Azerbaijani refugee from Karabakh (1993). Photo by Ilgar Jafarov.
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continue—the two sides clashed in April 2016, causing thirty casualties; and, most recently, in May 2017, when Azerbaijan Black destroyed an Armenian air mis- sile defense system. Six years after the ceasefire agreement, journalist Thomas de Waal, currently senior Garden fellow with Carnegie Europe, embarked on a book project about the conflict. Thanks to a grant from the U.S. Institute of Armenia and Peace, de Waal spent the year from 2000 to 2001 poring over archives; interviewing conflict victims, witnesses, and partici- pants; and traveling intensively Azerbaijan between Armenia and Azer- baijan. The logistics were complicated—to circumvent the closed border, he had to travel Through Peace hundreds of miles each time he wanted to get from one country to the other. But the trouble was worth it—in 2003, de Waal published Black Garden: Arme- n 1988 the unthinkable and War nia and Azerbaijan Through Peace happened: two Soviet and War (New York University republics—Armenia and Press), a nuanced portrayal of Azerbaijan—entered An Interview with the conflict and its aftermath. Iinto a violent territorial The book was rereleased in dispute, and the previously Thomas de Waal an updated tenth anniversary omnipotent Kremlin was addition in 2013 and continues powerless to stop them. The to be the definitive account of dispute—the first in a series the conflict. of nationalist uprisings that BY MASHA UDENSIVA-BRENNER In November 2017, all 120 of would contribute to bringing the original interviews de Waal down the Soviet Union— conducted for the 2003 edition revolved around Nagorny became available at Columbia Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian region located University Libraries as part of the new Thomas de Waal inside Soviet Azerbaijan. Technically, the conflict ended Interviews Collection. I spoke to de Waal about Black when the two newly independent nations agreed to a Garden over Skype last spring. What follows is an edited ceasefire in 1994, but the agreement did not bring peace. version of our conversation. (You can read my interview To this day, the Armenian-Azerbaijani border remains with him about Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, the closed and heavily militarized. Not to mention that vio- other book in the Thomas de Waal Interviews Collection, lent flare-ups between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in the Fall 2017 issue of Harriman Magazine.)
HARRIMAN | 31 De Waal: I think there have been a I wanted to write the book I wanted few crossings, but you can probably to read. count them all on one hand. It’s a very rare occurrence. Udensiva-Brenner: Can you give us some historical context for the Udensiva-Brenner: Your reporting relationship between Armenia and Thomas for this book took place from 2000 to Azerbaijan before the conflict de Waal 2001, six years after the conflict ended. broke out? How did the project come about? De Waal: There’s this concept I’ve De Waal: I’d been spending time in come across frequently in the Azerbaijan since ’95 and in Karabakh, Caucasus, that all these conflicts are Masha Udensiva-Brenner: Your book in Armenia, since ’96. I liked both ancient conflicts and people have opens with you crossing the ceasefire places. But, obviously, the narrative hated each other for centuries and line between Armenia and Azerbaijan. from each one was very black-and- waited for the opportunity to fight No one had crossed it since the two white. When you’re on the Armenian one another. It has been debunked by nations signed a ceasefire agreement side and you hear about this conflict, scholarship and also by the empirical in 1994. But there you were. How did you begin to inhabit their worldview; experience of the people living there. this happen? you begin to see everything through Armenians and Azerbaijanis began their eyes—that they were the victims to come into conflict perhaps in the Thomas de Waal: In May 2001, when of this injustice, that they tried nineteenth century, and certainly in they were gearing up for big peace political means to give freedom to the the early twentieth century. But, at talks in Key West, Florida, the U.S. Karabakh Armenians and were met the same time, they’ve always had a cochair [of the OSCE Minsk Group with violence. That’s their version lot in common; they’ve shared the mediating the conflict], Carey of reality. When you go over to the same territory. I think both sides Cavanaugh, invited some journalists to Azerbaijani