Nuclear Developments

15 NEWLY-INDEPENDENT ST ATES

reactivated. The financing of the renova- Belarusian State Nuclear Industry Inspec- tion efforts at Metsamor has yet to be re- tion body and the new committee will fi- ARMENIA solved; Abaghian estimates that “some 100 nalize an agreement to create a physical se- million dollars are needed for reopening the curity system for nuclear materials in block [at Metsamor].” Belarus. Aragil Electronic News Bulletin (Yerevan), 6/5/94; Radio Minsk Network (Minsk), 9/23/94; in FBIS- in FBIS-SOV-94-109, 6/7/94, p. 66 (11634). Snark SOV-94-185, 9/23/94, p. 58 (11793). Transcaucasia Economic News (Yerevan), 6/5/94; INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS in FBIS-SOV-94-109, 6/7/94, p. 66 (11634).

9/22/94 BELARUS WITH UNITED STATES Armenia signs the International Convention on Nuclear Security. 7/7/94 Aragil Electronic News Bulletin (Yerevan), 9/30/ AZERBAIJAN It is reported that Belarus is receiving ap- 94; in FBIS-SOV-94-191, 10/3/94, p. 50 (11535). proximately $7 million from the U.S. un- der the Nunn-Lugar program for dismantle- ment of nuclear and other types of weap- ARMENIA WITH RUSSIA ons. AZERBAIJAN WITH TURKEY Radio Minsk Network (Minsk), 7/7/94; in FBIS- 6/94 SOV-94-130, 7/7/94, p. 54 (11525). A Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy del- Late 7/94 9/26/94 egation visits Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear Turkish police confiscate 22 pounds of ura- It is reported that, according to Secretary of power plant to inspect the facility before nium believed to have come from Defense William Perry, the U.S. has con- renovation efforts begin. Director of the Azerbaijan; five Turks are arrested. Police cluded 38 agreements with Belarus, Russian Institute of Nuclear Plants Use have not said whether the material was weap- Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia, raising Armen Abaghian, a member of the delega- ons-grade. U.S. aid to the region to over $900 million. tion, characterizes the state of the plant as Edith M. Lederer, Washington Times, 8/21/94, p. 9 (11814). Izvestiya (Moscow), 7/26/94, p. 3 (11642). Paul Mann, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9/ “ready to [sic] reconstruction.” Another 26/94, p. 23 (11680). group of Russian specialists will arrive shortly and will remain until the plant is

BELARUS ESTONIA The numbers listed in parenthesis following the bibliographic references refer to the identification number of the document in the Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project Database, from which the news summaries BELARUS WITH JAPAN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS are abstracted. Because of the rapidly 9/94 changing nature of the subject matter, The 8/26/94 Nonproliferation Review is unable to The Japanese Foreign Ministry sends a rep- Estonian police arrest an Estonian man who guarantee that the information reported resentative group to Belarus to consider is- was attempting to smuggle 3 kg of U238 to herein is complete or accurate, and sues for the Committee for Nuclear Non- Western Europe. Estonian authorities be- disclaims liability to any party for any loss proliferation, a joint committee created by lieve this is not an isolated incident and ex- or damage caused by errors or omissions. the two countries in 1993. At the conclu- press concern that Estonia is becoming a sion of the talks, it is expected that the

102 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments major transshipment point for illicit nuclear packed in 590 cylinders, 10 cm in length transferred to Russia by train. In order to material from Russia. and 8 cm in diameter. According to Juri prevent possible terrorist attack, the trans- Flemming Rose, Berlingske Tidende (Copenhagen), Pihl, the head of the security police, Rus- port date has not been publicized. Two 8/27/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-168, 8/30/94, p. 56 sian sources informed Estonia in 8/94 that hundred Russian servicemen are guarding (11567). “a certain amount of radioactive material had the reactor building during the process. been smuggled” into the country. The Es- Reuter (Tallinn), 9/20/94; in Executive News Ser- tonian citizen who then received the mate- vice, 9/21/94 (11730). ESTONIA WITH RUSSIA rial buried it in Polva, where he lives. Po- lice are concerned that the LEU was pro- 6/30/94 duced by the same Russian factories that Juri Tikk, Estonian administrator at the manufacture nuclear weapons. KAZAKHSTAN former Soviet submarine base in Paldiski, BNS (Tallinn), 8/25/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-166, 8/ states that dismantling of reactors at the base 26/94, p. 58 (11635). will proceed in three stages. First, the fuel will be removed and transferred to Russia. 8/17/94 Second, Russian specialists will remove “se- Juri Tikk, Estonian administrator at the cret military objects” from the reactors. And Paldiski submarine base, announces that the INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS third, reactor components and radwaste will equipment for dismantling one of the base’s be transported back to Russia. reactors has arrived at Paldiski, along with 5/94 ETA (Tallinn), 6/30/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-126, 6/ 25 Russian specialists needed for the pro- Viktor P. Zhelnov, chief geologist for 30/94, p. 69 (11730). cess. Tikk says that containers for trans- Kazakhstan’s National Stock Company porting the fuel will not be brought to KATEP, details the status of Kazakhstan’s 7/26/94 Paldiski until the actual removal date. uranium mining and processing, as well as Russia and Estonia sign agreements on the BNS (Tallinn), 8/17/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-160, 8/ its total mined and untouched uranium re- withdrawal of Russian troops from the 18/94, p. 42 (11730). serves. There are five entities which cur- Paldiski submarine base and on the status rently mine and refine uranium in of retired Russian soldiers and KGB per- 8/24/94 Kazakhstan: the KASTOR stock company sonnel remaining in Estonia. However, an Russia begins work on dismantlement of the in western Kazakhstan, the Tselinny Min- agreement on dismantling reactors at the first reactor at the Paldiski submarine base. ing and Chemical Combine (CMCC) in the base is still not finalized. The entire dismantlement process is ex- north, and the Central, Stepnoye, and Num- Aleksandr Krylovich and Valeriy Sevryukov, Itar- pected to take about three months which ber Six mining companies in southern Tass (Moscow), 8/2/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-149, 8/3/ Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuri 94, p. 11 (11733). Interfax (Moscow), 7/28/94; in Kazakhstan. Of these, only KASTOR and FBIS-SOV-94-146, 7/29/94, p. 43 (11733). Luikka estimates will cost $10 million. The CMCC conduct the full uranium mining and West has guaranteed $5 million in aid. A refining cycle; the other three companies 7/30/94 committee of international experts will su- explore uranium deposits and mine and pro- In Moscow, Russia and Estonia sign an pervise the process. duce partially finished product (a solution agreement on dismantling the reactors at the Novosti (Moscow), 8/24/94; in Russia & CIS To- with a 25-30 percent uranium content, or day, 8/24/94, p. 10 (11673). Izvestiya, 7/23/94, p. Paldiski submarine base. The dismantle- 3 (11673). N. Ostilovskaya, Novosti (Moscow), 7/ yellowcake with a 50 percent uranium con- ment process will involve 210 Russian spe- 30/94; in Russia & CIS Today, 8/1/94, p. 35 (11673). tent). Mining is done using in-situ leach- cialists. All Russian troops — except for the E. Sosipatrova, Novosti (Moscow), 8/24/94; in ing (ISL), open-pit and underground meth- nuclear specialists — are supposed to leave Russia & CIS Today, 8/25/94, p. 26 (11673). K. ods. Zhelnov estimates that the total ura- Kozlova, Segodnya (TV Moscow), 8/26/94; in Rus- Paldiski by 8/31/94; the reactors must be sia & CIS Today, 8/29/94, p. 22 (11673). nium reserves of Kazakhstan, both proven completely dismantled by 9/30/95. and estimated, equal 1,168,000 tons. Of Aleksandr Krylovich and Valeriy Sevryukov, Itar- 9/8/94 these reserves, 888,600 tons have a “forward Tass (Moscow), 8/2/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-149, 8/3/ cost” below $80 per kilogram. 94, p. 11 (11733). BNS (Tallinn), 8/3/94; in FBIS- All the fuel from the first Paldiski reactor Nukem, 5/94, pp. 9-13 (11772). SOV-94-151, 8/5/94, p. 9 (11733). Reuter (Tallinn), has now been transferred from Estonia to 9/20/94; in Executive News Service, 9/21/94 Russia. (11730). ETA (Tallinn), 9/8/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-175, 9/9/ 8/94 94, p. 74 (11730). It is reported that the BN-350 fast breeder Early 8/94 reactor in Shevchenko has been forced to Estonian security police arrest an Estonian 9/20/94 close down due to lack of funds to purchase citizen in the possession of 2.95 kg of low- Dismantlement of the second reactor at the nuclear fuel and to pay transport charges, enriched uranium (LEU), which was given Paldiski base begins. The fuel rods will be customs duties, and staff salaries. The to him by two Russians who brought the removed, packed in special containers, then reactor’s management says that, due to lack material to Estonia in 1/94. The LEU was

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 103 Nuclear Developments of wages, one-fourth of the staff has not guards on uranium exports and nuclear fuel before 9/19/94. worked at the BN-350 since 4/94. pellet production. Interfax (Moscow), 8/25/94; in JPRS-TEN-94-021, Nuclear News, 8/94, p. 47 (11536). Nuclear News, 9/94, p. 92 (11764). Vesti (Mos- 8/25/94 (11637). cow), 7/28/94; in Russia & CIS Today, 7/28/94, p. 8/22/94 8 (11644). It is reported that a 30 MWe reactor near KAZAKHSTAN WITH UKRAINE Almaty, which belongs to the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan, is attracting KAZAKHSTAN WITH KYRGYZSTAN 8/27/94 the attention of politicians and journalists, It is reported that Kazakhstan’s Defense despite the fact that it is not operating. 6/22/94 Minister Sagadat Nurmagambetov and According to eye-witnesses, special vehicles It is reported that during a meeting in Ukraine’s Defense Minister Vitaliy designed for the transportation of nuclear Almaty between Kyrgyz Prime Minister Radetskyy met in Kiev to discuss nuclear materials (including uranium) often leave the Abbas Dzhumagulov and Kazakh Prime disarmament issues as well as a draft of a reactor site at a frequency which experts Minister Tereshchenko, the two leaders bilateral agreement between the two defense believe is too high for an inactive reactor. reached an agreement under which ministries. Some politicians in Kazakhstan surmise that Kazakhstan will export “raw materials con- Mayak Radio Network (Moscow), 8/27/94; in FBIS- the republic might therefore be trading its taining uranium” to Kyrgyzstan; the ship- SOV-94-167, 8/29/94, p. 46 (11524). nuclear materials. ments will start in 1994 and continue until Segodnya (Moscow), 8/22/94; in Russia and CIS 2000. Today, 8/23/94, p. 22 (11645). Kazakh Radio Network (Almaty), 6/22/94; in FBIS- KAZAKHSTAN WITH UNITED STATES SOV-94-121, 6/23/94, p. 51 (11560). 3/19/94 KAZAKHSTAN WITH AUSTRALIA After signing the Defense Conversion Agree- KAZAKHSTAN WITH RUSSIA ment with Kazakhstan, the U.S. pledges $15 1994 million to assist Kazakh defense industries ERA, one of Australia’s two uranium pro- 3/28/94 in their conversion efforts. One of the eight duction firms, is now using purchases from Russia and Kazakhstan conclude an agree- industrial enterprises chosen to receive funds Kazakhstan to fill half its current uranium ment on the dismantlement and subsequent is the National Nuclear Center in Kurchatov. orders. removal from Kazakhstan of the nuclear Jane’s Defense Contracts, 8/94, p. 3 (11778). Financial Review, 8/29/94, p. 70 (11774). device at the facility known as “object 108” located at the Semipalatinsk test site. The 8/15/94 device was placed at the site in 5/91 in prepa- The “Uranium Purchases Report 1993,” pub- KAZAKHSTAN WITH CANADA ration for a nuclear test. lished by the U.S. Department of Energy, Olzhas Suleimenov and Vladimir Yakimits, indicates that in 1993 the U.S. purchased Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 6/25/94, p. 4 (11809). 1/94-5/94 Kazakh U308 at an average price of $9.56 per pound; the U.S. bought Russian U308 at Canada imports 404.8 tons of uranium from 6/1/94 Kazakhstan, most of which is probably for an average price of $10.02 per pound. In Russia turns over control of the 1993, Russia and Kazakhstan were among conversion and re-export. Semipalatinsk test range to Kazakhstan. UNECAN News, 8/31/94, p. 4 (11537). the top five exporters of uranium to the U.S. 2X2 Television (Moscow), 6/1/94; in FBIS-SOV- NuclearFuel, 8/29/94, p. 18 (11648). 94-105, 6/1/94, p. 17 (11538).

KAZAKHSTAN WITH IAEA 8/15/94-8/20/94 9/26/94 A Russian-Kazakh “coordinating group” It is reported that, according to U.S. Secre- 7/26/94 meets in Kurchatov, Kazakhstan, to discuss tary of Defense William Perry, the U.S. has Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Sergei progress on the dismantling of the nuclear concluded 38 agreements with Belarus, Tereshchenko and IAEA Director Hans Blix device at the Semipalatinsk test site. The Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia, raising sign an IAEA nuclear safeguards agreement removal process is on schedule. Respond- U.S. aid to the region to over $900 million. in Almaty. The agreement requires safe- Paul Mann, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9/ ing to concerns over the environmental con- 26/94, p. 23 (11680). guards for the 350 MWe reactor at sequences of removing the device, engineers Shevchenko, a research reactor located in from the Kazakh National Nuclear Center Almaty, and three experimental reactors at and the Russian Federal Nuclear Center took the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. Impo- radiation level readings at the removal site sition of nuclear-related export controls are and found that they were not in excess of also part of the agreement, including safe- the norm. The group plans to meet again

104 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments

is “not possible to take away plutonium from LITHUANIA WITH UNITED KINGDOM [the] Ignalina nuclear power-station either KYRGYZSTAN from [a] technical or theoretical point of 1994 view.” His statement comes in response to Lithuania completes negotiations with the Western media reports naming the Ignalina U.K. firms NNC and Scottish Nuclear on a station as a suspected exporter of radioac- contract to implement a series of technical tive materials. and procedural safety improvements at the KYRGYZSTAN WITH KAZAKHSTAN Elta (Vilnius), 8/25/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-166, 8/ Ignalina nuclear power plant. The contract 26/94, p. 59 (11636). is worth 1.9 million ECU. 6/22/94 Nuclear Europe Worldscan, 5-6/94, p. 24 (11780). It is reported that during a meeting in Almaty between Kyrgyz Prime Minister LITHUANIA WITH GERMANY, POLAND, Abbas Dzhumagulov and Kazakh Prime AND RUSSIA Minister Tereshchenko, the two leaders reached an agreement under which 8/94 MOLDOVA Kazakhstan will export “raw materials con- Juozas Jacevicius, Deputy Director of the taining uranium” to Kyrgyzstan; the ship- Lithuanian Customs Administration, says ments will start in 1994 and continue until that although Lithuania is not a producer of 2000. nuclear materials, it is an intermediary for Kazakh Radio Network (Almaty), 6/22/94; in FBIS- the smuggling of such materials. Because MOLDOVA WITH ROMANIA AND RUSSIA SOV-94-121, 6/23/94, p. 51 (11560). customs agents do not have the proper equip- ment to detect radiation, there is no way to 6/21/94 find nuclear substances as they come into Simion Lacramioara, chief of the Moldovan KYRGYZSTAN WITH PRC or go out of Lithuania. Radioactive materi- Ministry of Interior Department for Com- als from Moscow, Kaliningrad, and St. Pe- batting Organized Crime, reports that a 7/94 tersburg can come through Lithuania en group of smugglers was arrested last week Following the PRC’s 6/10/94 nuclear test route to Poland and Germany via train, since while trying to sell a tank filled with 1 kg at Lop Nor — the third such test in less than train cars cannot be checked in transit “be- of the radioactive material gamma cobalt- two years — Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minis- cause doors are locked from the inside.” 60 to a foreign merchant for $20,000. This ter A. Aytmatov delivers a message of con- Lithuania’s Prosecutor General Paulauskas was the first smuggling incident where cern to China’s ambassador in Bishkek, Pan says that although he “could arrest at least Moldovan police found material of a “high Ranglin. Kyrgyzstan opposes nuclear test- one border guard a day for taking bribes,” quality.” A Romanian citizen is believed to ing on the grounds that it threatens the health he does not do it. have ordered the substance, but officials lack of the region’s inhabitants and undermines Horst Stenzel, ZDF Television Network (Mainz), sufficient evidence for his arrest. The ma- negotiations on a comprehensive test ban 8/19/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-162, 8/22/94 (12016). terial was brought into Moldova from Rus- treaty. China expresses its willingness to sia. Three Moldovan citizens, Ion Petcu, ban all nuclear testing if a corresponding Alexandru Budoianu, and Simion Tarlev, international treaty is signed prior to 1997. LITHUANIA WITH RUSSIA and one Russian collaborator were appre- Vladimir Berezhovskiy, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Mos- hended after being monitored by the cow), 7/21/94, p. 6; in FBIS-SOV-94-142, 7/25/ 8/94 94, p. 59 (11566). Moldovan Ministry of Interior for four It is disclosed that on 11/16/93 the months. One source reports that only two Lithuanian government cancelled construc- Moldovans were arrested. The confiscated tion of a third reactor at the Ignalina nuclear material had the potential to pollute the en- power plant, and that there is no prospect tire Moldovan region. Although the con- LITHUANIA of constructing another unit in the immedi- tainer was “factory-made” and hermetically ate future. Ignalina generates more than 80 sealed, a small leak of the substance was percent of Lithuania’s electricity. Nuclear discovered by experts. Moldova has recently fuel and reactor components for Ignalina are experienced an increase of nuclear smug- purchased solely from Russia, which has gling incidents due to the lack of strict cus- recently increased the prices for these prod- INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS toms controls on Romania’s eastern borders. ucts. Radwaste storage for the Ignalina plant Basapress (Chisinau), 6/21/94; in FBIS-SOV-94- will run out for its first unit in 9/94, and 122, 6/24/94, p. 56 (11531). Interfax (Moscow), 8/94 for the Ignalina-2 unit in 7/95. 6/22/94; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 7/13/94, p. 43 Lithuanian State Nuclear Energy Inspection Nuclear Europe Worldscan, 7-8/94, p. 58 (11735). (11568). Interfax (Moscow), 6/22/94; in FBIS- expert Mikhail Demtshenko claims that it SOV-94-121, 6/23/94, p. 49 (11633).

