Social Policy in Post-Industrial Singapore

TONG_f1_i-vi.indd i 2/7/2008 1:35:43 PM Social Sciences in Asia

Edited by Vineeta Sinha Syed Farid Alatas Chan Kwok-bun

VOLUME 17

TONG_f1_i-vi.indd ii 2/7/2008 1:35:44 PM Social Policy in Post-Industrial Singapore

Edited by Lian Kwen Fee & Tong Chee Kiong

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

TONG_f1_i-vi.indd iii 2/7/2008 1:35:44 PM Cover photo montage: Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore collection. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

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ISSN 1567-2794 ISBN 978 90 04 16642 4

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TONG_f1_i-vi.indd iv 2/7/2008 1:35:44 PM CONTENTS

Social Policy Issues in a Post-Industrial Society ...... 1 Tong Chee Kiong and Lian Kwen Fee

Is There a Social Policy in Singapore ...... 21 Lian Kwen Fee

Family Policies: Interface of Gender, Work, and the Sacredization of Child ...... 45 Paulin Tay Straughan

Social Policy for the Aged in Singapore ...... 73 Angelique Chan

Education, Globalization and Equality ...... 97 Anne Rafﬁ n

Manufacturing Human Resources: The Role of Social Investment State ...... 121 Alexius A. Pereira

Management of Foreign Manpower ...... 145 Md. Mizanur Rahman

Household Production as a Moderator in Singapore’s Economic Development ...... 173 Euston Quah and Lim Sze How

Strengthening the Nation’s Roots? Heritage Policies in Singapore ...... 201 Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Shirlena Huang

Culture and the Arts: Intrusion in Political Space ...... 225 Chua Beng Huat

TONG_f1_i-vi.indd v 2/7/2008 1:35:44 PM vi contents

Criminal Justice Policy: Social Order, Risk and the “Governmental Project” ...... 247 Narayanan Ganapathy

Decoding Sexual Policy in Singapore ...... 279 Laurence Leong Wai Teng

Convergence with a Twist: East Asian Welfare Capitalism in Comparative Perspective ...... 309 Volker H. Schmidt

Index ...... 333

TONG_f1_i-vi.indd vi 2/7/2008 1:35:44 PM SOCIAL POLICY ISSUES IN A POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Tong Chee Kiong and Lian Kwen Fee

I The Historical Setting

The ‘welfare state’ is a dirty word, at least amongst the fi rst generation PAP leadership. The origins of this aversion for welfarism may be traced to the time when the key leaders of that generation went to Britain for their university education in the post-war years. While there was much to admire about British society at the time, including its civility and the ability of its people to pull together after the devastation of the Second World War, these leaders were fully convinced, by the 1970s, that state welfarism had the undesirable consequence of undermining the work ethic and contributed to a culture of dependency. The disdain for state handouts, no doubt, was exacerbated by the brief period when Singapore was part of the Federation of Malaysia, during which the People’s Action Party (PAP) was embroiled in a bit- ter dispute with the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) dominated Federation, over the privileged status of the Malays as the indigenous community of the new society. The subsequent ejection of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, over the PAP leadership’s refusal to concede that migrant aspirations should be subordinated to indigenous rights, made the leaders even more determined that the city-state, which possessed only human capital derived signifi cantly from migrant communities, should stand on its own feet. The conviction they held, that welfarism would eventually sap the energy and dynamism of its citizens, was confi rmed by the success of its economic policies. By the 1970s Singapore was committed to full participation in a competitive and export-led economy, and welcomed the presence of multinational corporations (MNC) in playing a critical role for this purpose. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, Singapore’s economic growth was among the highest in the world. Near full employment was achieved by 1970 and real per capita income was doubled in the 1970s. Singapore, the newest member of the exclusive club of the much vaulted dragon economies of the 1970s, in part, rode on the wave of what Esping- Andersen (2001: 832) described as golden age capitalism. It participated

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in an economy that could absorb masses of low-skilled workers on simple assembly-line production, churning out mass-produced goods, for which there was massive demand. By the 1980s, the advanced economies of the West were undergoing a transformation that would have far reaching consequences on how they would tackle employment and manage programmes of social amelioration. Variously described as the coming of the post-industrial society, the post-industrial economy, the post-industrial revolution, de- industrialisation, and more recently a knowledge-based economy, these societies faced new challenges that required new responses to social policy and to the welfare of their citizenry. These challenges have arisen, Esping-Andersen contends, as a consequence of critical technological and demographic changes. The ﬁ rst of these, drawing on the work of Daniel Bell, is the signiﬁ - cant loss of manufacturing jobs, as the economy shifts to a knowledge- intensive one with a premium on professional and technical services (Esping-Andersen, 2001: 832–833). The shift to a knowledge economy does not spell the end of the low-skilled labour market, for there will always be a demand for low-end, low-productivity and routine jobs in personal and social services. However, workers at this end of the labour market will have to contend with low pay, unemployment, and uncertainty (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 2). The labour market will be highly polarised and the consequence, noted by Lian Kwen Fee in the next essay, is a ‘dual’ or ‘two-speed’ society, consisting of a competitive but potentially rewarding sector and a marginalised sector. Hence, Esping- Andersen continues, there will be a new set of winners and losers; the latter will be particularly vulnerable to social risks and insecurity, that their low and semi-skilled predecessors in the post-war manufacturing economy were shielded from. In particular, stress-related risks will come to the fore in the new economy and those, who fall victim to such risks, are likely to experience long-term marginalisation in the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 22). The second, but no less critical, development that has marked the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society in the West, is in demographic and family behaviour. Declining birth rates and low fertility, accompanied by an aging population, have created huge demographic imbalances. Very small working-age cohorts are now a feature of such societies, raising serious questions about the ability of the State to sustain and manage an aging society. Related to this is the ongoing gender revolution (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 20). The educational quali-

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fi cations and economic participation of women have continued to rise. Marriage is increasingly the result of personal choice and bringing up children is no longer the preserve of the conventional two-parent family. Furthermore, Esping-Andersen (2001: 841) suggests, families seem no longer inclined to bear the full costs of child-rearing. In painting this scenario and identifying some of the challenges to welfare regimes, Esping-Andersen is referring to the advanced Western economies. Are there signs of convergence in Singapore, and will the State come under increasing pressure to provide substantial allocation for social protection and amelioration in the 21st century? On the surface, it appears so. Since the 1960s, manufacturing and services have unsurprisingly been the backbone of Singapore’s economy. The contribution of manufacturing to its gross domestic product (GDP) grew steadily from over 16% in 1960 to 29% in 1990 (Huff, 1994: 302–305). The tertiary or service sector (defi ned in three categories: a) transport and communication, b) fi nancial and business services, and c) public administration, community, social and personal services) consistently contributed over 60% of the GDP during the same period. However, the last of the service sectors fell continuously in both share of output and employment in the period, whereas the other sectors have expanded. The fastest growing sector was in fi nancial and business services, which, by 1990, contributed almost as much to GDP as manufacturing. The successful expansion of these services, Huff comments, was an important part of the government strategy to grow what was then termed as ‘brain services’—activities that required heavy investment in human capital and formal education. The contribution of manufacturing began declining in the 1990s, reaching a low of 23% before the onset of the fi nancial crisis of 1997 (Chia, 2001: 171). By 1999 the fi nancial and business sector continued its strong growth and its share of the GDP exceeded that of manufacturing. The trend, Chia describes, refl ects the process of de-industrialisation. Further, the proportion of administrative, professional and technical personnel rose from 18% of the workforce in 1980 to over 40% by 1999, while the share of production workers and labourers declined from 46% to 29% over the same period (ibid.: 171–172). The skills level of Singapore’s workforce, she notes, has been increasing. There is little doubt that the knowledge economy, as a feature of post-industrial society, is well on its way in Singapore. What is missing from this analysis is the number of older workers with low educational qualifi cations and skills, who have been gradually displaced since the

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late 1980s and now constitute the marginalised segment of the labour market. They, along with the youths, who have prematurely dropped out from school, and the aged with no savings support, are the risk populations that Esping-Andersen refers to. By the 1980s, there were clear signals that rapid economic development and social change had had a signifi cant infl uence on demographic patterns and family behaviour in Singapore. Fawcett & Khoo (1980: 575) identifi ed rising educational levels, widespread female employment, rising affl uence, improvement in housing conditions and government efforts to legitimise the small family norm as critical to the rapid decline in fertility. In 1983, the Prime Minister then publicly raised the alarm that Singaporeans were reproducing themselves in a lop-sided way, women with secondary or tertiary education having the least number of children at 1.25. In the early 1970s, the total fertility rate was 2.6; by 1975 it had fallen to 1.9 or below replacement level, and in 2004 to 1.24. Women were marrying later in life. In 1970 over 8% of the female population aged 35 to 44 were single; in 2000 it rose to 30% (see Paulin Straughn’s paper). In 1970, less than 1% of females had tertiary education; in 2003, nearly 27% had either a degree or a diploma. The female labour force participation rate rose from over 24% in 1970 to 54% in 2004. Finally, 7% of the population is over the age of 65; in 2030, this will increase to 19% (Angelique Chan’s essay). The old age dependency ratio will rise from 1:10 to 3:10 in this period. These trends point in one direction—that Singapore is rapidly reproducing the demographic and social structure of the Western countries over a shorter period of time. However, for political and ideological reasons, it has resisted pressures to respond in a concerted manner to the social needs of its risk population by adopting any of the welfare state models available from the West. Esping-Andersen (2001: 839) best sums up the issue: If there is one great question that unites all welfare state researchers, it is this: why is that nations respond so differently to a set of social risks that, all told is pretty similar whether you are an American, a Spaniard, or a Swede? Why is it that Scandinavia responds with social democracy and comprehensive welfare states, continental Europe and East Asia with familialism and corporatist social insurance, and the Anglo-Saxon world with targeted assistance and maximum markets?

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This is a challenging sociological question to answer. The variations in national responses to welfare and social policies are due to a deep-rooted problem that politicians, policy-makers, and scholars need to address, i.e. what is the good society? What is a morally desirable or acceptable way of dealing with the weak and vulnerable in society and ensuring that the majority of citizens are able to enjoy, at the minimum, a way of life that can be underwritten by governments? Esping-Andersen (1997: 182–183; 2002: 13–17) identifi es three models of welfare regime in practice in Western societies. The comparative and analytical purpose of this typology is twofold: the extent to which these regimes decommodify wage labour, and the extent to which they stratify the status of welfare recipients (Pierson, 2004: 398). These issues will be examined by Lian Kwen Fee in the next paper. Here we are concerned with the normative assumptions that underlie each of these models. The social democratic model of the Scandinavian countries is committed to gender equality and maximum employment for both men and women. To this end, the State assumes responsibility for social care of children and the aged. It is comprehensive, universal, and service-intensive. The overall effect is that its citizens are relatively less dependent on the family and the market for managing household welfare. The rationale for the conservative-corporatist regime—found in most continental European countries—is that families are primarily responsible for their members, both in sharing income and caring needs. Social provision is contingent on employment and contributions. It is insurance-based and occupationally-biased. Equity overrides equality. Such a regime favours the male breadwinner, women’s welfare rights are merely derivative. The regime supports generous transfers but minimises social services. The liberal-welfare states of the UK and US insist that the market is both preferable and adequate in providing for the welfare of most citizens, through work incomes and private welfare, such as company benefi ts and life insurance. In limiting public responsibilities to market failures, its welfare role is residual, targeting benefi ts only to the demonstrably needy through means-testing. What is striking about these three contrasting approaches is the value judgment and moral preference that each of these countries have come to hold about what its ideal society is, what people’s expectations should be, and how they should conduct themselves in times of need. These models are fi rst and foremost normatively driven, but they can only

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be understood by situating them within the historical-political-cultural complexity of their respective societies. Esping-Andersen (2001: 840) intuitively provides useful insights to the values and human nature of such societies. In the Nordic countries that have adopted the social- democratic ideal, people believe that the world is better off without want, but it should also be without free-riders. Men and women are encouraged to work, but there is heavy investment in public goods in order to ensure a minimum standard of the good life. The proponents of conservative-corporatist welfare eschew self-interest and individualism. They believe that the stability, security, and solidarity of society can be developed around the family. The market should be tamed for this purpose. Finally, the liberal-welfare state rejects a free lunch: there is nothing more important than self-reliance. The market should dictate welfare provisions, and charity should only be given to the most deserving. In his assessment of the Japanese welfare state, Esping-Andersen (1997: 183; 187–188) suggests that Japan has adopted in fairly equal measure key elements of both the conservative and liberal models. It depends on strong familialism and a self-selected insurance scheme of the conservative regime, and, following the liberal prescription, relies on private welfare and regards its welfare obligations as residual. This hybrid system he attributes to two reasons. One is that the Japanese welfare system is still evolving and has yet to crystallise. The other is that no powerful institutionalised interests have been formed that will put pressure on the development of a coherent system. Hence, to be critical, the Japan’s welfare response is at best eclectic. It reﬂ ects, in our view, a State that wants to have its cake and eat it. Indeed, the same conclusion can be drawn about the PAP government’s response to the welfare needs of its citizenry. From the normative point of view, the PAP government’s approach to welfarism is a peculiar mix of all three regimes and appears to be contradictory. The consistency with which it has invested heavily in public goods such as education, health, public housing and transport, and its promotion of “an equality of the highest standards”—to borrow Esping-Andersen’s phrase—belie the PAP roots in democratic socialism. In its determination to maintain the family unit as the basis of social planning, believing that it is critical to the stability and solidarity of an Asian society, it strongly identiﬁ es with conservative-corporatist values. Drawn into a global and market economy long before it became an

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independent State, and driven by migrant aspirations and a ‘survival- ist’ ethos, it is no stranger to self-reliance and competition; hence it begrudgingly accepted, until recently, that its welfare responsibility should only be residual. The ‘welfarist turn’—in which signifi cant and specifi c State funding was allocated for social support of particular groups—in Singapore began when the transition to the second generation leadership was completed and Lee Hsien Loong succeeded Goh Chok Tong as Prime Minister in early 2004. In his fi rst major speech as PM the same year, the younger Lee identifi ed the declining birthrate as a national issue, and announced the introduction of a pro-family policy to provide a conducive and supportive environment for couples and families to raise children. This included a lower maid levy, longer maternity leave of 12 weeks (extended from eight), subsidised infant care, and tax relief that encouraged grandparents to provide child care (Straits Times, 26 August 2004). A baby bonus scheme was also introduced to provide cash grants as well as matching contributions to a children development account for the second, third and fourth child. It does not take much to fi gure out that the households that will benefi t from these incentives are middle-income in a stable two-parent family situation. It was estimated that 35,000 couples would gain from the package and it would cost the government S$300 million. In mid-2005 PM Lee acknowledged that the Asian fi nancial crisis in 1997 and globalisation had widened income gaps. The bottom 20% of per capita household income had seen no improvement in their earnings in the last fi ve years. Expressing concern that an underclass may become entrenched in Singapore society, he launched a new government initiative, called ComCare, to provide a safety net for what he believed to be a small group of Singaporeans who had fallen on hard times. These were people who had lost their jobs or fallen ill, children unable to meet school expenses, poor elderly, and the disabled. ComCare funding, he stated, will enable community development councils, grassroots organisations, and voluntary welfare organisations the fl exibility and discretion to deliver support and initiate projects, where they were most needed. Following numerous requests from low income families for fi nancial assistance, the People’s Association reiterated that ComCare was reserved only for urgent and temporary relief to needy Singaporeans (Straits Times, 15 July 2005). To avoid criticisms that this was the beginning of welfarism in Singapore, ComCare was set

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up as an endowment fund with a government contribution of S$500 million, gradually building to S$1 billion. In its fi rst year of operation, a modest sum of S$55 million was allocated. In his budget of February 2006, several months before the General Election, PM Lee introduced a massive S$2.6 billion Progress Package that will pay every adult citizen in cash a ‘growth dividend’ of between S$200 and S$800, the maximum favouring the low wage worker (Today, 18 February 2006). Low-wage workers, aged 40 and above, would also get ‘workfare bonuses’ ranging from S$150 to S$1,200 each, as a reward for regular and productive work. These were in addition to the regular National Service bonus and CPF top-ups. Those living in one and two-room Housing and Development Board (HDB) fl ats would also be eligible for rental rebates. The PM stated that these packages were weighted towards those in the lower income groups; the dividends would cost S$1.4 billion and the workfare bonus S$400 million (Channel NewsAsia, 17 February 2006). In total, these would incur a rare budget defi cit. The government suggested that if the workfare scheme worked out well, Singaporeans could see more targetted assistance in future, if fi nancially sustainable. Since the younger Lee succeeded as PM, targetted welfare assistance and generous transfers have emerged as signifi cant developments in Singapore’s social policy. However, he has, like the fi rst generation leadership, continued to warn against the pitfalls of Western-style State welfare. Indeed, in its public pronouncements, the PAP has assiduously rejected the use of words such as welfare and handout to describe its initiatives in social support, preferring to call them workfare social assistance, enabling growth. Clearly these initiatives point to the conservative-corporatist regime as the preferred alternative of the government: strengthening the family for its social support function, favouring generous but targetted transfers, and minimising its role in social services, by encouraging voluntary welfare organisations through generous grants. The issues for researchers of social policy and welfare in Singapore are several. First, is its welfare system in the process of evolution or has it adopted the conservative-corporatist model by default? Second, if Singapore is prepared to spend billions of dollars on its social programmes, is this model the best option for a post-industrial society? Are there contradictions between such a model and the social structure of a society created by a post-industrial economy and globalisation? Third, does it have a coherent social policy that justifi es the acceptance and continued practice of this model in the fi rst place? Fourth, if there are

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tentative indications that the State will continue to allocate a substantial sum to social programmes, should it not begin to develop a regime that will suit the particular conditions of Singapore? Fifth, if convergence and the attendant problems are inevitable, what are the obstacles and resistance to developing a coherent and sustainable welfare system? Indeed, the issue may well be, not when, but whether a sustainable regime is achievable. That is the challenge the PAP government will have to face sooner or later.

II Social Policies Analysed

Conceptions of social rights, social welfare and social policy developed in the UK, in response to the negative effects of capitalism in the decades preceding and following the mid-point of the 20th century. Largely due to the inﬂ uence of Titmuss, social policy came to be concerned with the allocation of a limited range of resources to meet a limited range of social needs (Lavalette & Pratt, 1997: 2). These social needs were narrowly conceived to include health care, housing, education and income maintenance—areas of social life in which individuals and families experience the most tangible of consequences in times of interruption or cessation of earnings. The market’s role in meeting such needs, Titmuss advocated in the 1950s, should be minimal, in line with his view that this was a matter of entitlement. At about the same time that Titmuss laid the intellectual basis of social policy, T.H. Marshall attempted to mediate the conﬂ ict between the market principle of capitalism—which invariably produced social inequality and privilege—and the principle of equity that was implied in membership of the modern nation-state (Hindess, 1987: 40). This he did in his often quoted exposition of social citizenship, embodying “the whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, to the right to share to the full in the social heritage, and to live the life of a civilised being, according to the standards prevailing in the society.” In doing so, Marshall extended the concerns of social policy beyond the mere amelioration of social misfortune, caused by unexpected economic episodes, and argued that people’s right to participate generally in the lifestyle and shared civilisation of the society they live in, should not be compromised through the lack of resources. Social policy and the extension of social services, Marshall states, are not primarily a means of equalising income, but should also contribute

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to the general enrichment of life. For Marshall, social policy should be situated broadly within the context of how social citizenship may be realised. In outlining his conception of social rights, he was concerned with the role played by citizenship in integrating society (Hindess, 1987: 37), for the purpose of nurturing a community or nation. Social policy, as broadly conceived by Marshall, implies that a government has some vision of what constitutes good society (Lavalette & Pratt, 1997: 5), and what constitutes good citizenship. Without such a vision, Lavalette & Pratt continue, programmes in health, education, housing, economics or taxation will be reactive rather than directed; the consequence is that social provision will proceed as incremental adjustment, rather than as a well-conceived plan with clear goals. Hence, social policy is an intensely political and ideological project. Even when a government articulates what it sees as social problems and needs, it refl ects the values and prejudices of its members and its constituency. This book provides a broader treatment of social policy in Singapore. While it deals with areas conventionally considered social policy, such as education, health, the aged, and community services, we have also included contributions on economic policies, such as industrial planning, household production and migrant workers, as well as the arts, criminal justice, and sexuality. Thus, other than addressing the economic, welfare and security of social citizenship, many of the contributions in this volume are, in Marshall’s prescient description, concerned with social heritage and the quality of life one can reasonably expect in society. Singapore has often been described as an interventionist or developmental state. Under the dominant PAP government since 1965, social policy or social planning is conceived as a comprehensive programme, covering all aspects—public and private—of the lives of its citizens, whether it be encouraging population growth, institutionalising religious education, getting graduate women to marry, or keeping Singapore clean. Given the unique socio-political environment of Singapore and a one-party State that enjoys signifi cant political support, the PAP government has been able to forge a relatively consistent social policy. While the contributors in this volume review and discuss a whole range of social issues, there are certain commonalities and pattern regarding social planning in Singapore. For example, it is clear that, from the perspective of the State, the primary goal of policies or governance is to ensure the economic survival, stability and viability of the small nation-state. In Anne Raffi n’s essay on education, for instance, she

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notes that policy makers tend to view education not so much as intrinsic to individual development, but as a tool to promote the economy. Education has more to do with manpower training than as something valuable in and of itself. Thus, the recent drive to make Singapore an educational hub, attracting top universities in the US, Europe, and Australia to set up shop in Singapore, is related to growing the economy and attracting foreign students to augment its talent pool. In the discussion on family planning and marriage policies in Singapore, Pauline Straughan shows that achieving optimum population growth level is a primary concern of the State, as it is the most important source of labour supply for the economy. Even in areas such as arts and heritage policies, Chua and Yeoh & Huang argue that the driving force behind these policies has more to do with attracting tourist dollars to Singapore than improving the quality of life of its citizens. Arts and heritage policies ‘mean business’ and should be economically viable if not proﬁ table, adding to the economic assets of the country. It is suggested that social policy in Singapore is less driven by pure ideological underpinnings, but by rational considerations. As Lian Kwen Fee argues in his paper, there is a rational-calculative focus in governance. Given the dominance of the PAP government, we observe the centrality of the State in policy formulations and setting the parameters for discussion and discourse. Other agencies, whether non-governmental organisations (NGO) or civil society groups, have a peripheral role, unless they support the national agenda. Alexius Pereira, for instance, claims that while investment in education does improve the lives of the citizens, it is also a means by which the State builds political legitimacy and invests in human resources. He notes that in Singapore, education planning is coordinated by the Council for Professional and Technical Education, chaired by the Minister for Trade and Industry, and not by the Minister for Education. Higher education in Singapore, according to Pereira, is driven by how the State views future economic needs, especially in relation to manpower training. Similar arguments are made in Rafﬁ n’s essay regarding developing Singapore as an educational hub, and Mizanur Rahman’s discussion of the management of foreign workers in Singapore. Another common thread found in the different essays is that social policy planning is generally less reactive and more preventive in nature, with the State taking an anticipatory stance towards social issues. For instance, in population planning, social policies are put in place to deal with projected problems which may arise in 20 to 30 years time.