side, you see a different would tell you that in cultural terms come with him on a symbolic crossing reality. That they thought they were they have a lot more in common with of the ceasefire line, which is also living in a peaceful republic with each other than they do with the called the Line of Contact. I was one of all these Armenians, and suddenly Georgians, the other big nation in the the people he invited. Just to give you the Armenians start revolting. It’s Caucasus. They’ve always tradition- an idea, the ceasefire line had started very scary for them; they aren’t sure ally done business with one another as trenches—not very fearsome—but whether the Armenians are backed more than they have with the Geor- it became more and more fortified by Moscow, and the whole thing gians. And if you look at the culture over the years. Now it’s incredibly descends into violence. They’ve in terms of music, in particular, there militarized, with artillery and drones lost control, they try to reassert are a lot of songs that an Armenian and minefields and helicopters. So, it’s control over their republic, and the would say are Armenian songs and an basically this big scar running through Armenians start attacking them. Azerbaijani would say are Azerbaijani the territory of Azerbaijan. When we Both sides obviously have a certain songs. And there’s always been some crossed it, we started in Azerbaijan validity to their view, but the prob- intermarriage, particularly in Baku. and walked across. They demined it lem is that they have no empathy for So these are people who have mixed for us, but we were actually crossing a one another. I wanted to get a deeper together culturally, historically, minefield. Most of the time we do this understanding of what was happen- demographically. metaphorically, but I did this literally ing. But there was nothing written But, politically, there had been in 2001. about the conflict that presented the collisions between them. Part of this view from both sides. Everything was was for socioeconomic reasons— Udensiva-Brenner: Has anyone quite biased, quite partisan, very pro- Armenians were closer to the top of crossed the line since then? pagandistic. So, eventually, I decided the social pile, particularly in Baku,
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and Azerbaijanis were down toward weaken under Gorbachev—during There was nothing written the bottom. But the main clash has all those periods, tensions about always been over the highland part of who this place owed its allegiance about the conflict that the Karabakh region, which we tend to, who deserved to be there, and presented the view from to call by its Russian name, Nagorny who deserved to be running things Karabakh. This ambiguous place had resulted in conflict. both sides. Everything was been part of the culture and history of quite biased, quite partisan, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. As Udensiva-Brenner: The conflict long as Armenians and Azerbaijanis erupted during perestroika in 1998. very propagandistic. were part of the Russian Empire, or What happened? the Soviet Union, it didn’t matter so much whose territory it was. During De Waal: For that we have to take those times, there was this kind of a brief excursion to 1921, which is province in Azerbaijan, run by central policeman who looked after when the Bolsheviks held a meeting Armenians but within the Republic of things. People lived together, and in Tbilisi that decided what to do Azerbaijan. That was in 1921. In 1923, if there was a dispute, the Russians with all these conflict regions in the the autonomous region of Nagorny could always restore order. But at Caucasus, including Abkhazia and Karabakh was created. There is times when the empire weakened— South Ossetia. Stalin chaired the lots of speculation about why this such as during the early twentieth meeting—he was the Commissar decision was made. But I think a century with the Russian Empire; for Nationalities—and they basically primary reason was economic. It after the Bolshevik Revolution when allocated Nagorny Karabakh to was part of the economic space of the Russians left the Caucasus; and Azerbaijan, but with autonomous Azerbaijan, and there wasn’t even then again during perestroika, status. The idea was that it would a good road at that point between when the Soviet Union started to become an Armenian majority Yerevan and Karabakh.
Men working by war-ruined building in Shusha, Nagorny-Karabakh. Photo by Adam Jones (2015).
HARRIMAN | 33 Shell-pocked facade, Stepanakert, Nagorny-Karabakh. Photo by Adam Jones (2015).
