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Presentation Kit
15YEARS PRESENTATION KIT TURKISH POLICY QUARTERLY PRESENTATION KIT MARCH 2017 QUARTERLY Table of Contents What is TPQ? ..............................................................................................................4 TPQ’s Board of Advisors ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 Strong Outreach ........................................................................................................ 7 Online Blog and Debate Sections ..........................................................................8 TPQ Events ...............................................................................................................10 TPQ in the Media ..................................................................................................... 11 Support TPQ .............................................................................................................14 Premium Sponsorship ............................................................................................ 15 Print Advertising .......................................................................................................18 Premium Sponsor ...................................................................................................19 Advertiser ................................................................................................................. 20 Online Advertising ................................................................................................... 21 -
LETTER to G20, IMF, WORLD BANK, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS and NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
LETTER TO G20, IMF, WORLD BANK, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS and NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS We write to call for urgent action to address the global education emergency triggered by Covid-19. With over 1 billion children still out of school because of the lockdown, there is now a real and present danger that the public health crisis will create a COVID generation who lose out on schooling and whose opportunities are permanently damaged. While the more fortunate have had access to alternatives, the world’s poorest children have been locked out of learning, denied internet access, and with the loss of free school meals - once a lifeline for 300 million boys and girls – hunger has grown. An immediate concern, as we bring the lockdown to an end, is the fate of an estimated 30 million children who according to UNESCO may never return to school. For these, the world’s least advantaged children, education is often the only escape from poverty - a route that is in danger of closing. Many of these children are adolescent girls for whom being in school is the best defence against forced marriage and the best hope for a life of expanded opportunity. Many more are young children who risk being forced into exploitative and dangerous labour. And because education is linked to progress in virtually every area of human development – from child survival to maternal health, gender equality, job creation and inclusive economic growth – the education emergency will undermine the prospects for achieving all our 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and potentially set back progress on gender equity by years. -
Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008
SMALL WARS JOURNAL smallwarsjournal.com Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008 by David Hollis The Russian-Georgian War in August of 2008 represented a long history of geostrategic conflict between the two nations and was based on many complex factors: geopolitical, legal, cultural, and economic. The 1992 South Ossetia War and the 1993 Abkhazian War resulted in the loss of the regions from Georgia to internationally unrecognized, pro-Russian local governments. Tensions had been building in the region for several years prior-to the initiation of conflict in August 2008. The war officially started on 7 August 2008 after several weeks of growing arguments over the future of the South Ossetian territory. Georgian troops initiated a military attack against South Ossetia and began a massive shelling of the town of Tskhinvali in response to alleged Russian provocation. Russia deployed additional combat troops to South Ossetia and retaliated with bombing raids into Georgian territory. Russia deployed naval forces to formally blockade Georgia and landed naval infantry (marines) on Abkhaz coast (near Georgia). The decisive ground combat operation of the campaign resulted in mechanized Russian military and Ossetian militia forces defeating the more lightly armed Georgian military forces in the only large-scale major ground combat of the war (battle for the town of Tskhinvali). Georgian tactical military defeat at the battle of Tskhinvali, operational defeat via Russian uncontested invasion of the western part of Georgia, unchallenged naval blockade of Georgia, and Georgian difficulty getting their media message out to the world, led to Georgia's strategic defeat in the war. The conflict forced approximately 25,000 Georgian residents to flee from ground combat as refugees into internal displacement. -
Adlib Express Watermark
