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A Teaching Guide to Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove

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A Teaching Guide to Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove What I Learned Since I Stopped Worrying and Studied the Movie: A Teaching Guide to Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove Dan Lindley, University of Notre Dame Introduction tack may set off a doomsday device that pabilities and resolve, but also on the will kill all life on the surface of earth.2 adversary’s values and emotional state John Pike, former director of space The doomsday weapon is unrealistic. (hence, mind).Deterrence rests not only policy at the Federation of American However, if one views it as analogous to on having missiles, bombers, and the Scientists, once said to me: “Everything mutually assured destruction (the near willingness to use them, but also on there is to know about nuclear strategy total destruction of the U.S. and Soviet knowing where to target them so that can be learned from Dr. Strangelove.” Union inevitable in a real nuclear war), the enemy will fear the retaliatory at- “Everything” is only a mild overstate- then almost everything that happens in tack.Deterrence is impossible if the en- ment.I show Dr. Strangelove annually to the movie could have actually happened. emy fears nothing and does not mind Notre Dame audiences to teach about The most important theme of the film is being dead and destroyed. nuclear war, and I will continue to do so that it makes fun of the sad, perverse, until nuclear weapons and war itself are and absurd reality that the U.S. and the no longer problems.The film offers les- Soviet Union could destroy each other The Necessity of Communication for sons about war, politics, and history and within 30 minutes.Unlikely and improb- Effective Deterrence can serve as a teaching aid for classes in able, yes.Possible, yes. Deterrence only works if the threats introductory international relations, for- Dr. Strangelove also highlights the intended to cause fear are communi- eign policy, defense policy, causes of range of procedures and strategies in- cated to the adversary.No threats made, war, organizational politics, and Cold volved in maintaining the nuclear stand- no fear created.This point is made by War history.1 off.Why did the U.S.havebombers con- Dr.Strangelove when he says: “Yes, but In this teaching guide I cover three stantly in the air, already well on their the ...whole point of the doomsday ma- tasks, all of which highlight concepts and way to their targets? Why might individ- chine ...is lost ...if you keep it a se- themes in Dr. Strangelove.First, I use ual base commanders have had the au- cret! Why didn’t you tell the world, eh?” the film as a springboard to discuss de- thority to use nuclear weapons at their (56:29). terrence, mutually assured destruction, own discretion? Why were our forces on preemption, the security dilemma, arms hair-trigger alert? Why might a dooms- races, relative versus absolute gains con- day device seem to be a logical step? The Logic and Illogic of Nuclear cerns, Cold War misperceptions and The single, simple answer to these ques- Deterrence paranoia, and civil–military relations (in tions is the U.S.’s (and Soviet Union’s) this order).Second, I put these concepts When mutually assured destruction quest to make nuclear deterrence credi- (MAD) is achieved, it becomes illogical into their historical contexts to teach ble.Think about deterrence and the about Cold War history.Third, I show to use nuclear weapons, no matter the need for credibility as you read this and scenario.If anyone attacks, all will get how closely Dr. Strangelove parallels ac- watch the film. tual events and policies.I conclude with clobbered.If one receives a first strike, Finally, remember that the U.S. and there is little or nothing to gain from the story of how an article by Thomas Russians can still easily destroy each Schelling led to the making of the film. retaliation.Deterrence will have failed other and that several other countries and retaliation risks further strikes and have nuclear weapons.The Cold War is more fallout.Ironically, MAD makes over, but nuclear danger is not.When nuclear weapons so illogical that deter- Dr. Strangelove, Nuclear Stanley Kubrick made Dr. Strangelove in Strategy, and the Cold War rence may actually suffer unless the 1963, there were 34,000 nuclear weapons credibility of suicide (or further damage) 3 Dr. Strangelove is a black comedy on earth.Today, there are 31,500. The can be restored.Two ways of making about a renegade U.S. Air Force Gen- doomsday device is alive and well. retaliation credible involve automating eral, Jack D.Ripper, who orders his retaliation and introducing illogic and B-52 bombers to drop their nuclear uncertainty. The Definition of Deterrence weapons on the Soviet Union.This at- Automation