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 105 Nuclear Developments

the Research Institute of Physics and Tech- 6/1/94 nology in Chelyabinsk-70 (Snezhinsk); in Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev, deputy RUSSIA 7/94, it was reported that the material had chief of the Main Administration of the been recovered and, according to the Asso- Russian Ministry of Defense, says that while ciated Press, a number of people were ar- the theft of any nuclear material from Rus- rested for the crime. Along with the ura- sia is cause for concern, stolen Russian ura- nium, some 150 g of platinum were found. nium is "enriched to 2-4 [percent], and INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS One counterintelligence officer in rarely 30 percent,” rendering it useless for Chelyabinsk has suggested that the thief in- an explosive device. Yakovlev also talks of 2/94 tended to cover the uranium cylinder with the stringent control system that makes it Yuri Vishnevsky, head of the Russian Atomic platinum and then sell it as an ingot of pre- “impossible to lose not only a nuclear charge Industry Inspectorate, says that the Minis- cious metal. Russia is currently investigat- but even its vehicle or any other non-nuclear try of Atomic Energy and the Defense Min- ing approximately 50 cases of smuggling of part of it.” Yakovlev says that the 1,500 istry are obstructing nuclear inspections and non-weapons-grade uranium. Ukrainian nuclear devices Russia has de- attempts at effective regulation. Vishnevsky Vladimir Ivanidze, Izvestiya, 7/9/94, p. 1 (11672). stroyed is over half of the total number of says, “This situation cannot be tolerated any Associated Press, 7/8/94; in UI News Briefing, 7/ devices removed from Ukraine. According 6-12/94, p. 3 (11672). longer. These facilities should be placed to Yakovlev, the USSR began removing under [outside] supervision, under inspec- 4/94 nuclear weapons from the Warsaw Pact coun- tors only responsible for safety and for the An article in the Paris journal Al-Watan Al- tries and from Soviet republics in response removal of any problems.” Vishnevsky notes Arabi carries portions of a report purport- to growing political instability during the that nuclear material security is hampered edly written by the Russian counterintelli- era of perestroika, such that by the end of by the fact that installations are spread out gence service detailing chemical and nuclear 1991 only Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia still and are “accessible to about 14,500 enter- weapons proliferation concerns in the Cen- had “nuclear ammunition.” Yakovlev says prises and individuals.” tral Asian republics. The report states that there is still a need to conduct nuclear test- Washington Post, 8/19/94, p. 32 (11588). most nuclear and other military scientists ing to make nuclear arsenals safer. Finally, Yakovlev says that Russian nuclear forces 3/94 formerly working in Central Asia — approxi- mately 3,000 in number — are now in Brit- are still safe and reliable and Russia is not Members of Russia’s Antiterrorist Service — planning any new weapons systems due to a part of the Federal Counterintelligence ain, Germany, France, Japan, Sweden, and the U.S. The report also notes that sales of their high cost. Service’s (FCS) St. Petersburg Directorate — Kirill Belyaninov, Literaturnaya Gazeta (Moscow), arrest several people, including a butcher advanced weapons and technology to Iran, 6/1/94, p. 10; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 7/13/94, p. and a plumber, who were attempting to sell Pakistan, and Iraq are not being stopped and 46 (11723). 3.05 kg of “highly enriched uranium diox- that a secret Kyrgyz “chemical and laser ide.” The material was stolen from an “en- weapons laboratory had disappeared and was Early 6/94 terprise near Moscow” and was stored in a apparently sold off.” Viktor Mikhailov of Russia’s Ministry of Al-Watan Al-Arabi (Paris); in Steven Zaloga, Armed Atomic Energy announces that Russia will glass jar and a metal flask. According to Forces Journal International, 7/94, p. 43 (11629). the head of the St. Petersburg FCS, Yevgeniy disarm all but 3,500 of its most effective nuclear weapons by 2003. Mikhailov states Lukin, “the mole fraction of the uranium- 4/94 235 in the mixture of isotopes was 90 per- that Russia’s security needs will be met in Alexei Lebedev, director of protocol and spite of this tenfold reduction. Nuclear dis- cent.” Earlier, the arrested men were trying personnel at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, to pass off radioactive waste or LEU as stra- armament costs Moscow up to 1 trillion says that the facilities which store plutonium rubles a year. tegic raw materials, but the current incident from dismantled nuclear weapons lack is believed to involve actual weapons-grade Radio Moscow World Service (Moscow), 6/6/94; proper security. in FBIS-SOV-94-10, 7/21/94, p. 44 (11565). material. The smugglers, now being inter- Edith M. Lederer, Washington Times, 8/21/94, p. 9 rogated in St. Petersburg, will face charges (11814). 6/4/94 of radioactive materials theft in Moscow It is reported that Russia can start receiving under Article 223, Note 3. 6/94 “spent ionizing radiation sources” from Anderey Ishchenko, Yezhednevnaya Gazeta (Mos- It is reported that work is underway on abroad at the Moscow Interregional Radio- cow), 6/9/94, p. 1; in FBIS-SOV-94-111, 6/9/94, Russia’s first underground nuclear facility p. 35 (11669). active Waste Storage center near Zagorsk, in Apatity, located on the Kola peninsula. as soon as customs and financial questions Mayak Radio Network (Moscow), 6/23/94; in JPRS- 4/94 TND-94-014, 7/13/94, p. 14 (11577). are settled. Five and one half kilograms of U238, which Izvestiya (Moscow), 6/4/94, p. 1; in JPRS-TND- is unsuitable for military use, are stolen from 94-016, 6/24/94. p. 32 (11676).

106 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments

6/9/94 7/94 erational for two years, while the third is Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev, Commander of the still functioning, producing nuclear fuel and details Russia’s doctrine on the purposes of Northern Fleet, states that due to lack of heating residences in the city. its strategic forces. Grachev renounces the funds many of the Yankee Class nuclear Krasnaya Zvezda, 7/30/94, p. 1 (11674). Krasnaya USSR’s stand on non-first-use, and declares submarines falling under START I limita- Zvezda, 7/28/94, p. 1 (11764). Vladimir Gavrilenko, Krasnaya Zvezda, 7/29/94, p. 1 that Russia’s nuclear weapons are a means tions have not yet been dismantled. Spent (11674). to prevent large-scale war, adding that “we fuel has been removed from only 16 sub- do not view nuclear weapons as a means of marines while another 44 submarines that 8/94 conducting military actions, but as a means have been withdrawn from the fleet remain Sergei Vasiliev, spokesman for Russia’s Fed- of deterrence against the unleashing of ag- docked awaiting dismantlement funding eral Counterintelligence Service (FCS), re- gression.” Grachev declares that Russia has from either the Navy or the Russian gov- ports the arrest of an unspecified number of no intentions of using its nuclear weapons ernment. According to Yerofeyev, at the individuals suspected of smuggling fissile against any state party to the NPT, except present rate it could be “many, many years” materials. Although he declines to name in the cases of either outright attack by an before the roughly 100 nuclear submarines those arrested or reveal precisely what type NPT state allied with a nuclear weapon state are completely dismantled. of radioactive material was confiscated, or “joint actions” between an NPT state and Viktor Litovkin, Izvestiya (Moscow), 7/23/94, p. Vasiliev firmly denies Moskovskiy a nuclear weapons state “to implement or 2; in FBIS-SOV-94-144, 7/29/94, pp. 26-27 (11679). Komsomolets reports that two of those ar- support” such an attack. This provision rested were FCS officers. covers all the territory of the Russian Fed- 7/94 Paris AFP, 8/30/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-169, 8/31/ eration, its military forces, and any country 94, p. 35 (11678). At a three-day summit between the national allied with Russia. crime fighting agencies of the U.S. and Pavel Grachev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), 6/ 8/94 9/94, pp. 1, 5 (11743). Russia, Colonel General Mikhail Yegorov Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman reports that over the past 18 months, 50 in- Grigoriy Karasin states that Russia hopes to 6/25/94 cidents of nuclear materials theft have been conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) It is reported that a Russian government reported. According to Yegorov, “there have as soon as possible in order to create an commission working in the Urals ordered been no thefts of materials which can be atmosphere more favorable to NPT exten- the repayment of debts to military-indus- made into weapons.” sion. Karasin states that the CTB must not Monterey Herald, 7/3/94, pp. 1A, 16A (11797). trial complex enterprises in the oblast by 7/ be a financial burden on Russia, must be 1/94 for “work carried out under the state easy to implement, and must accommodate order.” Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the 7/7/94 Russia’s interests as a nuclear power. State Committee for the Defense Sectors of It is reported that the State Duma adopted Interfax (Moscow), 8/2/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-149, Industry, said that the southern Urals re- the law on “State Policy in the Sphere of 8/3/94, p. 8 (11661). gion contains a concentration of facilities Radioactive Waste Handling.” The law pro- that produce essential equipment for the hibits the import of waste into Russia. Ar- 8/94 Russian military, including electronic war- ticle 50 of the new law provides for crimi- Kuznetsov, the former Chief Inspector of the fare hardware, missiles, and nuclear weap- nal prosecution for violation of the adopted Russian State Committee for Atomic Power ons, and that defense sector workers in that norms on radioactive waste handling and Surveillance’s (SCAPS) Inspector Bureau, region are in need of help. treatment as well as for concealment of in- says that a number of nuclear medical fa- Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 6/25/94, p. 3; in FBIS- formation related to the banned activities. cilities and closed nuclear cities (such as SOV-94-124, 6/28/94, pp. 35-36 (11532). Vladimir Taranov, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 7/7/94; in Arzamas-16) have inadequate safeguards FBIS-SOV-94-130, 7/7//94, pp. 19-20 (11638). against theft and that the Ministry of Atomic 6/30/94 Vladimir Yermolin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 7/9/94, p. 1; in FBIS-SOV-94-134, 7/13/94, p. 24 (11638). Energy does not have an accurate picture of Three members of Russia’s Northern Fleet how radioactive materials are transported are arrested for stealing 4.5 kg of enriched 7/26/94-7/29/94 and stored. Kuznetsov states that Russia uranium from a nuclear fuel depot in Rosta Russian President Boris Yeltsin visits lacks clear policies to safeguard nuclear sometime in 11/93. This theft was the sec- Krasnoyarsk where “important decisions” are materials, that Russia does not have a com- ond attempt by Northern Fleet members to made regarding conversion of regional de- plete inventory of such materials, and that steal nuclear materials; a prior 7/93 attempt fense plants and, in particular, the pluto- nuclear engineers are often not paid on time, was unsuccessful. nium processing facility at Krasnoyarsk-26. and then only with “reduced wages.” These Nikolay Rodionov, Segodnya (Moscow), 7/2/94; in factors make the system vulnerable to orga- FBIS-SOV-94-128, 7/5/94, p. 27 (11792). Pursuant to the recent agreement between Russia and the U.S., reprocessing plutonium nized crime. at the plant is to be terminated. Two of the Yoichi Nishimura, Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 8/28/ 94, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-168, 8/30/94, pp. 21-22 facility’s three reactors have not been op- (11518).

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 107 Nuclear Developments

8/94 type or quantity of the substance. How- 8/31/94 The Russian Security Council Interdepart- ever, a later report claims the substance was It is reported that [Russian politician] mental Commission for Defense Security plutonium. The suspects had kept the ra- Vladimir Zhirinovsky and several colleagues endorses the creation of an “information and dioactive substance in the basement of a attempted to gain access to the Arzamas-16 analysis center” for dual-use equipment and home and had been attempting to sell it for nuclear center but were refused admittance, technology. more than 18 months. despite threats Zhirinovsky made to “fire Krasnaya Zvezda, 8/27/94, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94- AFP (Paris), 8/18/94; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/ everyone.” 169, 8/31/94, p. 30 (11736). 94, p. 28 (12027). Christopher Parkes and John Vladimir Gubarev, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 8/31/ Thornhill, Financial Times, 8/19/94, pp. A1, A16 94, p. 2 (11810). (12027). Segodnya, 8/18/94; in Russia & CIS To- 8/94 day, 8/19/94, p. 19 (12027). Deputy Minister of the Russian Federation 9/94 for Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Mikerin says 8/21/94 Colonel Aleksey Zhvanko, commander of that the only smuggled nuclear material re- Two men are arrested for the theft and ille- Strategic Missile Forces unit X, states that ported in the Western press that can be cor- gal possession of 9.5 kg of industrial grade his unit is currently dismantling six strate- rectly labelled Russian in origin is a collec- U238 belonging to a nuclear facility at gic missiles per month and will soon be tion of uranium cakes, discovered “several Arzamas-16. The arrested men have never disarming 10-12 missiles per month. years ago,” that were produced in Ust- worked for the All-Russian Science Insti- Oleg Bedula, Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 9/14/94, p. 1; in FBIS-SOV-94-179, 9/15/94, p. 24 (11657). Kamenogorsk. Mikerin adds that the West- tute of Experimental Physics. In response ern push for nuclear security improvements to the arrests Arzamas Deputy Mayor 9/1/94 in Russia is a plot to force Russia to pur- Valentin Mamyshev says, “We have not chase Western technology for future stor- It is reported that sometime between 8/26/ adopted any additional security measures. 94 and 8/30/94, thieves broke into a radio- age facilities and a radioactive materials se- We have the usual entry and exit procedures. curity system. active materials storehouse at the Uvarovo As far as I know, the theft of the 9 kg of chemical plant and stole a capsule contain- Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), 8/17/94, p. 6; in uranium was the first case of this kind to JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, p. 23 (11745). ing 4.5 g of cesium137. have ever occurred here.” The uranium was Irina Shkarnikova, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), 8/9/94 possibly obtained from land around the 9/1/94, p. 1; in FBIS-SOV-94-170, 9/1/94, p. 30 (11726). Pavel Bely, managing director of the ship- center’s detonation sites, where experimen- tal explosions were conducted in 1988; dur- yards in Komsomolsk-na-Amure, announces 9/6/94 that the facility is phasing out production ing these experiments, pieces of uranium and Yuriy Volodin, head of the Department for of nuclear submarines. other materials were scattered around the Supervision over Assessment and Physical Aleksey Tsvetkov, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 8/9/94; in site. FBIS-SOV-94-153, 8/9/94, p. 17 (11649). Vladimir Gubarev, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 8/31/ Protection of Nuclear Materials of the Rus- 94, p. 2 (11810). Washington Times, 8/25/94, p. sian State Committee for Nuclear Supervi- A13 (12021). Nadezhda Popova, Rossiskiye Vesti, sion, states that security in Russia over “ma- 8/9/94 8/26/94 (12021). Enrico Franceschini, La It is reported that 2 kg of radioactive ce- Repubblica (Rome), 9/13/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-164, terials of the first category” [i.e., plutonium sium rods were confiscated by the Russian 9/16/94, pp. 30-31 (12021). and highly-enriched uranium (HEU)] is transport police on a commuter train bound strong enough to prevent seizure of large for Samara from Moscow. According to 8/30/94 enough amounts of these materials to manu- police, the cesium rods, which had a radio- Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev facture nuclear weapons. Volodin says that active level “25 times higher than the per- says that nuclear nonproliferation and the in comparison with defense facilities, there mitted standard,” were found in the baggage physical safeguarding of radioactive mate- is a greater risk of nuclear theft occurring of a Mordovian resident. Mordovia is noted rials are a Russian foreign policy priority. at research institutions. Volodin goes on to for being the site of several military-indus- Kozyrev notes that because the states sur- define “nuclear terrorism” as a case where trial facilities. rounding Germany and the U.S. are either radioactive materials which lack scientific Victor Yasmann, RFE/RL News Briefs, 8/8/94-8/12/ NPT members or do not seek nuclear weap- or military interest are stolen. Yuriy 94, p. 4 (11559). Izvestiya (Moscow), 8/10/94, p. ons — something that cannot be said about Rogozhin, the head of the press center for 1 (11626). the states bordering Russia — the physical the State Committee for Nuclear Supervi- safeguards issue is comparatively of greater sion, also states that there are few dangers 8/12/94 concern for Russia than for Western nations. of high-grade nuclear materials theft from A joint police force from Kaliningrad and Yuriy Kozlov, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 8/30/94; in FBIS- Russian stocks, and that nuclear terrorism St. Petersburg arrest three Kaliningrad resi- SOV-94-168, 8/30/94, p. 5 (11540). today is comprised primarily of the sale and dents attempting to sell a 60 kg container purchase of LEU taken from chemical com- holding a radioactive substance for $1 mil- bine waste. Both Volodin and Rogozhin lion. Police officials decline to identify the state, however, that there is still no stan-