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Similarly, Angelique Chan shows, measures are now being enacted to deal with an ageing population that will increase to 19% of the population in 2030. In recent years, there is increasing focus on the aged and the underclass in Singapore. This, several contributors contend, has to do with the perception that there is increasing social inequality and reduced social mobility in Singapore society, which could threaten social cohesion and the social compact between the State and its citizens. Due to its anticipatory and preventive stance, one feature of social policy in Singapore is that they are often top-down pronouncements by the government. This can lead to resistance from the population at large. This point is echoed by Brenda Yeoh & Shirlena Huang, who found that most Singaporeans do not identify with the heritage policies of the State. There is considerable skepticism about the beneﬁ ciaries of heritage preservation, and a widespread perception that it is often undertaken for commercial purposes and tourism. Given Singapore’s small size and dominant government, social planning is highly centralised and co-ordinated, often involving committees drawn from many different ministries and statutory boards. The ideology, goals, and deliverables are often clearly spelt out. Social policy planning in Singapore is rarely piecemeal or haphazard. It is prescriptive, driven by what the State considers as a nation-building project, whether it is ensuring the economic viability of the country, social integration of its citizens or meeting the social needs of the population. As noted in most of the papers in this volume, social policy in Singapore is inﬂ uenced by pragmatic and rational considerations, framed by what the State conceives as good society and good citizenship. Citizenship in Singapore has to do with responsibility, how subjects can contribute to Singapore economic and social development, with the focus on productive citizenship. Centralised planning, economic considerations, and the pragmatic nature of social policy in Singapore are accompanied by a willingness of the State to alter course, if a particular policy does not achieve the intended consequences, or when social circumstances change. Social policy planning in Singapore is very nimble and receptive to changing social and economic conditions. For example, Straughan shows that early population planning policy was concerned with reducing the population in Singapore, at a time of high fertility rates, low income, and mass unemployment. However, by the 1980s, the success of the policy produced one of the lowest fertility rates in the world. The policy quickly shifted to stimulating population growth.

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It should be noted, however, that the early successes of Singapore’s social policy occurred at a time when it was an underdeveloped third world country, with low income levels, high unemployment, inadequate physical and social infrastructure, including housing and health, and a largely uneducated populace. For many Singaporeans at that time, buying into the State-sponsored ideology, with its incentives and disincentives, was a means of social mobility. Singaporeans were prepared to accept an interventionist State, sacrifi cing some personal freedom, if it meant improving their lives and livelihood. Social policy was synonymous with social engineering. However, given the success of its economic and social policies in a short span of 40 years, Singapore has moved from the third world to the fi rst world, with one of the highest GDP per capita in Asia, and a largely educated and affl uent population. Would an increasingly affl uent and educated population subscribe to the ‘carrot and stick’ approach to social planning? With the impact of globalisation, increasing social mobility and greater personal choices in decision making, will citizens in present-day Singapore accede to policies that directly affect their daily lives, especially those that are regarded as private, such as who to marry and how many children to have? From the contributions in this volume, it is clear that the changing expectations of second and third generation Singaporeans will require a softer, nuanced approach to social planning—the winning of minds rather than a heavy hand. These are challenges that an affl uent post- industrial state such as Singapore will face as it tries to shape the future of Singapore society. Each of the contributors in this volume attempt to trace the origins of social policy in specifi c areas, their rationale and contradictions, the reception to these policies from Singaporeans and mediations from relevant constituents, as well as intended and unintended consequences. The analyses by the different contributors also identify possible ramifi cations for policy as a consequence of the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial state. Lian Kwen Fee deals with the broader issue of whether there is a social policy in Singapore. He suggests that the success of the Singapore State’s economic policy in the 1970s, which led to increasing Westernisation and its attendant problems, has resulted in a counter-cultural discourse of neo-Confucian values in Singapore, with the promotion of social discipline, frugality, diligence, and a collectivist ethic centred on the family and community. This discourse informs the crafting of social policies in Singapore. Moreover, like other Asian states, Singapore’s policy regime follows that of ‘developmental states’ with ‘productivist’ social policies. Lian argues that one central feature

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of social planning in Singapore is the government’s fundamentally anti-welfarist stance. He traces this to the personal experiences, political philosophy and views of the fi rst generation leaders of Singapore. The next three papers in the volume examine what would generally be considered as the traditional concerns of social policy: income maintenance, health, education, family and ageing. Paulin Straughan argues that the State in Singapore views the family as a microcosm of society and, as such, the policy initiatives promote marriage, parenthood, and self-reliance. Family-centred policies are thus used to infl uence the size and social structure of the family through a series of incentives and disincentives, including tax incentives, housing allocation, subsidised delivery costs, and the provision of child care, aligned to what the State regards as the prescribed ideals. Given its small size, lack of natural resources and dependence on human resources, one core area in family policies relates to population growth. She demonstrates how these policies have changed over time, in response to the economic needs and social conditions of Singapore, from a policy that sought to reduce population size in the 1960s and 1970s, to one that promotes population growth from the 1980s onward, with new incentives such as the ‘baby bonus’ scheme, and tax breaks for those with third or fourth children. Straughan contends that the State will face new challenges in family policy planning in the 21st century, as there are multiple contesting ideologies of family, parenthood, child, gender, and work arising from a global economy—the Singapore family is being pulled in different directions. As such, she concludes that new policies on the family must include a serious re-thinking and re-conceptualisation of what the family means in Singapore society. One of the biggest challenges facing post-industrial Singapore is the low fertility rate and a rapidly ageing population. As Angelique Chan notes on the ageing population in Singapore, currently, 7% of the population is over the age of 65 but will increase to 19% by 2030. The relevance to Straughan’s discussion is important, as traditionally for policymakers in Asia, the family is viewed as the main source of support for the elderly. However, Chan suggests that there are indications that this role will decline in the future. She argues that the Singapore State continues to hold to the belief that familial support of the elderly is ideal, and has adopted policies that enhance family support rather than replace it, including tax and fi nancial incentives as well as housing priority for adult children, who live with or nearby elderly parents. However, as the ageing problem is compounded by very low fertility

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rate and the changing familial structure in Singapore, the stress and burden on the family to support the elderly will increase, and in the longer term, is not sustainable. Chan suggests that such a situation requires a re-thinking of policies regarding the aged, especially on how to attain a mix of familial and government support that will ensure older adult well-being. Chan also notes that policies on the aged are multi-pronged: addressing the short-term immediate needs of the elderly as well as longer term policies such as the retraining of older workers, so that they can be economically productive for a longer period of time. Finally, Anne Rafﬁ n examines educational policy in Singapore. She suggests that Singapore is rapidly developing a two-tiered system. At one level, the purpose of education is geared towards manpower training and nation building. Singapore educational policy, at another level, is increasingly focused on developing an educational hub. Education is viewed as a tool to promote the economy and as a generator of wealth, both in terms of drawing foreign students to study in Singapore, as well as attracting foreign talent to the island. Given the need to adapt to a post-industrial society, there is also a gradual process of redeﬁ n- ing education, particularly tertiary institutions, in commercial terms, including steering public universities to be less dependent on State funds, and the commercialisation of intellectual capital produced by the universities. The Singapore educational system is evolving from a State-controlled model to a market-led model. The following three papers examine human resource development in Singapore. As noted earlier, the highly centralised and co-ordinated nature of social policy in Singapore is driven, to a large degree, by economic imperatives and pragmatic considerations. Thus, human resource, manpower planning, and labour policies, are, like education and healthcare, viewed as forms of social investment. Alexius Pereira, in reviewing the industrial policies of the State, claims that there is an economistic logic that dominates the formulation and implementation of policies. He suggests that one of the reasons MNCs choose to invest in Singapore is due to the government’s economic and social priorities, such as the development of a well-trained industrial work force, and the ability to ‘discipline’ labour. Furthermore, Pereira contends that educational policies in Singapore are integrally linked to industrial planning. At each phase of economic development, educational policies were tweaked to serve the industrial agenda. Education is viewed in economic terms, rather than education for its own sake.

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Mizanur Rahman continues this line of argument by demonstrating how policies on foreign workers in Singapore are driven by the economic needs of the State. Yet, while trying to attract foreign talent, the State is very much aware of the impact and consequences of having a large foreign worker pool in Singapore society. Policies, which differentiate between different classes of migrants, as well as between solicited and unsolicited migration, are enacted to balance between the need for foreign labour and the social impact of foreign workers in Singapore. Finally, Euston Quah, taking a more economic perspective, examines the economic contribution of women, particularly in factoring the productivity of household production. In addition to the problems of an ageing population, low fertility rate, and the poor, a social policy relevant to women poses a great challenge to the State. As Straughan notes in her discussion on the family, the State often imposes contradictory demands on women: to join the workforce to contribute to the economy while, at the same time, requiring them to play the traditional role of homemakers. As noted earlier, social policy in Singapore extends beyond the traditional areas of health care, education, ageing, and income maintenance. In Singapore, the State is present in most areas of everyday life. Four contributions deal with social policies regarding heritage, the arts, crime, and sex. Yeoh & Huang note that in the early years of nation building, cultural heritage preservation was neglected in the relentless drive to develop the economy, leading to a systematic amnesia of the past. By the mid-1980s, a growing nostalgia with the past began to set in. At the same time, political leaders were concerned with the increasing Westernisation, materialism, and the danger of Singaporeans losing their Asian roots and its consequences. In response, there was a shift in cultural and heritage policies to preserve the past and encourage greater awareness of culture, arts, and collective heritage of Singaporeans. While the State has been relatively successful in preserving heritage buildings and conserving historical sites, Yeoh & Huang suggest that most Singaporeans do not have a high degree of involvement in heritage activities and not many Singaporeans have visited heritage sites for the purpose of appreciating heritage and history. Moreover, as even heritage planning and conservation are prompted by economic considerations, they found that many Singaporeans feel that heritage activities are too commercialised and targetted at the tourism industry. This point is also raised in Chua Beng Huat’s paper on arts policy. Like heritage planning, the arts have seen resurgence in Singapore,

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with the State providing greater funding and developing infrastructure to build a ‘Renaissance city.’ The arts, however, as Chua contends, is not viewed as important for its own sake, but as part of the economic development of the nation. The creative industry is seen as a new source of capital for the State, attracting tourists to spend money in Singapore and attracting foreign talent to work here. Chua argues that the promotion of the arts cannot be done without simultaneously loosening up the administrative restrictions and moral censorship that have been in place for the last 30 years. While there have been some progress made in these areas, on the whole, the liberalisation of the cultural sphere has, until now, not affected the iron-clad control that the PAP has over the political arena and this is unlikely to change for the conceivable future. In the remaining papers in this section, Ganapathy Narayanan and Leong Wai Teng examine the criminal justice policies and sexual policies in Singapore. Both trace the origins, rationale, and implementation of social policies in these areas. More importantly, they highlight the contradictions, anomalies, and intended and unintended consequences of social policies, regarding crime and sexuality in Singapore. Ganapathy, for example, argues that the State in Singapore prioritises order over justice and uses a deterrent model of justice, including the use of extra-judicial and administrative procedures to repress crime. He notes, “. . . the logic of the criminal justice system is thought to exemplify the ability of the State to ensure preventive deterrence, preserve social order and provide the opportunity for its citizens to take pleasure in the perceived safety and security, which has come to characterise much of modern Singapore.” In the same vein, the PAP government’s aversion to risk has transformed the role of penology from one of guilt attribution to the administrative function of risk categorisation and the management of ‘dangerous people.’ Leong, in examining sex policies in Singapore, argues that in Singapore, there is a clash between economic liberalism and political conservatism. Political conservatism results in repressive sexual policies which, in his view, put a damper on self expression and choice. Examining the logic or illogic of the framing of sex laws in Singapore, he suggests that the laws are invariably prohibitive and punitive. They do not encourage sexual expression or protect individuals from discrimination on the grounds of sexuality. While there have been some relaxation of laws regarding homosexuality, Leong argues that these are largely cosmetic and superﬁ cial. The status quo regarding sexual behaviour, or what the

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State considers sexual deviance, is maintained and justifi ed, using the mantra of supposed ‘Asian conservatism.’ In the fi nal paper in the volume, Volker Schmidt takes a regional perspective, comparing Singapore with social policy arrangements found in other East Asian societies. In Convergence with a Twist, Schmidt looks at East Asian welfare capitalism, specifi cally at Japan and the four ‘tiger economies.’ He notes that East Asian social policy regimes are marked by fairly residual and limited statutory protection, are hardly socially redistributive and thus strongly status maintaining, more investment rather than consumption-oriented and predominantly regulatory. Moreover, the policies tend to be pragmatically devised, rather than principle driven, and thus incessantly modifi ed. They are also lean, effective, and largely successful. Schmidt notes that while there will always be debates as to whether there is such a thing as East Asian welfare capitalism, he believes that with the continuing growth of East Asian economies, all segments of the society will benefi t from ‘shared growth.’ There is growing convergence, with Europe moving in the direction of Asian productivism. At the same time, as East Asian welfarism is only marginally redistributive, there are also signs that East Asia may eventually need a dose of European non-productivistic welfarism. Social policy planning in Singapore is coming to a crossroads. In a relatively short period of 40 years, Singapore has developed from a third world country to a fi rst world State. However, compared to many fi rst world countries, Singapore’s expenditure on social welfare has not grown proportionally. Will Singapore, as it continues to grow economically and become more affl uent, commit to long-term welfarist policies, or maintain the ideological position of anti-welfarism? Where will Singapore social policy planning go from here? Will it develop a comprehensive welfare programme or continue to treat the provision of welfare as a residual function? As various contributors in this volume note, the Singapore State, aware of the growing income disparities in Singapore, with the Gini co-effi cient rising from 0.490 to 0.522 in the last fi ve years, has enacted various policies, such as ‘Singapore Shares’ and the ‘Progress Package,’ to try to redress this problem. These policies can be seen as attempts by the State to redistribute part of the economic reserves of the State. It also demonstrates that the State is aware that there is a political cost to not providing welfare programmes for its citizens, particularly for those in the lower income groups. These recent welfare provisions suggest that Singapore is, at least, in reality if not ideologically, acknowledging the

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need for the State to shoulder a larger share of welfare responsibilities. At the same time, the State steadfastly maintains the ideological stance that it is anti-welfarist, and loathes creating a culture of dependency in its citizenry. The contributors in this volume address these issues and reﬂ ect on whether Singapore can develop a welfare model and social policies that can bridge the gap between reality and perception, practice and ideology.

References

Chan, Jasmine (2000) “The Status of Women in a Patriarchal State: The Case of Singapore” in Louise Edwards & Mina Roces (eds) Women in Asia: Tradition, Modernity and Globalisation, London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 39–55. Chia Siow Yue (2001) “Singapore: Towards a Knowledge-based Economy” in S. Masuyama et al. (eds) Industrial Restructuring in East Asia, Tokyo: Nomura Research Institute & Singapore: ISEAS. Esping-Andersen, G. (1997) “Hybrid Or Unique: The Japanese Welfare State Between Europe And America” in Journal of European Social Policy, 7 (3): 179–189. —— (2001) “Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies” in D. Grusky (ed) Social Stratiﬁ cation, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 830–845. —— (2002) Why We Need a New Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hindess, B. (1987) Freedom, Equality, and the Market, London & New York: Tavistock Publications. Huff, W.G. (1994) The Economic Growth of Singapore, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fawcett, J.T. & Khoo, S. (1980) “Singapore: Rapid Fertility Transition in a Compact Society” in Population and Development Review, 6 (4): 549–579. Lavalette M. & Pratt, A. (1997) “Introduction” in M. Lavalette & A. Pratt (eds) Social Policy, London: Sage Publications. Leong Wai Teng (1989) “Culture and the State: Manufacturing Traditions for Tourism” in Critical Studies in Mass Communication 6 (4): 335–375. Pierson, C. (2004) “Contemporary Challenges To Welfare State Development” in N. Deakin et al. (eds) Welfare And The State: Critical Concepts in Political Science (Volume IV). London & New York: Routledge.

TONG_f2_1-20.indd 19 2/7/2008 1:36:17 PM TONG_f2_1-20.indd 20 2/7/2008 1:36:17 PM IS THERE A SOCIAL POLICY IN SINGAPORE?

Lian Kwen Fee

Policies and programmes of social amelioration have been dominated by discourses of the Western welfare state since the middle of the last century. The unremarkable observation that can be made about these discourses is the unabashed normative and ideological tones adopted by the advocates of the welfare state and the workfare state. As the assault on the welfare state by the conservative right and the neo- liberals began in the 1970s and gathered pace, it was inevitable that the economic dynamism of pre-1997 East Asian societies was held up as an alternative to discredit a welfare state ‘in crisis.’ In this essay, I examine the relevance of Western conceptualisation of social policy and welfare programmes to understanding the approach taken by the People’s Action Party (PAP) government, in power since 1959, in social redistribution. I argue that the ﬁ rst generation PAP leadership, led by Lee Kuan Yew, had developed a robust political response to the normative dominance of the welfare state discourse. However, this should not obscure the coherence of its social policy, which has its origins in a utopian yet pragmatic vision that the more successful a society is, the more it is able to care for those who fall behind.

