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Francis Bacon and the Pragmatic Theory of Forms

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Francis Bacon and the Pragmatic Theory of Forms Francis Bacon and the Pragmatic Theory of Forms Evan Wm. Cameron Professor Emeritus Senior Scholar in Screenwriting Graduate Programmes, Film & Video and Philosophy York University [Original version submitted on 27 November 1964 to fulfill the requirements of a graduate course on 'Bacon, Locke and Hume' taught by Donald C. Williams within the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University. (See footnote 1 of the essay.) The revision presented here, published a decade later as pages 592-610 of Philosophical Forum 5 (New Series), No. 4 (Summer, 1974), was the first philosophical publication of the author. (A sentence on page 8 has been repositioned, end notes converted into footnotes and the bibliography refined.)] Francis Bacon and the Pragmatic Theory of Forms1 . .philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however is to change it. Karl Marx2 . of myself I say nothing; but in behalf of the business which is in hand I entreat men to believe that it is not an opinion to be held, but a work to be done; and to be well assured that l am laboring to lay the foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but of human utility and power. Francis Bacon3 I To Francis Bacon there were three "beams of man's knowledge"; the "Radius Directus" by which nature is known; the "Radius Refractus" by which God is known; and the "Radius Reflectus" by which "man beholdeth and contemplateth himself".4 These epistemological modes were distinct and self-sufficient, permitting no shift of method or content from one to another. 1 I wish to thank Professor Donald C. Williams, one of my finest teachers, for introducing me to the writings of Francis Bacon and for carefully criticising an earlier draft of this paper with whose principal thesis he is in total, spirited yet scrupulously fair disagreement, as those who know and respect him as I do might well have expected. 2 Karl Marx, from “Thesis #11 on Feuerbach’s Philosophy”, as quoted by Barrows Dunham, “On Teaching Marxist Epistemology”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 29, #4, October 1961, page 365. 3 From page 16 of the reproduction of Bacon's Preface to The Great Instauration within Francis Bacon [1], listed within the Bibliography of works at the end of this essay to which all further citations will be made. [I shall hereafter refer to Bacon's New Organon (or Novum Organum), as it appears within Francis Bacon [1], as NO.] 4 From page 256 of the reproduction of Bacon's The Advancement of Learning within Francis Bacon [2]. [I shall refer hereafter to Bacon's text, as it appears within Francis Bacon [2], as AOL.] Francis Bacon and the Pragmatic Theory of Forms Page 2 of 19 The theory of Forms was conceived by Bacon to be part of the "Radius Directus", and was thus assumed to be inapplicable to either of the other two modes of human knowledge. But what role did the Forms play in the Radius Directus? In particular, were they or were they not natural objects (i.e., entities in the natural universe)? To answer the above questions, I shall firstly examine Bacon's ontology of nature. Against this ontological backdrop, I shall then argue for an interpretation of the theory of Forms that is pragmatic and non-ontological (as, I believe, Bacon himself once spent a lifetime doing). II Philosophers have interpreted the natural universe in various ways. In so doing, they have expressed with varying degrees of clarity and assurance a variety of conceptions concerning the ontological status of various types of entities. To most philosophers the question 'What is there?' could not be answered with insight in any simple fashion, and elaborate schemes of ontological classification have arisen in the face of it. Francis Bacon, however, thought otherwise. To the ontological question there was a simple, single and straightforward answer: matter. The particles of matter existed in widely varying patterns of motion and combination, of course, for otherwise the diversity of nature could hardly be explained. But to Bacon this was not to be confused with the false assertion that the patterns of notion and combination existed as entities in themselves distinct from natter. The natural universe consisted of matter having properties; it did not consist of matter and properties. Bacon's ontological position is most clearly express in De Sapientia Veterum (1609), a collection of classical fables interpreted in a charming though "thoroughly naturalistic" manner.5 While employing the fable of Cupid to explain the nature of the atom, "primary matter, together with its properties, is distinguished in treatment from matter's motion".6 What emerges is a conception of the elementary particles of matter as containing an intrinsic propensity toward combination and motion. 