held a vote of censure against Senator McCarthy. They also point out that Joe McCarthy was a friend of Joe Kennedy, Sr., JFK’s brother Robert had once worked in the controversial senator’s office, and McCarthy had even briefly dated JFK’s sister, Patricia. (Burns, 2006)

velt had had to cope with deteriorating health starting at the age of 39, John Ken-

nedy had been dealing with, compensating for, and frequently denying his ill

health from childhood. 38 For Kennedy, even the slightest indication of poor health would have cost him the nomination against such senior politicians as

Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Stuart Symington and Adlai Stevenson, all of whom he had to beat in 1960 39 (Dallek, 2003). Thus, he denied to even his closest political staffers that he suffered from Addison’s Disease (Gilbert, 2002;

Schlesinger, 2002).

Much, too, has been made of their extramarital affairs, but until the time of

Watergate, political conditions and proprieties were slightly different in that the press was far more discreet in what it reported about presidents than it is today.

In the Post-Watergate era, neither of these presidents could have expected any less scrutiny than Bill Clinton received at the close of the 20 th century.

38 As a child JFK contracted scarlet fever, measles, chicken pox, whooping cough and was suscep- tible to frequent bouts of bronchitis and general infections. He was also diagnosed with chronic colitis and recurring back pain at the age of 17, for which he was given injections of recently- approved corticosteroids – then a new and little understood treatment therapy at the time. Duo- denal ulcers, thinning of bones and chronic back problems, all of which Kennedy suffered from, may have been side effects resulting from prolonged use of these substances. It has also been theorized that his Addison’s may have been brought on by taking steroids over many years. (Dallek, 2002b)

39 Classic Addison’s disease is frequently associated with tuberculosis, something that JFK never had. His campaign press office, which was directed by Robert Kennedy, once responded to the accusation with a technically true but deliberately misleading statement just prior to the Democ- ratic Convention, saying that John Kennedy “does not now nor has he ever had an ailment described classically as Addison’s Disease, which is a tuberculosis destruction of the adrenal glands . . . ” (Sorensen, 2008).

A final comparison relates not directly to the presidents themselves, but to

their high-profile first ladies, both of whom emerged as strong, independent per-

sonalities and staunch defenders of their late husbands’ administrations.

Presidential Transition:

In the brief period between his election and inauguration, Kennedy struggled

to find the right balance between the past and the future: he needed to shake off

the stodgy image of the Eisenhower presidency without appearing to populate

the White House with only young iconoclasts and inexperienced mavericks. He

was also very cognizant of the fact that he came to the office lacking anything re-

sembling a resounding mandate, having won the election by fewer than 120,000

votes – a fact that caused him to proceed with uncharacteristic deliberateness.

Even though they had had little direct contact prior to the election, Kennedy

and Eisenhower generally held the each other in mutual low regard based pri-

marily on their respective politics, reputations and, perhaps, even their respec-

tive generational prisms. In the period leading up to the 1960 conventions, Ei-

senhower confided to a trusted reporter that he considered Kennedy “a medioc-

rity in the Senate . . . a nobody who had a rich father . . .” (Dallek, 2003). Ken-

nedy truly disagreed with Ike’s old fashioned management model, his plodding

formality and a status quo social agenda. The president-elect determined to govern in a more hands-on and involved manner. It was going to be his way, or,

91 more precisely, the Kennedy way, which would be direct, engaged and vastly more energetic than Eisenhower’s (Reeves, 1997). To smooth the transition out of the Eisenhower era, while concurrently instilling greater national confidence, JFK conscientiously borrowed elements from the styles of both FDR and Harry Tru- man.

Nearly a month passed between the election and the first meeting between

Eisenhower and Kennedy on December 6, from which each emerged with a new- found respect for what the other brought to the presidency. Each achieved a better understanding of the disparate qualities that made both men successful politically. When the two met the day before the inauguration on matters of substance, it was “for two reasons: to reassure the public as to the harmony of the transition . . . and to deal with the exploding crisis in Laos” (O'Brien, 2005).

President-elect Kennedy was well aware of the clumsy and often rocky transition from Truman to Eisenhower and determined not to repeat the same errors.

Therefore, Kennedy commissioned successful DC attorney and Harry Truman’s former special counsel, Clark Clifford, and professor of Political Science, Richard

Neustadt to study previous presidential transitions and present him with lessons learned and recommendations for structuring his White House. The only restric- tion was that they were to work entirely independently of each other (Barnes,

2005; Giglio, 2006). Kennedy wanted to avoid the trap of group-think via multi-

ple, independent viewpoints, while positioning the Oval Office to play a central

role in his administration’s decision making. Kennedy’s transition marks the

first methodical attempt to structure the formation of a new administration

rather that basing it on subjective experience, chance or the incumbent’s good-

will.

One Hundred Days:

Besides recommending against a guardian-like Chief of Staff, Neustadt’s

white paper to the president-elect also warned against trying to repeat FDR’s

“Hundred Day” legislative marathon. He argued that national conditions in the

1960s were not at all like those of the 1930s (Dallek, 2003) – the tacit implication being that no successive president could measure up, and that he should not risk

a highly visible failure at the outset of his presidency. During his inaugural ad-

dress, after acknowledging the breadth of challenges then facing the country,

Kennedy attempted to dispose of the now-unavoidable 100-day comparison by

saying:

“All this will not be finished in the first 100 days. Nor will it be finished in the first 1,000 days, nor in the life of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin.” - from Kennedy’s Inaugural Address 40

40 With this inaugural reference to FDR, Kennedy brilliantly addressed Eleanor Roosevelt, who had not supported him for the party nomination. She had actively campaigned for Adali Stevenson, in his third and final attempt at the Democratic nomination. After the convention, however, she worked to support Kenendy’s election because of her commitment to the Democratic Party.

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

Neustadt describes a frustrated president-elect saying, “People, people, peo-

ple . . . I know only voters. How am I going to fill these 1200 jobs?” (Jones, 2005)

Macy et. al . provide a comprehensive understanding of the process of recruiting for the various policy positions, subcabinet posts, ceremonial assignments, and critical White House staffers (Macy, 1983).

Kennedy envisioned a ministry of talent as an effective means for coping with the constant pressure from the multiple interest groups advocating one or another candidate (Dallek, 2003). The responsibility for converting the vision into reality was given to Harvard Business School Professor Dan Fenn who sought to change the traditional method, which he labeled as BOGSAT, meaning “a ‘bunch of guys sitting around a table asking each other ‘Whom do you know?’” (Macy,

1983) Fenn created the first “Talent Bank” in order to provide candidates for the administration to evaluate, and he also established a non-political network – specifically non-patronage based – to vet and supplement lists of qualified individuals. The Kennedy administration laid the foundation for many of the White

House recruiting processes still used today.

Mrs. Roosevelt’s great dislike of Richard Nixon far outweighed her distrust of Kennedy. Even after the election, her political endorsement and personal approval continued to be highly important to John Kennedy.

When it came to key cabinet selections, “Kennedy immersed himself deeply

in . . . cabinet and other personnel choices” (Bose, 1998). President “Kennedy be-

lieved that people are policy,” and that putting the right people in the right

places . . . would produce the best results (Barnes, 2005). The degree of his in-

volvement demonstrated his commitment to an engaged presidency; however,

his commitment, time and perhaps even health had limitations, thus, he was

most critically interested in who would serve him directly at “State, Treasury,

Defense, Justice, and the UN” (Reeves, 1997), but several other cabinet positions

received less presidential attention.

Kennedy is said to have actually fallen asleep once while interviewing a can-

didate for Secretary of Agriculture (Dallek, 2002b). Other cabinet and subcabinet

appointments came together almost randomly (Dallek, 2003). Ted Sorensen 41 wrote, the team had to “fill some seventy-five key Cabinet and policy posts, name six hundred other major nominees, decide which incumbents to carry over

. . . and fix personnel policies for the future” (Brauer, 1986). Unlike Eisenhower,

Kennedy was not well disposed to letting the Cabinet Secretaries select his subcabinet (Bose, 1998).

41 Ted Sorensen began working for Senator John Kennedy in 1953. He became Kennedy’s primary speech writer and is generally believed to have ghostwritten the majority of Profiles in Courage which was published under JFK’s name and for which he won the Pulitzer Prize. Sorensen, also an attorney, served in the White House as Special Counsel & Adviser for domestic issues. After JFK’s assassination, he, like many others on the late president’s staff, remained for some months in the Johnson Administration before returning to private life.

Kennedy in Relation to his Cabinet:

Consistent with his distaste for large, formal meetings, Kennedy did away

with the regularly schedule cabinet meetings that had been the organizational bulwark of the Eisenhower years. In their place, he opted instead for focused

discussions with the secretaries of what he considered the critical departments,

i.e., State, Treasury, Defense, Justice and the UN. Kennedy regarded full cabinet

meetings “largely as an anachronism . . . and a waste of time” (Pfiffner, 1996). As

a result, Sorensen states, meetings with the domestic secretaries became fewer

and farther between and that these gentlemen “grew increasingly unhappy be-

cause it was so difficult to see the President” (Sorensen, 2008). The one obvious

exception was Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who effectively had 24 hour

access to the president.

Kennedy’s Management Model:

Kennedy disliked the Eisenhower’s formal, structured meetings, which some

authors argue served as an idea filtration and proofing process so that only the best ideas were presented to Ike for final consideration and official decision

(Greenstein, 1994). Kennedy scrapped this quasi-military model “in favor of his

own more fluid, less structured way of doing things. . .” (Barnes, 2005). Pfiffner

casts Eisenhower’s usage of an orderly chain of command as a defensive means

of remaining outside the messy pre-decision making process. Furthermore, Ike

96 believed that maintaining order in all things was the responsibility of a strong

Chief of Staff. Kennedy, however, chose consciously to follow the recommenda-

tions of Clifford and Neustadt, who independently recommended that the new

president become more rather than less involved in decision making processes in

the White House (Pfiffner, 1996).

Not only did Kennedy flatten the organizational structure of the White

House, he, like Roosevelt, placed the Oval Office at epicenter of his administra-

tion’s decision making, thereby reestablishing ”the presidential office as the mov-

ing force of government” (Hess, 2002). Acting as a pseudo-Chief of Staff, JFK

constructed a hybridized management model based loosely on those of FDR and

Truman, and made the Oval Office the cross road of his administration’s decision

making. (See figure below).

To make his management model work, Kennedy followed Roosevelt’s ap-

proach of relying on the best and the brightest people rather than Eisenhower’s

reliance on a highly structured organization (Dallek, 2003). Having rejected the

concept of a powerful Chief of Staff standing watch outside the Oval Office, he

turned to the unassuming Ted Sorensen to grease the necessary wheels and

“keep the White House functioning and the paper flowing,” with the under-

standing that he was never to control who or what could be allowed inside the

Oval Office (Barnes, 2005).

Figure 2-5 The Collegial Model (JFK) 42

To make his management model work, Kennedy followed Roosevelt’s approach of relying on the best and the brightest people rather than Eisenhower’s reliance on a highly structured organization (Dallek, 2003). Having rejected the concept of a powerful Chief of Staff standing watch outside the Oval Office, he turned to the unassuming Ted Sorensen to grease the necessary wheels and

“keep the White House functioning and the paper flowing,” with the under-

42 This diagram appears as figure 6.4 in Presidential Personality and Performance , edited by Alexander and Juliette George, and is included here with the publisher’s permission.

98 standing that he was never to control who or what could be allowed inside the

Oval Office (Barnes, 2005).

George and Stern (George, 1998b) characterize the Collegial model as one in which:

• The president occupies the center of a wheel, and spokes connect him di-

rectly to advisers and cabinet heads,

• Advisers/cabinet heads form a “collegial team” of co-equals in a flattened

organizational structure

• Information flows upward to the team from the departments/agencies,

• Advisers do not filter information; rather they debate it openly, represent

multiple points of view; and cross-fertilize ideas,

• Advisers consider all aspects of issues as opposed to becoming hyper-

focused or highly specialized,

• Discussion are to be frank, non-judgmental, and egalitarian, and

• The president may stimulate the process by giving overlapping assign-

ments or communicating directly into organizations at any level

Summary:

Kennedy was critical of Eisenhower’s “effort to institutionalize the Presi- dency,” and set about reestablishing a personalized approach to the office, which, according to Schlesinger, he saw as a means of regaining “control over the

99 sprawling feudalism of government” (Schlesinger, 2002). Greenstein, however, argues that Kennedy’s scrapping of “the deliberative machinery of the Eisen- hower presidency,” and allowing a confederation of advisers by which “he relied on ad hoc consultations” with a few top aides, were mistakes that manifested themselves negatively in such events as the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs.

This debacle occurred less than three months after his inauguration (Greenstein,

2004). Others have suggested that the root cause of the failures in Cuba were due to the common pitfall of small groups, i.e., groupthink, which occurs when small groups function in isolation under extreme time pressure (Rubenzer, 2004).

Given how early in Kennedy’s administration this event occurred – a little less than three months after the inauguration – the spokes-of-the-wheel model was not fully in place.

On this point, however, Hess and Pfiffner counter that since the president was well acquainted with his hand-picked advisory staff, and they with each other, from the perspective of Organizational Theory, it would have been completely inappropriate, if not counterproductive, to impose “Eisenhower’s organizational design . . . [which is more suited] for a group of relative strangers…”

(Hess, 2002). Years later during the Carter Administration and with the benefit of hindsight, Neustadt amended his original view of the spokes-of-the-wheel management model, saying that the presidency had become so complex it was

100

“now a virtual necessity” to have a dedicated White House Chief of Staff

(Pfiffner, 1999a).

Just as Leuchtenberg does, Landy and Milkis view FDR’s presidency as a

pivotal point in American history; however, they do so for different reasons.

While Leuchtenburg posits that FDR is the gold standard against which each

successive modern president is measured (often reluctantly), Landy and Milkis

propose that all modern presidencies are linked and therefore interdependent.

Rather than discrete political occurrences, they contend, the administrations of

Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy should be viewed in the more unified context

of a two-decade span on the national historical continuum. Furthermore, they

assert these three presidencies actually “represented the consolidation and conti-

nuity of FDR’s [New Deal] project” rather than independent, sequential changes between individual administrations (Landy, 2000).

Kennedy brought to the Oval Office a focus on improving the quality of government and getting “moving again” – something he believed also extended down to the people in the bureaucracy. In 1961 he asked John Macy, a retired

Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), to return and lead reforms at the

CSC. Macy’s task was to re-energize the career ranks by bringing the best and brightest into career government service, just as he was doing in the White

House and the appointive ranks of government.

101

In his short time in the Oval Office, he set forth his agenda under the title of

the New Frontier. It included boosting the economy, improved international re-

lations (Peace Corps and Partial Test Ban Treaty), increased defense and con-

tainment of communism (in Cuba, Vietnam, and Berlin), Civil Rights and the

Space Program. For the most part, the initiatives he started bore fruit under his

successor. He also established the President’s Commission on the Status of

Women and appointed Eleanor Roosevelt to lead it. 43

John Kennedy was assassinated during his first term having served a total of only 1,036 days from January 20, 1961 – November 22, 1963. During his time in office, he made 14 cabinet appointments in total – none of whom were women or

African Americans.

2.1.3.5 Lyndon B. Johnson (1963 – 1969)

Presidential Style & Personality :

The Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study assesses Lyndon Johnson as only

0.2% less extraverted than his immediate predecessor, Jack Kennedy, which con-

sequently places Johnson in the 99.4 percentile with respect to the general

American population. Along with extreme extraversion, he was classified as the

43 Kennedy appointed Eleanor Roosevelt the commission’s first Chairwoman – a position in which she served until her death in 1962. The commission’s work is credited with breathing life into the as-yet unratified Equal Rights Amendment.

102

second most neurotic among all modern presidents surpassed only by Richard

Nixon. A more noteworthy aspect of this study, however, is the fact that of the

42 presidents evaluated 44 , Johnson holds the lowest NEO ranking 45 of all for

character and trustworthiness with only a 0.1% score vis-à-vis the general popu-

lation (Rubenzer, 2004).

Lyndon Baines Johnson was born into conditions that were polar opposites of

Jack Kennedy’s. He was the oldest child born to a struggling farm family in rural

Texas – one that totaled five children in the short span of eight years. His origins

comprised one-room schooling, fundamentalist religious values, basic economic

subsistence, and a sprinkling of populist politics. When Johnson was five, the

family moved from their failed rural farm to Johnson City which had fewer than

325 residents. There were “. . . no paved streets, electric lights, or indoor toilets. .

. only two houses had bath tubs and running water . . . [and the roads] were

dusty and potted in the dry season and nearly impassable quagmires during the

wet spells” (Woods, 2006).

Sam Ealy Johnson was away from the family for extended periods of time ei-

ther looking for work or serving as a local politician representing rural counties

44 The Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study was conducted while Bill Clinton was in office. Their assessment, therefore, omits both George W. Bush and Barak Obama.

45 The NEO scale is a psychological measure based on five broad classes of personality characteristics: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness.

103

at the state Capitol in Austin. Rebekah struggled to run the farm and raise their

family during his frequent absences and openly resented shouldering the day-to-

day responsibilities on her own. She had attended Baylor University, but when

her father died unexpectedly, she married Sam believing her opportunities were

running out. In her history of the Johnson family, she stated, “I was determined

to overcome circumstances instead of letting them overwhelm me . . . I realized

that life is real and earnest . . . ” (Goodwin, 1991). Rebekah frequently displayed

her frustrations and disappointments with life in front of her children in the be-

lief that they would learn, strive and achieve far better than she had (Caro, 1990).

When Sam Ealy happened to be at home, family life was difficult since “. . . he

was a demanding disciplinarian, who drank to excess, lost control . . . upset his

wife . . . and used bad language,” all of which further offended his unhappy and judgmental wife and placed additional strain on the marriage and stress on the

family (Dallek, 1991). According to one of Johnson‘s more sympathetic biogra-

phers, Rebekah Baines Johnson managed to convince her children, and perhaps

even herself, that her own childhood had been idyllic and far more refined than

the shabby situation in which she found herself raising five children in the dusty

Texas Hill Country (Goodwin, 1991). As an adult, Johnson believed his unhappy

mother came to view his father as “vulgar and ignorant . . . [someone whose]

idea of pleasure was to sit up half the night with his friends drinking beer . . . “

104 hanging out and gambling. All this was profoundly offensive to Rebekah’s firmly held Southern Baptist mores (Woods, 2006). Given her unhappy marriage, Rebekah Johnson hyper-focused on her children particularly her first born,

Lyndon, on whom she doted to excess (Goodwin, 1991).

As a youngster, Johnson developed an idealized concept of the enterprising

Texas cowboy full of pride and an irrepressible pioneer spirit; however, it was his frequently-absent father who first exposed him to politics at the age of ten.

After moving the family down from the Hill Country to Johnson City, Sam Ealy would occasionally permit his son to accompany him to the Capitol at Austin, where young Lyndon observed first hand “the art of the deal” (Dallek, 1991). In

Austin, Sam Ealy Johnson was both successful and respected as a local politician

– things which LBJ yearned for and imitated throughout his life – and for which he quickly discovered he had an innate talent. He was a natural politician who knew when to apply just the right amount of assertiveness, charm or “bull” as the situation warranted. According to Robert Caro, Lyndon Johnson was close with his father for just the briefest of periods which happened to coincide with those rare points in time when Sam was successful both financially and politically (Caro, 1990).

Sam Ealy’s, and thus the entire family’s, existence was characterized by extremely good years followed by several extremely bad ones. As finances turned

105 bad again, Johnson’s father drank more and spent more time away from home until the family were in such extreme debt that they would have become homeless had it not been for his uncles’ intervention with the local banker (Caro, 1991).

Many years later, Johnson recounted that the family would “[i]n Johnston City terms . . . be up there with the A’s. But then . . . we’d lose it all . . . dropped to the bottom of the heap” (Caro, 1990). He came to see his father as a failure and blamed him for the public ridicule the family received (Caro, 1991). As an adult,

“Johnson spoke almost exclusively of his mother . . . [and w]hen he mentioned his father, it was to enumerate his liabilities . . .” (Dallek, 1998).

Johnson was never strong academically and after finishing High School in

1924, he worked a series of low paying, menial, and often degrading jobs. He finally enrolled in a State Teachers College because he saw it as the only means to the economic security and social respectability he desperately craved. Lacking both funds and sufficient academic preparation (his high school was not even accredited), he was forced to drop out twice and at one point, took a yearlong assignment teaching Mexican immigrant children. He finally graduated in 1930.

Johnson’s entry into national politics resulted from a series of Cinderella-like events: An Austin colleague of his father recommended Lyndon as assistant to first time Congressman Richard Kleberg. Lyndon Johnson arrived in Washing- ton in 1931 at which point he became instantly and permanently addicted to na-

106

tional politics. Since Kleberg preferred playing golf to working on Capitol Hill,

the day-to-day running of his office fell to Johnson, who ran it as if he were the

elected representative (Woods, 2006). It was early in the Depression: Hoover oc-

cupied the White House and dealt with the worsening economic crisis by peri-

odically issuing press releases that claimed the worst was over and asserting that

“. . . direct federal aid . . . or [even worse] increased spending on public works

were as unnecessary as debt relief for farmers . . .” (Dallek, 2002a). Hoover’s

statements and inaction failed to mesh with Johnson’s firsthand knowledge of

poverty. Franklin Roosevelt moved into the White House a year after Lyndon

Johnson arrived in Washington, at which point he became a committed New

Dealer. FDR subsequently appointed Johnson to head a New Deal program in

Texas, and three years later, Johnson ran in a special congressional election win-

ning his own seat in the House.

As a young congressman, he was always on the lookout for opportunities.

He focused on cultivating important, which is to say politically powerful, ac-

quaintances, focusing especially on the powerful players from Texas, which came

to include Roosevelt’s first vice president, John Garner, as well as Representative

Sam Rayburn. Johnson may have subconsciously begun filling the void of his

own father-son relationship by “symbolically adopting,” and subsequently dis-

carding, politically powerful father figures (Caro, 1990; Goodwin, 1991). It

107 worked on Sam Rayburn (Dallek, 1998) as well as Clark Clifford and Stuart Sym- ington but failed completely with Harry Truman (Caro, 1991). Johnson became so adept at cultivating and manipulating important figures on Capitol Hill that he gained the reputation of being a “professional son” (Caro, 1991). On the day

Roosevelt died, a tearful Johnson told a reporter, “He was like a daddy to me”

(Caro, 1990, 1991; Dallek, 1991). Lyndon Johnson was elected to Congress seven times and twice to the Senate, where, over the course of 12 years, he served as

Minority Leader, Majority Leader and Majority Whip before joining Jack Ken- nedy on the national ticket in 1960.

It was only logical that Lyndon Johnson would become an active and powerful Washington politician. He had grown up watching people in the Texas Hill

Country scratch and fight just to exist and believed firmly that while people might survive by their wits, they only advanced themselves by quickly seizing opportunities before anyone else did (Dallek, 1991; Goodwin, 1991). Yet despite all his professional accomplishments, Lyndon Johnson was plagued by lifelong insecurities and obsessive psychological needs (Caro, 1991; Goodwin, 1991). Any deep understanding of what drove him has eluded historians and biographers alike. “What was it he really wanted – attention? sympathy? respect? dominance? Whatever it was, he was desperate to have it” (Caro, 1990). From his earliest years through the end of his life, he “. . . aspired to be the best, to outdo

108

[every competitor] . . . to win ever higher standing, hold greater power, earn more money . . . [since being] less than top dog made him feel rejected and un- worthy” (Dallek, 1998).

Presidential Transition:

Lyndon Johnson, just as Harry Truman and Gerald Ford, awoke one morning as vice president but went to bed as President of the United States. Of the three, however, Lyndon Baines Johnson was perhaps more prepared, savvy, and knowledgeable in the intricate workings of national government than any other vice president, or perhaps even president, since Roosevelt. From the day he first arrived in Washington, he worked methodically to establish himself as one of the most powerful men in Congress. Power politics was his drug of choice, and in its pursuit he drove himself relentlessly “ . . . to seek status, control and wealth”

(Dallek, 1998); above all he sought personal validation and public recognition.

Unsuccessful in the 1960 presidential primary, Lyndon Johnson decided to exchange his Senate seat and position as Majority Leader for the vice presidency.

For three years, Vice President Johnson was effectively marginalized by the Ken- nedy insiders (Hess, 2002), existed without his former senatorial power and was constrained by the Constitution.

Woodrow Wilson’s vice president once stated it was “. . . like a man in a cata- leptic state. He cannot speak. He cannot move. He suffers no pain. And yet he is

109

conscious of all that goes on around him . . .” (Brauer, 1986; Dallek, 2004), and

long before him, Vice President John Adams had written, “My country has, in its

wisdom, contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of

man contrived . . .” (House, 2009). These statements accurately describe the po-

litical limbo to which Johnson was confined; and he was miserable.

On November 22, 1963, two bullets changed American history and Lyndon

Johnson became the 36 th US President. As the car carrying John Kennedy’s body

raced to Parkland Hospital, the limo with Vice President Johnson followed im-

mediately behind. The Secret Service urged him to go immediately to Air Force

One (as opposed to Air Force Two since he was now president) and return to

Washington where he could be better protected by both the Secret Service and

US military. 46 Once on board, however, Johnson refused to allow the plane to

take off (Woods, 2006). Recent insight into the earliest hours of the Johnson

presidency, which technically began in a speeding car in Dallas, has become pos-

sible through the release of recorded radio communications that were patched

through from Air Force One to ground-based telephone lines by the Army Signal

46 Immediately after Kennedy’s death, among the many rumors and theories surrounding possible motives for the assassination was one claiming the late president had been killed by one or more Communist governments. This was initially given some credence in Washington when CIA Di- rector McCone reported that Lee Harvey Oswald had had contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City a few weeks before the shooting in Dallas. McCone later reported that Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy while on the same trip; subsequently, both the CIA and the FBI determined there was another individual posing as Oswald who had actually visited the Cuban Legation (Holland, 2005).

110

Corp 47 as the events were unfolding. These conversations were captured as part of the mundane but routine recordings of aircraft-to-ground communications involving presidential jets as they remain in continuous contact with Washington.

These recordings were never intended to serve as official historical records. See

Holland, et. al . (Holland, 2005).

There was obviously no planning for a Johnson presidency. It began simply inside a jet on the tarmac in Dallas 48 ; consequently, those early conversations that were patched through radio communications to ground lines were automatically and unknowingly preserved. Before the plane had even started back to Wash-

47 The Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia published several volumes of transcripts of presidential conversations based on these inadvertent recordings, hundreds of hours of clandestine White House recordings, and the written summaries of discussions that Johnson’s staff transcribed and which LBJ had deposited at his Presidential Library with the intention that they remain sealed for 50 years after his death; however, they were released sooner under the Freedom of Information Act. See (Holland, 2005).

Another government aircraft was carrying most of Kennedy’s cabinet plus advisers to an economic conference in Tokyo. The “passenger manifest included, among others, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, Secretary of the Inte- rior Stewart Udall, presidential press secretary Pierre Salinger, and Walter Heller, chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers” (Holland, 2005) The flight was nearing Hawaii when it was diverted back to Washington.

For transcriptions of other White House recordings made surreptitiously at the requests of several presidents dating as far back as FDR’s administration, see (Doyle, 1999) and (Prados, 2003).

48 Holland, et. al. argue Johnson had been properly sworn in as vice president in 1960 and that the constitutionally directed succession had, in point of fact, automatically occurred the instant President Kennedy lost consciousness. Johnson ordered the plane be held in Dallas until friend and local federal judge Sarah Hughes could arrive and administer the Presidential Oath of Office to him in front of the press corps traveling with them. Johnson ensured the “official” moment was captured on film with both Lady Bird and Jackie Kennedy looking on, thus, providing “the first visual proof for Americans of their government’s continuity . . .” and, coincidentally, the start of a his presidency (Holland, 2005).

111

ington, Johnson began firmly taking over his new office. He remained in con-

tacted the White House, and, just as Harry Truman had done, he arranged for

meetings that evening with the cabinet, the White House Staff, and other senior

officials of his predecessor’s administration (Goodwin, 1991; Holland, 2005)

Johnson instinctively insisted on remaining in Dallas for how ever long Jackie

Kennedy remained there, but the First Lady refused to let the late president’s coffin out of her sight. The new president, however, determined not to return to

Washington without the widow and the coffin. In cases of homicide “Texas law .

. . required an autopsy be performed by the Dallas County medical examiner . . .

,” but Johnson made some phone calls and got a waiver on the grounds this was no ordinary murder (Holland, 2005). Back in Washington, he managed his public very artfully by staying on the sidelines and meticulously avoided any appearance of grabbing for power (Holland, 2005). “Johnson was the personifica- tion of gravitas and humility . . .” refusing even to enter the executive mansion until Mrs. Kennedy was able to vacate it, “. . . [thus he] began carrying out his constitutional duties from the vice-president’s office until the Oval Office was emptied . . .” (Greenstein, 2004).

One Hundred Days:

Lyndon Johnson was too experienced a politician to waste any opportunity

(Beschloss, 2001). The day after the assassination, Johnson was not seen publicly,

112 but he was hard at work with Kennedy’s senior appointees. “His first meeting was with national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, CIA Director John McCone, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk . . . “ for a situation briefing (Holland, 2005).

While the country mourned JFK, officials, political professionals and the press were willing to give Johnson time to begin his own administration, but 30-plus years in Washington taught him the political value of moving quickly to take advantage of a distracted Congress.

Three years in political limbo had not dulled Johnson’s instincts at all. He hit the ground running aware that as president, his political effectiveness as well as his potential legacy rested on his ability to take advantage of a point in time that combined national mourning as well as his presumed one hundred day political grace period. Later, he admitted his “ . . . job was to take the dead man’s program and turn it into a martyr’s cause” (Burns, 2006). In his memoirs LBJ wrote,

“I knew I must break the legislative deadlock which had delayed most of Presi- dent Kennedy’s programs on Capitol Hill” (Pfiffner, 1996).

Less than 48 hours after Kennedy’s state funeral, Lyndon Johnson made a public declaration of a smooth presidential transition in an address to a joint session of Congress declaring “the theme of his administration would be continuity”(Hess, 2002) and calling on Americans to “ . . . resolve that John Fitzgerald

Kennedy did not live – or die – in vain” (Burns, 2006). This theme enabled him

113

to leverage politically the nation’s somber mood to the Executive’s advantage in

ways not seen since FDR’s first year in office.

MacGregor Burns defines 1964 and 1965 as the Kennedy-Johnson co-

presidency (Burns, 2006), which is noteworthy for its extensive list of landmark legislation known collectively as the Great Society. Johnson applied his own management style and high pressure tactics to the domestic Cabinet Secretaries to refine individual programs which he artfully pressed through Congress.

Much of the legislation comprising the Great Society had originated with John

Kennedy but had become stalled in Congress. Ultimately, it was Johnson who knew how to unblock the political logjams and gain passage of these plus further initiatives within a space of seven months.

Years later Johnson declared that period to have been “the greatest outpour- ing of creative legislation in the history of the nation” (Doyle, 1999) and fully believed that accomplishments such as Voting Rights, Medicare, and Medicaid would rival even Roosevelt’s Hundred Days effort in getting the New Deal legislation passed (Pfiffner, 2000). To this list Michael Beschloss adds initiatives in civil rights, anti-poverty, and “. . . education; health care, the fight against crime; the arts and humanities; highways; the environment; and job training . . .” and emphasizes, furthermore, that these have endured as Johnson’s domestic legacy

(Beschloss, 2001).

114

Johnson summarized the political opportunity saying:

“You’ve got to give it all you can that first year . . . You’ve got just one year when they treat you right before they start worrying about themselves. The third year, you lose votes . . . [and the] fourth year’s all about politics. You can’t get anything through when half the Congress is thinking about how to beat you. So you’ve got one year.” (Johnson quoted in (Hess, 2002))

Technically speaking Lyndon Johnson was given a second One Hundred Day presidential sprint after winning the presidency in his own right in November,

1964. The depth of his political experience and the year served completing Ken- nedy’s term effectively prepared Lyndon Johnson as no other incoming modern president before or since. 49

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

Johnson, just as Kennedy had, opted to recruit the most qualified individuals rather than ones with acceptable political pedigrees or connections (Bonafede,

1987) and had an eagle’s eye for spotting young talent (Beschloss, 2001). In 1964, he asked John Macy, Kennedy’s appointee to the Civil Service Commission, to head up the Executive personnel operations. Kennedy had been inconsistent in

49 Some argue that as former vice presidents, Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush were equally or better prepared. Neither of these men, however, had the decades of experience in Congress that Johnson had despite serving their service as vice presidents. Prior to his election as president, Nixon served four years in the House and two in the Senate after which he held no elected office for a 12 year period prior to winning the presidency in 1968. Bush served four years in the House and another four in appointed positions prior to becoming vice president in 1980. Ulti- mately, neither of these former vice presidents came close equaling to Johnson’s legislative accomplishments.

115 his involvement with personnel issues, but Johnson stayed very close to these activities, even recalling candidates’ details months after being briefed (Lewis,

2008; Pfiffner, 2001b).

Johnson’s staffing practices stand in sharp contrast with those of Eisenhower and Nixon (Pfiffner, 1996). Even though Truman had established the first personnel section in the White House (Michaels, 1997), it was Macy, at Johnson’s in- sistence, who professionalized this function and introduced the use of computers to redesign completely the existing recruiting processes of earlier administrations. The White House’s first professional staffing and recruiting capability was developed during his administration, and by the end of Johnson’s term, Macy’s efforts resulted in a database of 30,000 qualified candidates (Bonafede, 1987).

The “Talent Bank” that originated under his predecessor had matured, and it was during the Johnson administration, that the White House Personnel Office

(WHPO) came into official existence (Macy, 1983; Newland, 2000). This office has been expanded in both size and complexity by every administration thereafter.

Though his legislative agenda was progressive and benevolent on a societal level, Johnson was known to be petty and manipulative on a personal level.

“Johnson . . . like Roosevelt, was a politician of great energy and ego who instinctively chose systems that kept all components dependent on him . . . [based] on

116 personal loyalty” (Hess, 2002), but Johnson carried it to extremes. Early in his administration, his dark and crass qualities frequently showed themselves. Not only did Johnson insist on loyalty from his staff but he also enjoyed displays of public gratitude and submission, saying of one new appointee, “I want him to kiss my ass in Macy’s window and tell me it smells like roses” (Doyle, 1999).

From the time of his arrival on Capitol Hill in 1931, he “drove himself and his staff relentlessly” (Woods, 2006), and the intervening decades only served to in- grain this habit. As president, Lyndon Johnson remained a workaholic, and he levied that same expectation on his staff. He typically started his workday at 7

AM getting to the office by 9 and working through until 2 PM. He then exercised vigorously, power napped, changed into fresh clothes and started again.

“The second half of his ‘day’ started at 4 PM. . . . [and] lasted until at least midnight and often until one or two” the next morning (Dallek, 2004). ”Johnson sought a staff organization capable of mass-producing legislative initiatives . . . that would be labeled ‘bold and innovative,’ in the Rooseveltian manner . . . [one that would] prove he was better than Kennedy” (Hess, 2002). Consequently, he drove both the Cabinet and White House staff harder than any other modern president before or since.

117

Johnson in Relation to his Cabinet:

Unlike Truman, Lyndon Johnson made no immediate changes in his predecessor’s cabinet level appointments – not until his inauguration thirteen months later (Hess, 2002) and not until he was elected president in his own right. (See

Table 2 below.)

Michaels asserts that Johnson’s actual motivation for delaying any cabinet replacements was to avoid “political suicide by appearing disloyal to the slain president” and further adds that on a more practical level, Johnson would have had significant logistical problems replacing appointees with less than a year remaining before the next election (Michaels, 1997). As a highly ambitious and seasoned politician, Lyndon Johnson certainly realized the extent to which he would have been criticized for not following through on his pledge of continuity.

Given some of the high profile appointees who chose to remain with the Johnson

Administration, however, both explanations tend to oversimplify the complicated dynamics between presidents and their cabinets. 50

50 By the end of Johnson’s Administration in 1968, four of Kennedy’s cabinet appointees were still in their original positions: Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Stewart Udall (Secretary of the Inte- rior), Willard Wirtz (Secretary of Labor) and Orville Freeman (Secretary of Agriculture). (See Table 2: Johnson's Inherited Cabinet.)

When Johnson wanted to replace such high profile individuals as Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense), Anthony Celebrezze (Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) and John Gro- nouski (US Postmaster General), he provided them with face-saving positions, i.e., President of the World Bank, US Federal Judge and Ambassador to Poland respectively (Hess, 2002).

118

Table 2: Johnson's Inherited Cabinet

Department Appointed by JFK Served from Replaced or (Retained) Served until by LBJ

Treasury Douglas Dillon 1/21/61 – Henry Fowler 12/20/68 4/01/65 Joseph Barr 1/20/69

State Dean Rusk 1/21/61 (retained) 1/20/69

Defense Robert McNamara 1/21/61 – 2/29/68 Clark Clifford 1/20/69

Justice Robert Kennedy 1/20/61 – N. Katzenback 9/30/66 9/03/64 Ramsey Clark 1/20/69

Post Office (Position was va- Lawrence O’Brien 11/3/65 cant on 11/22/63) - W. Marvin Watson 1/22/69

Interior Stuart Udall 1/21/61 (retained) 1/20/69

Agriculture Orville Freeman 1/21/61 (retained) 1/20/69

Commerce Luther Hodges 1/21/61 John Connor 1/31/67 A. Towbridge 3/1/68 C. R. Smith 1/20/69

Labor Willard Wirtz 9/25/92 (retained) 1/20/69

HEW A. Celebrezze 7/31/62 – John Gardner 2/29/68 8/17/65 Wilbur Cohen 1/20/69

119

Warshaw offers a slightly different argument saying that growing resistance to the Vietnam War from 1965 onward made it difficult for Johnson to recruit

Democratic appointees from the private sector. In the end, “. . . all but four [of his appointees] were promoted from within the federal government . . . with few personal or political ties to Johnson but with strong ties to the departments they oversaw” (Warshaw, 1996). She argues further that these inadvertently-formed cabinet loyalties turned out to be beneficial to Johnson with respect to his domestic initiatives.

Johnson was always in motion, which also describes his management style with both the Cabinet and White House staff. He tended to avoid cumbersome group meetings whenever he wanted quick answers from multiple sources. He frequently designated surrogates, such as his Senior Domestic Affairs Advisor, to work various sources to obtain information quickly. What Johnson initiated in the name of organizational efficiency actually had the effect of converting a staff advisory position into an operational and command position that he kept close within the White House.

In the long term, such actions tended to diminish the importance of the cabinet as a deliberative body and to magnify the selective importance that presidents since then have placed on certain staffers over specific cabinet appointees.

120

No other modern president has been able to maintain so much control concurrently of so many people, activities and issues as Lyndon Johnson (Bonafede,

1987). Another blow to the cabinet authority was the “ . . . rise of the president’s assistant for national security affairs to a prominence and visibility rivaling and eclipsing the secretary of state” (Heclo, 1999a) – something that had originated with Kennedy and simply advanced under Johnson. This subsequently reached an extreme under Nixon and Henry Kissinger at the expense of Secretary Wil- liam Rogers.

Johnson’s Management Model:

Both Kennedy and Johnson had returned to the earlier, informal management style of the Roosevelt Era. (See Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-5.) In reality, however, the increased size of the White House staff during the intervening decades made exact replication of Roosevelt’s style impossible (Kernell, 1999). Where “Eisen- hower found committee meetings congenial; Kennedy preferred small, informal sessions with a few [select] advisers; Johnson would accept any format as long as the information was presented orally . . .” (Hess, 2002). All of these were management approaches that Nixon came to avoid at all costs.

In the styles of FDR and Kennedy, “Johnson had no chief of staff, preferring to interact directly with a top tier of some ten special assistants, relying often on high-energy young men . . . “ (Doyle, 1999). At times his staff assistants, who

121

were decades younger than Johnson, had trouble keeping up with him. He “. . .

was in fact the most accessible president since Roosevelt . . . [despite] the re-

peated accusation that he had walled himself off from outsiders as well as insid-

ers” (Hess, 2002). This claim became increasingly valid over the course of his

presidency. By late 1967 Johnson had evolved into a war president becoming

less accessible and far more detached from domestic initiatives as the war in

Vietnam ground on (Leuchtenburg, 2001).

For many of the individuals who worked in the Johnson White House it was

not only an exhausting experience, but at times also a demoralizing one given

Johnson’s increased mean spiritedness. A Kennedy staffer who remained into the Johnson Administration stated, “LBJ was an emasculator, an egocentric son of a bitch . . . [some of us tried to remain] loyal to the institution . . . [but] he was a rat, pure and simple,” and Joseph A. Califano once described Johnson as simultaneously “brave and brutal, compassionate and cruel, incredibly intelligent and infuriatingly insensitive . . .” (Doyle, 1999).

Summary:

Johnson remains just as enigmatic decades after his death as he was in life.

Throughout his career, Lyndon Johnson had a highly inflated sense of self, never

doubting his potential or innate abilities. This amount of ego caused him to do

most things to excess which, being a shrewd politician, he recognized could be

122

damaging. As his political power grew, Johnson quickly recognized that a combination of action draped in subtlety and cunning was more effective than blunt

force. He once said, “I’m just like a fox. . . I can see the jugular in any man and

go for it . . . but I always keep myself on a leash . . .” (Choiniere, 1992).

Politically, Lyndon Baines Johnson was a work in continuous progress, evolv-

ing with each legislative accomplishment but honed more finely by his setbacks.

In both the literal and figurative senses, Johnson was always on the move and

always guided by innate political radar that he recalibrated continuously to the

prevailing political conditions. The one constant characteristic evident through-

out his life was that he never stopped driving himself to new heights in the hope

of casting a shadow larger than anyone else in American politics.

His 1964 landslide victory over Goldwater gave him far more than the just

presidency, however. It simultaneously freed him from playing the martyr’s

surrogate any further and also positioned him to challenge Roosevelt for a prime

place in the history books. Goldman and Harwood state, “He didn’t want to

[simply] equal his mentor, Franklin Roosevelt, he wanted to eclipse him”

(Leuchtenburg, 2001).

Unfortunately, while establishing legislative high water marks with his Great

Society legislation, he was concurrently drawn into an unwinable war. In chal-

lenging FDR, Johnson gave in to his own excesses. Kearns notes, “Roosevelt did

123 not attempt the New Deal and World War II at the same time. Only Johnson . . . sought to be simultaneously first in peace and first in war . . .” (Goodwin, 1991).

In the end, it was the lethal combination of endless self-aggrandizement, a

Texas-sized ego and an unchecked ambition that led Johnson to make risky foreign policy decisions which cost him his desired place in history. Johnson was a gifted legislator and domestic president, but on the international front, he proved to be a “. . . standard-issue Cold Warrior who saw his country as the bulwark of freedom against communist expansionism” (Burns, 2006).

Politics was for Johnson all-consuming. Clark Clifford, who served Presi- dents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson, states the latter personalized the Vietnam

War. “It was as if resistance in the jungles were directed against him personally, whereas . . . President Kennedy would have treated . . . [this] strictly as an international problem – not something aimed at him personally” (O'Brien, 2005). De- spite his many notable achievements, Johnson was a president who never managed to become presidential.

Lyndon Johnson served, from November 22, 1963 – January 20, 1969 and made a total of 14 cabinet-level appointments 51 while in office.

51 In 1966, Johnson named Robert C. Weaver, an African American, to be the first Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This appointment made Weaver the first African American ever named to Cabinet Rank.

124

2.1.3.6 Richard M. Nixon (1969 – 1974)

Presidential Style & Personality :

Richard Nixon was an anomaly among politicians in that he was extremely introverted and uncomfortable in social situations (Greenstein, 2004). The

Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study ranks Nixon quite high for introversion and extremely low on the scale for character – the 93 rd and 0.9 th percentile respectively. These scores are based on the general American population, which makes

Nixon the most neurotic of all the modern presidents; however, he placed in the

98 th percentile in the area of conscientiousness (Rubenzer, 2004).

Nixon believed that through intelligence, will power, and blind persistence,

he could overcome anything in spite of his lifelong sense of insecurity. Of all the

modern presidents, “Richard Nixon was the most emotionally flawed . . . [h]is

anger and suspiciousness were of Shakespearean proportions” (Greenstein,

2004) and was known to take medication to control anxiety at certain periods in

his life (Rubenzer, 2004). Even as a first time candidate, he harbored a “. . . burn-

ing, angry ambition [that powered] a fast-track trajectory up the right wing, anti-

Communist arc of the postwar Republican party” (Doyle, 1999) thereby estab-

lishing his national reputation politically before the age of 40.

When he finally attained the presidency, it was not so much as a winner as a

highly determined political survivor. During his tenure as vice president, Nixon

125

was kept at arm’s length by Eisenhower, who nearly dropped him from the

ticket twice: first in 1952 over questionable political contributions (Brauer, 1986)

and again in 1956 at the urging of senior White House staff, including his chief of

staff, Sherman Adams (Ambrose, 1990). After losing to Jack Kennedy in 1960 52 , he was subsequently defeated in a 1962 California gubernatorial bid, at which point he made the now-famous statement to the press, “You won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore . . . this is my last press conference . . .” (Nixon, 1990). At the time everyone, including Nixon himself, believed his political career had ended. 53

Richard Nixon considered himself a self-made man, for whom winning and losing were the only two, mutually exclusive outcomes. To him they were opposite sides of a single coin. Each political defeat served only to harden and then drive him harder to win at any cost. In his memoirs, Nixon states he acquired this life philosophy from a college football coach and followed it throughout his adult life: “. . . if you worked hard enough and played hard enough, [you] could

52 Nixon believed that, as incumbent vice president, the nomination was rightfully his, and he stubbornly refused to seek help from Eisenhower because of the perceived affronts during his eight years in vice-presidential limbo. Conrad Black theorizes that Nixon’s sensitive ego exaggerated any actual offenses, and that had he actively engaged Eisenhower in his campaign, Ike’s active support and personal popularity might have swung the tight election away from Kennedy in Nixon’s favor and, thereby, changed the course of history (Black, 2008).

53 Nixon blamed his gubernatorial loss in California on hostility from the press. For the remainder of his life, he retained an intense dislike of the press and went so far as to denigrate its role in a democratic society, especially after the events of Watergate became public.

126 beat anybody . . . [he rejected] the view that how you play the game counts more than whether you win or lose . . . [and w]hen you lose, get mad – but get mad at yourself” (Nixon, 1990).

In his book, Six Crises, Nixon wrote about the “warfare of politics” (Nixon,

1962), and “[p]olitics was indeed for him a succession of battles . . . to be fought against cunning and vicious foes with every weapon at hand” (Schlesinger,

2004). His 1968 defeat of Hubert Humphrey could reasonably be viewed as a na-

tional vote of no confidence in Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam policies, and, along

with George Wallace’s third party bid, Richard Nixon may have simply repre-

sented the least of all contemporary evils.

Nixon Described:

Eisenhower was once asked what Nixon’s major ideas were while he was vice president, to which Eisenhower responded, “If you give me a week, I might think of one” (Brauer, 1986). Other descriptions include:

“Tricky Dick” . . . – (Congresswoman) Helen Gahagan Douglas

“He was the most dishonest individual I ever met . . . Nixon lied to his wife . . . family . . . friends . . . the U.S. Congress . . . the American people, and the world.” – Barry Goldwater

127

“Making up his mind and then pretending that his options were still open – that was a Nixon trait that I’d have occasion to witness again.” – Gerald Ford

“In two hundred years of history, he’s the most dishonest President we’ve ever had. I think he disgraced the Presidency.” – Jimmy Carter

Presidential Transition:

Richard Nixon won the election and began implementing his presidential

transition at a time of national turmoil. 1968 was a pivotal year in American his-

tory: Martin Luther King’s assassination in April was followed by Bobby Ken-

nedy’s in June; police and National Guardsmen clubbed and tear gassed civilians

as well as news reporters on national television 54 during the National Democratic

Convention in August. The country was severely polarized politically due to an

unwinable war overseas and civil rights issues at home, and the electorate held

Johnson accountable for both. Third party candidate George Wallace of Alabama

ran on an anti-civil rights platform garnering 13.5% of the popular vote nation-

ally, which translated into 44 electoral votes from five southern states. 55 As a re-

54 Television reporters Mike Wallace and Dan Rather were in Chicago covering the protests outside the Democratic National Convention. Both were physically shoved and assaulted by police as they were broadcasting live news reports on national television.

55 Wallace achieved the majority of the popular vote in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, hence earning 44 electoral votes. During official Electoral balloting, and contrary to

128

sult, Nixon attained the presidency with only 43.4% of the popular vote edging

out incumbent Vice President Humphrey with 42.7%. The Republicans could

have run almost anyone that year and still taken the presidency. 56

In April, 1963, Congress passed, and in 1964 Lyndon Johnson signed, the

Presidential Transition Act of 1963. 1968 was the first year in which a presidential transition occurred. This legislation authorized The General Services Ad- ministration to provide office space for both a president- and vice president-elect from the time of their election to the inauguration. Furthermore, the Act provided $900,000 for relevant expenses to be divided between the incoming and outgoing presidents. Congressional Report RL30736 states that Richard Nixon actually incurred $1.5 million in transition expenses and easily raised $1 million in private funds to make up the shortfall (Smith, 2007).

The Nixon transition team, as all others before and since, drew heavily from the winner’s campaign staff and was based in New York. There the president- elect met with, among others, Henry Kissinger. At their first meeting Nixon was

the majority vote in his state, one rogue elector from North Carolina cast his vote for the Ala- bama governor resulting in a total of 45 votes for Wallace. The actual outcome, however, was unaltered.

56 Among those whom Richard Nixon had beaten out for the Republican nomination were (Gov) Nelson Rockefeller, his brother (Gov) Winthrop Rockefeller, (Gov) Ronald Reagan, (Gov) George Romney, Harold Stassen and (Mayor) John Lindsay.

Even if all of Wallace’s electoral votes had gone to Humphrey, Nixon would still have taken the presidency with his 301 to 237 electoral vote win. A total of 270 votes is required to win. (See Appendix F – Presidential Electoral Results for a history of presidential wins.)

129

immediately drawn to the Kissinger’s vision of US-Soviet relations could be and

immediately decided to ask him to head the National Security Council (NSC), but in classic Nixon style, he contemplated for two days and then had John

Mitchell extend the offer just in case Kissinger declined (Nixon, 1990). Nixon writes, they began immediately developing key elements of his administration’s foreign policy even before he was inaugurated.

Prior to the November election, Lyndon Johnson had determined to leave office in a dignified manner and that the transition to his successor would be the smoothest in history. All previous presidential transitions had been conducted inconsistently, and thus, according to Marvin Watson, Johnson was concerned.

Lyndon Johnson instructed “[e]very department or agency . . . to prepare complete information in written form . . . programs . . . budgets . . . the good and the bad. . . [and to h]old nothing back” (Watson, 2004). After Nixon’s win, the John- sons hosted the Nixons in the private living quarters of the White House, at which time Johnson was “. . . surprised to learn that it was the first time either

[of the Nixons] had seen that part of the White House, in spite of the eight years they had spent in the Eisenhower Administration” (Brauer, 1986). For the most part, both Nixon and Johnson deemed the transition to have gone well.

130

One Hundred Days:

Nixon was so focused on election strategy and simply winning the White

House, that he had invested essentially no time in strategizing any sweeping new domestic initiatives (Mackenzie, 1981). Although he was alive throughout

FDR’s presidency, Nixon was never directly affected by Roosevelt as were his predecessors Truman, Kennedy, Johnson and, to a minimal extent, Eisenhower.

Of all the modern presidents, he was the first not to have even seen him. Much of what the New Deal and Roosevelt’s social policies represented were anathema to Nixon both politically and philosophically (Leuchtenburg, 2001). In his post

1968 writings, Nixon omits any discussion of the traditional 100 day legislative period that has come to define the tone of all new administrations since 1932

(Nixon, 1990).

Given his precarious electoral win plus his deep-rooted, personal insecurities,

Nixon opted out of the classic 100-day legislative sprint in order to escape historical comparisons. Several members of his young administration reinforced his decision including his sole liberal adviser, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who “ . . . urged the first Nixon year be one of ‘consolidation,’ a time to accumulate new political capital, rather than to launch a host of new initiatives . . .” (Heubner,

2001).

131

By March, 1969, several Republican members of Congress began to let the

White House know of their displeasure stemming from an absence of domestic initiatives. 57 Nixon then instructed Bryce Harlow to prepare a response detailing the administration’s domestic agenda, but, in fact, the White House had outlined only six proposals for Congress, and none of these, according to the Harlow report, was significant (Graham, 1991). Nixon, however, attributed the failure to propose domestic legislation to the cabinet rather than himself (Warshaw, 1996).

Both Nixon and the congressional Republicans were at a legislative disadvantage in that both houses were controlled by Democratic majorities – an event that has invariably motivated other administrations to chart a visibly bipartisan course.

In what would become a characteristically Nixonian response, he reacted by assuming a defensive posture: he circled the wagons and focused solely on his political allies. Throughout his presidency, Nixon perceived he had far more foes than friends and, thus, repeatedly failed to “ . . . build effective bridges to the

Democratic majority (Heubner, 2001) or even to congressional leaders within his own party (Warshaw, 1996).

Another, and perhaps more philosophical, reason for Nixon’s avoidance of the Hundred Day sprint lay in his evolving view of what his presidency would

57 Republicans in Congress were seeking ways in which to blunt, if not roll back, some of the recent initiatives of Johnson’s Great Society. There were also calls to entice dissatisfied voters in Southern states by watering down Civil Rights legislation particularly with respect to busing as a means of de- segregating schools.

132 be and how best to allocate his time. More than anything else, he simply refused

to compete with his presidential predecessors as Johnson had, all of whom he

disliked intensely for political and/or personal reasons. That he consciously

chose not to engage in this perceived competition was reminiscent of Eisen-

hower’s aloofness. Nixon’s problem, however, was that the country did not see

him as a trustworthy grandfather figure, a war hero, or a venerable elder states-

man. He was only a minority president still carrying significant baggage from

the McCarthy era – a recycled Cold Warrior.

The early months of his administration turned out to be for Nixon a time of

discovery, refamiliarization and preliminary testing of the limits of presidential

authority. Initially it was “ . . . a cautious, often reactive period - characterized both by frustrating indecision and by wise restraint” (Heubner, 2001). Even before the November election, Richard Nixon had determined that foreign policy and the international stage were where he would commit his attention, and he never altered his opinion; domestic issues were for him annoyances that came with the job.

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

Since Nixon had run his campaign relatively independently from the Repub-

lican National Committee, he felt no obligation to find places for longstanding

party loyalists or the politically well-connected. Nor did he feel he owed con-

133

gressional Republicans any patronage positions. He viewed his presidency as

his alone and intended to staff his administration his way (Mackenzie, 2001).

Nixon’s first staff assignment was Rose Mary Woods, his personal secretary

since 1951; his second was Bob Haldeman, who would be his White House Chief

of Staff (Nixon, 1990). The chief of staff’s role had grown out of the position of

Appointments Secretary, and it was under the Eisenhower Administration that

the position was given the more military sounding name as well as broader re-

sponsibility. Both Kennedy and Johnson avoided naming anyone officially 58

with that title; however, given his personality and preference for formality,

Nixon resurrected it with Haldeman in mind and declared his redesigned chief

of staff would be first among equals.

Together Nixon and Haldeman laid out the duties of the chief of staff ostensibly to “. . . be administrative rather than substantive . . . [to] ensure that oppos-

ing views were included [for presidential consideration] . . . a gatekeeper of the

Oval Office . . . [with the ability] to say no to a lot of people . . . (Nixon, 1990).

The chief of staff position has appeared officially on every White House organ-

izational chart since the Nixon Administration as the preeminent senior staffer.

58 Kenneth O’Donnell was Director of John Kennedy’s campaign schedule and was appointed as the president’s Appointment Secretary. Likewise, Marvin Watson was named by Lyndon John- son to be Appointments Secretary but, based on actual duties he functioned as a chief of staff. He was followed as Appointments Secretary by James Jones, who served in the same capacity through the remainder of the Johnson Administration.

134

The evening of his inauguration Nixon told Bob Haldeman, “I must build a

wall around myself”(Burns, 2006), and protecting the Oval Office – more specifi-

cally himself – from unwelcome intruders was precisely what he wanted Hal-

deman to do (Kumar, 2003d). For his part, Haldeman executed those instruc-

tions literally, saying proudly, “Every president needs a son of a bitch and I’m

Nixon’s” (Doyle, 1999). On another occasion he went so far as to say, “I’m his buffer and I’m his bastard. I get what he wants done, and I take the heat instead

of him” (Pfiffner, 1996).

Until the day he resigned because of Watergate-related criminal charges,

Chief of Staff Haldeman exerted absolute control over which people and which

paperwork entered the Oval Office. In his post-Watergate writings, Haldeman

claims he never lost sight of the fact that he was an unelected member of the ad-

ministration and insisted that he never attempted to control policy decisions

(Kumar, 2003d); yet, cabinet appointees and general staff both claim otherwise

(Schlesinger, 2004). The senior triumvirate of Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman

and Henry Kissinger rendered the Oval Office impenetrable, leading some

within the administration to refer to them as “the other Berlin Wall” (Pfiffner,

1999b). Despite his claim of political neutrality, Haldeman was an extremely in-

fluential force in the Nixon White House not solely because he determined which

information and which individuals were granted access to the president but also

135

due to his unswerving personal allegiance to Richard Nixon over a twenty year

period. The sole exception to Haldeman’s exclusive control over presidential ac-

cess was Henry Kissinger, who could get to Nixon at anytime (Pfiffner, 1999b;

Doyle, 1999).

It has been generally acknowledged that the structure and organization of the

White House is almost entirely dependent on a president’s personality (Pfiffner,

1999a; Preston, 2001), and none exemplifies this interrelationship better than

Nixon’s. Nixon and Haldeman, as they did on multiple topics, spent consider-

able amounts of time theorizing, analyzing and architecting the optimal White

House staff structure (Heubner, 2001) but almost no time on the day-to-day pro-

cedures for filling these positions. These evolved later without the president’s

direct involvement. It turned out that Nixon continually tinkered with the staff-

ing structure from a conceptual perspective so as “. . . to have the organization

work for him, not necessarily with him” (Jones, 2005). Unlike either Kennedy or

Johnson, Richard Nixon had virtually no interest in the operational details of the

personnel recruiting and staffing processes (Macy, 1983; Michaels, 1997) based

primarily on his discomfort with dealing directly with people (Bonafede, 1987).

Since the personnel function was not one of Nixon’s priorities, his “… aides

had little contact with their counterparts in previous administrations . . .” – nei-

ther during nor after the transition; thus, the Nixon team failed to draw on the

136

institutional knowledge that had been building since the Kennedy and Johnson

Administrations and was condemned to reinventing the wheel (Macy, 1983).

Early on John Mitchell, Nixon’s former law partner turned campaign manager

hired a 28 year old whiz kid from the Republican National Committee (RNC) to

head up the administration’s general recruiting activities. The inexperienced

staffer 59 embarrassed the new administration by sending form letters to 80,000 people listed in Who’s Who in America soliciting their recommendations for talented individuals. Among others, letters went to Elvis Presley, Casey Stengel,

(Mackenzie, 1981) and even Lyndon Johnson (Pfiffner, 1996). Subsequently,

Haldeman and Ehrlichman took over a shared responsibility for White House personnel.

Nixon claimed that during the transition period people close to him urged him to be wary of the bureaucracy (Nixon, 1990). Rather, it was he who brought a lifetime of discomfort with and distrust of people to the presidency (George,

1998b; Rubenzer, 2004); thereby, establishing his administration’s antagonistic tone toward the career bureaucracy from the beginning. At the same time, Bryce

Harlow advised the Nixon administration against appointing anyone based on

59 Harry Flemming was the son of Arthur S. Flemming, who had served as Eisenhower’s third Sec- retary of Health, Education and Welfare. Mitchell hired the 28 year old Flemming away from his job at the RNC and made him responsible for identifying potential candidates for lower level staff positions. Since the positions themselves were not critical, the specifics of Flemming’s activities were not carefully monitored. Critics of the administration classified the unapproved mass mailing as little more than a media stunt, but this early lesson taught Mitchell and Halde- man to take the need for disciplined personnel procedures far more seriously (Bonafede, 1987).

137

Congressional recommendation, thereby alienating Congressional Republicans.

He argued such appointees could never be loyal to the White House but to the

Member who had advanced their names initially (Kumar, 2003d). In time,

“Nixon and his White House Loyalists increasingly saw themselves as pursued by three demons: the press, Congress and the federal bureaucracy” (Hess, 2002).