I Social Policy, Citizenship and Post-industrial Society

In the previous paper, I referred to social policy as social amelioration and social alleviation as understood by Titmuss; and social policy as social citizenship and social participation as part of a wider process of social integration within a nation-state, envisaged by T.H. Marshall. The intimate link that Marshall drew between social policy, broadly deﬁ ned, and social citizenship assumes that citizenship is unproblematic. The concept of citizenship is contestable and should, Mullard (1999: 13) argues, be viewed as competing discourses. He identiﬁ es several such discourses (ibid.: 13–18). The public citizen accords priority to personal freedom, values plurality, differences and transparency, and seeks to expand public space in order to create a democratic culture. The independent citizen is committed to the unfettered market economy and

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rejects political intervention. The entitled citizen, mirroring Marshall’s social citizenship, claims access to resources and opportunities to enable meaningful participation in society; the State strives to guarantee a minimal level of such participation. The discourse of communitarian citizenship eschews the egoism of the independent citizen, and promotes social responsibility and commitment to the community. These citizenship discourses are conceptually distinguishable but they are by no means mutually exclusive. In reality, they overlap as I will illustrate next. Few Singaporeans would subscribe to the discourse of the public citizen; more would harbour ideas of the independent citizen. I would suggest that many Singaporeans have strong expectations of entitlement, as they have evolved a dependency on the State, after a sustained period of affl uence since the 1970s, which has seen families double their standard of living in just one generation. It is the fear of the pervasiveness of the entitled citizen, that has caused the PAP government to maintain communitarian citizenship as a counter discourse. I have elsewhere pointed out, that the PAP government espouses the civic-republican tradition of citizenship (Hill & Lian, 1995: 244–245). It is a citizenship that is communitarian, emphasises the elements that integrates citizens into the community, involves participation for the collective good, and requires citizens to fulfi ll their obligations and duties to the nation-state. What I am suggesting here is that beneath the social policies instituted by the PAP government is a social vision of what is good for Singapore, one of which is communitarian citizenship. Equally important, it may be argued, the government is committed to social citizenship, in so far as this provides economic and educational opportunities to its citizens, so that the latter can strive to achieve a particular standard of living commensurate to the Marshallian notions of participation in a civilised society and enjoyment of social heritage. Hence, there is an overlap of discourses of the entitled and communitarian citizen. Needless to say, these are competing discourses between the citizenry and the State, the former putting pressure on the latter to increase the level of welfare provision in the city-state. It is useful to distinguish the two meanings of social policy, one broadly defi ned, and the other in its restricted sense. Broadly defi ned, social policy is about the analysis of access to life-enhancing and life- sustaining resources (Gil, in Lavalette & Pratt, 1997: 2) so that criminal justice or environmental policies are as relevant as wages or housing policies in its consequences for the lives of citizens. Social policy is

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concerned with the State organisation of social provision (ibid.: 6). In its restricted meaning social policy refers to the welfare regime, as described by Esping-Andersen, for the purpose of ameliorating the needs of citizens, in times of diffi culty and through no fault of their own. From here on, I shall use ‘social policy’ to refer to its broad meaning and ‘welfare regime’ in its restricted sense. Accordingly, following Lund (2002: 11), a useful distinction to make is that between primary and secondary intervention: “Primary intervention involves direct interference in the economy and social life to promote socially desirable outcomes, whereas secondary intervention redistributes resources already allocated via market transactions and social and political interaction.” Social policy requires primary intervention, whilst welfare regime involves secondary intervention. The last point is particularly relevant, because the conditions that ushered in the welfare state in the UK and parts of Europe, i.e. the unequal consequences of capitalism and the demands of an organised labour movement in the 1940s and 1950s, have now changed in the post-industrial society of the past two decades. The 1997 fi nancial crisis, the social and political consequences of which are yet to be fully comprehended, is a wake-up call as Singapore scrambles to reposition itself to face competitors and competitions that are changing by the day. The question that needs to be addressed is, does its social policy, guided in the past by high economic growth and full employment, require a shift in direction in order to meet the demands of a changing environment—that may no longer ensure as high a level of growth as it has enjoyed over the last 30 years. The challenges for the post-industrial State will therefore be different. The new forms of economic competition induced by globalisation have put increasing pressure on governments to develop labour market policies, which are fl exible and able to respond rapidly and effectively to complex and specialised demands. The challenges emerging from the globalised environment, Low (2001) identifi es, are in three areas:

a) information and communication technology (ICT), b) knowledge-based economy (KBE), and c) hyper-competition.

For this reason, governments in East Asian economies—no longer regarded as developing, but as in a position where they have to stay close to the heels of the advanced economies of Europe and North America,

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if only to maintain a standard of living that its people have become accustomed to—are now forced to think of new ways of governing and valuing different categories of its population (Ong, 1999). Referring to Foucault’s exposition of biopower, Ong says that fostering life, growth and care of population are now the central concern of the State. States in Southeast Asia, she continues, make different kinds of biopolitical investments in the population on the basis of gender, talent, skills, and race. Different sections of the population are subject to different regimes of valuation and control. Unequal biopolitical investment results in uneven distribution of services, care, and protection. While some have ready access to rights and resources, others are neglected outright. What, one may well ask, are the implications of such rational-calculative forms of governmentality—adopted by States in response to hyper- competitive conditions of a global economy—for social policy objectives in health, education, housing, human resource planning (particularly with regard to the young, the aged and migrants), social security and even in non-traditional social policy concerns, such as the environment, arts and criminal justice. Here, it is relevant to refer to Castel’s (1991) discussion of how risk is perceived in a post-industrial society and how such risks will be managed by post-industrial governments. Referring to preventive strategies of social administration being developed in the US and France then, Castel argues that State intervention in the lives of people, who are considered at risk, will no longer take the form of the direct relationship between the carer and the cared, the helper and the helped, the professional and the client. What governments will do is to establish what he calls “ﬂ ows of population” based on the col- lation of a range of abstract factors deemed liable to produce risk in general. While social workers, medical and educational practitioners in the past have been able to exercise some independence as specialists, State intervention will now be pre-emptive and come in the form of an autonomous development of managerial policy formation. Specialists will merely execute the policies dictated by State planners. The objective of social policy may well be interpreted as preventive and anticipatory and promote a new mode of surveillance, which Castel describes as systematic pre-detection. The intended objective is to anticipate and prevent the development of undesirable trends such as illness, abnormality, or deviant behaviour. As a corollary, social policy will be less reactive and more pro-active, in anticipating and facilitating the development of desirable consequences, such as productive, multi-task- ing and talented populations. “The emerging tendency,” Castel notes,

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“is to assign different social destinies to individuals, in line with their varying capacity to live up to the requirements of competitiveness and profi tability.” This will give rise to a ‘dual’ or ‘two-speed’ society, where hyper-competitive sectors and marginal activities (elderly, unemployed, marginalised youth, the unoffi cial economy) co-exist, the latter obviously more prone to risk. Under post-fordist conditions, social policy is now forced to shift from the alleviation of needs to the prevention and management of risks, by adopting techniques of early identifi cation and intervention (Kemshall, 2002: 21). The ramifi cation of a social policy of prevention is that “the State will seek to relieve the pressure upon it by displac- ing responsibility. . . . from the institutional to the individual realm” (Freeman, in Kemshall, 2002: 22). In this way individuals are called upon to bear the consequences of their behaviour and the risks that come with it.

II In Search of an East Asian Welfare Model

The search for an East Asian welfare regime has strong ideological overtones. Its origins may be located in the 1970s, when the PAP government successfully transformed the island-nation from a service- based economy to a manufacturing economy, with unprecedented economic growth and near full employment. Its economic success, in the view of the PAP ﬁ rst generation leaders, had come at a price—namely excessive Westernisation and its attendant social problems of crime, drug abuse, delinquency, abortion, and divorce. The government embarked on a counter-cultural discourse of neo-Confucianist values in the 1980s, promoting social discipline, frugality, diligence, and a collectivist ethic centred on the family and community. The economic dynamism of the so-called dragon economies of East Asia, of which Singapore was regarded as a member, during the 1980s drew its share of Western admirers and writers: two of whom, George Lodge and Ezra Vogel (1987), were inﬂ uential in promoting the Confucianist discourse to the English-speaking world. Touted as the culturalist explanation for East Asian economic dynamism, it was inevitable that Confucianism would soon be used to make sense of welfare regimes and social policy in East Asian societies. This came in the form of what Catherine Jones (1993) called ‘Confucian welfare states.’ Her thesis was a simple one. The delivery

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of social welfare and the responsibility of taking care of vulnerable members of society was that of the family and community, not the State ( Jones, 1993: 204–205), echoing the conservative-corporatist regime. Accordingly, the objective of social policy was to build or rebuild community through communitarian values, for the purpose of collective self-help ( Jones, 1993: 208). It was no coincidence that the search for an alternative welfare regime by Western governments and academics—which they readily found in the dragon economies—occurred at the same time that the welfare state in the West was perceived to be in crisis. The welfare state, Esping-Andersen (1996: 1–2) summarises, stiﬂ es the market and erodes the incentive to work, save and invest; it could no longer be supported by an aging population, and it critically reduced the ability of countries to compete in the global economy. By the mid- 1990s, governments in the UK, Germany, and Australia turned to East Asia for ideas to reform the welfare state (White & Goodman, 1998: 10). Since Catherine Jones’ early attempt at understanding Confucian welfare regimes, a number of writers have attempted to make sense of the East Asian welfare experience, and whether there is a welfare model unique to the region. The ‘orientalist’ treatment of welfare regimes in East Asia has been subjected to a critique resonant of that with the proponents of Asian values in the mid-1990s. I will highlight two of these analytical ﬂ aws (White, Goodman & Kwon, 1998: 15–16). It is an argument that esssen- tialises and homogenises East Asian societies and ignores their diversity. It also sets up a false dichotomy of contrasting alternatives between the West and East Asia, overlooking their common features. The prevailing view—one that appears to have much support amongst scholars—is that East Asian societies are essentially ‘developmental states’ heavily reliant on the utilisation and effective deployment of labour, and driven by export-oriented industrialisation (Deyo, 1989: 33). Such States are characterised as relatively autonomous, run by authoritarian regimes, possessing powerful bureaucracies, having weak labour movements and a weak civil society (Tang, 2000: 29–30). Variously described as ‘productivist social policy’ with the stress on human capital investment (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 3) and developmental welfare systems (White, Goodman & Kwon, 1998: 214), these governments have sought to keep expenditure on social assistance to a minimum, whilst concentrating investment in industry and infrastructure. Decades of high economic growth in the region have been responsible for the underdevelopment of welfare regimes and for obviating the need for a comprehensive

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welfare state that exists in the West. Indeed, it is argued, social policy (Deyo, 1992: 49–50), is closely aligned with the developmental strategy favoured by the State elite. As East Asian economies shift to higher value-added economies, Deyo maintains, social policy—insofar as it helps to enhance the skill and productivity of labour—will become expansive and critical to development policy. Alongside the developmentalist interpretation is a view that is not necessarily incompatible but shifts the attention to political effi cacy. At the beginning of this paper, I referred to Marshall’s view, that social policy should be broadly conceived as integral to the development of social citizenship, and having an instrumental role in social integration for the purpose of nurturing community and nation. The origins of the welfare state in Western Europe may be traced to the mass unemployment of the 1920s and 1930s and the rise of the labour movement in the pre-War years. Against the backdrop of a successful and debilitating war against fascist regimes, it was given an overtly political dimension. For this reason, Esping-Andersen (1996: 2) argues, welfare state construction should not only be regarded as a mere upgrading of social policies, but also as a political project of nation-building, including the affi rmation of liberal democracy. Hence, many countries readily embraced the welfare state, not simply as a progressive development in social policies, but also to foster national social integration. It is not easy to separate the strong ideological and moral undertones that exist, even in scholarly discourses of the welfare state. The argument that social policies and welfare regimes are driven by the nation-project has also been applied to East Asia. Goodman & Peng (1996: 210–211) explain that the social welfare agenda has often been determined by nation-building objectives: a clear and focused goal of economic development led top-down by a State elite. However, the coherence and clarity of economic objectives are not matched by the development of social policies and welfare regimes, the latter invariably haphazard and extremely pragmatic. Hence, they conclude, the welfare systems found in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are hybrids of various welfare models borrowed from Western countries. It is diffi cult to imagine, that in societies led by authoritarian regimes—whose populations have enjoyed decades of high economic growth, while believing political development should be subordinate to economic goals and dedicated to creating a middle class, the major benefi ciaries of social policies—an expansive social citizenship envisaged by Marshall for post-War Europe could evolve.

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While the nation-project concerns both Western European and East Asian societies, the political conditions are so different. To be precise, the purpose of social policies and welfare programmes are simply part of a broad political strategy to build legitimacy for authoritarian regimes in Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea (White & Goodman, 1998: 14). There is little reason to doubt that the Singapore government, Ramesh (2000: 11) suggests, would discard its aversion to the welfare state, if political circumstances required it. In the absence of political competition in Singapore, this is unlikely to happen. The absence of a coherent and comprehensive social policy/welfare regime in Asian societies, in contrast to Western societies, may be attributed to one important difference between the two regions. Drawing on Mishra’s analysis of the ‘differentiated welfare state’, Smyth (2000: 6) notes that Western understanding of social policy assumes economic stability and growth in the fi rst place. The welfare role of the State only developed subsequently, as an independent intellectual and political project. Scholarship on Asian social policy, on the other hand, is likely to assume the interdependence of welfare—as in the development of human capital—and economic policy. In his discussion of social policy in its restricted meaning of welfarist regimes, Kasza (2002: 272–273) argues persuasively, that the welfare programmes of most countries are usually contradictory and disjointed. Rather than replace old policies with new ones, offi cials tend to modify and adapt them in piecemeal fashion. Countries are unlikely to have coherent regimes for the following reasons (ibid.: 282): (1) each welfare policy tends to change incrementally over many years; (2) different welfare policies in the same country typically have different histories; (3) discrete sets of policy actors are involved in the various fi elds of welfare policy; (4) variations in the policymaking process affect the substance of policy; and (5) borrowing from foreign models introduces diverse practical and normative elements into each country’s welfare package. In the next section, I will examine the development of welfare policy in Singapore with regard to these issues. Suffi ce it to highlight here that because welfare policy covers areas as diverse as unemployment, health, housing, and others, policy actors—whether they come from the government or civil society—will be as varied and will have a differential infl uence. However, as I will take up later, given the unique socio-political environment of Singapore and a one-party State, that

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enjoys signiﬁ cant political support, the PAP government has been able to forge a relatively consistent social policy and minimise the incoherence of welfare programmes that exist in other countries.

III Origins of Anti-Welfarism and Social Policy in Singapore

By the time the PAP had begun to exercise its inﬂ uence on the political landscape of Singapore in the mid-1950s, living conditions had deteriorated. Singapore had one of the highest rates of population growth in the world in the mid-1950s, and half its population was aged below 21 (Turnbull, 1989: 268). There was considerable unemployment among the unskilled and semi-skilled. The colonial economy was ill- prepared to meet the demands for employment and social services. Unemployment had increased in 1954 and most working-class families lived in appalling conditions (Turnbull, 1989: 244). A survey of housing and poverty in Singapore by Goh Keng Swee in 1954, concluded that some 25% of the population lived below the poverty line and some 73% of surveyed households were found to live in badly overcrowded conditions (Pugh, 1989: 849). The period of decolonisation, beginning from the early 1950s until the PAP came into power in 1959, was a time of political uncertainty in Singapore. The British were confronted by a nationalist movement, that was increasingly radical, and a guerilla war led by the Communist Party of Malaya. The PAP faced electoral competition from several opposition parties and a powerful trade union movement, that was politically aligned with the leftwing Barisan Socialis. It was in these circumstances, Ramesh (2000: 161) argues, that both the colonial administration and the PAP committed themselves to introducing social programmes. These included increasing social security for civil servants and establishing the Central Provident Fund (CPF), essentially a savings scheme for private sector workers, and later, a more comprehensive social insurance scheme. The colonial administration also promised to spend more on health, housing and education but it was the PAP who eventually committed signiﬁ cant resources in these areas. The Department of Social Welfare was mainly responsible for the administration of basic welfare to the most needy of the population. However, much of the effort in organising social support and personal social services was left to voluntary welfare organisations, some from Britain but mostly from local philanthropists, migrant ethnic, and religious organisations.

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Although the fi rst generation PAP leadership, and in particular Lee Kuan Yew, had acknowledged the infl uence of Fabian or democratic socialism in the early years of their political life and believed that people who govern should commit themselves to establishing an egalitarian society (Barr, 2000a: 72), they were not doctrinaire either in promoting or putting in practice these ideas. The fi rst inkling of the PAP’s views on welfarism came in its founding manifesto of 1954, when it advocated social security for those unable to work because of sickness, infi rmity and old age, and subsequently expanded to include child endowment, maternity allowances and unemployment benefi ts (Barr, 2000b: 114). Its philosophy on welfare evolved on coming into power in 1959, when it was drawn into a debate on a proposal to replace the CPF with a social insurance scheme modelled after the British Labour Government’s Beveridge Report. The Beveridge plan proposed to establish universalism and comprehensiveness in providing insurance for the basic needs of people—ranging from illness and disability to unemployment in their entire lifespan—without having to rely on voluntary or charitable organisations or the means test (Lewis & Fink, 2004: 47–49). By attending to the welfare of the population in such a radical way, Beveridge also hoped that a new relationship between State and citizens would be fostered. However the social insurance scheme proposed by the colonial government in Singapore was a modest version that attended to the more urgent needs fi rst—sickness and maternity benefi ts—and later to old age, invalidity and survivors’ benefi ts (Low & Aw, 1997: 18). The debate over whether to introduce social insurance benefi ts was kept alive over the next few years. In particular, Lee and Goh Keng Swee successfully negotiated with employers to introduce an unemployment insurance scheme, but failed to convince the pro-communist trade union leaders to agree to employee contributions to the scheme and industrial peace (Barr, 2000b: 115–116). By early 1962, the PAP leadership ceased to take any further interest in the issue, as other events became more pressing, including merger with Malaysia. With hindsight, Barr (2000b: 116–117) argues that the PAP leadership’s advocacy of social insurance was dissimulation. It was meant to accommodate the interests of the Chinese-educated working class supporters of the PAP and, in my view, mitigate the appeal of the communist-infl uenced trade unions. The political struggle between the moderate and left wing/communist factions of the PAP in the second half of the 1950s and the 1960s has been well documented. The struggle, which resulted in the triumph of

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the moderates, Smyth (2000: 10) comments, secured the institutional base of social policy subsequently, but the normative signifi cance of this is not always fully appreciated. The fi rst generation leadership was only too acutely aware of the failure of socialist experiments in other Asian countries of the time. Fresh from gaining independence from the colonial powers, newly-formed governments of China, India, and Indonesia were eager to raise the standard of living of the impoverished masses quickly, by committing themselves to a radical programme of social redistribution. They however failed to recognise the priority of production or wealth creation, a mistake that the PAP was determined not to make (Smyth, 2000: 13). The moderate wing of the PAP, to head off the mass appeal of the communists for a radical redistribution of wealth among an impoverished migrant population, faced with health and housing problems and high unemployment, instituted a programme targetting housing, education, and health for the urban and low-income population. Goh, the infl uential economic architect of Singapore, believed that an initial period of capital accumulation was necessary in order to launch the development process (Smyth, 2000: 15). With neither an agricultural nor an industrial base at that time, the PAP made an explicit call for the use of ‘forced savings’ to form a development fund (Barr, 2000b: 117). In a recent interview, Goh was reported to have said that the CPF, started by the British, was a very useful institution of savings all along and that he intended to raise contributions at the appropriate time (Barr, 2000b: 116). Identifying the welfarist elements of Singapore’s approach to economic development in its early years of independence, Smyth (2000: 16–17) notes fi rstly, the emphasis on developing human capital, and secondly the signifi cance of social levelling—ensuring equality of opportunity. By the late 1960s, in consequence of a series of events that included its expulsion from Malaysia, the British withdrawal and the adoption of an export-oriented industrialisation programme, there was an ideological shift to the right, as it began to shed whatever socialist sentiments that remained. With full employment, increasing affl uence, and housing and health under control by the 1970s, the PAP was confi dent that its policies had been right and the way to maintain a steady ship was to steer into the eye of competition. The period of prolonged and sustained economic growth in Europe and North America—from 1945 to the mid-1970s—was accompanied by the unprecedented expansion of the Western welfare state, i.e. the

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development of comprehensive and universal welfare provisions and the commitment of substantial resources to fund social benefi ts and coverage (Pierson, 1998: 122–123). In Western Europe, only half the labour force was protected by accident, sickness, invalidity and old age insurance in the 1930s; by the mid-1970s more than 80% were covered for these contingencies. Coverage for unemployment rose from 20% to 60% for the respective periods. By the early 1970s, however, growing disquiet over the welfare state in the preceding years, developed into a full-blown ‘crisis’ as the years of uninterrupted post-war economic growth came to an end in 1973, as a result of oil price hikes. The Western industrialised economies went into a severe slump. The so-called crisis was not only viewed in economic terms—the cost of underwriting the comprehensive provisions of the welfare state—but the New Right also viewed the welfare state as a political and moral challenge to society. The neo-conservatives believed that post-war economic growth, the expansion of the welfare state and democratic politics had raised expectations and precipitated a moral breakdown: declining respect for traditional authority and the lack of constraints on individual aspirations (Pierson, 1998: 143). In particular, the decline of authority and responsibility within the family had led to the passing of the welfare burden to the State. The neo-conservative advocacy of the moral crisis of Western society and its solution in the 1970s was not lost on the fi rst generation PAP leaders. By the second half of the 1970s, the PAP leadership believed that Singapore was also faced with a similar moral crisis, the increasing Westernisation of its society and the negative values, including the lack of discipline, amongst young Singaporeans. The desired cultural values were promoted as ‘Asian values,’ a counter discourse to Western liberalism. They included thrift, industry, self-discipline, and fi lial piety (Hill & Lian, 1995: 188–189) at fi rst, and later reworked and translated as the need for strong government, rejection of welfarism in favour of volunteerism, and emphasis on communitarian values (Mauzy & Milne, 2002: 57). The ‘Asian values’ espoused by the PAP, despite its anti-Western rhetoric, were nonetheless a refrain of the moral values espoused by the neo-conservatives in the West. In his memoirs, Lee (2000: 126) recounted: Watching the ever increasing costs of the welfare state in Britain and Sweden, we decided to avoid this debilitating system. We noted by the 1970s that when government undertook primary responsibility for the basic duties of the head of a family, the drive in people weakened. Welfare

