Latfn America and the Caribbean from a Global Perspective

A Resource Guide for Teachers

Pedro R. Bermudez andiBarbara (-; Cruz *»« ... .' Latin American and Caribbean Center Florida International University 1991 '•-"-••-•: CONTENTS

Acknowledgements v Foreword vii Preface xi Conceptual Overview xiii What is Global Education? -. . . xv "An Attainable Global Perspective" xvii

PERSPECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS Mental Cartography . . .'. 1 Encuentro 5

STATE OF THE PLANET AWARENESS NiModo 17 Cueca Solo 29 '....-. • -•• •>'•- -:-.;:1" • •'*.. V .. •• • CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS The Other Americans 45 Retraidos 59

KNOWLEDGE OF GLOBAL DYNAMICS El Norte 69 "Comunista!" 81 Half a Loaf ; 93

AWARENESS OF HUMAN CHOICES Choices 129

Resources for Teaching about ' Latin America and the Caribbean 171

Maps of Latin America and the Caribbean 175 Knowledge of Global Dynamics

EL NORTH

Rationale

Traditional approaches to the teaching of immigration in American history have tended to emphasize factors that have pulled people to the United States. These have included such things as political freedom and democracy, economic opportunity, education, and in general, the chance for a better life. The study of why people come to America also offers an opportunity to introduce students to the harsh realities that push so many in the Third World to leave familiar surroundings, family and friends, and embark on difficult and dangerous treks towards the dream of a better life. For many in Latin America, this has meant the trip to "el Norte" (the North-the United States and Canada).

Objectives

The student will:

1. analyze the phenomenon of immigration to the United States in terms of chronolo- gy, nationalities, motivations, and experiences;

2. identify reasons that explain Nicaraguan citizens' decision to migrate to the United States and Canada;

3. differentiate between "pull" and "push" factors contributing to the recent influx of Nicaraguans into the United States, Canada, and specifically, Dade County.

Key Concepts

Migration/emigration/immigration, push factors, pull factors, Sandinistas, contras, interde- pendence, human choices

Infusion Area

American history

Materials Needed

"Background Notes on Nicaragua" "Background Notes on Nicaragua" {student worksheet) "Many Flee Troubled Nicaragua"

Suggested Time

Two class periods

69 Learning Activities

Suggested Activities for Day 7;

1. Ask students to brainstorm as many reasons as possible that might provide answers to the question: Why do people move? List student responses on the board. After five to ten minutes conclude the brainstorming session and ask students to come up with categories under which to subsume reasons listed on the board. Write the categories on the board (e.g., economic, political, educational, religious, etc.) and ask students to tell you under which category to place items from the list.

2. Explain to the class that usually the decision to leave one's country or place of resi- dence is not an easy one. Ask students if they have ever done this and askjthem to share their experience with classmates. Add that these decisions are often the result of "pull" factors (things that attract the person to where he/she is going—freedom, opportu- nity, jobs, education, etc.) and "push" factors (things that the person is trying to get away from—oppression, hunger, poverty, unemployment, etc.)- Ask students to review the list of categories and reasons on the board, identify, and explain which of these might be "pull" and/or "push" factors. Point out that often these decisions are a result of the interaction of both push and pull factors (the teacher should keep a record of the pull/push factors identified by students for use in day 2).

3. Distribute "Background Notes on Nicaragua" and allow students time to begin reading the material through a sustained silent reading period. Ask them to finish the material for the following class session and to complete the identification items on the worksheet provided for homework.

Suggested Activities for Day 2:

1. Distribute "Many Flee Troubled Nicaragua" and ask students to read the article careful- ly, underlining each of the reasons given for the migration of Nicaraguans into North America, especially the CInited States and Canada. Students should label each of the reasons as either "pull" or "push" and be prepared to support their choices. After students complete this part of the activity, write student responses on the board for everyone to view.

2. Write the list of "pull" and "push" factors that was derived from activity #2 in day 1. Ask students to compare similarities and differences in both lists.

3. Conclude lesson by having students make observations about what "push" factors tell us about living conditions in Nicaragua. Ask students to consider the following ques- tions:

a. In what ways might focusing on "push" factors help us to better understand immi- .gration issues facing the CInited States today?

b. How might this information contribute to a better understanding of immigration patterns in American history?

c. What might you predict about the future of Latin American immigration into the Onited States?

70 Assessment

Have each student write a short fictional account of what it might be like for a Nicaraguan student to decide to make the trip to "el Norte."