108 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments dardized system of assessment and physical various parties in Yeltsin’s government, such RUSSIA WITH ALGERIA control over nuclear materials in Russia, and as the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Min- that this must be changed. Russia lacks a istry of Defense, and Gosatomnadzor are 8/94 legal infrastructure for the inventory and currently arguing over the structure of a new German Minister Bernd Schmidbauer dis- security of nuclear materials, as well as a nuclear materials control system; this inter- closes in an intelligence analysis that Alge- universal system of material accountancy and agency squabble could prevent the imple- ria has allegedly hired a number of Russian technical infrastructure to implement such mentation of a system that could oversee both nuclear experts. a system. Rogozhin says that there is poor civilian and military nuclear plants and pro- Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 8/21/ coordination between the Defense Ministry, duction facilities. As a result of the debate, 94, pp. 1-2; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 43- the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Acad- the Defense Ministry has refused to allow 44 (11732). emy of Sciences, and other state bodies with Gosatomnadzor experts to inspect their regards to nuclear safeguards. Volodin states nuclear facilities. Although Yeltsin placed that the Russian government is beginning Director of Russia’s Federal Counterintelli- RUSSIA WITH ARMENIA to prepare a “corresponding resolution” on gence Service Sergey Stepashin as head of a the subject of nuclear material controls. new government body to monitor nuclear 6/94 Veronika Romanenkova, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/6/ materials trafficking, Stepashin does not A Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy del- 94; in FBIS-SOV-94-173, 9/7/94, p. 33 (11769). have the power to force the bureaucracy to egation visits Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear Russian Television Network (Moscow), 9/6/94; in power plant to inspect the facility before FBIS-SOV-94-172, 9/6/94, p. 45 (11769). cooperate with his commission. Reuter (Moscow), 9/16/94; in Executive News Ser- renovation efforts begin. Director of the vice, 9/19/94 (11747). Bill Gertz, Washington 9/7/94 Russian Institute of Nuclear Plants Use Times, 9/27/94, p. A11 (11747). Tatyana Armen Abaghian, a member of the delega- Three criminals are arrested in Glazov, in Smolyakova, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), 9/21/ tion, characterizes the state of the plant as northern Udmurtia, in an attempt to sell 100 94, p. 2; in FBIS-SOV-94-186, 9/26/94, p. 28 “ready to [sic] reconstruction.” Another kg of U238. The material, which contains a (11747). Dave Carpenter, Washington Times, 9/ 18/94, p. A6 (11747). Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Mos- group of Russian specialists will arrive mixture of U235, is “a by-product from pro- cow), 9/21/94, p. 4; in Russia & CIS Today, 9/21/ shortly and will remain until the plant is ducing fuel for nuclear power stations,” and 94, p. 33 (11806). reactivated. The financing of the renova- is not usable for weapons production. In tion efforts at Metsamor has yet to be re- 1993, 137 kg of uranium were confiscated 9/26/94 solved; Abaghian estimates that “some 100 in Glazov. The Russian Pacific Fleet press service re- million dollars are needed for reopening the Interfax (Moscow), 9/9/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-176, ports the launch of a new nuclear subma- block [at Metsamor].” 9/12/94, p. 31 (11812). I. Khrekin, Vesti, 9/9/94; rine capable of “patrolling ocean communi- in FBIS-SOV-94-176, 9/12/94, p. 31 (11812). BBC Aragil Electronic News Bulletin (Yerevan), 6/5/94; Summary of World Broadcasts, 9/12/94 (11785). cations in conditions of long-term self-sup- in FBIS-SOV-94-109, 6/7/94, p. 66 (11634). Snark Reuter, 9/10/94 (11781). porting navigation and for fulfilling other Transcaucasia Economic News (Yerevan), 6/5/94; multi-purpose missions.” in FBIS-SOV-94-109, 6/7/94, p. 66 (11634). 9/16/94 Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/26/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-186, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issues a de- 9/26/94, p. 28 (11660). cree to improve the security of nuclear ma- RUSSIA WITH BRAZIL terials in Russia. The decree creates new 9/29/94 standards for storage, utilization and trans- Oleg Stakhanov, head of the press service 8/94 fer of nuclear materials, including transpor- for Russia’s Social-Ecological Union (SEU), German Minister Bernd Schmidbauer dis- tation across borders. Russia’s nuclear safety reports the SEU has learned of a “presiden- closes in an intelligence analysis that the oversight agency (Gosatomnadzor) is made tial decree in the making at the Ministry for Brazilian Embassy in Moscow allegedly subservient to the President. The Foreign Nuclear Energy” to establish the Krasnoyarsk forwarded to Brazil 60 employment appli- Ministry is given the task of negotiating Stock Company in order to attract foreign cations from CIS scientists. export controls with other CIS republics. investment for a nuclear fuel processing Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 8/21/ plant in Krasnoyarsk-26. The SEU opposes 94, pp. 1-2; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 43- The decree also establishes a new govern- 44 (11732). ment commission, made up of members of construction of the plant because it will pose the Ministry of Atomic Energy, Ministry of a considerable threat to the environment of Interior, Ministry of Defense and the Rus- the region. Interfax (Moscow), 9/29/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-190, sian Counterintelligence Service to study 9/30/94, p. 39 (11641). problems related to the registration and stor- age of nuclear materials. Whether or not this decree will become a reality is uncer- tain, however. The CIA stated in 9/94 that

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 109 Nuclear Developments

9/15/94 equipment, technologies, software and teams Russia and Brazil sign an agreement to co- of specialists who will be stationed perma- 7/26/94 operate in civilian uses of nuclear energy. nently with operators of Russian nuclear Russia and Estonia sign agreements on the According to Brazilian Foreign Minister power plants. withdrawal of Russian troops from the Selso Amorim, and Victor Mikhailov of Reuter, 9/7/94 (11686). Paldiski submarine base and on the status Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy, the of retired Russian soldiers and KGB per- agreement will promote cooperation in such sonnel remaining in Estonia. However, an areas as space science, thermonuclear power, RUSSIA WITH CZECH REPUBLIC agreement on dismantling reactors at the applied physics, and superconductivity. The base is still not finalized. agreement also covers high technology trans- 8/91 Aleksandr Krylovich and Valeriy Sevryukov, Itar- fer, which Russia maintains in large abun- According to information obtained from Tass (Moscow), 8/2/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-149, 8/3/ Czech “special services analysts,” a 1991 94, p. 11 (11733). Interfax (Moscow), 7/28/94; in dance. FBIS-SOV-94-146, 7/29/94, p. 43 (11733). Andrey Kurguzov, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/16/94; in attempt by Czech authorities to confiscate FBIS-SOV-94-180, 9/16/94, p. 13 (11687). red mercury may actually have served as a 7/30/94 cover for a nuclear material or military tech- In Moscow, Russia and Estonia sign an 9/26/94 nology shipment. The incident happened Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commis- agreement on dismantling the reactors at the as follows: on 8/29/91, Interior Ministry Paldiski submarine base. The dismantle- sion (CNEA) President Jose Mauro Esteves personnel and military police descended on dos Santos says that although Russia and ment process will involve 210 Russian spe- Mosnov airport, hoping to confiscate con- cialists. All Russian troops — except for the Brazil recently signed a nuclear coopera- tainers of red mercury concealed in hangars; tion agreement, Russia will not supply Bra- nuclear specialists — are supposed to leave no such material was found and no one was Paldiski by 8/31/94; the reactors must be zil with technology or equipment for build- arrested. The analysts say that several of- ing a commercial-scale centrifuge enrich- completely dismantled by 9/30/95. ficers from the former Soviet Central Group Aleksandr Krylovich and Valeriy Sevryukov, Itar- ment plant. Army actually provided a false tip in an at- Tass (Moscow), 8/2/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-149, 8/3/ Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 9/26/94, p.3 (11664). tempt to see how quickly authorities would 94, p. 11 (11733). BNS (Tallinn), 8/3/94; in FBIS- respond to such an incident, and to “map SOV-94-151, 8/5/94, p. 9 (11733). the optimum transaction channels.” In fact, RUSSIA WITH BRAZIL AND an actual transaction — “which could have Early 8/94 UNITED STATES been the transport of fissionable material Estonian security police arrest an Estonian or USSR military technology” — took place citizen in the possession of 2.95 kg of LEU, 8/1/94 concurrently with the Mosnov incident, and which was given to him by two Russians It is reported that the U.S. firm Nuexco made was indeed camouflaged by that incident. who brought the material to Estonia in 1/ a deal to obtain uranium from Brazil. It is possible that heads of the local secret 94. The LEU was packed in 590 cylinders, Nuexco may supply Brazil with nuclear services “were involved in the affair.” 10 cm in length and 8 cm in diameter. Ac- material from the CIS to be enriched at Lidove Noviny (Prague), 8/25/94, p. 1; in JPRS- cording to Juri Pihl, head of the security Urenco. TND-94-017, 9/8/94, p. 13 (11770). police, Russian sources informed Estonia Michael Knapik, NuclearFuel, 8/1/94, pp. 17-18 in 8/94 that “a certain amount of radioac- (11699). tive material had been smuggled” into the RUSSIA WITH ESTONIA country. The Estonian citizen who received the material buried it in Polva, where he RUSSIA WITH CANADA 6/30/94 lives. Police are concerned that the LEU Juri Tikk, Estonian administrator at the was produced by the same Russian factories 9/6/94 former Soviet submarine base in Paldiski, that manufacture nuclear weapons. As part of a three-year, $22 million bilat- states that dismantling of reactors at the base BNS (Tallinn), 8/25/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-166, 8/ eral Nuclear Safety Initiative begun in 1992, will occur in three stages. First, the fuel 26/94, p. 58 (11635). Russia and Canada sign an agreement worth will be removed and transferred to Russia. $7.3 million to upgrade safety standards of Second, Russian specialists will remove “se- 8/17/94 Chernobyl-type RBMK reactors. Accord- cret military objects” from the reactors. And Juri Tikk, Estonian administrator at the ing to Canadian Ambassador Jeremy Kins- third, reactor components and radwaste will Paldiski submarine base, announces that the man, Canada intends to share its expertise be transported back to Russia. equipment for dismantling one of the base’s in the safety design and operation of nuclear ETA (Tallinn), 6/30/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-126, 6/ reactors has arrived at Paldiski, along with power facilities. Canada is also expected to 30/94, p. 69 (11730). cooperate with Russia in the upgrading of channel-type reactor safety by providing

110 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments

25 Russian specialists needed for the pro- the PCA signing had held up completion of lic until 6/6/94, after the police recovered cess. Tikk states that containers for trans- the agreement. Under terms of the settle- all of the uranium in question. Russian in- porting the fuel will not be brought to ment, uranium imports will continue to be telligence officials say the uranium would Paldiski until the actual removal date. governed by the more restrictive 1989 E.C.- have needed further enrichment to be suit- BNS (Tallinn), 8/17/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-160, 8/ USSR agreement while a new nuclear fuel able for use in a nuclear weapon. 18/94, p. 42 (11730). regime is negotiated by 1997. The aim of Tatyana Ustinova, Reuter, 6/7/94 (11795). negotiations is to achieve a stable market 8/24/94 situation by the 1997 date; if the market is 5/10/94 Russia begins work on dismantlement of the not yet stable, the 1989 provisions — which German police raid the house of Adolf Jackle first reactor at the Paldiski submarine base. allowed Euratom to impose price and quota in Tengen expecting to confiscate counter- The entire dismantlement process is ex- limits on Russian imports — will continue to feit money, but instead find approximately pected to take about three months which apply. 60 g of radioactive materials, including 6 g Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuri Moskovskiye Novosti (Moscow), 6/26/94-7/3/94, p. of “supergrade” plutonium: gallium stabi- Luikka estimates will cost $10 million. The B10 (11705). Ann Maclachlan, Nucleonics Week, lized, delta-phased, and enriched to 99.75 West has guaranteed $5 million in aid. A 6/23/94, pp. 14-15 (11688). percent Pu239 (Soviet weapons grade pluto- committee of international experts will su- nium usually contains 94 percent Pu239). pervise the process. Isotopic analysis, conducted two weeks later Novosti (Moscow), 8/24/94; in Russia & CIS To- RUSSIA WITH EUROPEAN UNION AND at the European Transuranium Institute in day, 8/24/94, p. 10 (11673). Izvestiya, 7/23/94, p. FRANCE 3 (11673). N. Ostilovskaya, Novosti (Moscow), 7/ Karlsruhe, showed that the plutonium had 30/94; in Russia & CIS Today, 8/1/94, p. 35 (11673). probably been enriched in a gas centrifuge E. Sosipatrova, Novosti (Moscow), 8/24/94; in 7/94 cascade and that the rest of the radioactive Russia & CIS Today, 8/25/94, p. 26 (11673). K. It is reported that the E.C. awarded France’s material was composed of broken glass and Kozlova, Segodnya (TV Moscow), 8/26/94; in Rus- Framatome a $240,000 contract to study sia & CIS Today, 8/29/94, p. 22 (11673). bristles, aluminum, antimony, copper, io- possibilities for improving operating mar- dine, mercury, nickel, rubidium, silicon, 9/8/94 gins of Russian VVERs and breeder reac- strontium, and zirconium. The plutonium tors; Russia will participate in the study. All the fuel from the first Paldiski reactor was believed to be weapons grade because The study will cover both fast neutron reac- has now been transferred from Estonia to the Tengen material was found to have only tors (Russia’s BN-600 and France’s 240 241 242 Russia. trace elements of Pu , Pu , and Pu — all Superphenix), and pressurized water reac- ETA (Tallinn), 9/8/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-175, 9/9/ of which are abundant in reactor grade plu- 94, p. 74 (11730). tors (PWR). tonium — and because it had more U238 than Nucleonics Week, 7/28/94, p. 15 (11800). is usually found in reactor grade plutonium. 9/20/94 Jackle confessed to receiving plutonium Dismantlement of the second reactor at the from Mitko M., a citizen of Bulgaria, and Paldiski base begins. The fuel rods will be RUSSIA WITH FRANCE investigators suspect that the material was removed, packed in special containers, then destined for Iraq. Jackle may have been transferred to Russia by train. In order to 6/94 working on behalf of North Korea. The prevent possible terrorists attacks, the trans- Russia’s Rosenergoatom awards a contract seized materials are said to have been pro- port date has not been publicized. Two to the French engineering group SGN/Re- duced either in Mayak (also known as hundred Russian servicemen are guarding seau Eurisys to work with the Chelyabinsk-65) or in Smolensk. German the reactor building during the process. Atomenergoprojekt on construction of spent investigations suggest that the plutonium had Reuter (Tallinn), 9/20/94; in Executive News Ser- fuel storage sites at the Smolensk and Kursk been offered for sale by Russian and East vice, 9/21/94 (11730). nuclear plants. European agents with reported links to the Nucleonics Week, 6/16/94, p. 11 (11813). KGB and the Bulgarian trading firm Kintex. Unnamed German sources believe that a RUSSIA WITH EUROPEAN UNION Kintex subsidiary transport company, pos- RUSSIA WITH GERMANY sibly owned by “Romanian interests,” could 6/94 also have been involved in the deal. West- Following settlement of a dispute over 3/94 ern intelligence sources have information nuclear fuel trade, the Russian Federation Three men are detained in St. Petersburg showing that at least one Kintex employee and the European Union (E.U.) sign a part- for allegedly stealing 3 kg of HEU from a was involved in obtaining and attempting to nership and cooperation agreement (PCA). Ministry of Atomic Energy facility located sell the material prior to its seizure. Re- Fears held by several E.U. members — France near Moscow; the thieves reportedly in- ports that the plutonium came from Russia, in particular — about a flood of cheap Rus- tended to sell the uranium in Germany for however, have been refuted by the German sian fuel imports into the E.U. following $300 per gram. The arrest is not made pub- Chancellor’s Office, investigative bodies,