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undermined self-reliance. People did not have to work for their families’ well-being. The handout became a way of life. The downward spiral was relentless as motivation and productivity went down. People lost the drive to achieve because they paid too much in taxes. They became dependent on the State for their basic needs. In an interview in the late 1990s, Lee, refl ecting on his views on egalitarianism early in his political career, affi rmed the principle of equal opportunity, but asserted that this does not mean equality of outcomes— a distinction that some Fabians had failed to make (Han et al., 1998: 159). Whatever notions of Western welfarism and egalitarianism it had fl irted with in the early years of its political development, it is clear, that, by the 1970s, the PAP was fully convinced that indiscriminate welfare would lead to bankruptcy, and social levelling did not mean equal reward. As early as 1972, the President at the opening of Parliament warned Singaporeans against adopting the welfare state syndrome (Ramesh, 2000: 162). Five years later, in Parliament he stated that loss or reduction of income due to retirement or sickness was the responsibility of individuals and their families. Lee expressed admiration for Frederick Hayek’s views, in particular the latter’s skepticism that social justice could somehow be achieved through planning and execution, rather than left to the historical forces of what the former described as economic Darwinism (Han et al., 1998: 159). Yet, throughout the development of Singapore, this was not how the PAP understood the relationship between the State and the market. Goh stated that the government had to be activist and interventionist and described democratic socialist economic policies as ranging “from direct participation in industry to the supply of infrastructure facilities by statutory authorities, and to laying down clear guidelines to the private sector as to what they could and should do” ( Josey, cited in Smyth, 2000: 16). It is of signifi cant interest to mention here that the Fabian socialists—to whom the fi rst generation PAP leadership often referred to, in articulating their political views—also regarded the State as the quintessence of rationality (Lund, 2002: 59–60). The Fabians believed that it was possible for an ‘intellectual aristocracy’, with expert knowledge, to conceive of and construct the ‘good society’ and government should be the business of such an intellectual aristocracy. Indeed, the party ideologue and former Minister, Rajaratnam, stated that the Singapore civil service was a political bureaucracy and must be staffed by some of the brightest and best of the citizens (Low & Aw, 1997: 11), constituting the ‘new samurai.’ Lee’s support of Hayek’s views was

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a qualifi ed one, and nowhere is this more evident than in the manner in which Lee and the PAP attempted to carve Singapore into a utopia primarily through its economic policy. To identify the foundation of social policy and understand how it has evolved in Singapore over the past 40 years, it is necessary to examine Lee’s views of human society and the role of government, which were shared by some of his Cabinet colleagues when he was Prime Minister (Han et al., 1998: 154–155). First, he believed that while it was important to give everyone equal opportunity, the results will not be equal because of unequal abilities. He argued that in the 1950s and 1960s, the majority of successful professionals and scholars were the children of hawkers, taxi drivers, and labourers; now the higher educated—20% of the population—provide the majority of them. He did not make it clear, whether equal opportunity was desirable, because it would spread the net wider and produce more successful people, or because it was a moral good. It is probably a bit of both, given his socialist sympathies in his early political years. Second, he was convinced that all societies are what he described as a ‘population diamond.’ In the middle of the diamond was the mass with average intellect and abilities. Towards the top, IQ and competence levels rose and, descending to the bottom, were people of commensurate abilities, the educationally subnormal and intellectually handicapped. The top and bottom were about equal proportions. Third the role of the State, Lee argued (Han et al., 1998: 165), could not be laissez-faire, leaving individuals and their families to fend entirely for themselves. Although competition and performance was the best way for society to level up, the less well-off and also-rans should not feel they have been discarded, for that could threaten social cohesion. He posed the problem in these terms: “How do you organise society so that you encourage everybody to do his best, never give up, even if he can do only one-tenth of the course, but still, encourage and give him something?” There was no question of a guaranteed social security. Instead, the priority and dilemma of government was how to strike a balance between social cohesion and performance. Hence he laid out the blueprint for what constitutes the good society in Singapore. In the rest of this essay, I will briefl y delineate some of the major features of social policy—in savings (CPF), housing, and family—as a refl ection of this utopia. The central provision for the welfare of paid workers in PAP Singapore is the CPF. A commission appointed in 1951 to assess the viability of providing retirement benefi ts to wage earners, chose a

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pension scheme over a provident fund, as the former could be fully operational in a few years compared to the latter, which would take 20 years before full benefi ts could be realised (Low & Aw, 1997: 14–15). The colonial government, sensitive to the political consequences of the poor conditions and insecurity of thousands of wage earners in Singapore, recognised the urgency of introducing retirement benefi ts. It opted for the self-funding CPF to avoid the fi nancial burden of having to cover any shortfall in the administration of pension funds. In 1955, the CPF came into force. Originally conceived as a simple savings- withdrawal scheme for old age and retirement, it evolved over the next 30 years into an elaborate and complex scheme unique to Singapore. It enables contributors to manage the funds in several ways to sustain, if not enhance, their lives in later years, including home ownership, government-approved investments, health and life insurance, education, and retirement support. The CPF has been erroneously regarded as a social security scheme (Ramesh, 2001: 427). Rather, Ramesh argues, it should be treated as a compulsory savings scheme for those who would have been able to save anyway without being mandatory. He estimated that about 20% of the labour force—in temporary or low-wage employment—is not covered by the CPF. The class bias of the CPF has also been noted by other writers. It is not intended to redistribute income and does not involve interclass transfer (Tremewan, 1998: 87). It reproduces inequalities because the employees only receive what have been contributed to their accounts. Indeed, the CPF complex, Tremewan (1998: 100) comments, provides the middle class with opportunities to improve their fi nancial status, but reduces the working class to debt and allows them minimal savings to draw on, when they need it most in retirement. The main benefi ciaries are the affl uent and the better paid workforce (Tang, 2000: 38). While it is clear that the CPF is not social security conventionally understood, it is also more than a savings scheme. It is a key instrument of social policy in Singapore in the Marshallian sense, referred to earlier. Unlike Marshall however, who argues that social policy is necessary to the development of an expansive citizenship, social policy in Singapore is a refl ection of State paternalism directed at the cultivation of a communitarian citizenship. Implicit in the savings policy of the CPF is the promotion of the PAP ideology of self-help, individual responsibility, social discipline, and the work ethic. Ultimately, the unequal economic and social rewards dispensed by the CPF, for the majority

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of Singapore’s citizens covered by the fund, are, as far as the PAP is concerned, commensurate with their abilities and effort. The minimal- ist interventionist policies of the government in income redistribution, however, has had the negative consequence of Singapore—along with Hong Kong—being the East Asian country with the greatest income disparity (Tang, 2000: 54). Originally set up in 1960 to address the housing crisis in Singapore by building and providing cheap and subsidised rental accommodation to low income groups, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) introduced home ownership in 1964. The take-up rate, however, was low until the CPF savings were liberalised in 1968, which allowed contributors to utilise the entire amount to purchase HDB fl ats. Although not initially linked to the CPF, the concept of public housing as incor- porationist and stakeholdership through private ownership, rapidly evolved amidst the optimism generated by impressive economic growth throughout the 1970s. The tie-up between housing and the CPF is a landmark development in the construction of Singapore society, once it is viewed as part of a coherent strategy in social policy formation. A discussion of this is located in Hill & Lian (1995: 120–139), to which I refer in some detail. To begin with, the CPF made it possible for couples with modest means to buy an HDB fl at and own property. The resettlement of thousands of low-income families in this way, led to the disciplining and proletarianisation of the population by 1970. The public housing programme initially catered to the low-income, working-class families, but, by 1973, the middle class had grown suffi ciently to put pressure on the government to lift the income ceiling to allow them to own HDB apartments. This they did, by building bigger and better quality fl ats in exclusive enclaves, a development the PAP viewed with some apprehension, because of the possibility of social tension arising from perceived disparity. In 1980, mindful of social integration, the government located the better middle class apartments within HDB housing estates. Notwithstanding, it was always the government intention to provide a range of differentiated housing grades—including encouraging the private market for property—in order to encourage social and housing mobility. In the heady years of economic affl uence in the 1990s, the prices of private apartments and condominiums skyrocketed. In response the government built executive condominium-style housing to meet the needs of Singaporeans, who wanted to upgrade but found it beyond their means in the private market.

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Another feature of the management of housing in Singapore was its attempt to marry the desirable characteristics of housing systems in capitalist and socialist societies. Left to the mercy of the free market, middle income households would soon move out of public housing, leaving behind depressed concentrations of the poor and its attendant ‘social problems’ (Chua, 1988: 15). At the other extreme in socialist societies, the universal provision of standardised and low rental housing would act as a disincentive to the population to improve themselves and drains State resources. Singapore’s mixed-income housing programme rewards its citizens who have done well but does not neglect those who can only “run a tenth of the race,” thus striking a balance between social cohesion and performance—as articulated by Lee in his pragmatist vision of society. Finally, no discussion of the CPF and housing programme as constituents of social policy is complete, without some comment on how the State has attempted to infl uence family behaviour over the last 20 years. From a peak of 4.4% in 1957, the population growth rate of Singapore steadily declined to 2.8% in 1970 and 1.5% in 1980 (Hill & Lian, 1995: 146–148) until it reached an all-time low in 2003. What was most alarming, from Lee’s point of view, was the lop-sided procreation pattern, in which women with secondary or tertiary education produced the least number of children. Since his 1983 speech when he made his concern known publicly, a series of measures have been introduced to provide incentives for educated women to increase their fertility rate. These included the infamous Graduate Mothers’ Priority Scheme of 1984 and the establishment of the Social Development Unit to encourage marriage amongst university-educated women (Hill & Lian, 1995: 152). At the same time, cash incentives were offered to poor and less-educated women to accept sterilisation. The population diamond, as far as Lee was concerned, was a ‘natural’ phenomenon. However the implication of low fertility in the higher-educated women is that the diamond would also become lop-sided toward the bottom half, and would ultimately reduce the pool of able and talented people. The scheme for graduate mothers proved politically unpopular and was rescinded in 1985. This did not stop the government from continuing to infl uence the procreation behaviour of Singaporeans, albeit in less offensive ways. In 1993, Prime Minister Goh expressed concern over drop-outs from a competitive educational system (Hill & Lian, 1995: 153–54). He described these drop-outs as coming from large families, living in one or two-room HDB fl ats, and having parents who had

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only primary education. Although the dropouts constituted no more than 1.7% of the cohort, the government deemed it serious enough to introduce the Small Families Improvement Scheme. The scheme provided housing grants and education bursaries for these women, if they agreed not to have more than two children. Alarmed by the lowest recorded population growth rate of 1.26% in 2003, the government announced a generous and wide ranging pro- family package the following year to address the high cost of bringing up children and help parents with time and childcare options (Channel NewsAsia, 25 August 2004). These included parenthood tax rebate, tax relief for working mothers, extending paid maternity leave from eight to 12 weeks and reduction of the foreign domestic worker levy. Despite claims that the package was comprehensive and covered all working mothers, not just the better-educated, the tax benefi ts would nevertheless benefi t higher income families the most. Government intervention in family behaviour has ramifi cations for the racialisation of the population and the practice of social policy in a post-industrial society. When the scheme to encourage graduate mothers to increase their reproductive rate was introduced in 1984, little attention was paid to the fact that the women of recalcitrant fertility were largely Chinese and middle to higher income, whereas working-class of Malay and Indian origin had higher birth rates (Heng & Devan, 1992: 345). Similarly, the improvement scheme targetted at low-income families in 1993, makes no mention of the racial/ethnic composition of the ‘vulnerable’ families. More recently, in response to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s comment, that Malays were over-represented in dysfunctional and low-income families, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew suggested that this was due to Malay girls getting pregnant and rushing into marriage (Straits Times, 28 August 2005). He then cited fi gures to support his claim: 18% of Malay brides were below 21, relative to 9% for Indians and 3% for Chinese. What all this suggests is that making biopolitical investment in the population on the basis of gender, ability, and race—referred to at the beginning of the paper—is not a recent development in Singapore. The systematic pre-detection of populations at risk and the introduction of preventive and anticipatory measures in order to pre-empt undesirable trends, discussed by Castel, is the hallmark of PAP governance, and the objective, even if unstated, of its social policy. In the previous essay, I referred to Esping-Andersen’s typology of Western welfare regimes. The typology was developed on the premise,

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that the modern State should undertake welfare and social provisions in order to fulfi ll its commitment to social citizenship, as advocated by T.H. Marshall. Esping-Andersen (1990: 21–23) highlighted two criteria—the extent of de-commodifi cation in and the system of stratifi cation promoted by the three models of welfare regimes that he identifi ed—as the critical measures for the achievement of social citizenship. The CPF is a savings scheme that covers most employees in Singapore, but clearly favours the middle class because of their ability to contribute more. Accessibility to better quality public housing is also dependent on such contributions, as the CPF has made it possible for most Singaporeans to buy their own homes as well as given them opportunities to upgrade. The so-called ‘welfarist turn,’ referred to in the previous paper, began in 2004, when the government introduced a pro-family package to increase the birthrate, followed shortly by funding for community-based initiatives targetting assistance for an underclass—identifi ed by the government as the bottom 20% of per capita household income—and, fi nally, a package, that disbursed fi nancial rewards to low-wage workers, who remained in work, through CPF top-ups. The policies and measures progressively adopted since the 1970s, point to a corporatist regime that promotes family responsibility, favours equity and supports generous transfers. Such a regime is consistent with Lee’s conviction that society is a population diamond, refl ecting a ‘natural’ social hierarchy of people with differing abilities and talents. Rising levels of income and affl uence from the 1970s to the late 1990s have undoubtedly contributed to social mobility for a signifi cant number of families in Singapore. While it is problematic to determine what constitutes the middle class and its extent, the combined share of the total workforce accounted for by administrators, executives, managers, professionals, and technicians rose from 17% in 1980 to 24% in 1990 and well over 35% in 2000 (Singapore Census of Population, 2000). The State is a major employer of the middle class (Rodan, 1996: 30–31). By any standard or measure, more than one third of the total workforce may be described as middle class and the proportion will continue to increase. The middle class and a prospering working class have been the main benefi ciaries of a corporatist welfare regime. Provisions in housing, health, education provided through the CPF and generous income transfers through pro-family incentives have discriminated in favour of the ‘achieving’ population in Singapore, while low-income families, until recently, have been overlooked. The consequence is a welfare regime that discriminates between the underclass and the

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middle class: a signiﬁ cant underclass that has little or no CPF savings to fall back on and at the mercy of charitable relatives or organisations, residual provision for relief of destitution, and, more recently, targetted assistance through community initiatives, and a middle class, that is dependent on CPF provisions, supplemented by private insurance for those who can afford it.

IV Conclusion

In their attempts to identify an East Asian welfare model, the scholars I referred to earlier, have taken a narrow view of social policy, i.e. social security, health and education. Social security is essentially protection against loss of income through unemployment, disability, sickness, and old age. As explanatory models, they have failed on two counts as far as Singapore is concerned. First, by restricting their discussion to welfare regimes they implicitly recognise the welfare state in Western society as a point of reference for evaluation. To understand the absence of a comprehensive welfare regime in Singapore, one has to begin by examining whether there is a coherent social policy in the fi rst place. If affi rmative, what are the origins and rationale of such a policy? Second, in addressing the effi cacy of cultural, economic, and political infl uences, they do so as broad and generalised descriptions but lack explanatory usefulness. As a consequence, much of the work that addresses the effi cacy of an East Asian welfare model is misdirected. Hence the title of this paper: Is there a social policy in Singapore? I referred to Gil’s broad conception of social policy as the analysis of access to life-enhancing and life-sustaining resources. What enhances and sustains life is a normative issue, and varies from one society to another. In this respect, I also drew attention to the relevance of primary intervention, which Lund describes as direct interference in the economy and social life for the purpose of achieving socially desirable outcomes. So, at the heart of social policy is the question that governments pose themselves: what is the ‘good society’? In his discussion of social policy as social citizenship, Marshall believed that an optimistic compromise can be struck between the social inequality that a market economy inevitably produces, and the equity of social participation meaningful to modern citizenship (Hindess, 1987: 40). However Titmuss, in Hindess’ view, takes this one step further. In resolving the confl ict between citizenship and the market, the moral

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values enshrined in social policy ought to predominate. Social policy must therefore interfere with the pattern of distribution created by the market, in accordance to the moral values prevalent in society. What form should such interference take? To answer this question in the case of Singapore, I examined the origins of anti-welfarism, by identifying the political philosophy of the ﬁ rst generation PAP leadership, as articulated by Lee. He believed in the intrinsic value of equal opportunity for all citizens, but in contrast to the leftwing views of the British Labour Party of 1940s and 1950s, he did not accept that this would necessarily lead to more or less equal rewards. Any population group is constituted by individuals with differential ability and effort in life enhancement. It would be wrong for governments, such as those in the West committed to the welfare state, to effect a universal redistribution of rewards to the point that individuals are no longer interested in either maximising their ability or effort. In this, he was simply reﬂ ecting the migrant ethos of hard work and self-help and that competition brings out the best in people and society. This does not mean that the State should not intervene. For competition means that there will always be winners and losers—who should not be alienated, otherwise social cohesion would be threatened. The PAP approach to social policy is best summed up and defended by George Yeo, long-serving Minister in the Cabinet (Straits Times, 26 November 2001): One way to pass judgment on a society is to look at how the top 10% of its population lives. . . . Another way to judge a society is to ask how it looks after its bottom 10%. And Singapore as a society, probably looks after its bottom 10% better than most other cities in the world.

References

Barr, M.D. (2000a) Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs Behind The Man, Richmond: Curzon Press. —— (2000b) “Lee Kuan Yew’s Fabian Phase” in Australian Journal of Politics and History, 46 (1): 110–125. Castel, R. (1991) “From Dangerousness to Risk”, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller (eds) The Foucault Effect, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Chua, B.H. (1988) Public Housing Policies Compared: U.S., Socialist Countries and Singapore, Singapore: National University of Singapore, Department of Sociology, Working Paper No. 94. Deyo, F.C. (1989) Beneath the Miracle, Berkeley: University of California Press. —— (1992) “Imperatives of Development and the Formation of Social Policy: East Asia’s Newly Industrialized Countries” in R.H. Brown & W.T. Liu (eds) Modernization in East Asia, Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

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Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press. —— (1996) “After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global Economy” in G. Esping-Andersen (ed.) Welfare States In Transition, London: Sage Publications. Goodman, R. & Peng, I. (1996) “The East Asian Welfare States: Perpatetic Leraning, Adaptive Change, and Nation-Building” in G. Asping-Andersen (ed.) Welfare States In Transition, London: Sage Publications. Han, F.K., Fernandez, W. & Tan, S. (1998) Lee Kuan Yew: The Man And His Ideas, Singapore: Times Editions. Heng, G. & Devan, J. (1992) “State Fatherhood: The Politics of Nationalism, Sexuality, and Race in Singapore” in A. Parker et al. (eds) Nationalisms and Sexualities, New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall. Hill, M. & Lian K.F. (1995) The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore, London: Routledge. Hindess, B. (1987) Freedom, Equality, and the Market, London & New York: Tavistock Publications. Jones, C. (1993) “The Paciﬁ c Challenge” in C. Jones (ed.) New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe, London: Routledge. Kasza, G.J. (2002) “The Illusion of Welfare Regimes” Journal of Social Policy, 31 (2): 271–287. Kemshall, H. (2002) Risk, social policy and welfare, Buckingham: Open University Press. Lavalette, M. & Pratt, A. (1997) “Introduction” in M. Lavalette & A. Pratt (eds) Social Policy, London: Sage Publications. Lee, K.Y. (2000) From Third World To First, Singapore: Times Media & The Straits Times Press. Lewis, G. & Fink, J. (2004) “All That Heaven Allows: The Worker-Citizen in the Post-War Welfare State” in G. Lewis (ed.) Citizenship, Milton Keynes: The Open University. Lodge, G.C. & Vogel, E. (eds) (1987) Ideology and National Competitiveness; An Analysis of Nine Countries, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Low, L. (2001) “The Singapore development state in the new economy and polity” The Paciﬁ c Review, 14 (3): 411–441. Low, L. & Aw, T.C. (1997) Housing a Healthy, Educated and Wealthy Nation through the CPF, Singapore: The Institute of Policy Studies & Times Academic Press. Lund, B. (2002) Understanding State Welfare: Social Justice or Social Exclusion? London: Sage Publications. Mauzy, D. & Milne, R.S. (2002) Singapore Politics Under the People’s Action Party, London & New York: Routledge. Mullard, M. (1999) “Discourses on citizenship” in J. Bussemaker (ed.) Citizenship and Welfare State Reform in Europe, London: Routledge. Ong, A. (1999) Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality, Durham: Duke University Press. Pierson, C. (1998) Beyond the Welfare State? (second edition), Cambridge: Polity Press. Pugh, C. (1989) “The Political Economy of Public Housing” in K.S. Sandhu & P. Wheatley (eds) Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Ramesh, M. (2000) Welfare Capitalism in Southeast Asia, London: Macmillan. —— (2001) “Social Security In Singapore” in G. Rodan (ed.) Singapore, Aldershot: Ashgate. Rodan, G. (1996) “Class transformations and political tensions in Singapore’s development” in R. Robison & D. Goodman (eds) The New Rich in Asia, London: Routledge. Singapore Census of Population (2000) Economic Characteristics Of Singapore Resident Population, Advance Data Release No. 4.