Udensiva-Brenner: And this is this was a completely devastated place were no mechanisms for dialogue interesting because while the because it was taking in refugees from or for working things out through Soviet regime separated Nagorny the Armenian genocide in Turkey democratic means. Basically, the Karabakh from Armenia, it also gave in 1915–1916. All of this shaped the center decided what got done, and Armenians a homeland for the first collective Armenian mentality. It left when the center broke down, no one time in recent history. And this had them with this fear of being killed, decided what got done. The result? an effect on Armenian attitudes fear of reprisals, a need for belonging, You end up with a conflict. And so, during the conflict . . . a need for solidarity. certainly, this fear of Turkey, fear of being massacred, was pervasive. And, De Waal: That’s right. Prior to the Udensiva-Brenner: How did these ironically, it meant that Armenians formation of the Soviet Union, there fears, and this sense of victimhood, engaged in some preemptive were Armenians scattered all over affect the evolution of the conflict? aggression against Azerbaijan, which the Caucasus, in Anatolia and what’s only fed the whole cycle of violence. now eastern Turkey. But they’d had De Waal: In part, it explains the very very little statehood. They had had strong emotional reaction in Armenia Udensiva-Brenner: And how did the some statehood back in the Middle toward the cause of Karabakh violence start? Ages. They had a brief independent Armenians. And it certainly meant republic again for a couple of years that both sides escalated pretty De Waal: It all happened within a few after the Bolshevik Revolution. But quickly. In the Soviet Union, there days. On February 20, 1988, there was
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Young woman with photos, including her missing brother, at the Museum of Missing Soldiers in Stepanakert, Nagorny-Karabakh. Photo by Adam Jones (2015).
a resolution from the local Soviet of janis on Karabakh and two of them The Politburo was completely the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous were killed, Azerbaijanis who had blindsided. They didn’t know what Region of Azerbaijan, asking for fled Armenia and turned up in this to do. It took twenty-four hours to the transfer of Nagorny Karabakh seaside town of Sumgait just north of deploy Interior Ministry troops to from the Republic of Azerbaijan Baku on the coast. It was a very poor, restore order. By that time, to the Republic of Armenia. There industrial, criminalized town. And twenty-six Armenians and six was this huge naïveté that “justice” they were telling tales of horror, which Azerbaijanis had been killed. could be restored at the stroke of were exaggerated, but they were in a The six Azerbaijanis were killed a pen. That Mikhail Gorbachev traumatized state, saying that they’d mainly by Soviet troops. Many would sign the order and everything been thrown out of Armenia. The local more were injured. would miraculously turn out well. leadership was out of town, and then, Hundreds of Armenians were That Karabakhis would live in their suddenly, this crowd—most of them taking refuge in a building. One of my homeland and this kind of nationalist not so much nationalists as opportun- most extraordinary interviewees was dream would fill the Soviet vacuum ist thugs—started rampaging through this guy called Grigory Kharchenko, that was being created. the Armenian part of town and doing who was basically the first official At first, there were some isolated, a classic pogrom, violently attacking from Moscow to arrive on the scene violent incidents. People grew scared Armenians. There were murders, trying to restore order. He gave this and started to flee. Within a few days there were rapes; it was pretty horrific. incredibly vivid interview about what there was a march by some Azerbai- And it lasted twenty-four hours. he had seen there. The Armenians
HARRIMAN | 35 in the building took him hostage at one point, in order to guarantee their own safety. These were completely unprecedented scenes in peacetime Soviet Union, and it was a point when the political system started to melt down. As a result, there was this massive outflow of Armenians fleeing from Azerbaijan. There were reprisals in Armenia against Azerbaijanis. So just one week after the resolution on February 20, everything was pretty much out of control and remained so from that point on.
Udensiva-Brenner: And what’s the relationship like between Karabakh Armenians and Armenians on the mainland?