IHS Global Insight Report: Georgia (Country Intelligence) Report printed on 14 January 2009 CONTENTS Country Reports AdlibCopyright ©2008 Express Global Insight Inc. All rights reserved. WatermarkPage 1 of 36 Nature of Risk Rating Summary Political: Risks 2.75 The situation in Georgia is uncertain in the aftermath of the military conflict with Russia, but it is clear that the state will remain functioning, even if the separatist republics claim chunks of its territory (highly unlikely). The economy will pay the price of military damage, although most importantly, crucial elements of the country's infrastructure such as bridges and mountain tunnels have remained intact. President Mikhail Saakashvili, who essentially triggered the hostilities by ordering a Georgian offensive on South Ossetia, will have to fight to retain his seat, which he only won for the second term in January 2008. Given the popular consensus in the face of the Russian offensive, however, Saakashvili may well rely on his charismatic turns to actually elevate and strengthen his domestic position. The government will also remain committed to its economic reform policy, although most of the legislation and regulation is already in place. Economic: Risks 3.50 Georgia is a poor country with weak external financial and trade links outside Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The collapse in growth associated with post-Soviet economic management during the early 1990s was heightened in Georgia's case by a brief civil war on its borders. The economy finally began to recover strongly from its collapsed base in the second half of the 1990s. Although Georgian GDP rose steadily in 1995-2006, growth rates have been highly variable, from lows of about 2% to highs of arou nd 11%. -
The Relevance of the Actual Values of the Political Actors of Georgia with the Ideologies Declared by Them
The Relevance of the Actual Values of the Political Actors of Georgia with the Ideologies Declared by Them Dr. Maia Urushadze1, Dr. Tamar Kiknadze2 1Caucasus International University 2Head of the Doctoral Program in Political Science, Caucasus International University Abstract The permanent ideological impact of the propaganda narratives of powerful political entities on the international community is perceived as one of the most important challenges of the 21st century. The international agenda is full of controversial interpretations, produced by powerful international political actors. As a result, the international media agenda is getting like the battlespace for the struggle of interpretations, where the ruthless kind of "frame-games" between the strongest global agenda-setting political entities takes place. The information field is open for all countries, including the small states, where political parties are not strong enough to have their propaganda to resist the ideological pressure from outside. Due to this, the societies of these countries are still easily influenced by the narratives of global political actors creating a suitable psychological environment for internal conflicts in societies. We consider Georgia among these states. Therefore, our research aimed to study the relevance of the actual values of local (Georgian) political actors with the ideologies declared by them. In this regard, our primary objective was to understand the specifics of strategic communication of local political actors, then, to compare their narratives with the rhetoric of international actors, and finally, to determine the strength of local society's resistance to these narratives. We hope that in this way we can assess the long-term impact of global actors’ propaganda communication could have on a small country. -
Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008
= :88.&8*47,.&=43+1.(9=.3=:,:89=,**2a= 439*=9=&3)=251.(&9.438=+47=_ _=39*7*898= .2=.(-41= 5*(.&1.89=.3= :88.&3=&3)=:7&8.&3=++&.78= &7(-=-`=,**3= 43,7*88.43&1= *8*&7(-=*7;.(*= 18/1**= <<<_(78_,4;= -.0+2= =*5479=+47=43,7*88 Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress :88.&8*47,.&= 43+1.(9=.3=:,:89=,**2a=439*=9=&3)= 251.(&9.438=+47=__= 39*7*898= = :22&7>= In the early 1990s, Georgia and its breakaway South Ossetia region had agreed to a Russian- mediated ceasefire that provided for Russian “peacekeepers” to be stationed in the region. Moscow extended citizenship and passports to most ethnic Ossetians. Simmering long-time tensions escalated on the evening of August 7, 2008, when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages against each other. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not respond to a ceasefire appeal but intensified their shelling, “forcing” Georgia to send in troops. On August 8, Russia launched air attacks throughout Georgia and Russian troops engaged Georgian forces in South Ossetia. By the morning of August 10, Russian troops had occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border. Russian troops occupied several Georgian cities. Russian warships landed troops in Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region and took up positions off Georgia’s Black Sea coast. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, serving as the president of the European Union (EU), was instrumental in getting Georgia and Russia to agree to a peace plan on August 15-16. -
News from Copenhagen 272.Indd
News from Copenhagen Number 272 Current Information from the OSCE PA International Secretariat 2 October 2008 Mediterranean Forum focuses on integration and co-operation With the goal of developing stronger ties with the OSCE the beginning of the Helsinki process.” Parliamentary Assembly and the Mediterranean Partners for U.S. Congressman Alcee L. Hastings, who serves as Special Co-operation, the Assembly’s annual Mediterranean Forum was Representative on Mediterranean issues, underlined the value held at the Fall Meetings of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly of promoting the OSCE Mediterranean dimension at the in Toronto, Canada, on 18 September. parliamentary level, stressing that European security is directly Chaired by Canadian Senator Jerry Grafstein, Vice-President linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. of the Assembly, this year’s Forum focused on multilateral Gilles Mentré, Representative of the French Ministry of initiatives to promote integration and co-operation in the Foreign Affairs, introduced a French proposal intended to Mediterranean, including the Union for the Mediterranean and further develop the EU’s Euromediterranean Partnership. the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension. Entitled the Union for the Mediterranean, the initiative unites It was the best attended Forum since its establishment in all EU members with several non-EU countries that border the Rome in 2003. High level parliamentary representatives from Mediterranean Sea, promoting co-operation on energy issues, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, and Morocco actively -
Recent Elections in Georgia: at Long Last, Stability?