As a presidential candidate, Nixon had promised leaner White House staffing levels and a related one to revitalize Cabinet government.

As the figure below shows, Nixon as president reversed his campaign promises completely as his White House expanded and specialized in order to serve his personal needs (Warshaw, 1999).

Figure 2-6 Growth in the number of Special Presidential Assistants from 1940 – 1972 (based on numbers in (Hess, 2002))

50 37 40

23 30 20

20 11 13

0 FDR Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Administration

138

There was a spike not only in the number of Special Presidential Assistants during Nixon’s first term, but also an astounding growth spurt in staffing within the Executive Office of the President. The number of staff positions under Eisen- hower averaged 1,175, a number that grew to 1,664 during the Kennedy-Johnson era; however, after just four years, the Nixon White House ballooned to an aston- ishing 5,395 (Schlesinger, 2004; Warshaw, 1996). During Nixon’s first term, operating expenses for the Executive Office rose from $31M to $71M (Michaels, 1997), and yet, this only represents part of the actual costs since there were unknown numbers of additional people who served at the White House while still remaining on Agency payrolls.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan once observed that White House staff are the only people in Washington who work exclusively for the president (Warshaw, 1999) and Nixon required frequent reassurance of that. It was only when he felt those around him were personally loyal did Nixon attain psychological comfort, but whether knowingly or unknowingly, Hess states Nixon’s select “advisers fueled his distrust to the point of being pathological” (Hess quoted in (Michaels, 1997)).

Nixon in Relation to his Cabinet:

Well beyond mere preference or even his psychological need to be buffered from the outside, Nixon’s instinctive decision to station a strong chief of staff outside the Oval Office was also deeply rooted in his political past.

139

“I believed that the matters brought before a President for decisions should be only those that cannot or should not be made at a lower level in the White House staff or by the Cabinet member directly responsible for them. This was a lesson that I had learned directly from Eisenhower, whose staff had too often cluttered his schedule with unimportant events and bothered him with minor problems that drained his time and energy.”

(Richard Nixon quoted in (Warshaw, 1996))

Shortly after the election, Nixon had given John Mitchell the assignment of

putting together the first cabinet, which the latter undertook with general guid-

ance from the president-elect. In hindsight it seems highly unusual that an ad-

ministration decidedly lacking the majority of voters’ support would have given

up so easily on reaching out and recruiting Democrats, blacks, Jews, Hispanics or

women. Although some attempts at achieving diversity were made 60 , the cabinet that Mitchell ultimately assembled comprised only “. . . prosperous white male Republicans” (Mackenzie, 1981). Even at the level of cabinet appointees,

Nixon failed to leverage successfully the prestige of presidency to recruit appointees (Bonafede, 1987) .

60 The new administration made some diversity-based overtures to select individuals: to Democrats Hubert Humphrey for the post of Ambassador to the UN and then to Sargent Shriver once Humphrey declined, and to Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson for Secretary of Defense. Mitchell approached two African Americans: Senator Edward Brooke, also for the post at the UN and Whitney Young to be Secretary of HUD, and finally Ersa Poston, the only woman considered, was asked to head the Civil Service Commission. All six declined to join Nixon’s Administration (Mackenzie, 1981; Nixon, 1990; Warshaw, 1991)

As an historical note, every president since Ford has included a member of the opposite party and an African American. Ronald Reagan appointed the first Hispanic to a cabinet level post, and each subsequent president has followed this blueprint of diversity and inclusion.

140

Lacking experience either as a cabinet appointee or governor, Nixon came to

the presidency absolutely no direct management or administrative experience.

As candidate, he had declared his belief in “a Cabinet made up of the ablest men

in America, leaders in their own right and not merely by virtue of appointment”

(Schlesinger, 2004). For him managing complex government organizations was

either a science or a profession, but in his view it was not a presidential responsibility – a belief he reinforced when he introduced his entire proposed cabinet on national television saying each nominee was “ . . . an independent thinker . . .

[and that he did not] want a cabinet of ‘Yes’ men” (Nathan, 1983).

In the run up to the election, Nixon frequently declared his belief in a strong

Cabinet that “ . . .would be the focal point of policy development, as it had been in the Eisenhower Administration” (Warshaw, 1991). There were, however, unplanned negative consequences for Nixon resulting from his confidence in an un- tested Cabinet. Given his focus on foreign policy while his senior appointees settled into their cabinet positions, contributed to the administration’s dearth of domestic legislative proposals in its first year. This apparent lack of interest in domestic issues strained relations generally with the Congress but particularly with the leaders of the minority Republicans who saw opportunity slipping away. Nixon firmly intended to focus on international affairs and “take on only

141

the big plays” when it came to domestic issues (H. R. Haldeman quoted in

(Pfiffner, 1999b)).

At one of the first cabinet meetings, Nixon was asked by his Secretaries for di-

rection on the staffing processes to be followed by Agencies. The new president,

disinterested as he was in such topics, was unprepared and chose to sidestep the

issue by declaring “primary responsibility for filling positions belonged to the

Cabinet officers themselves . . . [and they were to be filled] on the basis of ability

first and loyalty second” (Mackenzie, 1981). Even as he was leaving this session,

he realized the extent of the tactical error he had just committed (Black, 2008) ,

since once given, this authority and autonomy proved difficult for the White

House to wrest back from the Secretaries (Michaels, 1997). The Nixon Admini-

stration paid a high price in recovering control over this vital function in terms of

lost time, credibility and damaged working relations.

At first glance, an inclination toward “cabinet government” would appear to be a direct repudiation by Nixon of the personal, hands-on management styles of

Kennedy and Johnson; however, such a construct fit amazingly well Nixon’s per-

sonal preference for the more formalized approach to governing he had known

under Eisenhower. Warshaw supports the view that initially any strengthening

of the Cabinet would have blunted the increased power of an enlarged White

House staff which Lyndon Johnson had encouraged (Warshaw, 1996) and to

142 which Nixon was philosophically opposed; however, expanding the authority of the White House staff at the expense of the cabinet is what ultimately characterized Nixon’s Administration.

Within the first year, Nixon and his senior advisers began consolidating vast amounts of power and policy development inside the White House. The campaign promise that his cabinet would be the source of well crafted policy to rival

Eisenhower’s turned out to be nothing more than rhetoric (Warshaw, 1991). The

Secretaries were supposed to have been a group of the ablest men formulating policy through a process of open debate and consensus building (Schlesinger,

2004; Warshaw, 1991), but the circle of White House advisers ensured otherwise.

From the earliest days of his administration, however, Nixon’s deeds failed to match his words. Perhaps the most noteworthy example of such a disconnect was the Nixon-Kissinger relationship. Officially, Kissinger was the President’s

Adviser for Foreign Affairs, but he acquired so much power that Secretary of

State William Rogers was isolated within the administration, relegated to the pe- riphery, and deprived of all credibility (Burke, 2000a; Patterson, 2000). A similar example is found in the elevation of John Ehrlichman to the position of the Presi- dent’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs, who was given so much decision making power and direct presidential access that his influence, too, quickly surpassed that of any Senate-confirmed Cabinet Secretary. The administration’s Berlin Wall

143

encircled the Oval Office so effectively that “[b]y the end of Richard Nixon‘s first

term, the original strong cabinet model had been fully displaced” (Nathan, 1975).

Contrary to his words, Nixon entered office with a deep-seated distrust of

senior career civil servants. In time he even came to distrust his own appointees because he felt “that hey had been co-opted by the career bureaucracy” (Pfiffner

and Brook, 2000). Ehrlichman once rationalized this distrust claiming appointees

were given to “marrying the natives” after which they ceased to be responsive to

White House instructions (Pfiffner, 1996). Nixon’s distrust continued to deepen,

and he came to rely almost exclusively on his inner circle.

Right after his re-election in 1972, he “declared he had lost confidence in the

people he had called to serve him, and instead of celebrating by recognizing the

hard work” needed to win a second term, Nixon (through Haldeman) “de-

manded the pro forma resignations of his entire cabinet” (Michaels, 1997). Years later Nixon admitted this was a mistake having failed “ . . . to take into account the chilling effect this action would have on the morale of people who had worked so hard ” (Nixon, 1990). It has even been suggested that showing little

support for his cabinet revealed the internal rifts within the Executive Branch,

which in turn diminished the level of confidence that Congress had in the Ad-

ministration (Warshaw, 1991). Subsequent two-term presidents (Reagan, Clinton

144 and Bush II) took care to avoid this trap by choosing, instead, to stress stability and cohesiveness among their highest-level appointees (Patterson, 2000).

Nixon’s Management Model:

Throughout his life, Nixon had been uncomfortable with personal disagreement even if limited to “a spirited debate” (Greenstein, 2002). “Although quite at home with political conflict in the broader public arena, he had a pronounced distaste for being exposed to it face-to-face; he was an extreme ‘conflict avoider’ on a personal level” (George, 1998b). This distaste was even noted by Kissinger, who wrote, “[he] abhorred confronting colleagues with whom he disagreed . . . and shunned persuading or inspiring his subordinates” (Pfiffner, 1999b).

Unfortunately, Nixon viewed the federal bureaucracy as the enemy

(Heubner, 2001) - a “faceless machine” (Bonafede, 1987), which he was determined to tame. Richard Nixon had proven himself capable of overcoming what were for him difficult tasks, and he prided himself in his ability to organize and take on larger and larger challenges (Pfiffner, 1999b). He abandoned the spokes- of-the-wheel management model that “. . . both Kennedy and Johnson had used and returned to the hierarchical staff structure that Eisenhower had started”

(Warshaw, 1999). Given his negative opinions of the bureaucracy, of his own appointees, and people in general, he delegated more authority to his trusted

145 lieutenants than any other president, thereby insulating himself by inserting surrogates between himself and the source of any potential confrontation.

Figure 2-7 The Formalistic Model (Nixon) 61

The diagram in Figure 2-7 clearly shows how the delegation of authority to his Special Assistant for National Security simultaneously met Nixon’s management responsibilities as well as his psychological needs. “Nixon’s pronounced

61 This diagram appears as figure 6.5 in Presidential Personality and Performance , edited by Alexander and Juliette George, and is included here with the publisher’s permission.

146

sense of aloneness and privacy, his thin-skinned sensitivity and vulnerability

were not conducive to developing the kinds of interpersonal relationships asso-

ciated with a collegial model of management” (George, 1998b) . Compare the de-

gree of presidential separation according to the Formalistic Model above with the

levels of presidential involvement under Roosevelt (see page 58) and Kennedy

(see page 98).

Summary:

During the course of his 30 year political career, Richard Nixon won a major-

ity in only 3 elections, and each of these grew out of his belief in destroying his

opponent to win at any cost. He adopted this philosophy in his first election in

1946, in which he deliberately conducted a smear campaign against Representa-

tive Jerry Voorhis; then again in 1948 he personally attacked Congresswoman

Helen Gahagan Douglas accusing her of being a communist sympathizer. He

labeled her the “Pink Lady,” after which she began referring to him as “Tricky

Dick” – a name that stuck with him his entire life. These two elections, however,

were but precursors to the Watergate “dirty tricks” and his 1972 election victory.

According to an Eisenhower biographer, after personally destroying his first op-

ponent without compunction, Nixon effectively had “ . . . made the transition

from nice Quaker boy to ruthless politician without noticing” or ever looking back (Ambrose, 1990).

147

Other evidence of Nixon’s “Win by Any Means” philosophy is found in the

1968 election when he secretly sabotaged Lyndon Johnson’s efforts to initiate a peace conference in Paris out of fear the timing of a meeting would help Hubert

Humphrey win. Nixon sent a personal representative to communicate secretly with the South Vietnamese saying they would get a better deal from a Nixon

Administration and asked them to stall peace talks until after the November election (Watson, 2004). The prospect of extending the war or losing more lives seems not to have been a concern for him.

Long before “flip-flop” became a standard political accusation, Richard Nixon was practicing it. As president, he frequently reversed or ignored public declarations of support for his appointees or even his own long-held political and ideological positions. Despite his statements of belief in cabinet government, his actions undermined all possibility of achieving it (Warshaw, 1991, 1999). Through- out 1968, he claimed he would appoint only “independent thinkers . . . not Yes- men,” yet he only recruited faithful lieutenants and sycophants. Julie Nixon observed, “Loyalty was demanded of all, not judgment” (Doyle, 1999). Nixon made a total of 31 cabinet appointments; all were white males.

During the course of his career, Nixon had “embraced Eisenhower Republi- cans and Rockefeller liberals . . . Goldwater conservatives as well as Southern -

Democrats . . . [his rabid anti-communism morphed into a passionate] pursuit of

148 détente with China and the Soviet Union . . . [but due to the strain of Watergate,]

Nixon emerged as so divided a person and dysfunctional a leader that only his opportunism remained constant . . .” (Burns, 2006)

Nixon generally distrusted people but particularly government careerists.

His approach to the presidency was predicated on conquering the bureaucracy as well as completing end runs around Congress (Heubner, 2001). Because of this deep-seated distrust of the permanent government, he began ramping up the numbers of his staff and placing handpicked White House Loyalists inside the

Agencies. Ironically however, “. . . in doing so . . . he built his own bureaucracy”

(Nathan, 1975) – a counter bureaucracy, which he also came to distrust. His view of the press and its role in a democratic society was even more distrusted, and he never developed any connection to the people he was elected to serve.

Most presidents instinctively understand that their success, and perhaps even their place in history, hinge on not isolating themselves or limiting their information to a few handpicked sources. All presidents prior to Nixon acknowledged the legitimacy and usefulness of alternative opinions, and to varying extents, each understood the practicality aspects of compromise. Unfortunately for

Nixon, he chose to “. . . organize the executive branch and the White House in order to shield himself as far as humanly possible from direct . . . [dialogue,] question or challenge” (Schlesinger, 2004).

149

Nixon either failed to understand or simply gave in to his need for personal seclusion. Either way, the “result was the enthronement of unreality . . . [and according to Senator Charles Mathias, Nixon’s creation of] . . . a house of mirrors in which all views and ideas tend[ed] to reflect and reinforce his own”(Schlesinger,

2004). By accepting information from only friendly sources, he constructed “an echo chamber” that merely magnified his own the voice (Hess, 2002). To his further detriment, his overzealous lieutenants also failed to realize that providing too much protection actually impeded Nixon’s effectiveness (Greenstein, 2004).

It was the combination of his personal detachment, a sense of entitlement, and his enjoyment of the trappings of the office that led Schlesinger to describe his as the first “Imperial Presidency.”

Much of the highly personal and divisive politics observable today in Ameri- can society has it origins in the Nixon Administration. Claiming to have the un- qualified support of a silent majority, he dismissed “the gay libs, welfare rights, the black militants, the women’s libs, the pot-smokers, the long-haired college kids . . . [and] Nixon saw nothing but political opportunity in stoking social and cultural polarization” (Burns, 2006). The right of executive privilege was a claim

Nixon made frequent and extensive use of in order to shield his office from in- quiry, “thereby establishing a ‘go it alone’ attitude vis-à-vis the Congress” and

150 the Courts (Michaels, 1997) – something that was to become a frequent source of inter-Branch friction under the Reagan and Bush II Administrations.

Nixon was a highly analytical and strategic thinker (Warshaw, 1999) as well as “an agile and adept politician” (Greenstein, 2004). He was capable of complex thought on a macro level, yet he lacked sensitivity for any consequences on a detailed level. In the end, his irrational need in combination with the belief that he actually could control everything around him derailed his noteworthy intellect and abilities.

Unfortunately, “ . . . in spite of his brilliance, Nixon seemed to bring troubles on himself” (Greenstein, 2004). The day after his 1972 landslide reelection, Nixon gathered the White House staff in what should have been a celebration. “Hal- deman then asked everyone to submit a pro forma resignation . . . [one hour later, this was repeated with the cabinet” (Jones, 2005). Nixon neither anticipated the effect on staff morale that such a request would have, nor did he consider that it a risk to his administration. Shortly before Christmas, Nixon announced he had, in fact, decided to accept 57 resignations and was planning an additional 87 personnel actions (Hess, 2002).

“From 1933 to 1965 the median length of service for cabinet officials was 40 months; during Nixon’s presidency it dropped to 18 [months]” (Hess, 2002). In his first term, Nixon kept his cabinet at arm’s length, and he began his second

151

term with the “most anonymous cabinet in memory, a cabinet . . . of compliant

and faceless men who stood for nothing and were certified not to defy presiden-

tial whim” (Schlesinger, 2004). The numbers reveal that “Nixon ran through

cabinet members faster than any president in recent history” (Cronin, 2003); con-

sequently, the second Nixon term is often identified as the historical starting

point of shortened cabinet tenures which have not yet reversed (Michaels, 1997).

Richard Nixon was the mirror opposite of Lyndon Johnson. The latter’s ob-

vious strengths lay in domestic policy and reluctantly dealt with international

issues, whereas Nixon, who saw the presidency from the other side of the prism,

had the vision to alter permanently US relations with the Soviet Union and

Communist China. Ultimately, and unfortunately, each man‘s presidency has

come to be defined more by his weaknesses than strengths.

Harry Truman once said of (Senator) Nixon:

“Richard Nixon is a no-good lying bastard. He can lie out of both sides of his mouth at the same time, and if he ever caught himself telling the truth, he’d lie just to keep his hand in. “ (Harry Truman quoted in (Rubenzer, 2004))

Richard Nixon served from January 20, 1969 to August 9, 1974 and made a total of 31 cabinet-level appointments.

152

2.1.3.7 Gerald R. Ford (1974 – 1977)

Presidential Style & Personality :

All vice presidents who succeed to the presidency unelected do so during a period of significant national political and even psychological destabilization; it is, for the most part, a time when the country is greatly in need of reassurance.

Truman and Johnson had had to project just the right blend of continuity from their highly popular predecessors along with a reassuring nudge toward a new, more positive future. Gerald Ford, on the other hand, was faced with inverse situation: he had to instill national confidence amidst a much-needed sense of discontinuity to the politically exhausted nation.

Jerry Ford was welcomed by both the public and the news media merely for not being Richard Nixon (or Lyndon Johnson) (Greenstein, 2004), but it was his everyman image and down-to-earth personality that underpinned the nation’s collective relief. “Whatever the burdens of the Roosevelt legacy for Truman or the Kennedy legacy for Johnson, they paled in comparison to what Nixon left for

Ford” (Jones, 2005). He more than either of those vice presidents needed to hit the ground running, offer great hope for the future, and put a clear end to the

Nixon era.

Gerald Ford was significantly more prepared to assume the presidency than his predecessors Truman or Johnson had been inasmuch as he was aware of the

153 extended political firestorm over Watergate (DeFrank, 2007).62 Unlike those other vice presidents, Ford became increasingly aware that a normal completion of Nixon’s presidency was uncertain at best and that, in fact, impeachment was a distinct possibility. As had Truman and Johnson, Ford entered the Oval Office as a result of his predecessor’s terminated presidency, and although he inherited a nation in turmoil, and despite having to rebuild the public’s confidence in the presidency itself (Hess, 2002; Schlesinger, 2004), he was not confronted with a country in mourning over the loss of its leader.

An outstanding athlete in college, Jerry Ford turned down contract offers from the Green Bay Packers and Detroit Lions in order to attend Yale Law School after which he distinguished himself in World War II (Brinkley, 2007). In 1949,

Gerald Ford was elected to Congress from Michigan’s 5th District – a safe and solidly Republican seat, which he easily held for the next 25 years. As a freshman Congressman, he came to know both John Kennedy and Richard Nixon well, but unlike them, he never aspired to the Oval Office. Not without signifi-

62 For decades after leaving the White House, Ford claimed he never thought Nixon would leave office prematurely until just days before it actually happened. DeFrank, however, states that in May, 1973, then-Vice President Jerry Ford, in a private conversation with him, acknowledged that Nixon would not survive politically and that he (Ford) would assume the presidency.

Ford agreed to a series of candid, off-the-record interviews in exchange for DeFrank’s silence on the prediction. Each upheld his part of the bargain, and what resulted was a series of conversations that spanned three decades, the last of which occurring just days before Ford’s death in 2006. Though peppered with his personal and rather positively biased opinions, DeFrank claims the book is a faithful compilation of Ford’s blunt political observations shared over a 30 year period.

154 cant ambition, however, his goal was to become Speaker of the House (Brinkley,

2007; Greene, 1995). Over the course of a quarter century, he carefully built a reputation for being reliable, hardworking, fair-minded, dedicated, and fiercely loyal, but above all as someone who believed in playing by the rules. In 1963,

Lyndon Johnson named Jerry Ford the sole Republican Congressman to the War- ren Commission 63 , which was responsible for conducting the official investigation into the assassination of John Kennedy.

The results of the Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study identify Ford, along with Eisenhower, as one of the “good guys” of the modern presidency and ranks

Ford slightly ahead of Ike with respect to agreeableness and extraversion

(Rubenzer, 2004), although he was known to display rare, but controlled, bursts of anger over accusations of disloyalty (DeFrank, 2007). In overall personality, he most resembled George H. W. Bush and was least like Richard Nixon

(Rubenzer, 2004).

Even though Jerry Ford was highly respected on both sides of the Congres- sional aisle, he did not enjoy the same professional regard inside the Nixon

White House. John Ehrlichman, who had served initially as the administration’s liaison to Congress, never held Ford in high esteem. Ehrlichman referred to the

63 Lyndon Johnson assembled a seven member team under the direction of Chief Justice Earl War- ren. Serving on the Commission were: Sen. Richard Russell (D-GA), Sen. John Cooper (R-KY), Congressman Hale Boggs (D-LA), Congressman Jerry Ford (R-MI), Allen Dulles (former CIA Director) and John McCloy, (former president of The World Bank.)

155

majority of Republicans on the Hill as that “Congressional herd of mediocrities”

saying after his initial meeting with House Minority Leader Jerry Ford, “. . . I was

not impressed . . . he might have become a pretty good Grand Rapids insurance

agent . . . he wasn’t excessively bright” (Brinkley, 2007). Brinkley states further

that Ford was equally unimpressed by Ehrlichman, and he credits Ford’s finely

tuned political instincts in maintaining a safe distance from Nixon’s staffers even

in the earliest days of the administration.

In 1973, Vice President Spiro Agnew was indicted for, and subsequently

found guilty of, extortion, bribery and tax evasion, thereby making him the only

vice president ever to resign the office. 64 Nixon’s first choice to replace Agnew

was Treasury Secretary John Connally (Black, 2008), but Connally carried too

much political baggage. He was a Democrat-turned-Republican, a former Secre-

tary of the Navy under Kennedy, and a long time personal friend of Lyndon

Johnson; thus, he was unacceptable to the majority of Republicans (Hess, 2002).

Ronald Reagan was the favorite among party conservatives, while Nelson Rocke-

feller was the clear preference of the liberal wing (Black, 2008). Under increasing

political pressure due to the looming Watergate crisis, Nixon hoped to reach out

64 In his memoir, Go Quietly – or else , Agnew claims that Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, and possibly Nixon himself, were prepared to have him assassinated if he refused to resign the vie presidency. Agnew also asserts that Nixon could have saved him had he chosen to, but opted instead to sacrifice him in an attempt to salvage his own embattled presidency (Agnew, 1980). Whatever the actual motivations, Agnew’s resignation resulted in Jerry Ford’s becoming the first person to be appointed as vice president.

156

to congressional leaders of both parties by collaborating on a replacement for

Agnew. The imperiled president quickly accepted the political reality: only Jerry

Ford could ever be confirmed by both the House and the Senate (Nixon, 1990) as

required by the Twenty-fifth Amendment. 65

Gerald Ford was confirmed as vice president in December, 1973, and immediately undertook a highly visible defense of Nixon and any involvement in Wa-

tergate in ways that Agnew had never done (Nixon, 1990). As the administra-

tion’s representative at large, Ford traveled the country logging more than

130,000 miles, visiting 41 states, and making over 500 speeches trying to rally

grass roots support for the administration and its policies, all the while declaring

his presumption of Nixon’s innocence of impeachable acts, let alone anything il-

65 The Constitution as written fails to provide for replacing a vice president who leaves the office either by becoming president or vacating it due to either resignation or death. The country had no vice president for almost four years during Truman’s first term as president, and again during the 13 months that Lyndon Johnson served out JFK’s term. Under the Constitution, the Speaker of the House was next in succession during those periods. As a result, Congress proposed a Constitutional Amendment that provided for the “naming” of a vice president subject to confirmation by both the House and Senate.

Had Nixon failed to get congressional confirmation when he nominated a vice presidential candidate, then Carl Albert, the Democratic Speaker of the House, would have remained the next elected official in the presidential line of succession. That he was a Democrat would have severely complicated and further polarized the already volatile Watergate investigations, not to mention Nixon’s ultimate exit from office (Milkis, 2008).

The 25 th Amendment was ratified by the requisite number of states and made part of the Consti- tution on February 10, 1967. It has only been invoked twice: First, Nixon named Jerry Ford to replace Spiro Agnew, and second, Ford named Nelson Rockefeller to the office after he had become president. Between the time of Nixon’s resignation and Carter’s inauguration, the offices of president and vice president were concurrently filled according to the terms of this Amend- ment rather than by national election – a possibility that the constitutional framers never anticipated.

157

legal (DeFrank, 2007). His stubborn defense of Nixon despite the warnings of his

own staff and even those of Mrs. Ford (Woodward and Bernstein, 2005) was po-

litically dangerous. The reality was, however, that he “[ . . . had stayed out of

Washington as much as possible, as vice president, promoting Nixon’s innocence

while keeping a safe distance [from Nixon and the investigations] . . .” (Werth,

2006). Given his position within the administration, Vice President Ford could

have had access to reports, information and perhaps even transcripts of the Wa- tergate tapes themselves at any time simply by asking for them; however, he carefully chose not to do so. Consequently, for the better part of a year, he was able to state categorically, and, at least in his mind, truthfully that he had no

“first hand knowledge” of any guilt or illegal act on Nixon's part (DeFrank,

2007). In his memoirs, Ford claims he even avoided speculating about the legali- ties surrounding the Watergate case or any long-term consequences of Nixon’s actions but admits that by August, 1974, he no longer doubted the political conclusion: “Nixon was finished” (Ford, 1987).

On August 8, Nixon met with his loyal vice president for an hour and a half informing him personally of his decision to leave office. At that meeting, he made only two staffing recommendations: first, that Kissinger should be retained as Secretary of State and second, for Haig to remain as Chief of Staff, at least for a reasonable transition period (Nash, 1980). That evening on national television,

158

Richard Nixon announced his resignation from the presidency effective the fol-

lowing day at noon.

Gerald Ford, just as Harry Truman had been three decades before, was sworn

in to the presidency at the White House (rather than the Capitol) by the Chief

Justice of the Supreme Court and concluded his remarks by declaring, “Our long

national nightmare is over” (Ford, 1974).

Presidential Transition:

Presidents-elect have a three-month period in which to plan for their admini-

strations. In addition to time, they have legions of campaign supporters and an

organized political party structure from which to draw when taking over the

government under normal post-election conditions. Thrust as he was into an of-

fice he had never sought, Gerald Ford had nothing but a small vice presidential

staff to draw from, most of whom had come with him from Capitol Hill just

months earlier (Greene, 1995). Ford selected former Congressman Donald Rums-

feld to head his transition team of five trusted individuals.

On a personal basis, Ford identified far more with Harry Truman than he did

with Lyndon Johnson (Leuchtenburg, 2001) and approached his presidency with

similar Midwestern pragmatism; however, just as the other two accidental presi-

dents, on his first day, Gerald Ford was handed an intact government and cabi-

net that had been shaped by and for his predecessor.

159

It is not clear exactly when Jerry Ford had actually begun thinking in terms of assuming the presidency. What is certain, however, is that Ford’s deep sense of loyalty and his political sensitivities did not allow him to take any action that could in any way be interpreted as overtly planning a new administration, since to do so would have been interpreted as an indictment of Nixon. Unbeknownst to the vice president, preliminary discussions and planning for a Ford Admini- stration had occurred among his senior staff, without his involvement or approval, as early as May, 1974 (Greene, 1995; Woodward and Bernstein, 2005). On

August 5, just days before their private meeting, Nixon sent Chief of Staff Alex- ander Haig to inform the vice president that resignation was “a real possibility”

(Nixon, 1990), even though Haig had met with Ford on August 1 to discuss the

"hypothetical possibility" that Nixon “might” resign (Brinkley, 2007). At Nixon's direction, Haig had also met with Republican National Committee Chairman

George H. W. Bush earlier on the morning of August 1 – a fact that Haig appears to have withheld from Ford. By the time of his final meeting with Nixon, Jerry

Ford had only 72 hours officially in which to plan openly the initial organization of his White House.

When Gerald Ford took office, the country was facing more than just Water- gate-related turmoil or the first presidential resignation in history. Domestically the country was grappling with stagflation – something that economists had up

160

until then claimed was systemically impossible, that is, recession accompanied

simultaneously by high inflation. The new president was confronted with sig-

nificant rates of long term unemployment, a soaring annualized inflation rate

that had reached the 12% mark (Doyle, 1999), the aftermath of the 1972 oil embargo, the economic consequences of Nixon’s policy of wage and price freezes,

the first pandemic of the H1N1 virus (swine flu), and an irate Congress bent on

reining in an Executive Branch gone out of control. Internationally, the Vietnam

War still dragged on, détente with the Soviet Union and China was still in fragile

states of development, and in the Middle East, the 1973 Yom Kippur War was

not fully a year in the past.

There is almost no literature that focuses exclusively on political transitions between incoming and outgoing (living) presidents. The major exception is

Brauer’s 1986 work spanning the four decade period from the Eisenhower

through Reagan administrations. Unfortunately, this work excludes discussion

of Truman’s, Johnson’s and Ford’s assumptions of the presidency as well as sec-

ond term presidencies during that period asserting the differences are sufficient

enough as to warrant separate study (Brauer, 1986).

One Hundred Days:

Given the urgency of events surrounding his assumption of the presidency,

the hundred day legislative sprint was not a consideration for Gerald Ford, who

161 was not directly influenced, either positively or negatively, by FDR

(Leuchtenburg, 2001). Inasmuch as he had not run for the presidency, he had neither campaign promises nor legislative initiatives to make good upon. The press, however, still made the inevitable Rooseveltian comparisons. They were slightly unfair to the new administration, which began to deal immediately with the major domestic issues of the day – all of which had fallen off the political radar while the Nixon administration slowly imploded. From the first hours of the

Ford presidency, the most frequently asked questions at press conferences reflected the nation’s continuing fixation with the legal fate of Richard Nixon

(Brinkley, 2007; DeFrank, 2007). If Ford found himself in any president’s shadow, it wasn’t Roosevelt’s but rather that of his predecessor.

From the start of the new administration, there were numerous turf battles and confrontations between the former vice president’s incoming team and the Nixon staffers left behind (Greenstein, 2004), most notably involving Alexan- der Haig and Henry Kissinger. Such organizational shoving matches resulted in poor articulation of the new president’s agenda and resulted in very few legislative initiatives being sent to the Hill (Warshaw, 1999). The initially cordial relations with Congress were suddenly strained to the breaking point when, only 31 days into his administration, President Ford granted and unconditional pardon

162

to Nixon, thereby ending the honeymoon period (Schlesinger, 2004) well short of

the 100 day mark.

Gerald Ford was a veteran of Washington politics, or, to be more precise,

those of Capitol Hill but had spent most of his tenure as vice president traveling

the country and sensing the political mood. He knew as president that he

needed to move quickly in restoring a national sense of order, confidence and

reassurance after Nixon’s humiliation of the presidency (Greenstein, 2004). Fur-

thermore, he was critically aware of the strains that had developed between the

Executive and Legislative Branches and determined that as president it would be

necessary for him to bridge the gap with his former congressional colleagues. He

identified the struggling economy as his top domestic focus of his legislative ac-

tivities calling inflation “domestic enemy number one” (Greene, 1995), but the

pardon ultimately cost Ford decade’s worth of congressional good will.

On only his 4th day in office, he gave a nationally televised address to a joint

session of Congress in which he laid out the political philosophy of his new ad-

ministration saying it was time to “. . . restrain federal spending, and bring infla-

tion under control.” He hoped to declare the end of an era by pledging new

presidential leadership saying, “There will be no illegal tapings, eavesdropping, buggings, or break-ins by my administration” (Gerald Ford quoted in (Werth,

2006)). He intentionally focused attention on the pressing domestic issues that

163 had lain all-but-ignored by Nixon (Mieczkowski, 2005), and by bringing his case directly to the people, he began the process of national healing based on openness that he felt was critical in order to get past the issues left unresolved by his predecessor.

Gerald Ford, the veteran Congressman, and until-recently the first unelected vice president, attempted to rally the country in a way that was almost campaign-like (Greene, 1995). By means of a national speech, which was highly successful, Ford declared his intention to make a clean break from the country’s soiled past and, furthermore, to restore the nation’s confidence in its democratic institutions. Thus, with one speech, Gerald Ford declared the end of his twenty- five year career as a House Member and the start of a new presidential era.

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

The term “invisible presidency” has been applied to a White House staff structure that grew increasingly larger and more complex across the span of the modern presidency (Koenig quoted in (Warshaw, 1999)). The phrase had taken on such a negative – almost clandestine – connotation during the Nixon era that

Ford took obvious and highly symbolic steps in constructing a very different administration.

“Having stayed out of Washington as much as possible as vice president, promoting Nixon’s innocence while keeping a safe distance, his grasp of how the

164

White House was organized and operated was uncertain “ (Werth, 2006). There-

fore, on entering office, Jerry Ford was highly dependent on the staff structure

that Nixon had left behind, at least initially. Many of those on Ford’s transition

team, however, strongly urged him to replace the Nixon appointees immedi-

ately, but the new president opposed any wholesale “Stalinlike” purges saying

that while he acknowledged the need for his own people “Nobody was going to be thrown off the plane without a parachute” (Gerald Ford quoted in (Hess,

2002)). Within just a few weeks of taking office, however, he saw the wisdom in

his team’s advice and began bringing in new appointees.

A prime example of breaking with his predecessor’s management style was

his aversion to the title “Chief of Staff” and replacing it instead with the less nox-

ious one of “Staff Coordinator” even though the job’s functions were essentially

unchanged (Greene, 1995). Jerry Ford had over the course of a quarter century “.

. . grown comfortable with the way he had interacted with a small congressional

staff [and] wanted to be his own chief of staff” (Hess, 2002). In another apparent

repudiation of Nixon’s organizational structure, Ford tore down the barricades

that had surrounded the Oval Office and announced an open door policy to both

the (Nixon-appointed) Cabinet Secretaries and senior White House staff (Kumar,

2003c). Ford envisioned something akin to the Knights of the Round Table

165 where all members of the president’s inner circle played unique roles of equal importance (Nash, 1980; Pfiffner, 1999b).

An egalitarian management style based on trust and optimism fit Ford’s personality perfectly. Not only did he believe he could, but he strongly believed he should, establish a tone of openness by following the Kennedy management model of the spokes-of-the-wheel, in which the president served as the organizational hub connected directly to multiple functional areas through specific individuals who served as the spokes (Nash, 1980).

It did not take Ford long to realize that being too accessible was in fact counterproductive to being an effective Chief Executive. Not even in theory was such a management approach viable given that the White House staff had grown to more than 500. In retrospect, Ford admitted:

“I started out in effect not having a chief of staff and it didn’t work . . . [you need someone working] so closely with you . . . almost an alter ego. I just can’t imagine a president not having an effective chief of staff.” (Gerald Ford quoted in (Patterson, 2008))

Jerry Ford named Donald Rumsfeld to be his White House Staff Coordinator when he reassigned Alexander Haig as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe in September, 1974. 66 Approximately one year later, Rumsfeld

66 The Ford transition was highly compressed lasting little more than a month, after which Ford considered nominating Haig as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – a position that requires Senate confirmation. Members of the new administration became concerned that confirmation hearings might become controversial or, worse yet, rekindle intense media scrutiny due to Haig’s

166 was named Secretary of Defense, replacing Nixon appointee James Schlesinger, and Dick Cheney then became the White House Staff Coordinator. Donald

Rumsfeld turned out to be such a powerful force within the Ford White House that he was not only able to displace Alexander Haig, but also to engineer the removal of Defense Secretary James Schlesinger. Moreover, he was successful in marginalizing Vice President Rockefeller within the administrative sphere of influence and, to a limited extent, even in blunting the star power of Henry Kiss- inger (Werth, 2006; Brinkley, 2007).

From the beginning of his presidency, Ford demonstrated an exceptional degree of interest in staffing at all levels of his administration that was second only to Johnson’s. The new president met routinely with his personnel director, sometimes as frequently as three or four times per week (Mieczkowski, 2005).

Ford and his staffing director scuttled the name White House Personnel Opera- tion (WHPO) in favor of the less officious Presidential Personnel Office (PPO) and decreased the Nixon technique of relying on professional recruiters to find candidates. Believing it more effective “. . . to put personnel decisions back in the hands of people with substantive government experience” (Mackenzie, 1981), the new administration preferred “knowledgeable Washington generalists in an ef-

close association with Nixon in the post-Haldeman era. Ford opted instead to avoid the political risk of renewed Congressional attention on Watergate so soon after pardoning Nixon. There- fore, he opted to name Haig to the NATO post which does not require Senate approval.

167 fort to shift from politics to good government” (Michaels, 1997). This made a huge difference as he “. . . face the toughest recruiting challenges [of the modern presidency] . . . in the aftermath of Watergate . . . “ (Macy, 1983) and the Nixon pardon. The latter haunted Ford’s entire tenure in office and made his reelection chances doubtful (Mackenzie, 1981) within 30 days of taking office (DeFrank,

2007).

Despite the investment of the president’s time, there was a decline in the overall numbers of political appointees. Lewis suggests there were greater was a greater than normal rate of attrition as a result of the Watergate taint and concludes that the Ford Administration found it exceptionally difficult to attract

(and/or obtain Senate confirmation of) the most qualified people (Lewis, 2008).

As difficult as the situation was post-Watergate, it would have been significantly more difficult for the administration to fill appointments had Gerald Ford detached himself from the personnel process as many other presidents have.

Ford in Relation to his Cabinet:

Ford believed that Watergate had only been possible because Nixon was almost entirely detached operationally. He was out of touch with the staffing process, an unchecked chief of staff, and White House aides, who, needing to fill the presidential leadership vacuum, ultimately came to wield more decision

168 making power than even cabinet officers. He “. . . wanted to reverse the trend and restore authority to the Cabinet” (Gerald Ford quoted in (Bonafede, 1987)).

The day after his inauguration, Ford met the cabinet saying he did not want, expect or plan to accept any resignations (Werth, 2006). Ford was deeply re- spectful of people in public service felt that even the slightest perception of any house cleaning would send exactly the wrong message (DeFrank, 2007). Recall- ing how Nixon (via Haldeman) had cleaned house after his landslide re-election in 1972, the Ford Administration was faced with a majority of recently-arrived cabinet officers whose entire tenures had been “marred by Watergate and the resulting White House paralysis . . . [these men constituted] a group that, as a whole, represented both the strangeness and half-realized hopes of Nixon’s aborted second term” (Werth, 2006).

Once again, Ford found himself in the cross fire, caught between his commitment to providing continuity and stability while at the same time wanting to establish himself as the very different new man in the Oval Office. Ford and

Rumsfeld set about restoring policy-making authority to the cabinet as well as granting the Secretaries open access to the president (Hess, 2002).

In January, 1975, approximately four months after taking office, Ford began making changes among the cabinet officers. By the six month mark, he had re-

169 placed the Attorney General 67 and the Secretaries of Labor 68 , Transportation 69 ,

Commerce 70 and HUD. 71 By the end of his term, Ford also replaced Nixon’s cabinet secretaries at Interior 72 , HEW73 , Defense, the NSC 74 , and the CIA. 75

Of all Nixon’s cabinet-level appointees, only Henry Kissinger at State and

William Simon at Treasury remained throughout Ford’s term in office. Yet, what appeared to be a complete cabinet shakeup actually equated to little more than a realignment of Nixon’s appointees into, what seemed to Ford, a more suitable configuration.

67 On replacing him, Ford named William Saxbe as Ambassador to India. 68 On replacing him, Ford offered to name Peter Brennan as Ambassador to Ireland, but Brennan declined, after which he left government permanently. 69 On being replaced by Ford, Claude Brinegar left government permanently. 70 On replacing him, Ford named Frederick Dent as U S Trade Representative. 71 On replacing him, Ford named James Lynn as Director of OMB. 72 On replacing him at the Department of the Interior, Ford named Rogers Morton as Secretary of Commerce and then subsequently to be his Election Campaign Manager in the 1976 election. 73 On being replaced by Ford, Caspar Weinberger left government for the private sector but returned five years as Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration. 74 Ford named Brent Scowcroft, who had been a military adviser to Nixon, to replace Kissinger as head of the National Security Council, but Kissinger remained Ford’s Secretary of State. 75 Ford named George H. W. Bush, Nixon’s Diplomatic Representative to the People’s Republic of China, to replace William Colby as Director of the CIA. Ford offered to name Colby as U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, but Colby declined the position and left government permanently.

170

Table 3: Ford's Inherited Cabinet

Department Appointed by JFK Served from Replaced or (Retained) Served until by Ford Treasury William Simon 5/8/1974 (retained 1/20/77

State Henry Kis singer 9/22/1973 (retained) 1/20/77

Defense James Schlesinger 11/19/75 Donald Rum sfeld 1/20/77

Justice William Saxbe 12/17/1973 Edward Levi 1/20/77

Interior Rogers Mo rton 1/29/1971 Stanley Hathaway 10/9/75 Thomas Kleppe 1/20/77

Agriculture Earl Butz 12/2/ 1971 John Knebel 1/20/77

Commerce Frederick Dent 2/2/1973 Rogers Mo rton 2/2/76 Eliot Richardson 1/20/77

Labor Peter Bre nnan 2/2/1973 John Dunlop 1/31/76 W. J. Usery 1/20/77

HEW Elliot Richar dson 6/24/1970 Caspar Weinberger 8/10/75 David Mathews 1/20/77

HUD James T. Lynn 2/22/1973 Carla Hills 1/20/77

Ford’s described his strategy in relating to Cabinet-level appointees:

• Have no special confidants within the cabinet;

• Listen, don’t confide;

• Don’t get involved in jurisdictional rivalries;

• Have confidants outside the cabinet from whom advice can be solicited;

171

• Don’t get mired down in detail – handle broad policy decisions and leave

the management and program implementation to the department heads;

• Move aggressively on all fronts toward resolution and decision;

• Look at all proposals as if you’re going to have to be the advocates who

sell them to the public; and finally,

• Encourage dissent before a final decision is made. (Gerald Ford quoted in

(Nash, 1980))

Ford’s Management Model:

As a congressman, Jerry Ford maintained a grueling routine, and as the vice

president, he traveled almost continuously. Therefore, it is not surprising that he

applied the same drive in the Oval Office. He, like most modern presidents (Ei-

senhower and Reagan being the notable exceptions), communicated the same

high expectation to his White House staff. “. . . there’s no forty-hour week and

they [staffers] shouldn’t expect it . . . It has to be almost a twenty-four hour-a-day job for both president and staff.” (Gerald Ford quoted in (Kumar, 2003a))

Ford’s managerial style had always been collegial, and he, in stark contrast to

Nixon, preferred having spontaneous give and take with his staff as opposed to impersonal communications through memoranda, formal presentations or official reports (Greene, 1995). His openness in dealing with his cabinet was intended not merely to reverse the pattern of the Nixon years, but was a genuine

172 attempt to turn cabinet meetings into an open forum for exploring and debating important issues. Ford stopped short, however, of allowing the monthly meetings to become policy-making in nature. Rather, they served as a vehicle for him to gather multiple points of view from senior advisers, after which the information formed the basis of decisions that were ultimately his alone (Pfiffner, 1996).

Although he was not a natural administrator (Greenstein, 2004), Ford, unlike his predecessor, was quite comfortable making decisions and then communicating them clearly and directly. Ford continued the modern presidential practice of focused councils, such as the National Security Council and the Council of

Economic Advisers, which were comprised of subject matter experts.

“Ford conducted these [council meetings] as if he were a judge in a courtroom: At the end of a discussion he would pause, ask if anyone have anything further to say, and go to the Oval Office. There he would make his decision, without delay, and in writing – he wanted no misunderstanding about his intention. Once decided, he didn’t worry or second- guess himself; he moved on to the next task at hand.” (James Cannon quoted in (Greenstein, 2004))

Not long into his presidency, Ford gave up on the spokes-of-the-wheel management model. (See page 98). Some analysts claim the new president abandoned this approach because he was inherently too nice a guy, and that by being too available, he was quickly overwhelmed by multiple demands for his time

(Greene, 1995; Pfiffner, 1999a). Other individuals, both inside and outside the

173

administration, believed that Ford’s 25 years in Congress, and especially his ex-

perience as the House Minority Leader, had programmed him to compromise

and build consensus rather than command and direct (Hess, 2002).

Summary:

Jerry Ford enjoyed a brief but intense honeymoon with the American public

that played itself out in the national media. The press delighted in “ . . . the regu-

lar guy who walked down his front walk in slippers to pick up his own newspa-

per” 76 (DeFrank, 2007), but it all ended abruptly. At the end of his first month in office, he granted Nixon “ . . . a full, free, and absolute pardon . . . for all offenses against the United States which he . . . has committed or may have committed . .

.” (Ford, 1974). The public was stunned and Congress was outraged. Political insiders theorized Alexander Haig, Nixon’s loyal advocate and intermediary to the new administration, may have convinced Ford that without such a release, the depressed Richard Nixon might commit suicide (Greene, 1995).

Historian Arthur Schlesinger summed it up saying Ford, “At a stroke . . . re- vived Watergate as an issue and tied himself irrevocably to what [may well be called] . . . the ultimate cover-up . . .” (Schlesinger, 2007). Ford spent the remainder of his long life claiming, “There was no deal” and defending the pardon as

76 Nixon resigned so abruptly that the Fords remained in their suburban Virginia home for a week until all the ex-president’s personal belongings could be packed and removed from the White House residence.

174

his only means of getting on with the business of governing the country and ef-

fectively ending the national paralysis caused by Watergate (Mieczkowski, 2005).

Whatever Ford’s actual intent, pardoning Richard Nixon had the effect of rein-

forcing a national cynicism regarding politics in general and of politicians in par-

ticular. Some political strategists hold that this one act so early in his presidency

probably cost him the 1976 election (Abshire, 2001; DeFrank, 2007).

Although his was considered an accidental presidency by some or simply an

interim presidency by others (Warshaw, 1999), the Ford Administration can be

credited with several “firsts.” His was the first to expand the role of the vice

president to something meaningful – well beyond appearances at ribbon cuttings

and state funerals (Werth, 2006). Jerry Ford was actually the first, although not

the last, modern president to insist that his cabinet to reflect the diversity of the

American people. 77 In struggling to de-Nixonize the White House and restore lost prestige to the presidency, the Ford team organized the first formal orientation program for new senior appointees in order to minimize the learning curve.

These sessions were presented multiple times throughout 1975 (Patterson, 2003).

Jerry Ford’s brief administration also turned out to be pivotal in ways he had not anticipated. At the time his choice of Governor Nelson Rockefeller for vice

77 While not an actual “first,” Ford named Carla Hills to be Secretary of HUD and William T. Coleman as Secretary of Transportation – only the third female and second African American respectively ever to be appointed to Cabinet rank. (See Appendix D - African Americans Ap- pointed to Cabinet on page 509 for the complete list.)

175 president (over Governor Reagan) seemed to be nothing more than selecting a capable man who would provide balance to an apparently conservative ticket.

Vice President Rockefeller not only came from the liberal wing of the party, but simultaneously brought star power and an impeccable establishment pedigree to the first post-Watergate administration. Although unsuccessful, the Rockefeller selection was another attempt on Ford’s part to heal existing rifts within the Re- publican ranks by reaching out to many in the party whom Nixon had slighted.

Unfortunately Ford’s choice backfired resulting in such severe polarization within the Republican Party that the origins of today’s dominant “conservative right” began to form. Nixon’s staunch defenders joined the disaffected Goldwa- terites in support of the Reaganites. Together they seized control from party moderates (represented by Ford) and party liberals who supported Rockefeller.

Ford, in abandoning his belief in the practicality of negotiation and compromise, inadvertently set the stage for the polarization and quasi-religious conservative politics that surged in the 1990s and remains prominent today. Ford failed to recognize in 1974 that his pardon of Nixon plus Reagan’s assault from the right rendered him unelectable in 1976 no matter who the Democratic candidate was.

Given that Reagan and party conservatives (primarily Goldwaterites) were openly challenging the incumbent president, William Simon (Secretary of the

Treasury) and Donald Rumsfeld managed, in 1975, to convince Ford that retain-

176

ing the liberal Rockefeller on the ticket was political suicide (Brinkley, 2007),

They argued, that even if he managed to win the nomination, he would certainly

lose the presidential election with Nelson Rockefeller as his running mate. 78

Unlike previous modern presidents and their vice presidents, Ford and

Rockefeller had a genuinely close working relationship – one that had them meeting regularly and discussing policy on a weekly basis (Hess, 2002). While

Ford had chosen Rockefeller in an attempt to reach out to party liberals and broaden the ticket beyond his own moderate image. He failed to appreciate that among a growing number of Republicans, his vice president represented “everything that antagonized social conservatives” (Werth, 2006). Ford writes in his memoir, that at one of their regular weekly meetings in late 1975, he told the vice president that certain political difficulties might be eliminated if he (Rockefeller) were to choose not to run. Ford told him, “I’m not asking you to do that, I’m just stating the facts”(Ford, 1987). Shortly thereafter, Rockefeller loyally and stoically wrote Ford, publicly declaring his intention not to run for the vice presidency.

Jerry Ford and his conservative running mate, Robert Dole, lost their White

House bid in 1976, but years later Ford admitted, “My not defending Nelson at that juncture is my biggest professional regret . . . He was a good man, and, and I

78 The argument held that in the event the Ford-Rockefeller ticket were able to beat back the Reagan challenge, the large numbers of disaffected conservatives would boycott the November election; and that without their support, Ford would surely lose, and the Democrats would have the presidency back.

177 should have gone to bat for him” (Gerald Ford quoted in (Brinkley, 2007)).

A lifelong politician, Ford had an uncanny ability to spot political talent or at least people who had strong political futures. Referred to as in-and-outers for their roles in multiple administrations, Ford boosted the careers of Alexander

Haig, Alan Greenspan, Brent Scowcroft, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, James

Baker, Elliot Richardson, Carla Hills, Paul O’Neill and Robert Gates.

By the time Ford left office, he succeeded in restoring credibility to the presidency, reducing inflation to 5% (from 12%), and improving relations between the

Congress and the Executive. He also signed the Helsinki Accord with the Soviet

Union and extricated the US from its protracted war in Vietnam – something that neither Johnson nor Nixon had been able to do in more than a decade.

After leaving office, Ford went on to become the longest-lived former president. He died in 2006 at the age of 93 and a half. Although Gerald Ford served only 29 months, from August, 1974 to January, 1977, he made a total of 12 cabinet-level appointments.

178

2.1.3.8 Jimmy Carter (1977 – 1981)

Presidential Style & Personality :

If one considers the presidents from Roosevelt through Ford, it is difficult to determine what, if anything, these seven modern presidents have in common.

One of the few professional traits they all share is that each was a long-term political insider 79 whose reputation was based on extensive public service at the national level prior to entering the White House.

Jimmy Carter, however, the eighth modern president, went from unknown private citizen to the White House in only 15 years. Prior to seeking the nomination, his record of elective experience comprised a grand total of eleven years, all of which were limited to the state level. He served two terms in the Georgia Sen- ate from 1961 – 1966, at which point he returned to private life. He mounted a grassroots populist campaign for governor in 1970, which he managed to win, and served a single five-year term. He became known as one of the young, progressive governors of the New South, and actively supported the end of segregation and the advancement of African American civil rights.

In 1975, Carter decided to enter the presidential primary race, despite his having very low voter recognition beyond the state lines of Georgia. He realized early on that his only chance of winning depended on his ability to transform his

79 Although Eisenhower spent his career in the Army, he was very well connected within the De- partment of Defense, had served multiple presidential administrations, and possessed extensive political contacts in both houses of Congress and on both sides of the aisle.

179 lack of Washington experience into an asset, which he did. He capitalized successfully on being the outsider – specifically, the only candidate who had absolutely nothing to do with Nixon, Watergate or the pardon. His not having deep political roots in Washington was the proof he offered voters affirming a fresh start. Supporting his candidacy represented the ultimate act of laying to rest all the turmoil the country had endured as far back as the Kennedy assassination.

Greenstein argues that were it not for the national agony of Watergate and the

“full, free and absolute” pardon granted to Nixon, a candidate such as Carter – one with no national experience – could never have been elected president

(Greenstein, 2004).

James E. Carter, Jr. was born the oldest of four children in the rural Georgia and came of age during the later part of the Depression. His family was not wealthy; however, his father had farmland, employed black tenant farmers, and owned a dry goods store. His mother was a registered nurse in the small local hospital. Both parents set high standards for their children, none of whom was spoiled or indulged. Carter writes, he spent significant time growing up in the homes of his black playmates, and, just as everyone else in deep South in the

1930s and ‘40s, he simply accepted the reality of segregation and the myth of

“separate but equal” educational systems (Carter, 2001).

180

Carter understood that expensive private colleges were beyond his family’s means, so he determined at an early age that he wanted to attend the Naval

Academy at Annapolis (Bourne, 1997). After graduating high school as the salu- tatorian, he invested the next two years strengthening his skills in science and mathematics at local colleges before being admitted to the Academy. He was by this time self-confident, hardworking, and highly determined, although socially somewhat shy “finishing sixtieth out of a class of 822” (Kaufman and Kaufman,

2006). Despite his ambition, he never attained any real prominence at Annapolis, where his peers adjudged him “ . . . [quite] capable but not marked for greatness”

((B. Glad quoted in (Choiniere, 1992)). After graduation, he applied for and was assigned to the first US atomic submarine, after having been vetted by Admiral

Hyman Rickover himself. Carter was starting a course in nuclear studies when his father’s untimely death caused him to resign his naval commission and return to Georgia to take up responsibilities for the family businesses (Carter,

1992).

He was elected to the state senate where he served six years, and after a four year hiatus from politics, he ran for and won the governorship. While serving as

Georgia’s governor – a position that was, at the time, term-limited under state law – he served concurrently as chairman of the Democratic National Commit-

181

tee. Having observed closely McGovern’s spectacular 1972 defeat 80 for the presidency, he determined to present a very different kind of Democratic candidate in

1976. With methodical determination, he campaigned for the nomination, which he narrowly won on the first ballot. 81

Carter not only defeated Jerry Ford, but his election might reasonably be considered an anti-Watergate and anti-pardon referendum. His win was effectively a vote of no confidence in the previous two administrations. Declaring he would never lie to the American people (Brinkley, 2007), candidate Carter played the

“outsider” card effectively – first against his Democratic rivals for the nomination and subsequently against the incumbent president. He promised “. . . to shake things up in Washington by bringing new faces, especially women and minorities, into government . . .” (Hess, 2002). Being the Washington outsider served him well as candidate Carter; however, it ultimately backfired on him once he was president.

The Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study ranks Jimmy Carter just behind Ei- senhower as being low on the scale for neuroticism but very high on conscientiousness (98 th percentile) and moderately high in strength of character (82 nd per-

centile) and openness (77 th percentile) (Rubenzer, 2004). He is not a natural poli-

80 In the 1972 presidential election, George McGovern carried only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia against Richard Nixon.

81 Candidate Carter benefited significantly from the fact that none of the traditional Democratic heavyweights, such as George McGovern, Hubert Humphrey or Ted Kennedy had opted to run.

182

tician in the traditional sense, but rather the “ultimate technocrat,” which is what

led to both his greatest achievements (at Camp David) and his worst mistakes in

Washington (Doyle, 1999). Carter was also judged highly intelligent with a bet-

ter-than-average understanding of “. . . advanced mathematics and clearly excel-

ling in science . . . [he approached] problems in a quantitative, analytical manner

. . . [and is] meticulous, perfectionistic, and precise, as well as . . . self-

disciplined” (Rubenzer, 2004).

The downside to this combination of attributes, according to Choiniere and

Kiersey, was Carter’s inability to associate the significance of fine details into broad meanings and implications (Choiniere, 1992). They conclude that Carter’s ultimate political flaw was his inability to see the political paradox of his own making – the blending of a moralistically-based style with a folksy, Everyman approach to complexities of national government. Although for different reasons, he ultimately alienated himself equally from the politicians on Capitol Hill as well as the ordinary citizen on Main Street by projecting a somewhat smug,

“holier-than-thou” attitude – which neither group related to.

Presidential Transition:

Carter revealed his tendency for details and careful preparation far in ad-

vance of his election in several areas including transition planning. Although

Eisenhower, Kennedy, and even Nixon himself had initiated modest pre-election

183

activities, Carter was the first candidate to “divert significant financial resources

from his campaign” for this activity (Brauer, 1986). By so doing, Brauer states

Carter inadvertently unleashed an ongoing resentment between the campaign

team, headed by Hamilton Jordan, and the transition committee, led by Jack

Watson 82 , both of whom were Atlanta insiders who were highly loyal to Carter personally.

As president-elect, Carter was authorized $2 million in transition funding by

Congress – an amount that was 5 times more than that given to Nixon in 1968 83

(Hogue, 2004) ; however, “additional funds and staff members did not mean that he (Carter) had a better transition” (Brauer, 1986).

The 1976 presidential campaign got off to a slow start, but Jimmy Carter beat

Jerry Ford by a narrow margin in what turned out to be a hard-fought campaign.

As a result, communication and cooperation through the transition between the

82 Jack Watson led the effort to identify important positions that Carter would need to fill. He established lists of capable candidates to fill these positions, and by Election Day, the project was very well advanced. During the transition, the effort matured into what became known as the Talent Inventory Program (TIP). TIP was intended to help the new team hit the ground running by being a mature recruiting tool.

TIP bogged down, unfortunately, as the friction increased between Jordan and Watson, representing the political vs. merit argument for White House appointments. Jordan being the strong insider prevailed over Watson, and much of the work done by TIP was simply disregarded (Macy, 1983).

83 The Presidential Transition Act (PTA) of 1967 provided for $900,000 total for transitioning between incoming and outgoing presidents and their vice presidents. In 1976, Congress amended PTA by authorizing $2,000,000 to the President- and Vice President-elect with “not more than $1,000,000 . . . to the former President and Vice President.” Again in 1988, Congress amended the PTA by authorizing these amounts at $3.5 and $1.5 million respectively. The 1988 amendment also provided for all future adjustments based on official inflation rates in the intervening years between transitions (Hogue, 2004). A post-transition GAO report stated that only $1.7 million and $635,000 were utilized by Carter and Ford respectively (Smith, 2007).

184 two men’s organizations were strained. Just as his predecessors, Kennedy and

Nixon, had experienced, Carter’s incoming management team inherited what were essentially empty filing cabinets (Macy, 1983).

Carter failed on several occasions to factor in the closeness of the election that had just brought him to office. Several special interest groups, including several important politicians on Capitol Hill, believed it was their support that had made the difference between Carter’s victory and Ford’s defeat. As a result, there was an expectation that such vital support would naturally be rewarded via high level appointments. Big labor especially felt this way as did “. . . blacks, women

[and] environmentalists” (Mackenzie, 1981). He truly believed he had won because he was a Washington outsider. The problem was that the methodical, hardworking Carter viewed the election win as his alone – simply the logical outcome of two years worth of planning and dedication on his part, saying:

“ . . . I’m completely at liberty, absolutely and completely at liberty, to make my decisions about the Cabinet membership on the basis of merit and who can do the best job working with me harmoniously to lead our country. There are no other commitments.” [(Carter), Press Conference, December 14, 1976]

One Hundred Days:

As a new president, “Carter was looking for an issue on which he could make his mark quickly . . . and he grabbed hold of energy” (Brauer, 1986). The aftereffects and prolonged economic uncertainty brought on by the oil embargo

185 of 1973 and Nixon’s programs for gas rationing and price controls remained largely unmitigated as late as the end of the Ford Administration. Carter therefore sought, and ultimately received, Congressional authorization to create the

Department of Energy based on his concern for national security. He envisioned a comprehensive and unified energy policy addressing fossil, renewable and nuclear power driven by a national program of energy conservation. At the time, the US was both the largest producer and consumer of energy in the world, and it was Carter’s long term goal to free the US from its growing dependence on foreign oil. He named James Schlesinger, who had been Nixon’s (and Ford’s first) Secretary of Defense and the only Republican in the Carter Cabinet, to be the first Secretary of Energy.

Carter was, and still is, most comfortable when immersed in the finer details.

