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The Causes of Budget Gridlock in California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles The Causes of Budget Gridlock in California: Institutions, Parties, and Conflict A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology by Isaac David Fligstein Speer 2016 © Copyright by Isaac David Fligstein Speer 2016 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION The Causes of Budget Gridlock in California: Institutions, Parties, and Conflict by Isaac David Fligstein Speer Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology University of California, Los Angeles, 2016 Professor Rebecca J. Emigh, Chair This dissertation addresses three broad questions in political sociology: How do the structures of political institutions shape political conflicts? How are social cleavages (race, class, etc.) linked to conflicts between political parties? And why do states vary in their capacity to make and implement political decisions? I develop a theory of political decision-making by drawing on the work of Max Weber, political institutional theories, and other sources. The overall argument is that states’ ability to reach decisions (such as creating new laws) is influenced by three factors: 1) the number and location of veto points, 2) the pattern of partisan control, and 3) the extent of alignment of partisanship with social and ideological cleavages. Many veto points, divided partisan control, and a strong link between partisanship and cleavages lead to a high level of political gridlock. ii Budget gridlock in California provides a perfect case for assessing my theory of political decision-making. From 1970 to 2010, California’s government was increasingly unable to enact budgets on time. However, since 2010, it has enacted all of its budgets by the deadline. I use comparative-historical methods to examine the rise and fall of budget gridlock. Broadly speaking, I find that the conjuncture of three factors drove the rise of budget gridlock from 1969 to 2010: the establishment of supermajority rules within the government; divided partisan control of government positions; and increasing polarization of Democrats and Republicans along demographic and ideological lines. Changes in two of these factors - the elimination of the supermajority rule for passing budgets, and the shift to full control of the budget process by Democrats – largely account for the disappearance of gridlock since 2010. These findings provide support for my theory of political decision-making. The theory that I develop in this dissertation offers a much stronger explanation for political gridlock than existing models in political science. It can be used to improve our understanding of gridlock in the U.S. federal government, the states, and in other settings. More broadly, it is useful for explaining both the dynamics of political conflicts and variations in state capacity in a variety of contexts. iii The dissertation of Isaac David Fligstein Speer is approved. William G. Roy David O. Sears Edward T. Walker Rebecca J. Emigh, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2016 iv Table of Contents List of Figures and Tables…………………………………………..…………………………..viii Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………..x Vita………………………………………………………………………………………………xii Introduction………………………………………………………………..………………………1 The Case of Budget Gridlock in California…………………………………………….…5 Chapter Summaries………………………………………………………………………..9 Chapter 1: A Theory of Political Decision-making……………………………………………...13 Sociological Theories of Political Outcomes…………………………………………….13 Political Science Theories of Gridlock…………………………………………………..39 Theory of Political Decision-making…………………………………………………….66 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….78 Chapter 2: Case and Analytic Strategy…………………………………………….…………….79 California’s Budget Process……………………………………………………………...82 Trends in Budget Gridlock in California...………………………………………………87 Studies of Budget Gridlock in California………………………………………………..89 Analytic Strategy………………………………………………………………………...95 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...110 v Chapter 3: The Origins and Rise of Budget Gridlock, 1933-1998……………………………..111 1933-1966: The Origins of the Supermajority Rule for Budgets………………………115 1958-1966: The Emergence of the Tax Revolt…………………………………………126 1967-1974: Reagan and the Beginning of Budget Gridlock……………………………132 1975 – 1982 Jerry Brown, the Tax Revolt, and its Aftermath………………………….145 1983-1990 Deukmejian and Gridlock under ‘Divided Government’…………………..169 1991-1998 Wilson, Fiscal Crisis and Intensifying Gridlock…………………………...178 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...