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Smyth, P. (2000) The Economic State and the Welfare State: Australia and Singapore 1955–1975, CAS Research Paper Series No. 23, Singapore: Centre for Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore. Tang, K.-L. (2000) Social Welfare Development in East Asia, Hampshire: Palgrave. Tremewan, C. (1998) “Welfare and governance: public housing under Singapore’s party-state” in R. Goodman, G. White & Kwon, H.-J. (eds) The East Asian Welfare Model, London: Routledge. Turnbull, C.M. (1989) A History Of Singapore 1819–1988 (second edition), Singapore: Oxford University Press. White, G., Goodman, R. & Kwon H.-J. (1998) “The politics of welfare in East Asia” in R. Maidement, D. Goldblatt & J. Mitchell (eds) Governance in the Asia-Paciﬁ c, London: Routledge & Open University Press. White, G. & Goodman, R. (1998) “Welfare Orientalism and the search for an East Asian welfare model” in R. Goodman, G. White & Kwon H.-J. (eds) The East Asian Welfare Model, London: Routledge.

TONG_f3_21-44.indd 43 2/7/2008 5:04:50 PM TONG_f3_21-44.indd 44 2/7/2008 5:04:50 PM FAMILY POLICIES: INTERFACE OF GENDER, WORK, AND THE SACREDISATION OF THE CHILD

Paulin Tay Straughan

Families serve as an important pillar of support for the nation. At the individual level, families are the primary source of emotional, social and fi nancial support. At the national level, they contribute to social stability and national cohesiveness as they help develop socially responsible individuals and deepen the bond Singaporeans have with our country. Introduction to the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports’ web section on Family (http://app.mcys.gov.sg/web/faml_main.asp) The family is the most important social unit in any society. Its functions include reproduction, socialisation, care for young and elderly, and it serves as an important agent for social control. It is through family policies that the State polices a normal family ideology that is functional to the well-being of society. As illustrated by the strong statement on the role of the family on the MCYS’s website, the State sees the family as the social pillar of society and works through family policies to infl uence desired social outcomes. Family policies in Singapore cover a wide spectrum and affect family life in various areas. These include who should marry, living arrangements, who constitutes family, and how family life is managed. The demographic trends since the 1980s signal critical changes to the Singapore family: smaller family size, delayed marriages and more remaining single. These together with healthier mortality rate result in a rapidly graying population. For a small nation-state that is dependent solely on manpower resources, these trends are particularly alarming. To address these concerns, family policies in Singapore have been largely concerned with promoting the ideal family size, with most of the policies directed towards population control. Over the course of the past 40 years, these population control policies have been fi ne-tuned and/or revamped, and new initiatives introduced to meet the changing

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needs of the State and the family. This paper will focus primarily on the changes to these population control policies since the nation state gained independence, and their effectiveness in achieving the ideal family size.

I Policing the Family—An Overview

In his thesis on policing the family, Donzelot (1979) argued that governments will be more effective, if the family, as a microcosm of society (that is, the smallest political unit), falls in line with State- sponsored initiatives. Direct policing is expensive and, by and large, ineffective. However, if families buy into the State-sponsored ideology of the normal family, then we can expect families to police their members, and the outcome will be an orderly society where deviance is minimised. Thus, rather than impose family policies as direct monitoring mechanisms (i.e. a set of rules and regulations with penalties imposed on non-conformists), the State should introduce a system of incentives and disincentives through family policies to encourage members to buy into the prescribed ideological norm. In other words, we move from government of families (with direct State intervention) to government through families. When we look at family policies in Singapore, we see incentives and disincentives that are aligned to prescribed ideals. For example, family policies are used to inﬂ uence the social structure of the family. Traditionally, the husband, as head of the household, would focus his energy on paid work. The wife played the role of domestic manager and child minder. However, as Singapore joined the ranks of the newly industrialised economies, adjustments had to be made in the way gender roles were prescribed. To meet the increased demand for manpower in the industrialised economy, women were encouraged to enter the labour force. In 2004, female employees made up about 45% of the total working population and the female labour force participation rate was 54.2%, of which 52.6% were married women (Ministry of Manpower, 2005). As a result, there is an increase in the prevalence of dual-earner families. The 2000 Singapore census showed that 40.9% of all married couples were dual-earners compared to 40.2% where only the husbands worked (Leow, 2004). Even though women have crossed over to the traditionally male domain of paid work, domestic labour is still very much the responsibility of the wives (Quah, 1998;

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Straughan et al., 2005). However, as the small nation-state is dependent on human resource, the government is mindful that married women should be encouraged through various tax and housing policies to remain gainfully employed while they play their domestic roles. This is illustrated in the family policies highlighted in the later part of this paper when we discuss the pro-family policies in detail. When we examine the Singapore family policies, we see clearly that the State promotes marriage, parenthood, and self-suffi ciency. While the State governs families mainly through incentives and disincentives, it reserves the right to step in and police the family directly, if the members willfully vary from expected behaviour. This is exemplifi ed in the Maintenance of Parents Act that was passed by Parliament in 1996, and the mandatory primary school education law passed in 2000. Prior to the Maintenance of Parents Act, elderly parents depended on the moral ties of social reciprocity and good Confucian ethics to ensure that their adult children would take care of them. While there are laws that mandate parents to look after their children who are legal minors, no similar laws exist to require adult children to ‘pay back’ and support their aged parents. In 1996, this Act was passed and aged parents can now seek fi nancial maintenance from the Maintenance of Parents Tribunal, if their children refuse to voluntarily support them. Normatively, respect for ones’ elderly parents is considered to be an integral part of Asian culture. The normal family ideology, up to recently, embraces the three-generation family, where aged parents continue to live in the same household as their adult children and grandchildren. Families are expected and encouraged to look after their aged. The Housing and Development Board (HDB), which oversees the huge public housing sector (which houses about 80% of the population), has several policies, which encourage young married couples to either live with their parents (through the allocation of ‘granny fl ats’) or near their parents. Examples of these include the Multi-Tier Family Housing Priority Scheme, where 5% of HDB apartments are set aside to encourage two-three generation families, and the Joint-Selection Scheme, where 5% of HDB apartments in non-mature estates are set aside for parents + married children to buy separate apartments within same estate. In addition, a housing grant of S$50,000 is available for married children who purchase resale HDB apartment near their parents’ home (see Ministry of Community Development, Youth & Sports, 2004 for details on pro-family policies). These are examples of how incentives are used to encourage families to adopt the normal family ideology, which

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prescribes a family that looks after its own. However, when the family fails to take on its responsibility and aged parents are not able to get by independently, the State reserves the right to step in and directly police the delinquent family. The welfare of children is another area where the State reserves its right to direct intervention. Children are perceived to be invaluable assets, not just to the family but also to society. While families are ultimately responsible for the well-being and welfare of their young, there are family policies in place to act as safeguards, just in case the family fails to conform to expectations. One good example is in the education of the young. In 2000, a mandatory primary school education law was put in place to ensure that all children in Singapore receive at least six years of primary school education. While most parents in Singapore strongly embrace the essential value of formal education, this law was intended for the delinquent few, and serves to protect children in families which are not able to police themselves. As in many other societies, the family is the only legitimate source of reproduction in Singapore, and remains the most important source of supply for the next generation of labour. Thus, in areas relating to children’s well-being, the State is particularly cautious and mindful of children’s rights, so that each child has a good chance of succeeding in adulthood and can in turn, contribute meaningfully to society. Related to this is the State’s concern with population growth. Given Singapore’s geographical size, city-state status, and her dependence on manpower as her only resource, achieving the optimum population growth level has been a primary concern since the nation-state achieved independence in 1965. On one hand, the State had to be mindful of escalating fertility because of the city-state’s limited geographical space as well as resources for sustaining too large a population. On the other hand, because of the importance of manpower as a resource, the State is also concerned that population growth must not fall too far below replacement rate. These concerns are reﬂ ected very clearly in the family policies that relate directly to population growth.

II Family Policies on Population Growth

When the nation-state was developing in the period 1966 to 1982, population policies were focused on population control. However,

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with the emergence of a developed economy, the attractions and demands of paid work posed serious challenges to large family size. To combat the falling fertility rate, the Government reversed its ‘Stop At Two (children)’ policy in March 1987 and replaced it with ‘Have Three Or More Children If You Can Afford It’ (Singapore Planned Parenthood Association, 1993: 4). However, since then, the fertility rate has continued its downward spiral, and it dipped to an all-time low of 1.24 in 2004 (Department of Statistics, 2005). This section will look at the population policies in detail. In Singapore, population policies can be largely categorised into three distinct phases:

a) the family planning policies to curb population growth in pre- industrial Singapore through the mid-1980s, b) the selectively pro-natalistic period from mid-1980s to 1999, where those who could afford were encouraged to have more children, and c) the distinctly pro-natalistic policies with the advent of the ‘baby bonus’ announcements in 2000, where the primary concern was on arresting the falling fertility rate.

Though each phase, as advanced by Donzelot (1997), State policies aim at a desired normal family ideology through a series of family policies and set up a system of philanthropy, where the State encourages families to enter into social contracts through a system of privileges and rewards. In general, family policies in Singapore serve to facilitate extended families and the entry of married women in paid work. As a fairly traditional Asian society that is very much governed by a patriarchy, the normal family ideology supported by the State also promotes a gender- based division of responsibility. Many family policies are designed to help women play their role in the family and sustain their position in paid work. I will look at the changes in family policies in the last 40 years, and critically evaluate the impact the new initiatives will have on the future of the family.

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III Building a Nation—the Initial Years Post-Independence Years 1965–1985

When Singapore gained independence in 1965, the fertility rate was 4.7 (Department of Statistics, 2002). The primary concern for the leadership, at that time, was economic and urban development, industrialisation and skills enhancement for the labour force, and population control. The leadership, at that time, identifi ed economic success as the key to the survival of the small nation-state, and to achieve this, it was deemed necessary to adopt a population-control policy. The concern with arresting population growth was fueled by the statistical trend between 1947 to 1970, which saw the population of Singapore increase twofold (Wong & Yeoh, 2003). The Family Planning and Population Board was formed in 1966, when the government took over control of all responsibilities for family planning, and the tag line was ‘Stop At Two’ (Wong, 1979). Family policies were focused on disincentives for those who had more than two children, and incentives for those who conformed. By 1975/1976, the total fertility rate (TFR) had dropped to replacement rate, and has remained at below replacement rate since. Why were the population control policies so effective? In her refl ections on Singapore’s family planning programme in this period of the nation’s development, Wong (1979) argued that the social and cultural factors governing the nation-state, at that time, acted as catalysts for population control initiatives. Perhaps the most signifi cant development was the availability of birth control options (including cheap and safe abortions) and the social acceptance of contraceptive use. With contraception, women gained control over their fertility decisions. This freed them from unwanted pregnancies, and gave them freedom to pursue careers outside of the family. The timing for opportunities to achieve self-actualisation for Singapore women could not have been better. Post-independent Singapore saw tremendous opportunities for economic development and industrialisation. Job opportunities were abundant as factories sprouted up throughout the island, and agricultural space was transformed to industrial parks. To meet the need for skilled labour, formal education was accessible to all regardless of race or gender. Women were trained, and soon became an indispensable part of Singapore’s labour force. The labour force participation rate rose from 24.6% in 1970 to 44.3% in 1980 (Department of Statistics, 2002). These developments had signifi cant social impact on the family. The social status of women, in general, rose signifi cantly. With more women

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endowed with formal education and independent income, the social dynamics in Singapore families changed. While patriarchy remained the dominant ideology, and husbands continued to reign as head of household, the wife was no longer the docile partner. As women became more empowered socially and economically, they also took on a more active role in birth control decisions and opted for smaller families, to facilitate their participation in the labour force. In the 1980s, while population control concerns were still governing family policies, the TFR fell sufﬁ ciently for the government to react. In his 1983 National Day Rally speech, the then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew lamented, that Singapore must address the falling birth rate, particularly among the graduate women (see Saw, 2005). This sparked the ‘Great Marriage Debate,’ which saw family policies in Singapore take on an eugenics ﬂ avour. Graduate women were targetted and encouraged to get married and reproduce. The Social Development Unit was set up in 1984 to facilitate this, and, conversely, monetary incentives were offered to less educated women, who abided by the small family ideal encouraged by the State. In short, a two-prong population policy was adopted: those who were deemed to be capable and able parents were encouraged to have more children, and. those who were not, were encouraged to stop at two—the replacement level. This was the beginning of a differentiated population policy, where the more able Singaporeans were encouraged to have more children, while the less able were given incentives to keep their family size small. However, this did not go well with the population in general (see Wong & Yeoh, 2003: 10). By 1986, the TFR fell to an unprecedented low of 1.4. The government had to seriously rethink the existing family policies, and send a clear message out that procreation should be a top priority for all married couples. The Singapore Family Planning and Population Board, which was set up in 1966 to provide family planning services to the general population, was closed down in 1986. In its place, the Singapore Planned Parenthood Association was set up to promote family life and provide support for issues relating to sexuality and fertility (for more information, see the SPPA website at http://www.sppa.org. sg/services.html).

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IV 1986–1999: Work and Family Interweave

By now, low fertility has become a serious national concern. It was clear to the leadership, that the old population control policies were now inappropriate, and a new set of pro-natalistic policies must be put in place to remedy the adverse demographic trends. “Have Three Or More Children, If You Can Afford It” became the new slogan for this era, and the leadership shifted focus from eugenics to economics. There was growing awareness of the change in ideology towards having children, and that married couples were moving away from larger families to a concentration on providing quality nurturing for children. Campaign slogans began to impress on society the importance and signiﬁ cance of family and siblings. These included ‘Children—Life Would Be Empty Without Them’, ‘Life’s Fun When You’re A Dad And Mum,’ and ‘The Most Precious Gift You Can Give Your Child Is A Brother Or Sister’ (Wong & Yeoh, 2003: 12). As the fertility rate fell, the age at ﬁ rst marriage for both brides and grooms rose, and so did the proportion of singles. Part of the new population policies focused on the never married segment of society, and media messages like ‘Why Build Your Career Alone? Family Life Helps’ addressed concerns that the push towards economic productivity may have made Singaporeans too work-focused. Singles were also reminded that it was important to ‘Make Room For Love In Your Life’ for ‘Life Would Be Lonely Without A Family’ (Wong & Yeoh, 2003). The new population policies focused on four main dimensions:

a) tax incentives, b) housing, c) delivery costs, and d) childcare (see Lien, 2002 for details).

Tax incentives and housing incentives, which were in place to encourage small families a decade ago, were now restructured and reﬁ ned to encourage, those who could, to have more children. To facilitate living arrangements for larger families, housing policies gave priority to large families for upgrade to larger HDB ﬂ ats. The tax incentives were designed with a dual-intent: to encourage middle and higher income couples to have more children, and to encourage women to stay engaged in the workplace while they raise their children. For example, under

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the Enhanced Child Relief, a progressive increase in percentage of tax relief is given for each child, based on the mothers’ earned income. Prior to the new population policies, couples could only use Medisave, a compulsory saving scheme for medical expenses, to cover delivery expenses for their fi rst two children. The intent then was to encourage couples to stop at two children, as delivery costs for the third child would have to be paid in cash. The new population policies extended use of Medisave to cover delivery costs of the third child. To help working mothers manage the demands of work and family, a centre-based childcare subsidy was initiated and working mothers were given a set amount for each child they place in a licensed childcare centre (for the fi rst four children). Various leave schemes were also introduced in the civil service for married female offi cers only. These included no-pay leave for childcare, up to a maximum of four years for each child below four years old, part-time employment for up to three years (regardless of the child’s age), and full pay unrecorded leave of fi ve days per year to look after a sick child below six years old. These policies relating to maternal employment had a signifi cant impact on the ideology of the family in Singapore. While the State’s intent was to lure mothers back into the workforce to ensure that its manpower needs are met, the message sent to both men and women was very clear: childcare is the sole responsibility of the mother. The second signifi cant consequence of the population policies is its philosophy of promoting self-suffi ciency and encouraging those who could afford to have more children. Underlying this is the concern that all children have a right to a decent family life where their basic needs are met and they have a good chance of succeeding as adults. This philosophy will later re-inforce the ideology of the sacred child, where couples who are well-positioned economically believe that they cannot afford to have children, because they perceive that they do have not suffi cient to provide for the needs of a child. Taken together, these ideologies placed tremendous stress on women. The State upholds an ideology of childhood which requires that the child should be well looked after, and the mother has been assigned this important role. Up to this point in the population policies, fathers continue to be economic providers only. This will have serious implications for the fertility trends in Singapore, as women continue to struggle between the economic benefi ts of paid work and the demands of maternal duty.

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V 2000 and Beyond: Shifting the Focus on the Family

In 2000, the government introduced what is popularly termed the ‘Baby Bonus’ scheme, which was further enhanced in 2004. Under this scheme, a Children Development Account is opened for a family upon the birth of the couple’s fi rst four children. A baby bonus of S$3,000 cash is given upon the birth of the fi rst child, and for subsequent children, the Government will contribute S$500 each year into the account and up to another S$1,000 each year to match contributions, dollar-for-dollar, from the parents. This contribution will add up to S$9,000 for the second child and S$18,000 for the third and fourth children (Ministry of Community Development, Youth & Sports, 2004). In addition to monetary incentives, the government also announced that working mothers will get 12 weeks of maternity leave for the fi rst four children (Ministry of Community Development, Youth & Sports, 2004; Straits Times, 21 August 2000). To fi ll the gap at home, when the wife enters paid work, the State initiated the foreign domestic workers scheme, which allowed families to employ full-time live-in maids from around the region (mainly from Indonesia and the Philippines). About 20% of households in Singapore hire foreign domestic maids to help manage their households. When a household hires a foreign domestic maid, a tax of S$250 per month is levied by the State. To help dual-earner families cope with childcare and family responsibilities, tax relief for the Foreign Maid Levy was introduced to encourage working married women to have children (Ministry of Community Development, Youth & Sports, 2004). Public housing allocation policies were also introduced to facilitate larger families. The Third Child Priority Housing Scheme was set up to give priority to families, who wish to upgrade to bigger public housing (HDB) apartments upon the birth of the third child (Ministry of Community Development, Youth & Sports, 2004). While foreign maids are an option for dual-earner families, the State is mindful, that this remains a temporary solution, and that families should seek a long-term solution, that is more stable and not dependent on the availability of foreign labour (Huang & Yeoh, 1996). The logical solution to childcare needs, lies in support from grandparents. This will ensure that the children are socialised by adults from the same cultural backgrounds. The Grandparent Caregiver Tax Relief was initiated in 2004 to encourage grandparents to be the primary caregivers when the mother is engaged

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in paid work. To facilitate the three-generation extended family, several public housing policies were also initiated (see Ministry of Community Development, Youth & Sports, 2004). Overall, the pro-family policies announced in 2004 under the new Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong addressed three main areas: i) family time, ii) childcare options, and iii) work-family balance (details of the new family policies can be found at http://fed.ecitizen.gov.sg/fam- ily_population.htm). One signifi cant variation from previous policies is the removal of mothers’ education qualifi cation from tax incentives. The fertility rate had slipped so low, that it is no longer feasible to hold on to selective pro-natalistic policies. Perhaps the most signifi cant change in the post-2000 population policies is the ideological change on men’s role in the family. Prior to this, childcare leave was only provided for mothers as it was expected that the mother is responsible for looking after young children. Fathers were expected to play the traditional role of economic provider. In 2000, paternity leave was introduced as part of the new population policies. Although it grants only three days of leave for fathers (compared to 12 weeks for maternity leave for mothers), the signifi cance was symbolic, because, for the fi rst time, men were directly involved in childcare. In addition, men are now eligible to take unrecorded childcare leave, which was previously only available to their female counterparts in the civil service. This sends a clear message that childcare is a shared responsibility between husbands and wives. Finally, it is also important that at recent public speeches, State leaders have stood up for the social signifi cance of the family. As a husband, a father and now a grandfather, I can only tell you that a family adds warmth and meaning to our lives. Friends are important, but a family is indispensable. We would be so much lonelier if we did not have a partner with whom to share our achievements and anxieties, our joys and sorrows. The house would be so much emptier without the laughter of children. How miserable we would be if we have no children to look after us when we grow old and weak. Goh Chok Tong, 2000 National Day Rally speech It’s fulfi lling to bring up a child. You can have the most successful career, you can be the richest man on earth or the most powerful man or woman on earth, but if you don’t have a family and don’t have children, I think you’re missing something. It starts off with missing changing nappies when you have a child, but then you miss watching a child learning to walk, learning to talk, going to school, getting sick, depending on you, walking

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with you, playing with you. You are teaching him, doing homework with him or her. Then you’ll ﬁ nd that he’s got his own temperament, character, personality, he’s different from you. He’s got his own ideas and after a while, one day, you are helping him or her do homework and he says, “No, no, you do it like this” and I look puzzled and I don’t quite know what he is talking about, but he does and you know he’s taken a step forward and he’s on his own. And then they grow up a bit more and you have to, come a time when they ring up and say, “Can you pick me up at the cineplex?” Then you will worry whether they have found girlfriends or boyfriends. Then you will worry if they have not found girlfriends or boyfriends and you will think by the time they are 20 years old, they would have grown up, but actually, even when they are 50 years old, if I’m still around, I will still be fussing. “Drink your pao shen” (泡参 ginseng), take care of yourself, don’t overstrain because my parents do that and I think if I’m still compos mentis, I will do that too. Lee Hsien Loong, 2004 National Day Rally speech These recent developments in family and population policies have enhanced the role of the family in Singapore society, and calls for work-family balance have also raised the social status of the family vis-à-vis paid work. However, will this be enough to stop the fertility rate from sliding? Ideologies that have been reinforced over decades take another decade or more to change. While the government waits for the shift in ideology to be matched by changes in behaviour, will the family be able to sustain itself in the face of challenges from the various contradictory demands?