ensures retaliation by tak- The eccentric nuclear strategist Dr. ing humans out of the loop.A dooms- Strangelove4 defines deterrence when he day machine fits the bill.Ruling out “hu- says: “Deterrence is the art of producing Dan Lindley is assistant professor in interna- man meddling” is crucial because one tional relations and security studies at the Uni- in the mind of the enemy ...the fear to must make credible the incredible threat versity of Notre Dame. Lindley worked for sev- attack” (55:09).5 of suicide.Dr.Strangelove explains this eral arms control and research organizations Because deterrence requires the cre- logic: in Washington, D.C. before receiving a Ph.D. ation of fear, deterrence is arguably from MIT. Lindley has published and spoken on more an art than a science.The enemy President Merkin Muffley: “But, how is U.N. peacekeeping, internal conflict, the Cyprus must fear that the costs of attack will it possible for this thing to be triggered problem and Greco-Turkish relations, collective automatically, and at the same time security, the U.S. intervention in Panama, the outweigh the benefits.Whether one can impossible to untrigger?” (54:42) role of ideas in international politics, and SDI produce enough fear to prevent an at- Strangelove: Mr.President, it is not contracting. tack depends not just on one’s own ca- only possible, it is essential.That is the PSOnline www.apsanet.org 663 whole idea of this machine, you know. credibility.The idea was for plan R to visors to President Kennedy wanted to Deterrence is the art of producing in the be a sort of retaliatory safeguard.” strike Cuba during the Missile Crisis, an mind of the enemy ...the fear to attack. President Muffley: “A safeguard?” action which could have easily escalated. And so, because of the automated and Turgidson: “I admit the human ele- irrevocable decision making process which ment seems to have failed us here.But Had the U.S. engaged the Soviet Union rules out human meddling, the doomsday the idea was to discourage the Russkies in nuclear combat, we would have gotten machine is terrifying.It’s simple to under- from any hope that they could knock out more than our hair mussed.This is one stand.And completely credible, and con- Washington, and yourself, sir, as part of a reason why it is dangerous to build first- vincing. general sneak attack, and escape retalia- strike weapons (or defenses whose effec- tion because of lack of proper command tiveness is uncertain).They lend cre- Although it may not be fair to con- and control.” demn the automated-response doomsday dence to semiplausible theories of victory that may persuade the president device on the basis of a single slip-up, Ripper’s attack order to his bomber to attack during a crisis.8 the film invalidates the wisdom of that wing exemplifies the main tradeoff with machine by highlighting its dangers. devolution of authority: one cannot de- Would any state cede control of its volve authority and retain central control weapons to computers and sensors?6 So at the same time.Loss of control is ex- Advocacy for Preemption the problem remains: how to make the acerbated by the CRM-114 coded com- Although many believe that the U.S. incredible credible.A fallback strategy is munications device which makes it would never consider preemption, or to introduce illogic and uncertainty into nearly impossible to communicate with make it an official strategy, the U.S. has nuclear strategy and nuclear command and recall the planes while in the air. never been willing to make a “no-first- and control.Akin to throwing the steer- Only Ripper knows the code.Individu- use” pledge.Scott Sagan notes that one ing wheel out the car window when en- ally, devolution and prevention of false of the U.S. government’s most important gaged in a game of chicken, delegating communication seem like good ideas. early Cold War strategy documents, to base commanders the authority to But when combined as part of one plan, NSC-68, embraces preemption.He ex- issue strikes decentralizes military con- they render Ripper’s orders almost irre- cerpts: the U.S. should strike with its trol and makes retaliation more likely. 7 versible. “full weight ...if possible before the Deterrence is enhanced if nuclear Note too the influence of domestic Soviet blow is actually delivered” (1989, bombs might explode whenever a situa- politics (Senator Buford). In the U.S., it 20). tion becomes precarious.If the enemy is politically difficult to be seen as “soft Compare the language of Turgidson does not know who controls the bombs on defense.” This makes it easier with that of General Curtis LeMay, a and under what circumstances authoriza- (though not always easy) for military key Air Force strategist during the early tion for their use “devolves” to lower hawks to corner opponents, win debates, Cold War: levels of command, perhaps they would and influence policy.
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