Recent Elections in Georgia: At long Last, Stability? DARRELL SLIDER G eorgia held its fourth contested parliamentary elections 31 October 1999 (the fifth, if one includes the 1918 multiparty elections that produced a Social Democratic government that was forced into exile by the Red Army in 1921) and its fourth presidential election on 9 April 2000. Press reports emphasized the endorsement the elections provided to President Eduard Shevardnadze and his party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia, which won a clear majority in the parlia- ment. At the same time, both the parliamentary and presidential elections were marred by heavy-handed manipulation of the political atmosphere preceding the balloting. The parliamentary elections also continued a troubling trend in Geor- gian politics: the exclusion of significant segments of the political spectrum from representation in the legislature. Perhaps more than any other former Soviet republic, Georgia has emphasized the development of political parties. Party list voting is the chief method for choosing members of parliament: lince 1992, 150 of 235 parliamentarians have been chosen by proportional voting.' The remainder, just over one-third, are cho- sen from single-member districts that correspond to Soviet-era administrative entities.2 Each election, however, has taken place under a different set of rules, which has had a major impact on the composition of the parliament. The party list system was also employed in November 1998 to choose local councils. In theory, a party list system should contribute to the formation of strong par- ties and a more stable party system. In practice, however, Georgian political par- ties remain highly personalized and organizationally weak. -
Hate Speech in Pre-Election Discourse, Presidential Elections 2018
Hate Speech in Pre-Election Discourse Presidential Elections 2018 Author: Tina Gogoladze Editor: Tamar Kintsurashvili Monitoring by Tamar Gagniashvili, Khatia Lomidze, Mariam Tskhovrebashvili, Sopo Chkhaidze Designed by Mariam Tsutskiridze The report Hate Speech in Pre-Election Discourse has been prepared by the Media Development Foundation (MDF) within the USAID-funded Promoting Integration, Tolerance and Awareness Program in Georgia (PITA), implemented by the UN Association of Georgia (UNAG). The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or UNAG. 1 Methodology The present report provides the results of monitoring conducted by the Media Development Foundation (MDF) ahead of the 2018 presidential elections. The monitoring was carried out on the cases of hate speech and discrimination on various grounds expressed by electoral subjects and political parties, as well as hate speech used against presidential candidates and political parties. The report involves only the cases of discrimination on ethnic, religious, racial and gender grounds, as well as the cases of encouraging violence; it does not provide insulting comments made by political opponents against each other. The monitoring covers the period from 1 August 2018 to 15 October 2018. The subjects of monitoring were selected from both mainstream and tabloid media. The monitored subjects were: ● News and analytical programs of five TV channels: Georgian Public Broadcaster (Moambe); Rustavi 2 (Kurieri; P.S.); Imedi (Kronika; Imedis Kvira); Maestro (news program) and Obieqtivi (news program). ● Talk-shows of five TV channels: Rustavi 2 (Archevani); Imedi (Pirispir); Iberia (Tavisupali Sivrtse); Obieqtivi (Gamis Studia, Okros Kveta); Kavkasia (Barieri, Spektri). ● Seven online media outlets: Sakinformi, Netgazeti, Interpressnews, Georgia and World, PIA, Kviris Palitra, Marshalpress. -
Technical Election Assessment Mission: Georgia 2020 Parliamentary Election Interim Report
TECHNICAL ELECTION ASSESSMENT MISSION: GEORGIA 2020 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION INTERIM REPORT TECHNICAL ELECTION ASSESSMENT MISSION: GEORGIA 2020 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION INTERIM REPORT International Republican Institute IRI.org @IRI_Polls © 2020 All Rights Reserved Technical Election Assessment Mission: Georgia 2020 Parliamentary Election Interim Report Copyright © 2020 International Republican Institute. All rights reserved. Permission Statement: No part of this work may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system without the written permission of the International Republican Institute. Requests for permission should include the following information: • The title of the document for which permission to copy material is desired. • A description of the material for which permission to copy is desired. • The purpose for which the copied material will be used and the manner in which it will be used. • Your name, title, company or organization name, telephone number, fax number, e-mail address and mailing address. Please send all requests for permission to: Attn: Department of External Affairs International Republican Institute 1225 Eye Street NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20005 [email protected] IRI | Technical Electoral Assessment Mission: Georgia 2020 Parliamentary Election Interim Report 3 INTRODUCTION In June and July of 2020, the government of Georgia adopted significant constitutional and election reforms, including a modification of Georgia’s mixed electoral system and a reduction in the national proportional threshold from 5 percent to 1 percent of vote share — presenting an opportunity for citizens to pursue viable third-party options and the possibility of a new coalition government after decades of single-party domination. -
Georgia by Michael Hikari Cecire Capital: Tbilisi Population: 3.7 Million GNI/Capita, PPP: US$7,510
Georgia By Michael Hikari Cecire Capital: Tbilisi Population: 3.7 million GNI/capita, PPP: US$7,510 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores NIT Edition 2016 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 Electoral 4.75 5.25 5.25 5.00 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 Process Civil Society 3.50 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 Independent 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 Media National Democratic 5.75 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 Governance Local Democratic 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.25 5.25 5.25 Governance Judicial Framework and 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.75 4.75 Independence Corruption 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 Democracy 4.79 4.93 4.93 4.86 4.82 4.75 4.68 4.64 4.61 4.61 Score NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. -
Political Forum: 10 Questions on Georgia's Political Development
1 The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development Political Forum: 10 Questions on Georgia’s Political Development Tbilisi 2007 2 General editing Ghia Nodia English translation Kakhaber Dvalidze Language editing John Horan © CIPDD, November 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or oth- erwise, without the prior permission in writing from the proprietor. CIPDD welcomes the utilization and dissemination of the material included in this publication. This book was published with the financial support of the regional Think Tank Fund, part of Open Society Institute Budapest. The opinions it con- tains are solely those of the author(s) and do not reflect the position of the OSI. ISBN 978-99928-37-08-5 1 M. Aleksidze St., Tbilisi 0193 Georgia Tel: 334081; Fax: 334163 www.cipdd.org 3 Contents Foreword ................................................................................................ 5 Archil Abashidze .................................................................................. 8 David Aprasidze .................................................................................21 David Darchiashvili............................................................................ 33 Levan Gigineishvili ............................................................................ 50 Kakha Katsitadze ...............................................................................67