De Waal: So, Karabakh is this highland territory that’s quite geographically separate from the Republic of Armenia, eastern Armenia. They speak a very different dialect. I don’t speak Armenian, but, even to my ear, it’s fairly obvious. They also have a very different history. They’re more pro-Russian. This is partly because, during the Soviet years, many of them didn’t go to Baku to study—they didn’t want to go to the regional capital of Azerbaijan; they went straight to Moscow. They’re fluent Russian speakers. Both Karabakh Armenians who’ve been president of Armenia, Robert Kocharian and Serzh Sarkisian, certainly used to speak better Russian than they do Armenian, although they wouldn’t admit that publicly. So, they have a very different mentality as well. Karabakh Armenians are famous (Top) Armenian village guards from Nagorny-Karabakh (1918–1921); photo by for being more stubborn, being Movses Melkumian (1891–1937). (Bottom) Tank monument near Mayraberd good fighters. And what we’ve (Askeran), Nagorny-Karabakh; photo by Adam Jones (2015). seen throughout this conflict is the
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Karabakh tail wagging the Armenian them send that message. And when There was this huge naïveté dog. This small group of Karabakh people said things that I disagreed Armenians has basically dominated with or thought were untrue, I that “justice” could be restored Armenian politics, and they’ve wouldn’t just keep silent. I would at the stroke of a pen. kind of set the course of modern actually engage them in dialogue Armenian history, where defend- and try to give them a different ing Karabakh has been the number point of view. I met a lot of people one priority. And this is a bit of a who’d been displaced. There was one now lives in Baku, or does it belong paradox, because Karabakhis as a Armenian lady from Baku, whom I to this Armenian lady who’s found people are often rather unpopular met while she was working as kind a home because she lost hers?” In a and disliked in Yerevan because they of a hotel servant in Armenia, in way, it belongs to them both. are perceived to have taken over. pretty poor circumstances. She There’s even a joke that you hear in really missed Baku, and I was able to Udensiva-Brenner: Was the swap of Armenian—that first the Karabakh deliver a message back to her friends houses governed by any official body? Armenians occupied Azerbaijan, and there, who hadn’t heard from her then they occupied Armenia. for years. In another instance, I De Waal: I think in the beginning met a group of Azerbaijanis in Baku it was pretty improvised. But then Udensiva-Brenner: How did regular who were from Shusha, a town in I’m sure there was some kind of citizens feel about the conflict when Karabakh that had been a major system. More recently, it became it started? center of Azerbaijani culture. They, much more organized and people too, really missed their homes. I were allocated to houses. And then, De Waal: In my book, I have a lot passed a message to some of the of course, on the Azerbaijani side, of examples of Armenians and Armenian friends they’d grown up all these hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis who were friends and with in Shusha. It was very touching; IDPs [internally displaced persons], didn’t want to fight each other and quite difficult, at times, too, because refugees—many of them lived in tent even passed messages to one another there was obviously resentment camps for ten, fifteen years until they across the radio while the conflict there as well as friendship. were rehoused. There was nowhere was going on. “How are you getting There was one case where an for them to go. along?” “How is it on the other side?” Azerbaijani from Shusha gave me It’s a great tragedy. More than a This was a conflict between neighbors the address to his old apartment and million people were displaced in a who didn’t really want to fight but asked me to check whether or not it very small region. Many of those were forced into it. was still there. The town was pretty people were displaced from towns badly destroyed during the war, but and cities that are not very far from Udensiva-Brenner: And you played his apartment was still standing. where they ended up, but they a role in passing messages back and There was an Armenian lady leaning could never go back or see their forth between the two sides. Can over the balcony. She invited us up, original homes. There was a lot of you discuss some of the experiences and we had a friendly conversation loss and longing. you had? that turned a little bit tense as it became clear that I’d actually met the Udensiva-Brenner: And you De Waal: When I started writing previous occupant. It was a very com- mentioned that there had been the book, I decided that I wasn’t plicated story, because this woman a lot of intermarriage between just going to try to be an academic had had her house burned by some Armenians and Azerbaijanis. What author. I was interested in trying to Azerbaijanis during the war, and then happened to those couples during be helpful in the conflict. If anyone, found this apartment in Shusha. So, and after the conflict? whether a politician or an ordinary the question was: “Who does this person, wanted to send a message to apartment belong to? Does it belong De Waal: A lot of people went to the other side, I would try and help to the guy who was thrown out and Russia. A few stayed in Azerbaijan,
HARRIMAN | 37 but mostly they went abroad. I actually got a letter from someone in Australia; I think she was of mixed parentage. She wrote: “As far as I was concerned the world went mad when that conflict started, and I ended up in Australia. Thank you for writing a book that describes the conflict and describes my life. It makes me feel a little bit saner.” There are people like that all over the world.
Udensiva-Brenner: How did the collapse of the Soviet Union affect the evolution of events?