The “outsider” president set forth a highly ambitious legislative agenda, for which he never established priorities or was willing to compromise. Despite these tactical shortcomings, Carter’s legislative success rate during his first year in office was still somewhat better than his two Republican predecessors’ (despite Ford’s personal connections to the Hill), “but it fell considerably short of the support given to other recent Democratic presidents” [Congressional Quarterly quoted in (Brauer, 1986)]. Carter and his senior staff repeatedly failed to understand the political subtleties and protocols by which Washington functions

186

(Michaels, 1997; Grant, 2004), and in the end, Jimmy Carter’s overall “policy as-

pirations were thwarted by his failure to adhere to the norms of Washington

politics” (Greenstein, 2004).

The new administration’s poor working relations with the Hill stemmed largely from believing in its own “outsider” image. This perspective colored the thinking of president, the White House staff and the thousands of political appointees, who were, in most instances, completely new to national government.

Burke argues that Carter’s legislative difficulties could have been avoided, since the Democrats held 291 out of 435 seats in the House and 61 seats in the Senate – a super majority (Burke, 2001b), but retaining his “outsider” perspective im- paired the Carter Administration’s ability to govern collaboratively with any

Congress.

Another, but less obvious reason for the chilly relationship between the White

House and the Democratically-controlled Congress, was that having given his cabinet secretaries appointment authority over key positions within their agencies, Carter not only gave up his own control over patronage, but he also inadvertently severed a long-standing courtesy with Congress by depriving it of all opportunities to propose individuals for appointment consideration. No longer could senior House and Senate Democrats trade favors, apply influence and build working relationships with either the White House or the Executive de-

187

partments. Consequently, the inter-Branch rift, which had began under Nixon

for very different reasons, simply continued to widen under Carter.

It was during Carter’s last year in office, when the Shah of Iran was finally

overthrown, that 52 Americans were taken hostage in Teheran, and another oil

embargo was imposed, that the US economy was plunged into another energy-

driven recession proving the wisdom of Carter’s energy and security concerns.

In 1980 the administration issued what has become known as the Carter Doc-

trine 84 , which states that any attempt to control the Persian Gulf will “be regarded as a direct assault on the vital interests of the United States” (Kitfield,

2001).

The Carter organization never really wanted to be compared to Roosevelt’s hundred-day legislative sprint, nor, for that matter, to that of any other administration, claiming times and conditions in the 1970’s were different. When the inevitable comparisons were made, however, the White House issued a dis- claimer saying, “As you know, we have consciously tried not to emphasize the administration’s first one hundred days out of a desire to avoid seeking hurried changes when more deliberate ones are needed” (White House press release quoted in (Leuchtenburg, 2001)).

84 At the time the doctrine was issued, political historian Arthur Schlesinger considered it little more than a “hollow” statement (Schlesinger, 2007). Years later, however, the Carter Doctrine provided George H. W. Bush the justification for taking military action against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

188

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

Despite all the public declarations of being a new and different kind of president (and in many ways he truly was), Carter, unfortunately, fell quite naturally into one of the longest standing transitional patterns: namely, converting his campaign staff into his White House staff (Brauer, 1987). Thus, he continued to surround himself almost exclusively with his trusted cadre of “outsider” Georgi- ans85 now that he was in Washington. Truman had gathered several Missouri cronies, Kennedy established an Irish Mafia (including appointing his brother as

Attorney General), and even Nixon favored southern Californians, but Carter carried home-state cronyism farther than any other modern president

(Sundquist, 1979).

85 Most of the key positions in the executive branch were staffed by Georgians who had longstanding personal connections to the new president. These included Budget director Bert Lance, Communications Director Gerald Rafshoon, Domestic Policy Advisor Stuart Eizenstat, Attorney General Griffin Bell, who is also a second cousin of Mrs. Carter’s, Appointments Secretary Phil Wise, Congressional Liaison Frank Moore, and White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz.

The closer one came to Carter's inner circle, the longer and deeper the connection. At the core were Carter's press secretary, Jody Powell, and de facto chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan.

Of all the Georgians he surrounded himself with, only Carter’s Domestic Policy Adviser, Stuart Eizenstat, had had any Washington experience (Doyle, 1999), having spent two year on the Johnson White House staff and then worked on Humphrey’s campaign staff (Nash, 1980).

Six of the eight top presidential assistants were from Georgia and had worked for Carter at the state level. More significant, however, was the fact that they were experienced working with each other before coming to Washington (Nash, 1980) – a unique situation that explains their loyalty not only to the president they served but also to each other. Collectively, they became known as the Georgia Mafia.

189

One area where Carter showed himself to be unique among presidents was his primary selection criteria for cabinet secretaries. Whereas Eisenhower had viewed cabinet members’ duties as predominantly managerial and, thus, required appointees be skilled in that area, and Nixon demanded ideological pu- rity first and managerial skill secondarily, Carter truly valued technical expertise that matched the departments’ primary missions and functional areas, which

“resulted in the highest number of Ph.D.s that the cabinet has every incorpo- rated” (Warshaw, 1999).

Carter followed a top-down methodology when selecting cabinet-level appointees. He worked methodically in what he called “clusters” by collectively considering all the people who would be working in a given policy area. This was the result of “his concern with the compatibility among his top advisers in each area” (Mackenzie, 1981).

“Although pre-election and post-election policy planning sounded good in theory, it was largely a paper exercise until Cabinet members and agency heads

[were] chosen” (Brauer, 1986). Candidate Carter promised to institute cabinet government, which in Carter’s mind meant “. . . delegating some subcabinet appointments to cabinet secretaries,” (Hess, 2002), but when as President, Carter gave approval to Secretary Joseph Califano (HEW) to select his entire departmental management team, the White House Personnel Director concluded that they

190 had lost control of a critical function (Pfiffner, 1987). Carter actually envisioned an arrangement of “mutual veto,” whereby the White House could veto a Secre- tary’s subcabinet choice and vice versa; however, what actually occurred was a highly decentralized and uncoordinated approach to appointments (Mackenzie,

1981). During the first two years of the Carter Administration, the PPO was caught in repeated turf battles for the prerogative of departmental appointments as a result of vague mandates and unclear lines of authority originating with the president himself (Bonafede, 1987). Having given away the appointment authority, even partially, to his cabinet officers meant the Carter White House had effectively relinquished control over those who came into government as decision- makers and representatives of the new administration (Brauer, 1986).

Carter in Relation to his Cabinet:

Although he surrounded himself with trusted and familiar loyalists from

Georgia when staffing the White House, Jimmy Carter consciously cast a wide net in seeking out the best and the brightest when selecting his cabinet officers

(Hess, 2002). Even in the earliest days of formulating his new administration,

Carter’s White House staff articulated concerns over the disruptive impact that results from appointees coming and going before they become fully effective in their positions. In other words, Carter understood the potential impact of in- and-outers on his administration. His solution was to ask appointees “to pledge

191

to serve for the President’s full term” (Mackenzie, 1981). Although the admini-

stration was given verbal agreement by nominees, Mackenzie goes on to state

categorically there is no way any president can compel appointees to remain in

public service.

Despite extensive pre-election planning and careful vetting of potential ap-

pointees, friction still arose between the cabinet secretaries and the White House

staffers who surrounded the president. Several secretaries complained that

Hamilton Jordan, the most senior of all the president’s aides, routinely failed to

return their phone calls, was difficult to coordinate with, and spoke negatively

and openly about cabinet officers to the press. Internal dissent grew to such a

point that President Carter finally realized he needed to take action. Indirectly,

he acknowledged the breadth of the presidency by deciding to fire three cabinet

officers, reassign two others 86 and to appoint Hamilton Jordan officially as his chief of staff.

Just as Nixon had done in 1972, Carter requested the pro forma resignations of

all the remaining secretaries and subsequently extended the shakeup downward

through the next several levels of appointees. After giving them so much auton-

omy, “Carter became increasingly concerned about loyalty and discipline . . .and,

86 Joseph Califano (Health, Education and Welfare), Richard Blumenthal (Treasury), and Brock Adams (Transportation) were fired, Griffin Bell (Attorney General) and James Schlesinger (En- ergy) were reassigned.

192 in an unprecedented purge in July 1979 . . . [unfortunately] instead of projecting an image of decisive leadership, Carter merely increased the skepticism about his own ability and judgment” (Grant, 2004). There was immediate reaction both in this country and overseas, and Time Magazine ran an article saying, “Washing- ton was rocked by rumors, the dollar plunged, and America’s allies were won- dering about the country’s stability” (Editorial, 1979). Carter had “. . . presided over the greatest cabinet shake-up in history, and by the end of his administration, only six of the [original] seventeen people . . . were still serving in their original posts” (Brauer, 1986).

In referring to these event years later, Carter wrote tersely, “On the one hand,

I was involved in too many things simultaneously, but, in some cases, I had delegated too much authority to my Cabinet members” (Carter, 1995).

Carter’s Management Model:

Carter’s approach to the presidency was very much hands-on and highly involved in details based on the belief that his ability to govern well was dependent upon his to master the issues. Unlike Eisenhower, who refused memos greater than two pages, Carter read everything, and in order to deal with the informational flood, “ . . . Carter instituted a speed reading course for himself, his wife and the senior staff” (Nash, 1980). By following a micro-focused management style, the “outsider” president inadvertently continued his predecessors’

193

pattern of White House-centric government by immersing himself too deeply in

policy details (at the expense of previous commitments to both cabinet govern-

ment and greater openness). Carter increased the number of White House-based

policy working groups, focusing on such things as the drug crisis, women’s is-

sues, improved coordination with state and local governments, and a growing

list of special interest groups (Warshaw, 1999).

Carter, who was naturally given to micromanaging anything and everything

within his purview, was described by his Attorney General once as “about as

good a President as an engineer could be” (Griffin Bell quoted in (Hess, 2002) – a

characterization echoed by Vice President Mondale (Doyle, 1999). Secretary Cali-

fano (HEW), Frank Carlucci (CIA) and even Hamilton Jordan, the president’s

longtime senior staffer, all put positive spins on his tendency to focus on fine de-

tail, at least publicly. A Pentagon official, however, once commented Carter

could see neither forests nor trees because he always examined things at the “leaf

level” (Doyle, 1999).

In another symbolic repudiation of past administrations, Carter initially de-

termined he would not have a chief of staff, or anyone else, controlling access to

him. During the Kennedy transition, both Neustadt and Clifford had advised

JFK to act as his own chief of staff; however, with the benefit of hindsight, Neus-

tadt reversed his original position saying that the presidency had become so

194

complex that the appointment of an Eisenhower-like chief of staff was “now a

virtual necessity” (Neustadt, 2004).

Despite Clifford’s and Neustadt’s recommendations, “Carter wanted to be his

own chief of staff, and he organized the White House to identify and create op-

tions and then leave final decisions to him,” and this, during the first half of his

term, gave way to power centers within the administration, which in turn left the

Carter White House without a cohesive hierarchy or authority (Hess, 2002). Dur-

ing the transition, Stephen Hess advised then-President-elect Carter that a chief

of staff was not absolutely necessary provided he divide those duties among

multiple individuals (Hess, 2002) – something he unfortunately he failed to do.

Instead, the new president decided initially not only to abolish the chief of

staff’s position, but also to revert to the spokes-of-the-wheel model, which had been used successfully by Kennedy and Johnson but abandoned by Ford (See

figure on page 98). Only a month prior to leaving the White House, some of

Ford’s staffers had jokingly presented Chief of Staff Cheney a bicycle wheel with

a single spoke symbolizing Ford’s failed attempt to serve as his own chief of

staff. It was a tangible reminder that all executives, including presidents, must be able to trust and delegate. Cheney left the wheel and a note for Hamilton Jor-

dan with the warning “Beware the Spokes of the Wheel,” (Nash, 1980; Jones,

2005), but Carter’s win was Ford’s defeat, and there is generally little continuity

195 or institutional memory preserved during presidential transitions (Mackenzie,

1980, in book review).

While it is tempting to write off Carter’s decision to forego a chief of staff as yet another symbolic protest against the Nixon-Haldeman-Watergate experience, the fact remains his choice to do so actually suited Carter’s personality and style quite naturally. Carter was truly interested in, comfortable with and capable of mastering large amounts of detailed information. Beyond that, he had successfully worked with an open door policy as governor of Georgia; thus, it seemed a logical choice based on his firsthand experience. Just after the inauguration, his press secretary explained simply, “Carter didn’t want to put one person in a position to control the flow of information and access to him” (Jody Powell, quoted in (Doyle, 1999)).

Summary:

While president, Carter’s successes were not immediately obvious. In fact, he did not have an easy time of it on either the domestic or international fronts.

Among other things, he was criticized for giving up control of the canal to Pa- nama, boycotting the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow in protest over the Soviet

Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, and for granting full diplomatic recognition of communist China. He was also severely attacked by Congressional Republi-

196

cans 87 for negotiating the SALT II 88 arms control agreements with the Soviets and

his handling of the failed Iran hostage rescue mission, which dominated his last

year in office and ultimately cost him re-election. Yet he stunned his critics by

personally brokering the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and

raised Human Rights Issues to international prominence.

Special consideration needs to be given concerning the relationship between

presidents and their vice presidents. More than any other modern president,

with the possible exceptions of subsequent Presidents Reagan and Clinton,

Jimmy Carter consciously set about giving genuine importance and respect to the

role of the vice president. “Although presidential promises of a meaningful role

to their Vice Presidents previously had about the same unhappy history as their

promises of Cabinet government, this pattern was broken under Carter . . . (Wal-

ter) Mondale’s vice presidency became the most satisfactory and sensible . . . and

has served as a model for the one(s) that followed” (Brauer, 1986). In addition to

several policy and council meetings, the two men met privately at least once a

week to discuss substantive issues making Mondale’s an influential voice in the

policy-making processes (Nash, 1980). Carter, unlike his predecessors Ford,

87 After the Democratic Convention, “Nixon quickly came to regard Carter with outright horror, as a naïve, moralistic yokel, who thought America’s internal problems and any foreign abrasions could be addressed with an avalanche of Southern Baptist goodwill. He thought the USSR could run rings around Carter and would take the lead in the Cold War” (Black, 2008).

88 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II was an extension of the SALT I agreement (signed by Ford) and the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (signed by Nixon).

197

Kennedy and Eisenhower, sincerely respected and valued his vice president - so much so that Attorney General Griffin Bell, one of the Georgia Mafia, openly expressed concern over the influence the more liberal Mondale could exert over the president. The working relationship turned out to be a sincere and productive one in which the two men held a genuine admiration for each other (Carter,

1995). Not only was Mondale one of the few people on the Carter team with any real Washington experience, but he also proved highly successful in utilizing that knowledge and experience to the administration’s benefit.

As president-elect, Carter the “outsider” had repeatedly declared his intention to establish cabinet government promising that never in his administration would there be White House staff interference, dominance or subverting of the authority of the members of the cabinet (Bonafede, 1987). Yet his continuous over-involvement in the finer details of administration ultimately rendered cabinet government an impossibility. As a result of Carter’s tendency to delve too deeply into operational details, one of the unintended legacies of his time in

Washington turned out to be the “expansion of White House staff into [focused] single-issue units, rather than broad policy ones . . .” whose activities should have logically, and more broadly, fallen under either domestic or foreign affairs

(Warshaw, 1999).

198

Unfortunately, Carter insisted on being actively involved in the policy formu-

lation process at the earliest stages, “. . . before the system had produced [any vi-

able] options or a single . . . policy for consideration” (Burke, 2000a). His Na-

tional Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, believes one of Carter’s long-term

legacies was a “. . . significantly factionalized system that had evolved into one of

the most White House-centered in modern history,” asserting that, contrary to

his declared intention, Jimmy Carter’s turned out to be perhaps the most central-

ized decision-making system of all the modern presidents (Brzezinski quoted in

(George, 1998b)). Campbell further asserts that Carter’s administrative style re-

sulted as much from his personality as his naval training and experience as an

engineer” (Campbell, 1986).

Although his record for domestic legislation was not as successful as those of

his democratic predecessors’ (Burke, 2001b), Jimmy Carter succeeded in estab-

lishing changes within the Executive Branch that are still operational today. He brought the Zero-based budget (ZBB) formulation and planning process to national attention. 89 Also during his term as president, Carter foresaw the strategic value in establishing the Department of Energy, which had 14,000 employees in

89 As governor of Georgia, Carter had had some success planning and organizing the state budgets using Zero-based budgeting (ZBB). Unlike the traditional “incremental” budget process whereby departments request and justify current funding requests based on the previous year’s allocation plus some percentage, ZBB is a process that starts from the bottom up. It requires each element within the request to be justified based on purpose, need or expected value to be gained and is developed irrespective of whether the total year over year budget is increasing or decreasing.

199

2009 (Energy, 2008), the Dept of Education, with 5,000 employees, and the Fed-

eral Emergency Management Agency, with 6,600 employees (FEMA, 2008).

In the administrative area of the Executive Branch, he revamped the civil ser-

vice structure by eliminating the top three civil service grades and redefining

these to be the Senior Executive Service (SES). Stemming from his belief that the

Civil Service Commission (CSC) was suboptimized by working toward conflict-

ing goals, specifically, (1) the effective management of the bureaucracy and (2)

the protection of federal employees’ rights, Carter replaced the Civil Service

Commission with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Merit Sys-

tems Protection Board (MSPB) (Macy, 1983). This was one of the few administra-

tive issues on which the White House and Congress agreed, which took legisla-

tive form in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.

Among the many problems faced by all presidents is administrative stability

among their staffs and appointees. Turnover, particularly among higher level

appointees, has become of increasing concern for administrations from Ken-

nedy’s forward. Carter firmly believed that the personal example he set for hard

work, commitment and dedication would be matched in equal measure by those

he invited to join his administration. The problem for presidents has always been, and still remains, finding just the right combination of politically savvy appointees who are loyal team members and competent leaders, who bring with

200

them neither competing aspirations nor private agendas. Despite his explicit re-

quest that appointees remain for his entire term in office, Carter’s appointees av-

eraged only 2.5 years (Brauer, 1987) with a median time on the job of only 2.3

years (Fisher, 1987).

“The end of Carter’s administration was agonizing: the oil crisis ignited

stratospheric inflation and interest rates, and the American hostage misery con-

sumed Carter’s attention and energy . . . Instead of an in-charge, compassionate

executive, Carter looked like a hostage himself” (Doyle, 1999). In 1980, because

of greater emphasis on his perceived domestic failures, compounded by along

with a struggling economy and another oil crisis, he was easily defeated in his re-

election bid.

His long post presidency, however, has been an active one. He has estab-

lished himself as a peacemaker and defender of global human rights (Brinkley,

1998). In 2002 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his accomplishments at

Camp David with Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin more than 20 years earlier.

Jimmy Carter served one only term from January 20, 1977 – January 20, 1981 and during that time he made a total of 21 cabinet appointments including the appointment of the first African American women to a cabinet position. 90

90 Patricia Roberts Harris served at Carter’s Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from January, 1977 – July, 1979 and then as the Secretary of Health and Human Services from July, 1979 – January, 1981.

201

2.1.3.9 Ronald Reagan (1981 – 1989)

Presidential Style & Personality :

Ronald Reagan was born two years before both Nixon and Ford and was raised in rural Illinois. His mother, a devout Christian fundamentalist, raised her two sons to view their father’s alcoholism as a disease – a condition for which he was not responsible (Rubenzer, 2004). During his formative years, the Reagan family moved nearly every year, and despite the instability of his youth, he remained outgoing, personable and socially well adjusted.

Personally, professionally, and politically, his message was all American. To the 1980 electorate, which had grown weary and cynical after 20 years of social upheaval resulting from the country’s first failed war in Viet Nam, loss of trust in the American political system caused by Watergate, and the national frustration due to the ongoing Iran hostage situation, a vote for Reagan represented a vote to return to the idealized Eisenhower years. Reagan easily defeated Carter, since on many levels he symbolized the “good guy” and a return to a place in the Ameri- can psyche that was simpler, safer, and more secure. He was a cross between the all-American boy next door and an indulged, favorite uncle, who, though getting on in years, was able to inspire confidence (Donovan, 1985). As a Republican candidate, Reagan lacked both the aggressiveness of Goldwater and the “naked

202

opportunism of Nixon,” (Burns, 2006); politically, he promised the country eve-

rything that Carter lacked plus the “feel good” factor.

Despite his never having achieved superstar status in Hollywood, Reagan

still managed to build a solid career making B-grade movies, and throughout his

more than 50 films, he had maintained his “good guy” image playing the villain

only once. When his acting career sagged in the 1950s, he became a highly paid

spokesman for the General Electric Corporation traveling the country giving pro- business speeches full of anti-regulation messages to hundreds of thousands.

Recall this was a time when the Cold War and strong anticommunist sentiment were ramping up. Thus, in a sense, he had been campaigning as the all-

American good guy for decades.

By 1964 Reagan, a former Democrat, had evolved into a committed Republi- can and openly endorsed Barry Goldwater for the nomination at that year’s convention in his challenge to Lyndon Johnson. Two years later, Reagan ran for and won the governorship of California, where he was considered surprisingly effective. His communication and acting skills were easily transferred to the political arena (Burns, 2006). It was during his time as governor that Reagan saw the opportunity to go farther in politics than he ever could have in Hollywood.

Reagan ran for the presidential nomination in 1968 but was beaten by the more experienced Nixon and then again in 1976 losing to Gerry Ford – but just barely.

203

By 1980, Reagan was mystifying political observers and pundits alike. How was it that “a youthful New Dealer, Hollywood liberal and activist union leader had transformed himself . . . into an apostle of conservative Republicanism, a

Goldwater promoter, and ultimately the most right wing president before the . .

.” (Burns, 2006) two subsequent Bush presidencies? Part of the answer lies in the fact that although Reagan’s campaign speeches borrowed freely from FDR’s, he did so quite selectively. “Reagan liked to portray himself as loyal to Roosevelt’s early principles, though by citing a very partial sample, he [deliberately] recast and misrepresented Roosevelt as a conservative at heart (Brauer, 1986).

Reagan was now an actor playing to a national audience and calling himself a politician. He was someone who was always comfortable in the public spotlight, easily switching personalities and perspectives to suit his audience at an almost unconscious level. He understood that his success and professional longevity, as either an actor or politician, actually depended on skill with the public. A subtler explanation for the shift in his political center is offered by Burns, who notes that throughout his life “Reagan slavishly submitted to the dominant ideology of his changing environments” (Burns, 2006) – the consummate adapter and reader of crowds, someone in need of public approval.

The Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study ranks Ronald Reagan low on the scale for neuroticism (4 th percentile) and very high for Extraversion (98 th percen-

204

tile) (Rubenzer, 2004). His ranking in the area of conscientiousness, however, is

particularly low at a mere 9% when compared to both other presidents or even

the general American population. The assessment team determined that

“Reagan was decidedly shallow, nonintellectual, and unreflective . . .” but he had become quite adept at compensating for these traits with considerable charm,

and gregariousness (Rubenzer, 2004). There is strong agreement across the lit-

erature that, probably as a consequence of his years in Hollywood, he was com-

pletely comfortable in his new role from the moment he won the election.

George and Stern, support the Rubenzer study saying that “Reagan comes across

as both intelligent and [simultaneously] intellectually lazy (George, 1998b).

Unlike the highly analytical Carter, Reagan preferred short memos and oral briefings apparently demonstrating an actor’s skill in quickly absorbing focused

concepts and information that is explicitly presented.

During his eight years as California’s governor, he developed the habit of

having a clean desk. He was most comfortable dealing with issues and people at

a macro level and, since he delegated detail work easily, he established a “board-

of-directors system of governance relying heavily on a strong staff and cabinet . .

. [showing a distinct] preference for mini-memos summarizing a problem and

potential options” (Doyle, 1999). He believed that if his staff were unable to rep-

205

resent an issue in one page, they (emphasis added) probably did not really un-

derstand it.

As the next president, Ronald Reagan was about to inherit an economy in

trouble, but the country was certainly not dealing with the depths of financial

depression as it had during the 1930s. Even so, he knew he needed to be seen

acting boldly and decisively in the manner of FDR, the hero of his youth. An

early example of the ease with which he was able to accommodate conflicting

points of view simultaneously, Reagan “. . . set out to dismantle the New Deal,

all the while Roosevelt remained his political model, especially for his coura-

geous leadership in an emergency” (Burns, 2006). The actor turned politician es-

pecially enjoyed the official aspects of the presidency and drew great satisfaction

from his audiences, but when there were situations “where [simple] ideology did

not apply or performances had no bearing, Reagan was at a loss” (Cannon, 2000).

The 1980 election was largely driven by image, emotion and perception, and

Reagan had a decided advantage over Carter in all areas. The Carter Admini- stration’s inability to secure the release prior to the election of the 52 Americans held hostage by Iran, and an apparent failure to manage the economy 91 played neatly into Reagan’s twin conservative mantras: build up the country’s military and cut back spending on federal social programs.

91 Unemployment and inflation ran high; however, at its peak, the prime rate exceeded 21%.

206

In setting the context for their advice to a President-elect John Kennedy, Clark

Clifford and Richard Neustadt had both emphasized the degree to which presidential preferences give shape and direction to an overall presidency (Neustadt,

2000). Having just beaten an incumbent president soundly, no one needed to inform Ronald Reagan of the obvious. While Truman, Kennedy, Nixon and

Carter had come to the White House on rather thin electoral margins – and John- son and Ford attained it without election – Reagan was the first president since

Eisenhower to enter the Oval Office on a wave of strong national appeal. 92

Just as Carter had done four years earlier, Ronald Reagan ran as the political outsider criticizing the Washington status quo , and although Carter had run and failed as the liberal outsider, the country gave Reagan the opportunity as a conservative one. His approach would be very different from that of his predecessor

– one based on experience gained in the much larger state of California. He would form his cabinet out of highly successful, conservative, senior executives, and he intended to be the Chairman of the Board. Reagan emulated the most successful executives he had known, but unlike Carter, he was quite comfortable delegating responsibility to and through his senior staff. Also unlike his predecessor, this outsider came to town knowing that he needed to extend an olive

92 Reagan defeated Carter by taking a majority in 44 out of 50 states plus DC with a total of 442 electoral votes to Carter’s 89. Four years later, Reagan defeated Walter Mondale by the even larger plurality of 489 to 49 electoral votes.

207 branch to the Congress. “Three days after the inauguration, Reagan hosted a breakfast for GOP leaders and [later that night, held] a dinner with Tip O’Neill, the Democratic Speaker of the House” – things that never came easily to Jimmy

Carter. Reagan, more than any other president since Roosevelt, appreciated the theatricality of the presidency, but more importantly, he instinctively knew how to use it (Cannon, 2000).

Presidential Transition:

Candidate Reagan, his entire election organization and his “kitchen cabinet”

had been confident they would win the White House. Two of his three top

White House aides, Edwin Meese and Mike Deaver, had been selected early in

the campaign, and everyone in the Reagan camp was keen to avoid the mistakes

that Nixon and Carter had made but most specifically the internal friction be-

tween the teams responsible for the campaign and the transition. With the

nomination secured, Reagan was able to recruit James Baker 93 as his chief of staff.

Among the critical lessons Ronald Reagan had learned from Nixon’s experience was that no one member of his White House should ever gain too much unchecked authority (Burns, 2006). Thus he established a balanced trio consisting of Ed Meese, his former gubernatorial chief of staff, Michael Deaver, another

93 In addition to serving as Gerald Ford’s Undersecretary of Commerce under, Baker was also one of the senior campaign strategists who had helped beat back Reagan’s intra-party challenge in the 1976 primary. In addition, he was also held in great respect throughout the party.

208

trusted aide from Sacramento, and James Baker. It initially appeared as though

Baker was an odd choice since he had worked for the Ford campaign in 1976, and in 1980, he was campaign manager for his friend, George Bush, in his failed run for the nomination against Reagan. Yet political insiders were not totally surprised since Reagan tended to hire people for what they could do for him rather than what they had done with others (Cannon, 2001). In the end, “Baker was what Reagan badly needed . . . an honest broker, [and a seasoned Washing- ton insider who quickly] became first among equals in the troika” (Burns, 2006).

Reagan’s executive team was both senior and highly seasoned. The troika, also known as the Reaganauts (Meese, 1992), studied carefully the lessons of the

Ford-Carter transition and were determined to avoid such pitfalls as spokes-of- the wheel management, overly independent cabinet secretaries, and, most importantly, poor internally coordination among the White House staffers. The new administration was also unique among all modern administrations in that the same individuals comprised both the campaign and transition teams. By merging the two teams, the Reaganites averted the usual intergroup competition for a new president’s attention as well as avoiding the inevitable resentments over resource allocation going to one rather than the other function. Thus, the spending of resources became a matter of decision makers setting priorities, thinking past Election Day, and avoiding pointless and costly internal friction.

209

Ultimately, combining the two functions had the added benefit of getting the

new administration up and running much more quickly than all previous ones

(Cannon, 2001).

Pre-election transition planning and expenditures were modest and rather

low key. What planning did occur initially “emphasized the importance of the jobs’ requirements . . . [thus, planners consciously] avoided the recruitment of

‘superstars’ with high profiles” (Brauer, 1986). In the post-election period, how-

ever, things changed radically and were transformed “into the most elaborate

transition machinery in history. The [Reagan] presidential transition operation

spent the full $2 million appropriated by Congress plus an additional $1 million”

(Brauer, 1986) to “$2 million . . . presumably based on the assumption that it

takes a bureaucracy to take over a bureaucracy” (Pfiffner, 1996).

Presidential transitions are considered successful in part based on a reduction

in the amount of time required for the new administration to get up and running, but this is highly dependent on naming key nominees quickly. The Reagan Ad-

ministration was highly successful in this are, partially because it was able to at-

tract good people with relevant experience (Kumar, 2003d). It was even more

successful because Reagan announced and deputized the triumvirate of Baker,

Meese and Deaver quickly. As a result, the president-elect appeared decisive

and his administration looked prepared to govern quickly.

210

Direct contact between outgoing and incoming presidents is traditionally

quite limited. 94 In his status of president-elect, Reagan had met with Carter only

once before the inauguration, at which time Carter personally briefed him on

what he considered the twenty most critical issues. Reagan, accompanied by

only a couple of aides, took no notes whatsoever and asked almost no questions

(Brauer, 1987). In the end, the Carter-Reagan transition turned out like all others,

with the outgoing team trying to impart more lessons and information than the

incoming one was willing or able to understand.

Like all new administrations, Reagan’s entered the White House on Inaugura-

tion Day with a sense of political entitlement. One example of this occurred that

same day when Hamilton Jordan phoned the White House requesting an update

on the Iran hostage situation. Jordan, who served as Carter’s chief of staff, had been one of the principal negotiators throughout the previous 15 months. The

new administration refused him any information on the grounds that “Jimmy

Carter was no longer president” (Pfiffner, 1996). The 52 American hostages were

released later that day. The new administration publicly took the credit and ap-

94 This is generally true; however, the one exception of the modern presidency was the transition between Reagan and his successor. George Bush was the outgoing vice president as well as the president-elect during the period from Election Day to Inauguration Day. Only days after George Bush won the election in 1988, one-on-one meetings between Reagan and Bush were reinstated – the latter having spent the better part of the previous year campaigning. During the three months between Election Day and Inauguration Day, the two principals discussed transition, staffing, foreign affairs and the value of cabinet meetings. As a courtesy to Bush, the White House requested all Reagan appointees to submit resignations but to remain in their jobs until replacements were in place (or they were asked to join the new administration) (Reagan, 2007).

211

peared tough on the Iranians from their first day on the job; however, it was

Jimmy Carter who met the newly-freed Americans in Germany as they returned

to the U S.

One Hundred Days:

James Baker stated “One reason . . . the Reagan administration succeeded in

the first term as well as we did was that we had a really definitive, well-thought

out, right here hundred-day plan. We went back and we looked at the plans of

everybody all the way back to Truman . . . and we stuck to it” (Burke, 2003b).

The new team actually began the administration with “a remarkably coherent

agenda and a clear set of policy priorities to increase defense spending and cut

spending on virtually all domestic” programs (Pfiffner, 1996). The consistency of

Reagan’s conservative values and his handlers’ demand for loyalty to the presi-

dent resulted in a unity across the entire administration, which other presidents,

with the possible exception of Kennedy, have never been able to achieve.

Luck also favored Reagan in ways that were denied to Jimmy Carter, specifi-

cally with respect to the Iranian hostage situation. While the international crisis

had all but consumed Carter’s final year in office, the matter was resolved before

the new administration had finished its first full day in office. It has been noted

that had the Americans remained captive in Tehran, Reagan would have faced

212

the same situation, with all the associated international risks, as Carter had

(Doyle, 1999).

Reagan’s luck continued domestically as well. On the 70 th day of his presi-

dency, John Hinckley attempted to assassinate the new president. His survival

and full recovery had a kind of Hollywood publicity element to it and blunted

residual concern over his being the oldest person ever to assume the office. Ul-

timately, the combination of getting all the hostages back unharmed plus surviv-

ing an assassination attempt provided Reagan with even more personal capital

than his resounding election win had provided in terms of political clout (Doyle,

1999). It has also been argued that these two events, when taken together, reset

the transition countdown, and in very real terms gave Reagan a reprieve from

the 100 day accounting that has been applied to all modern presidents, starting

with Truman (Cannon, 2001).

For years, Reagan had campaigned against big government – the platform

that Carter had used; however, unlike Carter’s, Reagan’s “outsider” claim was

supported by consistent messages plus recommended actions, not to mention a

consistent image of the clean cut cowboy riding in to straighten out the mess in

Washington. His pledge was simple: cut taxes, increase military spending, “and balance the budget by reducing domestic spending” (Gergen, 2001) . Inside the

administration, James Baker admonished the new president’s White House staff

213

that “We ought to have three goals, and all three of them are economic recovery

(Baker, quoted in (Cannon, 2000)). During this period, the White House Person-

nel Office identified the “Key 87” positions that had the potential to make or break the new president’s economic program (Lewis, 2008; Meese, 1992).

The National Journal reported that after 10 weeks in office, the Reagan Ad-

ministration had submitted 95 only names to the Senate for confirmation – this,

as compared to Carter’s 142 nominations in the same period (Kirschten, 1981).

Again luck favored Reagan with a far more subtle, and perhaps even Machiavel-

lian, result to come out of delaying the submissions, since, without management-

level appointees in place, particularly at the domestic agencies, there was much

less opportunity for the agencies to resist the budget slashing that occurred in

Reagan’s first proposed budget. These programs lacked critical advocates either

within the administration or on the Hill.

Reagan’s strategists and spin doctors worked to showcase the new presi-

dent’s effectiveness and leadership during his first 100 days despite his period of

hospitalization and recovery. They hailed the release of the hostages, tackled the

economy by revising Carter’s last budget, slashed social spending, increased

military funding, and deliberately set about improving working relations with

Congress including the Democratic leadership (Brauer, 1986). These were all

things with which Carter had had limited success at best. It was all done as part

214 of the strategy to “lay the basis for future successes,” and like Nixon, Ronald

Reagan entered office with the intention of eliminating the Departments of Edu- cation and Energy (Meese, 1992).

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

The Reagan Administration never followed through on its promise to “dra- matically change the size of the White House staff . . . [rather, it expanded the numbers in order] to centralize policy making in the White House – something that Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford had formalized . . . thus, Departments were constantly supervised by the White House” (Warshaw, 1999). Any new policy initiatives were continuously screened for consistency with and through the

White House.

The exercise of tight control was particularly characteristic of the administration’s approach to staffing of personnel and appointees alike. The predominant feature was an overreaction to the tone of previous administrations and was characterized by “unrelenting White House control over the appointment process . . . by starting the personnel search early and giving the personnel chief direct access to the president [as well as] discouraging independent ‘head hunting’ on the part of the cabinet secretaries (Neustadt, 2000). As personnel chief, Pen- field James held more authority in the Reagan Administration than any of his previous counterparts, but there was a high price to be paid with increased staff

215

and decreased efficiency because of such a heavy commitment of senior White

House staffer time and exercising the White House’s control over all final deci-

sions even down to the subcabinet selections.

Once the administration’s staffing approach was established, it did not vary

significantly throughout the eight years Reagan occupied the White House.

From the start of the transition, (Penfield) James, Meese, Deaver, and Baker met

every day to go over candidates for positions down to the assistant secretary

level, after which they “ . . . would discuss their recommendations with the

Reagan, and he would make [often by tacit concurrence] the final decision”

(George, 1998b). James and the triumvirate screened potential nominees for their

policy records and political background as well as legislative ties, ethics, and

general compatibility with the core team. After that, there was a series of sign-

offs required from key individuals in each area (Salmon, 1984). The impact of

such a laborious search, clearance and signoff process was to slow the rate at

which appointees took up their responsibilities. Brauer also points out that the

new Ethics in Government Act of 1978 also contributed to the slow down

(Brauer, 1986). Starting with the Reagan Administration, and each subsequent one, this legislation is also believed to have reduced the numbers of “in-and- outers” returning to government service (Martin, 1991). Together, these two fac-

216 tors may also account for the extended length of time required for Senate confirmation.

As refined as the personnel process was, it was not perfect; there were significant bumps in the road. Within the administration, there was little disagreement that the Democrats remaining from the Carter years had to go, but, somewhat surprisingly, there were complaints from the Republican Right that too great a number of Nixon’s and Ford’s retreads were coming back into government. The political Right was responsible not only for implementing the “loyalty test” but also for making it a the most important criterion for political appointment sur- passing even that of professional ability (Pfiffner, 1996).

There were consequences to Reagan’s rigid staffing approach, especially the

“loyalty first” requirement. The obvious one was that officials were appointed,

“who in previous administrations might have been ruled out by a concern over possible lack of qualifications or conflict of interest or even open hostility . . . to the agencies they were assigned to lead” (Auberbach quoted in (Michaels, 1997)).

The selection criteria for his new, highly politicized appointees, as well as his open antagonism toward the bureaucracy, only added to the normal levels of friction between inexperienced political appointees and career executives.

A certain amount of distrust had always existed between these groups even under FDR; however, it took “a great leap forward under Eisenhower and stalled

217

under Kennedy and Johnson until Nixon revitalized it” (Michaels, 1997). From

Nixon forward, the old hostility accelerated to an all time high with the Reagan

Administration, when poor political-career relations were cemented as part of its bureaucracy-bashing, “government-is-the-problem mantra” (Michaels, 1997).

Given the increasing levels of polarization, the Carter Administration may have

served as little more than an interlude between Nixon’s start of the trend and

Reagan’s continuation of it (Pfiffner, 2000). The Civil Service Reform Act, which

Carter signed in 1978, actually provided Reagan an additional, legal tool with

which to corral the civilian government, in that it allowed him to add more ap-

pointees than ever before. In many instances, Reagan went so far as “to appoint

regulators from the industries they were charged to regulate,” as happened at

EPA and HUD (Michaels, 1997).

During his eight years as California’s governor, Reagan turned in his best

performances when he remained focused on the broader picture and, therefore, became rather apathetic toward the routine aspects of government. Where he

excelled was at communicating and delegating. “[H]e learned to let others, par-

ticularly Edwin Meese, do the heavy lifting . . . relying on his directors, as he had

in Hollywood, [and] saving himself for the big scenes” (Cannon, 2000). As

president, he merely transferred these lessons to Washington, only on a larger

stage.

218

Immediately following the election, Reagan consulted personally with James

Pfiffner, who both advised and warned the president-elect regarding the role of a

chief of staff. He distilled his advice down to two critical points, saying:

• a chief of staff was essential to the modern White House (something both

Ford and Carter had learned the hard way), and

• that a “domineering” chief of staff will almost certainly lead to presiden-

tial troubles (learned first by Eisenhower, relearned by Nixon, and again

by Reagan himself) (Pfiffner, 1999b).

Thus, by both design and preference, Reagan structured his White House such that it would be overseen by a strong, yet balanced, triumvirate consisting of James Baker, Ed Meese, and Mike Deaver (Warshaw, 1996, 1999). When, in the earliest days of the transition, Richard Neustadt was also asked to instruct

Chief of Staff Baker in critical lessons learned from previous administrations, he emphasized the importance of:

• coping with the president’s personal operating style,

• compensating for mismatches in the styles of others,

• not filling jobs because they exist,

• not slashing jobs too soon,

• forming cabinet councils (a habit of both Nixon and Carter),

• linking foreign and domestic perspectives, and

219

• holding staff size down (Cannon, 2001)

The triumvirate, a.k.a. the “troika,” worked very well during Reagan’s first

term. Early in his second term, however, Chief of Staff Baker and Treasury Sec-

retary Donald Regan switched jobs (obviously, with presidential approval), and

Ed Meese became Attorney General. The highly disciplined trio no longer sur-

rounded Reagan, which was an error. According to Reagan biographer, Lou

Cannon, this turned out to be a mistake for many reasons but primarily due to

Regan’s large ego, his personal disdain for politics 95 , his failure to grasp the extensive influence wielded by Nancy Reagan within the administration, but mostly because he brought his own followers with him onto the White House staff whereas James Baker had recruited capable individuals (Cannon, 2000).

In the end, Don Regan’s tight control over both presidential access and the flow of information in and out of the Oval Office upset the delicate equilibrium established by Baker. According to the Tower Commission Report, the heavy handed Regan inadvertently established the conditions that led to the Iran-

Contra Affair (Pfiffner, 1999a), thereby proving James Pfiffner’s original point.

Reagan in Relation to his Cabinet:

Long before either the convention or the election, Reagan discussed potential political appointees with his “kitchen cabinet” (Pfiffner, 1987), which was a

95 According to Cannon, Don Regan never succeeded in making the mental transition to government from Wall Street (Cannon, 2000).

220 small, elite and very wealthy group of conservative Californians who had essentially underwritten Reagan’s presidential bid. These backers wanted to ensure that Reagan would be surrounded by politically acceptable individuals whom they wanted populate a new Republican administration. They were all committed to avoiding “Carter’s mistakes, so they chose people who, above all else, were ideologically compatible with Reagan” (Bonafede, 1987).

After winning the nomination, Reagan assigned responsibility for transition planning to Ed Meese, his former chief of staff during his eight year governorship. Ultimately, however, Reagan personally approved the cabinet level nominees but only for those departments in which he was specifically interested:

State, Defense, Justice, Transportation, OMB and the United Nations. He was much less interested in Commerce, HUD, Interior and Agriculture, and, like

Nixon, entered the White House intending to eliminate the of Education and En- ergy (Hess, 2001).

In the end, all the Reagan appointees “fell into [one of] two categories – either pragmatists or ideologues . . . [all were] right of center . . .with liberal Republi- cans a scarce commodity in the Reagan Administration” (Brauer, 1986). Reagan, through his director of White House Personnel, had no trouble convincing his cabinet designates that, unlike the Nixon and Carter Administrations, this White

House intended to maintain complete control over departmental appointments.

221

Each candidate under consideration was required to agree to this as a precondi-

tion prior to going forward with the nomination process. The administration’s

goal was to have all appointees beholden to the president as opposed to the sec-

retaries for their positions (Kumar, 2003d).

In terms of identifying other lesser members of the administration, the

Reagan team had a much easier time than almost all other modern presidents.

Given the size of his electoral win over Jimmy Carter, Reagan, unlike Nixon,

Carter or even Kennedy, had no intention of even paying lip service to biparti-

sanship, and in the end he included only one nominal Democrat in his final cabi-

net. Additionally, since there had been only a four year Democratic interlude

since the eight years of Nixon and Ford, there was no shortage of candidates

with recent Washington experience from which to draw his potential staff 96 , not

to mention his large pool of loyalists from California. One speed bump in the

staffing process that was unique to Reagan, however, resulted from the Ethics in

Government Act 97 , which was passed in 1978. It has also been called the curse of

96 Regan’s final team had more had more prior experience in the “executive branch than any previous incoming White House staff” (Hess, 2001) . Although large numbers of Kenney’s, John- son’s and Ford’s staffers had extensive Washington experience, strictly speaking their experience was primarily Congressional, which, as Hess points out, is different from White House experience.

97 The two most significant provisions of the law 1) require that public officials and high-ranking civil servants must make public financial disclosures and 2) prohibit certain activities by federal employees/appointees after their federal employment ends. In addition, the act imposed limits on gifts and honoraria while serving.

222

Republican administrations. “As a result [of tighter legislation,] at least three of

Reagan’s choices simply opted not to join his cabinet: Walter Wriston (Citicorp) .

. . Clifford Hansen, a former senator from Wyoming . . . and oilman Michael

Halbouty” (Hess, 2001).

Almost exclusively, the new president chose solid, low profile loyalists with

Washington experience, with the one exception of Alexander Haig, his nominee

for Secretary of State. Haig was perhaps the only appointee with his own star

power although other names were highly recognizable. Others, like Schultz,

Weinberger or even Baker, were experienced in government and certainly well

known as well as capable, but the difference them and Haig was they harbored

no personal political ambition. This might explain why, ultimately, Haig served

only 18 months before leaving the administration (Pfiffner, 1987), after which

George Schultz became Reagan’s second Secretary of State serving through the

end of the administration.

Throughout the domestic agencies, the new administration began putting

foxes in charge of henhouses. “[T]he near religious fervor with which the

Reaganites embraced the business lobby and sought to ‘get government off its back’ led Reagan to appoint regulators from the very industries they were

charged to regulate, particularly at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

223 and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)” (Warshaw,

1999).

The troika rigidly enforced the established criteria for all appointees and

White House personnel, and given that philosophical commitment to Reagan counted more than any other, the Reagan Administration achieved the highest degree of bureaucratic consistency of all modern presidencies up to that time.

Thus Reagan’s key decision makers were strategically positioned to carry out his declared agenda to “cut the federal bureaucracy, increase defense spending, reduce taxes and cut the federal deficit” (Warshaw, 1999). Although he ultimately accomplished his agenda, he did so at the expense of a bloated federal deficit – a point which he simply denied.

Where Carter, the micromanager, had clearly sought expertise when making appointments, Reagan, the delegator, opted for “managers over experts”

(Bonafede, 1987) and directed that his appointees function as presidential representatives directly within the departments, and, in an extension of the Nixon-

Haldeman belief, that they were expected never to become “captives of the bureaucracy . . . [which they were] supposed to direct” (Smith, 1980). Edwards, in discussing research conducted into the Reagan Administration, confirms the practice of selecting faithful followers in order to serve as “agents, provocateurs, enforcers, and proconsuls . . . [with allegiance] overshadowing managerial com-

224

petence and experience or sometime familiarity with the issues” (Edwards,

2001b). By the end of the administration’s first year, however, top White House

aides had developed severe distrust of many of the departmental secretaries, and

reminiscent of Ehrlichman’s concern over “marrying the natives,” Reagan’s

staffers became convinced the secretaries had generally become advocates of

their own constituencies (Cronin, 2003).

In addition to distrusting the secretaries’ motives, and despite the great care

in the selection, vetting and approval processes, the Reagan Administration also began experiencing significant turnover among appointees. By the end of his

first term, a 56% turnover rate within just the cabinet equaled Carter’s 98 (Hess,

2001), and by the end of his second term, “Regan had appointed two secretaries

of state, two secretaries of defense, and six national security advisers,” which in-

dicates the level of difficulty he had in establishing a sound foreign policy infra-

structure (George, 1998b). Pfiffner concludes that administrations are better

served when their appointees have relevant experience working in the Federal

Government, and even Reagan’s director of White House Personnel admitted,

“Businessmen make the worst appointees because they are used to command

and control . . . [but g]overnment doesn’t work that way” (Pfiffner, 2001b). Some

98 Compare Reagan’s and Carter’s turnover rates to Nixon’s of only 36% after his first term (Hess, 2001).

225

individuals make the transition and some cannot, but it is the latter group that

primarily drives the turnover rate.

Another influence unique to this administration was the First Lady, who, be-

hind the scenes, was far more willing to take action – even to the point of oppos-

ing the men her husband knew and trusted (Pfiffner, 1999b). Nancy Reagan

sought “to compensate for what she saw as her husband’s ‘soft touch’ in person-

nel matters . . .[and played] a key role in the ousters of National Security Adviser

Richard Allen, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Cabinet Secretaries James Watt

and Raymond Donovan, and Chief of Staff Don Regan” (Doyle, 1999).

Reagan’s Management Model:

When it came to processing detailed information, Reagan was neither a

Carter nor a Nixon, nor was he a future-focused, social visionary in the style of either Kennedy or Johnson. He was, however, a man who thoroughly enjoyed

“being” the chief executive and was sufficiently image conscious to seek actively to avoid the perceived mistakes of his predecessors (Pfiffner, 1987). As a “chairman of the board,” he delegated – and in many instances he over delegated – to people he trusted.

Reagan and his staff initially used cabinet meetings for gathering ideas, but this quickly devolved into opportunities for communicating predetermined views and pushing for consensus (Brauer, 1987). At the end of the first year, be-

226

lieving the secretaries to have gone native, one staffer stated that “Cabinet gov-

ernment is a myth . . . [it may not have] dawned on the members yet that they

have been cut out of the decision-making process” (Cronin, 2003). James Baker

went even further calling full cabinet meetings “staged show-and-tell events . . .

[because the] real business of the White House is accomplished in small meet-

ings, usually in the Oval Office” (Baker, 2006). Thus, from early in the admini-

stration, “it had centralized policy making, personnel selection, and budget for-

mulation more tightly in the White House than any other administration

(Pfiffner, 1999a).

By establishing a triumvirate of trusted, senior aides with its inherent checks

and balances, Reagan actually established a highly modified version of the

spokes-of-the-wheel model (Pfiffner, 1996) to whom he delegated clearly-defined

areas of responsibilities. For the most part this approach succeeded because of

the experience, maturity and specific personalities of James Baker, Ed Meese and

Michael Deaver. 99 All three were men of great intelligence and experience but above all, they were bound by their loyalty and commitment to serving Reagan.

99 The “troika,” as they were called, agreed among themselves on the limits of there areas of responsibilities. Meese and Baker, both being lawyers, even went so far as to draft and sign a Memo of Understanding to formalize their agreement (Meese, 1992). As chief of staff, James Baker was responsible for the implementation and administration of the Office of the President, and controlling access to the Oval Office. Meese oversaw policy, cabinet operations and national security activities, and Deaver, perhaps Reagan’s closest aide, managed the more personal issues such as scheduling, travel, support services and management of the First Lady’s office.

227

During the transition, Baker contacted all living former chiefs of staff and asked for advice as well as lessons learned. All were forthcoming, but Baker makes special note of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld’s guidance and summarized everything he gathered:

• restore power and authority to the executive branch,

• maintain and orderly schedule and organized paper flow to the president

• keep a low profile personally and only talk to the press on background.

Never become a major public figure, otherwise you lose credibility

• protect the president’s time

• assume anything you say/do could be on the front page of the Washington

Post

• establish the right to speak freely on any topic with the president

• always tell the truth, and “If you screw up, tell him and correct it!”

• force responsibility downward and out through the organization

• expect leaks; they are inevitable (Baker, 2006).

As Reagan’s first chief of staff, James Baker understood and followed this guidance carefully. His successor, Don Regan did not, and the Reagan Admini- stration struggled during its second term.

Given Reagan’s relaxed and personal management style was, his senior staff recognized quickly that it needed to counterbalance the new president’s man-

228 agement approach with careful planning and control. The director of White

House Personnel stated that the senior staff decided to handle all appointments, which “included boards, commissions, Schedule C’s, ambassadorships, judgeships, etc. . . [even making] a concerted effort . . . to control the people that came into [the administration] ” (Brauer, 1987). Although Regan himself was removed from these people, each appointee felt connected philosophically, if not personally, to their president (Pfiffner, 1987), which was critical in building a unified administration. Such an ideological litmus test would not have worked in other modern administrations such as Kennedy’s, Carter’s or even Nixon’s because their agendas were not as tightly defined as Reagan’s (Pfiffner, 1987).

Reagan initially came to office with an agenda that was primarily domestically focused. Thus, when it came to foreign policy and dealing with the State

Department and the National Security Council, he embraced a hybrid management model in hopes of avoiding the problems that had plagued Carter (George,

1998b). For this reason, he blended the formalistic and collegial models and trusted that the cooperative spirit of his carefully-chosen appointees would make it work. It did for a while until he started making personnel changes late in his first term.

There is an inherent risk in over delegating to and blindly trusting even the most competent aides. As his first term wore on, Reagan began to appear to

229

many in the administration as slightly superficial and rather self-absorbed. This,

in turn, began to undermine both the personal loyalty to him and the formerly

high level of morale that had characterized the early years of his administration.

These personal characteristics also contributed “. . . to the high turnover rate

among senior staffers and officials” (George, 1998b). Beyond the 56% rate of

turnover that was previously cited, Stern further supports this point by noting

the higher than average number of “Kiss and Tell” books that were published

while Reagan was still in office by those who had left the administration early

(George, 1998b).

Summary:

On close examination of the Reagan Presidency, it becomes apparent just how

much in politics occurs by chance, Hayward asserts that, had it not been for the

Agnew resignation, Reagan would never have tried initially for the nomination

in 1976 or again in 1980 100 . Reagan did not believe he was strong enough among

Republican conservatives to defeat the initially popular vice president. Similarly, had Ford not weakened himself and, in Reagan’s opinion, the party by pardoning Nixon, the probability of defeating an incumbent president was quite low

(Hayward quoted in (Burns, 2006)). The pardon and its subsequent political fall-

100 Hayward presumes that if Agnew were vice president instead of Ford when Nixon resigned, he would have certainly run on the top of the ticket in 1976 and probably have defeated Carter. Had the conservative Agnew won in 1976, there was no doubt he would have run as the incumbent again in 1980, and there might never have been a Reagan Presidency.

230

out weakened Ford sufficiently so as to invite challengers from within the Re-

publican Party (Burns, 2006).

Another stroke of good fortune afforded to Reagan that was denied to Eisen-

hower, Nixon and Ford was a Republican majority in the Senate where presiden-

tial appointees are confirmed. The ease with which Reagan’s appointees were

confirmed – even the questionable ones – simply added to the president’s image

of political effectiveness. The fact remains, however, that simply following weak

or failed presidents helped reinforce the image of a hard-charging Ronald

Reagan entering the Oval Office (Hess, 2001). Part of Carter’s presidential weak-

ness, at least initially, was due to his limited experience as governor of Georgia.

Brauer argues that, although Reagan came to the White House with only guber-

natorial experience, he was actually better prepared than Carter simply because

California is so much bigger than Georgia, far more representative of the coun-

try’s heterogeneous composition, and economically larger 101 and more complex than most countries (Brauer, 1986).

In his youth, Reagan had been an outspoken Hollywood liberal and even served as president of the Hollywood union, the Screen Actors Guild, but he shifted politically as his career moved from acting to politics. He opposed the

101 In 1980, California’s budget was $24.5B (Senate, 2010); however, Georgia’s amended budget for the same year was only $2.85B (Georgia, 2010).

231 domestic politics of Lyndon Johnson and the international posture of Jimmy

Carter. It also became advantageous to oppose Nixon for going soft on communism and Ford for pardoning his Richard Nixon. Thus it fell to Reagan to pick up the mantel of the fallen Goldwater and lead the conservatives back to power

(Brauer, 1986).

Reagan the politician was merely an extension of Reagan the actor. He was reliant upon on chiefs of staff, press secretaries and advance men instead of writ- ers, directors and publicity departments. While exuding political confidence before the cameras, he was still dependent and perhaps overly trusting as “he clung to a flawed [and somewhat Hollywood-like] understanding of the chief executive’s role” (Doyle, 1999). As president he stated, “I believe you surround yourself with the best people you can find, delegate authority and don’t interfere as long as the overall policy is being carried out” (Reagan quoted in (Pfiffner,

1999b)). Reagan’s executive flaw, however, lay in not ensuring accountability from those around him and failing to verify as well as trust.

Endemic in presidential politics is the utilization of appointees for obvious political purposes. The pattern of politicization has ebbed and flowed throughout the modern presidency starting with FDR himself, but “it took Ronald

Reagan to mobilize political appointees into a full-blown frontal assault on the very government they . . .” were expected to serve (Michaels, 1997). Although

232

Carter initially sought the presidency claiming, “Washington has problems,”

Reagan crusaded his way to the White House proclaiming, “Washington is the problem.”

These and other variations of these statements have become a permanent part of the national political rhetoric since 1980 thanks to Ronald Reagan. The logical consequence of gaining the presidency on this theme is the automatic establishment of an adversarial relationship between the new administration and career civil servants. Moreover, it increases the difficulties of recruiting the best appointees to what are supposed to be “posts of honor.” Such political negativism, according to Bonafede, only “leads to further centralization of executive authority” (Bonafede, 1987), and simply reinforces the “problem-with-Washington” argument by increasing intra-executive polarization and government inefficiency.

Thus, the Reagan Administration succeeded in politicizing and controlling the machinery of government as no other administration before it. “[U]nder

Reagan, ambassadorships once again became largely the province of rich and well-connected amateurs” 102 (Brauer, 1987). It even reached into the ranks of the diplomatic service, where concerns were voiced by the Under Secretary for Man-

102 Reagan demoralized career professionals at the State Department with such appointments as Shirley Temple Black to be ambassador to Ghana in 1980 and subsequently by appointing his former personal secretary from Sacramento, Helene von Damm, as ambassador to Austria in 1981.

233

agement at the State Department over “the casual use of Foreign Service posi-

tions for political patronage,” warning:

I am deeply concerned about the diminishing percent of career appointments. . . [from] 1981, when 75 percent of our ambassadors were career Foreign Service Officers, now only 60 percent [have built their careers as diplomats. The reduction in] senior positions makes managing the Foreign Service difficult. Seeing the dubious quality of some of those judged worthy or capable of serving as ambassador [is] wasteful and demoralizing for well qualified people who climb a 30-year ladder, only to be preempted at the top rung by someone lacking the necessary qualifications or experience.” (Ronald Spiers, quoted in (Richardson, 1999))

The Reagan Administration marked the beginning of what has become the ongoing politicization of the ranks of the permanent government. Toward the end of the Reagan Presidency, the National Academy of Public Administration

(NAPA) surveyed previous political appointees from as far back as FDR’s second term. Although Reagan appointees had turned over in great numbers, this group “had the lowest incidence of policy-motivated resignations [at only 1.5 percent, which was] . . . probably attributable to the careful screening . . . for philosophical affinity” (Brauer, 1987).

Reagan considered Jimmy Carter as the perfect example of what not to do in the Oval Office. “The Problem with Carter is that he tries to do every thing at once . . . himself” (Reagan quoted in (Doyle, 1999)). Administratively, Reagan

234 became the great delegator. His tendency to “over” delegate ultimately had ramifications when it came to the formulation of foreign policy, which became dominated by the White House and the NSC rather than emanating from the

State Department (Schultz quoted in (Woodward, 1999)). Although only somewhat simplistic, it has been argued that since Reagan over delegated and over trusted those who supported him and that the Iran-Contra scandal 103 was a logical outcome (Doyle, 1999; George, 1998b; Woodward, 1999).

Ronald Reagan, occasionally referred to as the “Teflon president” managed to do what no other president since Eisenhower had done – leave office with his reputation intact and a high public approval rating (Doyle, 1999). (He was also the first since Eisenhower to leave the presidency after two full terms in office.)

He managed this despite having an administration in which “some officials failed to understand and respect the difference between private interest and public trust . . . [compiling] the worst record of conflict of interest allegations and scandals since the Eisenhower administration” (Brauer, 1986).

103 Military arms were secretly and illegally sold to the Iranians and the proceeds were used to fund military insurgents in Nicaragua. Admiral John Poindexter, who headed the National Security Council, his deputy Colonel Oliver North, and even Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were among the 14 administration officials who were ultimately indicted. Eleven were convicted, but several convictions were subsequently overturned on appeal. Had the independent counsel found the “smoking gun” proving that Reagan had known about and authorized illegal arms sales and the funding of the Contra rebels, he would have face impeachment charges in the Con- gress. For full treatment of the Iran-Contra cover up, including George’s Bush’s role in it, see (Woodward, 1999).

235

By the end of his administration, infighting and intrigue existed at the highest levels of the Reagan White House. At times, it “resembled FDR’s coliseum of gladiators, but unlike FDR, Reagan would not jump in and manipulate the spec- tacle . . . and he was simply unable or unwilling to intervene and crack heads”

(Kemp quoted in (Doyle, 1999)). To do so was beneath the leading actor. Several personal confrontations erupted between some of the most senior members of the administration (including cabinet secretaries), especially over the Iran-Contra scandal, but Reagan is reported to have sat silently eating jelly beans while these scenes played themselves out. Non-confrontation and non-engagement are common traits of adult children of alcoholics, who always try to “put a good face on and do not let anyone know anything is wrong” (Rubenzer, 2004). Rubenzer and Faschingbauer believe this explains how Reagan could appear as such a compassionate and friendly president while he was actually slashing social and humanitarian programs (Rubenzer, 2004).