Additional Activities

Have students conduct research into why other Latin Americans (Colombians, Guatema- lans, Haitians, Hondurans, Cubans, etc.) are also coming into the United States. Ask students to compare and contrast "push" factors affecting each of these groups.

71 --' _- ^jffA./ BACKGROUND TIOTES ON NICARAGUA

Nicaragua. In 1909, the United States sent a naval The Iran/CcnfraScandal. In November 1936. At- force to intervene in.Ni^aragua aftvmr r.vo Americans torney General £dwm Meese revealed that a White were executed. U.S. marines stayed in Nicaragua House staff member, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver off and on until 1933. Before leaving, the marines North, had secretly sent millions of dollars to the trained General An^tasio Scnoza Garcia to lead a contras in Nicaragua. According to Meese, North national guard. Somoza used the guard to assassinate diverted profits from secret arms sales between the guerrilla leader Augusto Sandino, to overthrow lib- United States and Iran to the rebels. This diversion eral President Juan Batista Sacassa, and to establish of funds came at a time when Congress had banned a military dictatorship. During the next forty-five U.S. aid to the contras. Further details revealed thac years, three Somozas ruled Nicaragua—Anastasio between 1984 and 1986, administration officials had Somoza and his two sons, Luis Somoza Debayle organized a secret network of private citizens and and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Somozas were foreign government officials to fund the contras, so undemocratic and corrupt that, by 1978, many The resulting scandal damaged public confidence Nicaraguan peasants, business leaders, and mem- in the president and jeopardized future funding for bers of the middle class had ceased to support the the contras. regime. In response to the scandal. Congress created two The Sandinistas. On July 20, 1979, after a two- special committees to investigate the secret contra year civil war, the Somoza regime was overthrown funding network. The committees were to examine: by a popular opposition movement made up of a « whether laws were broken in funding the con- procommunist group—known as the Sandinista Na- tras; tional Liberation Front—and several other political • whether there was a "cover up" of evidence factions representing both the poor and the middle after the Iran/ro/i/ra "connection" was re- class. A new Government of National Reconstruc- vealed; and tion was formed. Although the Sandinistas played • whether high-ranking government officials, in- a major role, the" new government included represen- cluding the president, were involved in provid- tatives of the private business sector and the middle ing money for the contras. class. The new government said it would spurn The Reagan administration welcomed the estab- "American-style" capitalism and "Soviet-style" lishment of the investigative committees. The ad- communism and follow a third way: a part-socialist ministration said that the investigations would show and pan-capitalist economy with political plural- that only a few government officials, acting on their ism—many political groups instead of one. own initiative, had run the contra aid network. But Despite strong opposition from the United States many members of Congress and the press were skep- and antigovemmem rebels (contras) fighting in the tical. They wondered how a small number of people countryside, the Sandinista government has re- could plan and run such an operation without the mained in power. Significant reform* have been knowledge of the Department of State, the Depart- instituted in (vinc^'io.^> " ?«<.,.,_*! Ia.—..!«nd. "'vrfirchi„ ,> tab* t>«MJ^n 4 fevtlwtc'.--w. ment of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, lions have also been held, although the United States or the president: . considers them to be fraudulent. The Nicaraguan government has also established ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. In response to Nicaragua's pro- communist government, the Reagan administration has strongly backed the contra forces and enacted a trade embargo against the Sandinistas.

Copyright 1987 Close Gp Foundation, Arlington. Virginia. Reprinted by permission from Current Issues, 1988.