De Waal: You could make an argument that this conflict was the first stone in the avalanche of territorial conflicts that ended the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union collapsed, it became a conflict between two states, the newly independent states of Armenia and Facade with boy walking, Shusha, Nagorny-Karabakh. Photo by Azerbaijan. This gave a certain trump Adam Jones (2015). card to Azerbaijan, because the world recognized the territorial integrity of these new states on the basis of Soviet borders. Armenians could argue for Armenians more. They got more we look at other conflicts in the as long as they wanted that this was a weapons and fuel and things like that. region—in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, border drawn by Stalin, but this was Third—and I think this was the major Transdniestria, Ukraine—we see de jure how the world recognized the reason—Azerbaijan was in complete a definite Russian role, a definite former Soviet states. Then, in 1994, political turmoil; there was political Russian strategy. In this case, the Armenia won the conflict by capturing infighting and massive instability, Kremlin has multiple agendas, not just Karabakh itself, but all of the after which eventually Heidar Aliev, probably more so on the Armenian surrounding regions as well—a much the old Communist leader, came side if we consider the larger bigger territory, and certainly home to back to power. A lot of people in Baku picture, but, at certain significant a lot more people. were more interested in capturing moments, on the Azerbaijani side power than they were in defending as well. Certainly, at the beginning, Udensiva-Brenner: How were the Karabakh or the regions around it; so when Moscow rejected the central Armenians able to do this? many of them fell without a fight. Armenian demand for Karabakh Armenians to secede from Azerbaijan De Waal: There are three reasons Udensiva-Brenner: Can you discuss and join Armenia. why the Armenians won the conflict. Russia’s role? When the war started things First, they were better organized, became even more complicated and they organized earlier. Second, De Waal: This is probably the most because the Russian military got there was Russian help to both sides, confusing question of all in what is involved. And we have evidence of but Russia ended up helping the already a confusing conflict. When Russian tank drivers and Russian air
38 | HARRIMAN Soldiers of the Army of Azerbaijan during Karabakh War (1992–93). Photo by Ilgar Jafarov.
pilots participating in some of the ’92 forced to resign in ’98 in a kind of This was a conflict between battles in Karabakh on both sides. But palace coup. Ter-Petrosian said it’s difficult to tell how many of them a number of interesting things, neighbors who didn’t really were actually sent there by the Russian including confirming something that want to fight but were army—some of them were Russian many had already suspected—that officers left behind in the Caucasus Russians had sold a lot of weapons to forced into it. after the Soviet collapse, who signed the Armenians. He told me that they up for the states of Armenia and Azer- had done this in order to preserve baijan as freelance fighters in order to a military balance, because the earn some income. Azerbaijanis had a stronger army. Udensiva-Brenner: And how did “Yeltsin would be pretty tough about the two sides come to a ceasefire Udensiva-Brenner: But there is clear not selling me more than he thought agreement in ’94? evidence that Russia sold weapons to I was due,” he told me. There was one the Armenians . . . famous incident where Ter-Petrosian De Waal: By that point, the actually flew to St. Petersburg to Armenians had captured enough De Waal: Yes, that is another factor. plead with Yeltsin. So, this tells us that territory to secure what they would In 2000, I interviewed Levon Russia’s strategic interest was not so regard as a buffer zone around Ter-Petrosian, who was a leading much about the Armenians winning Karabakh. Some wanted to carry politician in Armenia and then its the conflict as the Armenians not on fighting, but I think, in general, president from 1991 until he was losing the conflict. they had tired themselves out. The
HARRIMAN | 39 describing Azerbaijani and Armenian soldiers on the border swapping cigarettes and stories. They don’t actually want to be fighting . . .