5 F. H. Anderson [2], page 57. 6 Ibid., page 78. Francis Bacon and the Pragmatic Theory of Forms Page 3 of 19 Bacon's conception of matter as essentially alive, a thing developing out of an inherent principle of motion, is one of the most important of his contributions to philosophy and points forward to modern evolutionary views.7 Indeed, all the properties of formed matter (i.e., the simple natures with which the Forms were to be associated in the Novum Organum) are conceived as being ontologically grounded in a particular type of motion. This is local motion. According to Bacon all activity is to be explained as the local juxtaposition of parts of matter.8 Yet it is not the essence of this primary motion with which Bacon's theory of Forms was to be concerned, for to Bacon the mode of power that structured matter into things is totally formless and hence "inexpressible" by finite man.9 Rather, Bacon was to be concerned with the patterns of its effect – its footprints as opposed to it. Love seems to be the appetite, or incentive, of the primitive matter.. .the natural motion, or moving principle, of the original corpuscles, or atoms: this being the most ancient and only power that made and wrought things out of matter. .it could have no natural cause; for, excepting God, nothing was before it. And as nothing is more inward with nature, it can neither be a genus nor a form; and therefore, whatever it is, it must be somewhat positive, though inexpressible.10 The theological sources of Bacon's ontological conception have seldom been sufficiently recognized, and a discussion lies beyond the scope of this paper. But it is clear that Bacon accepted the notion of the eternity of matter, though not the eternity of formed matter, in accordance with his theological and biblical persuasions. When interpreting the fable of Coelium, he expressly accepted the doctrine of Democritus, . who expressly asserts the eternity of matter; but denies the eternity of the world: thereby approaching to the truth of sacred writ, which makes chaos, or uninformed matter, to exist before the six days works.11 7 Benjamin Farrington [1], page 79. 8 F. H. Anderson [2], pages 76 and 77. 9 I shall use double quotations marks " . " to indicate that a writer has used this exact word or phrase or a close derivative of it. 10 Francis Bacon [5], remarks on the fable of Cupid, page 51. 11 Ibid., remarks on the fable of Coelium, page 10. Francis Bacon and the Pragmatic Theory of Forms Page 4 of 19 Not only were the particles of matter eternal, in accordance with holy writ; but to Bacon the story of creation in Genesis had to do with the formation of bodies from particles of matter that already existed, for in the Novum Organum Bacon asserted that "the absolute quantum or sum total of matter remains unchanged, without increase or diminution".12 Thus to Bacon "the universe is. ..the face of matter, not under constraint"13 (using the anthropomorphism "face" as in Genesis 2:1, "And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters", to explain the universe of appearances as the property of matter rather than as a mode of existence distinct from matter). But it is at this point that the question of the relevance of Bacon's ontology to his theory of Forms arises. For to Bacon the universe consisted solely of "individual bodies performing individual acts according to a fixed law", which bodies in turn were composed of substances composed in turn of the particles of matter.14 Bacon's substances were roughly equivalent to what we would today call 'elements' (although, as one might expect, Bacon included among his substances various things that we would no longer consider elemental): "wood, iron, lead, cloth, parchment. .," ". a lion . oak. .gold . water . air," etc..15 Only bodies and their composite substances could be observed on the face of Bacon's universe (hence the use of the Genesis metaphor). But the essences of substances were not to be the subject of Bacon's theory of Forms any more than were the essences of compound bodies, for Bacon sharply castigated Paracelsus for "polluting" the springs of knowledge by engaging upon such a fruitless quest. Where you ought to have tried to calculate motions you grasped at the elusive, protean, nature of substances and thus polluted the springs of knowledge and left the human mind stripped of its aids.16 If Bacon's theory of Forms, therefore, was not to be concerned with the essences of either substances or compound bodies, with what was it to be concerned? If (for whatever reason) one holds that Bacon's theory of Forms must have been concerned with the essence of matter at some level of his ontological scale (i.e., particles of matter, substances and bodies), then one is left with the essence of the non-appearing primary particles of matter themselves.
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