73 Does (he Sandinista Government. Threaten Our President Reagan'says that he is not seeking to Nations! Security? President Reagan believes that overthrow the Sandinista government, only to force the Sandinistas in Nicaragua pose a "mortal threat- the Sandinistas to end their repression of individual to the entire New World." According to the presi- rights and to allow democratic elections to be held. dent, the Sandinistas have given weapons to radical He claims that the Sandinistas have betrayed the forces in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 1979 Nicaraguan revolution that brought them to Honduras. He warns that if the Sandinistas are noc power. According to. the president, the Sandinistas checked, unrest and revolution could engulf Central have harassed the Catholic Church, limited the par- America and Mexico. President Reagan also says ticipation of competing political parties, reduced the that the Soviet Union supplies the Sandinistas with freedom of the press, and curtailed other civil rights. military and economic aid and that Nicaragua may Reagan says that more and more dissatisfied Nicara- allow the Soviets to build a naval base there. He guans are joining the coniras snd that other countries warns that the Sandinistas could block vita! sea lanes in the region support his policies. He warns that if that carry almost half of our exports and more than we abandon the contras, the United States may even- half of our imported oil. tually have to send American soldiers to Central Opponents of President Reagan's policies in Cen- America to stop the spread of communism. tral America believe that the Sandinistas do not Congressional opposition to the president's sup- threaten the United States. They say that Nicaragua port of the contras is strong. Some members of is a small country that cannot begin to match the Congress believe that we have no right to interfere military and economic might of the United States. in the affairs of Nicaragua simply because we find According to critics. President Reagan has invented its policies distasteful. They say that the Nicaraguan a SandiniMa "thrc:it" to build public support for people have a right to choose their own type of overthrowing a government he dislikes. They claim government and theirown leaders. Members of Con- that there is no evidence (hat the Soviet Union is gress are aiso concerned about human rights viola- building u n::val ba.sc in Nicaragua. Moreover, crit- tions allegedly committed by the coniras and wonder ics say that Nicaragua has only taken aid from the whether the coniras would be harsher rulers than Soviet Union and Cuba because the United States the is unwilling to help. They claim that the Sandinistas the contras have no hope of toppling the Sandinista are sensitive to U.S. concerns in the region. For government because the contras lack support from example, after the United States pressured the San- the Nicaraguan people. The only way a military uiriioiuo iG end tuCir support GI me anrjgovcrruvicrit solution could succeed is if the United States uses rebels in El Salvador in 1981, the flow of weapons its own troops. to the rebels slowed to a trickle. Nicaragua knows that if it ever became a clear and direct threat to Plans for Peace. Many Latin American countries U.S. interests, the United States would take decisive believe that the conflict in Nicaragua can best be military action-against it. solved through diplomatic • means, rather than through military conflict. During the last five years, Should the United States Support the Contras? leaders from several countries have met to discuss President Reagan believes that the structure of the how peace can best be achieved. Sandinista government must be changed. To do this, the president wants to give military aid to the con- iras, who are waging a war against the Sandinistas. Reagan believes that the contras offer the best hope for freedom and democracy in Nicaragua, calling them "freedom fighters."

74 Comadora Peace Plan. In 1933, leaders from Costa Rican Peace Plan, In 1937, the government four countries—Colombia" Mexico, Panama, and of Costa Rica proposed a new peace plan to replace Venezuela—met on the island of Contadora to draft the Contadora plan. The Costa Rican plan calls for a plan for achieving peace in Nicaragua. The Con- the government of Nicaragua to: ( 1 ) declare a cease- tadora peace plan calls for: Unending all arms im- fire with the conira rebels, (2) hold free elections, ports into Central America; (2) expelling all foreign and (3) allow complete freedom of the press. The military advisors, including those from the United plan also calls for a complete cutoff of aid to all States; (3) prohibiting aid to guerriila movements; r=bel movements in Central America, including (4) prohibiting foreign military maneuvers; and (5) those in El Salvador and Guatemala, and an overall limiting the size of Central American armies. Al- reduction in the size of Central American armies . though the Conradora peace plan is aimed at settling A commission drawn from the United Nations, the the conflict in Nicaragua, all Central American Organization of American States, and the Ccntadora countries would be bound by these terms. group would supervise the plan. Despite several meetings of the Contadora group Many members of Congress support the Costa since 1983, the Sandinistas and the United States Rican plan. They believe that the Contadora peace have not agreed to the terms of this treaty. Both plan will not work and that it is the countries of countries say that they will negotiate their differ- Central America who are in the best position to ences only when certain conditions are met. The solve their own problems. However, the Sandinista United States insists that the Sandinistas must first government has denounced the Costa Rican plan. open talks with the contras. while the Sandinistas The Sandinistas say that the Costa Rican plan sup- say the United States must first end its support for ports U.S. efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan gov- the coniras. ernment and subverts the efforts of the Contadora Critics of the U.S. position claim that President Reason is avo'iding'negotiattons in the hope that the U.S. influence. conrrns will win their war against the Sandinistas. But President Reagan, says that he supports a negotiated settlement and that it is Nicaragua that is foiling his efforts. He points out that the United States ua.s the largest donor of aid to Nicaragua from W79 to 1980 but (hat the Sandinistas rebuffed the United States in favor of the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration also claims that other Central American countries privately support II $. policies but are afraid to say so publicly because it would anger Nicaragua, which has the largest army in the region. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega claims that President Reagan is trying to "fool the American people into supporting a military solution to the problems.of Central America so that the United States can control the region.