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 111 Nuclear Developments and scientists. Some in Bonn’s “political came from either a Russian submarine or lead packaging is not the same as used in circles” have said that attempts to implicate nuclear power plant. Acting on informa- Russia to transport fissile material. Refer- the Russian mafia with smuggling of nuclear tion from confessions obtained as a result ring to the 75 or so attempted thefts of materials may have diverted attention from of this seizure, on 7/4/94 German under- nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union the real culprits. In 7/94, Director of the cover police buy 600 g of 3 percent enriched in 1992 and 1993, Yegorov noted that, with E.U. Commission’s Euratom Safeguards uranium dioxide pellets at a rest stop near one exception, all involved “shift person- nonproliferation agency Wilhelm Gmelin Landshut; German police then arrest a Czech nel, drivers, and other workers — not top- said, “The data we have suggests it is highly who had 120 3 percent enriched pellets. [It level officials in the weapons complex.” probable the material was manufactured at is not clear from the article if the 600 g of Mark Hibbs, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9- a Russian military site.” Moscow’s pellets are in fact the same pellets in pos- 10/94, pp.6-7 (11702). Kurchatov Atomic Energy Research Insti- session of the Czech national] The Czech tute and Sverdlovsk-44 have been cited as has told German police that he received the 7/16/94 possible sources of the material. pellets from four Slovaks. The pellets were It is reported that German police in Stuttgart Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 8/22/94, pp. 18-25; in then transported from Prague to Germany recently seized highly radioactive material JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 39-42 (12023). by a taxi driver who, according to German believed to have been manufactured in Rus- Mark Hibbs, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9- police, was unaware that he was carrying sia. German authorities will be able to de- 10/94, pp. 6-7 (11702). Jimmy Burns, Michael termine the material’s origin from indica- Lindemann, and Leyla Boulton, Financial Times nuclear material. German police said that (London), 7/23-24/94, p. 22 (11624). Trust and the “central figure” of the case is a 48 year tors in the radioactive material linking it to Verify, 9/94, p. 1 (11627). Yevgeniy Bovkun, old German woman, arrested on 8/8/94, a specific production plant. The incident is Izvestiya, 8/2/94, p. 3 (11707). Mark Hibbs, who calls herself a real estate agent. particularly troubling, said Chief of the Nuclear Fuel, 7/18/94, pp. 1-3 (12030). Mark German Federal Chancellory Bernd Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 7/21/94, pp. 14-15 Reuter; in Washington Post, 8/12/94, p. A32 (12030). (12023). Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 8/15/94, pp. Schmidbauer, because it would not have 25-26 (11586). been possible without the assistance of Rus- 6/94 sian officials. Information collected by Germany’s Chief of Security Bernd 6/17/94 German officials will be released to Rus- Schmidbauer believes the Russian mafia al- The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy sian authorities to help them in their own ready has access to technology for construc- denies Greenpeace accusations that pluto- investigation. tion of a nuclear bomb; Schmidbauer fears nium fuel rods are to be sent from Germany Victor Yasmann, RFE/RL News Briefs, pp. 2-3, 7/ 18/94-7/22/94 (11534). that such a weapon will be used for nuclear to Russia’s Beloyarsk nuclear power facil- ity. According to a Ministry official, using blackmail. 8/94 William Boston, Executive News Service, 6/13/94 foreign-origin fuel rods in Russian nuclear (11724). plants is “technically extremely difficult.” It is reported that Arzamas-16 was the scene Greenpeace believes 123 fuel rods initially of a recent theft of U238, which spurred the 6/94 planned for use at the Kalkar fast breeder director of the facility to create an inven- It is reported that Russia is paying off debts reactor are now intended to be used at tory for all nuclear materials in the center, it incurred for an audio and video tape plant Russia’s Beloyarsk plant in the southern weapons-grade or otherwise. Commenting by supplying uranium fuel rods to Germany. Urals. The fuel rods are composed of 1.1 on the security of the Arzamas facility, Dr. Vesti, 6/19/94; in Russia & CIS Today, 6/20/94, p. tons of plutonium and are presently stored Stephen Younger, deputy head of the nuclear 2 (11808). in Hanau in a Siemens operated bunker un- weapons program at Los Alamos, stated that der federal supervision. Brueter- “on all my visits to Arzamas-16 I see that Mid-6/94 Kernkraftwerksgesellschaft (SBK) of Ger- the security system in the case of these Eight hundred mg of “crudely packed and many, a subsidiary of Germany’s [nuclear] materials is very strict. It is simi- handled” HEU (87.8 percent U235) are seized Rheinishch-Westfaelishes Elektrizitaetswerk lar to the system which we have in the United in Germany. Euratom believes that the ma- AG (RWE), wants to ship the fuel rods to states, and therefore, in my view, a leak of terial — tested by the Transuranium Institute Beloyarsk so they may be used in the BN- such materials is impossible.” in Karlsruhe — was intended for use in a sub- 600 breeder reactor, which is considered to Vladimir Gubarev, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 8/30/94, p. marine or research reactor. Five men and be unsafe. 3 (11727). one woman, Czech, Slovak, and German by DDP/ADN (Berlin), 6/17/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-117, nationality, are being charged with “illegal 6/17/94, p. 12 (11558). 8/94 possession of nuclear fuel and illegal com- It is reported that 120 kg of plutonium may merce in weapons related materials.” Ger- 7/94 have been smuggled into Germany from man officials believe that the 800 mg was a Gen. Mikhail Yegorov, a Russian Interior Russia for sales to foreign buyers. Samples sample of a “much larger inventory” located Ministry official visiting Germany to dis- of this material have been located in deals somewhere within the former Soviet Union. cuss the Tengen case, does not concede that uncovered during 8/94, the latest event oc- It is believed that the uranium originally the material originated in Russia, since its curred on 8/12/94 in northern Germany.

112 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments

Although some of this shipment has been 8/94 8/12/94 recovered, there may be as much as 68 g in Vladimir Chernoshenko, a former director German police arrest a 34 year old man from northern Germany that have yet to be found. of the Chernobyl clean-up, warns that re- Lower Saxony at the Bremen train station Christoph Arnowski, ARD Television Network cent seizures in Germany of Russian-origin for possession of a 2 g capsule — .05 mg of (Munich), 8/15/94; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, fissile materials are “just the tip of the ice- which is a mixture of americium and weap- p. 34 (11783). berg” and that “there is already more weap- ons-grade plutonium — presumably from the 8/94 ons-grade material in [Germany] than...the former Soviet Union. The man was attempt- Chancellor Kohl writes two letters to Presi- authorities can imagine.” Chernoshenko — ing to sell the “sample” to a German under- dent Yeltsin, requesting the strengthening who still maintains contact with leading cover investigator saying that he could pro- of nuclear materials security in Russia Russian and Ukrainian nuclear authorities — vide up to 70 g of plutonium. A later re- against theft and smuggling. On 8/12/94, says he and his colleagues estimate that port discloses that the man was apparently 238 Yeltsin replies to Kohl’s first letter, denying smuggled material amounts to “several tons offering to sell 237.6 lbs of U and be- 239 that plutonium seized in Germany came of uranium” and what “could already be more tween 34 and 50 capsules of Pu . The from Russia; nonetheless, Yeltsin pledges than 500 kg” of plutonium. Chernoshenko man had a certificate from the All-Soviet cooperation in the area of nuclear security. blames the illegal fissile material trade on Isotope Association which accompanied the Kohl’s second letter advocates the use of an “international nuclear mafia” which, de- plutonium. The sample was said to have qualified scientists to investigate the smug- spite the plans and operations of the U.S. had the markings of a Russian nuclear com- gling incidents. Kohl has raised concerns FBI and the German BND, will be impos- pany called “Isotop.” In a later television about the possible brain-drain of Russian sible to control. report, an unnamed man, who claims to be DDP/ADN (Berlin), 8/17/94; in JPRS-TND-94- scientists to nuclear threshold states, and has the undercover investigator in the case, says 017, 9/8/94, p. 34 (11740). Dirk C. Fleck and that former Stasi agents had organized a pushed the West to find ways to employ these Olaf Preuss, Die Woche (Hamburg), 8/18/94, pp. scientists. Some of these threshold states 18-19; in FBIS-SOV-94-162, 8/22/94, pp. 7-9 nuclear smuggling operation using small are named in an analysis by German minis- (11740). ZDF Television Network (Mainz), 8/19/ Russian boats along Germany’s coast. The 94; in FBIS-SOV-94-162, 8/22/94, p. 5 (11740). ter Bernd Schmidbauer: India, Iraq, Iran, investigator also discloses that the arresting officers had interfered with his investiga- Libya, Algeria, Brazil, and the PRC. Ac- 8/10/94 cording to information gathered by the Ger- tion and that, as a result, it was possible Several hundred kilograms of lithium6 and man government, each of these countries has that nuclear material was “wandering around 560 g of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel are seized tried to utilize Russian expertise and/or north Germany.” on a Lufthansa flight arriving in Munich Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 8/22/94, pp. 18-25; in materials: India has purportedly received from Moscow. German police arrest a JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 39-42 (12023). applications for employment from four Rus- Columbian, Justiniano Torres Benitez, and Craig R. Whitney, New York Times, 8/17/94, pp. sian scientists; Iraq may employ 50 nuclear A1, A13 (12023). Mark M. Nelson, Wall Street two Spaniards, Julio Oroz Eguia and Xabier experts from the former Soviet Union, in- Journal, 8/17/94, p. A8 (12022). Christopher Benegoetxea Arratibel; a fourth Spanish Parkes and John Thornhill, Financial Times, 8/17/ cluding a laser specialist from Arzamas-16 suspect escapes. Torres grew up in Bogota 94 (12022). Trust and Verify, 9/94, p. 1 (11627). and a Ukrainian MIRV expert; Iran has pur- and studied in Moscow for a number of portedly had 14 CIS nuclear scientists within years. On 7/9/94, the Columbian and two Mid-8/94 its borders since the beginning of 1992, and Spaniards travelled from Moscow to Munich Russian and U.S. views on the origins of may have concluded employment contracts by train carrying a 4 g sample of weapons- nuclear materials seized in Germany — in with 200 technicians and over 50 nuclear grade plutonium. For a number of weeks, particular, materials seized in Tengen on 5/ experts; two nuclear experts from Russia the three men negotiated with two under- 10/94 and in Munich on 8/10/94 — differ turned down “official offers” from Libya, cover investigators from the Munich Land from those held by Euratom and Germany. though Libya may still be employing a num- Office of Criminal Investigations, one of Ministry of Atomic Energy officials say the ber of Russians in research institutes; Alge- whom was known as “Rafael.” On 7/25/94, origin of the Tengen material may be an elec- ria has allegedly hired a number of Rus- the three men gave a lead container with the tromagnetic mass separator operated at the sians; the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow plutonium sample to Rafael. Torres and Scientific Research Institute of Experimen- allegedly forwarded to Brazil 60 employ- Bengoetxea left for Moscow to obtain the tal Physics at Arzamas-16. These officials ment applications from CIS scientists; and rest of the shipment and returned on 8/10/ say the “S-2” separator produced “micro- in 1992, the PRC’s Army General Staff pub- 94 to the Munich airport. The source of grams to hundreds of milligrams” of highly lished plans for locating and recruiting Rus- the radioactive material is not known. pure isotopes of heavy radioactive elements sian nuclear experts. Craig R. Whitney, New York Times, 8/17/94, pp. but was not used to produce warhead pluto- Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 8/21/ A1, A13 (12023). Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 8/22/ nium. A U.S. official says the S-2 product 94, pp. 1-2; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 43- 94, pp. 18-25; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. “matches pretty well” with the isotopic prop- 44 (11732). Novosti (Moscow), 8/17/94; in Russia 39-42 (12023). Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 8/29/ & CIS Today, 8/18/94, p. 9 (11732). 94, pp. 1, 10-12 (11804). erties of the Tengen material. More gener- ally, the Clinton administration says on 8/

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 113 Nuclear Developments

18/94 that it has no evidence suggesting that 8/22/94 nium [presumably from Russia]. It was “any” of the smuggled material came from German intelligence coordinator Bernd unclear which German nuclear smuggling Russian weapon facilities. However, Schmidbauer and Russian Counterintelli- case this raid was related to, although it has Euratom safeguards Director Wilhelm gence Service director Sergei Stepashin end been suggested that the raid could be re- Gmelin says there is “a very high probabil- three days of talks with the signing of a lated to the 5/94 Tengen case, in which the ity” that the Tengen plutonium “must have memorandum designed to encourage coop- German businessman Adolf Jackle had been been produced in a weapons factory” or an eration between the two countries in the fight given $100 million “by an unnamed coun- auxiliary enrichment facility. Chief of Staff against nuclear smuggling. Although de- try.” at the Safeguards Division Georges tails of the memorandum are not made pub- International Herald Tribune, 8/24/94 (11625). Herbillon says the material came from one lic, the negotiators issue a joint communi- of three sites: Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk or que outlining specific steps to be taken, in- 8/24/94 Yekaterinburg. German officials, basing cluding: tightening of border controls, es- It is reported that Kurchatov Institute offi- their belief on Euratom analysis, say the tablishing an international clearing house cials, following the 8/10/94 German seizure material was probably diverted from a plu- of information on illicit nuclear trade and of smuggled MOX fuel and lithium at the tonium separation plant that produced ma- opening of “contact offices” in Moscow and Munich airport, admit that the material terial for warheads. With respect to the Berlin, which Schmidbauer characterizes as could have originated in Russia, though they Munich material, Terry Hawkins, a senior establishing “bilateral liason [sic] at the op- deny that any fissionable material is miss- official at the U.S. Los Alamos laboratory, erational level.” Despite the positive tenor ing from their institute. Their remarks are says “[it] was not produced in a reactor for of the talks, the sides remain in disagree- at variance with earlier Russian assertions military weapons” and undoubtedly came ment over the origin of plutonium recently that the material “absolutely” could not have from a civilian power reactor. Hawkins adds seized in Munich. Aleksander Mikhailov, come from Russia. Kurchatov officials also that the recovered material was MOX fuel, Stepashin’s spokesman, says that based on say that Russia’s nuclear material control comprised of 87 percent Pu239. Euratom’s spectral analysis of the plutonium, Russian systems must be modernized. Herbillon is more equivocal on the origins experts determined that “this kind of raw International Herald Tribune, 8/24/94 (11625). of the Munich batch: he says it came from material is not produced in Russia.” For Russia “but not necessarily from the same their part, German experts present the Rus- 8/25/94 place” as the Tengen material. Director sians with their own laboratory results pur- In response to the case of MOX fuel recov- Gmelin says that while there is no evidence porting to show that the material was, in ered at the Munich airport Yevgeniy that the plutonium came directly from a fact, of Russian origin; sources differed on Mikerin, director of the Russian Ministry warhead it is not “logical or reasonable” to whether or not the Germans actually pre- of Atomic Energy’s technology and nuclear believe it came from a civilian power facil- sented some of the material to their coun- chemistry department, says that Russia pro- ity. terparts. With respect to the Munich sei- duces only small amounts of MOX fuel for NuclearFuel, 8/15/94, pp. 9-10 (11742). Steve Coll, zure itself, Schmidbauer explains that Rus- research purposes and is only in the initial Washington Post, 8/19/94, p. A32 (11745). Will- sian authorities were not alerted prior to the stages of using this kind of fuel. Mikerin iam Broad, New York Times, 8/17/94, pp. A1, A13 stresses that mass production of MOX fuel (11827). arrests due to fears that “certain offices in Moscow could have been involved” in the is not needed because Russian nuclear in- 8/18/94 transaction. Further investigation into the stallations do not currently use it. Mikerin adds that the investigation should determine The Russian Foreign Ministry announces it Munich incident will be carried out jointly. the fuel’s origin by comparing the proper- is investigating allegations that nuclear As the talks opened, the German govern- ties of the MOX fuel that was seized with materials recently seized in Germany came ment announced that the Munich seizure those countries that use such fuel in their from Russia. It is not known if the Minis- included approximately two lbs. of lithium. reactors. try of Atomic Energy and Ministry of De- Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 8/21/94, p. 9 (11628). Olga Semenova, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 8/ Veronika Romanenkova, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 8/25/ fense, which control Russia’s nuclear facili- 22/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-163, 8/23/94, p. 2 (11746). 94; in FBIS-SOV-94-166, 8/26/94, pp. 5-6 (11882). ties, are cooperating with the investigation. Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 8/23/94, p. A5 Although President Yeltsin signed an order (11746). 8/30/94 providing for regulatory oversight of nuclear Russian and U.S. experts indicate that the facilities, both the Ministry of Atomic En- 8/23/94 nuclear facilities at Arzamas-16 have been ergy and the Ministry of Defense have re- The German television station RTL reports improperly identified in Western media re- peatedly ignored or denied requests by the that, based upon anonymous sources, Ger- ports as the source of the plutonium seized Atomic Industry Inspectorate — Russia’s man police had raided a home where they on 8/10/94 at the Munich airport. The plu- nuclear regulatory body — for information discovered documents — including a $100 tonium seized in Munich is not of a type and access to their facilities. million letter of credit — showing that Lee Hockstader, Washington Post, 8/19/94, p. 32 Baghdad was attempting to purchase pluto- (11588).