De Waal: I think people who actually fight the wars and deal with the other side are often the most peace-loving because they understand the cost of violence, they understand what it’s about. Who actually wants to go kill in the name of a political slogan? And you still see a basis of pragma- tism in ordinary people. In Georgia, for instance, outside the conflict zones, there are Armenian villages with mixed Armenian and Azerbaijani populations. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry shakes hands with Armenian President Serzh They happen to live in areas outside Sargsyan before a meeting on the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict, in Vienna (May the political context of the conflict, and 16, 2016). they find ways of getting along. So, I believe that if a decision was made to pursue peace, the population could go along with it. Unfortunately, I just don’t fighting was getting more intense, De Waal: I’ve described it as a see how to get from here to there. the weapons were getting stronger, “Karabakh trap,” in which the leaders more people were dying, and the decide not to have a proper dialogue Udensiva-Brenner: The construction war was becoming less popular. And with society about how they can get out of the BTC [Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan] the Azerbaijani side was exhausted. of this situation; how they can make pipeline has had quite an impact on Heidar Aliev wanted to consolidate compromises, make peace. They prefer the conflict’s status quo. Can you power in Baku, and he agreed to a to pursue the nationalist narrative discuss that? ceasefire in order to consolidate his of the conflict, which helps them own power. politically at home. But that means De Waal: This is a major new factor And the Russians mediated the that when they do talk to the other since the ceasefire in the region. ceasefire. Their goal was to get a side about peace, they’ve suddenly The new Azerbaijani oil boom in Russian peacekeeping force on the got problems at home; because of the Caspian Sea, led by a number ground, as they had done in Abkhazia this nationalist narrative, 99 percent of Western oil companies, BP in and South Ossetia. That would have of the population isn’t interested in particular, resulted in a new major given the Russians leverage. But nei- peace. Leaders have created a context Western oil export route from the ther side wanted the Russians there, in which there’s no support for peace, Caspian to the Mediterranean. That because it would give them too much even though they know deep down was opened in 2006, and it did a few power, so you had a ceasefire without that this is in the long-term interest things. It gave Western oil companies any peacekeepers. of their countries. For that reason, the a strategic role in the region; it whole thing is stuck in a vicious cycle anchored Azerbaijan and Georgia as a Udensiva-Brenner: You’ve called the that doesn’t have any way forward. transit route to Europe and the West; resulting situation between Armenia and it also made Azerbaijan incredibly and Azerbaijan one of the worst “peace” Udensiva-Brenner: At the same time, wealthy for ten years. There was an periods in history. What did you mean? there’s an anecdote in your book enormous influx of wealth, some
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of which was spent on useful things Udensiva-Brenner: And how likely of some kind of small operation such as rehousing refugees, and do you think it is that something getting bigger; and if that happens infrastructure, and so on, and a lot will happen again? . . . A few years ago that would of which has been, unfortunately, just have been a very low intensity wasted or stolen. And also spent on De Waal: I’m quite worried, to be thing, but now, given the scale of weapons. This is the other major honest. I think there’s a danger the weaponry they have, it could significance of the BTC pipeline: of misjudgment, miscalculation blow out of control, and at that Azerbaijan massively boosted its defense budget after having had this very weak army in the ’90s. Now it has some very formidable weapons— (Top) U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry shakes hands with Azerbaijani President aviation, drones, heavy artillery, and Ilham Aliyev before a meeting on the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict, in Vienna (May long-range missiles—which it uses to 16, 2016). (Bottom) Homemade rifle with photo of mourning at the Museum of Fallen Soldiers in Stepanakert, Nagorny-Karabakh; photo by Adam Jones (2015). intimidate the Armenian side.
Udensiva-Brenner: So the weaker military side remains the winner of the conflict, but the military balance has shifted.
De Waal: That’s right. The Armenians still have the advantage of having won the conflict and captured the territory. They are holding the high ground. And, obviously, it’s easier to defend that than to fight if there were to be a new conflict. Ne dai bog [God forbid], as the Russians say. Let’s hope that doesn’t happen. So this is where we are at the moment. We had a kind of low-tech conflict that ended in the 1990s and a rather low-tech ceasefire with no peacekeepers and militaries on either side of these trenches, and now, suddenly, you have this incredibly militarized zone with two very well-equipped armies on either side of the trenches. Rationally, neither side really wants to fight a war. They both have much to lose. Yet the risks of a miscalculation or a misjudgment are huge, and we saw in April of 2016 this so-called four- day war in which about 200 people died, which I think is a dangerous portent to what could happen again, unfortunately.