75 Outlook

Increasing American Presence In (he Region. O *-J Sines 1980, the United States has increased its pres- ence in Centra! America by increasing its aid and by introducing American forces there. For example, U.S.. military advisors help train the SaJvadoran army and American helicopters have carried Honda- ran troops Into combat. Some experts fear that the growing American presence could lead the United States into a war similar to our disastrous involve- ment in Vietnam. The American presence is especially strong in Honduras, where American soldiers have construct- ed airfields, roads, bridges, and training bases. The military has also conducted large-scale maneuvers there. Since 1983, there have rarely been fewer than 1,000 U.S. troops stationed in Honduras, and tens of thousands of oLhers have participated periodically in military exercises. The strong U.S. presence has placed Honduras in a difficult position. On the one hand, Honduras wants the aid and protection provid- ed by the United States and the spending that the bases and maneuvers pump into the economy. On the other hand, Honduras'reaJizes that Nicaragua views the U.S. presence with alarm. Honduras tears that the United States may use their country for an invasion of neighboring Nicaragua. Civil wars, revolutions, coups,-poverty, and unjust economic and political systems have plagued Cen- tral America for many years, and the situation prob- ably will not improve soon. The question for the United States is: Can Congress and the president agree on a policy to deal with injustice and upheaval in Central Ajnerica, especially in Nicaragua? Pres- ident Reagan is determined to stop the spread of communism in the region and supports sending mil- itary aid to strengthen anticommunist forces there. Many members of Congress believe that the real enemies in Central America are economic and social problems, which cannot be defeated with guns. They are reluctant to send increased military aid, espe- cially in light of the [ran/ron/ra scandal, and have vowed to seek a more peaceful solution to the prob- lems in Central America.

76 NAME:

DATE:

PERIOD:

BACKGROUND NOTES ON NICARAGUA

1. Summarize, in writing, the relations between the United States' government and Nicaragua during the years of 1909-1979.

2. List the reasons given as pros and cons to the question of whether the Sandinista government threatens American national security.

Pro Con

77 3. Define-the

a.