114 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments used in or manufactured for Russian war- dangerous amounts of nuclear materials systems as a whole.” heads and that no weapons-grade Pu239 is through nuclear power generation, and to Interfax (Moscow), 9/17/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-181, missing in Russia — an assertion confirmed reduce the chances of fissile material being 9/19/94, p. 8 (11721). by documentation. stolen in Russia and smuggled to unscrupu- Mikhail Rebrov, Krasnaya Zvezda, 8/30/94, p. 3; lous buyers. The 8/94 seizure of 560 g of 9/21/94 in FBIS-SOV-94-168, 8/30/94, p. 23 (11519). smuggled high-grade MOX casts doubts on Head of Russian counterintelligence Sergei a plan by the German firm Siemens AG to Stepashin, who met with German intelli- 8/30/94 build a plant in Russia and use Russian plu- gence coordinator Bernd Schmidbauer on It is reported that two Russian Federal Coun- tonium for making MOX fuel, which would 9/19/94 and 9/20/94, reports that radioac- terintelligence Service officers were arrested supposedly be a secure way to dispose of tive materials seized in Germany were not for smuggling nuclear materials. Although plutonium. produced in any Russian nuclear facilities the specific date for the arrest is not given, Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 9/12/94, p. 11 (11765). “which have been named.” When asked by the report comes on the eve of talks between journalists whether the materials came from Chancellor Kohl and President Yeltsin re- 9/10/94 Russia, Stepashin would not elaborate. garding illicit nuclear trade. Yeltsin spokes- The German weekly magazine Focus issues According to Schmidbauer, German and man Vyacheslav Kortikov calls the report a an advance release of an article containing Russian intelligence services now have “very “provocation.” information from an unpublished 1993 Rus- precise clues” concerning the 8/10/94 Victor Yasmann, RFE/RL Daily Report, 8/31/94, p. sian Atomic Supervision Agency report, nuclear smuggling incident in Munich. 1 (11732). stating that nuclear materials at the Tomsk- Daily Telegraph, 9/21/94 (11623). 9/94 7 nuclear plant were under minimal secu- rity and could be stolen by plant staff. The 9/28/94 The second round of Russian-German ne- report was written in 1993 and was never Itar-Tass reports that, based upon informa- gotiations on nonproliferation of radioac- published. According to the report, trans- tion which the IAEA apparently gave to tive materials is held in Bonn. These talks port containers leaving the site were not “circles arranging Russian President Boris are based on the Russian-German security being checked for contents, weight measure- Yeltsin’s trip to the United States,” the plu- services memorandum signed in Moscow ments of the containers were inaccurate, tonium confiscated in Tengen in 5/94 and on 8/22/94. According to Aleksandr security installations and equipment were at the Munich airport on 8/10/94 was “more Lopushinskiy, counsellor of the European obsolete, and the number of guards on hand than likely” produced in the German towns department of the Russian Foreign Minis- to supervise operations were too few. As a of Wackersdorf and Alke. try, this memorandum will serve as the le- result of the lax security, a large quantity of Veronika Romanenkova, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/28/ gal foundation for future Russian-German 94; in FBIS-SOV-94-190, 9/30/94, p. 18 (11623). enriched uranium was once taken to a dump. cooperation to combat nuclear smuggling, The report concluded that “it cannot be ex- organized crime and narcotics trafficking. cluded that the staff have amassed stocks of In an effort to facilitate implementation of RUSSIA WITH GERMANY, LITHUANIA, [nuclear] material which has not been ac- the memorandum, the security services will AND POLAND counted for.” establish bureaus in Bonn and Moscow to Reuter, 9/10/94 (11781). DDP/ADN (Berlin), 9/ better coordinate their activities. This co- 10/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-176, 9/12/94, p. 13 8/94 operation will allow specialists to discover (11781). Juozas Jacevicius, Deputy Director of the not only the origins of illicit materials, but Lithuanian Customs Administration, says also how they were acquired and who might 9/17/94 that although Lithuania is not a producer of be potential buyers. It is reported that Russian Counterintelli- nuclear materials, it is an intermediary for Gennadiy Kulbitskiy, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/20/94; gence Service Director Sergei Stepashin the smuggling of such materials. Because in FBIS-SOV-94-183, 9/21/94, pp. 15-16 (11721). stated that Germany cannot prove, and no customs agents do not have the proper equip- Andrey Serov, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/19/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-181, 9/19/94, p. 8 (11721). Vadim longer claims, that plutonium confiscated ment to detect radiation, there is no way to Markushin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 8/24/94, p. 3 in Munich was originally obtained in Rus- find nuclear substances as they come into (11721). sia. Stepashin said that, owing to tight se- or go out of Lithuania. Radioactive materi- curity at the facilities which produce the als from Moscow, Kaliningrad, and St. Pe- 9/94 radioactive substance, theft of weapons- tersburg can come through Lithuania en It is reported that the 8/94 seizure of small grade plutonium from Russia is not possible. route to Poland and Germany via train, since amounts of Russian nuclear materials in Stepashin described Western media reports train cars cannot be checked in transit “be- Germany may spur Bonn to consider ways on nuclear smuggling as a conspiracy to cause doors are locked from the inside.” to integrate more ex-Soviet uranium and portray Russia as incapable of safeguarding Lithuania’s Prosecutor General Paulauskas plutonium into its fuel cycle. This plan its nuclear materials, thereby creating a pre- says that although he “could arrest at least would be a means to eliminate potentially text for outside control “of Russia’s security

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 115 Nuclear Developments one border guard a day for taking bribes,” RUSSIA WITH HONG KONG ing that the IAEA already receives infor- he does not do it. mation directly from both the British and Horst Stenzel, ZDF Television Network (Mainz), 6/19/94 Russian intelligence services and their re- 8/19/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-162, 8/22/94 (12016). Hong Kong Assistant Commissioner Davis spective governments, the Russian intelli- Hodson says “international intelligence” has gence official says that an “exchange of such pinpointed Hong Kong as a possible base information is in mutual interests.” RUSSIA WITH GERMANY, PAKISTAN, AND for organized crime to traffic in nuclear Itar-Tass (Moscow), 6/29/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-126, 6/30/94, p. 7 (11521). POLAND materials, especially from nuclear storage sites in former Soviet states. 9/14/94 8/17/94 Darren Goodsir, South China Morning Post (Hong A plutonium smuggling operation involv- Kong), 6/20/94, p. 3; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 7/13/ IAEA spokesman David Kyd says that the ing a Pakistani, a German, and two Poles is 94, p. 11 (11794). Agency is developing a radioactive material uncovered in Berlin. Based on documents safeguards program with CIS and Eastern seized from the dealers, German authori- European states. ties assert that the intended recipient for the RUSSIA WITH HUNGARY Julian Borger, The Guardian, 9/15/94 (11782). plutonium is Pakistan. Russia is named as the origin point for the plutonium. Paki- 8/22/94 stan may be using Germany as a conduit for Police confiscate 2 kg of uranium rods con- RUSSIA WITH INDIA obtaining plutonium to use in its nuclear taining 4-5 percent U235 in Budapest. The program, which already has the necessary two Hungarians arrested intended to sell the 8/94 fuel and capability to make weapons with material at a price of $40,000 per kilo, but German Minister Bernd Schmidbauer dis- HEU, but not plutonium. it is unclear who the potential clients were. closes in an intelligence analysis that India J. N. Dixit, Indian Express (New Delhi), 8/30/94 Col. Laszlo Tonhauser, head of the National has purportedly received applications for (12017). Jansatta (New Delhi), p. 6; in JPRS-TND- Police Department for Combatting Orga- employment from four Russian scientists. 94-017, 9/8/94, p. 21 (12017). Indian Express (New nized Crime, suspects that the material Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 8/21/ Delhi), 8/20/94, p. 8; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/ seized in Hungary is of Russian origin. 94, pp. 1-2; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 43- 94, p. 20 (12017). Aleksandr Sychev, Izvestiya, 8/ 44 (11732). 20/94, p. 3 (12017). Press Association (London), However, Georgy Kaurov, spokesman for the 8/18/94; JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, p. 47 Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy, asserts (11587). 8/24/94 that the rods — which cannot be used in weap- It is reported that during his official visit to ons production and are not regarded as stra- Moscow in 8/94, Indian Home Minister S. tegic raw materials — could have come from B. Chavan will discuss the migration of RUSSIA WITH GERMANY AND UNITED any country operating a nuclear power plant. STATES Russian nuclear specialists to Pakistan with The rods can easily be obtained on the in- Russian officials. ternational market for a price much lower All India Radio (Delhi), 8/24/94; in FBIS-SOV-94- 6/94 than $40,000 per kilo. According to Kaurov, 167, 8/29/94, p. 12 (11640). The U.S. firm Unarez reportedly purchases the high price the smugglers were planning about 650,000 lbs of CIS-origin U308 in or- to ask for serves as evidence that they lacked der to make delivery on a long-term con- any specific knowledge on the use of radio- RUSSIA WITH IRAN tract to a German utility. active materials. Michael Knapik, NuclearFuel, 8/1/94, pp. 17-18 MTI (Moscow), 8/31/94 (11729). MTI (Budapest), 6/16/94 (11699). 8/30/94 (11729). It is reported that Russia will assist Iran in completing construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which is expected to RUSSIA WITH GERMANY AND ZAIRE RUSSIA WITH IAEA produce one-seventh of Iran’s electricity 9/12/94 demand. Currently, Russian specialists are 6/29/94 finishing technical research for the project. A Zairian man flying from Moscow to IAEA General Director Hans Blix meets The plant is scheduled for completion by Germany’s Schoenfeld Airport is arrested with Russian Foreign Intelligence Service 1995. after it was discovered he was carrying 1.5 (SVR) Director Yevgeniy Primakov to dis- Oleg Kuzmin, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 6/16/94; in FBIS- lbs. of uranium ore. cuss nuclear nonproliferation issues. An SOV-94-117, 6/17/94, p. 12 (11801). Times (London), 9/13/94 (11701). Bettina Vestring, unnamed, high-ranking Russian intelligence Reuter, 9/12/94 (11766). officer says Hans Blix is interested in ob- 8/94 taining information gathered by the SVR on German Minister Bernd Schmidbauer dis- the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not- closes in an intelligence analysis that Iran

116 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments has purportedly had 14 CIS nuclear scien- RUSSIA WITH JAPAN AND UNITED 6/1/94 tists within its borders since the beginning KINGDOM Russia turns over control of the of 1992, and may have concluded employ- Semipalatinsk test range to Kazakhstan. ment contracts with 200 technicians and over 6/23/94 2X2 Television (Moscow), 6/1/94; in FBIS-SOV- 94-105, 6/1/94, p. 17 (11538). 50 nuclear experts. Russia and Japan sign an agreement to con- Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 8/21/ struct a processing facility near Vladivostok 94, pp. 1-2; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 43- 8/15/94-8/20/94 to extract radioactive materials from liquid 44 (11732). A Russian-Kazakh “coordinating group” nuclear wastes. The mobile barge-type fa- meets in Kurchatov, Kazakhstan, to discuss cility — which will be completed in 1995 — progress on the dismantling of the nuclear will process 1.5 cubic meters of polluted RUSSIA WITH IRAQ device at the Semipalatinsk test site. The water per hour, which will purify accumu- removal process is on schedule. Respond- lated wastes as well as those which will re- 8/94 ing to concerns over the environmental con- sult from further utilization of nuclear-pow- German Minister Bernd Schmidbauer dis- sequences of removing the device, engineers ered vessels in the next 10 years. The sides closes in an intelligence analysis that Iraq from the Kazakh National Nuclear Center agree that actual construction should be open may employ 50 nuclear experts from the and the Russian Federal Nuclear Center took to international bidders. The project will former Soviet Union, including a laser spe- radiation level readings at the removal site be funded out of the $70 million that Japan cialist from Arzamas-16. and found that they were not in excess of is providing to Russia for nuclear disarma- Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 8/21/ the norm. The group plans to meet again 94, pp. 1-2; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 43- ment. In the two days prior to the signing, before 9/19/94. 44 (11732). experts from Japan and the British consult- Interfax (Moscow), 8/25/94; in JPRS-TEN-94-021, ing firm “Kram-Adjins” meet with represen- 8/25/94 (11637). Mid-9/94 tatives of the Pacific Fleet, the “Zvezda” It is reported that senior U.S. officials indi- nuclear submarine repair plant, the State cate that Iraq could have a nuclear device in Committee for Nuclear Safety, the Minis- RUSSIA WITH LIBYA three to six months if it obtains the needed try of Environment and natural resources, enriched uranium or plutonium from the and the “Morskoy Registr” as well as the 8/94 former Soviet Union. Although Iraq would Maritime Kray administration and scientists German Minister Bernd Schmidbauer dis- need longer to develop a nuclear weapon from Far East Branch of Russian Academy closes in an intelligence analysis that while deliverable by a missile or plane, it could of Sciences to discuss ways of solving the two Russian nuclear experts turned down easily load a device on a truck to be driven problem of accumulated liquid radioactive “official offers” from Libya, Libya in fact to a detonation site in a nearby county, ac- wastes. may be employing a number of Russians in cording to one of the U.S. officials. U.S. Kyodo (Tokyo), 6/23/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-122, 6/ research institutes. military expert Michael Eisenstadt says that 24/94, pp. 16-17 (11811). Nikolay Litkovets, Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 8/21/ Iraq has already been involved in attempts Krasnaya Zvezda, 7/16/94, p. 4 (11639). Yevgeniy Lents, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 6/24/94; in FBIS-SOV- 94, pp. 1-2; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 43- to acquire nuclear materials from the former 94-119, 6/21/94, p. 14 (11639). “Pacific Ocean” 44 (11732). Soviet Union. Historical ties between the Program, Vladivostok Radiostantsiya Tikhiy Okean Russian and Iraqi militaries also increase Maritime Network, 6/22/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-119, the possibilities that Iraq could obtain Rus- 6/24/94, p. 39 (11639). RUSSIA WITH LITHUANIA sian nuclear materials. Philip Finnegan, Theresa Hitchens, and Barabara 8/94 Opall, Defense News, 9/12/94-9/18/94, pp. 3, 24 RUSSIA WITH KAZAKHSTAN It is disclosed that on 11/16/93 the (11847). Lithuanian government cancelled construc- 3/28/94 tion of a third reactor at the Ignalina nuclear Russia and Kazakhstan conclude an agree- power plant, and that there is no prospect RUSSIA WITH ITALY ment on the dismantlement and subsequent of constructing another unit in the immedi- removal from Kazakhstan of the nuclear 9/20/94 ate future. Ignalina generates more than 80 device at the facility known as “object 108” percent of Lithuania’s electricity. Nuclear The Italian Parliament ratifies a Russian- located at the Semipalatinsk test site. The fuel and reactor components for Ignalina are Italian agreement which will provide 10 device was placed at the site in 5/91 in prepa- purchased solely from Russia, which has billion lira to help Russia in nuclear weapon ration for a nuclear test. recently increased the prices for these prod- dismantlement. Olzhas Suleimenov and Vladimir Yakimits, ucts. Radwaste storage for the Ignalina plant Dmitri Polunin, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/21/94; in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 6/25/94, p. 4 (11809). FBIS-SOV-94-183, 9/21/94, p. 9 (11656). will run out for its first unit in 9/94, and for the Ignalina-2 unit in 7/95. Nuclear Europe Worldscan, 7-8/94, p. 58 (11735).