VI Fertility Trends in the 21st Century

Given the size of the city-state, the homogeneity of the population through the advancement of formal education, and the ease with which announcement of new State policies are effectively communicated to the population, the Singapore government has been fairly successful in using policies to police the normal family ideology that has been upheld by the State since post-independent Singapore. In particular, policies tied to public housing and tax incentives are very effective as the incentives are applicable to a vast majority of the population. This is because almost 80% of the population lives in public housing, allocation of which is dependent on housing policies. Given that Singapore families are clustered around the middle-income range, income tax relief is an effective incentive for conformity to prescribed social norms.

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However, while the population control policies of the 1970s were particularly successful, we must also be mindful that the curb of population growth in that period coincided with the advancement of industrialisation and economic development in Singapore. The lure of rewards from paid work played an important role in shrinking family size, especially when women began entering the labour force. When the family polices shifted towards a pro-natalistic trend, the effect on the fertility rate was limited. Why is this so? We posit that changes in ideology play a signiﬁ cant role in fertility decisions. Expectations of parenthood, which are tied to changes in the ideology of childhood (speciﬁ cally, the social construction of what child is and deserves), gender role expectations (particularly the involvement of women in paid work), and expectations of paid work in an increasingly global economy are the main ideologies which have confounded family life in Singapore. I will elaborate on this in the following sections.

Interface between Gender Ideology and Ideology of Work One key reason lies in the tremendous progress women have made, both globally and in Singapore. Since independence, social indicators refl ect a population, where both men and women have gained in terms of formal education and access to gainful employment. The proportion of women with no formal education has decreased and the proportion with tertiary education has increased signifi cantly (see Table 1). With better formal education, women have also gained greater access to paid work, as refl ected in the labour force participation rates (see Table 2). As a result, many Singapore women now enjoy economic independence, which translates to greater social, political and negotiating power. In pre-independence Singapore, many women had to marry for economic reasons as they were dependent on their husbands for income. In contemporary Singapore, this is no longer the case for a vast majority of women. Even though the average female income is still a fraction of the average male income, Singapore women are, by and large, economically independent (see Table 3). Thus, when they marry, they marry for intrinsic reasons—to satisfy desires of companionship, social support, and romantic love.

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Table 1. Gains in formal education 1970–2003 Education Background Gender 1970* 2003** % % Percentage with No Formal Male 17.4 12.4 Education Female 39.4 14.2 Percentage with Tertiary Male 2.3 11.1 Diploma Education 20.6 Degree Female 0.9 9.1 Diploma 17.7 Degree * Census data, Department of Statistics ** Labour Force Survey, Ministry of Manpower

Table 2. Labour force participation rate 1970–2004 Labour Force Participation Rate Males Females % % 1970* 67.6 24.6 1980* 81.5 44.3 2004** 75.6 54.2 * Census data, Department of Statistics ** Labour Force Survey, Ministry of Manpower

Table 3. Average monthly income by gender Male Female % Male Income S$ S$ 1980* 692 421 60.1% 1990* 1584 1161 73.3% 2000* 3420 2660 77.8% 2003** 2000 1500 75% * Average monthly income, Census data, Department of Statistics ** Median monthly income, Labour Force Survey, Ministry of Manpower

But the problem lies in the fact that, while the social and economic status of women has changed, the status of men and their expectations have remained relatively stable. And more importantly, the ideology of the family has remained unchanged. Patriarchy continues to be the governing ideology, and this has caused serious contradictions in the

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family, where traditional gender roles are now challenged by women, who are socially and economically empowered.

Family as Guardian of Tradition The family has been and remains one of the most traditional social institutions in Singapore society, and it is in the family where traditional gender roles are imposed and policed. This is particularly accentuated when the couple enters parenthood and someone has to assume the responsibility of full-time minder for the helpless child. And this someone is usually the mother. To encourage women to take on the dual expectations of career and family, the State has committed, among others, S$10 million to the new WoW! (Work-life Works!) Fund. This Fund aims to provide fi nancial support to companies and facilitate the development and implementation of family-friendly work practices. Under WoW!, companies can get reimbursement of up to 70% of the cost of family-friendly initiatives at the workplace, up to a cap of S$30,000. While the jury is still out on the success of WoW! as it was only implemented in October 2004, the initial take-up rate is not encouraging. As of August 2005, less than 10% of the S$10 million fund has been committed to 32 projects (Straits Times 23 August 2005). Particularly problematic are the small and medium-sized enterprises, which employ more than half of Singapore’s workforce, who tend to see family-friendly practices as “luxuries, distracting from their main aim—survival” (Straits Times, 23 August 2005). Similarly, other existing schemes for part-time and fl exi work opportunities have not been encouraging (Straits Times, 18 January 2005; Ministry of Manpower, 1999). This suggests that either women themselves are reluctant to reduce their economic participation rate, or that their employers are not able to easily adopt fl exi-work schemes because of the rigid organisational structure. The reality is very likely a combination of both.

Workplace in Men’s World Like the family, the workplace is another social institution that is governed by very traditional expectations. The workplace has traditionally been the men’s arena. Just as women were expected to stay home and assume the role of full-time domestic manager and child-minder, men were expected to devote their energies to paid work and sustain their families as the economic provider. In fact, the work-family interweave

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is ignored, and in its place, the dual-sphere ideology prescribes the relationship between work and family (see Lopata, 1993). Essentially, this ideology expects employees to be able to devote their total attention to the demands of paid work, and it assumes that family affairs are taken care of by women, who stay home full-time. It also assumes that work demands should take priority over family demands, thus the ease with which overtime work and business-related travels take place as family time is often expected to be available as surplus work time. However, when family demands sometimes require one to be absent from work, this is often not welcomed by employers and this is refl ected in the reluctance with which employers view family-friendly practices. When women began entering full-time paid work, they entered on ‘men’s rules’ and organisations did not vary their expectations of these female employees. In fact, many would argue that women had to work harder to prove themselves worthy of this coveted membership. This makes it extremely diffi cult for married women to balance work and family demands. Signifi cantly, the dual-sphere ideology renders domestic work ‘invisible,’ and creates the illusion of a dual-sphere co-existence between work life and family life. This adds tremendous stress to working women, who have to continue to shoulder their domestic responsibilities as wives and mothers beyond their work duties. Because of the reward imbalance between paid work and family life, women gain when they enter paid work, but men do not received extrinsic rewards when they venture into domestic responsibilities. As a result, the foray of women into the traditionally men’s world of paid work is asymmetrical. As Siberstein (1992) argued, this asymmetry can be conceptualised in terms of power dynamics: while women stand to gain power when they enter the work sphere, men do not increase their power in the family by participating in domestic chores. Therefore, most husbands continue to adhere to traditional gender roles and expect their wives to continue as the primary providers in the family. This expectation stands, regardless of the fact that their wives may be participating full-time in the labour force. Data from the US shows that women continue to perform the bulk of household chores (Lennon & Rosenfi eld, 1994). Research has also demonstrated that women doing ‘homework’ (i.e. work from home) continue to take on a greater share of domestic chores than men doing ‘homework’ (Siberstein, 1993). In Singapore, data from two recent surveys on marriage and family life found similar trends. In a survey on married women completed in 2000, respondents were asked who in their households was primarily responsible for 19 domestic tasks (which covered home

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Table 4. Work and division of domestic labour Dual-Income Family Single-Income Family Husband’s Chores 2.2 2.5 Wife’s Chores 4.6 8.7 Shared Chores 4.5 3.1 Reference: Straughan, Huang & Yeoh, 2000

care, childcare, and elder care). On average, women reported that they were responsible for 7.2 domestic tasks (standard deviation 4.6), and their spouses were responsible for only 2.4 tasks (standard deviation 2). The average number of tasks shared equally by both husband and wife was 3.6 (standard deviation 3.7) (Straughan, Huang & Yeoh, 2005). This unequal division of domestic labour persists, even when the wife is working full-time (see Table 4). Wives continue to take on more sole responsibility of domestic chores, even when they are engaged in full-time work. We see that, regardless of the couple’s work-status (i.e. either single or double-income), the husband’s contribution remains somewhat the same (Straughan, Huang & Yeoh, 2000). The result is the emergence of the ‘second shift’ for working women, especially for those with young children. Hochschild & Machung (1989) detailed the emergence of the super-mom syndrome. The super-mom, an imagery of a woman who has successfully embraced the multiple roles of career woman-ideal wife-model mom, exempliﬁ es how a single individual can absorb such a mosaic of responsibilities without help from others. Hochschild (1989: 23) wrote, There is no trace of stress, no suggestion that the mother needs help from others. She isn’t harassed. She’s busy, and it’s glamorous to be busy. However, this image of the super-mom serves only to suppress the problems inherent in the multiple responsibilities imposed on the working mother. It succeeds in highlighting the competence of women and reinforces the message that women are special beings, who are able to take on all the domestic responsibilities over and above that of her job. There is no mention of the presence of a sound social arrangement, that enables the woman to embrace a career as well as to nurture a family (Straughan, Huang & Yeoh, 2005). This imagery is constantly reinforced by popular culture and, as a result, the myth is perpetuated, so much so, that society assumes that working mothers need very little help to manage.

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Thus, the conﬂ ict between work and family is assumed to be non- existent, because super-moms are expected to take care of everything. And if they cannot manage, perhaps they should reconsider their full-time status in the work force. So women end up having to choose between motherhood and career. To make matters worse, the false imagery of a super-mom also masks the unhappiness women feel, when laden with the unequal division of domestic labour. As demonstrated elsewhere, surveys in Singapore document, that women who shouldered an overload at home report lower marital satisfaction, and are more likely to be divorced (see Straughan, 2005; Straughan et al., 2005). While the returns of motherhood are tremendous, it is a long-term investment and the rewards are largely intrinsic. Career investments, on the other hand, tend to yield tangible results in a much shorter period of time. Increasingly, women are opting to invest in work, than in the family. This is demonstrated through the trend data on the proportion who remain single and the proportion of childless married couples or DINKS (double-income, no kids).

Sacredisation of the Economically Worthless—Changing Ideology of the Child One major barrier to increase fertility is the changing ideology of the child and how society views the social worth of the child. Zelizer’s (1994) thesis sums up the evolution of this ideology. The traditional ideals of having children tend to be tied more closely to economic returns. Children are seen as potential labour and, therefore, couples would choose to have larger families to ensure that childbearing yields good returns. However, as societies progress and the standard of living improves, the child in increasingly seen as having intrinsic worth. With infant mortality rate going down and changes in perception towards the child as potential labour, family size has also shrunk. With fewer children, parents tend to give more to each child, and the expectations of parenthood is transformed to one that is child-centred. Hays (1996) traced how changes in the ideology of the child affected societal expectations of motherhood in particular. She argued that contemporary women are drawn into a subculture, where they are expected to be guardians of this ‘sacred,’ helpless and precocious child, and to be on-call 24 hours everyday (24/7) to meet the child’s demands and needs. The culture of intensive mothering conceptualises the child as pure, scared, innocent and priceless, and of immeasurable value. Child-centred, expert-guided and expensive methodology for childcare

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are prescribed, and the mother is the ‘natural’ primary caregiver. Hays (1997: 228) argued that intensive mothering is a “moral commitment to unremunerated relationships based in affection and mutual obligation” and something that is out of place in a competitive capitalist society. In fact, childcare experts actually prescribe, that there be a full-time primary care giver for the ﬁ rst three years of a child’s life. In an era where women strive to gain equal excess to paid work, this creates tremendous work-family tension for mothers. So why does this ideology persist? The ideology of intensive mothering is policed by various social agents in society—these include the mass media, popular culture, the State, capitalist enterprises, the family, and even other women. Such models of childrearing are a consequence of women’s relative power- lessness within patriarchal cultural, capitalist economic and rationalised political systems (Hays, 1997). In particular, intensive mothering is a larger model of family life that serves State interests (Donzelot, 1979). It also serves capitalism for women’s unpaid work at home produces labour power (i.e. nurturing the child so that he grows up to be a contributing member of the labour force) at relatively low cost. Capitalism stands to gain from another standpoint, when permissive child-centred ideology creates little consumers. From a gender perspective, intensive mothering serves men’s needs for it maintains women’s subordinate positions in family and society. In a recent study on Singaporean’s assets in the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a mandatory savings scheme that serves retirement needs, it was revealed, that there is a tremendous gender gap in CPF savings and women suffered lower savings because of their involvement in unpaid housework (Straits Times, 15 February 2005). Social class and ethnic boundaries also serve to valorise actors’ social position. In this case, women from the upper social class buy into and perpetuate this expensive and expansive methodology of childrearing, and set expectations that lower class mothers cannot possibly achieve. This is a case of women policing women. Because of its dependency on expert prescription (be it pediatricians or other medical professionals, nutritionists, early life educationalists or other experts on childcare), demands of intensive mothering increases women’s ability to claim that the mothering role requires “analytical, interpretive and independent decision-making capabilities of a professional” (Hays, 1997: 304). In short, the ideology of intensive mothering is the cumulative result of various social groups in action to exert supremacy over others, and socially constructed in conjunction with the ideology of the

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“sacredisation of the economically worthless but morally and emotion- ally priceless” child in contemporary society (Hays, 1997: 305). It valorises innocence and purity of childhood, and at the same time, valorises the work of mothers. Intensive mothering portrays mothers as selfl ess, self-sacrifi cing and devoid of self-interest and depicts childrearing as a moral enterprise. Such is the demand on contemporary motherhood, that it is no wonder many women are thinking twice before venturing into this life-long commitment. Interestingly, there is no similar ideology for fathers to uphold. When we look at all these contesting ideologies—of family, parenthood, child, gender, and work in the context of a global economy—we can see how Singapore families are being pulled in different directions. Work demands have a tremendous hold on all for its rewards are immediate, extrinsic, and essentially for everyday life. Work in a global economy, which crosses several time zones rewards those who demonstrate a 24/7 commitment. On the other hand, investment in family is a long-term investment, and the rewards are intrinsic and non-tangible. And the ideology of the family also requires family members to put family fi rst, and commit 24/7 to the responsibilities of parenthood in particular. This is particularly diffi cult for women, who are expected to take on the role of domestic manager and primary childcare provider, on top of their full-time involvement in paid work. Thus when it comes to the crunch, they either take on the overload—or increasingly, they choose work over family.

VII Prognosis

Demographic Indicators Current demographic trends show that Singaporeans are getting married later, and the proportion of unmarried adults between 35–44 years is growing larger (see Tables 5 & 6). The TFR continues to fall well below replacement, and TFR is inversely correlated with higher female education achievement (see Tables 7 & 8). As a result of all this, the ageing indicators point to a bleak graying population and raise alarm signals to the leadership. Median age has crept up, and the proportion of our adult population aged 65 and older continues to grow. This result in a higher dependency ratio, where each working adult will have to support more elderly members (see Table 9).

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Table 5. Age at First Marriage Males Females 1970 27.8 24.3 1980 27.1 24.1 1990 28.7 25.9 2000 29.8 26.8 2003 27.2 27.2 Reference: compilation from various reports from Department of Statistics, Singapore.

Table 6. Proportion Single 35–44 years Male Female 1970 18 8.4 1980 19.7 9.1 1990 28.2 26.1 2000 37 30.3 Reference: compilation from various reports from Departmentt of Statistics, Singapore.

Table 7. Total Fertility Rate Year Total Fertility Rate 1991 1.73 1996 1.66 1997 1.61 1998 1.48 1999 1.47 2000 1.60 2001 1.41 2005 1.25 2006 1.26 Reference: compilation from various reports from Dept of Statistics, Singapore.

Table 8. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Education Level of Women Education Level 1990 TFR 2000 TFR Below Secondary 3.4 3.3 Secondary 1.6 1.9 Post Secondary 1.5 1.5 University 1.4 1.3 Reference: Leow, 2004

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Table 9. Ageing Indicators Proportion ≥ 65 Dependency Ratio Median Age 1980 4.9 7.3 24.4 1990 6.0 8.5 29.8 2000 7.3 10.2 34.2 2001 7.4 10.4 34.6 2002 7.5 10.5 34.9 Reference: compilation from various reports from Departmentt of Statistics, Singapore.

The Practice of Family Given the current trends, we should look at the practice of family, to see if it presents itself as an attractive option for women in particular. The latest survey conducted on marriage and divorce in Singapore in 2005, showed that women continue to be responsible for most of the domestic responsibilities (Straughan, 2005). Out of a total of 19 tasks on childcare, home care, and elder care, women continue to take on sole responsibility for most of the tasks. The data, from both male and female respondents, tell the same story: women do a lot more at home than their husbands. We asked how many domestic chores our respondents were responsible for. The average reported by females was 8.8, compared to only 2.7 by the males (see Table 10). When we asked for the number of chores that were under their spouses’ responsibility, male respondents reported that their wives took charge of an average of 6.1 chores, which is signifi cantly higher than the average of 1.8 wives reported of their husbands. We also asked for the number of domestic responsibilities, that were shared equally between spouses. These tend to be childcare-related responsibilities, and here, men claimed a higher portion than the women. By and large, the routine and repetitive chores are placed in the women’s domain, while the incidental chores (like car repair and lawn work) are men’s primary responsibilities. Men perceive that they are doing more in terms of shared responsibilities. Not surprisingly, this is not concurred to by women! These fi ndings tell us that the family is still a very traditional institution, and unless family roles are re-conceptualised, it will be very diffi cult for women to manage both career aspirations and family responsibilities.

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Table 10. Division of Domestic Labour and Gender

Division of Domestic Gender N Mean Standard Labour Deviation Self Responsible for Chores Male* 824 2.7 2.4 Female* 1026 8.8 4.8 Spouse Responsible for Male* 824 6.1 4.2 Chores Female* 1026 1.8 2.0

Shared Responsibility for Male* 824 5.6 4.4 Chores Female* 1026 3.2 3.4 * statistically signiﬁ cant at 95% conﬁ dence

Egalitarian as Ideal? Can we conceptualise a Singapore family, that is based on a more egalitarian model, where both husbands and wives invest equally in home management and child care? Findings from a recent study on the family from women’s perspective suggest that this may be easier said than done. The study found married Singapore women, particularly those who are older and less educated, to be traditional in ideals, re- inforcing our argument that gender role socialisation is so deeply rooted that it will take a long time for these ideals to shift. Gender socialisation is perpetuated through social policing by women, who embrace traditional ideals. When asked about their ideal family structure, the majority preferred that the husband be the head of household, and that he works full-time while the wife either takes on part-time work or stays home as full-time domestic manager (see Straughan et al., 2005 for details). A key ﬁ nding of the study demonstrated how Singapore women were at a cross-roads with regards to family ideals—while many traditional expectations were articulated, there were also signs that women were looking toward incorporation of shared responsibilities in the management of the family. For example, in the division of domestic labour, women articulated the desire for a shared-responsibility model when it comes to parenting (see Table 11). The ideal family through women’s eyes is one where women continue their dominance in the home (reﬂ ecting their embrace of traditional gender roles), and men take on greater ownership through shared-responsibilities (see Table 12). In terms of household structure, the study found that women preferred to have

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nuclear families rather than extended families, three children on average, and interestingly, they did not want a live-in maid. The inclination towards self-suffi ciency becomes a serious contradiction for women in their attempt to balance paid work and family responsibilities. As long as women continue to defi ne their self-worth in terms of traditional gender role expectations, and as long as there is a pull towards participation in paid work, we can see that something will have to give. This, coupled with their desire to be self-suffi cient at home, with no reliance on domestic maid or help from parents/in-laws, means that women’s ideals of the perfect family, results in a no-win situation where they end up totally exhausted.

