University of Baltimore Law ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship Summer 2006 Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq? Charles Tiefer University of Baltimore School of Law,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons Recommended Citation Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq? 42 Stan. J. Int'l L. 291 (2006) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. CAN ApPROPRIATION RIDERS SPEED OUR EXIT FROM IRAQ? By CHARLES TIEFER • I. INTRODUCTION If the President loses centrist American political support for continuing the war in Iraq, members of Congress might employ their most legally potent, yet controversial, tool to speed our exit, or at least to change policy. Namely, they can attach conditions-typically in the form of provisions added to the war funding and Iraq aid appropriations, known as "riders" because of how they "ride" on the underlying bill-pushing the military ground combat operations toward an earlier exit. I Congress enacts an appropriation bill for funding the continuation of the Iraq war at least once every year and also enacts funding bills for military training, reconstruction, and other aid for the government of Iraq.2 Congressional procedure allows proponents of policy changes to offer riders for these funding bills.