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 117 Nuclear Developments

RUSSIA WITH MOLDOVA AND ROMANIA could be useful to countries that already have Russia was able to prevent a mass exodus of active nuclear-weapons programs.” Russian missile researchers and their fami- 6/21/94 Fred Hiatt, Washington Post Foreign Service, 9/24/ lies to North Korea. Stepanov says that he 94 (11734). Simion Lacramioara, chief of the Moldovan does not know whether there were nuclear scientists among the group. Ministry of Interior Department for Com- 8/18/94 batting Organized Crime, reports that a Sergei Pulzhnikov and Sergei Sokolov, It is suggested that Russian nuclear materi- Komsomolskaya Pravda, 6/17/94-6/20/94; in FBIS- group of smugglers was arrested last week als are being smuggled through Estonia, SOV-94-117, 6/17/94, p. 1 (11698). while trying to sell a tank filled with 1 kg Germany, and Latvia, “with meetings tak- of the radioactive material gamma cobalt- ing place in Finland.” 7/5/94 60 to a foreign merchant for $20,000. This Press Association (London), 8/18/94; in JPRS-TND- It is reported that Komsomolskaya Pravda was the first smuggling incident where 94-017, 9/8/94, p. 47 (11587). recently published an article citing claims Moldovan police found material of a “high that Russian scientists working on quality.” A Romanian citizen is believed to Pyongyang’s nuclear program are now able have ordered the substance, but officials lack RUSSIA WITH NORTH KOREA to avoid risky border crossings into North sufficient evidence for his arrest. The ma- Korea by sending their nuclear-related cal- terial was brought into Moldova from Rus- 3/94 culations through unmonitored computer sia. Three Moldovan citizens, Ion Petcu, Five North Koreans are forced to leave mail. Alexandru Budoianu, and Simion Tarlev, Moscow for “showing too much interest in Warren Strobel, Washington Times, 7/5/94, pp. A1, and one Russian collaborator were appre- nuclear components.” A8 (11820). hended after being monitored by the Warren Strobel, Washington Times, 7/5/94, pp. A1, Moldovan Ministry of Interior for four A8 (11820). 7/8/94 months. One source reports that only two Georgi F. Kunadze, Russia’s Ambassador to Moldovans were arrested. The confiscated 6/7/94 Seoul, announces that Russia is prepared to material had the potential to pollute the en- North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Young- provide a light water reactor to North Ko- tire Moldovan region. Although the con- nam announces that North Korea is consid- rea to replace its graphite-moderated reac- tainer was “factory-made” and hermetically ering Russia’s proposal for an international tor once Pyongyang complies with interna- sealed, a small leak of the substance was conference to discuss the North Korean tional nuclear safeguards under the NPT. discovered by experts. Moldova has recently nuclear issue and a nuclear-free zone on the International Herald Tribune, 7/9/94-7/10/94 experienced an increase of nuclear smug- Korean Peninsula. (11855). gling incidents due to the lack of strict cus- Itar-Tass (Moscow), 6/7/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-110, toms controls on Romania’s eastern borders. 6/8/94, p. 1 (11838). 8/5/94 Basapress (Chisinau), 6/21/94; in FBIS-SOV-94- North Korea rejects the U.S. offer to supply 122, 6/24/94, p. 56 (11531). Interfax (Moscow), 6/15/94 North Korea with a South Korean light wa- 6/22/94; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 7/13/94, p. 43 Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service ter reactor and renews its request for a Rus- (11568). Interfax (Moscow), 6/22/94; in FBIS- Chief Sergei Stepashin reveals that on 6/13/ sian-model reactor. SOV-94-121, 6/23/94, p. 49 (11633). 94, three North Koreans were arrested near Yonhap (Seoul), 8/6/94; in FBIS-EAS-94-152, 8/ the Russian-North Korean border in 8/94, p. 47 (11955). Primorskoye territory because they were RUSSIA WITH MULTI-COUNTRY GROUP believed to have been attempting to obtain 8/5/94 It is reported that during a meeting in Mos- 1994 nuclear weapons components. It is believed that Russian organized crime is involved in cow, representatives of the Russian Minis- An international center, designed to employ the transactions. Russia’s Justice Minister try of Atomic Energy and Robert Gallucci, 3,000 Russian scientists previously engaged Yuri Kalmykov says that Russia’s organized U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, discussed in nuclear, chemical, and biological weap- criminals only have nuclear “spare parts,” the idea of replacing the Soviet-origin gas- ons development, begins operations in Mos- not core technology. graphite nuclear reactor in North Korea. cow. The organization is receiving a total Alan Philps, Hugo Gurdon, and Robert Guest, Daily Viktor Sidorenko, deputy Minister of of $70 million from the U.S., Japan, Fin- Telegraph, 6/16/94 (11927). Warren Strobel, Wash- Atomic Energy, informed Gallucci of land, Sweden, and the E.U. to fund grants ington Times, 7/5/94, pp. A1, A8 (11820). Russia’s willingness to deliver a new reac- for projects in non-defense areas. Although tor. The idea for the replacement, suggested initially created to employ 200-300 scien- 6/17/94 by the U.S. earlier in 1994, was discussed tists, the center expanded because, accord- Valentin Stepanov, head of the main direc- with Japan and South Korea as a possible ing to its director, Glenn E. Schweitzer, torate for space rocket technology of the means to settle the nuclear crisis. The reac- “more than 60,000 [scientists] have skills in Russian State Committee on the Defense tor delivery could be funded either by Ja- electronics, rocketry or other fields that Industry, describes how, at the end of 1991, pan or South Korea. According to the Min-

118 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments istry of Atomic Energy’s preliminary esti- would cost approximately $4 billion. Rus- RUSSIA WITH PAKISTAN mates, payments for the project could ex- sia insists that other countries must pay for ceed $1.5 billion and would partially alle- the reactors. 8/24/94 viate the financial problems the Russian Foreign Report, 9/29/94 (12019). It is reported that during an official visit to nuclear industry is experiencing. During Moscow in 8/94, Indian Home Minister S. the meeting, the U.S. also raised the possi- 9/20/94 B. Chavan plans to discuss with Russian bility of reprocessing and storing North Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander leaders the issue of the migration of Rus- Korean spent fuel in Russia. Panov travels to North Korea for bilateral sian nuclear specialists to Pakistan. Alexander Platkovskiy, Izvestiya, 8/5/94, p. 3 discussions on Russian participation in the All India Radio (Delhi), 8/24/94; in FBIS-SOV-94- (11728). replacement of North Korea’s nuclear reac- 167, 8/29/94, p. 12 (11640). tors. Russia proposes replacing North 8/9/94 Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors with It is reported that Russian Ministry for 640 MW light water VVER reactors. Panov RUSSIA WITH PRC Nuclear Power Engineering specialists, in says the North Koreans are interested in the accordance with the Russian-North Korean Russian reactor, but that further discussion 1994 Agreement, have discussed the possibility at U.S. and North Korean bilateral talks Sun Guangdi, chief engineer for nuclear of replacing a North Korean nuclear facility scheduled for 9/23/94 is required. Russia power at the China National Nuclear Cor- capable of producing weapon-grade pluto- reached an agreement with North Korea in poration, confirms that the design of two nium, with three 640 MW reactors. The 1985 to modernize North Korea’s reactors VVER-1000s — which will be supplied by feasibility of the deal is dependent on find- with four 440 MW VVER reactors on credit, Russia to Liaoning, China’s north-east in- ing a means to finance the project. Itar- but the deal was called off in 1992 when dustrial province — has begun. The plant Tass was told by “reliable sources” in Tokyo North Korea withdrew its part of the fund- will be located at Wafangdian. that Japan is unofficially considering a fi- ing for the project. Nuclear Europe Worldscan, 5-6/94, p. 25 (11695). nance package whereby North Korea would Andrey Smirnov, Kommersant Daily, 9/2/94; in receive a Russian-made light water reactor FBIS-USR-94-105, 9/2/94, p. 4 (11899). Reuter, 6/94 to replace the current North Korean facil- 9/20/94; in Executive News Service, 9/20/94 (11899). Aleksandr Valiyev, Itar-Tass, 9/22/94; in Russia and China are jointly carrying out ity. FBIS-SOV-94-185, 9/23/94, p. 14 (11899). technical and economic feasibility studies Marina Barinova, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 8/9/94; in to build two VVER-1000s in China’s FBIS-SOV-94-117, 8/10/94, pp. 10-11 (11798). Marina Barinova, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 8/9/94; in 9/29/94 Liaoning province for a barter exchange FBIS-SOV-94-154, 8/10/94, p. 11 (11798). Mikhail Demurin, spokesman for the Rus- worth $2.5 billion. sian Foreign Ministry, denies the validity Chuangying Wang, Nuclear Europe Worldscan, 7/ 8/17/94 of statements made by North Korean defec- 94-8/94, pp. 46, 48 (11876). Chen Zhaobo; in ENS NucNet, 6/21/94 (11876). It is reported that U.S. Assistant Secretary tor Lee Chung-kuk that North Korea tested of State Robert Gallucci will go to the capi- three nuclear bombs in Ukraine and Russia 8/94 tals of South Korea, China, Russia, and Ja- in 1992. German Minister Bernd Schmidbauer dis- pan to raise $4 billion needed to pay for the Interfax (Moscow), 9/29/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-190, 9/30/94, p. 13 (11694). closes in an intelligence analysis that in construction of light water reactors in North 1992, the PRC’s Army General Staff pub- Korea, provided North Korea allows inspec- lished plans for locating and recruiting Rus- tions of two undeclared nuclear facilities. RUSSIA WITH OECD sian nuclear experts. South Korean officials say that the U.S. will Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 8/21/ not contribute to the cost of building the 94, pp. 1-2; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 43- light water reactors because U.S. law pro- 7/1/94 44 (11732). hibits financial exchanges with countries A Russian-OECD Nuclear Energy Agency categorized as “hostile.” (NEA) joint project is announced which will 8/23/94 Yonhap (Seoul), Washington Times, 8/18/94, p. A13 study the interaction of molten core materi- It is reported that the Russian representa- (12001). Washington Times, 8/19/94, p. A16 als (corium) with the lower head of a reac- tive from Sverdlovsk Oblast, Vitaliy (12001). tor pressure valve. The project — bearing Mashkov, sent a letter to the Russian gov- the Russian name Rasplav — was originally ernment protesting a plan by the Ministry 9/94 suggested in 4/93. The parties have agreed of Atomic Energy to help China construct a It is reported that Russia prefers to update to a $6.9 million budget over a three-year centrifuge enrichment plant. Mashkov be- the Russian-North Korean agreement and time period. An experimental installation lieves that the Chinese will use the technol- supply three 660 MW VVERs [as reported] will be constructed at the Russian Kurchatov ogy to narrow the gap between Russian and — the 1985 agreement gives Russia a con- Institute near Moscow. Chinese science and will, in turn, eventu- tract to build four 440 MW VVERs — which Nuclear News, 8/94, p. 46 (11693). ally dominate the market for such technol-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 119 Nuclear Developments ogy. In return for the assistance on the cen- cluded in Moscow with Russian partners.” RUSSIA WITH UKRAINE AND UNITED trifuge plant, China will place an order with It is not clear if delivery was actually made STATES the Ministry of Atomic Energy for construc- to the Swiss firm. tion of a nuclear power plant. Dan Damian, Evenimentul Zilei (Bucharest), 5/30/ 6/94 Aleksandr Pashkov, Izvestiya, 8/23/94, p. 2 (11805). 94, p. 1; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 7/13/94, pp. 23- 24 (11881). It is reported that in return for two train- loads of Ukrainian nuclear weapons sent last 9/2/94 winter and spring, one trainload of Russian Chinese President Jiang Zemin begins talks RUSSIA WITH SOUTH KOREA reactor fuel was sent to the Zaporozhye with Russian leaders in Moscow; the talks nuclear power station. are to culminate in the signing of a bilateral 6/3/94 Maryana Oleynik, Kiyevskiye Vedomosti (Kiev), 6/ agreement under which China and Russia 30/94, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-129, 7/6/94, p. 40 will detarget their nuclear missiles. At a meeting with South Korea’s Minister (11580). G. Hutchings, Daily Telegraph, 9/2/94 (11511). for Trade, Industry, and Energy Kim Chol- Su, Russian First Vice Premier Oleg 6/94 Soskovets announces that Russia is ready to Aleksandr Shondruk, a member of Ukraine’s RUSSIA WITH ROMANIA increase the annual amount of LEU sup- Commission for Foreign Affairs and CIS plied to South Korea from 40 tons to 100 Relations, states that several members of the 5/30/94 tons. commission intend to ask the Ukrainian It is reported that “several” Romanians, in- Interfax (Moscow), 6/3/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-109, president and Foreign Ministry to revise the 6/7/94, p. 7 (11690). cluding Niculae Costel and Elisabeta Ana tripartite agreement. Shondruk says that the Stefanescu, have made contacts with Rus- Supreme Council will consider halting the sian and Romanian firms for delivery of removal of warheads from Ukraine if the RUSSIA WITH SWEDEN nuclear-related materials; Costel represents U.S. and Russia are proven to be in viola- tion of the agreement. several Romanian companies, such as 6/94 Rombel and Sircom, while Stefanescu is sole Maryana Oleynik, Kiyevskiye Vedomosti (Kiev), 6/ It is reported that Sweden will participate proprietor of Technotours. Costel offered 30/94, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-129, 7/6/94, p. 40 in building nuclear waste storage facilities (11580). to deliver red mercury, osmium192, radium in the Murmansk oblast. and scandium — in quantities ranging from Izvestiya, 6/9/94, p. 1 (11703). 6/28/94 15-200 kg — to firms such as Germany’s The Ukrainian Supreme Council votes to Finanz Consulting AG, Norway’s Euronor include Oleh Vitovych’s proposal — which Business Partner Ltd and DHS-Merger- RUSSIA WITH SOUTH KOREA AND will temporarily halt nuclear warhead trans- Alois Geissler. In 1992-93, Costel was in TAIWAN fers to Russia — on the tentative list of issues Russia several times to arrange transport and to be discussed during its plenary session financing of deliveries. On 7/5/92, 6/14/94 from 6/28/94 - 7/1/94. Vitovych, chair- Stefanescu — who until 1989 held adminis- man of the subcommission for human rights trative posts in several foreign embassies — In parliamentary hearings, Chairman of the Russian State Committee on Atomic Energy issues, says the U.S. and Russia are in vio- used a Bucharest-Rome Tarom flight to de- lation of the tripartite agreement and that liver a sample of red mercury to an Italian Yuri Vishnevskiy confirms a statement by Chang Chung-Cheing, Chairman of Taiwan nuclear weapons may be the only viable citizen Egidio Mussa, who was also her deterrent to aggression against Ukraine. business partner. Once delivery was made, Energy Company, that negotiations have taken place over the possibility of storing Unian (Kiev), 6/28/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-125, 6/29/ Stefanescu told Mussa to open a dollar ac- 94, pp. 33-39 (11815). count at the Italian bank Credito Italiono; Taiwanese nuclear waste on Russian terri- Stefanescu was the only person entitled to tory. According to Chang, the Russian Re- 6/28/94 search Institutes, which own 10 nuclear withdraw from the account. Meanwhile, By a 12-member margin, the Ukrainian par- waste storage sites, agreed to reprocess and Stefanescu informed the Laespezia-based liament votes to debate whether or not store Taiwan’s nuclear waste if the two par- Italian firm Omnia Tecno SRL that the red nuclear shipments to Russia should be con- ties could settle the cost of the anticipated mercury was brought to Romania by “an tinued. Ukrainian National Assembly ex- job. Vishnevskiy added that Russia held agent of an embassy empowered to deal with tremist Oleh Vitovych, sponsoring the pro- similar discussions with South Korean rep- this affair.” In another transaction, posal to stop weapon transfers, calls the tri- resentatives, although no final agreement Stefanescu offered 138 kg of red mercury to lateral agreement “the worst possible strate- was signed in either of the two cases. a Zurich firm, Mueller Treuhand, at a price gic error.” Spaseniye, 6/94, No. 12(13) (11709). of $340,000 per kilogram; Stefanescu Reuter, 6/28/94 (11880). claimed the material was purchased in Chelyabinsk and that delivery was “con-