Ronald Reagan served two terms from January 20, 1981 – January 20, 1989.

During that time he made a total of 33 cabinet appointments.

2.1.3.10 George H. W. Bush (1989 – 1993)

Presidential Style & Personality :

236

George Herbert Walker Bush was born the year before Robert Kennedy into a

New England family with “old money,” which is very difference from the kind of wealth the Kennedy’s had. Those who have “old money” are quiet about their wealth and consider it in very poor taste to draw attention themselves or whatever they may have. Thus George and his siblings were raised with a sense of privilege and security as well as social obligation but not a sense of entitlement.

Politically and socially, the Walkers and the Bushes were well-connected traditional, conservative Republicans – full members of the establishment. All the

Bush children were raised to believe that personal integrity and loyalty were essential virtues, and that one’s accomplishments in life were the consequences of a person’s hard work, commitment and inner worth.

Born into a family of well heeled bankers and industrialists, George Bush was automatically a member of the Brahmin class which tolerated at best but never fully accepted men like Joe Kennedy. Bush’s patrician upbringing resembled most that of Franklin Roosevelt, and, during the height of the depression, was driven to and from elite schools by the family chauffeur (Naftali, 2007).

After graduating from Phillips Andover Academy, Bush chose not to go directly to college opting instead to serve in World War II, during which he became a highly decorated Navy pilot. After the war he attended Yale University and graduated with honors in three years. While there he became a member of a fra-

237 ternity and was inducted into the exclusive and highly secret Skull and Bones

Society. 104

Having graduated Yale with a degree in economics, he moved to Texas, went into the oil business, and by the age of 40, had become a millionaire in his own right. His interests then turned to local Republican politics, and in 1966, George

Bush, the son of a retired Connecticut senator was elected to the US House of

Representatives from the 7 th District of Texas. The elder Bush made some phone calls to help his son get onto the fast track in Washington, helping the freshman congressman to obtain a seat on the powerful House Ways and Means Commit- tee, which is a high profile assignment that never goes to members without sen- iority. Former Senator Prescott Bush called in favors from two future presidents, then-Vice President Richard Nixon and House Minority Leader Gerald Ford

(Naftali, 2007).

Congressman Bush’s image of duty, honor and quiet work ethic made him highly appealing to the conservatives in the party. When he first went to Wash- ington, he lacked any particular agenda, but he held certain generalized beliefs.

104 The membership by invitation only into the Skull and Bones Society is extended to fifteen members of the junior class and, until 1991, remained an all-male organization. It was founded in 1832 by two students, William Russell, who went on to become a General of the Army, and Alphonso Taft, who later became a judge and ambassador as well as the father of President Wil- liam Taft. Over time its membership has included such individuals as: Senator David Boren, James Buckley, William Buckley, McGeorge Bundy, Prescott Bush, George H. W. Bush, George W. Bush, William Sloan Coffin, John H. Chaffee, Averill Harriman, John Kerry, Winston Lord, Archibald MacLeish, Percy Rockefeller, Henry L. Stimson, and William Howard Taft.

238

Among these were a dislike of extremists, preference for non-governmental solu-

tions (that is, private sector Rather than legislative involvement), and spending

cuts rather than tax increases (Naftali, 2007).

In 1970, it was President Richard Nixon, who convinced the young Con-

gressman to run for the Senate – a race that he lost to Lloyd Bentsen. The follow-

ing year, Nixon made it up to Bush by naming him U S Ambassador to the

United Nations. Subsequently, Bush served as Chairman of the Republican Na-

tional Committee at the height of the Watergate Scandal, throughout which he

publicly and unwaveringly supported Nixon’s claim of innocence.

After Nixon’s resignation, President Ford named Bush as the U S Envoy to

China and then to be Director of the CIA. By this time, George Bush had already been thinking in terms of the presidency, and Ford’s loss to Carter in 1976

opened the field for the 1980 race. Bush turned out to be a viable national candi-

date finishing second to Ronald Reagan. Up to the night before the 1980 conven-

tion, there were intense back channel negotiations to get Ford to take the vice

presidential nomination under Reagan (Hayward quoted in (Burns, 2006)). The belief was that such a “dream ticket” would have automatically healed the mul-

tiple rifts within the party (Meese, 1992), but as a former president, Ford sought

an unprecedented degree of autonomy and authority for the office of the vice

president, effectively establishing a co-presidency, and that was something

239

Reagan could not and would never agree to (DeFrank, 2007). Had Reagan and

Ford been able to strike a suitable deal, the Bush political dynasty would never have been launched.

Bush’s preparation for the presidency continues to be questioned. Sherry argues that Bush’s political record is erratic (a twice failed senatorial candidate, a two term Texas Congressman, RNC Chairman during Watergate, envoy to China and CIA director for a year) – a record that seems inadequate preparation for the presidency (Sherry, 2004). Others, from a political and strategic perspective, view the same background as sufficient preparation for the presidency claiming that it augmented Reagan’s limited gubernatorial experience (Burns, 2006).

Notwithstanding the extent to which he was prepared, George Bush was un- doubtedly ambitious for the presidency. He had demonstrated this as early as

1975, when, at his confirmation hearings to become Director of the CIA, he refused to take himself out of the running for the 1976 vice presidential nomination

(Mackenzie, 1981). It was not until Gerald Ford sent a letter to the senate committee promising that he would not consider George Bush for his running mate was the stalled confirmation unblocked (Mackenzie, 1981). Yet even as late as

1988, Bush still demonstrated the lack of a burning or defining agenda. Nor did he present any lofty purpose for seeking the presidency; rather, like Nixon in

240

1960, the-Vice President Bush seemed to see it as his next logical career step –

perhaps even his due.

Despite having only limited evaluative data on George Bush, the Rubenzer

and Faschingbauer study still determined the 41 st occupant of the Oval Office

was ill suited to being president (Rubenzer, 2004). They further state “[i]f the

personality scores reported are accurate, we would predict George H. W. Bush

ultimately will be considered one of the less successful presidents of the twenti-

eth century, comparable to Coolidge or Harding.” Evaluators observed his per-

sonality was most like that of Gerald Ford while his overall profile least resembled Lyndon Johnson’s or Richard Nixon’s (Rubenzer, 2004).

Politically and psychologically, George Bush was the product of the country’s

five decades old cold war, and as president he had to figure out how to deal with

the end of that era. Initially, unlike Reagan and Thatcher, it was a struggle for

him to trust Gorbachev since he foresaw international political collapse in the ab-

sence of the traditional balance of superpowers. It has been argued that he was

most comfortable on the aggressive, international footing he had known his en-

tire life, which may explain why he was more strategic in his dealings with the

invasion of Panama, the abduction of Manuel Noriega, and the “huge military buildup that made clear Bush would choose war if [Sadam] Hussein failed to

leave Kuwait” (Sherry cited in (Michaels, 1997)).

241

According to one scholar, Bush’s and Reagan’s personal styles was casual; yet

somehow Reagan remained distant, often appearing to think impersonally in

terms of roles, scripts and institutions, but Bush was his complete opposite

(Jones, 1998). “He personalized all his relationships . . . he liked people who had been involved in his campaign – people he knew and was familiar with [something more than mere loyalty]” (Warshaw, 1999). In an interview prior to his inauguration, Bush described himself as somewhere between Jimmy Carter, who micromanaged everything including the schedule of the White House tennis court, and Ronald Reagan, who was the master delegator (Brook in (Pfiffner and

Brook, 2000)). Bush’s natural executive style was always diplomatic and collegial stressing the personal side of relationships, constancy and dependability, but when there were disagreements, he expected them to be settled privately in a gentlemanly manner. He also had a talent for inspiring affection and trust, seeming to care genuinely and valuing team spirit and morale (Dowd in (Doyle,

1999)).

Presidential Transition:

Not since 1929, when Herbert Hoover succeeded Calvin Coolidge, had there been an interparty transfer of presidencies – also known as a “friendly” takeover.

Yet, even then there were differences since Coolidge was not the incumbent vice

president. In the case of a “friendly” handoff, it is generally agreed, the political

242

dynamics associated with a change of administration are anything but the stan-

dard “us-versus-them transition. In this case, the prime transition question shifts

to who stays and who goes” (Hess, 2001) - and, possibly, why.

Reagan viewed the election of George Bush as additional affirmation of his

own eight year presidency. Not only did he see the transition as a means of de-

fining his presidential exit, but Reagan, still the competitive showman, also in-

tended to make of this transition a high water mark for all others who come after

him (Burke, 2003b). As president, he had already given Vice President George

Bush an office in the West Wing, thus drawing him closer to the administration’s

decision making center than any other modern vice president, with the exception

of Walter Mondale before him (Donovan, 1985) and Al Gore subsequently.

Reagan also undertook a series of symbolic, but slightly self-serving actions.

First, in order to spare Bush potential fallout, Reagan required that all his ap-

pointees submit pro forma resignations. This enabled the incoming president either to decline outright the resignations from anyone whom he wanted to retain, to accept them quietly, or simply to say nothing to those whom he wanted to leave. 105 Second, just days after the election, Reagan reinstated regular one-on-

105 With respect to political appointees, the Reagan-Bush transition was made smoother than any other in the modern presidency. Secretary of State George Schultz, with whom Bush had pro- found differences over the Iran-Contra affair as well as other issues, was allowed to leave quietly on Inauguration Day. Ed Meese, who had been forced to resign three months prior to the election due to his connection with the Wedtech scandal, but probably would have had no place in the new administration for the same reasons as Schutlz. On the other hand, the resignations of

243 one meetings with Bush after more than a year long hiatus. During these discussions, they focused on the transition and brainstormed staff and cabinet issues

(Reagan, 2007); however, there is no evidence that Reagan actively tried to shape the Bush Administration beyond offering advice.

There is much debate within the ranks of presidential scholars regarding the differences, as well as the presumed advantages, of an interparty transfer of the

Executive. Neustadt takes a purely scholarly approach to this question focusing specifically on the scenario where the incoming president is also the current vice president (Neustadt, 2000). Attempting to draw any conclusions regarding interparty transfers of power is problematic in that this event had occurred only once and not since Martin Van Buren succeeded Andrew Jackson in 1837; however, it had the potential of happening in 1960 (Eisenhower – Nixon) and in 2000

(Clinton – Gore) and may occur in the future. There simply is not enough data to predict the advantages, disadvantages, differences or risks associated with this kind of transfer of power.

Neustadt points out that the Reagan-Bush transition was a relatively smooth one but not entirely without a certain predictable angst brought about simply by

Education Secretary Cavasos, Treasury Secretary Brady, and newly-appointed Attorney General Thornburgh were not accepted by President-elect Bush, and they were invited to remain in their current positions within the new administration (Pfiffner, 1996).

It should be noted that in the event an appointed incumbent remains in the same position, the need for Senate confirmation is avoided. If, however, a president nominates an existing secretary to a new department, a new Senate confirmation is required just as if s/he were entering the government for the first time.

244

changes at the top. It is not certain, but the relative ease and efficiency may have been due simply to the personalities of the two men involved as well as their mu-

tual interest in accomplishing a smooth handoff. Based on personal interviews

with Bush’s director of White House personnel, Neustadt also reports that spe-

cial briefing books were created that detailed each White House staff position,

identified the current incumbent, including that incumbent’s personnel file and

performance assessment, and a recommendation by the Reagan personnel office

whether to keep, reassign or replace the current individual (Neustadt, 2000). In

the period leading up to the election, this information was never made available

to the other candidate’s (Dukakis’) team, nor were they even informed that such

information existed.

Another reason for so smooth a transition was Bush’s decision early on to

merge his election team with his transition managers as Reagan had successfully

done in 1980 (Burke, 2003b) – something that most scholars agree avoids internal

competition and friction. Ultimately, the transition may have gone well because,

in addition to the preceding steps, George Bush did something that Reagan had

not done – which was to become actively engaged in the transition planning and

execution without over delegating to his staff (Naftali, 2007).

Thinking past the transition period, George Bush had a problem in distin-

guishing himself from his predecessor without appearing disloyal, but in practi-

245

cal terms, a friendly transfer of power appears also to be a two-edged sword.

“On the one hand, there was no rush to find people to fill all possible positions

since the incumbents were all loyal Republicans” (Pfiffner, 1996). Bush’s prob-

lem still remained, however, that of finding positions for his own people or risk being viewed as nothing more than Reagan’s third term. He had to balance this

risk with the fact that he was still Reagan’s loyal vice president and a loyal Re-

publican. As such he could not be perceived to be in too great a hurry to set up

an independent office of the president-elect.

One Hundred Days:

In his inaugural address, President George Bush “stressed continuity and

stewardship of the Reagan legacy”; however, within less than two months, this

perception quickly gave way to complaints that the new administration “lacked

momentum, grand design [and] new direction” (Pfiffner, 1996) – something that

the new president referred to as “the vision thing” and which he admitted to

lacking. Bush, who had always been a political moderate, was limited in his abil-

ity to propose any really new, sweeping or expanded legislation. He was

painted into a political corner not only because he was Reagan’s loyal vice presi-

dent and direct political heir, innately conservative and struggling with “the vi-

sion thing,” but was on the record with campaign promises such as “Read my

lips, no new taxes.” Having successfully campaigned on the Reagan record,

246

George Bush had effectively limited what changes he might propose as well as

the grounds on which he could justify making even minor proposals without

paying a steep political price. This all translated into setting the bar for new ini-

tiatives so low that he could hardly fail to meet expectations. Thus, it is not diffi-

cult to understand why George Bush struggled well beyond his initial 100 days,

in fact, throughout his entire four year term, to differentiate himself from his

predecessor while still remaining the loyal and rightful successor. 106

President George Bush did manage to differentiate himself in a positive way in the manner he chose to deal with the press. Within the first 100 days of his administration, the new president held eleven press conferences, thereby making himself far more accessible than either Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan (the great communicator). Furthermore, he artfully arranged such encounters as informal question and answer sessions in the White House press room rather than staging them as formal events in the East Room, as Reagan had insisted. By going to the press room, he also succeeded in adding a touch of humility to his presidential style – something that paid off nicely. It was due to his personalized and collegial relationship with the White House press corps, that George Bush managed

106 Bush found symbolic ways in which he could differentiate himself from Reagan while still remaining loyal and non-critical. For example, a month into the new administration, the new president met with prominent African American leaders on Martin Luther King Day – something that Reagan had not done. This was made all the more significant since Reagan had publicly questioned the motives of civil rights leaders just a week before Bush’s inauguration.

247

to shift the inevitable 100 day scrutiny from matters of legislative substance to

issues of presidential style (Naftali, 2007), which was much more complimentary

than it would have been. In total, George Bush gave more news conferences

within his first 80 days than Ronald Reagan had during his entire last two years

in office (Pfiffner, 1996).107

Beyond the symbolic acts of independence, it becomes clear that George Bush

was inextricably bound to the Reagan legacy. “He scarcely offered an agenda beyond consolidating [and, thus, reaffirming] the Reagan revolution” (Sherry,

2004). And his first chief of staff, John Sununu, went so far as to tell the press not

to look for any “. . . drastic change or redirection. . . [T]his is a conservative Re-

publican President taking over from a conservative Republican” (Sununu quoted

in (Naftali, 2007)).

There was another, almost structural reason that Bush needed to avoid the

100 day score card, and that was because his transition team had not been well

developed. All significant transition planning was deferred until the election re-

sults were in so as to appear completely confident of the win and the anticipated

“friendly” handoff from Reagan. Ultimately, his team, once fully formed, was

not nearly as prepared as either the Carter or Reagan teams had been (Michaels,

107 Reagan, the great communicator, had held exactly 50 highly controlled and well scripted news conferences while in office, with each one lasting precisely 30 minutes (Pfiffner, 1996).

248

1997). Bush’s campaign strategy had been largely a commitment to continuing

the Reagan momentum that the transition team struggled to balance voter expec-

tations of four more Reagan years against finding ways of breaking free from

Reagan’s shadow. His campaign team, which would also serve as his transition

team, continuously urged then-candidate Bush to staff up in order to be in the best position to run the traditional 100 day legislative marathon, but nothing

more than the minimum transition structure was put in place. When the post-

election press reports identified the seeming lack of a presidential agenda, sev-

eral special interest groups began making themselves available (quite publicly) by offering to fill the apparent void. These included various environmental

groups, the conservative Heritage Foundation, and even the 275,000 member

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (Warshaw, 1999).

At the halfway mark of his four year term, George Bush was taking political

flack for his weak domestic agenda. Around the time of the mid-term elections,

not only were the Democrats predictably critical of the administration, but also

the conservatives within Bush’s own party began to complain. It was majority

whip Newt Gingrich who led the charge against Bush claiming that he was need-

lessly behaving as a bipartisan, accusing the president of being too accommodat-

ing and insufficiently confrontational (Doyle, 1999). In retirement, Reagan him-

249 self once commented that Bush “doesn’t seem to stand for anything . . . [he has] no compelling social agenda” (Doyle, 1999).

Another point at which the new president found himself on political thin ice originated from statements made during the campaign. He had gone on the record advocating clean government declaring he would not tolerate the “sleaze factor” – potentially a reference to Iran-Contra but certainly to other ethical and legal issues that had enveloped individuals in the Reagan Administration. This, however, came back to haunt him early during his first hundred days with the failed nomination of fellow Texan John Tower 108 to be his Secretary of Defense.

Within just days of his inauguration, George Bush unknowingly stumbled on the widening chasm that separates the Executive Branch and Congress – a separation that originated under Johnson (Vietnam), escalated severely under Nixon

(Watergate), abated only slightly under Carter and neatly papered over by

Reagan. As a result, “Bush was the first president to have a cabinet nomination defeated in his first term” (Sherry, 2004), and this, for only the second time in the

108 John Tower served 24 years in the Senate, including the chairmanship of the Armed Services Committee. There was no question regarding Tower’s qualifications; however, allegations about his private life, excessive drinking, sexual misconduct and conflicts of interest with large defense contractors were openly discussed. Ultimately, his hubris, abrasive style and personal arrogance caused his former Senate colleagues to defeat his nomination by a vote of 47 to 53, thereby making him the second senator ever to be denied a cabinet confirmation by his former peers. The Bush Administration wanted to believe that the president’s type of loyalty also existed within the Senate. “[O]nly one former senator had ever been denied a cabinet seat, and that was in 1868 . . . Washington [insiders] questioned Bush’s decision to go down fighting” (Hess, 2001).

250

modern presidency 109 , occurred just days into the new presidency at the height of the proverbial honeymoon period. Unfortunately, Bush’s stubbornness and rigid loyalty to on a personal level proved disastrous for him politically and may have cut short the traditional goodwill extended to all new presidents. He subsequently sacrificed additional political capital during the difficult confirmation of

Justice Clarence Thomas. 110

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

When it comes to staffing the White House, an incoming president under a

friendly takeover has more personnel opportunities and information to work

with than during an interparty transfer of power. The Bush team was given

unique staffing options. There is, and was, a significant downside in the poten-

tial loss of fresh thinking and, therefore, the possible difficulty in establishing a

unique identity for the new administration. Not only did the Bush organization

suffer both these events, but the Reagan incumbents generally expected to have a

place in the new administration. Inertia and resistance to change became signifi-

cant forces that blunted any sense of urgency to clean house – something which

109 In 1959, late in his second term, Eisenhower nominated Lewis Strauss to be Secretary of Com- merce. He failed to win Senate confirmation by a vote of 46 to 49 along party lines.

110 George Bush, who was far more committed to Civil Rights than Ronald Reagan, was determined to nominate an African American judge to the Supreme Court. Thomas’ confirmation hearings became extremely contentious due to charges of sexual harassment by a former subordinate, attorney Anita Hill. Bush displayed the same fierce loyalty for Thomas as he had for John Tower almost a year earlier. The Senate ultimately confirmed Thomas by a vote of 52 to 48.

251 has happened automatically in every other takeover of the modern presidency.

Consequently, George Bush had a smooth transition “that befitted from the good auspices of the Reagan Administration (Burke, 2001a).

There were other, more directly related reasons for Bush’s well-managed changeover of White House staff. Quite simply, the new president “played a direct role in selecting both staff and cabinet members” (Neustadt, 2000), which was markedly different from the Reagan approach of delegating this function to his troika. Of the 53 White House staffers announced by Inauguration Day, “27 came from the Reagan government,” (Hess, 2001) and of the 29 most senior staffers, “twenty-four . . . had prior White House experience, advanced degrees, and impressive resumes” (Burke, 2000a). This demonstrates Bush’s commitment to appointing highly qualified people to his administration.

Low key was the watchword not only to his staffing, but also in how Bush expected his people to operate as well. Given the high levels of competence among those he tapped to serve him, and because Bush went on to select his cabinet secretaries from people he knew personally, the White House staff were much less likely to interject themselves between the president and the cabinet secretaries than had occurred in previous administrations. Personality clashes were successfully kept to a minimum.

252

Other appointments went smoothly but were not entirely without controversy. The New York Times reported that in the early months of the new administration, the ratio of political donors to career diplomats remained almost as high in the Bush Administration as the Reagan Administration. The old charge resurfaced that ambassadorial appointments were for sale to the wealthiest Re- publican donors, and reignited the argument that professionalism among the U S diplomatic corps continued to be undermined by the White House (Pfiffner,

1996).

George H. W. Bush had entered the presidency promising both a trimmed down White House staff and an empowered cabinet – a reference to the mythical concept of the “cabinet government” model of presidential management. He generally succeeded in his goals, but the result was generally problematic for his administration. The White House staff, particularly in the domestic and economic policy areas, was never given adequate authority to manage domestic policy, and the powerful chief of staff, John Sununu 111 , failed to appreciate the im-

111 Highly reminiscent of John Ehrlichman, John Sununu was neither balanced nor fair in the running of the president’s office. Bush, however, was no Nixon and this type of chief of staff was neither appropriate nor effective. Sununu, who proudly identified himself as the president’s SOB, alienated everyone equally from cabinet secretaries to Congressmen and Senators. Yet even when scandal ruined Sununu’s creditability, Bush still did not fire him outright but rather allowed him to resign. In the manner Ronald Reagan with Don Regan, Bush utilized a family member, his son and future president, George W., who “came to Washington to oversee the departure of . . . John Sununu” (Gergen, 2000). Altogether, George H. W. Bush had three chiefs of staff during his four year presidency, which is a indicative that the president failed to get his support staffing model correct (Pfiffner, 1996).

253

portance of nurturing, coordinating and guiding the cabinet. As a result, there

was never a consistent understanding of the president’s agenda across the Execu-

tive Branch (Warshaw, 1996).

When it came to autonomy and authority granted to the White House staff,

Nixon, Ford and Carter had all opted to keep theirs on short leashes. This

changed slightly during the twelve Reagan-Bush years. Reagan preferred to

delegate what he considered mundane tasks but only as far as his select troika,

whereas Bush, who also chose to avoid micromanagement, did so because he

wanted to believe in the goodwill and collegial spirit of the team he had assembled around him. Regardless of individual motives, Warshaw asserts, the country will always hold presidents accountable for the results their staff produce since every White House organization is configured by him and for him. 112 The degree of “power that the White House staff [wields] is only what the president wants it to be, and clearly Reagan and Bush were comfortable” (Warshaw, 1999) allowing their staff to speak both to Congress and the cabinet departments on behalf of their administrations.

112 Bush named John Sununu, who turned out to be exceptionally egotistical and domineering, as his Chief of staff. This type of choice ended badly just as it had for Eisenhower and Adams, Nixon and Haldeman, and even Reagan and Regan. Yet Bush stubbornly stuck by Sununu for three years until he was finally forced to resign after documented evidence was published pertaining to his misuse of federal funds and government planes involved in more than 70 personal trips. According to The Washington Post he even flew to New England for a dental appointment but reported it as government business. Based on the recommendation of Bush’s White House Counsel, Sununu was allowed to resign quietly and repay less than $50,000 for flights that had cost taxpayers more than $600,000 (Walsh, 1991). No criminal action was ever taken.

254

Bush in Relation to his Cabinet:

George Bush came to the presidency intending that his cabinet should be stronger than the White House staff simply because he knew them well and expected more from them (Jones, 1998). He further believed that a more effective cabinet would result in moderating the recent trend of centralizing too much control in the White House – something that had characterized not only the

Reagan Administration but also those going back to Nixon. “[George H. W.

Bush] appointed cabinet officers he knew personally and trusted them to run their departments. He also allowed his cabinet secretaries to have more say in the appointments of their political subordinates” (Pfiffner, 1999a). In addition, he made himself far more available to his secretaries than Reagan had done

(Pfiffner, 1996).

Those cabinet secretaries who were closest to the president personally recov- ered most of the hiring authority that all cabinet secretaries had lost under

Ronald Reagan. In the Bush Administration, this turned out to be especially true where James Baker (State), Nicholas Brady (Treasury), and Bob Mosbacher

(Commerce) were concerned, but even the other secretaries had an easier time planning and staffing their departments (Pfiffner, 1996). For Bush “loyalty and family connections [were] a critical part of cabinet building . . . which was peppered with longtime associates whom he knew and trusted” (Warshaw, 1999).

255

Appointees’ performance on the job was not completely taken for granted in the Bush Administration, therefore, throughout his four years, Bush’s personnel director “. . . made periodic personal visits to cabinet secretaries’ offices to discuss how the PAS subordinates were performing, and on rare occasions a resignation was arranged” (Patterson, 2003). Closed-loop personnel processes were never used during the Reagan Administration, and although Bush wanted a stronger cabinet in the managerial sense, he stopped short of granting them rights to develop their own policy positions (Burke, 2000a). The policy development process remained firmly under White House control where he continued the Reagan model of the cabinet council system and policy development

(Pfiffner, 1996). In an oblique reference to his predecessor, President-elect Bush was quoted as saying he’d “been to cabinet meetings [that were] show-and-tell – in a not-so-veiled reference to Reagan’s style” (Patterson, 2000). As President

Bush, he met with the cabinet quarterly, but the purpose for full cabinet meetings was primarily for team building.

The first Bush cabinet was composed of a high percentage of “in-and-outers” including: James Baker, Brent Scowcroft (National Security Adviser), Roger Por- ter (Domestic Policy), Richard Darman (OMB), and Secretaries Jack Kemp,

Manuel Mujan, James Watkins, Clayton Yeutter, Elizabeth Dole, and William

Bennett (Hess, 2001). There would have been one more long-term insider in the

256

Bush Cabinet, had the Tower nomination been confirmed. When it failed, however, Bush settled on Dick Cheney to be his Secretary of Defense, so the number of insiders remained high. The new president set the tone for his administration early on saying, “think big . . . challenge the system . . . be frank, and although we’re going to have some fights with Congress, we’re not going to approach it as though dealing with the enemy” (Pfiffner, 1996). The cabinet that George Bush assembled was overwhelmingly white, male, middle-aged (average was 57), and nearly all had longstanding personal relationships with him (Warshaw, 1996).

In broad terms, the primary role of the cabinet is to provide information and a range of views to support the president in his decision making. Consequently, presidents have the flexibility of expanding its membership beyond just the departmental Secretaries, and George Bush elevated four additional positions to cabinet rank: budget director, chief of staff, director of the Environmental

Agency (EPA), and the US Trade Representative. Hess maintains the first two positions fully merit this rank because of the inherently policy-making aspects of these roles; inclusion of the Trade Representative sent a clear signal of the importance this administration placed on world trade, but cabinet rank was used to entice Governor Whitman to take the directorship of the EPA (Hess, 2002).

There is no denying that presidents need their cabinet choices in position as quickly as possible, and similarly each secretary needs his/her support team up

257 and running in order to serve the president most effectively. Regardless of which party controls the White House and which controls the Senate, the average length of time to confirm presidential appointees had been steadily increasing throughout the modern presidency. The Bush confirmations at the deputy and associate secretarial levels required an average of 8.1 months to complete – a record up to that time. This compares poorly to Reagan’s first term, where it required 5.3 months on average to obtain Senate confirmation but the average was twice as long for Bush as it had taken for Jack Kennedy’s nominees just three decades earlier (Mackenzie, 2002a).

One of the prime reasons Bush’s cabinet functioned as well as it did – which was more successful than Reagan’s – resulted from the conscious strengthening and balancing of the cabinet vis-à-vis the White House staff. George Bush ensured there was better parity between these two traditionally competitive power centers. Because of personal ties between the president and his secretaries, White

House staff generally “did not tend to interpose themselves . . . or have major fights because Bush, unlike Reagan, made a habit of keeping in touch with them.

. . with one major exception: Chief of Staff, John Sununu” (Pfiffner, 1999c). Un- fortunately, the president realized too late that his cabinet could have worked even more effectively, and this was due to his over reliance on, and core belief in, the collegial approach which, absent strong and consistent direction, the cabinet

258 will drift toward the departments’ views rather than presidential goals. This happened to Bush, not because of disloyalty, but “rather a lack of consistent signals from the White House” regarding its priorities (Warshaw, 1996).

Bush’s Management Model:

Colin Powell described Bush’s management style as smooth, coordinated and highly integrated (Doyle, 1999). George Bush was the first president to integrate crosscutting team membership such as Powell’s on both the political issues and policy subgroup for civilian and military matters as well as making him chairman of the Joints Chiefs. His management style has been categorized as a hybrid of hierarchical and collegial with a greater bias toward the latter (Burke, 2000a).

His vice president stated that “Bush didn’t mind varying viewpoints, but he didn’t want a lot of tension . . . [he] always wanted to avoid friction” (Doyle,

1999).

Given the care with which he recruited his secretaries and senior staff, along with his deep interest in foreign affairs, Bush succeeded more than any other president since Kennedy in putting together a true foreign policy team in the most literal sense of the term (George, 1998b). By replacing (Reagan’s) Secretary of State, George Schutlz, and reassigning Colin Powell, the Bush administration initially appeared to be a less than friendly takeover of power; however, this should be considered as nothing more than Bush’s choice of working with peo-

259

ple he knew better, placing them in positions that complemented his strengths,

and ensuring he was surrounded by people with whom he could work closely.

Foreign policy was, after all, an area in which he had great interest and experi-

ence, thus, he relied heavily on James Baker (State Department), Brent Scowcroft

(Security Adviser) and Dick Cheney (Secretary of Defense), all of whom were ca-

pable men he considered as friends. Although his management style was colle-

gial, he was likely more successful because of the selective requirements for per-

sonal friendship, team loyalty and the confidence these bring (Preston, 2001).

Bush, like Roosevelt and Reagan, preferred receiving information through

conversation but for very different reasons, and he actually enjoyed on an intel-

lectual level the give and take of active debate (George, 1998b). Unlike other

modern presidents who have used their time to read or rest while on Air Force

One, Bush frequently spent entire flights on the phone with foreign leaders,

members of Congress or his own cabinet. He even checked in to a meeting that

James Baker was conducting in Russia with the Soviet Foreign Minister rather

than waiting for a debrief (Preston, 2001).

In sharp contrast to his immediate predecessor, George Bush “ran a non-

ideological White House where obedience, loyalty, and collegiality were valued

most. [He was] loyal to people more than ideas [preferring people like himself]:

prudent, loyal, buttoned-down, and not ideological crusaders, but capable, gra-

260

cious enthusiastic second bananas” (Doyle, 1999). Perhaps more than other

presidents, he was concerned with maintaining secrecy and avoiding leaks. The

Washington Post attributed this to Bush’s roots “in secret societies and member-

ship in the clubs of the elite decision-making class of power brokers – men who believed they had been endowed with the education and experience to perform in the public’s interest, often without the public’s knowledge” (Doyle, 1999).

Summary:

In a subtle attempt to step out of Reagan’s shadow, George Bush the candi-

date said during the campaign, “I am a practical man. I like what works . . . and

do not yearn for a crusade” (Doyle, 1999); and even before the election results

were tallied, the Bush insiders consciously began tailoring the future presidency

as Bush I rather than Reagan III. They were never totally successful in this re-

gard, and the inevitable comparisons to the previous president haunted the Bush

Administration throughout its term. Once elected, the new president outlined

his plans for working with congress saying he liked putting together coalitions

and building bridges, but this got him in trouble with House Speaker Gingrich

and the far right elements of his own party.

If the mantra of Carter’s staffing process had been “find good managers,”

then Bush’s was “find good team players” (Sherry, 2004). It was this qualifica-

tion that George Bush valued above all. Connections and loyalty to the Bush

261

family played an important part in his selection of appointees and the trust he

place in them. Yet despite these requirements, he remained moderately commit-

ted to the concept of diversity, and over the course of his four year administra-

tion, he appointed two Hispanics, one African American, and a woman to cabi-

net level posts (Warshaw, 1999). (See also Appendix B.)

George H. W. Bush was the last of the cold warrior presidents, and as such,

his interests and strengths were greater on the international level than domesti-

cally. To his detriment, he was personally reserved and distrusting of large po-

litical events that ultimately changed the world assumptions he had held his en-

tire life. Jack Matlock, who was first appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union by Reagan and then reappointed by Bush, stated that “Bush tended to be suspi- cious of political change – even when it was for the better. His strength was in managing the present and avoiding the mistakes of the past, [but it] was not in his nature to seek to mold the future” (Matlock quoted in (Pfiffner, 1996)). In this regard he differed markedly not only from Reagan, but almost all other modern presidents.

Among modern presidents, George Bush’s managerial style stands out. He was simultaneously collegial, unlike Nixon and Johnson, and highly personal, unlike Eisenhower and Reagan, all without sinking into micromanagement like

Carter. He was most successful at building coalitions as a means of advancing

262

his policies, and was sometimes referred to as the “mad dialer” due to his habit

of grabbing a phone and staying in touch with people all over the world at al-

most any time (Doyle, 1999). His strong preference for direct, personal diplo-

macy with other world leaders gave rise to the term “Rolodex diplomacy, and

this is a central part of Mr. Bush’s decision-making style [as well]: He develops

personal friendships with world leaders . . . talks to them frequently as he weighs

his options; however, final judgments are formulated in a highly informal and

secretive setting with only a few aides . . .” (Burke, 2000a).

Prior to taking action in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, George Bush

invested heavily in Rolodex diplomacy by building extensive political bridges

into the Arab world before taking any military action. Once he decided war was

necessary, he determined that that it needed to be focused, neat and surgical.

Thus, he worked the phones building critical international coalitions, used Saudi

Arabia as a staging point, and successfully pushed Sadam Hussein out of Ku-

wait. The whole undertaking was carefully presented as a war of liberation to both Arabs and non-Arabs, thereby casting the US as liberators and instead of

occupiers. It was executed well and finished quickly, and he avoided any Viet-

nam-like quagmire – all positive things in the minds of Americans.

Despite the first US military successes in half a century, not to mention the

enormous pride he instilled in Americans, George Bush still self-destructed do-

263

mestically. Having come to the presidency with no clear or defining agenda, he

would most likely have been considered strictly a caretaker president had the

situation in the Persian Gulf not occurred. As a consequence of events originat-

ing as far back as Carter, and possibly even Ford, the world changed on an inter-

national scale quickly and profoundly on Bush’s watch. The cold war ended,

Germany was finally and fully reunified, there were wars in Panama and the

Persian Gulf, and, most significantly, the Soviet Empire crumbled.

Unfortunately for George Bush, things did not go as well on the domestic

front, where the economy tanked due largely to legacy of supply side economics

– also known as “voodoo economics.” Of greater impact, however, were the

massive deficits he had inherited from Reagan, but unfortunately, as his political

heir, Bush could neither criticize nor complain openly about Reagan’s policies.

In the end, the single issue of the economy was sufficient to cost him reelection

(Burns, 2006; Jones, 1998; Naftali, 2007). Early in his administration, Bush was

forced to go back on his campaign promise of “no new taxes,” but even then he borrowed a play from Reagan. By bailing out the savings and loan companies,

Bush himself added $100B more to the sizeable Reagan deficit. Through finan-

cial sleight of hand, he deliberately reported only 40% of this additional deficit in

the 1989 budget numbers and buried the other 60% as a special bond issue that

was never reported under the country’s deficit accounts (Naftali, 2007). Reagan,

264

the man responsible for the Bush Presidency, turned out also to be responsible

for its being a one-term administration. Together, Reagan and Bush kicked the

economic can down the road and handed Bill Clinton a shaky economy.

There was also a darker side to George Bush not immediately obvious but

neatly packaged in Ivy League refinement. “From Nixon, he learned to preach

unity and practice division . . . [he was merely] a kinder, gentler Nixon” (Sherry,

2004). From Reagan he learned to deny any facts he found uncomfortable. Some

paint Bush as an innocent bystander during the Iran-Contra affair (Meese, 1992)

while others present compelling evidence to the contrary; not only was he cogni-

zant and approving of these events but also a participant in the subsequent cover

up 113 (Naftali, 2007). George Bush blamed the liberal press as well as the independent Iran-Contra prosecutor for his failure to be reelected (Woodward, 1999).

113 George Bush, as a lame duck president with fewer than 30 days left in office, granted presidential pardons to Caspar Weinberger, Elliott Abrams, Duane Clarridge, Alan Fiers, Clair George and Robert McFarlane, all of whom had been found guilty of and/or confessed to crimes in connection with the Iran-Contra Affair and its subsequent cover up. According to Bob Woodward, George Bush felt that Reagan should have pardoned each of these men – something that had actually been considered but rejected by Reagan himself just before leaving office in 1988.

Several members of the Bush White House saw these pardons as huge mistakes politically and historically because they effectively linked Bush to Reagan’s scandal. On the other hand, there may have been a more self-serving motive on Bush’s part in that by pardoning everyone, especially Weinberger, Bush neatly averted having to submit his personal diaries as evidence in that upcoming trial. His writings state explicitly that he (then-Vice President Bush) was not only “in the loop” with respect to all aspects of Iran-Contra (Naftali, 2007), but that he was “one of the few people [to] know fully the details” (Woodward, 1999).

During his last year in office, George Bush named another involved individual, Admiral John Poindexter, to be the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA’s) Information Awareness Office. Poindexter had resigned from the Reagan White House in dis- grace and was found guilty of Iran-Contra crimes. He is generally believed to have been the

265

George Herbert Walker Bush served one term from January 20, 1988 - January

20, 1992. During that time he made a total of 21 cabinet appointments.

mastermind behind the entire arms for hostages deal, and as Reagan’s National Security Adviser, was Lt. Oliver North’s direct supervisor.

266

2.1.3.11 Bill Clinton (1993 - 2001)

Presidential Style & Personality :

William Jefferson (Blythe) Clinton was born in 1946 making him the first Baby

Boomer to become president. He was born to a single mother who had been widowed just months before his birth, and, at the age of two, Bill Clinton was left with his maternal grandparents while his mother complete her nursing degree at an out of state school. His grandmother was a domineering personality known for her independence and frequent emotional outbursts, whereas his grandfather was her absolute opposite: gentlemanly, even-tempered and socially popular but lacking in formal education. In his grandmother and mother Clinton saw strong women who were determined, hardworking, and self-sacrificing. The three adults who nurtured him were all were highly extraverted, and Bill Clinton simultaneously blends the best and worst of their collective characteristics (Pika,

2005).

Clinton’s mother, Virginia, remarried when Bill was only four, at which time his stepfather became a fourth, and rather dark, influence in his life. Roger Clin- ton was a successful used car dealer, a part-time bootlegger, and full blown alcoholic who verbally and physically abused his family over more than a twenty year period. During his formative years, Bill Clinton began exhibiting a wide range of behaviors commonly found among children of alcoholics – some of

267 which were present in Ronald Reagan, too. By day the future president focused on school and church where he excelled and achieved success and social recognition; at night he coped privately as best he could with the alcoholism and domestic violence around him. As a young man, he tended to assume the role of

“hero” by trying to protect his mother and younger brother. At school, he showed himself to be a serious student earning kudos for his accomplishments in the hope of compensating for his dysfunctional home life (Maraniss, 1995).

Another trait often observed in children of alcoholics is “an exaggerated need to be agreeable,” (Greenstein, 2004) pleasant and easy to get along with - something else he shared with Reagan. These children are concerned that “they are not worthy of being liked [and thus] decide that personal accomplishment will make people like them” (Kelly, 1992). Journalist David Gergen, who worked in the Clinton White House as well as those of Nixon, Ford and Reagan, contends that Clinton defined himself by how much others liked him because he wasn’t really sure who he was (Gergen, 2000). “It has also been suggested that ‘as a child of addiction’ Clinton was predisposed to develop his own addiction, in this case a sexual one” (Levin quoted in (Pika, 2005)).

Having served as class president his junior year, William J. Clinton graduated

4th in his high school class. When he was 16, he had served as a delegate to Boys’

Nation, and while on a group trip to Washington, he was greeted by John Ken-

268

nedy. After high school, he attended Georgetown University on a scholarship,

where he excelled in building relationships, coalitions, and personal networks but came to be considered perhaps a bit too smooth by some of his peers

(Maraniss, 1995). After graduation he spent two years at Oxford as a Rhodes

Scholar and then enrolled in the law school at Yale. In 1972, while still a law stu-

dent, he served as the Texas campaign coordinator for McGovern’s presidential

run against Nixon. While at Yale he met Hillary Rodham, who was described as

“no less a brilliant, but far more focused, law school classmate” (Pika, 2005).

In 1976, Bill Clinton ran for and won his first political office as Arkansas’ At-

torney General at the same time he was serving as Jimmy Carter’s state campaign

chairman, and in 1978, Clinton was elected governor with a 63% plurality. After

losing his reelection bid in 1980 (the year Reagan defeated Carter), he came back

to serve as governor for 10 more years before being elected president. 114 Given

Clinton’s great intellectual and analytical capacity, he seemed to be inexorably drawn to debate and intellectual challenges, and is only “moderately uncomfortable with personal conflict and confrontation” (George, 1998b) but not nearly to the extent that Reagan was. Like Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton found ways to cope with being a child of an alcoholic. After leaving office he one admitted, “In

114 According to Maraniss, Clinton had briefly considered opposing Dukakis for the nomination and running for the presidency in 1988 but was dissuaded by an aide “who confronted him with a long list of women whose past relationships with him would be scrutinized in the press” (Maraniss, 1998).

269 an alcoholic family, I grew up with much greater empathy for other people’s problems than the average person . . . how to keep people together and try to work things out . . . to keep peace at all costs . . . All my life, I’ve had to work [in order to make] conflict my friend, not my enemy” (Greenstein, 2004).

Both personally and politically, Bill Clinton spans such a vast spectrum of self-contradictions that he becomes difficult to characterize. He is “considerate and calculating, easy going and ambitious, mediator and predator . . . sincere and deceptive at the same time . . . indecisive yet eager to please, and prone to decep- tion . . . indefatigable, intelligent, empathetic and self-deprecating (Maraniss,

1995). Margaret Herman described Clinton as perpetually late, quick tempered, possessed of almost limitless energy with a love for politics and horse trading;

[he seeks] the center of the action; thrives on chaos and uncertainty, and is perse- verant and determined (Herman quoted in (Renshon, 1995)). Ms. Herman also notes that he is highly articulate and exceedingly capable of subtly shading meanings linguistically while remaining deceptively, but technically, correct especially when dealing with unpleasant topics such as his extramarital affairs. 115

As a politician, Bill Clinton was, however, oddly malleable. With highly tuned political antennae, he was a “creature of his audience, besotted with his

115 Recall Clinton’s artfully shaded, and deliberately misleading, denial of his involvement with Monica Lewinsky, stating “I did not have sexual relations with that woman.” (Emphasis added.)

270

[own] ability to charm, constantly trying to please” (Klein, 2002). His long-time

friend and secretary of labor stated Bill functions by political sonar: he sends out

policy and political signals then adjusts his course based on the returning echoes

(Reich, 1997). In the end, he appeared to shift political positions in rather self-

serving ways – sometimes subtly, and sometimes not. It was his continuous

adaptability that made him the political survivor he is. Even his political neme-

sis, Newt Gingrich, acknowledged that Bill Clinton was “the best tactical politi-

cian” he’d ever seen (Gingrich quoted in (Pika, 2005)).

Bill Clinton had first seen the Oval Office in 1963 when, along with his stu-

dent group, he was introduced to Jack Kennedy in a Rose Garden ceremony. The

picture taken by the White House photographer that day was used as the back-

drop when Clinton accepted the Democratic presidential nomination at the 1992

convention (Doyle, 1999). Clinton came to the presidency as a young, energetic

outsider from a small state with great ambitions. As a highly educated intellec-

tual, he brought a vitality and excitement to the White House that had not been

seen since the Kennedy days. He even broke with conventional political wisdom by running an “unbalanced ticket” in which he named another Baby Boomer and

fellow Southerner as his running mate. Unfortunately, all his vast political tal-

ents were “channeled through a messy, chaotic, and yet often effective executive

style . . . [with a great capacity] for learning, listening, and absorbing and synthe-

271

sizing information” (Doyle, 1999) – all the while emphasizing and communicat-

ing in ways unimagined by previous presidents, perhaps even the Great Com-

municator himself.

During the 1992 campaign, Clinton identified the economy as the most vital

campaign issue, whereas George Bush, at least officially, remained in denial over

it. Once in office, the new president made it his top priority as he put together

his administration. He signaled this quite clearly by selecting highly respected,

seasoned appointees Lloyd Bentsen, Roger Altman, Robert Rubin, Leon Panetta,

and Alice Rivlin. In so doing, he had borrowed directly from Jack Kennedy’s

playbook in moving quickly and openly to build credibility with Wall Street; both men believed this to be critical for a young Democratic president. As noted in subsequent sections, Clinton was far less deliberate when it came to naming his White House staff.

That Bill Clinton was always driven to and by politics is beyond question, but drive alone does not make for good national policy or successful presidencies.

The outsider president from Arkansas lacked a cohesive focus in the sense that

Johnson, Nixon and Reagan had one. This leads one to wonder how different the

Clinton Presidency might have been had he had the pragmatism of Harry Tru-

man, the vision of Jack Kennedy, or the Washington experience of Lyndon John-

son or even Gerry Ford.

272

Presidential Transition:

Bill Clinton, like Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, was elected as an “outsider” president. Both Clinton and Carter were New (Southern) Democrats possessed of no national experience – simply governors of small southern states.

Thus the transition of 1993 served was first crucial test of Clinton’s administration – the first Democratic one in twelve years. “For Clinton the postelection period was especially sensitive. Richard Neustadt wrote to Clinton advising him specifically to avoid the mistakes made by Carter, but most of this advice was

[ultimately] ignored” (Jones, 1998). The recommendations he made to Clinton were compilations of transition-related lessons learned:

1. Assemble the White House staff by Thanksgiving, give them real

assignments and get them some [real] experience before January 20,

2. Name all Cabinet Secretaries by mid-December and get them to

suggest their assistant-secretaries but retain a White House veto; set

up the Presidential Personnel Office outside of Washington, thus,

avoiding politics as long as possible,

3. Appoint presidential task forces on substantive issues only; departments

should handle their own detailed ones but with White House concurrence,

273

4. Return transition funds to the Treasury, not only as a symbolic savings,

but also to avoid accusations of providing “welfare to the campaign

workers”,

5. Decide which issues to make bi-partisan, then pursue the opposition lead-

ers for support – this is the honeymoon period, so leverage it,

6. Establish transition operations someplace the press corps will enjoy – just

not Plains, GA or Little Rock, AK,

7. Appoint a strong, visible, trustworthy liaison to the outgoing administra-

tion,

8. Make no policy announcements or commitments that require the weight

of an inaugurated president, and

9. Finish filling secondary posts in the White House structure by January fol-

lowing your predecessor’s organizational structure. You can reorganize

the White House later when you know more (Neustadt, 2000).

For reasons that are only obliquely discussed in the literature, the relationship between the former Carter White House team and Bill Clinton was not a good one. (See (Gergen, 2000) for the best explanation on this topic.) Carterites were recruited very selectively and placed in diplomatic positions, but none was invited to join the inner White House team. The new president was so emphatic on this point as to have expressed a desire not to have any of “them” around him,

274

despite the value of learning their lessons and potential advantages in avoiding

inefficiencies (Shapiro, 2000).

A few months before the election, Clinton had asked Mickey Kantor, chair-

man of the Clinton-Gore election campaign, to establish a low-key transition ef-

fort. Kantor was part of Mondale’s unsuccessful presidential organization and

had subsequently worked with Hillary Clinton on immigration issues at the Na-

tional Legal Services Corporation dating back to the Carter Administration. The

low-key transition effort was established in Little Rock at a location separated

from election headquarters so as to avoid distracting the candidate from his elec-

tion and gubernatorial obligations. Turf and insider battles developed between

Kantor and others on the election committee, and Kantor was forced out of his

leadership role in the transition efforts. Unfortunately, he was one of the few

people around Bill Clinton who had any significant Washington experience, and by the time he won the election and needed to focus on the transition, Clinton

had to start rebuilding his team almost from scratch (Burke, 2000b).

It is generally agreed that the Clinton transition was amateurish, sloppily

planned and poorly executed (Pfiffner, 2001a). “Clinton’s transition into the

presidency, widely considered one of the most chaotic in modern times, could be judged a case study of what not to do . . . [it] was not in place early and did not

inspire confidence [among] either the Senate or the media” (Hess, 2001). Clinton

275

also got wound around the political axel because of his campaign promise to

make his cabinet “look like America,” and the urgency to achieve diversity, combined with an inexperienced team and serious errors in planning, cost him pre-

cious transition time (Stephanopoulos, 1999).

There were other unfortunate similarities between the Carter and Clinton

transitions. Like Carter, Clinton’s team was dominated by outsiders lacking

critical Washington experience. Neither president-elect’s organization was well

or consistently managed during the period between the election and the inaugu-

ration; neither knew, or inquired much about, the things he did not know. The

Clinton transition lacked finesse and proceeded in fits and starts. The outgoing

administration, however, remembered how high Reagan had set the bar for tran-

sitions, and George Bush wanted to do just as well. One Clinton staffer, how-

ever, did acknowledged, “The Bush Administration was very generous with

their time, extremely cordial; from the president himself to [Andy] Card, they

were professional . . . they very much wanted to provide the best transition for

the country” (Burke, 2000b).

The Clinton team simply did not switch gears fast enough from campaigning

to governing. David Gergen, who had been part of three Republican administra-

tions, observed that President-elect Clinton failed to slow down and rest in order

to plan his administration thoughtfully. Rather he completed his term as gover-

276

nor, continued his travels and acted as if he were still campaigning – meeting

voters and trying to convince then he was the right man for the office. As a re-

sult, he arrived in Washington simultaneously exhausted and unprepared

(Gergen, 2000).

Finally, although presidential transitions are not required to be based in

Washington, one of the most basic goals is to establish connections into the exist-

ing government and build collaborative bridges into the other branches. Just as

Carter had, Clinton based his transition activities in his home state and he, too,

discovered this critical activity should not be undertaken in isolation outside of

Washington. The Washington advantage has everything to do with political re-

alities and logistics than very little with geography. Yet despite wanting not to be compared to Carter, the parallels were inescapable, as the Clinton team

seemed to rediscover and recreate most of the pitfalls associated with the previ-

ous “outsider” president. 116

One Hundred Days:

With respect to developing a comprehensive legislative program, very little

was achieved during the transition period, where activities were inefficient and

116 Other presidents whose primary transition trams were located elsewhere were Kennedy in Hy- annis and Palm Beach, Nixon in New York, and Reagan in California. Carter had erred by placing his operation in Plains Georgia, which was served by neither airlines nor trains nor even bus- ses. It was so difficult to get to, the pressed complained openly. Clinton opted for Little Rock, which also offered limited logistics, accommodations and broadcast hookups.

277 the emphasis was on staffing issues as opposed to policy planning (Warshaw,

1999). This was further exacerbated by Clinton’s tendency to do things off the cuff. As a result, the country got the impression that the new president was disorganized at best or clueless at worst. Bill Clinton came to office facing massive deficits and huge unemployment but had neither a New Deal nor Great Society up his sleeve, making him essentially a new president with old problems and no policy vision. At most he possessed a vague idea of where he wanted to take the country – away from Reaganism.

The Clinton Administration stumbled early in nominating the Attorney Gen- eral. The new president had made a national commitment to naming a woman – the first ever – to that position. His first choice was Zoë Baird; however, she was forced to withdraw her name because of irregularities in her background that the new administration’s vetting process had not considered carefully enough. 117

From an organizational perspective, the first hundred days of Bill Clinton’s presidency “were an exercise in political excess” feeling he must simultaneously address an economy in recession, universal health care, gays in the military, and the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). He received high marks for following through on his campaign promises by tackling the economic problems

117 Corporate attorney Baird and her law professor husband had not only employed undocumented foreign women as nannies, but had also failed to pay social security taxes for their employees. Clinton’s second nominee, Kimba Wood, had a similar “nanny” issue. Ultimately, he nominated Janet Reno, who was not confirmed until March – almost two months after he took office.

278 first and successfully “steered a $1.5 trillion budget through Congress in record time” (Greenstein quoted in (Renshon, 1995)) In addition, he signed the Family

Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and responded quickly and positively to Boris Yel- tsin’s request for economic aid (Times, 1993). Unfortunately, all this reactivity on the part of the new administration appeared to lack cohesion. 118

On the administrative and policy side of the ledger, there were the blunders with his nominees for Attorney General, a secretive rush toward Health Care Re- form, the televised events showing the siege at the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco 119 , and his costly stand on gays in the military that established the “don’t ask – don’t tell” policy. As a result of his rather splattered early approach to governing, by “the 100 days mark, Clinton had a record low approval rating in the polls” (Greenstein quoted in (Renshon, 1995)). Bill Clinton listened well to the message and internalized the negative feedback as a political wakeup call and, thus, began adjusting his political position toward the center of the contemporary political spectrum – despite the alienating affect this had on both the traditional and liberal elements in the Democratic Party (Klein, 2002; Reich, 1997).

118 Not only was this legislative mixed bag confusing, but it was loaded with two huge political risks. First, recall that Reagan had only moderated his political position toward the Soviet Union at the end of his administration, while most Main Street Americans still thought in terms of a Cold War mindset and were not generally disposed to helping the old Communist foe. Second, expensive foreign aid on top of a record setting budget only aggravated an already bad economic situation.

119 The 50 day siege of the radical religious sect began just a few weeks into the new administration on February 28, 1993 and resulted in the deaths of 75 men, women, and children as well as federal agents.

279

Scholars of the presidency stress the importance for new presidents to remain

highly focused on and directly engaged in a select set of legislative priorities,

which are best linked to their campaign promises and thus interpreted as voters’

mandates (Edwards, 2001a). Bill Clinton failed to heed this advice by not engag-

ing directly and swiftly on Health Care Reform but, instead, he entrusted it to an

unelected political surrogate (the First Lady) to serve as the administration’s

point person with Congress. The message here was that this issue was somehow

not quite as important to the administration as the others with which the presi-

dent was directly involved. Beyond the symbolic impression, there was a silent

gap and the appearance of a “policy vacuum . . . in the approximately 10 months between Bill Clinton’s inauguration and the arrival of a complete health care re-

form proposal on Capitol Hill” without open consultation (Pfiffner, 1996). All

the while, the new president mistakenly spent valuable political capital on the

minor issue of gays in the military – something of interest to a limited number of

people with a result that satisfied even fewer.

During the transition, Bill Clinton did some things well, however. Specifi-

cally, he began taking appropriate steps based on his campaign promises and

remained engaged by naming a stellar economic team early. This bore positive

fruit within the 100 day period. He schedule and presided over an economic

conference of experts in Little Rock, even before the inauguration, and success-

280 fully elevated it to the level of a national forum from which he gathered ideas and formulated the framework of his first budget proposal. He then extended this into a comprehensive economic recovery plan, but even this produced mixed reviews. To some he seemed unsure and without a plan. Yet to others he appeared analytical, open minded and thoughtful.

Regardless of the interpretation, the fact remains he expended far too much of the transition period on a single issue that resulted in his scrambling to name his

White House Staff right up to Inauguration Day. Presidential scholar Richard

Neustadt counseled that a president’s support team needs to be named early and trained (as much as possible) so that they can work with him and each other to make the 100 day formulation of policy effective (Neustadt, 2000), but failing to heed this advice had a costly ripple effect on the Clinton Administration, and was something the president himself later admitted was a mistake but one he failed to recognize at the time (Clinton quoted in (Jones, 1998)).

With the benefit of 21 st century hindsight, it appears that Reagan’s 100 day transition period has become a model for new administrations. The critical

White House staffers were named and already taking up their functions well before Inauguration Day. Reagan’s policy focus was kept narrow and simple, and the outcome was a coherent legislative and governance roadmap that was well grounded in his most important campaign promises.

281

Table 4: Comparison of the Reagan and Clinton Transitions

Attribute Reagan Administration Clinton Administration

Pre-election transition Well integrated into the Campaign given top prior- planning campaign structure ity; transition was secondary

Chief of Staff DC-experienced, politically Personal friend from Ar- experienced; given clear kansas; no DC experience; authority by presidential not seen as strong delegation

White House Staff All appointments made Made late and continued well before Inauguration past Inauguration (under- staffed and unprepared)

Transition Management Smooth, seamless, exten- Uneven, irregular, choppy; sion of the election win slow change from campaign mode

Presidential involvement Delegate responsibility and Personally involved; made verified assignments press announcements; too detailed; looked like candidate

Unfortunately, Bill Clinton was by nature far less organized and somewhat more Carter-like in tending towards a hands-on approach. He and his (incomplete) team were not by nature well disciplined, which led to a less than favor- able first impression of the Clinton Administration. See

282

Table 4 above, which is based on discussions in (Jones, 1998) and summarizes

the critical differences between these two administrations.

It is noteworthy that during the 100 day period, “the Reagan team managed expectations, while the Clinton team raised,” but failed to meet them (Jones,

2001).

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

Being ready to hit the ground running is a claim made automatically by every

administration; however, the day after winning the election, the members of Bill

Clinton’s team were not at all ready. According to Clinton’s de facto press secre-

tary, George Stephanopoulos, the “single biggest mistake he made then . . . was

not appointing a White House chief of staff and at least a core [White House]

staff” in order to appear ready (Stephanopoulos, 1999). The extra time required

to name his cabinet secretaries cost the Clinton administration valuable time in

staffing up. Even Bill Clinton’s first chief of staff acknowledged that the presi-

dent-elect knew quite a lot about cabinets and their roles in governing but not

nearly enough about the formulation of a White House staffing model (McLarty

quoted in (Jones, 1998)).

When it came to the position of a chief of staff, unlike Presidents Ford and

Carter, Bill Clinton had no intention of following their lead in not filling the job.

By naming longtime friend Thomas “Mack” McLarty to the position, he also in-

283 tended to avoid errors made by both Nixon and Bush by avoiding the aggressiveness of an Ehrlichman or Sununu. In choosing McLarty, a friend he had known since elementary school, Clinton saw someone he could trust completely.

Mack never sought the political limelight, in fact, he was “unfailingly polite, low- key, even tempered and polite” to the point of earning the nickname of “Mack the Nice” (Pfiffner, 2001a). Although McLarty was exactly what the new president thought he wanted in helping to set the tone of his White House staff, it turned out to be an unsuccessful one.

Bill Clinton wanted, and believed he needed, a trustworthy organizer to oversee the Oval Office – someone to facilitate his intention to follow a modified spokes-of-the wheel organization and to enable the president to maintain close contact with all his policy advisers. As a non-political, personal friend of the president, McLarty never tried to assert himself into the presidential flow. In fact, he was highly deferential to anything the president wanted and quietly tolerated it when the president went around him or cut him out of the loop entirely

– something that occurred so frequently as to diminish the role of the chief of staff. Bill Clinton frequently held meetings without informing McLarty and granted direct access to the Oval Office by people who were not officially sched- uled. These actions made it impossible to manage the president’s time effec-

284 tively, and only fueled the impression that Clinton’s was a disorganized administration.

Besides being someone with no preparation for his new job at the political epicenter of Washington, Mack McLarty was another outsider. Compounding his challenges was the fact that he was also faced with a unique situation – one none of his predecessors had ever encountered: there were actually three distinct, but coexistent power centers in the West Wing of the Clinton White House.

First there were the traditional policy advisers, second there was a strong and

(presidentially) respected vice president, and finally, there was the influence of a very strong and involved First Lady (Pfiffner, 2001a).

Staffing the White House is a critical activity, but one that was both delayed and extended across the brief transition period by the Clinton administration.

This had costly negative consequences. Problems in submitting nominations at the cabinet and multiple subcabinet positions caused the Senate to lose confidence early in the incoming administration. The Senate reacted by slowing down the confirmation process itself. Clinton mistakenly took a linear approach and did not concentrate fully on staffing his White House while he tried to resolve his political appointment issues (Gergen, 2000). The final result of these cascading decisional dominoes was to force the staffing of the White House into

285 a lower priority. All these events converged and caused Bill Clinton to hit the ground at a crawl.