Table 11. Division of Domestic Labour: Ideal and Practice

Domestic Responsibility Person Primarily Responsible Ideal Family Actual Family Assign chores Shared Wife Feed child Wife Wife Bath child Wife Wife Fetch child to/from school Shared Wife Fetch child to others Shared Wife Discipline child Shared Shared Supervise homework Shared Wife Take to doctor Shared Wife Stay home with sick child Wife Wife Marketing Shared Wife Cook Wife Wife Wash up Wife Wife Tidy home Wife Wife Laundry Wife Wife Supervise maid Shared Wife Household repairs Husband Husband Gardening Husband or shared Husband Wash car Husband Husband Pay bills Husband Husband

Table 12. Average number of chores in ideal and actual family

Ideal Actual Wife 6 7.2 Husband 2.3 2.4 Shared 6.4 3.6

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Table 13. Responsibility for Domestic Tasks & Status of Marriage among Singapore women Status N Mean Standard Deviation Self Responsible for Chores Divorced* 527 9.9 5.1 Married* 499 7.6 4.2 Spouse Responsible for Divorced* 527 1.2 1.7 Chores Married* 499 2.4 2.0

Shared Responsibility for Divorced* 527 2.0 2.9 Chores Married* 499 4.5 3.6 * Difference is statistically signiﬁ cant at 95% conﬁ dence

There are other more serious consequences to this overload at home. In a recent survey on divorce in Singapore, we found a strong correlation between role-overload and divorce (Straughan, 2005). Women, who do more than their husbands at home, are more likely to be divorced. Those who share more domestic responsibilities with their husbands, or whose husbands do more housework than they themselves, are more likely to be in intact marriages (see Table 12).

VIII The Future of the Family

As long as the family continues to be the social icon for social stability and optimism for the future, the State must continue to promote family formation, as a desired goal for all young adults. For it is within the family that values like deferred gratiﬁ cation, planning for the future, placing the family’s interest before self, and self-sacriﬁ ce for the sake of children are perpetuated. So what can be done to arrest the falling fertility trend? One of the stronger barriers seems to be the prevalence of traditional gender roles in society that is governed by patriarchy. That women’s roles are primarily homebound while men should be free to pursue gains in paid work is inscribed in patriarchy, the dominant ideology in Singapore. The Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew commented recently that values which emphasise a patriarchal outlook may have to make way for a more egalitarian one given the current social status of women in society (Straits Times, 1 May 2005). An eradication of patriarchy would

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give wives and mothers a stronger voice at home, and result in a more equal division of domestic responsibilities. With husbands and fathers taking on a fairer share of homecare and childcare, the overload on women will ease and this will make larger families more attractive to the contemporary Singapore woman. The discourse in this paper highlights the interweave between the ideologies of gender, work, and the family—in particular, expectations of parenthood and childhood. Another signifi cant barrier to higher fertility is the contradiction in the ideologies governing work and family. Global trends refl ect women’s foray into paid work, but the rules governing paid work continue to be structured around the assumed presence of a full-time domestic manager at home. The demands of the new economy, which transcends different time-zones and national boundaries, aided by the advancement in technology, have made the boundary between paid work and family time increasingly diffi cult to tell apart. Concurrently, expectations of motherhood have intensifi ed in our child-centric society, where capitalism continues to propagate the ideology of the sacred child. What is needed is a serious re-look at the expectations we place on work and family, and initiatives on how we can protect family time, without compromising overall economic productivity. If we do nothing, and continue to push for a 100% commitment to both, the attractions of paid work being immediate and extrinsic, will always draw more followers than the intrinsic rewards of family life. Do our new policies address these concerns? To a certain extent, but not quite enough. The fi ve-day work week was a big step towards establishing a work-family balance. The institutionalisation of paternity leave and extension of childcare to fathers are both symbolic of an important ideological shift, that includes fathers as caregivers to young children. However, there is more we can do to minimise the gender divide on domestic responsibilities. For example, the foreign domestic worker levy is still tied to female employment and continues to perpetuate the message that the maid is there to take over the woman’s responsibilities at home. Society must come to terms with the changing social status of women. To move forward, we cannot continue to lament that things would be better if women reverted to the traditional gender role of playing full-time domestic manager and stay-home moms. If we allow demographic trends to continue on their current trajectory, the alarms have already sounded that we will not be able to sustain our social system (Sunday Times, Singapore, 10 July 2005). It is time

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to seriously rethink what ‘family’ means in our society. Traditionally, the family invokes strong sentiments of reliability, social and emotional support, and is perceived as the guardian of morality and champion of ultimate unquestioning love. However, increasingly, the young see family as a moral and economic obligation, and ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to embrace family formation in the midst of the serious challenges outlined in this paper. For the family to sustain, we must take time to re-conceptualise what family means.

References

Department of Statistics. (2005) Population Indicators, http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/annual/indicators.html#Population%20Indicators —— (2004) Singapore 2004: Statistics Data Sheet, http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/ annual/poster.pdf —— (2002) Twenty-Five Years of Below Replacement Fertility: Implications for Singapore, Singapore: Department of Statistics. Donzelot, J. (1997) The Policing of Families, translated from the French by Robert Hurley, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Goh, C.T. (2000) National Day Rally Speech, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html Hays, S. (1997) “The ideology of intensive mothering: a cultural analysis of the best- selling ‘Gurus’ of appropriate childrearing” in Elizabeth Long (ed) From Sociology to Cultural Studies: New Perspectives, (Malden, MA.): Blackwell Publishers Ltd. —— (1996) Cultural Contradiction of Motherhood, New Haven: Yale University Press. Hochschild, A.R. and Machung, A. (1989) The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home, New York: Viking. Huang, S. & Yeoh, B.S.A. (1996) “Ties that bind: State policy and migrant female domestic helpers in Singapore” in Geoforum, 27(4): 479–493. Lee, H.L. (2004) National Day Rally Speech, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html Lennon, M.C. & Rosenﬁ eld, S. (1994) “Relative fairness and the division of housework: the importance of options” in American Journal of Sociology, 100(2): 506–531. Leow, B.G. (2004) Census of Population 2000: Households and Housing, Singapore: Singapore Department of Statistics. Lien, L. (2002) “Marriage and procreation: to intervene or not—a policymaking perspective” paper presented at Workshop on Fertility Decline, Below Replacement Fertility and the Family in Asia: Prospects, Consequences and Policies. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, Asian MetaCentre. Unpublished manuscript. Lopata, H.Z. (1993) “The interweave of public and private: women’s challenge to American Society” in Journal of Marriage and the Family, 55: 176–190. Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports. (2004) Singapore—A Great Place for Families, Singapore: Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sport. Ministry of Manpower. (2005) Report on Labour Force in Singapore 2004, Singapore: Ministry of Manpower. —— (1999) Flexible Work Arrangements, Singapore: Ministry of Manpower, Occasional paper No. 1/99. Quah, S. (1998) Family in Singapore: Sociological Perspectives, Singapore: Times Academic Press. Saw, S.H. (2005) Population Policies and Programmes in Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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Siberstein, L.R. (1992) Dual-career Marriage: a System in Transition, Hillsdaye, NJ: L. Erlbaum. Straits Times, various issues. Straughan, P. (2005) Report on Marriage and Divorce in Singapore. Unpublished report submitted to the Ministry of Community Development, Youth & Sports, Singapore. Straughan, P. Huang, S. and Yeoh, B.S.A. (2005) Family Ideology and Practice: Implications for Marital Satisfaction, unpublished manuscript. ____ (2000) “Work, family and marital satisfaction: Singapore women’s perspectives” paper presented at Conference on Families in the Global Age: New Challenges Facing Japan and Southeast Asia, Singapore. Sunday Times, Singapore, 10 July 2005. The Singapore Planned Parenthood Association. (1993) Towards 2000: a Time for Renewal—Strategic Plan 1993, Singapore: The Singapore Planned Parenthood Association. Wong, A.K. (1979) “The national family planning programme and changing family life” in Kuo, E.C.Y. & Wong, A.K. (eds) The Contemporary Family in Singapore, Singapore: Singapore University Press. Wong, T & Yeoh B.S.A. (2003) Fertility and the family: an overview of pro-natalist population policies in Singapore, Singapore: Asia Research Institute, Asian MetaCentre Research Paper Series No. 12. Zelizer, V.A. (1994) Pricing the Priceless Child: the Changing Social Value of Children, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

TONG_f4_45-72.indd 72 2/7/2008 1:37:00 PM SOCIAL POLICIES FOR THE AGED IN SINGAPORE

Angelique Chan

Singapore entered a demographic window of opportunity in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During this period, the baby boom cohort reached working age and began manifesting much lower fertility levels than their predecessors. The large numbers of working-age adults, relative to the numbers of young and retired adults, produced a ‘demographic dividend,’ which aided the dramatic economic development of the State (Bloom, Canning & Sevilla, 2003). Singapore was able to capitalise on the demographic window of opportunity because appropriate policies were in place. As Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2003) note, the critical policy areas included public health, family planning, education, and ﬂ exible and open economic policies. In each of these areas, Singapore excelled. Public health was a major area of concern once the island gained independence in 1965. Family planning programmes were extremely effective and far-reaching. Education was a top priority, and the government had ﬂ exible and open economic policies to spur economic growth. Thirty years after the demographic window began to open, we can now see it beginning to close. Within the next 20 to 30 years, shifts in Singapore’s age structure and increases in the old age dependency ratio highlight the need to re-think avenues towards economic productivity. Currently 7% of Singapore’s population is over the age of 65; however, by 2030, this will increase to 19% (Inter-Ministerial Committee on Aging Report, 1999). The old age dependency ratio will increase from 1 older adult (65+) relying on 10 working-age adults (15–64) to 3:10. Decreasing fertility, later marriage or non-marriage, increasing divorce rates and increased longevity, create a situation where the family has fewer individuals available (or willing) to care for increasing numbers of older members. Thus far, the Singapore government views the family as the main care provider for older members. Reference is made to ‘Asian values’ and the need to preserve tradition, in the face of rapid economic development and globalisation. The questions of family resilience, and the ability of the family to care for increasing numbers of aged members are interesting and important sociological issues. This paper discusses both topics, with reference to available data on the care of older adults in Singapore. The

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critical issue is how to attain a mix of familial and government support that will ensure older adult well-being. The focus is on intergenerational transfers as forms of family support, with the inclusion of living arrangements as a form of social support in old age.

I The Closing of Singapore’s Demographic Window

At present, Singapore’s population stands at 4.02 million, with an annual growth rate of 1.8% for resident (citizens and permanent residents) Singaporeans (Singapore Census of Population, 2000). The growth rate of non-residents was much higher, 9% (see Table 1). This ‘non-resident’ group consists mainly of migrant labourers ensconced in lower-level occupations, such as construction or foreign domestic workers. Older Singaporeans, aged 65 and above, make up 7% of the population and by the year 2030, they are expected to make up 19% of the population. This translates into an increase from 235,000 elderly in 1999 to 796,000 elderly in 2030 (Interministerial Committee on Aging, 1999). The oldest old-population (85 and above) is experiencing the fastest growth at 6.1% per year. As a result of improvements in sanitation, medical technology, and public health awareness, life expectancy has risen in Singapore to 76.9 years for men and 80.9 for women (Department of Statistics, 2003).

Table 1. Singapore’s Population and Growth Rate, 1871–2030

Year Total Residents Non- Total Residents Non- popn residents popn residents 1871 97,111 – – – – – 1881 137,755 – – 3.6 – – 1891 181,612 – – 2.8 – – 1901 227,592 – – 2.3 – – 1911 303,321 – – 2.9 – – 1921 418,358 – – 3.3 – – 1931 557,745 – – 2.9 – – 1947 938,144 – – 3.3 – – 1957 1,445,929 – – 4.4 – – 1970 2,074,507 – – 2.8 – – 1980 2,413,945 2,282,125 131,820 1.5 – – 19901 3,047,132 2,735,868 311,264 2.4 1.8 9.0 2000 4,017,733 3,263,209 754,524 2.8 1.8 9.3 1 Includes resident population residing overseas. Source: Census of Population, 2000

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Table 2. Median Age for Singapore (1911–2000) Census year Median age 1911 28 1921 28 1931 26 1947 23 1957 19 1970 20 1980 24 1990 29 2000 34 2010 37 2020 39 2030 41 Source: Singapore Census of Population, 2000 and the Inter-Ministerial Committee Report on the Ageing Population, 1999

As shown in Table 2, this aging of the population has had the cumulative effect of raising the median age of the population from 19 in 1957 to 34 in 2000 (Singapore Census of the Population, 2000). The ageing of Singapore’s population was primarily motivated by a fertility decline beginning in the late 1950s (Fawcett & Khoo, 1980). Total fertility rates (TFR) declined rapidly in Singapore from an average of 6.5 births per woman in 1957 to 1.9 births per woman, or below replacement fertility, in 1975. Since 1975, fertility rates have remained below replacement level despite attempts by the government to increase fertility. Incentives to increase fertility have had only modest success. In 2004, the TFR was 1.26 (Department of Statistics, 2004). The realisation that the Singapore population was not reproducing itself led the government to reverse its population planning policy. Since 1987, Singaporeans have been encouraged to have three or more children if family fi nances permit (Lee, Alvarez & Palen, 1991). Numerous fi nancial and other incentives, including priority schooling, have been provided to couples having three or more children. (Lee, Alverez & Palen (1991) provide an excellent review of the types of incentives provided to increase fertility from 1987 to 1991). Recently, the government has instituted the provision of a ‘Baby Bonus’ for parents having a second or third child. Under the new baby bonus scheme, a Children Development Account will be opened for a family, once a couple has a child. Parents will get a S$3,000 cash gift for the fi rst child, a cash

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gift and co-savings of up to S$9,000 for the second child, and up to S$18,000 each for the third and fourth children. These funds can be used to pay fees at government-licensed centres, and/or to purchase medical insurance for the children (http://www.mcys.gov.sg). With effect from October 2004, maternity leave was extended from eight to 12 weeks for all births. For the fi rst two births, the fi rst eight weeks of maternity leave will be paid by the employer. The additional four weeks are government-funded for married working mothers, if the child is a Singapore citizen. For the third and fourth births, the government will fund the full 12 weeks of pay, if the mother is married and working, the child is a Singapore citizen, and the mother has fewer than four living children at the time of confi nement. The government will pay the wage cost of maternity leave for these additional months to ease the employer’s burden. In addition to these fi nancial incentives, the government aims to create a total environment conducive to raising a family, such as making childcare centres more easily available and affordable, and creating family-friendly work arrangements in the civil service (http://www.mcys.gov.sg). Although the government is actively promoting pro-natalist policies, there is an awareness that the Singapore population will age and that appropriate policies need to be put in place to adapt to the closing of the demographic window of opportunity in Singapore. In the next section I review the development of policies for the aged in Singapore.

II Policies for Older Adults in Singapore

The government’s review of the population planning policies began in the 1984 with the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Population Committee (Vasoo, Ngiam & Cheung, 2000). At the same time, the government began analysing the impending shift in Singapore’s age structure from a youthful population to a mature and aged population. As early as 1982, a high-level committee on Problems of the Aged was formed to address the long-term impact of population aging. Since then, various policy recommendations have been implemented such as changing the Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution rates for older persons, legislating minimum standards for old age homes, increasing elderly dependants’ tax relief, and legislating ﬁ lial piety, i.e. the Parental Maintenance Act (Vasoo, Ngiam & Cheung, 2000). In June 1988, the National Advisory Council on the Aged (NACA) was formed to address

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aging issues in Singapore. Various policies have been implemented as a result of NACA’s recommendations, including an increase in the retirement age from 60 to 62 on January 1st 1999. In 1998, the Inter- Ministerial Committee on Aging Population was established to examine six main areas related to older adults:

a) ﬁ nancial security, b) employment and employability, c) housing and land use policies, d) social integration of the elderly, e) healthcare, and f ) cohesion and conﬂ ict in an ageing society.1

In 2004, the Committee on Aging Issues was set up to make policy recommendations to prepare Singapore for an ageing population (http://www.mcys.gov.sg/successful_ageing/report/CAI_MR.pdf ). The terms of reference for the committee were to:

a) identify the challenges of an ageing society, b) determine policy directions for government and non-government agencies in addressing the needs of an ageing population, c) steer and guide the comprehensive, holistic, and co-ordinated development of policies and programmes for the elderly, d) recommend ways to prepare Singapore for the effects of an aging population, and e) recommend ways in which younger Singaporeans can better prepare themselves for active aging.

The committee proceeded to identify eight key recommendations in February 2006. These were to

a) vary the length of land leases as shorter land leases facilitates the development of retirement housing, b) offer reverse mortgage schemes to elderly HDB (Housing and Development Board) flat lessees at commercial terms so that

1 For a review of government policies for the aged see Vasoo, Ngiam & Cheung (2000).

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elderly would be able to monetise their homes to meet their ﬁ nancial needs, c) create barrier-free living environments, d) create a barrier-free physical environment and rail system, e) top-up the medical insurance (Medisave) accounts of less well-off Singaporeans when there are budget surpluses, f ) have family physicians play a greater role in the management of healthcare needs of seniors, g) set up a S$10 million government GO! (Golden Opportunities!) Fund to seed more programmes and activities for seniors by seniors, and h) continue to build on strong family ties, to ensure that the family continues to be the ﬁ rst line of support for older adults.

The family has traditionally been the main source of support for older adults in Asia, and Singapore is no exception. In recent decades, academic debate has centered upon gauging the effect of modernisation or industrialisation on levels of familial support (Cowgill & Holmes, 1972; Martin & Kinsella, 1994). This interest intersects with the awareness of policymakers in Asia, that traditional family support of the elderly may decline in future. There is some evidence of declining levels of familial support in countries such as China and India, due to the effect of massive rural-urban migration of young adults, and changes in occupational structures (World Bank, 1994). However, there is also evidence to suggest that the Asian family is adapting to changing economies and that elderly well-being is not declining. Research on intergenerational transfers in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand has shown high-levels of intergenerational support for elderly parents either via co-residence or the transfer of goods and services (Knodel, John & Debavalya, 1997a; Knodel & Chayovan, 1997b; Hermalin, 1997; Chan, 1999; Ofstedal, Knodel & Chayovan, 1999; Chang, 1999). The goal of most Asian governments is to develop programmes that do not undermine family support, which is perceived as far superior to state-based support, both morally and ﬁ nancially (Ofstedal, Chayovan, Chan, et al., 2001). In Singapore, the government has strongly upheld the belief that familial support of the elderly is the ideal. To a certain extent, we see that there remain very high levels of family support in Singapore (Chan, 1997). However, the Singapore family is under increasing pressure to support its older members, given the low fertility

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rates since 1975. Lower fertility translates into fewer children available to provide for parents in old age. Alternative views exist, which suggest that increased human capital investment per child may make up for lower numbers of children available to provide for parents in old age. In Taiwan, for example, increased levels of female education have been correlated with signifi cant increases in the amount of fi nancial transfers female children make to their parents, even after marriage (Lee, Parish & Willis, 1994). However, even if children are able to provide more to parents per child, increasing longevity and the increased cost of living will render adult children hard-pressed to support older parents fi nancially for a long period of time. In Singapore, the family plays a central role in the care for older adults. The Singapore government has been careful to adopt policies that enhance family support rather than replace it. For adult children, there exist strong incentives to continue supporting one’s parents. There are the cultural and religious injunctions surrounding the doctrine of fi lial piety. Children are expected to take care of their elderly parents and the dictates of the three major religions Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, defi ne and bolster this expectation. Singapore has also instituted laws governing the economic support of one’s aged parents. In June of 1996, a tribunal was set up, under the Maintenance of Parent’s Act (1994), allowing parents to take legal action against their children for neglect.2 The number of cases presented to the tribunal has never been greater than 150 p.a. Most of the cases presented are dysfunctional families, in which a history of abuse has resulted in the unwillingness of adult children to support an older parent in old age. There remains a stigma towards discussing family issues in a public sphere. One of the central concerns of Asian governments is that economic development will be accompanied by a decline in familial support of the elderly. In the next section, I review familial support available to older adults in Singapore, some 30 years after rapid economic development began. Currently, in Singapore, economic development appears paired with the maintenance of cultural norms regarding care of older adults. That being said, there are demographic changes that may make it harder for families to support their older members in future. Singapore’s below replacement fertility level since 1978, has created a

2 Neglect was defi ned in terms of fi nancial neglect as Parliament agreed that emotional neglect is diffi cult to prove.

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situation where the number of children available to provide old age support has decreased from an average of 6 per family to the current 1.24 per family. In addition, increasing divorce rates and non-marriage, later age at marriage, and increased levels of international migration, decrease the size of the available social support network. A child who never marries will neither produce a support system of in-laws nor, typically, any grandchildren. Children, who marry later, are more likely to have few or no children, which also results in a reduced social support network. Although one could argue that monetary remittances from children living abroad or in Singapore may be a form of social support, physical and emotional support are often the most important among those aged 75 and above. The following section evaluates social support for the aged in Singapore and the policies surrounding family support.