120 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments

7/1/94 Late 7/94 8/3/94 The Ukrainian Supreme Council reverses its Konstantin Zalutin, Chairman of the State Vice President Al Gore notes that “as of to- 6/28/94 decision to discuss a proposal to Duma Commission on the CIS and on Com- day” Ukraine has transferred about 300 war- end the transfer of nuclear weapons to Rus- patriots, criticizes the revision of the tri- heads to Russia. The trilateral agreement sia. Adam Chikal, Deputy Chairman of the partite agreement. Zalutin believes that if obligated Ukraine to remove only 200 war- Standing Commission for Issues of Defense Ukraine and Russia become strategic part- heads by 11/94. and State Security, says Ukraine has removed ners, or if Ukraine’s economic constraints U.S. Department Of State Dispatch, 8/15/94, p. 557 36 percent of its warheads in return for Rus- become too great, then Russia could not (11683). sian promises to deliver 25 tons of fuel for object to a halting of Ukrainian disarma- nuclear power stations. Chikal adds that ment or to Ukrainian jurisdiction over those the topic of suspending withdrawals was weapons remaining on Ukrainian territory. RUSSIA WITH UNITED KINGDOM closely examined during the commission’s Interfax (Moscow), 7/30/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-147, session and that Vitovych’s statements re- 8/1/94, p. 32 (11581). 8/18/94-8/19/94 garding this issue are not in line with the John Large, a British nuclear expert, says facts. 8/94 senior Russian nuclear plant workers asked Demokratychna Ukrayina, 7/5/94, p. 1; in FBIS- Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaliy him to arrange for the testing of a sample of SOV-94-130, 7/7/94, p. 53 (11815). Radetskyy and Ashton Carter, the U.S. de- nuclear material about the size of “an old fense secretary’s assistant for military and sixpence,” which weighed approximately 7/1/94 political issues, meet in Kiev to discuss the 0.25 grams. Large, who declined to iden- It is reported that, to date, Ukraine has trans- implementation of the tripartite agreement tify who had asked him to perform the test, ferred 300 of its 1,600 nuclear warheads to and START I. In an earlier interview, said this was not the first time in his five Russia for dismantlement. Radetskyy complained that while Russia is years of business trips to Russia that he was Reuter, 9/1/94 (11711). meeting its obligations under the tripartite approached in this manner. Large says that agreement — having sent 75 tons of “fuel el- he was first approached by Russians — two 7/7/94 ements” to Ukrainian nuclear power stations engineers and a manager from a nearby Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security — the U.S. is not meeting its obligations. nuclear facility who were interested in sell- Council Vladimir Gorbulin says that due to Interfax (Moscow), 8/11/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-156, ing nuclear materials, including plutonium Ukraine’s inability to transfer its nuclear 8/12/94, p. 26 (11653). Radio Ukraine World Ser- — in summer 1993. Large was also ap- weapons to Russia by the end of 1994, vice (Kiev), 8/11/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-156, 8/12/ 94, p. 26 (11651). Interfax (Moscow), 8/11/94; in proached in 2/94. Large said that the Rus- “Ukraine is not ready to join the nuclear FBIS-SOV-94-156, 8/12/94, p. 26 (11653). sians carried the sealed plutonium sample weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty this year.” in “a spherical, iron container measuring Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik, Itar-Tass 8/94 several centimeters in diameter.” After ex- (Moscow), 9/7/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-174, 9/8/94, p. 38 (11711). Chairman of Ukraine’s Parliamentary Com- amining their “English-language docu- mission for Foreign Affairs Boris Oliynyk ments,” Large turned the Russians down. 7/14/94 states that Kiev’s rapid nuclear disarmament Large believes that people in the city, which It is reported that Vitaliy Radetskyy, Ukrai- “does not obviously contribute to Ukraine’s he has not named because he still travels to nian Defense Minister, ordered senior de- security and does not, to put it mildly, point Russia on business, “intended to use the fense officers to end withdrawals of nuclear to its growing international prestige.” small number of Western engineers in the warheads to Russia on the grounds that Oliynyk believes that the nuclear powers are city to earn money in one way or another.” Moscow and Washington are not fulfilling primarily concerned with the 46 modern Large also noted that the Russians do not their tripartite agreement obligations. missiles that will remain under Ukraine’s always store small quantities of plutonium, Unian (Ukraine); in Russia/CIS Intelligence Report, control even after current disarmament ob- whose alpha radiation can be blocked by a 7/14/94 (11652). ligations are satisfied. sheet of paper, in lead containers. The ra- Molod Ukrayiny (Kiev), 8/26/94; in FBIS-SOV-94- diation emitted by quantities of up to 300 7/15/94 168, 8/30/94, p. 34 (11659). grams of plutonium is difficult to detect. Valeriy Ivashchenko, Assistant to Ukraine’s Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 8/20/94, p. 27; in FBIS- Deputy Minister of Defense, denies that 8/94 SOV-94-162, 8/22/94, p. 7 (11585). Press Asso- ciation (London), 8/18/94; in JPRS-TND-94-017, Defense Minister Radetskyy stopped trans- Ukrainian President Kuchma states that Ukraine will fulfill its international obliga- 9/8/94, p. 47 (11587). Edith M. Lederer, Wash- fers of Ukrainian warheads to Russia. While ington Times, 8/21/94, p. 9 (11814). Ivashchenko agrees that the U.S. and Rus- tions — including its commitment to with- sia are violating their tripartite obligations, draw all nuclear weapons to Russia — in ac- he adds that only the Ukrainian Parliament cordance with the tripartite agreement. has the authority to suspend the agreement. Marta Kolomayets, Ukrainian Weekly, 8/7/94, p. 1 (11683). Unian (Ukraine); in Russia/CIS Intelligence Report, 7/15/94 (11652).

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 121 Nuclear Developments

RUSSIA WITH UNITED STATES rived from dismantled Ukrainian warheads. excess plutonium and HEU storage facility. Meanwhile, by about 8/94 Matek is expected Dunbar Lockwood, Arms Control Today, 7/94-8/ to have proposals from several commercial 94, p. 24 (11722). Wilson Dizzard III, NuclearFuel, 5/94 7/4/94, p. 15 (11722). The U.S. and Russia begin talks on modify- entities for air transport of up to 10 or more ing Russia’s research reactors to use com- metric tons of HEU to the U.S.; the ship- 7/94 ment could take place by autumn. Russian mercial grade fuel instead of HEU uranium. R. James Woolsey, Director of the U.S. partners in the joint venture favor HEU Argonne National Laboratory and Russia’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), says his blending in the U.S. ENTEK are developing the LEU for these organization will follow operations of orga- reactors. Vestnik Chernobylya, 6/94, No. 45 (564), p. 3 (11704). Wilson Dizard III, Nuclear Fuel, 6/20/ nized crime in Russia; Woolsey believes Wilson Dizard III, Nuclear Fuel, 7/4/94, p. 15 94, pp. 1-3 (11689). organized crime may have access to nuclear (11722). materials through its influence on the Rus- 5/94-6/94 6/23/94 sian military. Without proper safeguards According to a “Principles of Cooperation” In Washington, Vice President Al Gore and and security measures, nuclear materials can agreement signed between Westinghouse and Russian Prime Minister Viktor be seized by employees at various facilities. the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Chernomyrdin sign an agreement based on One particular example Woolsey cited was U.S. firm will join in safety projects on an earlier 3/16/94 “agreement in principle” a “recent incident” where a janitor in a Rus- Russia’s operating nuclear power plants and between U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel sian nuclear plant took some nuclear mate- those still under construction. Joint ven- O’Leary and Russian Minister of Atomic rial; the material was later recovered by tures between Westinghouse and the Minis- Energy Viktor Mikhailov. This latest agree- Russian authorities. Jane’s Defense Weekly, 8/6/94, pp. 4-6 (11768). try of Atomic Energy are planned to include ment is comprised of five provisions: 1) Russia will close its three dual-use weap- the development and manufacturing of in- 7/19/94 strumentation and control systems and ons-grade plutonium-producing reactors at The U.S. Department of Commerce issues worldwide fuel cycle services. Krasnoyarsk-26 and Tomsk-7 “no later than a second statement “of administrative intent” Nuclear Europe Worldscan, 5-6/94, p. 24 (11647). the year 2000”; 2) the U.S. and Russia will “take all practical steps” to ensure that the on the amended U.S.-Russian suspension first provision is carried out and that alter- agreement. The statement references the 6/7/94 native energy sources are created at the escrow account which is referred to in the U.S. and Russian companies publicly an- Krasnoyarsk and Tomsk facilities; 3) Rus- agreement. sia agrees not to use any plutonium pro- Michael Knapik, NuclearFuel, 8/1/94, pp. 17-18 nounce their 6/1/94 formation of “Matek,” (11699). a joint venture company designed to imple- duced at the aforementioned reactors for ment the U.S.-Russian HEU deal. The weapons purposes prior to the reactors’ shut- down; 4) within six months of this 7/26/94 Russian partners — holding 80 percent of The U.S. Department of Energy approves Matek’s equity — are Ural Electrochemical agreement’s signing verification arrange- ments — including on-site inspections at U.S. Siemens Power Corporation exports to Integrated Plant (UCEP), Siberian Chemi- Russia of equipment to convert UF6 to UO2. cal Plant, Techsnabexport, Priargunski Min- Krasnoyarsk-26, Tomsk-7, Chelyabinsk-65, and at Russian and U.S. reactors that for- The approval was conditioned on the equip- ing-Chemical Plant, the Russian Academy ment being utilized only for the manufac- of Sciences and a foreign trade company, merly produced weapons-grade plutonium — will be worked out; and 5) “as early as ture of nuclear fuel for civilian reactors and Litintern. Partners on the U.S. side are on the U.S. maintaining the right to forbid Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. (NFS) and Al- possible” the U.S. and Russia will work to- ward a broader agreement which prohibits any retransfer. lied Signal, which together formed Allied NuclearFuel, 10/10/94, p. 22 (11691). Fuel Energy Services Co. (AFES) to un- plutonium use — produced at any facility — dertake the joint venture. Matek’s Chair- for nuclear weapons purposes. In addition 8/94 to this agreement, nearly two dozen other man, UCEP Director Vitaly Kornilov, will A coalition of scientists from Los Alamos accords are reached during Chernomyrdin’s be joined on the board of directors by six and Arzamas-16 hold a test to study the ef- Washington visit. Among these, the two other Russians and two Americans. A key fects of “ultrapowerful” magnetic fields on sides establish a U.S.-Russian Fissile Ma- decisionmaker on the board will be Minis- liquids and gases. This was the first time terial Disposition and Accumulation Work- try of Atomic Energy Chairman Viktor that scientists from the two nuclear com- ing Group; the U.S. promises $30 million Mikhailov. In an early 6/94 letter, plexes worked together on a project. in Nunn-Lugar funds for nuclear material Mikhailov pressed Vice President Al Gore Vladimir Gubarev, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 8/30/94, p. to enlist U.S. Enrichment Corp. (USEC) as accountancy and control improvements in 3 (11727). partner to the venture and proposed that the Russia; and the U.S. pledges to supplement Ministry ship up to 30 metric tons of HEU the already committed $90 in Nunn-Lugar as UF6 or UO2 to the U.S., which was de- funds to assist Russia in constructing an

122 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments

8/15/94 significant energy source in the twenty-first The “Uranium Purchases Report 1993,” pub- century as it is able to produce electricity lished by the U.S. Department of Energy, while consuming weapons-grade plutonium UKRAINE indicates that in 1993 the U.S. purchased on a once-through fuel cycle. The venture Kazakh U308 at an average price of $9.56 will probably employ 200 or more Russian per pound; the U.S. bought Russian U308 at scientists and engineers in the short-term. an average price of $10.02 per pound. In Nuclear News, 9/94, pp. 95-98 (11799). 1993, Russia and Kazakhstan were among INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS the top five exporters of uranium to the U.S. 9/13/94 Nuclear Fuel, 8/29/94, p. 18 (11648). Ministry of Atomic Energy representative 6/94 in Moscow says that the Russian govern- Currently, about 90 SS-19 ICBMs with 8/19/94 ment is likely to raise the issue of ending about 540 nuclear warheads are deployed State Department spokesman Michael U.S. trade restrictions on Russian nuclear near Khmelnitsky and Pervomaisk; one third McCurry says that since the 6/23/94 meet- material exports during Yeltsin’s visit to of these missiles have had their warheads ings between Prime Minister Chernomyrdin Washington, which begins on 9/26. U.S. removed. Warheads from the SS-24s — al- and Vice President Gore, the U.S. has “pur- restrictions, however, are likely to remain most all of which have been removed from sued a series of initiatives” to assist Russia until Washington formally recognizes Rus- their missile bodies — “may be located” near in controlling its nuclear materials. Among sia as having a “transitional” economy. Un- the Pervomaisk base. According to the Tri- those initiatives, the U.S. envisions helping der this year’s current trade agreement partite agreement, by the middle of 11/94 Yeltsin establish a Russian-style Nuclear amendment, Russia is allowed to export a all of the warheads are to be removed from Regulatory Commission, as well as estab- total of 3,000 tons of natural uranium to the SS-24s. By 5/94, 240 warheads were re- lishing a “model security procedure” at a U.S. in 1994 and 1995 with two restrictions. moved from SS-19s and 420 from SS-24s. Russian nuclear facility that could then be First, Russia must finalize contracts for Moskovskiye Novosti, 6/12-19/94, p. A1 (11706). duplicated at other Russian installations. 6,000 tons of uranium in order to be able to Martin Sieff, Washington Times, 8/19/94, p. A14 sell 3,000 tons; U.S. uranium producers will 6/94 (11738). supply the other half. Second, the agree- Oleh Vitovych, a member of the Ukrainian ment has special restrictions on exporting National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self- 8/29/94 enriched uranium to the U.S. It is estimated Defense, believes that Ukraine should not It is reported that the budget of the Siberian that Russia has the potential to annually disarm unilaterally, and that all countries Nuclear Physics Institute of the Russian export up to 6,000 tons of uranium and up possessing nuclear weapons or attempting Academy of Sciences was affected by the to 30,000 tons of other nuclear material. to acquire these weapons should be included U.S. decision to stop building a super- Interfax (Moscow), 9/13/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-179, in disarmament negotiations. collider; the institute received just $800,000 9/15/94, p. 13 (11684). Maryana Oleynik, Kiyevskiye Vedomosti (Kiev), 6/ of an expected $2.5 million for its part in 30/94, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-129, 7/6/94, p. 40 developing the super-collider, and has been (11580). desperately searching for new enterprises to fill its financial loss. 6/94 Viktor Yelmakov, Itar-Tass, 8/29/94; in FBIS-SOV- TAJIKISTAN Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov states 94-168, 8/30/94, pp. 11-12 (11646). that if Ukraine continues its non-nuclear, non-aligned status it could become “an arena 9/94 for armed conflicts.” Morozov states that It is reported that Russia’s OKMB and because Moscow is aligning itself with Kurchatov institutes and General Atomics TAJIKISTAN WITH UNITED STATES NATO and will not guarantee Ukrainian of the U.S. have established a joint venture security, Ukraine should take measures to to develop the “Gas Turbine-Modular He- 8/94 guarantee its own security. Included in these lium Reactor (GT-MHR).” U.S. and Rus- It is reported that the U.S. firm La Mer In- measures would be the discontinuation of sian partners will participate on a “50-50 ternational will import 140,000 lbs of U308 nuclear weapon withdrawals and the formu- basis” and will equally contribute to financ- from Tajikistan. The uranium, carrying the lation of a policy to address the technical ing the joint venture’s needs. The joint ven- certificate of origin from the Tajik govern- and political aspects for Ukrainian mainte- ture is part of a larger Ministry of Atomic ment, “is expected to arrive in the U.S. nance of nuclear weapons. Energy blueprint to eventually replace the shortly.” Kostyantyn Morozov, Ukrayinska Gazeta (Kiev), 6/ plutonium production reactors at Tomsk and NuclearFuel, 8/15/94, pp. 1-2 (11775). 9/94-6/22/94, p. 8; in JPRS-TND-94-104, 7/13,94, p. 49 (11583). Krasnoyarsk with the safer GT-MHR. The GT-MHR reactor is expected to become a

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 123 Nuclear Developments

6/94 nuclear weapon state in close proximity to 9/3/94 Oleksandr Moroz, Chairman of the Ukrai- a nuclear weapon state. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Hennady nian Supreme Council, addresses statements Reuter, 9/1/94 (11711). Udovenko says that the West should stop made by the Congress of Ukrainian Nation- pressuring Ukraine to sign the NPT. alists (KUN) which, in effect, label Presi- 7/2/94 Udovenko vowed that Ukraine would up- dent Kravchuk a traitor for supporting tac- It is reported that Anotoliy Drugovin, Di- hold previous disarmament agreements, but tical nuclear weapon withdrawals from rector of the Kharkov interregional plant for that the West should allow Ukraine’s newly- Ukraine. Moroz supports this assessment the burial of nuclear waste, stated that a elected parliament “some time” in ratifying and states that the KUN has the right to “supra-budget fund” should be created to the NPT. express such opinions. build more nuclear dumps, since four of the Ron Popeski, Reuter, 9/3/94 (11720). Voloymyr Skachko, Holos Ukrayiny (Kiev), 6/25/ existing six Ukrainian nuclear waste stor- 94, p. 2; in FBIS-SOV-94-124, 6/28/94, p. 43 age facilities have run out of space. As of (11582). 1/1/94, the Kharkov plant had accumulated UKRAINE WITH CZECH REPUBLIC 1,226 cubic meters of solid waste and 305 6/1/94 cubic meters of liquid waste. If space is 6/94 Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk sub- consumed at the current rate, the plant can The nuclear engineering company Skoda mits a draft decree on Ukraine’s accession be only used for another decade, according Jaderne Strojirenstri Plzen agrees to sell to the NPT to the parliament. to Drugovin. compact grids to Ukraine for the Rivne Igor Porshnev and Vitaly Trubetskoy, Interfax (Mos- Interfax (Moscow), 7/2/94; in JPRS-TEN-94-018, nuclear power plant’s spent fuel pool. The cow), 6/2/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-108, 6/6/94, p. 38 7/12/94, p. 40 (11643). (11573). order will be completed by the end of 6/94 7/13/94 if Ukraine pays another 60 percent of the 6/2/94 total cost. Ukraine has already met 20 per- Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma states Anton Buteiko, leader of Ukraine’s Presi- cent of the total bill. that Ukraine may wait until 1995 to sign dential Service on Foreign Policy, says ac- Mlada Fronta Dnes (Prague), 6/14/94, p. 13; in the NPT, when a new treaty will be renego- cession to the NPT is not a pressing issue JPRS-TND-94-014, 7/13/94, p. 53 (11719). tiated at the extension conference. and that “at present, the Ukrainian parlia- AFP (Paris), 7/13/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-135, 7/14/ ment must first of all consider the economic 94, p. 20 (11712). issues.” UKRAINE WITH EUROPEAN UNION Igor Porshnev and Vitaly Trubetskoy, Interfax (Mos- 7/22/94 cow), 6/2/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-108, 6/6/94, p. 38 6/14/94 (11573). Boris Oliynyk, Chairman of the Parliamen- tary Commission for Foreign Affairs and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk signs a trade and cooperation agreement with the 6/26/94 Relations with CIS, says that due to neigh- boring nuclear weapon states, he would pre- E.U., but ratification by E.U. member par- President Kravchuk and former Prime Min- liaments will depend on Ukraine’s partici- ister Kuchma comment on their positions fer to have a “stage by stage disarmament” of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal. pation in the NPT. regarding the NPT. Kravchuk remains in Wall Street Journal, 6/15/94 (11574). favor of signing the treaty, while Kuchma Radio Ukraine World Service, 7/22/94; in FBIS- SOV-94-142, 7/25/94 (11715). justifies his opposition by stating that “Ukraine has not received a cent in Western 8/11/94 6/15/94 aid for scrapping nuclear weapons.” Chairman of the State Committee on Nuclear A report indicates that Ukraine’s member- Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovsky, Interfax ship in the NPT will not be a condition for (Moscow), 6/27/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-124, 6/28/94, Energy Use Mikhail Umanets says Ukraine p. 39 (11576). is planning on producing its own nuclear ratification of the 6/14/94 E.U.-Ukrainian fuel. agreement. 7/1/94 Krasnaya Zvezda, 8/11/94, p. 1 (11671). Nihonkeizai Shimbun (Japan), 6/15/94 (11574). Boris Olinyk, Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission, 8/19/94 says that the legislative body would agree Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma says UKRAINE WITH G-7 to Kiev’s participation in the NPT “when Ukraine should sign the NPT and that he we are ready.” Olinyk explains that this re- will ask the Supreme Council to “finalize” 5/31/94 luctance to address the NPT is due to the signatory process in October. Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov parliament’s previous difficulties in ratify- Larysa Ostrolutska, Ukrainya Moloda, 8/19/94, pp. responds to the lack of results in G-7/Ukrai- 4-5; in FBIS-SOV-94-166, 8/26/94, pp. 28-33 nian negotiations over the future of the ing START-1, insufficient economic aid, (11712). and the fact that Ukraine would be a non- Chernobyl power plant and an aid package by saying that billions of dollars would be