…………189 Chapter 4: Gridlock under Gray Davis, 1999-2003…………………………………………….197 The Partisan Context…………………………………………………………………....201 The 1999-2000 Budget Process………………………………………………………...204 The 2000-2001 Budget Process………………………………………………………...211 The 2001-2002 Budget Process………………………………………………………...218 The 2002-2003 Budget Process………………………………………………………...236 The 2003-2004 Budget Process………………………………………………………...254 Conclusion…………………………………………………………...............................273 Chapter 5: Severe Gridlock under Schwarzenegger, 2004-2010………………….....................279 The Partisan Context…………………………………………………………................284 The 2004-2005 Budget Process………………………………………………………...286 The 2005-2006 Budget Process………………………………………………………...294 The 2006-2007 Budget Process………………………………………………………...299 The 2007-2008 Budget Process………………………………………………………...302 The 2008-2009 Budget Process…………………………………………………….......309 vi The 2009-2010 Budget Process………………………………………………………...316 The 2010-2011 Budget Process………………………………………………………...333 Conclusion…………………………………………………………...............................345 Chapter 6: The Disappearance of Gridlock under Governor Brown, 2011-2014……................354 The 2011-2012 Budget Process………………………………………………..……….357 The 2012-2013 Budget Process…………………………………………….…………..367 The 2013-2014 Budget Process ……………………………...………………………...373 The 2014-2015 Budget Process………………………………………………………...375 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...380 Chapter 7: A Comparative Analysis of Gridlock, 1999-2014………………………………….384 Davis (1999-2003) versus Schwarzenegger (2004-2010) ………………...……………387 Davis (1999-2003) versus Brown (2011-2014) ……………………………..…………402 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...410 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...413 Assessing my Theory of Political Decision-making……………………………………413 Relevance for Political Sociology………………………………………………………423 Relevance for Fiscal Sociology………………………………………………………...425 Relevance for Studies of Political Gridlock………………………………….…………429 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………435 vii List of Figures and Tables Figure I.1 - Late Budgets in California, by Decade……………………………………………….6 Figure 1.1 - Theory of Political Decision-making. ……………………………………………...68 Figure 1.2 - Theory of Political Decision-making with Conjuncture of Factors…….…………..73 Figure 2.1. - Budget Gridlock by Governor, 1959-2014………………………………………...88 Table 1.1. - Theory of Political Decision-making: Possible Conjunctures………………………74 Table 2.1. - The Stages of California's Budget Process (1967-2010)……….………..………….83 Table 3.1. - Budget Gridlock by Governor, 1931-1998…………….…………………………..112 Table 4.1 - Budget Gridlock during Davis' Governorship, 1999-2003………………………...197 Table 4.2 - Budget Gridlock under Governors Wilson and Davis…………….………………..198 Table 4.3 - Partisan Composition of the Legislature under Davis…………….………………..199 Table 4.4 - Projected Budget Deficits, 1999-2003…………….……………………………….200 Table 4.5 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, January 2002…………………238 Table 4.6 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, May 2002…………………….242 Table 4.7 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, January 2003…………………258 Table 4.8 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, May 2003…………………….264 Table 5.1 - Budget Gridlock during Schwarzenegger's Governorship………………………....280 Table 5.2 - Partisan Composition of the Legislature under Schwarzenegger…………………..281 Table 5.3 - Projected Budget Deficits under Schwarzenegger …………….…………………..283 Table 5.4 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, January 2004…………………287 Table 5.5 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, January 2005…………………295 viii Table 5.6 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, January 2008…………………310 Table 5.7 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, January 2009…………………321 Table 5.8 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, May 2009…………….………328 Table 5.9 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, January 2010…………………334 Table 5.10 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, May 2010…………………...337 Table 6.1 - California's Budget Process under Governor Brown (2011-2014) ……….……….354 Table 6.2 - Partisan Composition of the California Legislature, 2011-2014…………………...355 Table 6.3 -Projected Budget Deficits, 2011-2014…………….…………….………………….356 Table 6.4 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, January 2011…………………358 Table 6.5 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, May 2011…………………….363 Table 6.6 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, January 2012…………………368 Table 6.7 - Governor's Proposed Solutions for Budget Deficit, May 2012…………………….370 Table 7.1 - Budget Gridlock by Governor, 1999-2014…………….…………….……………..384 Table 7.2 - California's Budget Processes, 1999-2014…………….…………….……………..386 Table 7.3 - Partisan Composition of the State Government, 1999-2014…………….…………389 Table 7.4 - Projected Budget Deficits, 1999-2014…………….…………….…………………395 ix Acknowledgements
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