When it came to the vice presidency, “Gore and Clinton had developed a

[genuinely] strong working relationship” (Burke, 2000b), and the two negotiated an expanded role for the vice president to play. Bill Clinton genuinely liked and respected his vice president and ensured that the vice presidency was put to good use rather than relegating Al Gore to funeral duty and the breaking of senatorial ties. Following the practice begun by Carter with Mondale, Clinton and

Gore met privately over lunch each week as the latter took on more significant leadership responsibilities in policy matters, especially those dealing with the environment and telecommunications. In addition to being co-chairman of several commissions dealing with arms control, Vice President Gore was also given primary responsibility for the Reinventing Government Initiative.

While Al Gore took on real responsibilities in the background, President Clin- ton was free to focus on his campaign promise to address the struggling economy. After all, he reasoned, this was perhaps the primary reason voters had put

George Bush out of office. One visible way was to reduce the size, and the corresponding cost of government, and over the course of his administration, Clinton reduced the size of government in real terms by roughly 12%, or 272,000 civil servant positions (Michaels, 1997). Bill Clinton stands in sharp contrast to Presi-

286

dents Nixon and Reagan, both of whom had railed against big government while

actually expanding the numbers of federal employees as a means of extending

White House influence across the entire Executive Branch. In the 1960s, it had been Kennedy who launched the first revitalization of ethics standards for permanent as well as appointed civil servants; Johnson subsequently established a universal code of conduct for all government employees; Carter quickly enacted the Ethics in Government Act, followed by George Bush, who banned outside employment and income for his appointees. Collectively, these presidential actions spanning three decades were incremental attempts to improve the quality of government, but it was Bill Clinton who proposed a macro approach under the title of Reinventing Government (Mackenzie, 2001).

Not unexpectedly, the new president got some things right and others wrong.

Although it was unintentional, he fell into one of the many traps that had en- snared Jimmy Carter sixteen years earlier, primarily those resulting from being an “outsider” president. Both men initially tended to recruit young, inexperienced but idealistic outsiders like themselves. Most of the initial waves of their staffs came to Washington for the first time, many of whom felt they had just landed the best job they could ever hope for. These were generally not people, who intended to build long-term careers in public service; rather, they were na-

287

ïve reformers, who were ill-prepared to form a disciplined and functional White

House as of Inauguration Day.

288

Clinton in Relation to his Cabinet:

The self-imposed urgency to make his cabinet “look like America” forced Bill

Clinton to make political tradeoffs in other areas (Hess, 2001). In giving up such

initial candidates as Tim Wirth, William Daley and James Blanchard, he was able

to nominate Hazel O’Leary, a relatively unknown African American woman, to be his Secretary of Energy, Federico Peña, the Hispanic former mayor of Denver

to be Secretary of transportation, and Madeleine Albright as Ambassador to the

United Nations.

Traditionally Democratic constituencies keep the pressure on the new presi-

dent. Women’s groups in particular held Clinton to his word and lobbied effec-

tively that he keep his promise of naming a woman secretary of one of the big

four agencies (Borrelli, 2002). Since he had already announced the nominations

of men to head Treasury, State and Defense, there was only the Attorney Gen-

eral’s position remaining, which, after two false starts, went to Janet Reno. Dur-

ing his eight years in office, Bill Clinton went on to name eight women to cabinet

positions and five others to cabinet-level posts.

Bill Clinton was fully committed to ensuring that “more than the usual white boys” in Washington formed his government (Friedman, 1993). The rigidity

with which this requirement was applied at the cabinet and subcabinet levels be-

came almost obsessive in the early days of the new administration, and this actu-

289

ally turned into a costly legislative and policy distraction (Warshaw, 1999). All

appointments, including ambassadorial nominations, “became subject to the

EGG test (ethnicity, gender and geography)” (Kamen, 1993).

In assembling his cabinet choices, Bill Clinton recalled some of the lessons

from the Carter Administration – in particular the Brzezinski-Vance conflict and

the associated foreign policy risks to the administration when there is poor coor-

dination and lack of teamwork between the secretary of state and the national

security adviser, who is based in the White House (George, 1998b). Because of

this, Clinton chose the highly respected senior statesman, Warren Christopher, to

lead the State Department and Tony Lake as the National Security Adviser, and

made it clear to both that the secretary of state was the one voice authorized to

speak officially for the administration.

The first nominees a president announces are interpreted as indicators of the

degree of importance the president places on each area. In Clinton’s case, his

first cabinet choices were a direct outgrowth of his campaign promise plus savvy

political instincts to “fix the economy.” To start the process, he followed the

Kennedy model by reaching out to calm the concerns of Wall Street and the banking community. The first appointees were conservative Texas Senator

Lloyd Bentsen as Treasury Secretary, Congressman Leon Panetta, chairman of

the House Budget Committee, to run the Office of Management and Budget, and

290

Robert Rubin to head the newly created National Economic Council (NEC). Bill

Clinton viewed these particular appointees as both political and strategic ele-

ments in his structural fix of the national economy (Klein, 2002).

Besides being the first the first Baby Boomer president, he brought a new

management twist to his administration. “One of his [unusual] strengths is his

willingness to share power” (Gergen, 2000) as well as recognition. Despite his

vast intellect and ability to grasp the finer points of multiple issues, Bill Clinton,

unlike Jimmy Carter, successfully avoided any temptation to micromanage his

team. He was extremely generous with recognition and praise when they suc-

ceeded, and despite the characteristic informality of his administration, which

generally took on the appearance of chaos, his staff generally enjoyed working

with him as opposed to for him (Gergen, 2000). Of all the modern presidents,

Bill Clinton had the highest number of cabinet officers remain for the entirety of both terms. 120

After twelve years of Reagan-Bush, during which time Hugh Heclo’s construct of “a government of strangers” lost some validity, the early days of the

Clinton Administration restored its credibility. Overall the new administration

120 Four departmental Secretaries served two full terms: Janet Reno (Justice), Richard Riley (Educa- tion), Donna Shalala (Health and Human Services) and Bruce Babbitt (Interior) served for the entire eights years of the Clinton Administration. Madelein Albright served four at the UN and another four years as Secretary of State. Not only the cabinet, but also Clinton’s appointees at the subcabinet level set a modern record for longevity and service at 3.36 years. The Nixon average was 1.73 years, Carter’s was 2.47, Reagan’s was 2.27, and Bush’s was 2.52 years (Gergen, 2000).

291 was composed of strangers despite the fact that some former Carter appointees were brought back to Washington. The unique aspect of these “in-and-outers” was their limited number as well as their assignments to new, rather than their prior, areas of responsibility. Bill Clinton’s overriding commitment to diversity, however, meant that the majority of his highest placed appointees were once again strangers – both to each other as well as to Washington (Michaels, 1997).

In the end, President Clinton, like every other occupant of the Oval Office, structured his cabinet and White House staff based on a combination of his understanding of earlier presidential management decisions, politics, his preferences and personal style (George, 1998b).

Clinton’s Management Model:

The management styles of chief executives arise partially from learning and partially from experience but, for the most part, are adaptations to the presidency that are heavily colored by subjectivity and personal preference. Drawing selectively from his predecessors, Bill Clinton tried to create an idealized system that would encourage, open communication, facilitate broad participation among his staff, and improve on what he perceived were the shortcomings of earlier presidents. Thus Clinton embraced “an organizational model that seemed to be an casual blend of collegiality and formalism explicitly designed, at least initially, to

292 limit the extent of presidential engagement in foreign-policy making – and to allow him to focus on his domestic agenda” (George, 1998b).

It was firm belief of the entire Clinton team that George Bush had been defeated because he was out of touch with domestic issues in general but the economy in particular, thus the campaign slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid.” To the new president, foreign affairs, while intellectually interesting, were distractions, and besides, he believed they were ably covered by his secretary of state and head of the National Security Council. Just as Lyndon Johnson had, Bill Clinton truly wanted to improve and advance American society, along the lines of Roo- sevelt some sixty years earlier (Preston, 2001).

President Clinton’s management style was the natural outgrowth of his prior gubernatorial style, which was a blend of multiple personal characteristics and preferences. While Presidents Ford and Carter had consciously experimented in an effort to find what worked effectively, and Reagan established a variant in his first term by creating a well balanced Troika, Clinton tended toward a “highly undisciplined” approach that led to a loose collegial style (Pika, 2005). The outcome was an organizational structure that most “resembled a great frat house replete with pizza boxes and empty soda cans” (Klein, 2002); and even though he is an acknowledged student of past presidencies, Bill Clinton applied very few of

293 the lessons from his predecessors’ management structures (Burke, 2000a) to his own.

Clinton’s style was firmly rooted in his legal training and his ability to envi- sion and argue opposing sides of the same argument. The ability to shift perspectives made him both a good listener and a flexible advocate as well as someone who enjoyed the give and take of policy debates (George, 1998b). His decision making style meshed neatly with his management style in that he was most comfortable coming to conclusions only after he had probed both sides and “internalized the issues” (Duffy, 1994). He was generally uncomfortable until all views were considered, and even when there was no dissent on a specific topic of interest, he was known to sketch out what the opposition would have argued had there been any (Harris, 2005). Bill Clinton displayed the rare ability to syn- thesize multiple concepts quickly and to “forge a robust and sophisticated position out of the sometimes chaotic process of deliberation and consultation”

(George, 1998b).

There was a range of reactions to Clinton’s free style even among his appointees and staff. Not everyone in the administration was initially comfortable with or approving of Clinton’s style. Within just months of the inauguration, Budget

Director, Leon Panetta felt that “Mr. Clinton must do a better job of picking and choosing the battles he wants to go through” (Editorial, 1993). Colin Powell, too,

294 felt that many meetings “meandered like ‘graduate bull sessions’ which Clinton’s intellectual and academic streak seemed to enjoy” (Renshon, 1998). Treasury

Secretary Bentsen, a traditionalist, also felt the president needed more focus, and that he seemed unable to separate important from non-important, thereby com- plicating the entire process. “Events in the White House reflected the way he thought . . . no hierarchy . . . no strong chief of staff . . . not a single economic adviser”; he had all kinds of advisers swirling about him constantly

(Stephanopoulos, 1999).

In many ways, Bill Clinton resembled a latter day FDR – minus the mean streak. He practiced a form of laissez-faire management style with his senior advisers and the White House staff (Greenstein quoted in (Renshon, 1998)), but one lesson Bill Clinton seems not to have learned until half way through his first term was to distinguish substance and progress from perpetual motion. He worked hard, but only gradually did he gain efficiency. On the plus side, Bill Clinton had the rare capacity to learn from his own less than successful political encounters (Klein, 2002; Maraniss, 1995), was not outwardly judgmental, and never made the same mistake twice (Harris, 2005).

Summary:

President-elect Bill Clinton had come to Washington in 1993 as the former governor of a small southern state, an out-of-towner, and certainly anything but

295

a mainstream Democrat and with only 43% of the popular vote. 121 Early in his quest for the nomination, Bill Clinton dubbed himself the “come back kid,” but two years later, after triumphing over the Republican controlled Congress in

1995 – specifically with respect to Newt Gingrich – he undertook reinventing himself in very calculated political ways.

Ultimately, he emerged more presidential. He learned to delegate more and to build more reflective time into his schedule; he read extensively and studied the presidency, analyzed videos of Reagan’s speeches, and lost weight. More importantly, he adjusted his initial approaches to managing the White House.

Clinton replaced longtime friend Mack McLarty with Leon Panetta as chief of staff, and ended the pizza-fueled all-nighters, and moved policy, planning and decision meetings into a formal conference room used by FDR (Doyle, 1999). He effectively added gravitas to his previously casual presidency.

In many ways, the Clinton presidency still confounds observers and scholars alike. “His presidency seemed to proceed simultaneously on two competing, dissonant tracks – policy and personality – the latter usually overwhelming the former” (Klein, 2002). The general public tended to react more positively to the president that did the political community – particularly in Washington. His

121 With less than 60% of eligible voters participating, Clinton won 43%, Bush won 38%, and Perot took 19% of the popular vote; however, 69% of the electoral votes went to Clinton.)

296 policies were genuinely popular, his skills and political abilities impressive, and the average citizen was bemused by tales of his personal indulgences. His was the all American success story, complete with human flaws, but Clinton had few real political friends in Washington. Although respected, not many politicians even within his own party felt entirely comfortable with him.

Bill Clinton’s “relationship with his staff was as complicated as the rest of his life. Awe and disappointment were intertwined,” but, based on his undisputed intelligence, perseverance and political acuity, “he was without question, the most intelligent politician of his generation (Klein, 2002). Yet, after leaving office,

Clinton himself admitted that as a newly elected president, he simply did not know enough about the system in Washington and how things worked (Pika,

2005). From both the political and administrative perspectives, he relearned almost every one of Jimmy Carter’s lessons. Belatedly, he came to understand that

Congress “can only digest so much at once . . . [and that going for Health Care

Reform] after the big economic recovery plan and NAFTA, was a mistake”

(Klein, 2002).

Bill Clinton’s executive management style evolved continuously during his first term, but he really hit his stride going into the 1996 election. Having initially staffed the area of foreign policy so well, (with Christopher, Lake, Albright and Gore), the president was initially free to focus on his primary policy interests

297 and ambitious domestic agenda. The evolving world situation during the mid

1990s in such places as Bosnia, Serbia, Iraq, Russia, and the Middle East, forced him to change focus and to engage more directly in international events (Harris,

2005).

Although both Kennedy and Clinton had opted for a collegial management model, George and Stern contend their motivations were fundamentally different: Kennedy selected this model as a means of remaining closely connected to the policy making process, whereas Clinton embraced it as a means of freeing himself to focus on domestic issues by delegating more to his foreign policy advisers (George, 1998b).

Just as Jimmy Carter had, so too did Bill Clinton learn some hard lessons on the job: this was especially true with respect to Congress (Pfiffner, 2001a). In

Carter’s time, it was his energy policy and the creation of a new cabinet-level department that stalled in Congress, which felt left out of the decision making and, therefore, free to reshape the final details. In Clinton’s case, the issue was Health

Care Reform, where he not only failed to consult powerful legislators of either party but had sent mixed signals by had entrusting the entire program to the

First Lady and a group of private consultants – all of whom were unelected.

Both presidents learned the hard way those things which came as second nature to experienced insiders like Lyndon Johnson, who artfully moved his vision

298

of the Great Society into law within a year. “Clinton developed his health care

reform mostly within the Executive” whereas Johnson conferred carefully with both parties “and was even willing to share credit for civil rights laws with Re-

publicans” (Edwards, 2001a).

Many of Bill Clinton’s shortcomings may actually have their origins in his

noteworthy strengths. His commanding verbal and logic skills, a near photo-

graphic memory, and the ability to think quickly on his feet may have resulted in

a certain overconfidence. At times, he operated carelessly, as though he really

could “come back” from any set back; consequently, he tended to take on politi-

cal and subsequently behavioral risks, which resulted in his being the “first

elected president to be impeached (Greenstein, 2004).

The scholarly literature on Clinton, while still relatively new and certainly in-

complete, often tends to ask the unanswerable: What might the Clinton legacy

have been? Had there been no Lewinsky, Jones or Flowers affairs, with the ac-

companying distractions that dominated two years of his presidency (Klein,

2002; Maraniss, 1995), how might the history of this presidency have been

changed?

While his presidency may never be counted among the great ones, it will cer-

tainly be acknowledged as pivotal. He influenced traditional Democratic politics

as profoundly as Nixon and Reagan had among Republicans. From his earliest

299

days on the national stage, Bill Clinton moved himself and the party to the politi-

cal center away from the left of center traditions of Roosevelt, Kennedy and

Johnson. He called it “the vital center . . . combining the party’s traditional concern for disadvantaged people with an emphasis on smaller government . . . fiscal conservatism and reliance on market forces” (Brinkley and Dyer, 2004).

As the first Baby Boomer president, as well as the son of a strong single mother, Clinton was completely at ease challenging conventionally-defined social and political roles. “He installed both his wide and his vice president in the

West Wing of the White House. No other First Lady had ever been [located] there before” (Gergen, 2000), and their staffs were given the status of assistant to the president. Unlike her strongest predecessors, Eleanor Roosevelt, Rosalyn

Carter or Nancy Reagan, Hillary Clinton’s involvement in her husband’s presidency was neither informal nor low key.

Bill Clinton served from January 20, 1993 – January 20, 2000. During that time he made a total of 30 cabinet appointments including 5 women, 7 African

Americans and 3 Hispanics.

300

2.1.3.12 George W. Bush (2001 – 2009)

Presidential Style & Personality :

Born in 1946, George W. Bush was the second baby boomer president but, prior to entering the Oval Office, that is the only trait he shared with Bill Clinton.

Bush was born while his father was a graduate student at Yale University in

Connecticut – the state that would subsequently elect his grandfather to the Sen- ate. George W’s parents moved to Texas where he attended local elementary school after which he was enrolled in Phillips Academy in Andover (Massachu- setts) for high school. His academic record was mediocre, and he might not have gotten into Phillips had it not been for his family’s connections. Based solely on academic performance, he certainly would have had problems getting into Yale had he not been a “legacy” applicant – someone whose father, grandfather and great-grandfather were alumni.

The Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study had the least amount of data on

George W. Bush and thus cautions against interpreting their assessments quite as confidently as those of the other modern presidents. The evaluators found

George W. Bush rates remarkably high for extraversion but very low on openness, character and conscientiousness. Even though there were fewer assessors for this president than in studies of the other modern presidents, their analysis found a high degree of consistency among them – a fact that increases the level of

301

confidence in the results (Rubenzer, 2004). Assessors also theorized that the low

degree of self-doubt Bush II shows in his own decision making ability might pos-

sibly be related to his lack of introspection, avoidance of highly analytical or

theoretical thinking, his preference for simple, straightforward explanations, as

well as a certain conceptual inflexibility – demonstrated by disinterest in consid-

ering multiple, alternate perspectives.

George W. Bush excelled at social activities while at Phillips and Yale. In fact,

he appears to have fit the stereotype of an indulged, rich kid with no immediate

goals and little motivation or self-discipline, which were traits he carried forward

into adulthood. After finishing a graduate degree at Harvard, he returned to

Texas where, through family connections, he raised significant amounts of in-

vestment capital in order to fund a startup oil exploration company. He was

never successful as an oilman; however, he was consistently able to raise funds.

For a period of time, he looked like “just another wealthy, underachieving

son of a superachieving father” (Greenstein, 2004); however, once his father be-

came president in 1988, he instantly became a hot commodity within Texas. He

formed a consortium of investors and purchased the Texas Rangers, a struggling baseball team, and evolved into a pseudo celebrity while serving as the team’s

general manager.

302

As a financially successful, presidential son leading a local baseball franchise, his springboard was established for his own political career. In 1994, George W.

Bush was elected governor after defeating one of his father’s political rivals, Ann

Richards, but it was not obvious at the time that the new governor harbored any interest in the presidency.

Governor Bush ruled Texas using the Reagan model. He delegated tasks easily and developed an amiability, folksiness and dyed in the wool conservatism that his father lacked. It was his homespun approach to Texas politics that masked his privileged upbringing, establishment connections and a nascent “political ruthlessness” (Burns, 2006). “On a personal level, he is gregarious, unpre- tentious, persistent, and highly adaptable. By all accounts his interpersonal skills are outstanding . . . [and given his family’s connections,] Bush has moved through life creating networks of contacts that later played a major role in his financial and political success” (Pika, 2005). In a foreshadowing of his presidency,

Governor Bush’s first campaign, under the guidance of Karl Rove, smeared Ann

Richards attacking her based on family values and even implied the grandmother of eight was secretly a lesbian; promoted (and subsequently signed into law) the right to carry concealed hand guns; and issued a gubernatorial proclamation declaring a statewide “Jesus Day” (WGBH Television, 2000). (See Ap- pendix H – Proclamation Signed by Governor George W. Bush for facsimile.) A

303

portent of his presidential fiscal policy was his depletion of the Texas treasury by

distributing a $2B surplus through tax breaks and rebates (Moore, 2003).

As they had when running for governor, Bush and Rove focused on a limited

number of populist issues in the presidential race of 2000. Aside from the stan-

dard accusations of “tax and spend,” Bush had only his short record as governor

to run on and the basic conservative platform: family values, tax reform, anti-

drugs, law and order, etc. Unfortunately for the Democrats, Al Gore ran a weak

campaign and the outcome came down to the wire. 122

George W. Bush came to the Oval Office with neither a simple, popular majority, 123 nor a clear political mandate. Indecisiveness was the predominant tone in the 2000 election; however, it was a time when Republicans controlled both houses of Congress, and the Bush team moved consciously to consolidate power.

As had happened in Texas, one of Bush’s first initiatives was to wipe out his

122 The 2000 presidential election came down to a final vote count in the state of Florida. There were several discrepancies in the ballot counts, and Gore filed legal protests which triggered mandatory recounts. Secretary of State Katherine Harris set a deadline of November 14 by which all counties were to complete a manual recount; otherwise, she ruled, their county’s ballots would be excluded from the state’s official tally. There were claims of voter disenfranchisement particularly from the poorer counties, which had larger percentages of African Americans, when she declared George Bush had beaten Al Gore by a mere 537 votes. State courts allowed her ruling to stand on a legal technicality, and all of Florida’s electoral votes went to Bush. The challenge went immediately to the Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, ruled to uphold the Florida court’s decision, thereby making George W. Bush the 43 rd US president. Jeb Bush, the younger brother of George W. was governor of Florida at the time. The Bush family actively supported Ms. Harris the following year in her successful congressional bid. (See also Appendix F – Presi- dential Electoral Results on page 511 for the electoral counts during the Modern Presidency.)

123 The Federal Election Commission states that Vice President Al Gore received 543,000 more popular votes nationally than did Governor George Bush (Federal Election Commission, 2001).

304 predecessor’s treasury surplus with a projected worth $1.35 trillion and to dis- perse it as tax cuts and rebates over a 10 year period (Pfiffner, 2004).

It is important at this point to note a word of caution regarding any assessment of the Bush II presidency based on current literature. Since, as of this writing, the administration has only been out of office less than 18 months, there is not as much scholarly literature as inevitably there will or ought to be. Hence, comparable levels of analysis between this presidency and the other modern presidencies are difficult to make. One point of concurrence that has emerged from the literature, however, is the sense that George W. Bush came to office on a narrow set of bland issues and that, until the events of September 11, 2001, he struggled to define his presidency, given the conditions under which he entered the Oval Office. Almost overnight, the attacks and the administration’s declaration of War on Terror gave shape to a previously formless administration. By casting himself as a warrior president, George W. Bush rendered moot any further discussions of the legitimacy of his presidency.

Presidential Transition:

Under the best of circumstances, presidents-elect have about 11 weeks from election to Inauguration Day to effect the transition of power. In the case of

George W. Bush, the presidential transition was not started officially until De- cember 13 when the Supreme Court declared him president. Thus there were

305 only 5 weeks, officially, in which to form a new administration and become responsible for the national government. Given the nature of the campaign and the cloud under which he came to office, the administration of George W, Bush seemed destined to be a weak one – one which, like his father’s, might last only a single term.

Lacking a simple majority, let alone a voters’ mandate, the new administration appeared slightly tainted to some and downright illegitimate to others.

George Bush had also failed to provide any Election Day coattail effect in the congressional races. The consequence was a 50 – 50 split in the Senate (placing the vice president in the tie breaker role) and a reduction in the majority in the

House. On top of everything else, it had ostensibly lost half the transition period due to the Supreme Court battle over the election results. The new administration faced some obvious difficulties (newness, haste, hubris and a certain naïveté

(Burns, 2006)) as well as some that were more subtle (fallout from the contentious election, shortened transition, delayed confirmations and the demands of conservative special interest groups). All these forces had negative “affects upon policy, [both domestic and foreign], but many of these problems did not surface until well after September 11 and the mid-term elections” of 2002 (Eksterowicz,

2005).

306

Despite the truncated transition period, the Bush II transition team still managed to appear, outwardly at least, to be disciplined, organized and effective under the guidance of the president-elect’s longtime friend and former Yale room- mate, Clay Johnson (Eksterowicz, 2005). As each administration since 1976 had since Jimmy Carter began the practice, Candidate Bush had actually begun to plan his organization long before Election Day. Johnson was responsible for identifying and vetting potential appointees and managed the staffing process for the new administration. Working closely with him to provide the operational oversight was Vice President-elect Cheney, who brought an impressive depth of

Washington experience to the job. Just as Ed Meese (for Reagan) and Chase

Untermeyer (for Bush I), Clay Johnson had the distinct advantage of having known the president-elect for several years and of understanding the finer points of the Bush agenda (Burke, 2003a). In addition, he had also served as Governor

Bush’s chief of staff and knew the new president’s thoughts on almost all topics.

He served ultimately as Deputy Director of the Office of Management and

Budget for the administration’s entire eight years.

Several months prior to the election, Johnson had begun studying the details of earlier presidential transitions and even conducted face-to-face interviews with James Baker, Ed Meese and George Schultz. He drew up his plans based on the collected lessons he learned from previous administration. He consciously

307 intended to avoid the pitfalls of both the Carter and Clinton transitions (Burke,

2004). He determined that:

• campaign managers should not be in charge of transitions (because elec-

tion skills are fundamentally different from governing skills),

• the chief of staff must be chosen early,

• selection of the cabinet and subcabinet should be based on capabilities

rather than political obligations (this turned out not to be the case below

the Deputy Secretary level),

• the White House staff needs to be in place as quickly as possible; they

need to be up to speed on Inauguration Day,

• the White House must avoid open adversarial relationships with Congress

and career executives (Note: although he does not state it explicitly, the

implication here is executives in the private sector. No concern is stated

for government careerists.),

• the hoards of job seekers and advice givers must be actively avoided (they

only distract from the main job and put the White House team on the de-

fensive),

• it is vital to establish appointees’ accountability clearly and quickly!

(Johnson, 2003)

308

Drawing on Cheney’s knowledge and experience in Washington, George

Bush put his vice president in charge implementing the transition, and together they evaluated people with government experience going back to the Ford,

Reagan and Bush I presidencies as well as several trusted aides from his Texas days. The major advantage in entrusting Cheney and Johnson with the transition was, that unlike Warren Christopher and Richard Riley (Bill Clinton’s Secretaries of State and Education respectively), their job assignments in the new administration that did not require Senate confirmation (Burke, 2004). Thus, they were free to concentrate 100% of their time on transition tasks without the distraction of preparing for Senate confirmation hearings.

In 2003, with the benefit of perfect hindsight, Johnson wrote the equivalent of a case study in which he describes the Bush II transition in ideal terms. He implies that everything followed the plan perfectly despite the compressed time- frames (Johnson, 2003). The essay is very well written and may better serve as guidance for future presidential transitions than it does as an accurate historical record of the 37 day Bush II transition.

Congressional Report RL30736 reveals the funds allocated for the incoming administration in 2001 were $4.27M (Smith, 2007), but the Bush team had already established a transition budget of $8.5M (Johnson, 2003). The shortfall, which

309 was equal to the entire Congressional allowance, was made up by private donors

(Burke, 2003a).

One Hundred Days:

George W. Bush came to office and tried to translate his campaign promises into the framework of a policy agenda, but the reality was he initially lacked a coherent national vision. There was no forward looking program similar to the

New Deal, Fair Deal, or Great Society, rather the new president intended to roll such programs back. While, quite correctly, he concentrated on getting his team in place, he also began to repay those who had supported him most – primarily the very wealthy and the highly conservative base of the party, with things like tax cuts, faith-based initiatives and freezes on stem cell research. Realistically, he needed to find the balance between reaching out to the Washington power centers of both parties while still appearing tough politically on the very insiders he needed. In many ways, he never stopped campaigning to his support base.

Not only was he the first modern president to gain the Oval Office with less than a majority, 124 he had done so through recounts and elimination of certain votes in his brother’s state of Florida (see footnote 122). The Supreme Court may have had the power to give him the presidency, but, for many voters, the court

124 The last time this had occurred was the election of 1876, which was resolved by legal and political compromises to give the deciding 20 electoral votes to Rutherford B. Hayes rather than Samuel Tilden. The former pulled only 47.5% of the popular vote to the latter’s 51.5%.

310 could never bestow the legitimacy of an election win. In his first 100 days, Bush got off to a bad start by rushing through a record tax cut which even some Re- publican fiscal moderates found excessive. This early partisan power play backfired, however, and the administration realized it needed minimally to appear, if not actually become, more bipartisan realizing it could quickly find itself in legislative gridlock. In May, Senator James Jeffords, a moderate Republican from

Vermont, resigned from the party to become an independent. Consequently, control of the Senate technically reverted to the Democrats and with it a shift in the chairmanships of many important committees.

A survey of contemporary print and media coverage reveals that assessments of the Bush Administration at the 100 day mark were generally reflective of the partisan split on the Hill. There is an undeniable left-right political divide in the print media’s assessment as well. While still slightly biased, television journal- ism attempted a somewhat more objective analytical assessment of Bush II’s first

100 days citing his folksy, Texas style. This casual business man approach made it difficult for many Americans to view George W. Bush as having any identifi- able presidential style or desire to lead the country collectively toward some new direction. Rather, the message was more one of saving America from some perceived negative course that had been set down by the previous Democratic ad-

311 ministrations. At the 100 day mark, comparisons were unavoidable but a clearly defined President George W. Bush had yet to emerge. One TV journalist said:

“. . . there’s no question that he’s got a smooth transition going. It was much smoother in terms of the appointments than Clinton’s was. He’s created a loyal team that doesn’t seem to have the in-fighting that Reagan’s team had. And he certainly didn’t screw around with his allies the same way Carter did those first days where he tried to undo all the pet projects of his famous Democratic allies.” – Doris Kearns Goodwin (Goodwin, 2001).

National poll results were cited by Andrew Kohut, Director of The Pew Re- search Center which found Bush II’s approval rating to be approximately the same as Bush I and Bill Clinton at the same point in their presidencies (Kohut,

2001).

Organizing the Executive Office – Staff and Cabinet:

George H. W. Bush had named Washington outsider, John Sununu, to be his chief of staff. George W. had been keenly aware of the difficulties that his father ran into when Sununu turned out to be overly controlling in ways that were reminiscent of Bob Haldeman and Don Reagan. Bush II, having learned the lessons of previous presidents, selected Andrew Card for the position in his White

House. Card, who worked for the Reagan White House as well as that of Bush’s father, had managed the Republican Convention in 2000 and was highly respected on both sides of the aisle on the Hill.

312

George Bush also brought from his Texas administration Karen Hughes and

Karl Rove, both of whom he named counselors to the president with the same unrestricted access to the Oval Office as the chief of staff. Thus, initially, it appeared that Bush II emulated more the Troika model of Reagan than the traditional organizational structure of his father (Walcott, 2004), which some at the time had felt to be an anti-Reagan statement on the part of the elder Bush (Burns,

2006).

Unlike Bill Clinton, who sought to reward his most promising youthful campaign workers while painstakingly building a senior team that “looked like

America,” George W. Bush “hired establishment Republicans, particularly those with a conservative bent” (Walcott, 2004). The next step was to utilize his staff

(as well as all members if his administration) as surrogates in controlling the bureaucracy, which he felt was hostile to him and, more specifically, his conservative agenda. The driving philosophy was to “pick the person who had the greatest chance of accomplishing what (Bush) wants done . . . After the strongest candidate[s were] identified, assess the political wisdom of the selection and adjust accordingly” (Clay Johnson quoted in (Lewis, 2008)). In the cases of Michael

Brown 125 and George Deutsch 126 ideology trumped concern for competence.

125 Michael Brown was hired in early 2001 as General Counsel at the Federal Emergency Manage- ment Agency (FEMA) by his personal friend and then FEMA Director, Joe Allbaugh. Bush named Brown to be Deputy Director after the attacks of 9/11 and then to be FEMA director when Allbaugh left government in 15 months later.

313

Although rare at the senior levels of the Bush II administration, disagreements did occur. In the case of Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, the severity of the disagreement over fiscal policy became public, and he left the administration quite early because he could not support the president’s deep tax cuts, deficit spending and their long term impact on the national economy. O’Neill con- tended that tax rates should be raised rather than cut for the richest Americans.

See Ron Suskind’s work for details of the O’Neill disagreement (Suskind, 2004).

All administrations experiment somewhat with diverse management structures based on presidential preferences and personalities. It has been noted that

Prior to FEMA, Brown had been the Commissioner of Judges for the International Arabian Horse Association but had resigned under a cloud. Brown was relieved of his responsibilities by the secretary of Homeland Security after FEMA failed to respond adequately to the Hurricane Katrina emergency in 2005. Brown blamed the politicians of the Gulf States generally, and the democrats of Louisiana and New Orleans in particular, for not managing the crisis better locally, saying his only mistake was in not recognizing their incompetence sooner.

126 George Deutsch was given a job in the Public Affairs Office at NASA after having worked on the 2004 (re)Inauguration Committee of Bush/Cheney. He sent an internal memo across the agency saying that the Big Bang is:

"not proven fact; it is opinion . . . It is not NASA's place, nor should it be, to make a declaration such as this about the existence of the universe that discounts intelligent design by a creator . . . This is more than a science issue, it is a religious issue." (Revkin, 2006)

Deutsch directed that all web sites and publications be changed to add the word “theory.” These revelations triggered other accusations that Bush political appointees not only threatened scientists with “dire consequences” but were also trying to spin or censor scientific information relating to global warming.

Deutsch resigned when it was revealed that he had lied on his resume; he had, in fact, only completed high school, having never finished college as he claimed. (See Revkin for a complete discussion of Bush politicos interfering with research programs at NASA (Revkin, 2006).)

314

Democratic and Republican administrations have differed in one key way, how-

ever, in that the former have dabbled with the “spokes-of-the-wheel” organiza-

tional model whereas the latter, with only one exception, have not. One area

where there has been little difference between the two has been in the recent

utilization of policy councils, which are “committees comprised of top executive branch officials, supported by a presidential adviser and significant [numbers of] staff,” based in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and focused on specific, major policy topics (Walcott, 2004). George W. Bush followed this model much as his predecessors had, and after 9/11, Condoleezza Rice and the National

Security Council became preeminent among these.

When it came to his appointees being confirmed, George Bush experienced significant delays. In general, confirmation of his appointees averaged slightly less than 9 months versus approximately 2.3 months during the Kennedy Ad- ministration (Tenpas, 2004). The average time for confirmation was roughly cor- related to the position’s importance within the administration’s hierarchy; the lower the position’s rank, the longer the average confirmation time. In some cases, it required 22 months to complete the confirmation process – which went well past September 11. Consequently, a large number of Clinton appointees were asked temporarily to continue serving, and this gradually became a point of contention between incoming members of the new administration and the exist-

315

ing incumbents (also known as “holdovers”). Under post-9/11 scrutiny at DoD,

these delayed confirmations led to the appearance of “complete and total disar-

ray” particularly within the office of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (Woodward,

2004).

Bush in Relation to his Cabinet:

Despite the shortened transition period accorded to George Bush, the incom-

ing president still managed to name his entire cabinet by January 2, which was

only a week behind Bill Clinton (Burke, 2003a). In point of fact, he named his en-

tire cabinet “ahead of Reagan and the first president Bush but just behind Carter

(Burke, 2004). Also, as Bill Clinton before him, George W. Bush achieved notable

levels of diversity among his initial cabinet members; moreover, he did so with-

out the publicity and confusion that accompanied his predecessor’s efforts. 127

At first glance, one might assume that the electoral cloud under which

George W. Bush attained the presidency, and the resultant political polarization that followed early in the administration, might have been responsible for the increased time it took to confirm his PAS appointees at all levels (Mackenzie,

2002a). This, however, is not the case. Lengthier times to confirm in 2000 were simply a continuation of a trend that has impacted all modern presidencies since

127 Bush’s proposed cabinet comprised two African Americans, two Hispanics, and Asian American and three women. Due to potential controversy surrounding Linda Chavez, his choice initial choice for Secretary of Labor, he quickly substituted Elaine Chao, who is the wife of Senator Mitch McConnell. She was easily confirmed.

316

1960. (See Figure 2-8 on page 318.) Several scholars have written on this subject

(Mackenzie, 2001; Hogue, 2004; Volker, 2003; Light, 2002) and the Senate held hearings on the issue early in 2001 (see congressional testimony of Senator

Kassebaum-Baker (Kassebaum-Baker, 2001a)). Despite these concerns, the fact was that on September 11, there were two under secretaries for the Department of Transportation still awaiting confirmation (Pika, 2005). Although some have argued the Bush Administration suffered from the cumulative effects of the delayed election results, the initial 50 - 50 stalemate in the Senate, the subsequent 50

– 49 ratio following the defection of Senator Jeffords, and finally the national confusion that ensued after 9/11 (Pika, 2005), the fact remains the process is bogged down and needs to be overhauled (Burns, 2006). Perhaps for this reason or simply out of political expediency, George W. Bush resorted frequently to the use of recess appointments, which are a procedural, but temporary, way around the ail- ing confirmation process. (See Congressional Report RS21308, (Hogue, 2010) for details of Bush’s use of recess appointments as well as the statistics for his 8 year administration).

The Bush White House set out, and ultimately exceeded its original expectation, to control five key positions in each of the cabinet level departments: the

“secretary, deputy secretary, general counsel, legislative liaison and press spokesperson” (Kumar, 2003b). Thus, the administration figured to coordinate

317 all information that went out to the public from any part of the administration regardless of the source, and, furthermore, that all statements were to be consistent and controlled. Each of his domestic secretaries was informed prior to nomination that all policy would emanate from the White House and was simply to be executed by the departments without question.

Figure 2-8 Average Time to Confirm PAS Appointees from 1960 – 2000

Scholars of government are quick to point out that ours is not a parliamentary system in which cabinet secretaries (or ministers) have a collective and shared responsibility for the development and implementation of national policy. Un- der our system of democracy, however, policy formulation is the sole prerogative of the president. Bush’s Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, stated that during the first

318 term, the president met with the full cabinet every two to three months, and he also emphasized that the president considered his cabinet secretaries to be specialized advisers (Government Executive, 2003). The concept of cabinet government never even received lip service from the Bush Administration. Only the

Secretaries of State and Defense had standing appointments with the president.

All other secretaries were required to schedule presidential time through the chief of staff as necessary.

It is well known that the Bush Administration became highly politicized outwardly while presenting a solid and unified image. What is strongly denied is that there were internal politics going on a well. This was particularly true as evidenced by the ongoing disagreements between Colin Powell (State) and Don- ald Rumsfeld (Defense), who was supported by his longtime friend, Dick Cheney

– and both of whom held great influence over the president. Periodically, these tensions flared up as DoD attempted to establish or influence with foreign policy, and they most often occurred in meetings led by the vice president during the president’s absence (Greenstein, 2004). From a management perspective, such occurrences suggest that President Bush might not have had as much management control over his inner circle of advisers as he believed.

After September 11, Secretary of State Powell repeatedly found himself on the losing side of policy debates within the administration, particularly over Iraq and

319 the issues of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). His advice had often gone unheeded, and the Washington Post reported that Rumsfeld and Cheney would frequently “nudge a willing Bush away from moderation and diplomacy . . . toward a hard line foreign policy” stance; the goal was clearly to go to war with

Saddam Hussein (DeYoung, 2006).

Within days of winning the 2004 election, the White House announced the resignations of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Energy, Education and State as well as the head of the Republican National Committee. Cheney and Rumsfeld successfully forced Colin Powell out of the administration.

Bush’s Management Model:

George W. Bush adopted a formal style with himself as the “hub of a quad- rangle” of senior aides who had ready access to him. Although other observers expand this number to six top aides with direct access to the Oval Office

(Pfiffner, 2004), the important point to note are the formality and relatively exclusive access that defined this administration. Above all, Bush’s chosen management style never considered the semi-open door approach of Clinton or the failed spokes-of-the-wheel model of Ford and Carter. (Recall, too, that Cheney had had direct experience with this management model in the Ford White House and had gone so far as to warn Hamilton Jordan against it during the Ford-

Carter transition.)

320

Many comparisons have been made between Bush II and Reagan in that each was an “instinctive politician – someone who is more comfortable with themes than specifics, somewhat incurious, and always ready to delegate . . . [preferring] a CEO style of the presidency” (Pika, 2005). In Bush’s case, he also brought a youth and energy level to the presidency that made him far more likely than

Reagan to monitor the White House staff and to hold them accountable.

Bush also emphasized the degree of importance he placed on a more formal management style by maintaining all critical elements tightly under White

House control and, in a slightly Nixonian way, his small group of select insiders.

One telling event was his subtle reorganization of the Office of Administration, which had existed as an office in the White House in previous administrations, but which he renamed the Office of Management and Administration. He also elevated the head of this office to the level of Assistant to the President – a clear signal of the greater importance he placed in this function (Arnold, 2003).

Bush’s management style was also an expression of his policy intentions.

When he first entered office, Bush signaled to his carefully chosen cabinet secretaries that they would be permitted a fair amount of leeway in the day-to-day running of their departments, but not in the area of policy. Determined “that his

White House operation would serve as the organizational core of his presidency”

(Kumar, 2003b), he negotiated with Congress by means of his Domestic Policy

321

Councils. Such issues as No Child Left Behind and school vouchers, for example,

were refined in White House policy meetings. Then the council’s recommenda-

tions were sent to pre-selected Congressmen in an attempt to formulate the basis

of proposed legislation. None of these programs was entrusted to the secretaries

much less the departmental organizations at large.

As a result of September 11, the Bush Administration “turned presidential

government into a power structure that more resembled the British Parliamen-

tary system than the American model [by short circuiting several] checks and balances” (Burns, 2006). With the president at the organizational apex, power emanated downward and outward from a White House whose staff enforced loyalty and demanded discipline, thereby ensuring presidential policy was faithfully followed. Thus the administration of George W. Bush, which had entered office under the taint of illegitimacy, defined itself with a presidential management style containing a degree of bureaucratic control in ways that Nixon and

Reagan had only hoped for.

There were, however, staffing mistakes even within the handpicked ranks of presidential appointees as a result of the heavy management style that came to characterize the Bush Administration. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill’s resignation over policy differenced in December, 2002 has already been mentioned. Six months later, in June, 2003, EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman chose

322

to resign rather than bend standing federal regulation as she had been directed to

do by Vice President Cheney. 128

Both the president and his senior staff were “careful to avoid losing legislative battles and were willing to compromise only as a last resort [so as to] claim victory. And once the administration had declared the War on Terror, Vice

President Cheney played the role of a deputy prime minister on the Hill stifling bipartisanship and genuine debate by label dissent as unpatriotic” (Burns, 2006).

Each political victory emboldened the administration to become gradually less subtle in its (mis)use of power.

128 Whitman discusses the pressure tactics generally applied to top appointees to support White House policy at all times, and those of Dick Cheney in particular, in her book, It’s My Party Too: the Battle for the Heart of the GOP and the Future of America (Whitman, 2005).

323

Summary:

The nature of the current literature on George W. Bush supports the claim

that the passage of a quarter century may be necessary before a reliable, objec-

tive, and perhaps even enduring, account of historic events is possible. Even

many of the readings dealing with the Clinton presidency required the proverbial “grain of salt.” The task of studying the Bush II administration, which at the

time of this writing ended less than 18 months ago, is even more difficult.

George W. Bush left office after eight years, and for seven of those years, he

operated as a wartime president. His thinking was literal; his views either black

or white; and he freely mixed national policy with partisan politics and personal

religiosity. He left the country socially fragmented, highly polarized (Edwards

and King, 2007), enmeshed in the longest ongoing wars in US history, and a na-

tional economy poised to implode. For all these reasons, it is difficult at this time

to find a significant body of balanced literature that compares with those of the

other modern presidents. The American people in general, and the scholarly

community in particular, need time to assess accurately the events of George W.

Bush’s presidency, let alone deal with their long term historical implications.

At this time, most of the literature falls into emotional or subjective categories

such as purely self-promoting (Aikman, 2004; Bush and Heskowitz, 2001; Bush

and Thiessen, 2009; Thompson and Ware, 2003), and ranging from the moder-

324

ately biased politically, both pro (Greenstein, 2003; Sammon, 2006) and con

(Woodward, 2002), to effusive with praise (Frum, 2003, 2005), as well as the

highly critical (Bugliosi, 2008; de la Vega, 2006). There are, within the past five

years, beginning to emerge a few objective and scholarly works. See (Draper,

2007; Pika, 2005) for analyses of Bush’s management and administration and

(Schlesinger, 2005; Warshaw, 2009) for discussions on the presidency and consti-

tutionality issues.

Several scholars argue that world events shape leaders at least as often as the

reverse (Pfiffner, 2004). For example, it has been debated whether Lincoln would be remembered for greatness had there been no Civil War. Or would there even

have been a civil war had a southern candidate beaten Lincoln in 1860? Or a

Churchill without a Hitler? It will require several years for the historical dust to

settle on George W. Bush’s presidential legacy. Events which were clearly be-

yond this president’s control or expectation, such as terrorist attacks, disruption

in the financial world, and Hurricane Katrina revealed an administration with

greater commitments to ideology than visionary leadership or national prepar-

edness. Several knee-jerk reactions to the unexpected might have been managed

differently had the presidential appointments process been based solely on merit.

George W. Bush came to office claiming to be a compassionate conservative

and, more importantly, to have learned vital lessons from previous presidencies.

325

Yet he felt justified in reversing (or perhaps simply ignoring) many of those lessons. Chief among these were candidate Bush’s statements on the appropriate use of military force versus nation building saying,

“The danger of an activist foreign policy . . . is that the United States would be disliked for its arrogance, whereas ‘if we are a humble nation . . . they’ll wel- come us.’” 129 - (George W. Bush quoted in (Greenstein, 2004)).

The Administration of George W. Bush came to office without a unifying national program. The events of September 11 unexpectedly filled that void. There was no longer any concern over a lack of voters’ mandate, and in the administration’s view, Bin Laden had provided the missing raison d’être. Gone too was the pretense of bipartisanship as the national focus shifted from massive tax cuts,

Medicare reform, or even faith-based initiatives to a demand for compliance in the name of patriotism. George Bush, under the guidance of his select inner circle consisting of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice and Karl

Rove, transformed a mundane administration into a wartime presidency.

The War on Terror provided the justification to assert “U.S. primacy . . . and its aggressive use of [military] force” (Pika, 2005) despite the lack of hard evi-

129 See the transcript of the second Bush-Gore Presidential Debate of October 11, 2000, found at http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2000-debate-transcript in which Bush discusses the topic of nation building and appropriate use of the military.

326

dence or reliable intelligence. 130 According to Burns, the Bush-Cheney Admini-

stration succeeded where Nixon’s had failed in asserting the primacy of the

presidency at the expense of both the Congress and the courts, while avoiding

accountability for its actions. 131 “Although the Bush team had successfully mis- led the country into war, its continued lack of candor, its refusal to acknowledge mistakes, and its rejection of accountability, drained public support for its war making as the Iraqi insurgency” (Burns, 2006) dragged on, thereby making inevitable the comparisons to the dreaded Vietnam experience.

As of this writing, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are ongoing. Thus, absent the conclusion of hostilities, objective assessment is impossible. When

George W. Bush used the cyclical recession of 2002 as the basis for returning to

Reagan’s argument of Supply-Side Economic Theory – something elder Bush had denounced as “Voodoo Economics” just a decade earlier – and he took the country from record surpluses to massive deficits. By passing an initial $1.35 trillion tax cut, which he followed a year later by another $726 billion, he deliberately and severely overspent the national revenue base. When compounded with the massive military expenditures for Iraq and Afghanistan, the long term negative implications to the US economy are inescapable.

130 Bin Laden was not associated with Iraq; nor did Saddam Hussein possess weapons of mass destruction.

131 Reference is made to such things as Extraordinary Rendition, water boarding and Abu Ghraib.

327

An interesting side topic to this presidency is the evolution and impact of a

greatly strengthened vice presidency. 132 The literature, from the Carter Admini-

stration through that of Bill Clinton, has been generally in favor of a stronger role

for the office of the vice president. With respect to the vice president’s role in the

Bush II Administration, the literature is just beginning to address Dick Cheney’s

abuse of power and influence throughout the eight years. John Dean asserts the

level of dirty tricks and politics exceeds anything done in the Watergate cover-up

(Dean, 2005). Presidential historian Michael Beschloss (Wolfensberger, 2002)

stated that George W. Bush concurrently restored the Imperial Presidency 133 - a

term first applied to Nixon – while declaring the War on Terror. For discussions

on the return of the Imperial Presidency see (Savage, 2008; Schlesinger, 2004,

2005) as well as the US House Judiciary Committee Report (Congress, 2009).

132 Recall “. . . Vice President Richard Cheney’s refusal, on grounds of executive privileges, to turn over to the General Accounting Office (GAO), an arm of Congress, information about meetings between the president’s energy task force and energy executives. The controversy took on added interest with the collapse of Enron, one of the energy companies that provided advice to the task force. Vice President Cheney . . . said his action was aimed at reversing ‘erosion of the powers’ of the presidency over the last 30 to 35 years resulting from ‘unwise compromises’ made by past Administrations. President Bush backed Cheney’s claim of executive privilege, citing the need to maintain confidentiality in the advice given to a president” (Wolfensberger, 2002)

133 Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines imperial presidency as "a U.S. presidency that is characterized by greater power than the Constitution allows." Midway through the Bush Presidency, presidential scholar Arthur Schlesinger wrote that the rise of the imperial presidency ran completely against the intent of the framers of the Constitution, and that Article 1 establishes the critical check and balance. Article 1, Section 8 explicitly empowers the Congress - and not the president – “to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to regulate commerce, and to grant letters of ‘marque and reprisal’.” (The latter equates to authorizing emergency military response.) (Article I, 1787).

328

Recently, presidential scholars have begun to explore and debate the significance of the apparent co-presidency of Bush and Cheney (Warshaw, 2009).

George W. Bush served from January 20, 2000 to January 20, 2008. During that time he made a total of 34 cabinet secretarial appointments.

329

CHAPTER 3

“You cannot teach a man anything; you can only help him discover it in himself.” Galileo Galilei, 1564 - 1642

3. METHODOLOGY

The Methodology section discusses the concepts, design and motivation behind our approach to gathering valid sample data from the target population.

3.1 Considerations for Experimental Design

All organizations exhibit characteristics of bounded systems comprised of groupings of people and their associated functions; however, we determined to examine the characteristics of success associated with the senior executive cadre of a large public sector organization. Political appointees make up a highly transient and somewhat changeable segment of the Executive Branch.

330

To study this small but influential group, we designed a survey aimed at the career members of the Senior Executive Service (SES). (Refer to Figure 1-3 on page 19.) Our study draws on the experience-based expertise acquired by these careerists who make up the permanent segment of government. The highly structured and rule-based nature of the Executive Branch, and indeed of the entire federal government, presents both a predictability and sizeable pool of survey candidates that is lacking among private sector as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

We were fundamentally motivated in this work by Heclo’s question regarding successful political appointees. (Refer to the problem statement on page 25.)

The survey instrument was designed to draw on individual’s experience and insight that are accumulated over the length of whole careers. As a result, a majority of the instrument was comprised of Likert questions.

Likert questionnaires have been accepted research tools since the 1930s for the gathering and evaluating of subjective knowledge based on the degree of respondents’ agreement or disagreement to questions. Likert survey techniques were developed specifically to measure opinions, attitudes or reactions. This non-numeric data is standardized among all respondents by requiring responses in fixed and ordered format (Dawes, 2008).

331

Psychometricians routinely use as few as 4 or as many as 10 alternative responses per question. An even number of response choices eliminates neutrality as a response option; thereby forcing respondents to commit, even slightly, to either agreeing or disagreeing with a given proposition. An odd number of choices, however, permits a neutral response, which is interpreted as a conscious expression of neutrality, i.e., neither agreement nor disagreement.

Clason and Dormody analyzed the Likert surveys published over a six year period in the Journal of Agricultural Education (Clason and Dormody, 1994).

Their findings are summarized in the following table:

Table 5: Analysis of Likert Scales in Published Surveys

item Number of Number of Studies

Response Alternatives 1 3 7

2 4 28

3 5 67

4 6 0

5 7 127

6 8 to 99 11

We opted to use an odd numbered scale in order to avoid forcing responses.

Furthermore, we felt this decision would22 eliminate any temptation to leave a question blank due to the inability to declare “no opinion.” We selected the 7

332

point scale in order to obtain the greatest granularity in response data while re-

moving the need for respondents to “over think” their input. (See Figure 3-1 on

page 335.)

The target population is drawn from career SESs at the U S Department of

Energy (DOE) whose headquarters are located at 1000 Independence Ave.,

Washington, DC, 20585. According to the Office of Personnel and Management,

DOE has a combined SES population of 244 in Washington, DC, of which approximately 202 are careerists and 42 are appointees (Office of Personnel

Management, 2009). The latter are excluded from our survey.

Approximately 18% of the total population at DOE (37 individuals) were invited to participate in the expectation of obtaining representative sample data from at least 10% or 20 participants.

All prospective participants were invited to participate via an individually- addressed email, which contained a statement of support from a well known careerist.

To avoid all external influence as well as the possibility of “group think,” all surveys were completed privately. Individual participants no knowledge of or any contact with the other participants. All respondents were given the same written instructions. Any additional clarification or explanation provided to one

333 participant would have been provided to all others; however, none was requested or supplied.

All respondents were encouraged to be thoroughly candid and forthcoming and were assured their anonymity would be completely protected at all times.

3.2 Design of the Survey

The questionnaire was constructed in three parts:

1. A Background Section

2. Section 1, consisting of ten questions based on observations

3. Section 2, consisting ten questions based on considered opinion

(The questionnaire is presented in the Appendix on page 515.)

3.2.1 Description of the Survey Sections

Background Section:

The introductory section, entitled Background Information, contains eight questions and was designed to gather demographic information about the respondents themselves.

This information served as a basis for comparison with official demographic reports from OMB. The purpose for comparison was to determine the degree of representativeness of this group of respondents with respect to known profiles of members of the SES across the Federal Government. The greater the degree of

334 representativeness of our respondents according to OMB profiles, the greater our confidence in generalizing any conclusions across federal agencies rather than limiting them to the Department of Energy solely.

Section 1:

Section 1 of the survey contains ten questions that either map to the hypotheses as stated in Section 1.2.3 on page 25 or were designed to gather ancillary information. (See Table 6: Mapping of Survey Questions to Hypotheses on page

338.)

All Questions in this section were conditioned by the initiating phrase, “In your experience, successful political appointees must:”, and responses to questions in this section were reported using a 7 point Likert scale. (See example Fig- ure 3-1 below.)

Figure 3-1 Example of 7-Point Likert Response Scale

- Disagree - Neutral - Agree -

Strongly Mostly Slightly Neither Agree Strongly Mostly Slightly nor Disagree

335

Section 2:

Section 2 of the Survey comprises ten questions and associated subparts that gather ancillary information and provide respondents opportunity to state personal opinion and provide explanations. A variety of input formats was utilized and all freeform textual responses will be reported in the analysis section.

3.2.2 Mapping of Survey Questions

All survey questions map to at least one of the following categories or hypotheses:

DI: Demographic Information

OP: Opinion Gathering

H1: Successful PAS appointees possess strong leadership and/or managerial

qualifications.

H2: Successful PAS appointees demonstrated commitment to their agency

and its mission.

H3: Successful PAS appointees have had prior experience in the public sec-

tor.

H4: Appointees’ success is not dependent on their political connections, in-

terests or activities.

336

In addition to the fundamental hypotheses identified above, we also investigated others based on opportunities offered by nonparametric analytical techniques. Specifically, we investigated the possibilities that:

H5: Respondents’ answers are independent of any gender bias, and

H6: Answers are independent of the time respondents have spent in gov-

ernment service (high consistency across participants based on tenure).

(See Table 6 below.)

337

Table 6: Mapping of Survey Questions to Hypotheses

DI OP H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6

Demographics #1 √ #2 √ #3 √ #4 √ #5 √ #6 √ #7 √ #8 √ Section 1 #1 √ √ √ #2 √ √ √ #3 √ √ √ #4 √ √ √ #5 √ √ √ #6 √ √ √ #7 √ √ √ #8 √ √ √ √ #9 √ √ √ √ #10 √ √ √ √ Section 2 #1 √ √ √ #2 √ √ √ #3 √ √ √ #4 √ √ √ #5 √ √ √ #6 √ #7 √ #8a √ #8b √ #8c √ #9 √ #10 √ Analysis √ √

338

CHAPTER 4

“There are no routine statistical questions, only questionable statistical routines.”

Sir David Cox, quoted in C. Chatfield, 1991. Avoiding Statistical Pitfalls, Statistical Science 6: 240-268

4. ANALYSIS of DATA

4.1 Survey Responses

A total of 37 survey requests were sent via email to potential respondents at the headquarters of the U S Department of Energy (refer to Appendix I – Letter of Introduction and Survey Questionnaire on page 515); 24 completed responses were received.

There were 22 individuals (91.7%) who returned their surveys electronically, and 2 (8.3%) who returned paper responses anonymously via interoffice mail.

All responses were received in slightly less than one month. Of the 24 individu-

339

als who comprised the sample population, only 2 expressed interest in seeing

survey results.

Of the 13 non-participants, 1 declined to participate after voicing career con-

cerns as well as political considerations. (This individual was hoping for a politi-

cal appointment, which, ultimately, he did not receive.) The remaining 12 de-

clined silently.

The 24 participating respondents represent almost 12% of all qualified SES

Careerists at DOE (24 out of a possible 202 individuals).

4.2 Approach to Data Analysis

The data collected for this research are ordinal. Research based on this type

of data has been extensively employed in opinion-based research to qualify in-

formation ranging from individual health outcomes to broad social science inves-

tigations and from marketing to forecasting political campaigns (Agresti, 1996).

Likert scales contain implicit ordering among responses, i.e., slightly versus mostly versus strongly (dis)agree . Strictly speaking, Likert data are neither

scaled 134 nor simply categorical 135 (Dane, 2008). Consequently, analyses of all

134 Scaling among data responses would require that respondents distinguish degrees of difference among their responses on an equally or proportionally quantifiable basis, In other words, “mostly agree” would have to be somehow greater than “slightly agree” by a fixed amount.

135 Categorical data has neither order nor scaled measure associated with it. A simple example would be to ask respondents to categorize classical music as a sonata, concerto or symphony.

340

data were conducted in accordance with appropriate nonparametric techniques

as called for in the majority of statistical literature (Conover, 1980; Lehmann,

2006; Randles and Wolfe, 1991).

We applied the Binomial Test for Significance 136 to all the questions in Survey

Section 1 and the first three questions in Section 2. Specifically, we calculated the

predictability of the distribution of responses due simply to chance.

n r (n−r ) P(r) = (r )p 1( − p) , where (4. 1)

n = number of Trials, r = number of Successes, and p = probability of Success (Bradley, 1976)

Additionally, we determined medians, modes, percentages, and chi-square statistics using Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence 137 to examine whether intra-

136 The Binomial Test for Significance is used with a one-sample test when the sample size is small and the experiment is a Bernoulli process, i.e., the outcomes are mutually exclusive and exhaus- tive, the probability of success is constant over time, and all trials are statistically independent (Levin, 1981).

137 The Chi-square Test is defined as: 2 2 ( f 0 − f e ) χ = ∑ , where f0 = frequency observed and fe = frequency expected. f e

It is used with 2-by-2 contingency tables to determine whether or not a binary outcome (e.g., Success or Failure, Agree/Disagree, Male/Female, etc.) is contingent upon an independent variable such as gender.

Unfortunately, the Chi-square distribution is not a good approximation when fe < 5 for any cell in the table since χ 2 is overestimated thereby increasing the likelihood of Type I errors, i.e., in-

correctly rejecting H0 (Bradley, 1976). Other statisticians argue that Fisher’s Exact Test is accurate in all cases; however, it must be used whenever ( fe1 + f e2 ) ≤ 10 for any row or column in the table (Pagano, 1986).

341 question responses might have been influenced by either a respondent’s gender or the amount of time s/he worked in government service (tenure).

Fisher’s Exact Test is a specific application of the Hypergeometric Distribu- tion, which is defined as:

R N−R P(r) = (r )(n−r ) N , where (4.2) ()n

Table 7: A 2-by-2 Table Test for Outcomes Independent of Gender

Agree Disagree Total Female r n – r n Male R – r (N - R) – (n – r) N – n Combined Sample R N – R N

Based on (Bradley, 1976).

4.3 Results and Analysis of Survey Questions

4.3.1 Background Information

The purpose for gathering background information was to determine the extent to which our sample population was representative of the SES population at large. The information we gathered is presented under individual questions and then compared to official OPM statistics where these are known.