124 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments needed to shut down the Chernobyl station may employ 50 nuclear experts from the UKRAINE WITH PRC and to construct new nuclear power stations former Soviet Union, including a Ukrainian in its place. On 5/16/94, Shmarov said that MIRV expert. 6/30/94 closing Chernobyl would require 10 years Heinz Vielain, Welt Am Sonntag (Hamburg), 8/21/ PRC Ambassador to Ukraine Zhang Zhen and would cost from $6-8 billion. 94, pp. 1-2; in JPRS-TND-94-017, 9/8/94, pp. 43- 44 (11732). and Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik, Itar-Tass Oleksandr Moroz discuss the benefits of (Moscow), 5/16/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-094, 5/16/94, p. 44 (11570). Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail expanding technical, scientific, and eco- Melnik, Itar-Tass World Service (Moscow), 5/31/ UKRAINE WITH JAPAN nomic relations between their two countries. 94; in FBIS-SOV-94-105, 6/1/94, p. 35 (11570). Zhen and Moroz agree that cooperation in 5/6/94 these areas has yet to reach its potential. UT-1 Television Network (Kiev), 6/30/94; in FBIS- The Japanese Embassy in Ukraine an- UKRAINE WITH IAEA SOV-94-127, 7/1/94, p. 41 (11658). nounces that $16 million of the $100 mil- lion Tokyo pledged for nuclear weapon dis- 6/94 mantlement in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Rus- UKRAINE WITH ROMANIA Ukraine agrees to sign the Non-Prolifera- sia, and Ukraine, will be allocated to tion Treaty (NPT) and will allow IAEA in- Ukraine. 8/6/94 spections of its facilities. President Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service, 5/6/94; in JPRS- Kravchuk promises that the Ukrainian Par- TND-94-012, 6/7/94, p. 40 (11571). It is reported that Romanian police arrested liament will promptly approve NPT mem- five people in Timisoara for smuggling three bership. 9/26/94 kilograms of enriched uranium from Reuter, 6/29/94 (11654). In a meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Min- Ukraine. ister Hennadiy Udovenko, Japanese Foreign BBC Monitoring Service, 8/6/94 (12026). 6/27-28/94 Minister Igiro Kono says Japan supports G- During negotiations in Vienna, Ukraine and 7 aid to Ukraine for disarmament, the IAEA agree ad referendum to a draft Chernobyl clean-up, and economic reforms. UKRAINE WITH RUSSIA AND UNITED comprehensive safeguards agreement in Interfax (Moscow), 9/27/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-188, STATES which Ukraine will use nuclear materials 9/28/94, pp. 42-43 (11717). and facilities only for peaceful purposes and 6/94 will place them under IAEA safeguards. It is reported that in return for two train- IAEA Newsbriefs, 7/94-8/94, p. 7 (11575). UKRAINE WITH KAZAKHSTAN loads of Ukrainian nuclear weapons sent last winter and spring, one trainload of Russian 9/30/94 8/27/94 reactor fuel was sent to the Zaporozhye It is reported that an agreement signed be- It is reported that Kazakhstan’s Defense nuclear power station. tween IAEA Director General Hans Blix Minister Sagadat Nurmagambetov and Maryana Oleynik, Kiyevskiye Vedomosti (Kiev), 6/ and Ukrainian Nuclear and Radiation Safety Ukraine’s Defense Minister Vitaliy 30/94, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-129, 7/6/94, p. 40 (11580). Committee Chairman Nikolay Shteinberg Radetskyy met in Kiev to discuss nuclear calls for the application of IAEA safeguards disarmament issues and a draft of a bilat- 6/94 and supervision to all Ukraine’s nuclear eral agreement between the two defense Aleksandr Shondruk, a member of Ukraine’s material and limits Ukraine to the use of ministries. Commission for Foreign Affairs and CIS nuclear material for peaceful purposes only. Mayak Radio Network (Moscow), 8/27/94; in FBIS- Relations, states that several members of the This agreement will end limitation on the SOV-94-167, 8/29/94, p. 46 (11524). commission intend to ask the Ukrainian supply of nuclear fuel and “special equip- president and Foreign Ministry to revise the ment” to nuclear power stations in Ukraine. tripartite agreement. Shondruk says that the The IAEA will soon monitor all Ukrainian UKRAINE WITH NORTH KOREA Supreme Council will consider halting the nuclear facilities. removal of warheads from Ukraine if the Itar-Tass (Moscow), 9/30/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-191, 9/29/94 10/3/94, p. 34 (12029). Mikhail Demurin, spokesman for the Rus- U.S. and Russia are proven to be in viola- sian Foreign Ministry, denies the validity tion of the agreement. Maryana Oleynik, Kiyevskiye Vedomosti (Kiev), 6/ of statements made by North Korean defec- 30/94, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-129, 7/6/94, p. 40 UKRAINE WITH IRAQ tor Lee Chung-Kuk that North Korea tested (11580). three nuclear bombs in Ukraine and Russia 8/94 in 1992. 6/28/94 German Minister Bernd Schmidbauer dis- Interfax (Moscow), 9/29/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-190, The Ukrainian Supreme Council votes to closes in an intelligence analysis that Iraq 9/30/94, p. 13 (11694). include Oleh Vitovych’s proposal — which

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 125 Nuclear Developments will temporarily halt nuclear warhead trans- (Moscow), 9/7/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-174, 9/8/94, fers to Russia — on the tentative list of issues p. 38 (11711). 8/94 to be discussed during its plenary session Chairman of Ukraine’s Parliamentary Com- from 6/28/94 - 7/1/94. Vitovych, chair- 7/14/94 mission for Foreign Affairs Boris Oliynyk man of the subcommission for human rights It is reported that Vitaliy Radetskyy, Ukrai- states that Kiev’s rapid nuclear disarmament issues, says the U.S. and Russia are in vio- nian Defense Minister, ordered senior de- “does not obviously contribute to Ukraine’s lation of the tripartite agreement and that fense officers to end withdrawals of nuclear security and does not, to put it mildly, point nuclear weapons may be the only viable warheads to Russia on the grounds that to its growing international prestige.” deterrent to aggression against Ukraine. Moscow and Washington are not fulfilling Oliynyk believes that the nuclear powers are Unian (Kiev), 6/28/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-125, 6/29/ their tripartite agreement obligations. primarily concerned with the 46 modern 94, pp. 33-39 (11815). Unian (Ukraine); in Russia/CIS Intelligence Report, 7/14/94 (11652). missiles that will remain under Ukraine’s control even after current disarmament ob- 6/28/94 ligations are satisfied. By a twelve-member margin, the Ukrainian 7/15/94 Valeriy Ivashchenko, Assistant to Ukraine’s Molod Ukrayiny (Kiev), 8/26/94; in FBIS-SOV-94- parliament votes to debate whether or not 168, 8/30/94, p. 34 (11659). nuclear shipments to Russia should be con- Deputy Minister of Defense, denies that tinued. Ukrainian National Assembly ex- Defense Minister Radetskyy stopped trans- 8/94 tremist Oleh Vitovych, sponsoring the pro- fers of Ukrainian warheads to Russia. While Ukrainian President Kuchma states that posal to stop weapon transfers, calls the tri- Ivashchenko agrees that the U.S. and Rus- Ukraine will fulfill its international obliga- lateral agreement “the worst possible strate- sia are violating their tripartite obligations, tions — including its commitment to with- gic error.” he adds that only the Ukrainian Parliament draw all nuclear weapons to Russia — in ac- Reuter, 6/28/94 (11880). has the authority to suspend the agreement. cordance with the tripartite agreement. Unian (Ukraine); in Russia/CIS Intelligence Report, Marta Kolomayets, Ukrainian Weekly, 8/7/94, p. 1 7/15/94 (11652). 7/1/94 (11683). The Ukrainian Supreme Council reverses its Late 7/94 6/28/94 decision to discuss a proposal to 8/3/94 Konstantin Zalutin, Chairman of the State end the transfer of nuclear weapons to Rus- Vice President Al Gore notes that “as of to- Duma Commission on the CIS and on Com- sia. Adam Chikal, Deputy Chairman of the day” Ukraine has transferred about 300 war- patriots, criticizes the revision of the tri- Standing Commission for Issues of Defense heads to Russia. The trilateral agreement partite agreement. Zalutin believes that if and State Security, says Ukraine has removed obligated Ukraine to remove only 200 war- Ukraine and Russia become strategic part- 36 percent of its warheads in return for Rus- heads by 11/94. ners, or if Ukraine’s economic constraints sian promises to deliver 25 tons of fuel for U.S. Department Of State Dispatch, 8/15/94, p. 557 become too great, then Russia could not nuclear power stations. Chikal adds that (11683). object to a halting of Ukrainian disarma- the topic of suspending withdrawals was ment or to Ukrainian jurisdiction over those closely examined during the commission’s weapons remaining on Ukrainian territory. session and that Vitovych’s statements re- UKRAINE WITH UNITED KINGDOM Interfax (Moscow), 7/30/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-147, garding this issue are not in line with the 8/1/94, p. 32 (11581). facts. 7/22/94 Demokratychna Ukrayina, 7/5/94, p. 1; in FBIS- 8/94 It is reported that the U.K.’s Atomic En- SOV-94-130, 7/7/94, p. 53 (11815). ergy Authority Technology was awarded a Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaliy Radet- one million pound contract from the Euro- skyy and Ashton Carter, the U.S. Assistant 7/1/94 pean Commission for Chernobyl clean-up. Secretary of Defense for International Se- It is reported that, to date, Ukraine has trans- European Energy Report, 7/22/94 (11718). curity Policy, meet in Kiev to discuss the ferred 300 of its 1,600 nuclear warheads to implementation of the tripartite agreement Russia for dismantlement. and START I. In an earlier interview, Reuter, 9/1/94 (11711). UKRAINE WITH UNITED STATES Radetskyy complained that while Russia is 7/7/94 meeting its obligations under the tripartite 2/2/94 agreement — having sent 75 tons of “fuel” to Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security The U.S. Department of Energy grants ap- Ukrainian nuclear power stations — the U.S. Council Vladimir Gorbulin says that due to proval to S3 Technologies to export train- is not meeting its obligations. Ukraine’s inability to transfer its nuclear ing equipment used to simulate a full-scope Interfax (Moscow), 8/11/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-156, weapons to Russia by the end of 1994, 8/12/94, p. 26 (11653). Radio Ukraine World Ser- control room to Ukraine’s Zaparozhe-1 “Ukraine is not ready to join the nuclear vice (Kiev), 8/11/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-156, 8/12/ VVER-1000 and Rovno VVER-1000 and weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty this year.” 94, p. 26 (11651). Interfax (Moscow), 8/11/94; in VVER-440 reactors. Rovno will also re- Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik, Itar-Tass FBIS-SOV-94-156, 8/12/94, p. 26 (11653).

126 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Nuclear Developments ceive personnel training education and an 8/2/94 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network, 8/ analytical simulator. On 1/26/94, the U.S. According to Askold Lozynskyj, President 10/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-155, 8/11/94, p. 19 (11522). Department of Energy gave approval for S3 of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of Technologies to export the same simulation America, President Kuchma considers the 8/19/94 equipment to the VVER-1000 South U.S. to be in violation of the tripartite agree- Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma states Ukraine-3 reactor. ment. Only $11 million of the promised that Ukraine has received only $6 million Nuclear Fuel, 7/4/94, p. 14 (11572). $350 million Nunn-Lugar funds has been of $350 million in promised U.S. aid and delivered and, states Lozynskyj, “the actual that, with Ukraine’s participation in the 6/94 delivery of American aid had been waste- The U.S.’s American Agency for Trade and NPT, economic assistance may change. ful, incompetent, and bordering on the scan- Larysa Ostrolutska, Ukrainya Moloda, 8/19/94, pp. Development and Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya dalous.” 4-5; in FBIS-SOV-94-166, 8/26/94, pp. 28-33 nuclear power plant reach an agreement Askold Lozynskyj, Ukrainian Weekly, 8/2/94, p. 4 (11712). whereby Zaporizhzhya will receive (11683). $300,000 to research the possibility of con- structing a dry storage facility for spent 8/3/94 nuclear fuel. Duke Engineering Services, Lynn Davis, U.S. Undersecretary of State the U.S. company responsible for the study for Arms Control and International Secu- will contribute $200,000. General Direc- rity Affairs, briefs reporters on the 8/2/94 tor of Zaporizhzhya Volodymyr Bronnykov Gore-Kuchma meeting. Davis says that, stated that if the study is successful, spent provided Ukraine signs the NPT, the U.S. fuel storage will begin in 18 months. has pledged high technology cooperation — Volodymyr Dupak, Holos Ukrayiny (Kiev), 6/29/ such as joint U.S.-Ukrainian efforts in the 94, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-127, 7/1/94, p. 40 aerospace industry — as well as a reduction (11721). in economic and commercial barriers. Be- cause Ukraine has shipped nearly 300 war- 7/26/94 heads to Russia for dismantlement and has The U.S. Department of Energy grants ap- deactivated over half of its 46 SS-24s, the proval for Westinghouse to export to Ukraine U.S. does not believe that Kiev’s hesitancy technology used in the analysis of VVER to sign the NPT is due to an interest in nuclear power plant safety, as well as for maintaining its nuclear arsenal; rather it instrumentation and control systems for appears Ukraine is trying to augment mon- VVER plants. Westinghouse must seek etary aid from the U.S. President Kuchma DOE approval in developing future com- has repeatedly noted the delays in receiving mercial ties with any Ukrainian entities, promised aid from the U.S. As outlined in including computer code transfers, licens- the Nunn-Lugar program, Ukraine will re- ing agreements, and sublicensing pacts. ceive $350 million in aid: $185 million for NuclearFuel, 10/10/94, p. 22 (11691). disarmament, $40 million for conversion, 8/2/94 and $49 million for social services. In 1995, Ukraine will receive $75 million in Nunn- Ukrainian President Kuchma meets with Lugar aid. Vice President Al Gore in Kiev to discuss Theresa Hitchens, Defense News, 8/8/94, p. 18 economic aid, bilateral relations and the (11713). Interfax (Moscow), 8/12/94; in FBIS- implementation of the trilateral agreement. SOV-94-157, 8/15/94, p. 36 (11713). Gore applauds Ukraine for the speed with which it has fulfilled its obligations under 8/10/94 the agreement and encourages Ukraine to A U.S. delegation meets with the “[Supreme accede to the NPT. Since the 1/94 signing Council] Commission for the Issues of De- of the trilateral agreement, the U.S. has fense and State Security” in Kiev to discuss promised $700 million in aid to Ukraine disarmament issues. The meeting focuses and the U.S. has been instrumental in se- on the imposition of strategic material and curing an additional $4 billion in assistance technology controls and on the global im- from the leaders of the G-7. portance of fully implementing the disar- Marta Kolomayets, Ukrainian Weekly, 8/7/94, p. 1 mament agreement between the U.S., Rus- (11683). sia, and Ukraine.

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 127