What Is Wrong With Representative Agent Equilibrium Models? Luca Pezzo, Washington University in St. Louis * December 30, 2016 Abstract Despite the ability to match an increasing number of data moments, equilibrium models, employing the widely used Representative Agent simplifying construct, do not properly t the data, why? Using a exible econometric model I provide, as a function of a set of key drivers capturing violations to the models' key assumptions, a joint model-free test for the Representative Agent Equilibrium Models (RAEMs) in the literature as well as the conditional probability of their failures over time. I nd such probabilities to be counter-cyclical, right- skewed and on average high (around 47%). RAEMs are rejected in periods of high illiquidity (market frictions) where the investors' level of disagreement (asymmetric information) is above the median and aggregate expectations are irrationally downward biased. These periods are followed by a decreasing demand to hold the market and, inconsistently with RAEMs predictions, low realized returns. During economic recessions, models are more likely to fail due to market frictions, while in normal times by the asymmetry in information. *Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, Email:
[email protected]. I am thankful to my advisor P.H. Dybvig, T.A. Maurer, F. Corielli, O. Kadan, M. Ringgenberg, G.Zhou, A. Manela and my fellow PhD students for helpful comments and discussions. All remaining errors are my own. 1 1 Introduction The Representative Agent and the Rational Expectation paradigm are two pillars of the neo- classical equilibrium models based on micro foundation and individual rationality.