We used Fisher’s Exact Test for all calculations since it avoids the issues of poor approximation and over-compensation. It is generally calculated as a one-tailed test; however, it may also be calculated as two-tailed as appropriate (Bradley, 1976).

342

4.3.1.1 Question #1:

Question #1:

This question identified the gender distribution among the sample population of respondents.

Results:

Our sample population was comprised of 6 females (25%) and 18 males (75%).

Figure 4-1 Gender Distribution within Sample Population

The distribution by gender within our sample population is comparable to

the average gender distribution acress the federal government according to offi-

cial statistics reported by OPM for the period 1990 through 2006.

NOTE: The percentage of women in the SES ranks more than doubled in the

10 year period from 1990 to 2000, leveling off slightly above 25% where it has

remained since 2000. (See Figure 4-2 below.)

343

Figure 4-2 OPM Data – Gender Distribution among Career SES from 1990 through 2006. (Source (OPM, 1997, 2005, 2007))

NOTE : No data reported by OPM for the years 1991, 1993, 1997 and 1999.

344

4.3.1.2 Question #2:

Question #2:

This question determined the total number of years each respondent had worked for the Federal Government. Individual responses were further broken out by the amount of time spent in the GS versus SES system.

Results:

The average time that all respondents had worked in government service was

24.5 years. This is only slightly higher than the OPM average of 23.8 years (OPM,

1997, 2005, 2007). (See Figure 4-4 on page 347.)

When examined by gender, women respondents within the sample popula-

tion averaged slightly more total time in government service than men, both as

GS and SES employees.

Two of the male participants had entered government directly at the level of

SES after retiring from the military – something which rarely happens. (See Fig- ure 4-3 on the following page for individual responses to this question.)

Table 8: Respondents' Time Served in Government Service

Total Time in GS SES Government Avg Median Avg Median Avg Median

Women 19.0 yrs 16.5 yrs 8.7 yrs 8.0 yrs 27.7 yrs 29.0 yrs

Men 17.2 yrs 19.0 yrs 6.3 yrs 4.5 yrs 23.5 yrs 28.5 yrs All Respondents 17.6 yrs 17.5 yrs 6.9 yrs 5.5 yrs 24.5 yrs 28.5 yrs

345

Figure 4-3 Years in Government Service by Gender

Years in Government Service (All respondents)

40 9 35 3 12 11 15 8 30 22 6 3 5 3 25 9 14 20 7 YEARS 9 3 33 22 32 15 29 30 4 26 26 27 27 27 23 10 10 1 20 17 18 14 16 4 16 5 11 1 9 6 7 3 4 5 0 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

|< ------>| < ------Years - - - > as SES Women Men Years . as GS

Data: GS SES GS SES WOMEN: 11 4 MEN: 0 2 14 9 0 3 16 14 4 1 17 7 5 4 23 15 6 22 33 3 7 10 9 1 16 3 18 22 20 9 26 3 26 5 27 6 27 3 27 8 29 12 30 11 ______32_ 9

Avg. yrs: 19.0 yrs 8.7 yrs 17.2 yrs 7.4 yrs

346

The U S Office of Personnel Management (OPM) published statistics for years in which data was reported. The average length of government service for careerists at the

SES level was 23.8 years for the period from 1990 through 2006 (OPM, 1997, 2005,

2007).

Figure 4-4 OPM Data - Average Years of Government Service

Avg. Length of Service (yrs) 26 25.5 25.4 25.2 25 24.6 23.8 24 23.5 23.2 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.5 22.1 22

90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 Reporting Years

NOTE : No data reported by OPM for the years 1991, 1993, 1997 and 1999.

347

4.3.1.3 Question #3:

Question #3:

This question determined respondents’ current employment status.

Results:

21 respondents were federal employees as the time of the survey

2 were retired and currently working as independent contractors at the

Department of Energy, and

1 retiree owned an IT consulting company with current contracts at DOE

24 total

All three retirees had retired from government at the SES level.

Figure 4-5 Number of Respondents Still in Government

348

4.3.1.4 Question #4:

Question #4

This question asked whether respondents had ever been political appointees.

Results:

23 responded No

1 responded Yes

24 total

NOTE: The individual (female) who responded “yes” to this question had served for less than 2 years and had returned to her SES status approximately 7 years prior to taking this survey. We feel there is no bias on the part of any of the respondents in assessing political appointees. Thus we retained all responses from our sample population.

Comparable OPM data is not available for this question.

Figure 4-6 Respondents who had Served as a Political Appointee

349

4.3.1.5 Question #5:

Question #5:

This question asked respondents to identify their current or, if retired, last federal agency.

Results:

23 of the 24 respondents (95.8%), including retirees working as contractors,

identified the Department of Energy or its sub-agency, the National Nuclear Se-

curity Administration (NNSA), as their current cabinet level department. Only 1

respondent was employed by another agency at the time of the survey.

NOTE: These results indicate a high degree of shared experience among the respondents who were potentially referring to many of the same appointees. We did not, however, attempt to assess this possibility.

Figure 4-7 Respondents' Current or Previous Federal Agency

350

4.3.1.6 Question #6:

Question #6:

This question asked respondents to identify the total number of federal agencies in which they had worked.

Results: When examined by gender, women respondents showed slightly

less mobility during their careers than men, which is consistent with other re-

search on gender studies within government (Borrelli, 2002). (See the following

table.)

Table 9: Number of Agencies in which Respondents Worked

Women Men All Respondents

Average 1.7 2.4 2.2

Median 1.5 2.0 2.0

The range of responses spanned from 1 to 6, and the median number reported

among all respondents was 2.

It is notable that 7 out of 24 respondents (29.2%) had spent their entire career

in the same agency, and of this number, 3 were women and 4 were men. (See

Figure 4-8 below for the distribution of all responses.)

351

Figure 4-8 Total Number of Federal Agencies Worked

Comparable OPM data is not available for this question.

352

4.3.1.7 Question #7:

Question #7:

This question asked respondents to quantify the number of political appointees with whom they had worked closely.

Results:

14 out of 24 (58.3%) of all respondents had worked closely with more than 10

political appointees. (See Figure 4-9 below for distribution of all responses.)

Figure 4-9 Number of Political Appointees Worked With

Close Work Experience with Political Appointees 14 12 10 8 6 4 2

NumberAppointees of 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011+ Women 01000000005 Men 01240020009

Comparable OPM data is not available for this question.

353

4.3.1.8 Question #8:

Question #8:

This question asked respondents to identify their primary area of professional expertise.

Results:

10 identified Policy and Management

3 “ Finance and Budget

8 “ Information Technology

1 “ Other ( Executive Management – Contracting )

1 “ “ ( Procurement and Acquisitions)

1 “ “ ( National Security Programs )

24 total

Figure 4-10 Areas of Professional Expertise

354

4.3.2 Survey Section 1

This section was comprised of 10 questions utilizing a 7-point Likert scale.

Following are the questions as well as the distributions of responses.

Table 10: Summary of Survey Section 2

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

1 have clear goals for his/her new job - - 1 - 17 5 1

have direct experience in the 2 mission of his/her new agency (eg., Security Emergency Mgt. etc.) 4 2 1 - 1 10 6

3 create visions that inspire people to follow - - - - 17 6 1

4 project confidence and trust in Career Civil Servants - - - - 19 4 1

emphasize the Department (or 5 Agency) missions rather than partisan politics. - - - - 17 7 -

have senior management experi- 6 ence that directly relates to their new jobs. 1 - 2 - 4 13 4

be highly knowledgeable about 7 relevant federal regulation, such as GPRA, Clinger-Cohen, FISMA, etc. 1 1 5 2 1 6 8

be knowledgeable regarding the 8 Department's/Agency's strategic plans, priorities and challenges. 1 - 1 1 10 6 5

9 have previous professional experience at either the Federal or State level. 3 3 5 4 - 3 6

have direct political ties into the 10 administration, preferably right to the White House. 2 3 3 3 2 5 6

355

4.3.2.1 Question #1: Goals

Question #1:

This question examined whether appointees who had clear goals for their new jobs were likely to be more successful than those who did not. 24 respondents were asked to agree, disagree or declare no preference on this issue.

Responses:

23 out of 24 individuals agreed that successful appointees have clear goals for

their new jobs.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

1 have clear goals for his/her new job - - 1 - 17 5 1

Gender: Women 4 1 1 Men 1 13 4

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 12 Less than 17.5 yrs 1 5 5 1

356

Figure 4-11 Goals as Success Criteria

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Having clear goals is not a significant success criterion for appointees

• H1: Having clear goals is a significant success criterion for appointees

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

Using Microsoft® Excel 2003 138 , we applied the Binomial Test for Significance.

We found p(23 Agree) = .000001, which is significantly less than α = .05. We therefore reject H0.

Both the median and the mode for all responses to this question equated to

Strongly Agree.

138 n x n−x Microsoft’s BINOMDIST function is calculated as: b(x;n, p) = ( x )p 1( − p) , where, n = number of Trials, x = number of Successes p = probability of Success

357

Using an online calculator (Pezzullo, 2010), we applied Fisher’s Exact Test for

Dependence (see equation 4.2 on page 342). Since we found the left-tail p-value

of this contingency table = .75, we conclude that responses to this question are

independent of gender.

Similarly, when the data were evaluated based on the respondents’ tenure

with respect to the sample median, the one-tailed p-value equaled .50, leading to

the conclusion that responses to this question are independent of total time re-

spondents worked in government service.

Conclusion:

23 out of 24 respondents (95.8%) agreed that successful political appointees have clear goals. The binomial test revealed significant concurrence which was not due to random chance. Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

358

4.3.2.2 Question #2: Direct Experience

Question #2

This question examined whether appointees who had direct experience with an agency’s mission are more successful than those who did not.

Responses:

17 out of 24 individuals agreed that successful appointees have direct mis-

sion-related experience.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

have direct experience in 2 the mission of his/her new agency (eg., Security Emer- gency Mgt. etc.) 1 2 4 - 1 10 6

Gender: Women 1 1 2 2 Men 1 1 3 1 8 4

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 1 3 5 3 1 1 1 5 3

359

Figure 4-12 Mission Experience as a Success Criterion

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Having direct mission experience is not a significant success crite-

rion for appointees

• H1: Having direct mission experience is a significant success crite-

rion for appointees

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

We found the Binomial Test for Significance had p(17 Agree) = .0206, which is less than α = .05. We therefore reject H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis.

The median response for this question equated to Slightly Agree, while the mode equated to Mostly Agree.

360

We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender and found

the left-tail p-value for this contingency table to be .5862; thus we conclude that

responses to this question are independent of gender.

The data were also evaluated based on respondents’ tenure in government

service with respect to the sample median. The one-tailed p-value = .50, leading

to the conclusion that responses to this question are independent of total time re-

spondents have worked in government service.

Conclusion:

17 out of 24 respondents (70.8%) agreed that successful political appointees have direct mission experience (i.e., matching the agency’s mission). The binomial test revealed significant concurrence which was not due to random chance.

Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

361

4.3.2.3 Question #3: Vision and Inspiration

Question #3

This question examined whether appointees who created visions that in- spired people to follow were more successful than those who did not.

Responses:

24 out of 24 individuals agreed that successful appointees were likely to cre-

ate visions and inspire followers.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

3 create visions that inspire people to follow - - - - 17 6 1

Gender: Women 3 2 1 Men 14 4

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 10 2 Less than 17.5 yrs 7 4 1

362

Figure 4-13 Vision as a Success Criterion

Must Create Vision & Inspire Followers

strongly agree 71%

mostly agree slightly agree 25% 4%

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Creating visions that inspire people to follow is not a significant

success criterion for appointees

• H1: Creating visions that inspire people to follow is a significant

success criterion for appointees

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

-8 We found the Binomial Test for Significance had p(24 Agree) = 5.95 x 10 , which is significantly less than α = .05. We therefore reject H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis.

363

Both the median and the mode for all responses to this question equated to

Strongly Agree.

We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender and found

the left-tail p-value for this contingency table to be 1.0; thus we conclude that re-

sponses to this question are independent of gender.

The data were also evaluated based on respondents’ tenure in government

service with respect to the sample median. The one-tailed p-value = 1.0, leading

to the conclusion that responses to this question are independent of total time re-

spondents have worked in government service.

Conclusion:

24 out of 24 respondents (100%) agreed that successful political appointees create visions that inspire people to follow. The binomial test revealed significant concurrence which was not due to random chance. Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

364

4.3.2.4 Question #4: Confidence and Trust

Question #4

This question examined whether appointees who projected confidence and trust in Careerists were more successful than those who did not.

Responses:

24 out of 24 individuals agreed that successful appointees were likely to

demonstrate confidence and trust in Career Civil Servants.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

project confidence and 4 trust in Career Civil Ser- vants - - - - 19 4 1

Gender: Women 4 1 1 Men 15 3

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 8 4 Less than 17.5 yrs 11 1

365

Figure 4-14 Confidence and Trust as Success Criteria

Must Have Confidence and Trust in Civil Servants

strongly agree 79%

slightly agree mostly agree 4% 17%

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Projecting confidence and trust in Career Civil Servants is not a

significant success criterion for appointees

• H1: Projecting confidence and trust in Career Civil Servants is a sig-

nificant success criterion for appointees

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

We found the Binomial Test for Significance had p(24 Agree) = 5.95 x 10 -8 which is significantly less than α = .05. We therefore reject H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis.

366

Both the median and the mode for all responses to this question equated to

Strongly Agree.

We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender and found

the left-tail p-value for this contingency table to be 1.0; thus we conclude that re-

sponses to this question are independent of gender.

The data were also evaluated based on the respondents’ tenure with respect

to the sample median. The one-tailed p-value = 1.0, leading to the conclusion

that responses to this question are independent of total time respondents have

worked in government service.

Conclusion:

24 out of 24 respondents (100%) agreed that successful political appointees project confidence and trust in Career Civil Servants. The binomial test revealed significant concurrence which was not due to random chance. Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

367

4.3.2.5 Question #5: Departmental Mission vs. Politics

Question #5

This question examined whether appointees who emphasized their Depart- ment’s mission rather than partisan politics were more successful than those who did not.

Responses:

24 out of 24 individuals agreed that successful appointees emphasized their

Department’s mission rather than partisan politics.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

emphasize the Department 5 (or Agency) missions rather than partisan politics. - - - - 17 7 -

Gender: Women 5 1 Men 12 6

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 9 3 Less than 17.5 yrs 8 4

368

Figure 4-15 Agency Mission versus Politics

Must Emphasize Organizational Mission Over Politics

strongly agree 71%

mostly agree 29%

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Emphasizing organizational mission over partisan politics is not a

significant success criterion for appointees

• H1: Emphasizing organizational mission over partisan politics is a signifi-

cant success criterion for appointees

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

We found the Binomial Test for Significance had p(24 Agree) = 5.95 x 10 -8 which is significantly less than α = .05. We therefore reject H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis.

369

Both the median and the mode for all responses to this question equated to

Strongly Agree.

We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender and found

the left-tail p-value for this contingency table to be 1.0; thus we conclude that re-

sponses to this question are independent of gender.

The data were also evaluated based on the respondents’ tenure with respect

to the sample median. The one-tailed p-value equaled 1.0, leading to the conclu-

sion that responses to this question are independent of total time respondents

have worked in government service.

Conclusion:

24 out of 24 respondents (100%) agreed that successful political appointees emphasize the Department’s (or Agency’s) missions rather than partisan politics.

The binomial test revealed significant concurrence which was not due to random chance. Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

370

4.3.2.6 Question #6: Relevant Management Experience

Question #6

This question examined whether appointees who had relevant senior management experience were more successful than those who did not.

Responses:

21 out of 24 individuals agreed that successful appointees were likely to have

senior management experience that directly related to their new jobs.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

have senior management 6 experience that directly relates to their new jobs. 1 - 2 - 4 13 4

Gender: Women 1 4 1 Men 1 1 4 9 3

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 1 1 1 8 1 Less than 17.5 yrs 1 3 5 3

371

Figure 4-16 Senior Management Experience as a Success Criterion

Must Have Relevant Senior Management Experience

mostly agree 54%

strongly agree 17% strongly slightly slightly agree disagree disagree 17% 4% 8%

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Having senior management experience that relates to a political ap-

pointee’s new job is not a significant success criterion.

• H1: Having senior management experience that related to a political ap-

pointee’s new job is a significant success criterion for appointees

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

We found the Binomial Test for Significance had p(21 Agree) = .0001 which is

significantly less than α = .05. We therefore reject H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis.

372

Both the median and the mode for all responses to this question equated to

Mostly Agree.

We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender and found

the left-tail p-value for this contingency table to be .5968; thus we conclude that

responses to this question are independent of gender.

The data were also evaluated based on the respondents’ tenure with respect

to the sample median. The one-tailed p-value equaled .5, leading to the conclu-

sion that responses to this question are independent of total time respondents

have worked in government service.

Conclusion:

21 out of 24 respondents (87.5%) agreed that successful political appointees have senior management experience that directly relates to their new jobs. The binomial test revealed significant concurrence which was not due to random chance. Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

373

4.3.2.7 Question #7: Having Knowledge of Relevant Federal Regulation

Question #7

This question examined whether appointees who were knowledgeable about federal regulation, such as GPRA, Clinger-Cohen , FISMA 139 , etc. were more suc-

cessful than those who did not.

Responses:

15 out of 24 individuals agreed, 7 disagreed and 2 neither agreed nor dis-

agreed that successful appointees were knowledgeable about federal regulation.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

be highly knowledgeable about relevant federal regula- 7 tion, such as GPRA, Clinger- Cohen, FISMA, etc. 1 1 5 2 1 6 8

Gender: Women 1 1 3 1 Men 1 1 4 1 1 3 7

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 1 1 1 1 3 5 Less than 17.5 yrs 4 1 1 3 3 Figure 4-17 Knowledgeable with Federal Regulation as a Success Criterion

139 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the Clinger-Cohen Act, and Federal Infor- mation Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) are legislative (Congressional) requirements that hold Executive agencies accountable for their performance, efficiency and security activities.

374

Must Have Knowledge of Federal Regulation slightly agree 34% mostly agree 25% neutral 8%

slightly strongly disagree mostly strongly agree disagree 21% disagree 4% 4% 4%

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Being knowledgeable of federal regulation is not a significant success

criterion for political appointees.

• H1: Being knowledgeable of federal regulation is a significant success crite-

rion for appointees.

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

Because two individuals responded neutrally, direct Binomial Test analysis was not possible without recharacterizing their responses to meet the mathematical requirement for dichotomous data. Thus, we took the following three approaches in analyzing it.

375

1. By considering the two neutral votes as though respondents “disagreed,”

we applied the Binomial Test for Significance as if the responses were 15

Agreed and 9 Disagreed. This analysis produced p = .0779, in which case

we would reject Ho.

2. Next, the two responses were split, i.e., 1 Agree and 1 Disagree, and the

Binomial Test applied. We obtained p = .0438, in which case we would

then accept H0.

3. Finally, we omitted the two neutral responses and evaluated for 15

Agreed and 7 Disagreed. We obtained p = .0407, which would again cause

us to accept H0.

Since the results of the Binomial Test for Significance varied above and below α = 0.05 depending on the manner in which we characterized the data, we are unable to draw any clear conclusion. We cannot accept one hypothesis in favor of the other. Additionally, the degree of dispersion among the responses implies a lack of clear consensus.

Both the median and the mode for all responses to this question equated to

Slightly Agree.

Using the three approaches described above, we calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence and, in all cases, we found responses were independent of gender as well as time worked in government service.

376

Conclusion:

Calculations for this question were inconclusive with respect to H0 and H1.

Accordingly, we neither accept nor reject either hypothesis. Furthermore, the distribution of responses within our sample population showed there was no bias among respondents based on either gender or tenure in government service.

377

4.3.2.8 Question #8: Understanding of Agency Plans and Priorities

Question #8

This question examined whether appointees who were knowledgeable about their Department’s (Agency’s) strategic plans, priorities and challenges were more successful than those who were not.

Responses:

21 out of 24 individuals agreed that successful appointees were likely to be

knowledgeable regarding their Department’s unique concerns. 2 out of 24 dis-

agreed and the remaining respondent neither agreed nor disagreed.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

be knowledgeable regarding 8 the Department's/Agency's strategic plans, priorities and challenges. 1 - 1 1 10 6 5

Gender: Women 2 3 1 Men 1 1 1 8 3 4

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 1 1 4 3 3 Less than 17.5 yrs 1 6 3 2

378

Figure 4-18 Familiarity with an Agency's Plans, Priorities and Challenges as a Success Criterion

Must Have Knowledge of Agency's Strategic Planning

strongly mostly agree agree 25% 42%

strongly slightly disagree slightly agree neutral disagree 4% 21% 4% 4%

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Being knowledgeable of the Department’s strategic plans, priorities and

challenges is not a significant success criterion for appointees.

• H1: Being knowledgeable of the Department’s strategic plans, priorities and

challenges is a significant success criterion for appointees.

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

As with Question 7, we had to accommodate a neutral response. In this instance, we applied only two approaches to analyzing the data since there were an odd number of neutral responses which could not be split evenly.

379

1. By considering the neutral response as though the respondent had “dis-

agreed,” we applied the Binomial Test for Significance as if 21 Agreed and

3 Disagreed. This analysis produced p = .0001, in which case we would re-

ject H0.

2. When we omitted the neutral response entirely and evaluated for 21

Agreed and 2 Disagreed, we obtained p = .00003, in which case we would

again reject H0.

Regardless of the manner in which we treated the neutral response, the results of the Binomial Test were consistent and significantly less than α = .05. Therefore, we reject H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis.

Calculations reveal that the median for all responses equates to “Slightly

Agree” while the mode equates to “Strongly Agree.”

We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender using both approaches. We found the left-tail p-value for this contingency table to be .4032 and .5375 respectively. In both cases, we conclude that responses to this question are independent of gender.

Likewise, we evaluated both approaches based on tenure. We determined one- tailed p-values of .2609 and .5000 respectively, leading to the conclusion that responses to this question were independent of total time worked in government service.

380

Conclusion:

21 out of 24 respondents (87.5%) agreed that successful political appointees were knowledgeable about their Department’s (Agency’s) strategic plans, priorities and challenges. Notwithstanding the neutral response, the binomial test revealed significant concurrence which was not due to random chance. Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

381

4.3.2.9 Questions #9: Previous Government Experience

Question #9

This question examined whether appointees who had prior government experience at either the Federal or State level were more successful than those who did not.

Responses:

9 out of 24 individuals agreed that successful appointees were more likely to

have prior government experience at either the Federal or State level. 11 dis-

agreed, while the remaining 4 individuals neither agreed nor disagreed.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, suc- nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly cessful political appointees agree must:

have previous profes- 9 sional experience at either the Federal or State level. 3 3 5 4 - 3 6

Gender: Women 1 1 4 Men 3 2 5 4 2 2

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 2 2 4 1 3 3 Less than 17.5 yrs 1 1 1 3 3

382

Figure 4-19 Prior Government Experience as a Success Criterion

Must Have Government Experience

strongly mostly agree disagree 13% 13% mostly slightly agree disagree 24% 13%

neutral slightly 17% disagree 20%

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Having previous government experience (Federal or State) is not a sig-

nificant success criterion for political appointees.

• H1: Having previous government experience (Federal or State) is a signifi-

cant success criterion for appointees.

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

Because four individuals responded neutrally, direct Binomial Test analysis was not possible without recharacterizing their responses to meet the mathematical requirement for dichotomous data. Thus, we took the same analytical approaches used in previous questions.

383

1. By considering the four neutral votes as though respondents “disagreed,”

we applied the Binomial Test for Significance as if the responses had been

9 Agreed and 15 Disagreed. This analysis produced p = .0779, in which

case we would reject H0.

2. Next, the four responses were evenly split, i.e., 2 Agree and 2 Disagree,

and the Binomial Test applied. We obtained p = .1499, in which case we

would then accept H0.

3. When we ignored the neutral responses and evaluated for 9 Agree and 11

Disagree, we obtained p = .1602, in which case we would again reject H0.

Using the three approaches described above, we calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence. The first case produced a one-tailed p-value = .0147; in the second, the one-tailed p-value = .0481, and in the third the p-value = .0379. These results indicate differences in opinion by gender with men believing previous government experience is a success criterion, while women did not.

384

We analyzed the tenure-based data using Fisher’s Exact Test. Since there

were an odd number of neutral responses; however, we only evaluated two

cases. First we considered the neutral responses as if respondents “Disagreed,”

and then we omitted these responses entirely. The results in both cases are con-

sidered statistically significant at p = .5418 and p = .5743 respectively. These re-

sults lead us to conclude that responses to this question were independent of to-

tal time worked in government service.

Conclusion:

Since the results of the Binomial Test for Significance varied above and below α = 0.05 depending on the manner in which we treat the data, we are unable to draw any clear conclusion. We cannot accept one hypothesis in favor of the other. Additionally, the degree of dispersion among the responses implies a lack of clear consensus.

Calculations for this question were inconclusive with respect to H0 and H1.

Accordingly, we neither accept nor reject either hypothesis. Furthermore, analysis using Fisher’s Exact Test revealed there was, in fact, a bias based with on gender. Men considered previous government experience to be a success criterion, whereas women did not. There was no apparent bias based on tenure in government.

385

4.3.2.10 Question #10: Close Ties to the White House

Question #10

This question examined whether those appointees who had direct political ties into the administration, particularly right to the White House, were more successful than those who did not.

Responses:

13 out of 24 respondents agreed that successful appointees had direct political

ties into the administration (particularly to the White House). 8 Disagreed, while

the remaining 3 individuals neither agreed nor disagreed.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, suc- nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly cessful political appointees agree must:

have direct political ties 10 into the administration, preferably right to the White House. 2 3 3 3 2 5 6

Gender: Women 2 1 1 1 1 Men 2 3 2 2 4 5

Tenure: More than 17.5 yrs 3 1 2 1 1 4 Less than 17.5 yrs 2 2 1 1 4 2

386

Figure 4-20 Close Ties to the Administration as a Success Criterion

Must Have Strong Political Ties to the Administration

strongly strongly agree disagree 8% 8% mostly disagree mostly agree 13% 21%

slightly disagree 13%

slightly agree neutral 24% 13%

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Having direct political ties into the administration is not a significant

success criterion for political appointees.

• H1: Having direct political ties into the administration is a significant suc-

cess criterion for appointees.

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

Because three individuals responded neutrally, direct Binomial Test analysis was not possible without recharacterizing their responses to meet the mathematical requirement for dichotomous data. Thus, we took the same analytical approaches used previously.

387

Again, we applied only two approaches to analyzing the data since there

were an odd number of neutral responses which could not be split evenly.

1. By considering the three neutral responses as though respondents had

“disagreed,” we applied the Binomial Test for Significance as if 13 Agreed

and 11 Disagreed. This analysis produced p = .0149, in which case we

would accept H0.

2. When we omitted the neutral responses and evaluated for 13 Agreed and

8 Disagreed, we obtained p = .097, in which case we would reject H0.

Calculations reveal that the median and mode both equate to “Slightly

Agree.”

We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender using both approaches. The left-tail p-values for this contingency table equal .0239 and

.0154 respectively. In both cases, we conclude that responses to this question are independent of gender.

Likewise, we evaluated both approaches to tenure and determined one-tailed p-values of .5000 and .0684 respectively, leading us to conclude that responses to this question were independent of total time worked in government service.

Conclusion:

Since the results of the Binomial Test for Significance varied above and below α = 0.05 depending on the manner in which we characterized the data, we

388

are unable to draw any clear conclusion. We cannot accept one hypothesis in

favor of the other. Additionally, the degree of dispersion among the responses

implies a lack of clear consensus.

Calculations for this question were inconclusive with respect to H0 and H1.

389

4.3.3 Survey Section 2

This section was comprised of 10 questions of differing types:

3 requested responses on a 7 point Likert scale

2 were discrete choices

2 were fill-in-the-blank

2 were “Yes/No”, and

1 requested the prioritization of a list of items

While all questions in this survey were based on respondents’ direct experience in working with political appointees, questions in this section were designed to be more open ended and tend to be slightly more subjective than those of the previous section. The last two questions in this section were multipart in which a free form response was requested to explain the rationale for the response given to the first part. (See Appendix I – Letter of Introduction and Sur- vey Questionnaire on page 515 which contains the actual survey.)

390

4.3.3.1 Question #1: Appointees’ Impact on Agencies

Question #1:

This question examined the type of impact political appointees have on their

Departments’ missions.

Responses:

22 out of 24 individuals believed that political appointees’ impact on their

Departments’ Missions were generally positive and only 2 out of 24 disagreed.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Results:

All responses are shown in Figure 4-21 on the following page. The tables be-

low present the data by gender and length of time in government service (upper

and lower 50 th percentile).

Negative Neutral Positive Women: 1 - 5 Men: 1 - 17

Over 17.5 yrs 1 - 11 Under 17.5 yrs 1 - 11

391

Figure 4-21 Appointee Impact on Agency Missions

What kind of impact do Appointees have on the Missions of Federal Agencies? 14 12 12 10 9 8 6 4 2 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Negative ...... Neutral ...... Positive

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Political appointees do not have a positive impact on the missions

of Federal Agencies

• H1: Political appointees have a positive impact on the missions of

Federal Agencies

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

We found the Binomial Test for Significance had p(22 Positive) = 1.6 x 10 -5, which is significantly less than α = .05. We therefore reject H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis.

392

Both the median and mode for all responses to this question equated to

“somewhat” positive.

We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender and found

the left-tail p-value for this contingency table to be .4457; thus, we conclude that

responses to this question are independent of gender.

The data were also evaluated based on respondents’ tenure in government

service with respect to the sample median. The one-tailed p-value = .7609, lead-

ing to the conclusion that responses to this question are independent of total time

respondents had worked in government service.

Conclusion:

22 out of 24 respondents (91.7%) agreed that political appointees’ impact on an Agency’s mission is generally positive. The binomial test revealed significant concurrence which was not due to random chance. Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

393

4.3.3.2 Question #2: Appointee Effectiveness and Performance

Question #2:

This question examined changes in appointees’ job Effectiveness and Per- formance over time.

Responses:

22 out of 24 individuals believed that appointees’ job effectiveness and per-

formance changed over time in the positive direction. 1 believed there was

change in the negative direction, and the remaining individual perceived no

change in either direction.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Results:

All responses are shown in Figure 4-22 on the following page. The tables be-

low present the data by gender and length of time in government service (upper

and lower 50 th percentile).

Negative Neutral Positive Women: - - 6 Men: 1 1 16

Over 17.5 yrs - - 12 Under 17.5 yrs 1 1 10

394

Figure 4-22 Change in Appointees’ Effectiveness Over Time

How did Appointees' Job Effectiveness and Performance change over time? 14 12 12 10

8 7 6

4 3 2 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Negative ...... Neutral ...... Positive

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: Political appointees’ job effectiveness and performance do not

change positively over time

• H1: Political appointees’ job effectiveness and performance do

change positively over time

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

As before, a neutral response constrained the calculations. We applied two approaches to analyzing it since there were an odd number of such responses.

1. First we considered the neutral response as though it were “negative.”

We applied the Binomial Test for Significance as if 22 responses were posi-

395

tive and 2 negative. The Binomial Test for Significance has p(22 Positive)

= 1.6 x 10 -4, which is significantly less than α = .05, causing us to reject H0.

2. We then omitted the neutral response and evaluated for 22 positive and 1

negative responses. Here, p(22 Positive) = 2.7 x 10 -6, which is also signifi-

cantly less than α = .05, causing us again to reject H0.

Calculations for all responses of both the median and mode equal 5, which equates to “somewhat” positive.

We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender using both approaches. We found the left-tail p-values for this contingency table to be .5543 and .7391 respectively. In both cases, we conclude that responses to this question are independent of gender.

Likewise we evaluated the tenure-based responses. We determined the one- tailed p-values to be .2391 and .4783 respectively. These, too, are considered not to be statistically significant, and we conclude that responses to this question are in-

dependent of total time worked in government service.

Conclusion:

22 out of 24 respondents (91.7%) believed that appointee’s job effectiveness and performance change positively over time. The binomial test revealed significant concurrence among respondents which was not due to random chance. Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

396

4.3.3.3 Question #3: Appointee and Careerist Working Relation-

ships

Question #3:

This question examined how the working relationship between political appointees and careerists changed over time.

Responses:

20 out of 24 individuals believed appointee’s working relationships with civil

servants changed over time in the positive direction. 3 believed there was

change in the negative direction, and the remaining individual perceived no

change at all.

The data are also presented according to gender and length of time in gov-

ernment service (upper and lower 50 th percentile).

Results:

All responses are shown in Figure 4-23 on the following page. The tables be-

low present the data by gender and length of time in government service.

Negative Neu tral Positive Women: 1 - 5 Men: 2 1 15

Over 17.5 yrs - 1 11 Under 17.5 yrs 3 - 9

397

Figure 4-23 Shift in Working Relationship between Appointees and Careerists

How did Appointees' Working Relationships with Civil Servants change over time? 9 8 8 7 6 6 6 5 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Negative ...... Neutral ...... Positive

Assume:

• p(agree) = p(disagree) = 0.5

• H0: The working relationship between political appointees and civil

servants did not change positively over time.

• H1: The working relationship between political appointees and

civil servants changed positively over time.

• Test at the α = 0.05 level of significance, i.e., 95% confidence.

Calculations:

We applied two approaches to the calculations due to the neutral response.

1. First we considered the neutral response as though it were “negative.” We

applied the Binomial Test for Significance as if 20 individuals had re-

sponded positively and 4 negatively. The Binomial Test returned p(20

398

Positive) = .0006, which is significantly less than α = .05, causing us to re-

ject H0.

2. We then omitted the neutral response and evaluated for 20 positive and 3

negative responses. Here p(20 Positive) = .0002, which is also significantly

less than α = .05, causing us again to reject H0.

Calculations for all responses of both the median and mode equal 6, which

equates to “highly” positive. We calculated Fisher’s Exact Test for Dependence based on gender using both approaches. We found the left-tail p-values for this

contingency table to be .6590 and .5615 respectively. In both cases, we conclude

that the responses to this question are independent of gender.

We evaluated the tenure-based responses using the same two approaches. We

determined the one-tailed p-value to be .2950 and .1242 respectively. These, too,

are considered not to be statistically significant, and we conclude that responses to

this question are independent of total time worked in government service.

Conclusion:

20 out of 24 respondents (83.3%) believed that the working relationship between political appointees and civil servants changed positively over time. The

Binomial Test revealed significant concurrence among respondents which was not due to random chance. Responses were not influenced by either gender or total time worked in government service.

399

4.3.3.4 Question #4: Optimum Number of Appointees

Question #4:

This question asked respondents whether there are too many or too few political appointees currently.

Results:

15 out of 24 individuals (62.5% of all respondents) believed there should be

fewer political appointees, while 8 out of 24 (33.3%) believed the current number

was satisfactory. 1 respondent believed there should be more.

Figure 4-24 More vs. Fewer Political Appointees

Should there be More or Fewer

16 Political Appointees to Federal Agencies? 15 14 12 10 8 8 6 4 2 1 0 Fewer ...... Same Number . . . . More

Women: 4 2 - Men: 11 6 1

Over 17.5 yrs 8 4 - Under 17.5 yrs 7 5 1

400

Calculations:

There was no single hypothesis associated with this “opinion only” question.

We did, however, apply Fisher’s Exact Test to determine whether the responses exhibited any gender or tenure-based tendency.

To evaluate these data, we first omitted the one “more” response. Secondly we incremented the “same number” category. In examining the gender-based data, we determined the one-tail p-values to be .6662 and .6031 respectively. We conclude that responses using both approaches are independent of gender.

We next evaluated the tenure-based responses using the same two approaches. We determined the one-tailed p-values to be .5000 and .4041 respectively. These, too, are considered not to be statistically significant, and we conclude that responses to this question are independent of total time worked in government service.

Conclusions:

By almost 2:1, our sample of careerists felt there should be fewer political appointees in government. These responses exhibited no apparent bias based either on gender or total time worked in government service.

401

4.3.3.5 Question #5: Work Attitude Toward Appointees

Question #5:

This question asked respondents whether they had any preference for working with career civil servants versus political appointees.

Results:

Responses were split almost evenly. 11 out of 24 individuals (45.8 % of all re-

spondents) preferred working with career civil servants, while 12 out of 24 (50%)

indicated no preference. 1 respondent stated a preference for working with po-

litical appointees.

Figure 4-25 Working Preference: Careerists vs. Appointees

Do you prefer working with Career Civil Servants or Political Appointees on a daily basis? 14 12 12 11 10 8 6 4 2 1 0 Civil Servants ...... No Preference . . . . . Appointees

Women: 3 3 - Men: 8 9 1

Over 17. 5 yrs 4 8 - Under 17.5 yrs 7 5 1

402

Calculations:

There was no single hypothesis associated with this “opinion only” question. We did, however, apply Fisher’s Exact Test to determine whether the responses exhibited any gender or tenure-based tendency.

To evaluate these data, we first omitted the one “appointee” response.

Secondly, we incremented the “no preference” category. In examining the gender-based data, we determined the one-tail p-values to be .6348 and .5899 respectively. We conclude that responses using both approaches are independent of gender.

We next evaluated the tenure-based responses using the same two approaches. We determined the one-tailed p-values to be .2068 and .2655 respectively. These, too, are considered not to be statistically significant, and we conclude that responses to this question are independent of total time worked in government service.

Conclusions:

Preferences among the sample population were about evenly split, and these responses exhibited no apparent bias based on either gender or total time worked in government service.

403

4.3.3.6 Question #6: Estimate of the Percentage of Appointees

Leaving Government

Question #6:

This question asked respondents to estimate the PAS’ rate of turnover prior to an Administration’s end.

Results:

The mean estimate for all respondents was 68.5% and the median = 72.5%.

Figure 4-26 Estimate the Percentage of Appointees Leaving Government before an Administration Ends

Estimate % of Appointees Leaving Government 6 before the End of an Administration

5 90%

3 50% 60% 80%

2 30% 70% 95%

1 10% 65% 75% 85% Number Number of Responses 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 % of Appointees

Calculations:

Based on GAO’s turnover rate of 2.1 years for PAS appointees, 21 out of 24 respondents (87.5%) overestimated appointees’ turnover rate. The GAO figures equate to an annualized rate of 52.5% (approximately) (GAO, 1994).

404

As a group, the average estimate by women was 68.2%, whereas it was 70%

among men. When tenure-based data were examined by upper and lower 50 th

percentile, estimate rates were still high at 67.9% and 69.1% respectively.

Conclusion:

There are two considerations with respect to “perception-based” questions such as this. It could be that these estimates accurately reflect the experience of this sample population. Alternatively, it could be that respondents estimated turnover rates incorrectly. Since there is no way to determined which is the case, we assess the results of this question to be inconclusive.

At a minimum, we are able to state that, for whatever reason, these estimates vary significantly from official GAO statistics on this matter.

405

4.3.3.7 Question #7: Estimate of Appointees Remaining in Govern-

ment

Question #7:

This question asked respondents to estimate the number of appointees who gave up appointments by becoming civil servants.

Results:

The mean estimate for all respondents was 17.4%, and the median = 10.0%.

Figure 4-27 Estimate the Percentage of Appointees Staying in Government Longer than the Administration

Estimate the Percentage of Appointees who BECAME Civil Servants rather than Leaving Government Service. 7 6 5% 5 15% 4

3 10% 2 2% 40% 25% 1 1% 70% 20% 30% 50% Number ofNumber Responses 0 0 20 40 60 80 Estimated % of Appointees Remaining in Government

Calculations:

Based on numbers reported at the end of G. W. Bush’s first administration,

the conversion rate of appointees to permanent civil servants (also known as

‘burrowing in’), almost all respondents (21 out of 24) overestimated the extent to

406

which appointees choose to remain in government. Figures reported by the

Washington Post in 2007 reported a total of 144 such conversions for the period

2001 through 2004 (Lee, 2007). These figures equate to less than 1.9% (approxi-

mately) for all appointees.

As a group, women estimated an average of 29.2%, and men estimated 12.7%.

When tenure-based data were examined by upper and lower 50 th percentile, the

estimates were 18.2% and 15.4% respectively.

Conclusion:

As was the case with the previous question, there are two possible explanations for the results of this “perception-based” question. It could be that these estimates accurately reflect the experience of this sample population (also assuming that men and women based their responses on different observations). Al- ternatively, it could be that respondents simply estimated conversion rates incorrectly. Since there is no way to determined which is the case, we assess the results of this question to be inconclusive.

At a minimum, we are able to state that, for whatever reason, these estimates vary significantly from official GAO statistics on this matter.

407

4.3.3.8 Question #8: The Most Important Attributes for Success

Question #8:

Comprised of three parts, this question asked respondents to identify, in priority order, the three most important characteristics leading to appointees being successful in their positions.

Results:

Data are shown individually in Figure 4-28 through Figure 4-30 below as well

as in summary form (see Figure 4-31).

Figure 4-28 The MOST Important Professional Attribute for Successful Appointees

408

Figure 4-29 The 2nd Most Important Professional Attribute for Successful Appointees

Figure 4-30 The 3rd Most Important Professional Attribute for Successful Appointees

409

Figure 4-31 The Top Three Professional Attributes for Successful Appointees

Calculations:

By summing the responses to parts a, b, and c according to categories, we developed the preceding figure. This aggregation represents the top three responses among all participants.

Conclusion:

Based on their combined input, 18 out of 24 individuals, or 75% of all respondents, believed Executive Management Experience to be the most important among the top three most critical success attributes.

13 out of 24, or 54.1% of all respondents, believed both Commitment to their

Agency’s Mission and Open-mindedness were among the top three most impor-

410 tant success attributes for political appointees. Furthermore, respondents assigned these attributes equal importance.

Finally, it should be noted that opinions regarding the importance of Execu- tive Management Experience and Commitment to an Agency’s Mission are consistent with the data obtained by questions #5 and #6 in the previous section (refer to pages 368 and 371).

411

4.3.3.9 Question #9: Definition of a Successful Political Appointee

Question #9:

Comprised of two parts, this question tested a “text book” definition of a successful political appointee based on Heclo (Heclo, 1977a).

The first part of the question asked respondents simply to agree or disagree with the definition (see initial discussion in section 1.2 on page 22). In the second part, respondents were asked to offer an alternative definition in the event they disagreed.

Results:

20 out of 24 respondents (83.3%) agreed with Heclo’s definition; 2 of these in-

dividuals offered further clarification. 3 out of 24 respondents (12.5%) disagreed,

while 1 individual partially agreed. Results are summarized below.

Figure 4-32 Agree/disagree with Heclo's Definition of a Success- ful Political Appointee

412

Respondents’ comments are provided below:

(agreed) – “Able to change or initiate government’s activities in planned or specific way and to communicate to those who have to execute the plan – why it is the right thing to do.”

(agreed) – “In my experience, political appointees primarily focused on the

“quick hits” and near-term successes. I can recall only one political appointee who focused on improving her organization into the future.”

(disagreed) – “Bringing the President’s policy positions to the department, and working collegially and successfully with career civil servants and the Con- gress to either enact or modify them as needed.”

(disagreed) – “I think a successful political appointee would trust his career subordinates enough to take their message to his political chain of command and win high-level political support for the good work the government organization is performing.”

(disagreed) – “Understanding the Executive Branch and the Congressional

Agenda for the term of an appointment and champion the agencies to successful mission accomplishment for the American public. The definition above says planned or specific ways without acknowledgment of the goals of the agency set forth by the Executive Branch but consistent with congressional intent as well.”

(partially agreed) – “I would extend the definition as follows ‘. . . in support of the constitution, laws, presidential priorities and agency mission.’”

413

4.3.3.10 Question #10: Respondents’ Interest in Political Appoint-

ments

Question #10:

Comprised of two parts, this question asked respondents whether they might accept a political appointment and why (or why not).

Results:

Results are summarized below in Figure 4-33.

Figure 4-33 Percentage of Respondents Who Would Accept Political Appointment

Of the 24 respondents, 15 (62.5%) stated they would not accept a political appointment. 8 out of 24 (33.3%) stated they would, and 1 one was undecided. The reasons given were highly varied and are included below.

414

NO:

12 of the 15 who responded “no” provided comments, while the remaining 3 offered none.

“I am a long time career civil servant and don’t really see myself as qualified to accept a political appointment. I believe I can be more effective by using my leadership and technical expertise to carry out the mission of the Department and my organization without being tied politically to one party.”

“I believe that as a career civil servant I can make more positive changes and/or impact. Any changes in the bureaucracy take some length of time and often more time than the length of one Administration.”

“I can be far more effective as a career official, because I will have longer- lasting influence on the people and on the development of procedures and policies. In addition, I would find the uncertainty of what I would do AFTER a political appointment to be such a drag on my energy and attention that I would not do as good a job as I can serving as a career official. Even without those considerations, I would never voluntarily submit myself or my family’s privacy to the ravages of the confirmation process. Not that I have done anything wrong or shameful, but I just couldn’t accept that degree of intrusion into my privacy.”

“I can effect the change we need from my current position without taking on the additional ‘high visibility’ activity.”

415

“I prefer to work and make decisions without the intensity politics brings to a particular assignment.”

“I will retire in one year and I cannot commit to the job for four years. I would not want to take on the responsibility.”

“I’d rather assist someone who has a genuine interest in achieving positive change.”

“Job Security; Lower compensation; Likely subject to political oversight which might conflict with doing the right thing for the Agency.”

“No longer in government. Enjoying activities in the commercial world to a much greater extent than I did as a federal employee.”

Political appointees must maintain their political relationships and loyalties to sustain their long-term career possibilities. Appointees that come from, and return to, the private sector appear to be performing the appointed position as a public service through the application of their experience and knowledge but seem to lack the commitment to a long-term vision for the agency they are working for. The constraints on success of political appointees is significant – the requirement to accept their predecessor’s budget plans and resources for 1 – 2 years substantially reduces their window of opportunity to have a significant impact on their organization(‘s) success.”

416

“Political appointee’s tenure(s) are short (less than 3 years). I prefer to work

for the long term advancement of agencies’ mission.”

“While the work would be very rewarding, the vetting, and if necessary, con-

firmation process is too partisan and too focused on personal issues, in my opin-

ion, rather than on the talent and experience portfolio and the ability to get the job done in an ethical, fiscally-responsible manner.”

YES:

4 of the 8 who responded “yes” provided comments, while the remaining 4

offered none.

“I am a career civil servant, ready to retire with 30 years of very relevant ex-

perience and perspective who has had a lot of success conceiving and imple-

menting change. I am a strategic thinker and understand the working and limi-

tations of the government and could design effective solutions working within

those structures.”

“It would be a unique opportunity to influence change within the Federal

Government.”

“It would depend on the position and type of change that I would be able to

provide or effect over the area for which I would be given responsibility.”

417

“One of the things that limits, at least initially, an appointee’s ability to make changes and improvements that add value is a lack of knowledge of the agency/federal processes, procedures and people. This causes many false starts and often bad feelings. Having been a long time “fed,” becoming an appointee would avoid this pitfall.”

Undecided:

The one respondent who was undecided also provided the following com- ment:

1. “I prefer to not mix loyalty to the mission and political party.”

418

4.3.4 Summary of Likert-based Questions

Bias Pg Section Title Conclusion Gender Tenure

356 §4.3.2.1 Goals Having clear goals is a significant suc- No No cess criterion for appointees.

359 §4.3.2.2 Experience Having direct mission experience is a No No significant success criterion for appointees

362 §4.3.2.3 Vision Creating visions that inspire people to No No follow is a significant success criterion for appointees

365 §4.3.2.4 Confidence Projecting confidence and trust in Ca- No No reer Civil Servants is a significant success criterion for appointees

368 §4.3.2.5 Mission Emphasizing organizational mission No No Focus over partisan politics is a significant success criterion for appointees

371 §4.3.2.6 Management Having senior management experi- No No Experience ence that relates to a political appointee’s new job is a significant success criterion for appointees

374 §4.3.2.7 Federal Results were Inconclusive . . . No No Regulation

378 §4.3.2.8 Agency Knowledge of the Department’s stra- No No Specifics tegic plans, priorities and challenges is a significant success criterion for appointees

382 §4.3.2.9 Government Results were Inconclusive . . . Yes No Experience

386 §4.3.2.10 Political Results were Inconclusive . . . No No Connections

391 §4.3.3.1 Appointees’ Political appointees have a positive No No Impact impact on the missions of Federal Agencies

394 §4.3.3.2 Appointees’ Political appointees’ job effectiveness No No Effectiveness and performance do change positively over time

397 §4.3.3.3 Working The working relationship between po- No No Relationships litical appointees and civil servants changed positively over time

419

CHAPTER 5

5. CONCLUSIONS BASED on RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1 Overview

5.1.1 Recap of the Problem Statement

This dissertation investigated the combination of personal attributes and characteristics that make some political appointees more or less successful than others – a question posed by Heclo more than three decades ago (see Section

1.2.3 The Problem Statement).

Based on a review of literature and discussions with career SESs as well as academics and practitioners in the field of government and policy, we developed six hypotheses (see Section 1.2.3 ). Finally, our sample population was identified and access to these individuals was verified.

420

5.1.2 Recap of Research Design and Findings

The questionnaire was divided into three main sections, the first of which gathered demographic information that characterized our sample population

(see Appendix I – Letter of Introduction and Survey Questionnaire. Refer also to pages 342 - 354 for data and findings.) Based on official statistics and information published by OPM, we found our sample population to be highly representative of current career SESs.

The six hypotheses were mapped to specific question comprising the remaining two section of the questionnaire. (See Table 6: Mapping of Survey Questions to Hypotheses on page 338.)

5.1.2.1 Findings for H 1

Statement Supported by (refer to) questions(s)

H1 Successful appointees possess strong leader- §1, quest. 1, 3, 4 §4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.3, ship and/or managerial qualifications. & 6 4.3.2.4 & 4.3.2.6

Each of the questions supporting this hypothesis revealed significant concur-

rence among the respondents that was not due to chance. The rates of concur-

rence among the supporting questions were 95.8, 100, 100 and 87.5% respec-

tively. Each of the supporting null hypotheses was rejected.

421

Therefore, we conclude that successful appointees possess strong leadership and/or

managerial qualifications.

5.1.2.2 Findings for H 2

Statement Supported by (refer to) questions(s)

H2 Successful PAS appointees demonstrated §1, quest. 2, 5, 8 §4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.5, commitment to their agency and its mission. &10 4.3.2.8 & 4.3.2.10

Three of the four questions supporting this hypothesis revealed significant

concurrence among the respondents that was not due to chance. Question 10 in

this section was inconclusive. (See the conclusion in §4.3.2.10) The rates of con-

currence among the supporting questions were 70.8, 100, 87.5 and 54.2% respec-

tively. Three of the four supporting null hypotheses were rejected, while the

fourth was inconclusive.

Notwithstanding the result of the final supporting question, we conclude successful PAS appointees demonstrate commitment to their agency and its mission.

5.1.2.3 Findings for H 3

Statement Supported by (refer to) questions(s)

H3 Successful PAS appointees have prior experi- §1, quest. 7, 8 & §4.3.2.7, 4.3.2.8 & ence in the public sector. 9 4.3.2.9

422

Only one of the supporting questions revealed significant concurrence among

respondents that was not due to chance (see §4.3.2.8 on page 378). The remaining

two questions were statistically inconclusive. (See the conclusions in §4.3.2.7 on

page 374 and §4.3.2.9 on page 382.) The rates of concurrence among the support-

ing questions were 62, 87.5 and 37.52% respectively.

Therefore, we are unable to conclude whether prior experience in the public sec-

tor is a contributor to PAS appointees being successful.

5.1.2.4 Findings for H 4

Statement Supported by (refer to) questions(s)

H4 Appointees’ success is not dependent on their §1, quest 9 & 10; §4.3.2.9, 4.3.2.10 political connections, interests or activities. §2, questions 8a, & 4.3.3.8 8b & 8c

Results for the first two supporting questions were statistically inconclusive.

(See the conclusions in §4.3.2.9 on page 382 and 4.3.2.10 on page 386.) The rates

of concurrence were 35.8 and 54.2% respectively. It is interesting to note that this

aspect was determined to be the 4 th most important success attribute by our sam-

ple population.

Therefore, we are unable to conclude whether or not appointees’ success is dependent on their political connections, interests or activities.

423

5.1.2.5 Findings for H 5

Statement Supported by (refer to) questions(s)

H5 Respondents’ answers are independent of §1, quest. 1 – 10; §4.3.2.1 – 4.3.2.10, any gender bias §2, quest. 1 – 5 §4.3.3.1 – 4.3.3.5

14 out of 15 questions supporting this hypothesis showed no bias among re-

spondents based on gender. The only question where analysis showed there to be a difference was §1, question 9, which asked whether successful appointees

much have previous professional experience at either the Federal or State level . Men be-

lieved having professional government experience was a success criterion while

women did not. (See §4.3.2.9 on page 382.)

Notwithstanding the result of the one question, we conclude respondents’ an-

swers to this survey were independent of gender bias.

5.1.2.6 Findings for H 6

Statement Supported by (refer to) questions(s)

H6 Answers are independent of the amount of §1, quest. 1 – 10; §4.3.2.1 – 4.3.2.10, time respondents have spent in government. §2, quest. 1 – 5 §4.3.3.1 – 4.3.3.5

424

15 out of 15 questions supporting this hypothesis showed no bias among respondents based on their time worked in government service.

5.1.3 Summary of Findings

Table 11: Results of Research Hypotheses

Statement Conclusion

H1 Successful PAS appointees possess strong leadership Proven

and/or managerial qualifications.

H2 Success PAS appointees demonstrate commitment to Proven

their agency and its mission

H3 Successful PAS appointees have prior experience in the Unproven

public sector.

H4 Appointees’ success is not dependent on their political Unproven

connections, interests or activities.

H5 Respondents’ answers are independent of any gender Proven

bias.

H6 Answers are independent of the time respondents have Proven

spent in government service (high consistency across

participants based on tenure).

425

CHAPTER 6

“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”

“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to.”

The Cheshire Cat, Alice in Wonderland , Lewis Carroll

6. CONCLUSION

6.1 Structure and Rationale behind this Research

Our research was conducted using multiple methods in order to achieve robust insight into a complex and fairly intangible problem, as noted in Figure 6-1.

A comprehensive historical and descriptive research effort was coordinated, in order to bring meaning and tangibility to the analysis of the problem. Based on direct observation, peer input, professional experience, and a broad, interdisciplinary review of literature, the survey instrument was constructed in three sections (see Appendix I – Letter of Introduction and Survey Questionnaire).

426

Figure 6-1 Notional Representation of Our Research Model

Data Analysis Govt . & Findings Info .

OMB & S u r v e y GAO § 1 § 2 § 3

History Review & published research

Literature Review Professional Experience Peer Input Observation

First Survey Section:

Section One was constructed so as to build a profile of our sample population. In gathering specific demographic information, the group of respondents was characterized and profiled, after which we compared their characteristics against official OMB and OPM data. We were, therefore, able to establish that our sample population was highly representative of the SES corps across the entire Executive Branch (see § 4.3.1).

427

The extent to which our survey respondents are representative of their counterparts across government leads us to believe there is a significant likelihood that we would obtain the same or similar results by administering our survey to careerists in other departments.

Second Survey Section:

Comprised solely of Likert questions, Section Two was deliberately archi- tected to test hypotheses that were formulated based on a review of literature as well as formal studies of political appointees spanning the modern presidency

(see § 4.3.2).

We succeeded in gathering our sample’s experience-based data that was acquired over decade’s worth of professional contact with political appointees.

Nonparametric analysis established, in all but one instance, the absence of bias among responses based either on gender or longevity in government service.

Third Survey Section:

This section was constructed largely as a means of internally validating the survey data obtained in previous, although other questions were included to camouflage this from respondents.

Only one area of low consistency was observed based on asking equivalent questions in both sections. Results from this section not only demonstrated con-

428

sistency among our population’s responses but also yielded an area of poten-

tially significant future research (see § 4.3.2.10).

Generally, data gathered by this section confirmed and validated the informa-

tion which had been obtained in the previous section.

6.2 Organizations and their Leaders

6.2.1 An Organizational Continuum

There exist certain distinguishing, structural differences between public and

private sector organizations as well as not-for-profits and NGOs, which fall in between the first two types on the organizational continuum (see Figure 6-2).

Despite certain obvious differences among various types of organizations, there

are more than enough similarities to make them collectively analogous to sys-

tems: complete with boundaries and specialized subsystems, complex interfaces,

internal transformations, as well moving parts in the form of people entering and

exiting the organization in a myriad of asynchronous, if not seemingly random

ways.

429

Figure 6-2 Notional Model of an "Organizational Continuum"

Non-governmental org. Governmental org. Corporate Non-profit org. Religious org. org.

Increasingly Profit-driven Single/limited- Multi-purpose purpose Or- Organizations ganizations with rapid rates with slower of change rates of change

6.2.2 Organizational Stability

Contrary to politically-based stereotypes, there is nothing static about the federal government‘s departments or agencies. Because of the relative constancy of departmental missions, however, there is a corresponding but negative perception that things never seem to change in Washington. In reality, federal organizations are as just as vital, responsive and adaptive as those positioned anywhere else on the continuum. As is the case with their non-governmental counterparts, federal organizations’ performance is ultimately a consequence of the caliber of their leaders; and frequent changes in executive leadership actually force federal organizations to remain both nimble and adaptable.

430

According to theorists and academicians, the frequent, unplanned, or, even worse, nearly continuous churn among the ranks of an organization’s executive leadership is considered highly detrimental to the organization in terms of both performance and outcomes (Rothwell et al., 2005).

Private sector organizations expend significant amounts of time, effort and resources to avoid the uncertainty that comes with changes in top leadership.

Stability and succession planning are observable indicators of active mitigation of an organization’s risks (Charan, 2008). Yet an almost steady turnover rate at the highest levels of federal departments and agencies is the reality – an accepted fact of life and an operational given.

In an effort to avert the negative consequences that result from intermittent authority, frequent turnover in the leadership ranks, and interruptions in the decision making process, the federal government has evolved a mechanism of temporary reliance on the members of the Senior Executive Service to provide the requisite continuity and stability in mission-related areas.

Federal organizations have developed a highly adaptive means for coping with discontinuities in leaders’ tenures; however, to ensure that these responses never alter the long-term organizational course, clear delineations of responsibility have been institutionalized. During gaps in executive leadership, SESs may

431

serve temporarily in appointive positions for the sole purpose of maintaining the

status quo , but they are never granted authority to alter government policy.

Our study took advantage of this set of organizational circumstances, which are unique to public sector organizations, by identifying careerists as the sample population of interest. Career SESs are one-of-a-kind in terms of both their organizational roles as well as their positions (refer to Figure 1-3 on page 19) with respect to political appointees who, lacking long term commitment to their jobs, enter and leave federal service on average every 2.1 years, which is approximately how long new computer science graduates remain in their first jobs.

6.2.3 Leaders and Leadership

The study of leaders and leadership is both broad and rich in scholarship despite the fact these terms lack commonly accepted definitions. This absence is often resolved merely by noting there are as many definitions as there are academics and researchers (Northouse, 2010), or by simply accepting that something as diffuse as leadership exists and, like emotion, is real but indefinable (Bennis,

2003), or by presuming a general understanding and sidestepping any formal definition entirely (Kouzes, 2010).

Our survey combined the first and third approaches. By omitting, at least initially, a specific working definition, all respondents were constrained to answer

432 questions based on their personal observations and, albeit subjective, direct experience. In the third section of the questionnaire, the penultimate question asked our respondents either to agree or disagree with a definition of successful leaders among political appointees as offered by political scientist Hugh Heclo

(see § 1.2.3). 87% of respondents agreed with his formal definition, which established a common reference point among our sample.

We succeeded in tapping into our population’s direct experience of working with and for multiple political appointees. By focusing tightly on the respondents’ observations, we were able to isolate certain critical attributes exhibited by appointees, and thereby began to understand why some political appointees are successful in their temporary “posts of honor,” while others are not.

6.3 Final Observations

Representativeness of Findings:

Although only indirectly addressed by our research, we believe the results and findings of this survey are representative of careerists at other executive agencies. This seems reasonable based on our population’s great similarity to profiles developed over the years by OMB and OPM. Such a belief also seems logical when one considers there is only a finite pool of candidate appointees available to any administration. Moreover, the process for selecting, screening

433 and approving appointees is the same for all those candidates, who are ultimately selected to fill openings wherever and whenever they occur.

Finally, careerists in one department are likely to have the same expectations for leadership as those at any other, since they share decade’s worth of experience dealing with the comings and goings of similar appointees, all of whom are selected in a semi-random way.