HARRIMAN | 41 point you factor in all the political my mind. One thing that interests in general. That’s certainly how this calculations. Once you’ve started me is the issue of identity, of how conflict started. something there’s a lot of pressure we all have not just one identity not to stop and not to back down. So but multiple identities—within our Udensiva-Brenner: What I found I think there’s a real danger that we family, our work, our region; but really striking in your book is the big could see another flare-up. obviously there’s national identity role that academics played in shaping as well. What a political conflict the conflict. Can you talk about that? Udensiva-Brenner: And what can situation does is it starts to put you we learn from this conflict about into categories, and that results in De Waal: This is a very interesting conflicts in general and how they start having to make choices. And that one. In Western countries, we tend and evolve? includes people in mixed marriages to think of academics as the kind and someone who’s got an Armenian of New York Review of Books–reading De Waal: I’m glad you asked that mother and an Azerbaijani father. class, the sort of people who want to question, because it’s certainly They’re suddenly told, “OK, there’s seek compromise, and understand something that is very much on this argument, this dispute, and all points of view; who have a you have to choose: which side are global vision. We assume that, in you on?” That, in turn, leads you to times of conflict, they would be a regard the other side as the “other,” progressive, moderating force. But, to demonize them, to cease contact in the Caucasus—and I think this with them. I guess what I’m saying is was the case in the Balkans as well— that conflicts start when people start intellectuals can very much be the to see another category of people as drivers of conflict. “other,” when identity boundaries In the Caucasus, this started harden. Only when that happens during the Soviet era, with historians is it possible to start fighting. producing work that was not polit- You can’t fight someone that ically controversial on the surface, you’re in daily contact with, because it was ancient history. But, that you have good relations they were actually writing history with. You have to start to that was very nationalist, that was draw lines with them, and denying the agency and historical I think that has a lot of participation of others. For instance, lessons for the world you could read ancient histories of Armenia and Karabakh, written by the Armenian side, that don’t even mention the word “Azerbaijani.” There are also whole histories written by Azerbaijanis that don’t even men- tion Armenia. And the Azerbaijanis came up with this bizarre theory about how the Caucasian Albanians, this national group who most people think died out about a millennium ago, have mysteriously lived on and were inhabiting Karabakh; that the Karabakh Armenians were not proper Armenians but Caucasian Albanians. Intellectuals were very much the driv- Above: Shusha, Nagorny-Karabakh, in February. Photo by Ilgar Jafarov (1992). ers of the nationalist narrative, which Opposite page: Haghpat Monastery in Nagorny-Karabakh. Photo by Saro was used in reaction to the Soviet Hovhannisyan (2011). system. When conflict broke out, they were some of the most implacable people, wanting to see it continue.
Udensiva-Brenner: Do they continue never met an Azerbaijani or an work on a new edition. The text did to play a role today? Armenian. They’ve grown up with a not change; I corrected a few small very simplistic, clichéd, black-and- things, added a new chapter, and De Waal: They do. Maybe not as white view of this conflict, which is that’s what happened. much. What we’re seeing now is a then unfortunately perpetuated by But, that’s it; I’m not going to do kind of internet culture, where a the internet. another edition. It can be quite lower level of intellectual discourse difficult dealing with this conflict. that relies on a few myths, a few Udensiva-Brenner: The book came Anything you write attracts angry conspiracy theories, drives the out in 2003, and you published a comments from Armenians or mentality. But it started from these second edition ten years later, in Azerbaijanis. I wrote something intellectuals forty years ago. 2013. Why did you decide to do this? warning of the dangers of war in 2017, and then on Twitter someone Udensiva-Brenner: And what role De Waal: The book obviously found accused me of being pro-Armenian. has this internet culture played? a niche on the market. It was the Fortunately, someone else wrote, first book on the conflict that tried “it’s well-known that you take Azer- De Waal: Unfortunately, 90 percent to deal with how it started and what baijani oil money.” So I was able to of what’s on the internet is myth- happened from both sides. It was connect those two people and say, making, it’s hate speech, it’s translated into Russian, Armenian, “You better talk to each other and misrepresentation, it’s conspiracy Azerbaijani; into Turkish as well— sort it out among yourselves.” I’m theories; and there’s a lot of that in so it was a resource for people. A glad I wrote this book, but I don’t this conflict. And what this means is few years after it was published, I want to be living with the Nagorny that the younger generations who looked around and saw that there Karabakh conflict until the end of have grown up with this conflict, was still no new major text on this time! So I think that having done but weren’t alive when the Soviet conflict, but quite a lot of things had the update, and now giving you this Union existed—many of these young happened since. So, I talked to my archive, is a way to draw a line on my Armenians or Azerbaijanis have publisher, and we decided I would main contribution to this field.
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