V?* • .;" •4-v*. -fl •..:_- * -.' b. Sandinistas

c. Iran/Contra, Scandal ?+:$:•

d. Contadora Peace Plan

e. Costa Rican Peace Plan

78 MANY FLEE TROUBLED NICARAGUA ?ear Sandinistas, chaotic econoiy

By Saa Dillon "hey have receat'.y eaily this lonth gration. targeted Roaja flerald Staff after ntvs leaied '.[ think aha '.'liter Cnholic CirdUii'i of government reasons are sore Kigoa! Obandc y plans to quadruple iconoaic thar, 3:avo vitb a H1H4GU1, Mcaragaa the piice o£ a nev political,1 tiarassiefit — aicaragoans ate passport to double Horales said. streaming cut of the sonthly salary "Soae nay belhve C-j2n3!l'l. Many apolitical their country in of a skilled their opvo:- Sicaragaans vh: an eiodas aflthor- voider. tanities for have lived it ities attribute to About a do:tn personal accoau- aneasy coexistt.ice ecouoaic chaos and nev has coapanies latlon are better vith the San:;- th; davning reali- have sprung op in in the United oista revolution zation that the recent lonths to States or Canada.' for cine yeais are Sandinistas are cash in on the Others pointed to pulling up stakss. finly entrenched burgeoning esi- political factors. In addition, a in pover at the grant traffic to 'Micaragnans are significant imib:: close of the Gnateiala, the realizing that the of state vo:U:s Reagan adiinis- only Central U.S. is cot going vho, until QOV, tration. laerican coantry to send, in the have appeared to icross this to vhich Hicara-' Karines, and that syipathiie vith battered country, gcans can travel coiaunisi is going Eroi the barrios vithoat a visa. to consolidate. Sandinista of Hanagaa to The Migrants They say, 'If policies are also Pacific coast include doctors, that's the case, suddenly eii- lavyers, engineers grating. fishing tovns and then I'i Biigrant: ir. cattle targeting and other profes- leaving." said a recent veeh froi villages of-the • sionals as vellvas diploiat vho has Esteli, a torn highlands, Hlcara- vendors, and intervieved Si- north of Hanag'ja, gaans ate selling stilled and caraguans abont have include" tht hoies and goods to unskilled toilers. vhy they are head or the Iocs] flee the country The Sandinistas deciding to eii- educatior. on foot and in have laid off at grate. iinistiy, the so^ bases, by car and hast 20,000 state The U.S. Congress oE a foundifi? by plane. eiployees this cat off lilitary teiber of the 'Six lonths ago year and devalued aid to the contra the belief that the currency three rebels in S^ftdlfiista rtofi; licaragaa coold tiies. Inflation February. Since in the itgiofi, ar.d the top adiials- change vas ;us- Is oat of control, sandinlsta-contra trator of a stat*- talning the estiuted at peace negotiations run tobacco tnte:- people, bat nov several thousand broke dovn in prise. !h? percent annually. they've lost all Jone, the latter, an hope. Hicaragua 'Joriing people Sandinistas have agricultural 1: going to reiain siiply can't live largely abandoned engineer, left in the Soviet here anyiore,' the deiocratic Nicaragua after caip, and people said Pablo rhetoric that vas being proiisec -. are looking for Barbosa, 17, ovner in fashion here job lilHng cov-: escape,1 Dr. of a 10-vorhr after the signing for a living IE llberto Saborio, glae factory in of a 1931 peace Costa Ricj, pact. They have president-of the Managua. according tc his ; licaiaguan Bar Carlos Kanael jailtd scores of friends. isaociation, said Hotales, the San- Sandinista oppo- 'It's a Etver-- in an interview. dinista governor nents, seized they'rt leaving in Thousands of of three northern several private such alaning nearly frantic •provinces, ac- fans and ioter- llcaragnans lobbed knowledged the littently sanc- tioned the icdia. Gustavo Barrantes, ligration offices Mi- an Esteli lavy;:. (Reprinted with permission of the Miami Herald.} Barrantes said migrants in th6 79 past have been choice DOV bicaase ailaly Dale physician, three son, to the boose jgars avoiding otbsr doctors have Sicaragoans can evacuated by a uilitary semce, resigned froa the travel there as trod driver vho , taarists, tata bat ;aov eatue local Saadicista-" tool his faiily to are TG3 hospital and ilict to stay on Houston last ut prspaiiDg to vith a chance for sonth. Is Barraotes emigrate. penaneat: resi- 'Generally they talked to an iDotber poveiful dence, according iaie their plans Jlaotega citizen to Ligia Kocge, ^Q qaistly, and then last ?esk, another preparing to have official at toey Jsavc. lou lavyai, 31, ?as nntil recently Canada's eabassy don't inov it ?jaring jeans and the Sandinistas' in Costa Rica. natil suddenly sangUsses, bint regional director tie U.S. they're gone,' bifiatahsiiy into of a lajor state- Consclate in Guido said. his Isteli legal ran iiport coi- Managua has beer. offices. pany. The head of closed since the ['They just sent Jinotega's Social Sandinistas papers to sy Christian Party in eipelled eight office orderiag it Jiaotega also D.S. diploiats in into the any eiigrated to Cana- July. Officials reserves," he da recently, party at the U.S. said.l 'I've officials said. Sibassy in Gaate- decided -- I'i The vife of a iala City said Saodinista deputy that hundreds of going to Los licaragaans each lagelss.1 The la the lational lavyer said that Isseibly is reel apply for sine: lany of his seeking a D.S. U.S. visas there. clients bave visa to eiigrate, Kore travel on eiigrated he had according to through Kexico to been considering another deputy, an enter the U.S. his Q7n departure. oppositionist, vho illegally. The president of said he is helping 'Reagan'is the Istell Bat her vith the leaving -- and the Issodation, Byroa arrangeients and devolution stays!1 jhoved a reporter says a Haoagaa Urgaesoada, eil- billboard. Many grated to Canada . the voiao's !lca- Hanagoans, hov- last icnth. ID an ragaan passport, ever, are not interrogation, 1 reporter's staying. stats security interviev vith the 8osa Gaido, tS police tried to opposition deputy stood in Managua's link Hi to an at a hoie in a Miraflor ntighbor- alleged Cll plot. raral to?n vas hood last vetk. *U Seguridad interrupted vhec For a reporter, vill never be able the local distri- she pointed north to call le in' butor of Barri- along a dirt again,1 Larga- cada, the Eandi- street to the sjpada told aista daily nevs- eipty house left associates al his ^apeif knocked at behind by the departure. tht deputy's door. to the east, ID • The distributor, Uriarte faiily, the provincial preparing to eil- vhlch recently capital of grate, ias seeling departed for lev Jinotega, resi- advice about hov lork. She pointed dents reported to arrange travel sooth, to the that since the docuienta to house eiptied vhen eiigration to the Canada. tht Barreto faiily suited States U Canada Is the left for Costa destination of Ilca, then vest, Septeiber of one beneath a setting 80