On Leadership and Executive Management:

Respondents clearly indicated that successful political appointees were those who:

• Demonstrated clear goals,

• Had had relevant executive/leadership experience (particularly with the

primary mission-domain of the agency),

• Projected positive, future-focused visions,

• Expressed confidence in their staffs (career civil servants), and

• Emphasized the department’s goals (rather than pursuing personal or po-

litical agendas)

These findings – most particularly the first three – are completely consistent with published research and current thinking regarding successful leaders within private sector (for-profit) organizations (Bennis, 2010). The extent of such

434

similar perspectives in both the public and private sectors suggests a high degree

of commonality among attributes associated with successful leadership across

the organizational spectrum.

Potential Future Research:

Based on our findings, there appear to be four highly promising areas for fu-

ture research.

The first is deals with the similarities and differences in expectations placed

on leaders in public versus private sector organizations. This would equate to an investigation of common successful leadership qualities across the organizational continuum.

The second has to do with characterizing the impact of frequent changes in executive leadership on large, public sector organizations. Analyses of one-term versus two-term presidencies might provide a fruitful starting point for initial insights.

The third is to investigate similarities in behavior between government organizations and bounded systems. We know that over-controlled systems tend to be highly volatile, and yet, federal organizations with their many layers of regulation exhibit quite the opposite behavior. What causes federal organizations to respond antithetically when confronted with almost steady instability in

435

the ranks of its executive leaders? Is it due to the presence of careerists? Legisla-

tive mandates levied by Congress? Or some other set of factors? The fact is the

mechanisms leading to organizational balance and continuity are not well under-

stood in the public sector.

The fourth, and perhaps most obvious area of further research, is based on

the unanswered question resulting directly from our data: To what extent do

appointees’ political connections influence their ultimate success as short term

government executives? This topic not only revealed the least concurrence

among our respondents, but also the greatest inconsistencies among responses between sections two and three of the questionnaire.

6.4 A Long-term View

Our research confirms that careerists hope their executive leaders to be successful; that they are willing to work hard and become committed to appointees who place the work of their agencies above partisan politics; and that careerists are called upon to provide critical organizational stability, because of, and in spite of, the turmoil resulting from the political appointment process.

An organization’s efficiency and effectiveness appear directly related to both the presence and absence of leadership at the top. Thus, it seems reasonable that if we could find ways to improve the caliber of executive leadership within fed-

436 eral departments and agencies, the natural outcome would be greater efficiency and effectiveness across the government.

Just as the Congressional and Judicial Branches require and provide consistent orientation and training for their incoming leaders, the Executive would be well served by implementing a similar policy – especially at a time of record national deficit when improved government performance is becoming a national imperative.

437

References

Abshire, David, ed. (2001). Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-

Six Case Studies in Presidential Leadership . Edited by The Center for the Study

of the Presidency. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Agnew, Spiro T. (1980). Go quietly ... or else . New York: William Morrow, Publishers.

Agresti, Alan. (1996). An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis . Hoboken, NJ: John

Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Agriculture, U S Department of. " Former Secretaries ," web site acessed September 7,

2007, at URL:

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?navtype=MA&navid=

ABOUT_USDA .

Aikman, David. (2004). A Man of Faith: The Spiritual Journey of George W. Bush .

Nashville, TN: W. Publishing Group.

Alter, Jonathan. (2006). The Defining Moment: FDR's Hundred Days and the Triumph of

Hope . New York: Simon & Schuster.

Ambrose, Stephen E. (1990). Eisenhower: Soldier and President . New York: Touchstone

Publishers, div. of Simon & Schuster.

Army, U S Department of. " Secretaries of Defense ," web site acessed September 4,

2007, at URL: http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/ .

———. " Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army ," web site acessed September

3, 2007, at URL: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/sw-sa/SWSA-Fm.htm .

438

Arnold, Peri E., Bradley H. Patterson and Charles E. Walcott. (2003). The Office of

Management and Administration, in The White House World: Transitions,

Organization, and Office Operations , edited by Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry

Sullivan. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O. Hughes Series in the Presidency

and Leadership Studies, no. 13. College Station, TX.

Article I, Section 8, The U S Constitution. (1787). Philadelphia: Drafted by the

Constitutional Convention.

Article II, Section 2, The U S Constitution. (1787). Philadelphia: Drafted by the

Constitutional Convention.

Ashkenas, Ron, Ulrick, D., Jick, T., and Kerr, S. (1998). The Boundaryless Organization:

Breaking the Chains of Organization Structure . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc.,

Publishers.

Baker, James A., III. (2006). Work Hard, Study - and Keep Out of Politics!: Adventures

and Lessons from an Unexpected Public Life . Edited by Steve Fiffer. New York:

G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Barnes, John A. (2005). John F. Kennedy on Leadership: The Lessons and Legacy of a

President : AMACOM, Division of the American Management Association.

Bennis, Warren and Burt Nanus. (2003). Leaders: Strategies for Taking Charge . New

York Harper Collins.

Bennis, Warren and Joan Goldsmith. (2010). Learning to Lead . New York: Basic Books -

Perseus Group, Inc.

Beschloss, Michael. (2001). The "First Hundred Days" of Lyndon Baines Johnson, in

Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in

439

Presidential Leadership , edited by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the

Presidency. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Black, Conrad. (2008). Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full . New York: Perseus Books.

Bonafede, Dom. (1987). The White House Personnel Office from Roosevelt to Reagan,

in The In-and-Outers: Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in

Washington , edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

University Press.

Borrelli, MaryAnne. (2002). The President's Cabinet: Gender, Power, and

Representation . Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers.

Bose, Meenekshi. (1998). Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy , The Joseph V.

Hughes Jr., and Holly O Hughes Series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies,

no. 2 . College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press.

Bourne, Peter G. (1997). Jimmy Carter . New York: Scribner div. of Simon & Schuster,

Inc.

Bradley, James V. (1976). Probability; Decision; Statistics . Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Brauer, Carl M. (1986). Presidential Transitions - Eisenhower through Reagan . New

York: Oxford University Press.

———. (1987). Tenure, Turnover, and Postgovernment Employment Trends of

Presidential Appointees, in The In-and-Outers: Presidential Appointees and

Transient Government in Washington , edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie. Baltimore:

The Johns Hopkins University Press.

440

Brinkley, Alan, and Dyer, Davis. (2004). The American Presidency . Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Company.

Brinkley, Douglas. (1998). The Unfinished Presidency : Jimmy Carter's Journey Beyond

the White House . New York: Viking Press.

———. (2007). Gerald R. Ford . Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The American

Presidents Series . New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Brook, Douglas A. (2000). Merit and the Civil Service Reform Act, in The Future of

Merit , edited by James P. Pfiffner and Douglas A. Brook. Washington, DC and

Baltimore: a joint publication by The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The

Johns Hopkins University Press.

Bugliosi, Vincent. (2008). The Prosecution of George W. Bush for Murder . Cambridge,

MA: Vanguard Press.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, U S. " Federal Employees in the Executive Branch ," web site

acessed September 14, 2007, at URL: http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs041.htm .

Burke, John P. (2000a). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the

White House from FDR to Clinton . 2nd ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

University Press.

———. (2000b). Presidential Transitions: From Politics to Practice . Boulder, CO:

Lynne Rienner Publishers.

———. (2001a). George H. W. Bush: Transition and Early Presidency, in Triumphs and

Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presiential

Leadership , edited by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the Presidency.

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

441

———. (2001b). Jimmy Carter: Transition and Early Presidency, in Triumphs and

Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presiential

Leadership , edited by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the Presidency.

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

———. (2003a). The Bush 2000 Transition: The Historical Context, in The White House

World: Transitions, Organization, and Office Operations , edited by Martha Joynt

Kumar and Terry Sullivan. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O. Hughes Series

in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, No. 13. College Station, TX: Texas A

& M University Press.

———. (2003b). Lessons from Past Presidential Transitions: Organization, Management,

and Decision Making, in The White House World: Transitions, Organization, and

Office Operations , edited by Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan. The Joesph

V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O. Hughes Series in the Presidency and Leadership

Studies, No. 13. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press.

———. (2004). The Bush Transition, in Considering the Bush Presidency , edited by

Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell. New York: Oxford University Press.

Burns, James MacGregor. (2001). Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'First 100 Days', in Triumphs

and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in

Presidential Leadership , edited by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the

Presidency Series. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

———. (2006). Running Alone: Presidential Leadership from JFK to Bush II : Why it

has Failed and How We Can Fix It . New York: Basic Books.

442

Bush, George W., and Heskowitz, Mickey. (2001). A Charge to Keep: My Journey to the

White House. New York: Harper Collins.

Bush, George W., and Thiessen, Marc A. (2009). A Charge Kept: The Record of the Bush

Presidency 2001 - 2009 . New York: Morgan James Publishing.

Campbell, Colin. (1986). Managing the Presidency : Carter, Reagan, and the Search for

Executive Harmony , Pitt series in policy and institutional studies . Pittsburgh, PA:

University of Pittsburgh Press.

Cannon, Lou. (2000). President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime . New York: Public

Affairs.

———. (2001). Ronald Reagan's One Hundred Days, in Triumphs and Tragedies of the

Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential Leadership , edited

by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the Presidency. Westport, CT:

Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Caro, Robert A. (1990). The Path to Power: The Years of Lyndon Johnson . New York,

NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Div of Random House Publishers.

———. (1991). Means of Ascent: The Years of Lyndon Johnson . New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, Div. of Random House Publishers.

Carter, Jimmy. Press Conference. Washington, DC, December 14, 1976.

———. (1992). Turning Point : A Candidate, A State, and a Nation Come of Age . New

York: Times Books - div. of Random House, Inc.

———. (1995). Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President . Fayetteville, AR: University of

Arkansas Press.

443

———. (2001). An Hour Before Daylight : Memories of a Rural Boyhood . New York:

Simon & Schuster Publishers, Inc.

Charan, Ram. (2008). Leaders at All Levels . San Francisco, CA: Josey-Bass.

Choiniere, Ray and Keirsey, David. (1992). Presidential Temperament . Del Mar, CA:

Prometheus Nemesis Book Company.

Clason, Dennis L., and Dormody, Thomas J. (1994). Analyzing Data Measured by

Individual Likert-Type Items. Journal of Agricultural Education 35 (4).

Cohen, David M. (1998). Amateur Government. Journal of Public Administration

Research and Theory 8 (4):450 - 497.

Cohen, Jeffrey E. (1986). On the Tenure of Appointive Political Executives: The

American Cabinet, 1952-1984. The American Journal of Political Science 30

(3):507 - 516.

Cohen, Steven and Eimicke, William. (2002). The Effective Public Manager . 3rd ed. San

Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Commerce, U S Department of. " Secretaries ," web site acessed September 7, 2007, at

URL: http://www.commerce.gov/About_Us/Secretaries/index.htm .

Congress, U S. (1867). The Tenure of Office Act: An Act regulating the Tenure of certain

Civil Offices Washington, DC: U S Senate, 39th Congress, 2nd Session.

Congress, U S House of Representatives. "106th Congress (1999) -- H.R. 3137: To

Amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to Provide for Training of

Individuals a President-elect Intends to Nominate as Department Heads or

Appoint to Key Positions in the Executive Office of the President. ," last updated

444

November 19, 1999, web site acessed October 5, 2007, at URL:

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?tab=summary&bill=h106-3137 .

———. " 107th Congress (2001) -- H.R. 127: To Limit the Total Number of Political

Appointees in the Executive Branch of the Government ," last updated January 3,

2001, web site acessed July 1, 2007, at URL:

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?tab=main&bill=h107-127 .

Congress, U S House of Representatives, 108th Congress, The Committee on

Government Reform. (2004). Policy and Supporting Positions (The Plum Book,

2004). U S Congress.

Congress, U S House of Representatives, The House Committee on Government Reform.

(2006). The Growth of Political Appointees in the Bush Administration

Washington, DC:

Congress, U S House of Representatives, The House Committee on the Judiciary. (2009).

Reining in the Imperial Presidency: Lessons and Recommendations Relating to

the Presidency of George W. Bush - The House Committee on the Judiciary, A

Majority Staff Report to Chairman John C.Conyers, Jr. Washington, DC:

Congress, U S Senate, 110th Congress, The Committee on Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs. (2008a). Policy and Supporting Positions (The Plum Book

2008). U S Congress.

Congress, U S Senate Historical Office. " Constitution of the United States ," (Senate

Publication 103-21) web site acessed November 22, 2007, at URL:

http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#a1_sec3 .

445

———. " Occasions When Vice-Presidents Have Voted to Break Tie Votes in the Senate ,"

last updated March 13, 2008, web site acessed January 4, 2009, at URL:

http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/VPTies.pdf .

Conover, W. J. (1980). Practical Nonparametric Statistics . New York: John Wiley &

Sons, Inc.

Cronin, Thomas E. and Genovese, Michael A. (2003). The Paradoxes of the American

Presidency . 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Dallek, Robert. (1991). Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times . New York

Oxford University Press.

———. (1998). Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times . New York: Oxford

University Press.

———. (2002a). Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson . New York: Alfred

A. Knopf, Div. of Random House Publishers.

———. (2002b). "The Medical Ordeals of JFK". Atlantic Monthly 290 (5).

———. (2003). An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963 . Boston: Little, Brown,

and Co.

———. (2004). Lyndon B, Johnson: Portrait of a President . New York: Oxford

University Press.

Dane, Bertram. " Likert Scales . . . are the Meaning of Life ," web site acessed August 24,

2010, at URL: http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~kristina//topic-dane-likert.pdf

Davison, Barbara. (2002). The Difference Between Rightsizing and Wrongsizing.

Journal of Business Strategy 23 (4):31 - 35.

446

Dawes, John. (2008). Do Data Characteristics Change According to the Number of Scale

Points Used? An Experiment using 5-point, 7-point-and 10-point Scales.

International Journal of Market Research 50 (1). de la Vega, Elizabeth. (2006). United States v. George W. Bush et. al. New York: Seven

Stories Press.

Dean, John W. (2005). Worse than Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W. Bush .

New York: Warner Books.

DeFrank, Thomas. (2007). Write it When I'm Gone . New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

DeYoung, Karen. (2006). Falling on his Sword. Published by The Washington Post ,

October 1, 2006.

Dickinson, Matthew J., and Rudalevige, Andrew. (2004). "Worked Out in Fractions":

Neutral Competence, FDR, and the Bureau of Budget. Paper read at Annual

Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2 - 5, 2004, at

Chicago.

Diggins, John Patrick. (2003). John Adams . New York: Henry Holt and Co.

Donovan, Hedley. (1985). Roosevelt to Reagan : A Reporter's Encounters with Nine

Presidents . New York: Harper & Row.

Donovan, Robert J. (1996). Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman,

1945 - 1948 . Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

Doyle, William. (1999). Inside the Oval Office: The White House Tapes from FDR to

Clinton . New York: Kodansha America, Inc.

Draper, Robert. (2007). Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush . New York:

Free Press.

447

Duffy, Michael. (1994) The State of Bill Clinton. TIME, vol. 43, 6 .

Editorial. " The Bottom ." Time & CNN (Online), March 13, 1933, web site acessed

January 11, 2008, at URL:

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,745289,00.html .

———. (1979) Carter's Great Purge. Time , July 30,1979.

———. (1993). Bill Clinton. Published by The New York Times , April 29, 1993.

———. " Careerists Make Better Managers ." Federal Times (Online), last updated

October 10, 2005, web site acessed August 28, 2007, at URL:

http://www.federaltimes.com/index2.php?S=1160661 .

Education, U S Department of. " About ED ," web site acessed September 12, 2007, at

URL: http://www.ed.gov/about/landing.jhtml?src=gu .

Edwards, George C. (2001a). The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, in Triumphs and

Tradgedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential

Leadership , edited by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the Presidency.

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

———. (2001b). Why Not the Best? The Loyalty-Competence Trade-off in Presidential

Appointments, in Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential

Appointments Process , edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie. Washington: The

Brookings Institution Press.

Edwards, George C., and King, Desmond S. (2007). The {Plarized Presidency of George

W. Bush . New York: Oxford University Press.

448

Eksterowicz, A. and Hastedt, G. (2005). The George W. Bush Presidential Transition:

The Disconnect Between Politics and Policy. Paper read at The Southeastern

Political Science Association, March 24 - 26, 2005, at New Orleans, LA.

Energy, U S Department of. "Secretaries of Energy ," web site acessed September 12,

2007, at URL: http://www.energy.gov/news/4757.htm .

———. " Citizens' Report: FY 2008 Summary of Performance and Financial Results ,"

web site acessed March 1, 2010, at URL: http://www.cfo.doe.gov/CF1-

2/2008CR.pdf .

Federal Election Commission. " 2000 Official Presidential Election Results ," last updated

on 12/2001, web site acessed June 17, 2010, at URL:

http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm .

Feltzenberg, Alvin S. (2001). The Keys to a Successful Presidency . Washington, DC: The

Heritage Foundation.

FEMA. " FEMA's FY 2008 Budget Request, Release Number FNF-07-005 ," web site

acessed March 1, 2010, at URL:

http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=34749

Ferling, John. (1992). John Adams: A Life . New York: Henry Holt and Co.

———. (2004). Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800 . New York:

Oxford University Press.

Ferrara, Joseph A. and Ross, Lynn C. Getting to Know You: The Rules of Engagement for

Political Appointees and Career Executives Washington, DC: IBM Center for the

Business of Government.

449

Ferrell, Robert H. (1996). Harry S. Truman: A Life . Columbia, MO: The University of

Missouri Press.

Fisher, Linda L. (1987). Fifty Years of Presidential Appointments, in The In-and-Outers:

Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington . Baltimore:

The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ford, Gerald R. 1974. Presidential Proclamation, 4311. Washington, DC.

———. (1987). A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford . Easton Press

collector's ed, The Library of the Presidents . Norwalk, Conn.: Easton Press.

Friedman, Thomas L. (1993). Diversity Pledge Slows Clinton on Appointments.

Published by The New York Times , January 12, 1993, A 18.

GAO, The General Accounting Office. (1994). Political Appointees: Turnover Rates in

Executive Schedule Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation (GAO/GDD-94-

115FS). Washington, DC:

George, Alexander L., and George, Juliette. (1998a). Presidential Personality and

Performance . Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

George, Alexander L., and Stern, Eric. (1998b). Presidential Management Styles and

Models, in Presidential Personality and Performance , edited by Alexander L.

George, and George, Juliette. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Georgia, State of. " Budget in Brief ." Office of Plannning and Budget web site acessed

April 17, 2010, at URL:

http://www.opb.state.ga.us/media/12412/fy%202006%20budget%20in%20brief.p

450

Gergen, David (2001). Ronald Reagan: Putting Together an Early Action Plan, in

Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in

Presidential Leadership , edited by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the

Presidency. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Gergen, David R. (2000). Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership - Nixon to

Clinton . New York: Simon & Schuster.

Giglio, James N. (2006). The Presidency of John F. Kennedy . Lawrence, Kansas:

University Press of Kansas.

Gilbert, Robert E. (2002). John F. Kennedy as Dramatic Leader, in Political Leadership

for the New Century: Personality and Behavior Among American Leaders , edited

by Linda O. Valenty and Ofer Feldman. Westport, Ct.: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Gilmour, John B. and Lewis, David E. (2006). Political Appointees and the Competence

of Federal Program Management. American Politics Research 34 (1):22 - 50.

Goodsell, Charles. T. (2006). Relations between Political Appointees and Career

Officials: Principal-Agent or Moral Equal? Presidential Studies Quarterly 36

(2):pp. 323 - 326.

Goodwin, Doris Kearns. (1991). Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream . New York,

NY: St. Martin's Press.

———. 2001. The McNeil Lehrer Report, televised on April 30, 2001. In The PBS

Newshour .

Government Executive, The. " The Cabinet's Keeper: Interview with Andrew Card ,"

February 3, 2003 web site acessed July 15, 2010, at URL:

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0203/020303ff.htm

451

Graham, Hugh D. . (1991). The Incoherence of the Civil Rights Policy in the Nixon

Administration, in Richard M. Nixon: Politician, President and Administrator ,

edited by Leon Friedman, and William F. Levantrosser. New York: Greenwood

Publishing Group.

Grant, Alan R. (2004). The American Political Process . 7th ed. London: Routledge Press.

Greene, John R. (1995). The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford . Edited by Donald R. McCoy,

Clifford S. Griffin, and Homer E. Scoolofsky, American Presidency Series .

Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas.

Greenstein, Fred I. (1994). The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader .

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

———. (2001). Dwight D. Eisenhower's 'First Hundred Days', in Triumphs and

Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential

Leadership. , edited by David Abshire. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

———. (2002). The Qualitative Study of Presidential Personality, in Political

Leadership for the New Century: Personality and Behavior Among American

Leaders , edited by Linda O. Valenty and Ofer Feldman. Wesport, CT: Praeger

Publishers, Inc.

———. (2003). The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment . Baltimore: The

Johns Hopkins University Press.

———. (2004). The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to George W.

Bush . 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Harris, John F. (2005). The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House . New York: The

Randon House Publishing Group.

452

Health and Human Services, U S Department of. " Historical Highlights ," web site

acessed September 7, 2007, at URL: http://www.hhs.gov/about/hhshist.html .

Heclo, Hugh. (1977a). A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington .

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

———. (1977b). Political Executives and the Washington Bureaucracy. Political Science

Quarterly 92 (3):395 - 424.

———. (1999a). The Changing Presidential Office in The Mangerial Presidency , edited

by James P. Pfiffner. Joseph V. Hughes, Jr., and Holly O. Hughes Series in the

Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 4. College Station, TX: Texas A & M

University Press.

———. (1999b). OMB and Neutral Competence, in The Managerial Presidency , edited

by James P. Pfiffner. Joseph V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O. Hughes Series in the

Presidency and Leadership Studies. College Station, TX: Texas A & M

University Press.

Hess, Stephen. (2001). First Impressions: Presidents, Appointments and Transitions, in

Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments

Process , edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie. Washington: The Brookings Institution

Press.

Hess, Stephen and Pfiffner, James. (2002). Organizing the Presidency . 3rd ed.

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.

Heubner, Lee. (2001). Richard Nixon's "First One Hundred Days", in Triumphs and

Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presiential

453

Leadership , edited by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the Presidency.

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Hogue, Henry B. (2004). 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Changes to the

Presidential Appointment and Presidential Transition Processes (RL 32588).

Washington, DC: A Congressional Research Service Report published by the

Library of Congress.

———. (2010). Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions (RS 21308).

Washington, DC: A Congressional Research Service Report published by the

Library of Congress.

Holland, Max, Robert David Johnson and David Shreve. (2005). Lyndon B. Johnson: The

Kennedy Assassination and the Transfer of Power, November 1963 - January

1964 . Vol. 1 - 3, The Presidential Recordings . New York: W. W. Norton.

Homeland Security, U S Department of. " Former Secretaries of Homeland Security ,"

web site acessed September 13, 2007, at URL:

http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0585.shtm .

House, White. " About the White House, Presidents ," web site acessed March 25, 2009, at

URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/johnadams/ .

Housing and Urban Development, U S Department of. " Prior HUD Secretaries ," web

site acessed September 10, 2007, at URL:

http://www.hud.gov/about/secretary/hudsecy.cfm .

Interior, U S Department of. " Past Secretaries of the Interior Department ," last updated

August 9, 2007, web site acessed September 6, 2007, at URL:

http://www.doi.gov/secretary/pastsecretaries/past_secretaries.html .

454

Johnson, Clay (2003). The 2000-2001 Presidential Transition: Transitions, Organization

and Office Operations, in The White House World:Transitions, Organization, and

Office Operations , edited by Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan. The Joseph

V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O. Hughes Series in the Presidency and Leadership

Studies, No. 13. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press.

Jones, Charles O. (1998). Passages to the Presidency: From Campaigning to Governing .

Washington: The Brookings Institution Press.

———. (2001). The Clinton Presidency: "The First One Hundred Days", in Triumphs

and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in

Presidential Leadership , edited by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the

Presidency. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

———. (2005). The Presidency in a Separated System . 2nd ed. Washington, DC: The

Brookings Institution Press.

Justice, U S Department of. " Past Attorneys General ," last updated February 4, 2008,

web site acessed January 4, 2009, at URL:

http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ls/agbiographies.htm .

Kamen, Al. (1993). Administration Still Walking on EGG Shells. Published by The

Washington Post , April 19, 1993, A 21.

Kassebaum-Baker, Nancy. (2001a). A Bipartisan Plan to Improve the Presidential

Appointments Process Washington, DC: Testimony before the U S Senate

Committee on Governmental Affairs.

Kassebaum-Baker, Nancy and Raines, Franklin. (2001b). Renewing Citizen Service - A

Considered Opinion. The Brookings Review 19 (2):pp. 2 - 3.

455

Kaufman, Burton Ira, and Kaufman, Scott. (2006). The Presidency of James Earl Carter,

Jr. , The American Presidency Series . Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of

Kansas.

Kelly, Michael J. (1992). A Man Who Wants to be Liked, and Is: William Jefferson

Blythe Clinton. Published by New York Times , Nov. 4, 1992, A1.

Kernell, Samuel. (1999). The Evolution of the White House Staff, in The Managerial

Presidency , edited by James P. Pfiffner. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr., and Holly O.

Hughes Series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 4. College Station,

TX: Texas A & M University Press.

Kirschten, Dick. (1981). You Say You Want a Sub-cabinet Post? Clear it with Marty,

Dick, Lyn and Fred. National Journal April 4, 1981:p. 564.

Kitfield, James. (2001). The U S and Iraq, 1990 - 1991, in Triumphs and Tragedies of the

Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presiential Leadership , edited

by David Abshire. The Center for the Study of the Presidency. Westport, CT:

Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Klein, Joe. (2002). The Natural - The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton :

Broadway Books, A Div. of Random House.

Kohut, Andrew. 2001. The McNeil Lehrer Report, televised on April 30, 2001. In The

PBS Newshour .

Kouzes, James M. and Barry Posner. (2010). The Truth About Leadership . San Francisco:

Josey-Bass.

Kumar, Martha Joynt. (2003a). The Pressures of White House Work Life, in The White

House World: Transitions, Organization, and Office Operations , edited by

456

Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O.

Hughes Series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 13. College Station,

TX: Texas A & M University Press.

———. (2003b). Recruiting and Organizing the White House Staff, in The White House

World: Transitions, Organization, and Office Operations , edited by Martha Joynt

Kumar and Terry Sullivan. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O. Hughes Series

in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 13. College Station, TX: Texas A &

M University Press.

———. (2003c). The White House is Like City Hall, in The White House World:

Transitions, Organization, and Office Operations , edited by Martha Joynt Kumar

and Terry Sullivan. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O. Hughes Series in the

Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 13. College Station, TX: Texas A & M

University Press.

Kumar, Martha Joynt and Sullivan, Terry. (2003d). The White House World: Transitions,

Organization, and Office Operations , The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O.

Hughes Series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 13 . College Station,

TX: Texas A & M University Press.

Labner, Judith M. (2001). A Vote of No Confidence: How Americans View Presidential

Appointees Washington, DC: A Report by The Brookings Institution.

Labor, U S Department of. " History at the Department of Labor ," web site acessed

September 7, 2007, at URL: http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/dpt.htm .

Landy, Marc and Milkis, Sidney M. (2000). Presidential Greatness . Lawrence, Kansas:

University Press of Kansas.

457

Lee, Christopher. (2005). Flops Are No Fluke in the Annals of Political Payback: Ex-

FEMA Chief Joins the Long List of Unsuccessful Appointees. Published by The

Washington Post , September 19, 2005.

———. (2007). Political Appointees 'Burrowing In'. Published by The Washington Post ,

October 5, 2007.

Lehmann, Erich L. (2006). Nonparametrics:Statistical Methods Based on Ranks . Upper

Saddle River, NJ: Simon and Schuster.

Leuchtenburg, William E. (2001). In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to George

W. Bush . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Levin, Richard I. (1981). Statistics for Management . Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-

Hall, Inc.

Lewis, David E. (2005). Staffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the

Executive Office of the President, 1988 - 2004. Presidential Studies Quarterly 35

(3):496 - 514.

———. " Patronage, Policy and Politics in Presidential Appointments ," ( draft version ,

Paper Prepared for Midwest Political Science Association) web site acessed

August 18, 2007, at URL:

http://www.princeton.edu/~delewis/Papers/Midwest2007.pdf .

———. (2008). The Politics of Presidential Appointments . Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press.

Light, Paul C. " The Changing Shape of Government ." The Brookings Institution, last

updated February, 1999, web site acessed August 15, 2007, at URL:

http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb45.htm .

458

———. " Our Tottering Confirmation Process ," last updated March 2, 2002, web site

acessed August 27, 2007, at URL:

http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/spring_governance_light.aspx .

———. " Fact Sheet on the Continued Thickening of Government ." The Brookings

Institution, dated July 23, 2004, web site acessed September 23, 2007, at URL:

http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/light/20040723.htm .

Light, Paul C. and Thomas, Virginia L. (2000). The Merit and Reputation of an

Administration: Presidential Appointees on the Appointments Process,

Washington, DC: A Report published jointly by The Brookings Institution and the

Heritage Foundation.

Mackenzie, G. Calvin. (1980). Book Review Section, in Presidential Studies Quarterly .

Summer, 1980.

———. (1981). The Politics of Presidential Appointments . New York: The Free Press -

Division of Macmillan Publishing Co.

———. (2002a). The Real Invisible Hand: Presidential Appointees in the Administration

of George W. Bush. Political Science & Politics 35 (1):27 - 30.

MacKenzie, G. Calvin. (in book review). Presidential Studies Quarterly . Summer, 1980.

Mackenzie, G. Calvin, ed. (2001). Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the

Presidential Appointments Process . Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution

Press.

MacKenzie, G. Calvin and Hafken, Michael. (2002b). Scandal Proof: Do Ethics Laws

Make Government Ethical? Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.

459

Mackenzie, G. Calvin and Shogun, Robert. (1996). Obstacle Course: The Report of the

Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process .

New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press.

Macy, John W., Adams, Bruce and Walter, J. Jackson. (1983). America's Unelected

Government: Appointing the President's Team , , National Academy of Public

Administration . Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co.

Maier, Thomas. (2003). The Kennedys : America's Emerald Kings: A Five-Generation

History of the Ultimate Irish-Catholic Family . New York: Basic Books.

Maraniss, David. (1995). First in His Class : A Biography of Bill Clinton . New York:

Simon & Schuster.

———. (1998). The Clinton Enigma : A Four-and-a-Half-Minute Speech Reveals This

President's Entire Life . New York: Simon & Schuster.

Maranto, Robert. (2005). Beyond a Government of Strangers . Lanham, MD: The

Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group.

Martin, Janet M. (1991). An Examination of Executive Branch Appointments in the

Reagan Administration by Background and Gender. The Western Political

Quarterly 44 (1):173 - 184.

McCullough, David. (2001). John Adams . New York: Simon & Schuster.

———. (2003). Truman . New York: Simon & Schuster.

Meese, Edwin. (1992). With Reagan: The Inside Story . Washington, D.C.: Regnery

Gateway Publishers.

Meyers v. United States , 1926. Supreme Court.

460

Michaels, Judith E. (1995). A View from the Top: Reflections of the Bush Presidential

Appointees. Public Administration Review 55 (3):pp. 273 - 283.

———. (1997). The President's Call . Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press.

———. (2005). Becoming an Effective Political Executive, in Learning the Ropes ,

edited by Mark A. Abramson, and Paul R. Lawrence. Lanham, MD: Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Mieczkowski, Yanek. (2005). Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s . Lexington,

Ky.: University Press of Kentucky.

Milbank, Dana. " Bush Seeks to Rule the Bureaucracy: Appointments Aim at White House

Control ." The Washington Post (Online), last updated November 22, 2004, web

site acessed October 1, 2007, at URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/articles/A2474-2004Nov21.html , .

Milkis, Sidney M. and Nelson, Michael. (2008). The American Presidency: Origins and

Development, 1776 - 2007 . 5th ed. Washington, D C: CQ Press.

Moore, James and Wayne Slater. (2003). Bush's Brain: How Karl Rove Made George W.

Bush Presidential . New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Naftali, Timothy J. (2007). George H. W. Bush , The American Presidents Series . New

York: Times Books.

Nash, Bradley D. (1980). Organizing and Staffing the Presidency , Proceedings / Center

for the Study of the Presidency . New York, NY: The Center for the Study of the

Presidency.

Nathan, Richard P. (1975). The Plot that Failed: Richard Nixon and the Administrative

Presidency . New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

461

———. (1983). The Administrative Presidency . New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Neustadt, Richard E. (2000). Preparing to be President: The Memos of Richard E.

Neustadt . Edited by Charles O. Jones as a joint publication by The American

Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution. Washington, DC: AEI Press.

———. (2004). Does the White House Need a Strong Chief of Staff?, in The Managerial

Presidency , edited by James P. Pfiffner. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr. and Holly O.

Hughes Series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 4. College Station,

TX: Texas A&M University Press.

Newland, Chester A. (2000). Politics of Transition from the Administrative to the

Facilitative State, in The Future of Merit: Twenty Years after the Civil Service

Reform Act , edited by James P. Pfiffner and Douglas A. Brook. Washington, DC

and Baltimore: jointly published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The

Johns Hopkins University Press.

Nicholls, Keith. (1991). The Dynamics of National Executive Service: Ambition Theory

and the Careers of Presidential Cabinet Members. The Western Political

Quarterly 44 (1):149 - 172.

Nixon, Richard M. (1962). Six Crises . Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

———. (1990). The Memoirs of Richard Nixon . New York: Simon & Schuster.

Northouse, Peter G. (2010). Leadership: Theory and Practice . 5th ed. Thousand Oaks,

CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

O'Brien, Michael. (2005). John F. Kennedy : A Biography . 1st ed. New York: Thomas

Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press.

462

Office of Management and Budget, (OMB). " Fiscal Year 2007 Midsession Review,

Budget of the U S Government ," web site acessed September 14, 2007, at URL:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/07msr.pdf .

———. " Budget of the United States, 2008 ," web site acessed February 26, 2010, at

URL:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/budget/fy2008/summarytables.html

Office of Personnel Management, (OPM). 2009. " Data and Trends, SES Demographics ,"

web site acessed December 29, 2009, at URL:

http://www.opm.gov/ses/facts_and_figures/demographics.asp .

OPM, (Offfice of Personnel Management). (1997). The Fact Book, "Federal Civilian

Workforce Statistics" Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

———. (2005). The Fact Book, "Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics" Washington,

DC: Government Printing Office.

———. (2007). The Fact Book, "Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics" Washington,

DC: Government Printing Office.

Pagano, Robert R. (1986). Understanding Statistics in the Behavioral Sciences . St. Paul,

MN: West Publishing Co.

Palmer, Betsy. (2005). 9/11 Commission Recommendations: The Senate Confirmation

Process for Presidential Nominees (RL 32551). Washington, DC: A

Congressional Research Service Report published by the Library of Congress.

Patterson, Bradley H. (2000). The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing . Washington,

DC: The Brookings Institution Press.

463

———. (2008). To Serve the President: Continuity and Innovation in the White House

Staff . Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press.

Patterson, Bradley H. and James P. Piffner. (2003). The Office of Presidential Personnel,

in The White House World: Transitions, Organization, and Office Operations ,

edited by Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr. and

Holly O. Hughes Series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 13. College

Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press.

Perret, Geoffrey. (1999). Eisenhower . Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corp., Publishers.

Pezzullo, John C. . " Interactive Statistical Calculation Pages ." StatPages.org, last

updated on December 7, 2010, web site acessed January 10, 2011, at URL:

http://statpages.org/ctab2x2.html .

Pfiffner, James P. (1987). Nine Enemies and One Ingrate: Political Appointments during

Presidential Transitions, in The In-and-Outers: Presidential Appointees and

Transient Government in Washington , edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie. Baltimore:

The Johns Hopkins University Press.

———. (1996). The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running . 2nd ed, Studies

in Government and Public Policy . Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

———. (1999a). Can the President Manage the Government?, in The Managerial

Presidency , edited by James P. Pfiffner. College Station, TX: Texas A & M

University Press.

———. (1999b). The Managerial Presidency . 2nd ed, The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr., and

Holly O. Hughes Series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 4 . College

Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.

464

———. (1999c). The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned, in The Managerial

Presidency , edited by James P. Pfiffner. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr., and Holly O.

Hughes series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 4. College Station,

TX: Texas A & M University Press.

———. (2000). Government Legitimacy and the Role of the Civil Service, in The Future

of Merit: Twenty Years after the Civil Service Reform Act , edited by James P.

Pfiffner and Douglas A. Brook. Washington, DC and Baltimore: a joint

publication by The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins

University Press.

———. (2001a). Deficit Reduction in 1993: Clinton's First Budget, in Triumphs and

Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential

Leadership , edited by David Abshire. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

———. (2001b). Presidential Appointments: Recruiting Executive Branch Leaders, in

Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments

Process , edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie. Washington, DC: The Brookings

Institution Press.

———. (2004). Assessing the Bush Presidency, in Considering the Bush Prersidency ,

edited by Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell. New York: Oxford University

Press.

Pfiffner, James P., and Brook, Douglas A., eds. (2000). The Future of Merit: Twenty

Years After the Civil Service Reform Act . Washington, D.C. and Baltimore: jointly

published by The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins

University Press.

465

Pika, Joseph A., and Maltese, John A. (2005). The Politics of the Presidency .

Washington, DC: CQ Press, a division of Congressional Quarterly, Inc.

Prados, John. (2003). The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President . New

York: The New Press : Distributed by W. W. Norton.

Preston, Thomas. (2001). The President and His Inner Circle . New York: Columbia

University Press.

Raines, Franklin D. (2001). A Bipartisan Plan to Improve the Presidential Appointments

Process Washington, DC: Testimony before the U S Senate Committee on

Governmental Affairs.

Randles, Ronald H., and Wolfe, Douglas A. (1991). Introduction to the Theory of

Nonparametric Statistics . Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company.

Reagan, Ronald. (2007). The Reagan Diaries . Edited by Douglas Brinkley. New York:

HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.

Reeves, Thomas C. (1997). A Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy .

Rosevale, CA: Prima Publishing - a div. of Random House.

Reich, Robert. (1997). Locked in the Cabinet . New York: Knopf Publishing Co.

Renshon, Stanley A. (1995). The Clinton Presidency: Campaigning, Governing, and the

Psychology of Leadership . Boulder: Westview Press.

———. (1998). The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates . New York:

Routledge Press.

Revkin, Andrew C. (2006). NASA Chief Backs Agency Openness. Published by The

New York Times , February 4, 2006.

466

Richardson, Elliot L., and James P. Pfiffner. (1999). Politics and Performance:

Strengthening the Executive Leadership System, in The Managerial Presidency ,

edited by James P. Pfiffner. The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr., and Holly O. Hughes

series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies, no. 4. College Station, TX: Texas

A & M University Press.

Rothstein, Barbara J. (2006). Federal Judicial Center Annual Report 2006, Washington,

DC: Federal Judicial Center.

Rothwell, William , Jackson, Robert D., Knight, Shaun C., and Lindholm, John E.

(2005). Career Planning and Succession Management . Westport, CT: Praeger

Publishers, Inc.

Rozell, Mark J., and Pederson, William D. (1997). FDR and The Modern Presidency:

Leadership and Legacy . Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Rubenzer, Steven J. and Faschingbauer, Thomas R. (2004). Personality, Character and

Leadership in the White House: Psychologists Assess the Presidents . Dulles, VA:

Brassey's Inc.

Salmon, Lester M. and Alan J. Abramson. (1984). Governance: The Politics of

Retrenchment, in The Reagan Record: An Assessment of America's Changing

Domestic Priorities , edited by John L. Palmer and Isabel Sawhill. Washington,

DC: The Instutite for Contemporary Studies.

Sammon, Bill. (2006). How George W. Bush is Defeating Terrorists, Outwitting

Democrats, and Confounding the Mainstream Media . Washington, DC: Regnery

Publishing, Inc.

467

Savage, Charlie. (2008). Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the

Subversion of American Democracy . New York: Back Bay Books.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (2002). A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White

House . New York: Houghton Mifflin.

———. (2004). The Imperial Presidency . 1st Mariner Books ed. Boston: Houghton

Mifflin.

———. (2005). War and the American Presidency . New York: W. W. Norton.

———. (2007). Journals, 1952-2000 . New York: Penguin Press.

Senate, Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review. " California State Budget History ."

State of California web site acessed April 17, 2010, at URL:

http://www.sen.ca.gov/budget/budgethistory.pdf .

Shapiro, Robert, Martha Joynt Kumar and Lawrence R. Jacobs. (2000). Presidential

Power: Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century . New York:

Columbia University Press.

Sherry, Michael S. (2004). George H. W. Bush, in The American Presidency , edited by

Alan Brinkley and David Dyer. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Smith, Hedrick. (1980). Managers, Not Ideaologues. Published by The New York Times ,

December 12, 1980.

Smith, Stephanie. (2007). Presidential Transitions (RL30736). Washington, DC: A

Congressional Research Service Report published by the Library of Congress.

Sorensen, Theodore. (2008). Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History . New York: Harper

Collins Publishers.

468

State, U S Department of. " Past Secretaries ," web site acessed September 3, 2007, at

URL: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/faq/ .

Stephanopoulos, George. (1999). All Too Human . New York: Little, Brown and

Company.

Sundquist, James. (1979). Jimmy Carter as Public Administrator: An Appraisal at Mid-

Term. Public Administration Review 39 (1).

Suskind, Ron. (2004). The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the

Education of Paul O'Neill . New York: Simon & Schuster.

Tenpas, Kathryn Dunn and Stephen Hess. (2004). Organizing the Bush Presidency:

Assessing Its Early Performance, in Considering the Bush Presidency . New York:

Oxford University Press.

Thompson, Carolyn B., and Ware, Jim. (2003). The Leadership Genius of George W.

Bush: 10 Common Sense Lessons from the Commander in Chief . Hoboken: John

Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Times, New York. (1993). Editorial. Published by New York Times , April 29, 1993.

Tomakso, Robert M. (1987). Downsizing: Reshaping the Corporation for the Future .

New York: American Management Association.

Tomlinson, Andrew R. and Anderson, William D. (1999). The In-and-Outers Revisited:

Duration Analysis and Presidential Appointee Tenure. Paper read at The Society

for Political Methodology, July 14 - 18, 1999, at College Station, TX.

Transportation, U S Department of. " Biographical Sketches of the Secretaries of

Transportation ," last updated March 13, 2008, web site acessed January 4, 2009,

at URL: http://dotlibrary.dot.gov/Historian/bios.htm .

469

Treasury, U S Department of. " Past Secretaries ," last updated August 23, 2007, web site

acessed September 3, 2007, at URL:

http://www.treasury.gov/education/history/brochure/index.shtml .

Truman, Harry S. (1953). Letter of Invitation to the President-Elect (dated Nov. 6, 1952),

in Public Papers of the Presidents . Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

———. (1997). Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman . Edited by

Robert H. Ferrell. Columbia, MO: The University of Missouri Press.

Veteran Affairs, U S Department of. " History of the Department of Veterans Affairs ," last

updated September 23, 2008, web site acessed January 4, 2009, at URL:

http://www1.va.gov/opa/feature/history/index.asp#order .

Volker, Paul A. (2003). Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal

Government for the 21st Century Washington, DC: A Report of the National

Commission on the Public Service.

Walcott, Charles E. and Karen M. Hult. (2004). The Bush Staff and Cabinet System, in

Considering the Bush Presidency , edited by Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Walsh, Kenneth T., Stephen J. Hedges and Bruce A. Auster. (1991) "John Sununu's

Flight Plans". U. S. News and World Report , April 29, 1991, 48.

Warshaw, Shirley Anne. (1991). The Implementation of Cabinet Government During the

Nixon Administration, in Richard M. Nixon: Politician, President, Administrator ,

edited by Leon Friedman, and William F. Levantrosser. New York: Greenwood

Press.

470

———. (1996). Powersharing: White House-Cabinet Relations in the Modern

Presidency . Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

———. (1999). The Keys to Power: Managing the Presidency . New York: Addison

Wesley Longman, Inc.

———. (2009). The Co-Presidency of Bush and Cheney . Stanford, CA: Stanford

University Press.

Washington, George. (1796). A Farewell Address to the People of the United States.

Published by The American Daily Advertiser , Philadelphia.

Watson, W. Marvin. (2004). Chief of Staff: Lyndon Johnson and His Presidency . New

York: St. Martin's Press.

Weko, Thomas J. (1995). The Politicizing Presidency - The White House Personnel

Office 1948 - 1994 . Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas.

Werth, Barry. (2006). 31 days: The Crisis That Gave Us the Government We Have

Today . 1st ed. New York: Doubleday Publishers, Inc.

West, William F. (2005). Neutral Competence and Political Responsiveness: An Uneasy

Relationship. Policy Studies Journal 33 (2):147 - 160.

WGBH Television. " Proclamation of Governor George W. Bush declaring June 10, 2000

to be Jesus Day in the State of Texas ." Public Broadcasting System web site

acessed June 17, 2010, at URL: http://www-

tc.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jesus/art/pop_jesusday.jpg .

Whitman, Christine Todd. (2005). It's My Party Too: The Battle for the Heart of the GOP

and the Future of America . New York: Penguin Press.

Wilentz, Sean. (2005). Andrew Jackson . New York: Henry Holt & Company.

471

Williams, Victor. " Why President Bush Should Use Recess Appointments to Fill Wartime

Vacancies ," last updated January 1, 2002 web site acessed, at URL:

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020101_williams.html .

Wilson, Patricia A. (1995). The Effects of Politics and Power on the Organizational

Commitment of Federal Executives. Journal of Management 21 (1):101 - 118.

Winter, David G. (2002). Motivation and Political Leadership, in Political Leadership for

the New Century: Personality and Behavior Among American Leaders , edited by

Linda O. Valenty and Ofer Feldman. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Wolfensberger, Donald R. (2002). The Return of the Imperial Presidency. The Wilson

Quarterly 26 (2).

Woods, Randall B. (2006). LBJ : Architect of American Ambition . New York: Free Press.

Woodward, Bob. (1999). Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate . New

York: Simon and Schuster Publishers.

———. (2002). Bush at War . New York: Simon & Schuster Publishers.

———. (2004). Plan of Attack . New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks.

Woodward, Bob, and Bernstein, Carl. (2005). The Final Days . New York: Simon and

Schuster Publishers.

Zernike, Kate. (2006). In House, New Class Arrives for Lessons in Lawmaking.

Published by The New York Times , November 15, 2006.

472

Appendix A - Presidents of the United States

President / Served Served to Served # of Cabinet Vice President From Appointments Made

1 George Washington / 04/30/1789 03/03/1797 8 yrs 12 John Adams

2 John Adams / 03/04/1797 03/03/1801 4 yrs 8 Thomas Jefferson

3 Thomas Jefferson / 03/04/1801 03/03/1809 8 yrs 9 Aaron Burr (term I) George Clinton (term II)

4 James Madison / 03/04/1809 03/03/1817 8 yrs 15 George Clinton (died in office) Elbridge Gerry (died in office)

5 James Monroe/ 03/04/1817 03/03/1825 8 yrs 8 Daniel Tompkins

6 John Quincy Adams / 03/04/1825 03/03/1829 4 yrs 6 John C. Calhoun

7 Andrew Jackson / 03/04/1829 03/03/1837 8 yrs 19 John C. Calhoun (resigned) Martin Van Buren (term II)

8 Martin Van Buren / 03/04/1837 03/03/1841 4 yrs 10 Richard M. Johnson

9 William Henry Harrison / 03/04/1841 04/04/1841 1 month 6 John Tyler

10 John Tyler / 04/06/1841 03/03/1845 3 yrs 15 (no VP) 11 mo

11 James K. Polk / 03/04/1845 03/03/1849 4 yrs 9 George M. Dallas

473

President / Served Served to Served # of Cabinet Vice President From Appointments Made

12 Zachary Taylor / 03/04/1849 07/09/1850 15 mo 7 Millard Fillmore

13 Millard Fillmore / 07/09/1850 03/03/1853 33 mo 18 (no VP)

14 Franklin Pierce / 03/04/1853 03/03/1857 4 yrs 7 William King

15 James Buchanan/ 03/04/1857 03/03/1861 4 yrs 14 William King (died in office)

16 Abraham Lincoln / 03/04/1861 04/15/1865 4 yrs 13 Hannibal Hamlin (term I) 1 mo Andrew Johnson (term II)

04/15/1865 17 Andrew Johnson / 03/03/1869 3 yrs 13 (no VP) 11 mo

18 Ulysses S. Grant/ 03/04/1869 03/03/1877 8 yrs 25 Schuyler Colfax (term I) Henry Wilson (died in office)

03/04/1877 19 Rutherford B. Hayes / 03/03/1881 4 yrs 10 William Wheeler

20 James A. Garfield/ 03/04/1881 09/19/1881 6.5 mo 7 Chester A. Arthur

21 Chester A. Arthur / 09/19/1885 03/03/1885 41.5 mo 10 (no VP)

22 Grover Cleveland / 03/04/1885 03/03/1889 4 yrs 11 Thomas Hendricks (died in office)

23 Benjamin Harrison / 03/04/1889 03/03/1893 4 yrs 11 Levi Morton

24 Grover Cleveland / 03/04/1893 03/03/1897 4 yrs 12 Adlai E. Stevenson

25 William McKinley/ 03/04/1897 09/14/1901 4 yrs 15 G. Hobart (died in office) 6 mo Teddy Roosevelt (term II)

474

President / Served Served to Served # of Cabinet Vice President From Appointments Made

26 Teddy Roosevelt / 09/14/1901 03/03/1909 7 yrs 20 Warren Fairbanks (term II) 6 mo

27 William H. Taft / 03/04/1909 03/03/1913 4 yrs 11 James Sherman (died in office)

28 Woodrow Wilson / 03/04/1913 03/03/1921 8 yrs 20 Thomas Marshall

Warren G. Harding / 04/04/1921 08/02/1923 28 mo 13 29 Calvin Coolidge

30 Calvin Coolidge / 08/02/1923 03/03/1929 5 yrs 8 Charles Dawes (term II) 8mo

31 Herbert Hoover / 03/04/1929 03/03/1933 4 yrs 14 Charles Curtis

32 Franklin Roosevelt / 03/04/1933 04/12/1945 12 yrs 26 John Garner (terms I & II) 1 mo Henry A. Wallace (term III) Harry S. Truman (term IV)

33 Harry S. Truman / 04/12/1945 01/20/1953 7 yrs 23 Alben Barkley (term II) 8 mo

34 Dwight D. Eisenhower / 01/20/1953 01/20/1961 8 yrs 21 Richard Nixon

35 John F. Kennedy / 01/10/1961 11/22/1963 34 mo 14 Lyndon Johnson

36 Lyndon Johnson / 11/22/1963 01/20/1969 5 yrs 14 Hubert Humphrey (term II) 2 mo

37 Richard Nixon / 01/20/1969 08/09/1974 5 yrs 31 Spiro Agnew (resigned) 7 mo Gerald R. Ford

38 Gerald R. Ford / 08/09/1974 01/20/1977 2 yrs 12 Nelson Rockefeller 5 mo

475

President / Served From Served to Served # of Cabinet Vice President Appointments Made

39 Jimmie Carter / 01/20/1977 01/20/1981 4 yrs 22 Walter Mondale

40 Ronald Reagan / 01/20/1981 01/20/1989 8 yrs 33 George Bush

41 George H. W. Bush / 01/20/1989 01/20/1993 4 yrs 21 Dan Quayle

42 William J. Clinton / 01/20/1993 01/20/2001 8 yrs 30 Albert Gore

43 G. W. Bush / 01/20/2001 01/20/2009 8 yrs 34 Dick Cheney

44 Barack H. Obama / 01/20/2009 Current - - Joe Biden

476

Appendix B – Chronology and Profile of Cabinet Level Departments

With the exception of the Departments of State and Treasury, which were established within months of each other, the Order of Precedence for the 15 Cabinet-level Depart- ments is based on the dates on which the departments were established. Protocol requires Secretaries to enter and/or be seated in this prescribed sequence at official functions such as White House Cabinet meetings, State of the Union Addresses before Congress, State Funerals, etc.

Historical data for each of the existing departments 140 is found in this Appendix.

Estab- Number of 2007 2008 Department of lished Employees Budget Budget in (thsnds) ($Billion) ($Billion) (Bureau of (Office of (Office of Labor Management Management Statistics) and Budget, and Budget, 2007) 2009)

1 State 1789 13 33.9 35.0

2 Treasury 1789 95 11.6 12.1

3 Defense 1789 616 439.3 481.4

4 Justice 1789 103 19.5 20.2

5 Interior 1849 71 10.5 10.6

6 Agriculture 1889 102 19.7 20.2

7 Commerce 1903 36 6.1 6.6

8 Labor 1913 16 10.9 10.6

9 Health and Human Services 1963 51 67.6 69.3

10 Housing and Urban Development 1979 10 33.6 35.2

11 Transportation 1966 57 13.2 12.1

12 Energy 1977 15 23.6 24.3

13 Education 1980 4 54.4 56.0

14 Veterans Affairs 1988 234 35.7 39.4

15 Homeland Security 2001 149 30.9 34.3 TOTALS: 2,198 $ 810.5 $ 867.3

140 Over time government departments have been renamed, split, reorganized or merged. Examples include the Department of War, Department of the Army and the Navy which were merged after WW II into the Department of Defense. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was split into the independent Departments of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education.

A different situation occurred with the Department of Homeland Security, which was created by combining selected functions from multiple departments and agencies and bringing them together under one (hybridized) department.

477 Department of the Treasury

The Department of the Treasury was established September 2, 1789 (Treasury, 2007) and is currently led by its 75 th secretary.

Months Treasury Served in President(s) Secretary from To office served 1 Alexander Hamilton 9/11/1789 1/31/1795 64 mo Washington Oliver Wolcott 2/03/1795 12/31/1800 70 mo Washington 2 John Adams Samuel Dexter 1/01/1801 5/13/1801 4 mo John Adams 3 Jefferson Albert Gallatin 5/14/1801 2/09/1814 153 mo Jefferson 4 Madison 5 George Campbell 2/09/1814 9/26/1814 8 mo Madison 6 Alexander Dallas 10/06/1814 10/21/1816 24 mo Madison 7 William Crawford 10/22/1816 3/03/1825 101 mo Madison Monroe 8 Richard Rush 3/07/1825 3/03/1829 48 mo J.Q. Adams 9 Samuel Ingham 3/06/1829 6/20/1831 27 mo Jackson 10 Louis McLane 8/08/1831 5/29/1833 21 mo Jackson 11 William Duane 5/29/1833 9/23/1833 4 mo Jackson 12 Roger Taney 9/23/1833 6/24/1834 9 mo Jackson Levi Woodbury 7/01/1834 3/03/1841 80 mo Jackson 13 Van Buren 14 Thomas Ewing 3/05/1841 9/11/1841 6 mo W. Harrison Tyler 15 Walter Forward 9/13/1841 3/01/1843 18 mo Tyler 16 John Spencer 3/8/1843 5/2/1844 14 mo Tyler 17 George Bibb 7/4/1844 3/7/1845 8 mo Tyler

18 Robert Walker 3/8/1845 3/5/1849 48 mo Polk Taylor 19 William Meredith 3/8/1849 7/22/1850 16 mo Taylor Fillmore

20 Thomas Corwin 7/23/1850 3/6/1853 32 mo Fillmore Pierce

21 James Guthrie 3/7/1853 3/6/1857 48 mo Pierce Buchanan 22 Howell Cobb 3/7/1857 12/8/1860 45 mo Buchanan 23 Philip Thomas 12/12/1860 1/14/1861 1 mo Buchanan

24 John Dix 1/15/1861 3/6/1861 2 mo Buchanan Lincoln 25 Salmon Chase 3/7/1861 6/30/1864 39 mo Lincoln 26 William Fessenden 7/5/1864 3/3/1865 8 mo Lincoln

478 Lincoln 27 Hugh McCulloch 3/9/1865 3/3/1869 48 mo A. Johnson 28 George Boutwell 3/12/1869 3/16/1873 48 mo Grant 29 William Richardson 3/17/1873 6/3/1874 15 mo Grant 30 Benjamin Bristow 6/4/1874 6/20/1876 24 mo Grant 31 Lot Morrill 7/7/1876 3/7/1877 8 mo Grant Hayes 32 John Sherman 3/10/1877 3/3/1881 48 mo Hayes

33 William Windom 3/8/1881 11/13/1881 8 mo Garfield Arthur 34 Charles Folger 11/14/1881 9/4/1884 34 mo Arthur 35 Walter Gresham 9/25/1884 10/30/1884 1 mo Arthur 36 Hugh McCullogh 10/31/1884 3/7/1885 5 mo Arthur Cleveland 37 Daniel Manning 3/8/1885 3/31/1887 24 mo Cleveland

38 Charles Fairchild 4/1/1887 3/9/1889 23 mo Cleveland B. Harrison 39 William Windom 3/7/1889 1/29/1891 22 mo B. Harrison 40 Charles Foster 2/25/1891 3/6/1893 25 mo B. Harrison Cleveland 41 John Carlisle 3/7/1893 3/5/1897 48 mo Cleveland McKinley 42 Lyman Gage 3/6/1897 1/31/1902 58 mo McKinley T. Roosevelt 43 L. M. Shaw 2/1/1902 3/3/1907 61 mo T. Roosevelt 44 George Cortelyou 3/4/1907 3/7/1909 24 mo T. Roosevelt Taft 45 Franklin MacVeagh 3/8/1909 3/5/1913 48 mo Taft Wilson 46 William McAdoo 3/6/1913 12/15/1918 69 mo Wilson 47 Carter Glass 12/16/1918 2/1/1920 14 mo Wilson 48 David Houston 2/2/1920 3/3/1921 13 mo Wilson

49 Andrew Mellon 3/4/1921 2/12/1932 131 mo Harding Coolidge Hoover 50 Ogden Mills 2/13/1932 3/3/1933 13 mo Hoover 51 William Woodin 3/4/1933 12/31/1933 9 mo F. D. Roosevelt 52 Henry Morgenthau 1/1/1934 7/22/1945 138 mo F. D. Roosevelt Truman 53 Fred Vinson 7/23/1945 6/23/1946 11 mo Truman 54 John Snyder 6/25/1946 1/20/1953 79 mo Truman 55 George Humphrey 1/21/1953 7/29/1957 54 mo Eisenhower 56 Robert Anderson 7/29/1957 1/20/1961 42 mo Eisenhower 57 Douglas Dillon 1/21/1961 4/1/1965 51 mo Kennedy L. Johnson 58 Henry Fowler 4/1/1965 12/20/1968 44 mo L. Johnson

479 59 Joseph Barr 12/21/1968 1/20/1969 1 mo L. Johnson 60 David Kennedy 1/22/1969 2/11/1971 25 mo Nixon 61 John Connally 2/11/1971 6/12/1972 16 mo Nixon 62 George Schutlz 6/12/1972 5/8/1974 23 mo Nixon 63 William Simon 5/8/1974 1/20/1977 33 mo Nixon Ford 64 Michael Blumenthal 1/23/1977 8/4/1979 31 mo Carter 65 William Miller 8/6/1979 1/20/1981 17 mo Carter 66 Donald Reagan 1/22/1981 2/1/1985 49 mo Reagan 67 James Baker 2/3/1985 8/17/1988 42 mo Reagan 68 Nicholas Brady 9/16/1988 1/17/1993 55 mo Reagan G.H.W. Bush 69 Lloyd Bentsen 1/22/1993 12/22/1994 23 mo Clinton 70 Robert Rubin 1/10/1995 7/2/1999 54 mo Clinton 71 Lawrence Summers 7/2/1999 1/20/2001 18 mo Clinton 72 Paul O'Neill 1/30/2001 12/31/2002 23 mo G.W. Bush 73 John Snow 2/3/2003 6/29/2006 40 mo G.W. Bush 74 Henry Paulson 7/10/2006 1/19/2009 30 mo G.W. Bush 75 Timothy Geitner 1/20/2009 - - - Obama

Department of the Treasury (created 1789) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 Months in Office Office in Months 40

served by each secretary eachbyserved 20 0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73

74 Secretaries (served a total of 220 years)

Average Tenure for all Secretaries = 35.4 months Average Tenure Post WWII = 34.6 months

480 Department of State

The Department of State was established September 15, 1789 (State, 2007) and is currently led by its 67 th secretary.

