Naval College Review Volume 57 Article 20 Number 1 Winter

2004 El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi, James Stavridis

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Recommended Citation Stavridis, James (2004) "El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi,," Naval War College Review: Vol. 57 : No. 1 , Article 20. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/20

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repeats his arguments in successive was a devastating blow against chapters is also somewhat irritating. Qaddafi’s regime and changed his ap- These criticisms notwithstanding, the proach profoundly. book provides an extremely interesting For those of us on active service in the and thought-provoking argument that is 1980s, the with Libya seemed a cogently expressed in a well organized bit of a sideshow when compared to the work. Barnett has produced a useful main dance of the . Yet this and positive contribution to the ongo- relatively short, bitter conflict was actu- ing revitalization of the field of strategy ally a harbinger of things to come. and to the associated debate surround- Much as today’s terrorists seek to influ- ing the use of force in the international ence global events through individual environment. Students and professors attacks, Qaddafi sought to drive the interested in security strategy in the course of world activity through new century should add this work to bombings and state-sponsored terror- their libraries. ism. The Reagan administration at first responded with rhetoric, but it JAMES A. RUSSELL Naval Postgraduate School eventually became clear that more forceful action would be needed. It is interesting, in this time of “global war on terrorism,” to look back to the 1980s and realize that this is a war that Stanik, Joseph T. El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Un- began long before 9/11. President Reagan declared War with Qaddafi. Annapolis, Md.: Na- was elected in no small measure in re- val Institute Press, 2002. 360pp. $34.95 sponse to the state-condoned terrorism This well researched and clearly written of Iran, where radical students had held study of U.S. combat with Libya in the American diplomats hostage for 444 1980s has important echoes for today’s days before Reagan’s election, releasing policy makers. It begins with a quick them just after his inauguration. Over look at America’s first war with a Mus- the next five years, a series of dramatic lim state—in the nineteenth century, terrorist incidents followed—bombings when the U.S. Navy fought viciously and killings in Lebanon, including the with the Barbary pirates off the coast of horrific truck-bomb attack on the U.S. North Africa. It then traces the rise of Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over one of the Barbary pirates’ direct two hundred Marines in a single mo- descendants—the well known late- ment; the murder of Marine embassy twentieth-century practitioner of state guards in El Salvador; the hijacking of terrorism Muammar Qaddafi of major airliners and the killing of hos- Libya. Throughout the book Joseph tages, including a U.S. Navy SEAL, Stanik, professor of history and retired Robert Stethem; airport killings in Rome naval officer, provides detailed accounts and Vienna; and the dramatic disco of the 1980 key attacks and a well rea- bombing in Berlin. Clearly, the United soned analysis of their political impact. States had to respond, so in the spring There is, of course, particularly well of 1986, Operation EL DORADO CANYON documented material covering the sent a clear and dramatic message to key air strike of 15 April 1986, which Muammar Qaddafi, with telling results.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004 1 BOOK REVIEWS 139 Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 20

Beginning in the 1970s with territorial naval forces conduct navigation, claims that the Gulf of Sidra was actu- communication, reconnaissance, and ally within Libyan internal waters, targeting. The reality is that modern Qaddafi had plotted a collision course forces depend almost entirely with the United States. For over two de- on platforms in space to know where cades he attempted to use Libya’s oil they are and to communicate with wealth to undermine moderate govern- friendly forces, as well as to know the ments in the Middle East and Africa, location of enemy forces and use that sought of mass destruction, information to destroy them. This “rev- and developed a national foreign policy olution in military affairs” is now hav- that incorporated the use of terrorism ing an effect on a global scale. to achieve his objectives. None of these observations, however, is This is a story painted on a global can- particularly new, and in fact all have vas, from the 1986 La Belle Disco been widely discussed within the de- bombing in West Berlin, which killed fense establishment since the Persian U.S. servicemen, to the ghastly destruc- Gulf War, when it became evident that tion of a global war on terrorism. U.S. military forces depend to a unique El Dorado Canyon is a fine case study in and unparalleled degree on constella- combating terrorism and deserves a tions of satellites. Such technologies as place on the shelf of anyone interested the Global Positioning System (GPS) in America’s current conflict, as well as became familiar in the public debate the history of U.S. Navy involvement about national security in the early 1990s in combat. with reports that U.S. soldiers used com- mercially purchased GPS receivers to JAMES STAVRIDIS navigate across Iraq’s featureless desert. Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy In addition, the images broadcast glob- ally of Scud missiles landing in Saudi Arabia and Israel reinforced the reli- ance on space-based systems to warn of impending attacks. Nor have we for- Friedman, Norman. Seapower and Space: From gotten the failure of coalition forces the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-centric Warfare. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. during the Persian Gulf War to find 384pp. $36.95 Iraqi Scud missiles in what were called “Scud hunts.” This work examines the development of space systems and its implications for What is interesting and noteworthy in the twenty-first century about Friedman’s work is its focus on by focusing on the argument that “access the fact that the development of these to space systems makes possible a new space systems has profound implications style of warfare.” It addresses the “linked for the nature and conduct of maritime revolution of long-range missiles and operations. In 2004, naval forces can their space-based supporting systems.” know exactly where they are in the mid- Furthermore, Friedman seeks to under- dle of vast oceans; communicate with stand how the development of space- their counterparts anywhere on the based systems (notably rockets and globe; scan entire oceans or land masses satellites) has radically influenced how for targets in relatively short order; https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/20 2