Months in President(s) Secretary of State Served from To office Served 1 Thomas Jefferson 3/22/1790 12/31/1793 45.3 mo Washington 2 Edmund Randolph 1/2/1794 8/20/1795 19.6 mo Washington 3 Timothy Pickering 12/10/1795 5/12/1800 53.1 mo Washington John Adams 4 John Marshall 6/13/1800 2/4/1801 15.7 mo John Adams 5 James Madison 5/2/1801 3/3/1809 94.0 mo Jefferson 6 Robert Smith 3/6/1809 4/1/1811 24.8 mo Madison 7 James Monroe 4/2/1811 3/3/1817 71.0 mo Madison 8 John Quincy Adams 3/5/1817 3/3/1825 95.9 mo Monroe 9 Henry Clay 3/7/1825 3/3/1829 47.9 mo J. Q. Adams 10 Martin Van Buren 3/28/1829 5/23/1831 25.8 mo Jackson 11 Edward Livingston 5/24/1831 5/29/1833 24.2 mo Jackson 12 Louis McLane 5/29/1833 6/30/1834 13.0 mo Jackson 13 John Forsyth 7/1/1834 3/3/1841 80.1 mo Jackson Van Buren 14 Daniel Webster 5/5/1841 5/8/1843 24.1 mo W. Harrison Tyler 15 Abel Upshur 7/24/1843 2/28/1844 7.1 mo Tyler 16 John Calhoun 4/1/1844 3/10/1845 11.3 mo Tyler 17 James Buchanan 3/10/1845 3/1/1849 47.7 mo Polk 18 John Clayton 3/8/1849 7/22/1850 16.5 mo Taylor Fillmore 19 Daniel Webster 7/22/1850 10/24/1852 27.1 mo Fillmore 20 Edward Everett 11/6/1852 3/3/1853 3.9 mo Fillmore 21 William Marcy 3/8/1853 3/6/1857 47.9 mo Pierce 22 Lewis Cass 3/6/1857 12/14/1860 45.3 mo Buchanan 23 Jeremiah Black 12/17/1860 3/5/1861 2.6 mo Buchanan 24 William Seward 3/5/1861 3/4/1869 96.0 mo Lincoln A. Johnson 25 Elihu Washburne 3/5/1869 3/16/1869 0.4 mo Grant 26 Hamilton Fish 3/17/1869 3/12/1877 95.8 mo Grant 27 William Evarts 3/12/1877 3/7/1881 47.8 mo Hayes 28 James Blaine 5/7/1881 12/18/1881 6.8 mo Garfield Arthur 29 Frederick 12/18/1881 3/6/1885 38.6 mo Arthur Frelinghuysen 30 Thomas Bayard 3/7/1885 3/6/1889 48.0 mo Cleveland

481 31 James Blaine 3/7/1889 6/4/1892 38.9 mo B. Harrison 32 John Foster 6/29/1892 2/23/1893 7.8 mo B. Harrison 33 Walter Gresham 3/7/1893 5/28/1895 26.7 mo Cleveland 34 Richard Olney 6/10/1895 3/5/1897 20.8 mo Cleveland 35 John Sherman 3/6/1897 4/27/1898 13.7 mo McKinley 36 William Day 4/26/1898 9/16/1898 4.7 mo McKinley 37 John Hay 9/30/1898 7/1/1905 81.0 mo McKinley T. Roosevelt 38 Elihu Root 8/1/1905 1/27/1909 41.9 mo T. Roosevelt 39 Robert Bacon 1/27/1909 3/5/1909 2.0 mo T. Roosevelt 40 Philander Knox 3/5/1909 3/5/1913 48.0 mo Taft 41 William Jennings 3/5/1913 6/9/1915 27.1 mo Wilson Bryan 42 Robert Lansing 6/24/1915 2/13/1920 55.6 mo Wilson 43 Bainbridge Colby 3/23/1920 3/4/1921 11.4 mo Wilson 44 Charles Hughes 3/5/1921 3/4/1925 48.0 mo Harding Coolidge 45 Frank Kellogg 3/5/1925 3/28/1929 48.8 mo Coolidge Hoover 46 Henry Stimson 3/28/1929 3/4/1933 47.2 mo Hoover 47 Cordell Hull 3/4/1933 11/30/1944 140.9 mo F. Roosevelt 48 Edward Stettinius 12/1/1944 6/27/1945 6.9 mo F. Roosevelt Truman 49 James Byrnes 7/3/1945 1/21/1947 18.6 mo Truman 50 George Marshall 1/21/1947 1/20/1949 24.0 mo Truman 51 Dean Acheson 1/19/1949 1/20/1953 48.0 mo Truman 52 John Foster Dulles 1/21/1953 4/22/1959 74.9 mo Eisenhower 53 Christian Herter 4/22/1959 1/20/1961 20.9 mo Eisenhower 54 Dean Rusk 1/21/1961 1/20/1969 96.0 mo Kennedy L. Johnson 55 William Rogers 1/22/1969 9/3/1973 55.4 mo Nixon 56 Henry Kissinger 9/22/1973 1/20/1977 39.9 mo Nixon Ford 57 Cyrus Vance 1/23/1977 4/28/1980 39.3 mo Carter 58 Edmund Muskie 5/8/1980 1/18/1981 8.4 mo Carter 59 Alexander Haig 1/22/1981 7/5/1982 17.4 mo Reagan 60 George Schultz 1/16/1982 1/20/1989 78.1 mo Reagan 61 James Baker 1/25/1989 8/23/1992 43.1 mo G.H.W. Bush 62 Lawrence 12/8/1992 1/19/1993 1.4 mo G.H.W. Bush Eagleburger 63 Warren Christopher 1/20/1993 1/17/1997 47.9 mo Clinton 64 Madeleine Albright 1/23/1997 1/19/2001 48.1 mo Clinton 65 Colin Powell 1/20/2001 1/25/2005 48.2 mo G. W. Bush 66 Condoleezza Rice 1/26/2005 1/20/2009 47.8 mo G. W. Bush 67 Hilary Clinton 1/20/2009 - - - Obama

482 Department of State (created 1789) 160.0 140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0

Months in Office Office in Months 40.0

served by eachSecretary byserved 20.0 0.0 1 5 9 1317 21 2529 33 3741 45 49 5357 61 65 66 Secretaries of State (served a total of 220 years )

Average Tenure for all Secretaries = 39.6 months Average Tenure Post WWII = 40.5 months

483 Department of Defense

The Department of Defense was established in July, 1947 by bringing together the De- partment of War, the Navy Department and the Department of the Air Force under a single cabinet-level secretary. The War Department, which was established in 1789, has always been headed by a cabinet-level appointee (Army, 2007b, 2007a).

Months Secretary of in President(s) War/Defense Served from To Office Served 1 Henry Knox 9/12/1789 12/31/1794 63.6 mo Washington 2 Timothy Pickering 1/2/1795 12/10/1795 11.3 mo Washington 3 James McHenry 1/27/1796 5/13/1800 51.5 mo Washington John Adams 4 Samuel Dexter 5/13/1800 1/31/1801 8.6 mo John Adams 5 Henry Dearborn 3/5/1801 3/4/1809 96.0 mo Jefferson 6 William Eustis 3/7/1809 1/13/1813 46.2 mo Madison 7 John Armstrong 1/13/1813 9/27/1814 20.5 mo Madison 8 James Monroe 9/27/1814 3/2/1815 5.2 mo Madison 9 William Crawford 8/1/1815 10/22/1816 14.7 mo Madison 10 John C. Calhoun 10/8/1817 3/4/1825 88.9 mo Monroe 11 James Barbour 3/7/1825 5/23/1828 38.5 mo J.Q. Adams 12 Peter B. Porter 5/23/1828 3/4/1829 9.4 mo J.Q. Adams 13 John Eaton 3/9/1829 6/18/1831 27.3 mo Jackson 14 Lewis Cass 8/1/1831 10/5/1836 62.1 mo Jackson 15 Joel Poinsett 3/7/1837 3/7/1841 48.0 mo Van Buren 16 John Bell 3/5/1841 9/13/1841 6.3 mo W. Harrison Tyler 17 John Spencer 10/12/1841 3/4/1843 16.7 mo Tyler 18 James Porter 3/8/1843 2/14/1844 11.2 mo Tyler 19 William Wilkins 2/15/1844 3/4/1845 12.6 mo Tyler 20 William Marcy 3/6/1845 3/4/1849 48.0 mo Polk 21 George Crawford 3/8/1849 7/22/1850 16.5 mo Taylor Fillmore 22 Charles Conrad 8/15/1850 3/4/1853 30.6 mo Fillmore 23 Jefferson Davis 3/7/1853 3/4/1857 47.9 mo Pierce 24 John Floyd 3/6/1857 12/29/1860 45.8 mo Buchanan 25 Joseph Holt 1/18/1861 3/4/1861 1.5 mo Lincoln 26 Simon Cameron 3/5/1861 1/14/1862 10.3 mo Lincoln 27 Edwin Stanton 1/20/1862 5/28/1868 76.9 mo Lincoln A. Johnson 28 John Schofield 6/1/1868 3/13/1869 9.4 mo Johnson 29 John Rawlins 3/13/1869 9/6/1869 5.8 mo Grant 30 William Belknap 10/25/1869 3/2/1876 76.2 mo Grant 31 Alphonso Taft 3/8/1876 5/22/1876 2.5 mo Grant

484 32 J. Donald Cameron 5/22/1876 3/7/1877 9.5 mo Grant 33 George McCrary 3/12/1877 12/10/1879 32.9 mo Hayes 34 Alexander Ramsey 12/10/1879 3/4/1881 14.8 mo Hayes 35 Robert Lincoln 3/5/1881 3/7/1885 48.1 mo Garfield Arthur 36 William Endicott 3/5/1885 3/7/1889 48.1 mo Cleveland 37 Redfield Proctor 3/5/1889 11/5/1891 24.3 mo B. Harrison 38 Stephen Elkins 12/17/1891 3/7/1893 14.7 mo B. Harrison 39 Daniel Lamont 3/5/1893 3/7/1897 48.1 mo Cleveland 40 Russell Alger 3/5/1897 8/1/1899 22.2 mo McKinley 41 Elihu Root 8/1/1899 1/31/1904 52.0 mo McKinley T. Roosevelt 42 William Howard Taft 2/1/1904 6/30/1908 53.7 mo T. Roosevelt 43 Luke Wright 7/1/1908 3/7/1909 8.2 mo T. Roosevelt 44 Jacob Dickinson 3/12/1909 5/21/1911 26.3 mo Taft 45 Henry Stimson 5/22/1911 3/4/1913 21.4 mo Taft 46 Lindley Garrison 3/5/1913 2/10/1916 35.2 mo Wilson 47 Newton Baker 3/9/1916 3/4/1921 59.8 mo Wilson 48 John Weeks 3/5/1921 10/13/1925 55.3 mo Harding Coolidge 49 Dwight Davis 10/14/1925 3/7/1929 40.8 mo Coolidge 50 James Good 3/6/1929 11/18/1929 8.4 mo Hoover 51 Patrick Hurley 12/9/1929 3/7/1933 38.9 mo Hoover 52 George Dern 3/4/1933 8/27/1936 41.8 mo F. Roosevelt 53 Harry Woodring 9/25/1936 6/20/1940 44.8 mo F. Roosevelt 54 Henry Stimson 7/10/1940 9/21/1945 62.4 mo F. Roosevelt Truman 55 Robert Patterson 9/27/1945 7/18/1947 21.7 mo Truman 56 Kenneth Royall 7/19/1947 9/17/1947 1.9 mo Truman . . . Department of Defense created . . . 1 James Forrestal 9/17/1947 3/28/1949 18.4 mo Truman 2 Louis Johnson 3/28/1949 9/19/1950 17.7 mo Truman 3 George Marshall 9/21/1950 9/12/1951 11.7 mo Truman 4 Robert Lovett 9/17/1951 1/20/1953 16.1 mo Truman 5 Charles Wilson 1/28/1953 10/8/1957 56.3 mo Eisenhower 6 Neil McElroy 10/9/1957 12/1/1959 25.7 mo Eisenhower 7 Thomas Gates 12/2/1959 1/20/1961 13.6 mo Eisenhower 8 Robert McNamara 1/21/1961 2/29/1968 85.3 mo Kennedy L. Johnson 9 Clark Clifford 3/1/1968 1/20/1969 10.6 mo L. Johnson 10 Melvin Laird 1/22/1969 1/29/1973 48.2 mo Nixon 11 Elliot Richardson 1/30/1973 5/24/1973 3.8 mo Nixon 12 James Schlesinger 7/2/1973 11/19/1975 28.6 mo Nixon Ford 13 Donald Rumsfeld 11/20/1975 1/20/1977 14.0 mo Ford 14 Harold Brown 1/21/1977 1/20/1981 48.0 mo Carter

485 15 Caspar Weinberger 1/21/1981 11/23/1987 82.1 mo Reagan 16 Frank Carlucci 11/23/1987 1/20/1989 13.9 mo Reagan 17 Richard Cheney 3/21/1989 1/20/1993 46.0 mo G.H.W. Bush 18 Les Aspin 1/23/1993 2/3/1994 12.3 mo Clinton 19 William Perry 2/3/1994 1/23/1997 35.7 mo Clinton 20 William Cohen 1/24/1997 1/20/2001 47.9 mo Clinton 21 Donald Rumsfeld 1/20/2001 12/18/2006 70.9 mo G.W.Bush 22 Robert Gates* 12/18/2006 - 25.0 mo G.W.Bush Obama

Dept. of War (created 1789) & Dept. of Defense (created 1947) 120.0

100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0 Months in Office Office in Months 20.0 ServedEachbySecretary 0.0 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77

78 Secretaries (served a total of 220 years)

Average Tenure for all Secretaries = 29.2 months Average Tenure Post WWII = 32.7 months

* For purposes of consistency with other departments, the averages for Secretaries of Defense were based on Robert Gates’ tenure through the end of G. W. Bush’s second term.

486 Department of Justice

The Department of Justice was established in 1870 (Justice, 2007) and is currently led by its 82 nd Attorney General .

Months in President(s) Attorney General Served from To office Served 1 Edmund Randolph 9/26/1789 1/26/1794 52.0 mo Washington 2 William Bradford 1/27/1794 8/23/1795 18.9 mo Washington 3 Charles Lee 12/10/1795 2/19/1801 62.3 mo Washington J. Adams 4 Levi Lincoln 3/5/1801 3/2/1805 48.0 mo Jefferson 5 John Breckinridge 8/7/1805 12/14/1806 16.2 mo Jefferson 6 Caesar Rodney 1/20/1807 12/10/1811 58.7 mo Jefferson Madison 7 William Pinkney 12/11/1811 2/9/1814 25.9 mo Madison Richard Rush 2/10/1814 11/12/1817 45.0 mo Madison 8 Monroe 9 William Wirt 11/13/1817 3/4/1829 135.7 mo Monroe J.Q. Adams 10 John Berrien 3/9/1829 7/18/1831 28.3 mo Jackson 11 Roger Taney 7/20/1831 11/14/1833 27.8 mo Jackson 12 Benjamin Butler 11/15/1833 7/4/1838 55.6 mo Jackson Van Buren 13 Felix Grundy 7/8/1838 1/10/1840 18.0 mo Van Buren 14 Henry Gilpin 1/11/1840 3/4/1841 13.8 mo Van Buren 15 John Crittenden 3/5/1841 12/12/1841 9.2 mo W. Harrison Tyler 16 Hugh Legaré 9/13/1841 6/30/1843 21.6 mo Tyler 17 John Nelson 7/1/1843 3/4/1845 20.1 mo Tyler 18 John Mason 3/5/1845 10/16/1846 19.3 mo Polk 19 Nathan Clifford 10/17/1846 3/17/1848 17.0 mo Polk 20 Isaac Toucey 6/21/1848 3/4/1849 8.4 mo Polk 21 Reverdy Johnson 3/8/1849 7/21/1850 16.4 mo Taylor 22 John Crittenden 7/22/1850 3/4/1853 32.4 mo Fillmore 23 Caleb Cushing 3/3/1853 3/4/1857 48.0 mo Pierce 24 Jeremiah Black 3/9/1857 12/16/1860 45.2 mo Buchanan 25 Edwin Stanton 12/20/1860 3/4/1861 2.5 mo Buchanan 26 Edward Bates 3/5/1861 11/24/1864 44.6 mo Lincoln 27 James Speed 12/2/1864 7/22/1866 19.7 mo Lincoln A. Johnson 28 Henry Stanberry 7/23/1866 7/18/1868 23.8 mo A. Johnson 29 William Evarts 7/17/1868 3/4/1869 7.6 mo A. Johnson 30 Ebenezer Hoar 3/5/1869 11/22/1870 20.6 mo Grant

487 31 Amos Akerman 11/23/1870 12/13/1871 12.7 mo Grant 32 George Williams 12/14/1871 4/25/1875 40.4 mo Grant 33 Edwards Pierpont 4/26/1875 5/21/1876 12.8 mo Grant 34 Alphonso Taft 5/22/1876 3/4/1877 9.4 mo Grant 35 Charles Devens 3/12/1877 3/4/1881 47.7 mo Hayes 36 Wayne MacVeagh 3/5/1881 12/15/1881 9.3 mo Garfield Arthur 37 Benjamin Brewster 12/18/1881 3/4/1885 38.5 mo Arthur 38 Augustus Garland 3/6/1885 3/7/1889 48.0 mo Cleveland 39 William Miller 3/7/1889 3/4/1893 48.0 mo B. Harrison 40 Richard Olney 3/6/1893 4/7/1895 25.0 mo Cleveland 41 Judson Harmon 4/8/1895 3/4/1897 22.9 mo Cleveland 42 Joseph McKenna 3/5/1897 1/25/1898 10.7 mo McKinley 43 John Griggs 1/25/1898 3/29/1901 38.1 mo McKinley 44 Philander Knox 4/5/1901 6/30/1904 38.8 mo McKinley T. Roosevelt 45 William Moody 7/1/1904 12/17/1906 29.5 mo T. Roosevelt 46 Charles Bonaparte 12/17/1906 3/4/1909 26.6 mo T. Roosevelt 47 George Wickersham 3/4/1909 3/4/1913 48.0 mo Taft 48 James McReynolds 3/5/1913 8/14/1914 17.3 mo Wilson 49 Thomas Gregory 8/14/1914 3/4/1919 54.7 mo Wilson 50 Mitchell Palmer 3/5/1919 3/4/1921 24.0 mo Wilson 51 Harry Daugherty 3/4/1921 4/6/1924 37.1 mo Harding 52 Harlan Stone 4/7/1924 3/1/1925 10.8 mo Coolidge 53 John Sargent 3/7/1925 3/4/1929 47.9 mo Coolidge 54 William Mitchell 3/4/1929 3/4/1933 48.0 mo Hoover 55 Homer Cummings 3/4/1933 1/31/1939 70.9 mo F. Roosevelt 56 Frank Murphy 1/2/1939 1/18/1940 12.5 mo F. Roosevelt 57 Robert Jackson 1/18/1940 8/25/1941 19.2 mo F. Roosevelt 58 Francis Biddle 8/26/1941 6/26/1945 46.0 mo F. Roosevelt Truman 59 Tom Clark 6/17/1945 7/26/1949 49.3 mo Truman 60 Howard McGrath 1/27/1949 4/3/1952 38.2 mo Truman 61 James McGranery 4/4/1952 1/20/1953 9.5 mo Truman 62 Herbert Brownell 1/21/1953 10/23/1957 57.1 mo Eisenhower 63 William Rogers 10/23/1957 1/20/1961 38.9 mo Eisenhower 64 Robert Kennedy 1/20/1961 9/3/1964 43.4 mo Kennedy L. Johnson 65 Nickolas Katzenbach 1/28/1965 9/30/1966 20.1 mo L. Johnson 66 Ramsey Clark 3/10/1967 1/20/1969 22.3 mo L. Johnson 67 John Mitchell 1/20/1969 2/15/1972 36.8 mo Nixon 68 Richard Kleindienst 2/15/1972 5/25/1973 15.3 mo Nixon 69 Elliot Richardson 5/25/1973 10/20/1973 4.8 mo Nixon 70 William Saxbe 12/17/1973 1/14/1975 12.9 mo Nixon

Ford 71 Edward Levi 1/14/1975 1/20/1977 24.2 mo Ford

488 72 Griffin Bell 1/26/1977 8/16/1979 30.7 mo Carter 73 Benjamin Civiletti 8/16/1979 1/19/1981 17.1 mo Carter 74 William Smith 1/23/1981 2/25/1985 49.1 mo Reagan 75 Edwin Meese 2/25/1985 8/12/1988 41.6 mo Reagan 76 Richard Thornburgh 8/12/1988 8/15/1991 36.1 mo Reagan G. H.W. Bush 77 William Barr 11/26/1991 11/20/1993 23.8 mo G. H.W. Bush 78 Janet Reno 3/12/1993 1/20/2001 94.3 mo Clinton 79 John Ashcroft 2/2/2001 2/3/2005 48.0 mo G. W. Bush 80 Alberto Gonzales 2/3/2005 9/17/2007 31.5 mo G. W. Bush 81 Michael Mukasey 11/09/07 1/20/2009 16.1 mo G. W. Bush 82 Eric Holder 1/20/2009 - - - Obama

Department of Justice (created 1870) [although Washington had appointed the 1st Attorney General in 1789]

160.0 140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0

each Attorney General eachAttorney 20.0 Months in Office served byserved Office in Months 0.0 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 Attorneys General (served a total of 220 years)

Average Tenure for all Attorneys General = 32.3 months Average Tenure Post WWII = 33.0 months

489 Department of the Interior

The Department of the Interior was established March 3, 1849 (Interior, 2007) and is currently led by its 50 th secretary.

Months Secretary of the Inte- in President(s) rior Served from To office Served 1 Thomas Ewing 3/8/1849 7/22/1850 16.5 mo Taylor Fillmore 2 Thomas McKennan 8/15/1850 8/26/1850 0.4 mo Fillmore 3 Alexander Stuart 9/14/1850 3/7/1853 29.8 mo Fillmore 4 Robert McClelland 3/8/1853 3/9/1857 48.0 mo Pierce 5 Jacob Thompson 3/10/1857 1/8/1861 45.9 mo Buchanan 6 Caleb Smith 3/5/1861 12/31/1862 21.9 mo Lincoln 7 John Usher 1/1/1863 5/15/1865 28.5 mo Lincoln 8 James Harlan 5/16/1865 8/31/1866 15.5 mo A. Johnson 9 Orville Browning 9/1/1866 3/4/1869 30.1 mo A. Johnson 10 Jacob Cox 3/5/1869 10/31/1870 19.9 mo Grant 11 Columbus Delano 11/1/1870 9/30/1875 59.0 mo Grant 12 Zachariah Chandler 10/19/1875 3/11/1877 16.7 mo Grant 13 Carl Schurz 3/12/1877 3/7/1881 47.8 mo Hayes 14 Samuel Kirkwood 3/8/1881 4/17/1882 13.3 mo Garfield Arthur 15 Henry Teller 4/18/1882 3/3/1885 34.5 mo Arthur 16 Lucius Lamar 3/6/1885 1/10/1888 34.1 mo Cleveland 17 William Vilas 3/6/1888 8/28/1888 5.7 mo Cleveland 18 John Noble 3/7/1889 3/6/1893 48.0 mo B. Harrison 19 Michael Smith 3/6/1893 9/1/1896 41.8 mo Cleveland 20 David Francis 9/3/1896 3/5/1897 6.1 mo Cleveland 21 Cornelius Bliss 3/6/1897 2/19/1899 23.4 mo McKinley 22 Ethan Hitchcock 2/20/1899 3/4/1907 96.5 mo McKinley T. Roosevelt 23 James Garfield 3/5/1907 3/5/1909 24.0 mo T. Roosevelt Taft 24 Richard Ballinger 3/6/1909 3/12/1911 24.2 mo Taft 25 Walter Fisher 3/13/1911 3/5/1913 23.7 mo Taft 26 Franklin Lane 3/6/1913 2/29/1920 83.8 mo Wilson 27 John Payne 3/15/1920 3/4/1921 11.6 mo Wilson 28 Albert Fall 3/5/1921 3/4/1923 24.0 mo Harding 29 Hubert Work 3/5/1923 7/24/1928 64.6 mo Harding Coolidge 30 Roy West 7/25/1928 3/4/1929 7.3 mo Coolidge 31 Ray Wilbur 3/5/1929 3/4/1933 48.0 mo Hoover 32 Harold Ickes 3/4/1933 2/15/1946 155.4 mo F. Roosevelt

490 Truman 33 Julius Krug 3/18/1946 12/1/1949 44.4 mo Truman 34 Oscar Chapman 12/1/1949 1/20/1953 37.6 mo Truman 35 Douglas McKay 1/21/1953 4/15/1956 38.8 mo Eisenhower 36 Fred Seaton 6/8/1956 1/20/1961 55.4 mo Eisenhower 37 Stewart Udall 1/21/1961 1/20/1969 96.0 mo Kennedy L. Johnson 38 Walter Hickel 1/23/1969 11/25/1970 22.1 mo Nixon 39 Rogers Morton 1/29/1971 4/30/1975 51.0 mo Nixon Ford 40 Stanley Hathaway 6/12/1975 10/9/1975 3.9 mo Ford 41 Thomas Kleppe 10/17/1975 1/21/1977 15.1 mo Ford 42 Cecil Andrus 1/23/1977 1/20/1981 48.1 mo Carter 43 James Watt 1/23/1981 11/8/1983 33.5 mo Reagan 44 William Clark 11/18/1983 2/7/1985 14.6 mo Reagan 45 Donald Hodel 2/8/1985 1/20/1989 47.4 mo Reagan 46 Manuel Lujan 2/3/1989 1/20/1993 47.6 mo G.H.W. Bush 47 Bruce Babbit 1/22/1993 1/2/2001 95.3 mo Clinton 48 Gale Norton 1/31/2001 3/31/2006 58.0 mo G.W. Bush 49 Dirk Kempthorne 5/26/2006 1/19/2009 31.8 mo G.W. Bush 50 Ken Salazar 1/20//2009 - - - Obama

Department of the Interior (created 1849) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 Months in office office in Months 40

served by eachSecretary byserved 20 0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49

49 Secretaries of the Interior (Served a total of 160 years)

Average Tenure for all Secretaries = 38.6 months Average Tenure Post WWII = 43.6 months

491 Department of Agriculture

The Department of Agriculture was established February 15,1889 (Agriculture, 2007) and is currently led by its 30 th secretary.

Months Secretary of in President(s) Agriculture Served from To Office Served 1 Norman Coleman 2/15/1889 3/6/1889 0.7 mo Cleveland 2 Jeremiah Rusk 3/6/1889 3/6/1893 48.0 mo B. Harrison 3 Julius Morton 3/7/1893 3/5/1897 48.0 mo Cleveland 4 James Wilson 3/6/1897 3/5/1913 192.0 mo McKinley T. Roosevelt Taft 5 David Houston 3/6/1913 2/2/1920 82.9 mo Wilson 6 Edwin Meredith 2/2/1920 3/4/1921 13.1 mo Wilson 7 Henry C. Wallace 3/5/1921 10/25/1924 43.7 mo Harding Coolidge 8 Howard Gore 11/22/1924 3/4/1925 3.4 mo Coolidge 9 William Jardin 3/5/1925 3/4/1929 48.0 mo Coolidge 10 Arthur Hyde 3/6/1929 3/4/1933 47.9 mo Hoover 11 Henry A. Wallace 3/4/1933 9/4/1940 90.0 mo F. Roosevelt 12 Claude Wickard 9/5/1940 6/29/1945 57.8 mo F. Roosevelt Truman 13 Clinton Anderson 6/30/1945 5/10/1948 34.3 mo Truman 14 Charles Brannan 6/2/1948 1/20/1953 55.6 mo Truman 15 Ezra Benson 1/21/1953 1/20/1961 96.0 mo Eisenhower 16 Orville Freeman 1/21/1961 1/20/1969 96.0 mo Kennedy L. Johnson 17 Clifford Hardin 1/21/1969 11/17/1971 33.9 mo Nixon 18 Earl Butz 12/2/1971 10/4/1976 58.1 mo Nixon Ford 19 John Knebel 11/4/1976 1/20/1977 2.5 mo Ford 20 Robert Bergland 1/23/1977 1/20/1981 47.9 mo Carter 21 John Block 1/23/1981 2/14/1986 60.7 mo Reagan 22 Richard Lyng 3/7/1986 1/20/1989 34.4 mo Reagan 23 Clayton Yeutter 2/16/1989 3/1/1991 24.5 mo G.H.W. Bush 24 Edward Madigan 3/12/1991 12/7/1994 44.8 mo G.H.W. Bush 25 Alphonso (Mike) Espy 1/22/1993 12/31/1994 23.3 mo Clinton 26 Daniel Glickman 3/30/1995 1/19/2001 69.6 mo Clinton 27 Ann Veneman 1/20/2001 1/20/2005 36.0 mo G.W. Bush 28 Mike Johanns 1/21/2005 9/19/2007 31.9 mo G.W. Bush 29 Ed Schafer 2/06/2008 1/20/2009 11.5 mo G.W.Bush 30 Thomas Vilsack 1/21/2009 - - - Obama

492

Department of Agriculture (created 1889) 200

175

150

125

100

75 Monthsin office

served (Secretary) per served 50

0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 29 Secretaries of Agriculture (Serving a total of 120 years)

Average Tenure for all Secretaries = 49.5 months Average Tenure Post WWII = 46.8 months

493 Department of Commerce

The Department of Commerce and Labor was established February 14, 1903. Subse- quently, the Department of Labor was established as a separate Department causing the original department to become identified simply as the Department of Commerce (Commerce, 2007). The department is currently led by its 41 st secretary.

Months Secretary of in President(s) Served Commerce Served from To Office 1 George Cortelyou * 2/18/1903 6/30/1904 5.4 mo T. Roosevelt 2 Victor Metcalf * 7/1/1904 12/19/906 29.4 mo T. Roosevelt 3 Oscar Straus* 12/17/1906 3/5/1909 27.5 mo T. Roosevelt 4 Charles Nagel* 3/6/1909 3/4/1913 47.6 mo Taft 5 William Redfield 3/5/1913 10/31/1919 78.9 mo Wilson 6 Joshua Alexander 12/16/1919 3/4/1921 15.9 mo Wilson 7 Herbert Hoover 3/5/1921 8/21/1928 88.6 mo Harding Coolidge 8 William Whiting 8/22/1928 3/4/1929 7.5 mo Coolidge 9 Robert Lamont 3/5/1929 8/7/1932 40.4 mo Hoover 10 Roy Chapin 8/8/1932 3/3/1933 7.1 mo Hoover 11 Daniel Roper 3/4/1933 12/23/1938 68.8 mo F. Roosevelt 12 Harry Hopkins 12/24/1938 9/18/1940 21.6 mo F. Roosevelt 13 Jesse Jones 9/19/1940 3/1/1945 53.8 mo F. Roosevelt 14 Henry A. Wallace 3/2/1945 9/20/1946 17.4 mo F. Roosevelt Truman 15 W. Averell Harriman 10/7/1946 4/22/1948 18.6 mo Truman 16 Charles Sawyer 5/9/1948 1/20/1953 56.5 mo Truman 17 Sinclair Weeks 1/21/1953 11/10/1958 70.5 mo Eisenhower 18 Lewis Strauss 11/13/1958 6/30/1959 6.6 mo Eisenhower 19 Frederick Mueller 8/10/1959 1/19/1961 17.6 mo Eisenhower 20 Luther Hodges 1/21/1961 1/18/1965 48.3 mo Kennedy L. Johnson 21 John Connor 1/18/1965 1/31/1967 23.8 mo L. Johnson 22 Alexander 6/14/1967 3/1/1968 9.4 mo L. Johnson Trowbridge 23 C. R. Smith 3/6/1968 1/19/1969 9.6 mo L. Johnson 24 Maurice Stans 1/21/1969 2/15/1972 36.4 mo Nixon 25 Peter Peterson 2/29/1972 2/1/1973 11.8 mo Nixon 26 Frederick Dent 2/2/1973 3/26/1975 24.1 mo Nixon 27 Rogers Morton 5/1/1975 2/2/1976 9.8 mo Ford

* The first four secretaries led a combined department known as the Department of Commerce and Labor. In March, 1913, the Department of Labor was established as a cabinet-level department making William Redfield the first Secretary of Commerce.

494 28 Eliot Richardson 2/2/1976 1/20/1977 11.0 mo Ford 29 Juanita Kreps 1/23/1977 10/31/1979 33.6 mo Carter 30 Philip Klutznick 1/9/1980 1/19/1981 12.3 mo Carter 31 Malcom Baldrige 2/20/1981 7/25/1987 78.3 mo Reagan 32 C. William Verity 10/19/1987 1/30/1989 15.2 mo Reagan 33 Robert Mosbacher 1/31/1989 1/15/1992 36.4 mo G.H.W. Bush 34 Barbara Franklin 2/27/1992 1/20/1993 10.5 mo Clinton 35 Ronald Brown 1/22/1993 4/3/1996 38.8 mo Clinton 36 Mickey Kantor 4/12/1996 1/21/1997 8.4 mo Clinton 37 William Daley 1/30/1997 7/19/2000 42.3 mo Clinton 38 Norman Mineta 7/21/2000 1/19/2001 5.6 mo Clinton 39 Donald Evans 1/20/2001 2/3/2005 48.9 mo G.W. Bush 40 Carlos Guiterrez 2/7/2005 1/20/2009 46.4 mo G.W. Bush 41 Gary Locke 5/01/2009 - - - Obama

Department of Commerce (created 1903) 100

50 Months in Office in Months served by each Secretary eachbyserved 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 40 Secretaries of Commerce (served a total of 106 years)

Average Tenure for all Secretaries = 31.0 months Average Tenure Post WWII = 28.1 months

495 Department of Labor

The Department of Labor was established March 4, 1913 (Labor, 2007) and is currently led by its 25 th secretary.

Months Secretary of in President(s) Commerce Served from To Office Served 1 William Wilson 3/5/1913 3/5/1921 95.9 mo Wilson

2 James Davis 3/5/1921 11/30/1930 116.8 mo Harding Coolidge Hoover 3 William Doak 12/9/1930 3/4/1933 26.8 mo Hoover 4 Francis Perkins 3/4/1933 6/30/1945 147.9 mo F. Roosevelt Truman 5 Lewis 7/1/1945 6/10/1948 35.3 mo Truman Schwellenbach 6 Maurice Tobin 8/13/1948 1/20/1953 53.2 mo Truman 7 Martin Durkin 1/21/1953 9/10/1953 7.6 mo Eisenhower 8 James Mitchell 10/9/1953 1/20/1961 87.4 mo Eisenhower 9 Arthur J. Goldberg 1/21/1961 9/20/1962 20.0 mo Kennedy 10 W. Willard Wirtz 9/25/1962 1/20/1969 75.8 mo Kennedy L. Johnson 11 George Shultz 1/22/1969 7/1/1970 17.3 mo Nixon 12 James Hodgson 7/2/1970 2/1/1973 31.0 mo Nixon 13 Peter Brennan 2/2/1973 3/15/1975 25.4 Mo Nixon

Ford 14 John Dunlop 3/18/1975 1/31/1976 10.4 mo Ford 15 W. J. Usery 2/10/1976 1/20/1977 11.3 mo Ford 16 Ray Marshall 1/27/1977 1/20/1981 47.8 mo Carter 17 Raymond Donovan 2/4/1981 3/15/1985 49.4 mo Reagan 18 William Brock 4/29/1985 10/31/1987 30.1 mo Reagan 19 Ann McLauhglin 12/14/1987 1/20/1989 13.2 mo Reagan 20 Elizabeth Dole 1/25/1989 11/23/1990 21.9 mo G.H.W. Bush 21 Lynn Martin 2/22/1991 1/20/1993 23.4 mo G.H.W. Bush 22 Robert Reich 1/22/1993 1/10/1997 47.6 mo Clinton 23 Alexis Herman 5/1/1997 1/20/2001 44.6 mo Clinton 24 Elaine Chao 1/29/2001 1/20/2009 95.7 mo G.W. Bush 25 Hilda Solis 2/24/2009 - - - Obama

496 Department of Labor (created 1913) 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 Months in office in Months 20 served (per Secretary) (per served 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23

24 Secretaries of Labor (Serving a total of 96 years)

Note: The first 4 Secretaries of Commerce were also Secretaries of Labor

Average Tenure for all Secretaries = 47.3 months Average Tenure Post WWII = 37.4 months

497 Department of Health and Human Services

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was established in 1953; however, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was created in 1979 by splitting out the functions of HEW (Health and Human Services, 2007). HHS re- tains the position of its predecessor department in the Order of Precedence. The De- partment of Health and Human Services is currently led by its 9 th secretary.

President(s) Secretary of Months Served Health, Education in and Welfare Served from To Office 1 Oveta Hobby 4/11/1953 7/31/1955 27.7 mo Eisenhower 2 Marion Folsom 8/1/1955 7/31/1958 36.0 mo Eisenhower 3 Arthur Flemming 8/1/1958 1/1/1961 29.0 mo Eisenhower 4 Abraham Ribicoff 1/20/1961 7/13/1962 17.8 mo Kennedy 5 Anthony Celebrezze 7/31/1962 8/17/1965 36.5 mo Kennedy L. Johnson 6 John Gardner 8/18/1965 2/29/1968 30.4 mo L. Johnson 7 Wilbur Cohen 5/9/1968 1/19/1969 8.3 mo L. Johnson 8 Robert Finch 1/22/1969 6/24/1970 17.1 mo Nixon 9 Elliot Richardson 6/24/1970 1/29/1973 31.2 mo Nixon 10 Caspar Weinberger 2/12/1973 8/10/1975 29.9 mo Nixon

Ford 11 David Mathews 8/8/1975 1/20/1977 17.4 mo Ford 12 Joseph Califano 1/26/1977 7/19/1979 29.8 mo Carter . . . Department of Health and Human Services created . . . 1 Patricia Harris 7/27/1979 1/19/1981 17.7 mo Carter 2 Richard Schweiker 1/22/1981 2/3/1983 24.4 mo Reagan 3 Margaret Heckler 3/9/1983 12/12/1985 33.1 mo Reagan 4 Otis Bowen 12/13/1985 1/20/1989 37.2 mo Reagan 5 Louis Sullivan 3/1/1989 1/1/1993 46.0 mo G. W. H. Bush 6 Donna Shalala 1/22/1993 1/19/2001 95.9 mo Clinton 7 Tommy Thompson 2/2/2001 1/26/2005 47.8 mo G. W. Bush 8 Michael Leavitt 1/26/2005 1/20/2009 47.8 mo G. W. Bush 9 Kathleen Sebelius 4/28/2009 - - - Obama

498 Department of Health & Human Svcs (created in 1979 from Health, Education and Welfare) 100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0

Months in Office in Months 20.0

served by each Secretary eachbyserved 0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617181920 20 Secretaries (served a total of 54 years)

Average Tenure for all Secretaries of HEW = 33.0 months Average for all Secretaries of HHS = 43.7 months

499 Department of Housing and Urban Development

The Department of Housing and Urban Development was established September 9, 1965 (Housing and Urban Development, 2007) and is currently led by its 14 th secretary.

President(s) Secretary of Months Served Housing and Urban in Development Served from To Office 1 Robert C. Weaver 1/18/1966 12/18/1968 11.0 mo L. Johnson 2 George W. Romney 1/22/1969 1/20/1973 47.9 mo Nixon 3 James T. Lynn 2/22/1973 2/5/1975 23.4 mo Nixon Ford 4 Carla A. Hills 3/10/1975 1/20/1977 22.3 mo Ford 5 Patricia R. Harris 1/23/1977 9/10/1979 31.6 mo Carter 6 Moon Landrieu 9/24/1979 1/20/1981 15.9 mo Carter 7 Samuel R. Pierce 1/23/1981 1/20/1989 95.9 mo Reagan 8 Jack F. Kemp 2/13/1989 1/19/1993 47.2 mo G.H.W. Bush 9 Henry Cisneros 1/22/1993 1/19/1997 47.9 mo Clinton 10 Andrew Cuomo 1/29/1997 1/20/2001 47.7 mo Clinton 11 Mel Martinez 1/24/2001 12/12/2003 34.6 mo G.W. Bush 12 Alphonso Jackson 3/31/2004 4/18/2008 48.6 mo G.W. Bush 13 Steve Preston 6/5/2008 1/20/2009 7.5 mo G.W.Bush 14 Shaun Donovan 1/26/2009 - - - Obama

Department of Housing and Urban Development (Created 1966) 120.0

100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0 Months in Office in Months 20.0 served by each Secretary Secretary eachbyserved 0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213 13 Secretaries (served a total of 43 years)

Average for all Secretaries of HUD = 37.0 months

500 Department of Transportation

The Department of Transportation was established in 1966 (Transportation, 2007) and is currently led by its 20 th secretary.

Months Secretary of in President(s) Transportation Served from To Office Served 1 Alan Boyd 1/16/1967 1/20/1969 24.1 mo L. Johnson 2 John Volpe 1/22/1969 2/1/1973 48.3 mo Nixon 3 Claude Brinegar 3/7/1973 2/1/1975 22.8 mo Nixon Ford 4 John Barnum 2/2/1975 3/6/1975 1.1 mo Ford 5 William Coleman 3/7/1975 1/20/1977 22.4 mo Ford 6 Brock Adams 1/23/1977 7/20/1979 29.9 mo Carter 7 Graham Claytor 7/21/1979 8/14/1979 0.8 mo Carter 8 Neil Goldschmidt 8/15/1979 1/20/1981 17.2 mo Carter 9 Andrew Lewis 1/23/1981 2/1/1983 24.3 mo Reagan 10 Elizabeth Dole 2/7/1983 9/30/1987 55.8 mo Reagan 11 James Burnley 12/3/1987 1/30/1989 13.9 mo Reagan 12 Samuel Skinner 2/6/1989 12/13/1991 34.2 mo G.H.W. Bush 13 James Busey 12/14/1991 2/23/1992 2.3 mo G.H.W. Bush 14 Andrew Card 2/24/1992 1/20/1993 10.9 mo G.H.W. Bush 15 Federico Peña 1/21/1993 2/14/1997 48.8 mo Clinton 16 Rodney Slater 2/14/1997 1/20/2001 47.2 mo Clinton 17 Norman Mineta 1/25/2001 7/7/2006 65.4 mo G.W. Bush 18 Maria Cino 7/8/2006 9/30/2006 2.7 mo G.W. Bush 19 Mary Peters 10/17/2006 1/20/2009 27.1 mo G.W. Bush 20 Ray LaHood 1/22/2009 - - mo Obama

501 Department of Transportation (created 1966) 70.0

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

Months in Office Office in Months 20.0

served by each Secretary each by served 10.0

0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 Secretaries (served a total of 43 years)

Average for all Secretaries of Transportation = 26.3 months

502 Department of Energy

The Department of Energy was established August 4, 1977 (Energy, 2007) and is currently led by its 12 th secretary.

Months Secretary of in President(s) Energy Served from To Office Served 1 James Schlesinger 8/6/1977 8/23/1979 24.6 mo Carter 2 Charles Duncan 8/24/1979 1/20/1981 16.9 mo Carter 3 James Edwards 1/23/1981 11/5/1982 21.5 mo Reagan 4 Donald Hodel 11/5/1982 2/7/1985 27.1 mo Reagan 5 John Herrington 2/7/1985 1/20/1989 47.4 mo Reagan 6 James Watkins 3/1/1989 1/20/1993 46.6 mo G.H.W. Bush 7 Hazel O'Leary 1/22/1993 1/20/1997 47.9 mo Clinton 8 Federico Peña 3/12/1997 6/30/1998 15.6 mo Clinton 9 Bill Richardson 8/18/1998 1/20/2001 29.1 mo Clinton 10 Spencer Abraham 1/20/2001 1/31/2005 48.4 mo G.W. Bush 11 Samuel Bodman 2/1/2005 1/20/2009 47.6 mo G.W. Bush 12 Dr. Steven Chu 1/20/2009 - - Obama

Department of Energy (created in 1977) 60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

Months in office 10.0

served by each Secretary 0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 11 Secretaries of Energy (served a total of 32 years)

Average for all Secretaries of Energy = 33.9 months

503 Department of Education

The Department of Education was established October 17, 1979 by combining offices from several federal agencies and splitting out educational responsibilityes from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) (Education, 2007). It is currently led by its 9 th secretary.

Months Secretary of in President(s) Education Served from To Office Served 1 Shirley Hufstedler 11/30/1979 1/21/1981 13.7 mo Carter 2 Terrell Bell 1/22/1981 1/20/1985 47.9 mo Reagan 3 William Bennett 2/6/1985 9/20/1988 43.5 mo Reagan 4 Lauro Cavazos 9/20/1988 12/12/1990 26.7 mo G.H.W. Bush 5 Lamar Alexander 3/22/1991 1/20/1993 21.9 mo G.H.W. Bush 6 Richard Riley 1/21/1993 1/20/2001 96.0 mo Clinton 7 Roderick Paige 1/20/2001 1/20/2005 47.9 mo G.W. Bush 8 Margaret Spellings 1/20/2005 1/20/2009 48.0 mo G.W. Bush 9 Arne Duncan 1/22/2009 - - mo Obama

Department of Education (created 1979) 120.0

100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0 Months in Office Office in Months 20.0 served by eachSecretary byserved 0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 Secretaries (served a total of 30 years)

Average for all Secretaries of Education = 43.9 months

504 Department of Veterans Affairs

The Department of Veterans Affairs, established March 15, 1989, has had 9 Secretaries. The department came was created from its predecessor, the Agency of Veterans Af- fairs, which had been created by Executive Order 5398 on July, 1930. There were 14 Administrators, the last of whom, Edward Derwinski, became its first Departmental Secretary in 1989 (Veteran Affairs, 2007). The department is currently led by its 10 th secretary.

Months Secretary of in President(s) Veterans Affairs Served from To Office Served 1 Edward Derwinski 3/15/1989 9/26/1992 42.4 mo G.H.W. Bush 2 Anthony Principi (act- 9/26/1992 1/20/1993 3.8 mo G.H.W. Bush ing) 3 Jesse Brown 1/22/1993 7/3/1997 53.4 mo Clinton 4 Herschel Gober 7/3/1997 5/5/1998 10.1 mo Clinton (acting) 5 Togo West 5/5/1998 7/10/2000 26.2 mo Clinton 6 Herschel Gober 7/10/2000 1/20/2001 6.3 mo Clinton (acting)

7 Anthony Principi 1/23/2001 1/26/2005 48.1 mo G.W. Bush (confirmed) 8 Robert Nicholson 1/26/2005 10/1/2007 32.2 mo G.W. Bush 9 James Peake 12/17/2007 1/20/2009 13.1 mo G.W. Bush 10 Eric Shinseki 1/20/2009 - - mo Obama

505

The Veterans Administration (created 1988)

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0 Months in Office Office in Months 10.0 served by each secretary each by served

0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Secretaries (served a total of 21 years)

Average for all Secretaries of Veterans Affairs = 26.2 months (Average for all confirmed Secretaries = 35.9 months)

506 Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security was established March 1, 2003 (Homeland Security, 2007) and is currently led by its 3rd secretary.

President(s) Secretary of Months Served Homeland Served in Security from To Office 1 Tom Ridge 1/24/2003 2/1/2005 24.2 mo G.W. Bush 2 Michael Chertoff 2/15/2005 1/20/2009 47.2 mo G.W. Bush 3 Janet Napolitano 1/21/2009 - - - Obama

Department of Homeland Security (created in 2003) 50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 Months in Office in Months 10.0

served by each Secretary each by served 5.0 0.0 1 2 2 Secretaries of Homeland Security (served a total of 6 years)

Average for the first two Secretaries of Homeland Security = 35.7 months

507

Appendix C – Allocated SES Positions from 1982 – 2006

The following data represent the number of available SES positions (all categories) from 1982 through 2006. These are the official statistics reported by OPM at the end of each fiscal year. (OPM, 1997, 2005, 2007)

Allocated SES Positions from 1982 - 2006

8500

Authorized but Unfilled Term Limited 8000 Appointees Career SES

7500

7000 Total All Categories All Total 6500

6000

5500

82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Year

Reagan ------> Bush I ------> Clinton ------> Bush II

508

Appendix D - African Americans Appointed to Cabinet Positions

JOHNSON 1966 1 Robert C. Weaver Housing and Urban Development

FORD

2 William Thaddeus Coleman Transportation 1975

CARTER

Housing and Urban Development, 3 Patricia Roberts Harris 1977, Health, Education and Welfare 1979

REAGAN

4 Samuel Pierce Housing and Urban Development 1981

G. H. W. Bush 5 Louis Wade Sullivan Health and Human Services 1989

CLINTON

6 Mike Espy Agriculture 1993 7 Ron Brown Commerce 1993 8 Hazel O’Leary Energy 1993 9 Jesse Brown Veterans Administration 1993 10 Alexis Herman Labor 1997 11 Rodney E. Slater Transportation 1997 12 Togo D. West Veterans Administration 1998

G. W. BUSH

13 Rod Paige Education 2001 14 Colin Powell State 2001 15 Alphonso Jackson Housing and Urban Development 2004 16 Condoleezza Rice State 2005

OBAMA

17 Eric Holder Attorney General 2009

509

Appendix E – Women Appointed to Cabinet Positions

ROOSEVELT 1 Frances Perkins Labor 1933

EISENHOWER 2 Oveta Culp Hobby Health, Education & Welfare 1951

FORD 3 Carla Hills Anderson Housing & Urban Development 1975

CARTER 4 Patricia R, Harris Housing & Urban Development 1977 5 Juanita A. Kreps Commerce 1977 6 Shirley M. Hufstedler Education 1979 7 Patricia R. Harris Health & Human Services 1979

REAGAN 8 Margaret Heckler Health & Human Services 1983 9 Elizabeth Dole Transportation 1983

G. H. W. Bush 10 Ann Dore McLaughlin Labor 1987 11 Elizabeth Dole Labor 1989 12 Lynn Martin Labor 1991 13 Barbara Franklin Commerce 1992

CLINTON 14 Hazel O’Leary Energy 1993 15 Janet Reno Attorney General 1993 16 Donna Shalala Health & Human Services 1993 17 Madeleine Albright State 1997 18 Alexis Herman Labor 1997

G. W. BUSH 19 Ann Veneman Agriculture 2001 20 Gale Norton Interior 2001 21 Elaine Chao Labor 2001 22 Margaret Spellings Education 2005 23 Condleezza Rice State 2005 24 Mary Peters Transportation 2006

OBAMA 25 Hillary Rodham Clinton State 2009 26 Janet Napolitano Homeland Security 2009 27 Hilda Solis Labor 2009 28 Kathleen Sebelius Health & Human Services 2009

510

Appendix F – Presidential Electoral Results

(from 1948 through 2008)

The US Constitution establishes the electoral process by which presidents and their vice presidents are elected. Each state casts votes equal to the total number of Senators and Congressmen who represent that state in Washington. Until 1948, there were a total of 531 votes for the 48 states. This changed in 1960 when Alaska and Hawaii were made states, then again in 1961, the District of Columbia was granted 3 votes, thus bringing the total number of possible electoral votes since 1964 to 537. An absolute majority is required to win an election; hence, it takes a minimum of 270 electoral votes to win the presidency.

Electoral Votes in Presidential Elections, 1948 - 2008

600

13 15 46 17 49 500 39 52 89 73 111 168 159 173 219 240 251 400 189 191 266

300 520 525 486 489 457 442 426 Electoral Votes, Votes, Electoral 200 379 ` 370 365 303 303 301 297 271 286 100 thru 1956: 266 votes needed to win, win, neededvotes to 266 1956: thru from 1964 - present: 270 votes to win to votes 270 present: - 1964 from for 1960 (only): 269 votes needed to win, win, neededvotes to 269 (only): 1960 for 0

n er er e y ond t ain lace Ford ar akis Dole m :Byrd wat : : cC n C uk :Bush I evenson o Wal : Mondale :M x : ter : St :Stevenso y ar : e n :McGovernC gan inton ush II :Gor er er o ea l B w phr 76 eagan C nedy :Ni R n um 19 80 R 92 1996 Clinton2000 Johnson ::GoldH 19 2004 Bush II :Kerr senhow 19 1988 Bush I :D 2008 Obama Ei 64 1972 Nix 1984 ruman :Dewey :Thur 19 ixon 52 1960 Ke N 48 T 19 1956 Eisenho 68 19 19 Presidential Candidates

511

Appendix G - Legislation Addressing the Presidential Appointment Process

H. R. 3137 [106th]: To Amend the Presidential transition Act of 1963 to Provide for the training of Individuals (Congress, 1999)

106TH CONGRESS H. R. 3137 1ST SESSION

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES NOVEMBER 3, 1999 Received NOVEMBER 19, 1999 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental Af- fairs

AN ACT To amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to provide for training of individuals a Presi- dent-elect intends to nominate as department heads or appoint to key positions in the Executive Office of the President.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Con- gress assembled,

SECTION 1. AMENDMENTS TO PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION ACT OF 1963.

Section 3(a) of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``including--'' and inserting ``including the following:''; (2) in each of paragraphs (1) through (6) by striking the semicolon at the end and inserting a period; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(8)(A) Payment of expenses during the transition for briefings, workshops, or other activities to acquaint key prospective Presidential appointees with the types of problems and challenges that most typically confront new political appointees when they make the transition from campaign and other prior activities to assuming the responsibility for governance after inauguration, including interchange with individuals who held similar leadership roles in prior administrations, agency or department experts from the Office of Management and Budget or an Office of Inspector General of an agency or department, and relevant staff from the General Account- ing Office.

``(B) Activities funded under this paragraph shall be conducted primarily for individuals the President-elect intends to nominate as department heads or appoint to key positions in the Executive Office of the President.''.

Passed the House of Representatives November 2, 1999. Attest: JEFF TRANDAHL, Clerk.

512 H.R. 127 [107th]: To limit the total number of political appointees in the Executive Branch of the Government (Congress, 2001)

107th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. 127

To limit the total number of political appointees in the executive branch of the Government.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES January 3, 2001

Mr. LUTHER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Government Reform 141

A BILL To limit the total number of political appointees in the executive branch of the Government.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Con- gress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES.

(a) DEFINITION- For purposes of this section, the term ‘political appointee’ means any individual who--

(1) is employed in a position listed in sections 5312 through 5316 of title 5, United States Code (relating to the Executive Schedule);

(2) is a limited term appointee, limited emergency appointee, or noncareer appointee in the Senior Executive Service, as defined under section 3132(a) (5), (6), and (7) of title 5, United States Code, respectively; or

(3) is employed in a position in the executive branch of the Government under schedule C of subpart C of part 213 of title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

(b) LIMITATION - The President shall ensure that the number of political appointees in the executive branch of the Government shall not, at any time after September 30, 2002, exceed a total of 2,000 (determined on a full-time equivalent basis).

141 Bills and resolutions proposed by Members of Congress may/may not have had any action taken on them along their path to becoming law. The vast majority of proposed legislation “dies in committee” and never comes to the floor for a vote.

Last Action: Feb 13, 2001 when it was referred to the Subcommittee on the Civil Service and Agency Organization. This bill was never enacted into law.

513

Appendix H – Proclamation Signed by Governor George W. Bush

514

Appendix I – Letter of Introduction and Survey Questionnaire

The following survey was completed by 24 current or retired members of the Senior

Executive Service (SES), all but one were associated with the Department of Energy.

The survey (see the following pages) consisted of 5 pages:

Page 1 – Context of this research and survey instructions

Page 2 – Demographic questions

Page 3 – Respondents’ opinions expressed on 7 point Likert scale

Page 4 & 5 – Respondents’ opinions expressed in multiple formats

515 [Letter of Introduction ]

November 13, 2009

Hello, The Chief Information Officer [ of NNSA ], with whom I worked until recently, suggested that I contact you regarding the attached survey. It is the basis of my doctoral research at the George Washington University and is intended to tap into the collected experience base of SES Careerists such as yourself who have worked directly with Po- litical Appointees.

I need and value your insight.

The survey requires no more than 10 – 12 minutes to complete and will be treated completely confidentially. Recognizing that this is a particularly busy time, I’d appreciate your input as soon as your schedule permits.

Thank you in advance,

Al Gallo

516 [instructions] Regarding this Survey

Background: In February, 2000, Senator George Voinovich requested the Government Ac- counting Office (GAO) for assistance by suggesting standardized questions for all presidential nominees who require Senate confirmation.

Purpose: The Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restruc- turing and the District of Columbia, (under) the Committee of Governmental Affairs had two focus areas: 1) to provide common criteria for all Senate confirmation committees in evaluating nominees, and 2) to ensure that potential appointees have the requisite skills to be highly- effective public leaders.

GAO’s Observations: GAO also acknowledged that not all questions were necessary for all potential appointees. It recognized the broad range of positions to be filled from heads of major departments and agencies to program managers.

GAO highlighted the Senate’s opportunity for sending a strong message to Administrations urging improvement of appointees’ effectiveness during their tenure in public service.

Focus Areas: The questions addressed the following categories: 1) result-oriented decision making 2) financial management 3) information and technology management, and 4) human capital management

None of GAO’s findings were based on the first hand experience of the Career Civil Servants who, collectively over the course of their careers, have worked with thousands of Presidential Appointees. This survey attempts to tap the experience and expertise of Careerists.

Please respond to the following based on YOUR professional experience in government service. Responses are both Anonymous and Confidential.

THANK YOU.

517

SURVEY

Background Information

1. Gender (Please circle) 2. Number of Years in Government Service

Male Female ______yrs as GS ______yrs as SES

3. Are you currently a Civil Ser- 4. Have you ever been a Political Appointee? vant?

Yes No Yes No

5. Name of current or last agency if retired. (No Acronyms . Please spell out the full name.)

6. How many different CIVILIAN Departments or Agencies have you worked in? (Please circle)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 or more

7. How many Political Appointees have you worked closely with? (Please circle)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 or more

8. Which most closely describes your area of greatest expertise (Please circle)

Executive Policy & Management

Finance & Budget

Human Resources

Information Technology

Applied Science or Technology

Other ( please specify) ______

518

SURVEY Section 1

Disagree Neutral Agree

Neither Agree In your experience, successful nor Strongly Mostly Slightly Dis- Strongly Mostly Slightly political appointees must: agree

1 have clear goals for his/her new job

have direct experience in the 2 mission of his/her new agency (eg., Security Emergency Mgt. etc.)

3 create visions that inspire people to follow

4 project confidence and trust in Career Civil Servants

emphasize the Department (or 5 Agency) missions rather than partisan politics.

have senior management experi- 6 ence that directly relates to their new jobs.

be highly knowledgeable about 7 relevant federal regulation, such as GPRA, Clinger-Cohen, FISMA, etc.

be knowledgeable regarding the 8 Department's/Agency's strategic plans, priorities and challenges.

9 have previous professional experience at either the Federal or State level.

have direct political ties into the 10 administration, preferably right to the White House.

519

SURVEY Section 2

1. Based on your experience, what type of impact do Appointees tend to have on the overall Missions of Federal Agencies?

Please circle your response on the following scale from 1 to 7.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

NEGATIVE NONE POSITIVE

2. Based on your experience, how did Appointees Job Effectiveness and Performance change over time?

Please circle your response on the following scale from 1 to 7.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

WORSE NO CHANGE IMPROVED

3. Based on your experience, how did Appointees’ Working Relationships with Career Civil Servants change over time?

Please circle your response on the following scale from 1 to 7.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

WORSE NO CHANGE IMPROVED

4. In your opinion, should there be More or Fewer Ap- pointees to Federal Agencies? (Circle your answer) FEWER About the MORE same

5. Would you prefer working with Career Civil Ser- vants or Appointees on a day-to-day basis? (Circle Civil Ser- No Pref- Appointees your answer) vants erence

6. Please estimate the percentage of Appointees who leave government BEFORE the end of the Admini- stration? Approximately ______%.

7. Please estimate the percentage of Appointees who BECAME Civil Servants rather than leaving government service? Approximately ______%.

520

SURVEY Section 2 (continued)

8. Please review the following lettered list and rank the TOP THREE ATTRIBUTES an Ap- pointee should have in order to be successful.

a. Advanced education b. Ambition

c. Commitment to Agency’s mission d. Creativity

e. Executive Mgt. experience f. Government experience

g. Idealism h. Open mindedness

i. Political contacts j. Related job experience

k. Subject matter expertise l. Other ______

(8.1) The MOST important attribute for an Appointee is choice [_____] .

(8.2) The Second most important attribute for success is choice [_____] .

(8.3) The Third critical attribute for Appointees’ success choice [_____] .

9. Hugh Heclo defines a Successful Political Appointee as someone who is able to change or initiate government’s activities in “planned or specific ways.”

Does this equate with YOUR definition? YES ______NO______

a. If not, how would YOU define success for Political Appointees?

10. Would you accept a Political Appointment? YES ______NO______

WHY? (Based on your answer, please identify the ways in which you would be more effective and explain why that choice is the better choice.)

THANK YOU for participating in this survey!

521