III Family Care of Older Adults

Living Arrangements Living arrangements of the elderly in Asia are often used as an indicator of elderly well-being by researchers and policy makers. In early studies of living arrangements of the elderly, co-residence levels were used to make indirect evaluations of levels of family support of the elderly in Asia (Martin, 1989). Since then, research has focused more on the ‘function’ of the family as opposed to the ‘form’ (Hermalin, 1997). The understanding is that, although levels of co-residence between elderly and adult children may decrease over time, intergenerational transfers across households may ensure that elderly well-being does not decline. Singapore has one of the highest co-residence rates in Asia. In 1995, 86% of elderly lives with at least one adult child (Chan, 1997). This high co-residence rate is, in part, a function of availability of children with whom to live with, and a culture that stresses fi lial piety. In addition, high housing costs in Singapore make it more economical for adult children to co-reside with older parents. Government policies have also encouraged co-residence both as a moral obligation of adult children to older parents, and as an attractive fi nancial arrangement. The Singapore government has instituted a variety of tax and fi nancial incentives such as tax relief and priority housing to adult children who live with, or nearby, elderly parents. In

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addition, the government has recently introduced housing options for those elderly that choose to live alone or with a spouse only. Currently, as shown in Table 3, 3% of both male and female elderly (aged 55 and above) lives alone. Males are more likely to be currently married, and hence a larger proportion (69%) lives with a spouse, compared to female elderly (28%). Male elderly are more likely to be living with unmarried children (60%), whereas female elderly are more likely to be living with married children (50%). Female elderly are also more likely to be living with grandchildren (46%), compared to male elderly (29%). Only 2% of the elderly in the sample co-reside with siblings. However, these living arrangements are not static. During the period of old age, elderly can live in a variety of living arrangements. Frankenberg, Chan & Ofstedal (2002) investigated the determinants of changes in living arrangements to isolate some of the signifi cant explanatory factors. The fi ndings suggest that, although co-residence is common, much of it may refl ect a situation in which young adult children have not left home yet. As they age and leave school, co-residence becomes less common. In Singapore, the institution of two years of national service for male adults, to be completed when they are 18 and 19 years old, later age at marriage and increasing education levels for children, have created a situation where adult children remain dependent on parents for longer periods of time. On average, males do not graduate from university until the age of 24, whereas females graduate at 22 years old (Frankenberg, Chan & Ofstedal, 2002).

Table 3. Type of Living Arrangements for Respondents aged 59 and above in 1999 Males Females Household members (n = 2058) (n = 2692) % % Living alone 3.3 3.6 Spouse 69.1 27.5 Unmarried children 60.1 48.4 Married children 32.3 50.0 Grandchildren 28.9 46.4 Siblings 2.2 1.5 Total Source: Transitions in Health, Wealth, and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 1995–1999

TONG_f5_73-96.indd 81 2/7/2008 5:06:08 PM 82 angelique chan

The government provides incentives to encourage co-residence between children and their elderly parents and familial care of the elderly. These include tax incentives provided to those children who live with an elderly parent. Adult children who apply for HDB fl ats3 are accorded top priority, if they intend to live with an elderly parent. Living near parents is also encouraged; fi rst-time HDB fl at buyers are eligible for a S$50,000 housing grant, when buying a fl at near their parents’ home. This is compared to the usual S$40,000 grant available to fi rst-time buyers of HDB fl ats. There is also an income tax relief of S$3,500 for the maintenance of each parent. For those children who live with parents, the tax relief is S$4,500. The respective tax relief amounts are allowed as long as the elderly parent does not have an income of more than S$2,000 per year. Current government policies promote ‘ageing in place.’ This policy underlies the recent efforts to retrofi t older housing estates with elder- friendly features such as lifts at every fl oor, non-slip fl ooring in bath- rooms, corridor railings, and wheelchair access (IMC, 1999). However, it remains to be seen whether future cohorts of elderly Singaporeans will opt for privacy and prefer to live alone or with a spouse only. Although modernisation theory (Cowgill & Holmes, 1972) would predict a decrease in co-residence rates as modernisation occurs, Singapore’s unique situation may dispel this theory. Consistent and far-reaching government programmes encouraging family support, in addition to high housing costs and lower marriage rates, may result in the maintenance of high co-residence levels. Hermalin notes the need to take into account the fact that changes in living arrangements need not necessarily mean a decline in the well- being of the older persons. He argues that a distinction between ‘form’ and ‘function’ has to be made. In future, older persons may be more

3 80% of the Singaporean population lives in Housing Development Board (HDB) fl ats. Essentially subsidised housing, these estates are built by the government and are leasehold properties. After 99 years from the date of building completion, the land reverts to the ownership of the government. Only Singaporean residents and permanent residents are allowed to purchase HDB properties. Once a new fl at is purchased, the buyer must live in the fl at for a period of fi ve years. If the fl at is not a new property, the buyer need only live in the fl at for a period of two and a half years (provided no government loan has been obtained) before reselling. If a government loan is used to purchase a re-sale fl at, the buyer must live in the fl at for a period of fi ve years. Buying a HDB property is an attractive option, particularly for young couples starting out because part of the Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings can be used as a down-payment for the property.

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likely to live alone (perhaps due to an increase in the value of privacy) and, at the same time, receive adequate support from children living elsewhere. This underscores the importance of studying the nature of intergenerational support from children living elsewhere. The next section examines the types of intergenerational transfers that occur in Singaporean families between adult children and their older parents.

Intergenerational Transfers Intergenerational transfers can take the form of money, material support, physical, or emotional support. An extensive literature examining the effect on family transfers, when public transfers are introduced, has developed using mainly Western data (Cox, Hansen & Jimenez, 2004; Schoeni, 2002; World Bank, 1994). The availability of social security income to older persons may lessen the amount of ﬁ nancial support received from family members. Work by Goodkind, Truong & Bui (1999) on the old age security system in Vietnam, suggests that parents are least dependent on their children’s income in the northern region of Vietnam, where pensions are most prevalent. Biddlecom et al. (2002) show that once pension programmes were implemented in Taiwan, the percentage of older persons relying on private transfers decreased from 52% to 38%. In Singapore, children were the major income source among older adults aged 60 and above in 1995. In 1995, 78% of older adults aged 60+ cited children as their major income source and, as this cohort aged, the percentage of older adults relying on children increased (Table 4). A very small percentage of older adults (2%) cite pension/retirement income as their major income source.

Table 4. Major source of income among a cohort of older persons aged 60+ in 1995, as observed in 1995 and 1999, Singapore Major source of income 1995 (60+ years) 1999 (64+ years) %% Work or family business 14.5 9.7 Private transfers 78.5 81.4 Pension or retirement 2.1 2.3 Other income (rental, stocks, etc.) 4.9 6.6 Total N 1493 1493 Note: Percentages are weighted to reﬂ ect over-sampling of 75+ in 1995. Source: 1999 Transitions in Health, Wealth, and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 1995–1999.

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Recently, the availability of detailed data on social support exchanges has facilitated research on the exchanges between older persons and non-co-resident children (Knodel & Chayovan 1997; Natividad & Cruz 1997; Chan, 1997).4 As shown in Table 5, Singapore has a higher co-residence rate compared to the Philippines, Thailand, and Taiwan. Eighty-ﬁ ve percent of older Singaporeans receive food, clothing, and money from adult children. About half the older adults have weekly contact with a non-co-resident child. These high levels of intergenerational transfers suggest that adult children and older adults are still intimately connected within families.

Table 5. Support from children for older persons, 60+, with at least one child, in selected Asian countries

Source of support Singaporea Philippinesb % Thailandc Taiwand % % % Co-reside with at least 85 70.4 70.9 69.0 one child From any child: Food, clothing 84.5 63.3 89.2 12.2e Money 84.6 94.1 87.0 – Emotional support – 18.8 – – From non-co-resident children: Daily contact 8.8 14.1 80.6 26.2 Weekly 54.7 6.6 88.8 83.8 Sources: a 1995 National Survey of Senior Citizens, Singapore b 1996 Philippine Older Persons Survey c 1995 Survey of the Welfare of the Elderly in Thailand d 1996 Survey of Health and Living Status of the Elderly in Taiwan Notes: e This includes material support. The low percentage of parents receiving material assistance from children may reﬂ ect the way the question was worded in the Taiwanese survey. Eighty-six percent of Taiwanese older persons report not needing assistance. Source: Chan, 1999

4 These studies can be found in a special issue of the Asia-Paciﬁ c Population Journal (December) 1997.

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Indeed, recent research suggests that families are remarkably adapt- able and co-residence with an adult child need not necessarily be the sole source of social support for older persons. In addition, changing characteristics of older persons over time, e.g., increases in education and income, may lead to changes in their preferences and ability to co-reside with, or live separately from, adult children. The needs of an older individual, and the types of support they receive, do not remain static over time. Research on intergenerational support has advanced dramatically with the recent availability of panel data. Recent analysis of such data for Indonesia has shown that the factors which are positively associated with co-residence at one point in time, e.g. marital status of older persons and education level, are not relevant, when investigating whether these older persons continue to live with their children over time (Frankenberg, Beard & Saputra, 1999). Thus, we are cautioned that results derived from cross-sectional studies alone may be misleading.

IV Formal Support Systems for Older Adults in Singapore

Financial Security One of the most apparent economic implications is the increase in the old age dependency ratio that will occur within the next 30 years. Old age economic support is an issue that the Singapore government has been concerned with since the nation’s independence in 1965. Singapore’s CPF was instituted in 1955 as a mechanism to provide Singaporeans with fi nancial security in old age. This is a defi ned contribution plan as opposed to the pay-as-you-go defi ned benefi t plans in the US or other OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. In defi ned contribution plans, individuals are only entitled to the savings in their individual accounts when they retire. Under pay-as-you-go fi nancing, workers today pay pensions to retirees today, and expect that they, in turn, will be supported during retirement by future generations. Defi ned contribution plans do not have any redistributive effect, i.e. wealth is not redistributed across generations, which is one source of criticism (World Bank, 1994). The CPF is a mandatory savings scheme for all employees and employers in Singapore. Currently, Singapore’s CPF has the highest coverage of any retirement plan in Asia. In 2000, total CPF members’ balances amounted to S$90.3 million (56.8% of GDP). The CPF contributes between 16.1 and 36.2% to the gross national savings rate. This is much higher than the coverage of other formal plans in Asia (Table 6).

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Table 6. Coverage of formal support schemes among older adults in Southeast Asia

Country Percentage (60+) covered by formal retirement scheme (%) Singaporea 66 (of 60+ pop) Vietnamb (RDD) 22.8 (of 60+ pop) Vietnam (HCMC) 2.4 (of 60+ pop) Thailandc 10 (of total working population) Indonesiad < 20 (of total working population) Philippinesd 53 (of total working population) Source a Asher, 1996 b Anh, Cuong, Goodkind,& Knodel, 1997 c Westley, 1998 d Westley, Lee & Mason, 2000

The Singapore government invests CPF balances in a variety of physical, fi nancial and strategic assets, although the exact nature of these investments is not immediately evident (Asher, 2002). Some observers have questioned, however, whether individual CPF savings will be suffi cient for support in old age. As Asher (1996) notes, government estimates show that, by 2003, the net balance of members’ accounts, after withdrawal for housing, investments, and other schemes, will not reach the minimum balance. Thus many elderly will have to resort to private savings and family support (Shantakumar, 1999). In 2002, the government introduced changes to the CPF system. In an attempt to pre-empt ‘future problems’ the government has decided to limit the amount of CPF savings that can be used for housing (Parliamentary speech by Deputy Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Straits Times, 22 July 2002).5 A more nuanced perspective, regarding the role of the CPF in providing economic support in old age, has been adopted since July 2002; offi cials have re-iterated that the CPF is to provide a basic level of support in old age, beyond which individuals should rely on their own private savings and arrangements. The key focus remains coverage of basic retirement and healthcare expenditure and home ownership.

5 The amount of CPF savings that can be used for private property and HDB resale properties will be capped at 150% of the property’s value (including interest payments).

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Table 7. Retrospective Reports of Cash Balances in CPF Account at Age 55 for respondents who have ever had a CPF account, N = 1,285

Amount (S$) Percentage (%) Less than 10,000 49.4 10,000–19,999 9.3 20,000–29,999 4.4 30,000–39,999 3.7 40,000–49,999 2.5 50,000–99,999 4.8 100,000–149,999 2.1 150,000 and above 1.9 Refused 0.4 Can’t remember/Don’t know 21.6 Source: Transitions in Health, Wealth, and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 1995–1999

However, offi cials note that the CPF is designed for the broad majority of Singaporeans, between the 10th and 80th percentiles of the income spectrum. Those below the 10th percentile need to look at other social support schemes for support. Those above the 80th percentile should be able to plan for their own fi nancial support during retirement. At present, cohort differences in CPF coverage are signifi cant. A much higher percentage of those aged 55 to 59 years old in 1995 were covered by the CPF (52%) compared to those aged 70–79 (25%). The percentage of elderly aged 80 and above who have CPF accounts is even lower: 14% (Chan, 1999). Among those individuals with CPF accounts, the majority (31%) had a total of under S$5,000 in their account (see Table 7). One-fi fth of the elderly in this sample had no savings left in their CPF account.6 Given the low coverage rates and savings amounts among the current generation of older adults, this generation is less likely to rely on CPF savings and more likely to rely on family support. In fact, 87% of this cohort of elderly (age 59 and above in 1999) are living in households in which they are not the main breadwinners. Older females in this cohort are particularly reliant on family members, given their low levels

6 The government has also been providing cash top-ups to individuals. Since 1st December 2000, all Singapore, and who had contributed at least S$100 into their CPF accounts, were eligible to receive top-up payments of between S$500 and S$1,700. The actual amount received is dependent upon employment status, monthly salary, and type of housing (Straits Times, 3 January 2001).

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of labour force involvement over their life course. These older females are also signifi cantly less likely to have received any formal education compared to older males. Over time, older adults experience signifi cant shifts in income levels that are correlated with changes in martial status, employment status, and living arrangements. For example, retirement and widowhood are signifi cantly associated with decreases in income over time.7 These results suggest the need for specifi c policies to cater to certain sub-groups of older persons, e.g. widowed or retired older persons. As such, blanket policies, that refer to older persons in general, will be of limited success unless target populations are identifi ed and their concerns addressed. Attention should also be paid to the fact that the measurement of income levels and adequacy among older persons has many facets. Economic well-being has objective and subjective components, e.g. older individuals with similar income levels may perceive their income to be inadequate due to large fi nancial or familial commitments. One possible measure of economic ‘need’ is the perception of income adequacy. Singapore is at the forefront, in the region, in terms of developing retraining programmes for older adults and public education to combat ageism among employers. As the dependency ratio begins to increase, it is becoming increasingly clear to the Singapore government that harnessing the productivity of older workers makes sense. Recently, the government has begun to emphasise the retraining of older workers. However, many older workers have not sought active re-employment (Shantakumar, 1999). As mentioned above, Singapore’s current mandatory retirement age is set at 62, with the expectation of raising it to 67 years in future. At present, employers tend to be hesitant about hiring older workers and this has led to public debates on this issue (Straits Times, 16 July 1999). Among the current generation of elderly (aged 59 and above), 16% are employed. Employed status includes individuals that are currently holding a job, those that are holding a job but temporarily not working for various reasons, and individuals that are working in family businesses but are not getting paid. Most of the current generation of older Singaporeans (59+) who work, are in sales or service occupations, production, or work as cleaners and labourers (Table 8). This refl ects the lower education levels of

7 For a detailed analysis of the determinants of these changes see Chan, Hermalin & Ofstedal (2002).

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Table 8. Description of current occupation among those older Singaporeans (59+) currently working (n = 309) Description of current occupation Percentage (%) Administrative/Managerial 10.0 Professional 1.3 Technical and Related 2.6 Clerical 6.5 Sales/Services 25.9 Production (including transport operators) 23.9 Cleaners and Labourers 29.8 Total 100.0 Source: Transitions in Health, Wealth, and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 199–1999

this generation: approximately two-thirds of older Singaporeans (55+) in 1995 had no formal education. Among those older Singaporeans (59+) who are currently not working, the majority (35%) reported being cleaners and/or labourers as their last occupation (Table 9). Given the types of jobs the current generation of older adults hold, or have held, re-entering the job market is diffi cult in the new technologically advanced Singaporean economy. To compound the negative effects of the lack of technological skills (e.g. computer processing skills) among this current cohort of older adults, there are disincentives to re-entering the labour force. As a result of rampant age discrimination among employers, to continue working means little or no employment benefi ts such as low employer CPF contributions and reduced medical benefi ts.

Table 9. Description of last job held among older Singaporeans (59+) not currently working but who have ever worked (n = 1163) Description of last occupation Percentage (%) Administrative/Managerial 5.9 Professional 3.1 Technical and Related 1.7 Clerical 7.0 Sales/Services 19.0 Production (including transport operators) 28.7 Cleaners and Labourers 34.6 Total 100.0 Source: Transitions in Health, Wealth, and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 1995–1999

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Table 10. Attitudes towards mandatory retirement in Singapore, 1999 Do you think there should be a compulsory Percentage (%) retirement age? Yes 16.1 No 33.4 Don’t Know 50.5 Total 100.0 Source: Transitions in Health, Wealth, and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 1995–1999

Male elderly are more likely to be employed (28%) compared to female elderly (8%). The panel data shown in Table 9 reveals the sharp drop in number of elderly individuals employed over the survey period. This is a product of the mandatory retirement age of 60, applicable to this cohort. In 2006, the government set up a tripartite Alliance for Fair Employment Practices, which aims to explore ways to hire and keep more older workers on the job. The group has representatives from unions, employers and the government (Straits Times, 2006). However, the group does not have any legislative backing, which may limit its infl uence. Currently, job advertisements in Singapore newspapers tend to specify preferred ages which disadvantage older applicants. Retirement, in cases where mandatory retirement does not apply, is often prompted by poor health, and this result has been found, in other countries in the region, e.g. the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. In future, we can expect healthier older adults, as a result of better preventive health practices and greater overall health awareness. This may lead to an increase in the number of older adults who prefer to continue working for longer. A signifi cant proportion of older adults (33%), feel that there should not be a compulsory retirement age (Table 10). However, the ambivalence towards employment at older ages shows through in the large proportion (51%), of older adults that respond ‘Don’t Know’ to this question. Using the 1999 survey data, 2.3% of respondents wanted to continue working. As shown in Table 11, the preference among the elderly was for part-time work. Among those elderly who continue to work, reasons for working include fi nancial need, the need to remain active, and to prevent bore- dom (see Table 12). There are some ethnic differences in the reasons given. Chinese elderly are most likely to cite feeling bored as a reason for continuing to work, whereas Malay and Indian elderly are most

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Table 11. Preference for part-time or full-time work among older Singaporeans seeking employment, 1999 (n = 46) Type of Work Percentage (%) Part-time 67.0 Full-time 33.0 Total 100.0 Source: Transitions in Health, Wealth, and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 1995–1999

Table 12. Main Reason for continuing work after retirement by ethnicity, 1999 Ethnic Group Reasons for CHINESE MALAY INDIAN OTHER Total working after retirement Need money for 26.6% 15.8% 22.2% 33.3% 25.1% own and family expenses Need money for 7.1% 7.9% 11.1% 7.4% future ﬁ nancial security Not enough 6.0% 18.4% 11.1% 33.3% 8.0% support from children Saving for .4% .3% something speciﬁ c Feel that can still 27.0% 36.8% 33.3% 28.3% lead an active life Interested in job 3.6% 5.6% 3.2% Feel bored 28.6% 18.4% 11.1% 33.3% 26.4% Others (specify) .8% 2.6% 5.6% 1.3% Total 252 38 18 3 311 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Transitions in Health, Wealth, and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 1995–1999

likely to cite a feeling that they can still lead an active life. A quarter of the Chinese elderly sample report needing money as a reason for working, compared to 16% of Malays and 22% of Indians. Over the past few years, labour and skills shortages have driven the government to recruit foreign talent. Immigration is a strategy to boost economic productivity that has been employed by the Singapore government, particularly in the last decade. Singapore aspires to be

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a ‘plug-and-play destination’ for professionals and their families from anywhere in the world. The government sees the role of foreign professionals as helping to meet shortfalls in local manpower and jumpstarting new economic initiatives. The current emphasis is on recruiting foreign professionals (as opposed to low-skilled workers), e.g. IT employees from India, nurses from China and the Philippines, animators from the Philippines, craftsmen from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and bio-pharmaceutical technicians from Australia (Chia, 2004). Foreign professionals are often granted permanent residence in a government effort to maintain population levels and boost human resource productivity. The response of the local Singapore population to this infl ux of foreign talent has been mixed. There is public concern about growing competition for a diminishing numbers of jobs (Richardson, 2001), particularly during the recent 1997 economic recession, that led to many Singaporeans losing their jobs. The existence of negative local sentiments towards foreign professionals suggests that the use of immigration to battle increasing old age dependency ratios is limited and other policies need to be implemented. Currently, foreign professionals currently make up 9% of the professional workforce—and the Ministry of Trade and Industry estimates that they contributed 37% to Singapore’s gross domestic product from 1991 to 2000 (Chia, 2004). Formal institutions for older adults do exist in Singapore in the form of day care centres, home help service, and sheltered homes. The former two types of formal care are aimed at easing family care of older adults. Day Care Centres for Senior Citizens are day-time programmes that offer supportive help to frail elderly, while their family members are at work. These centres run activities, such as exercises and recreational activities. Home Help Service is a programme that provides in-home support to frail elderly, which includes meal delivery, laundry service, housekeeping, help in personal care hygiene, help in running simple errands and aid in visiting doctors. Sheltered Homes cater to older adults without family support, and their residents are mainly destitute aged and low-income older adults, who are unable to live with their family, because of a breakdown in family relationships. Other formal schemes provided by the government and NGOs (non-governmental organisation) include activity-related programmes to keep older adults engaged and active in society. Two issues make it diffi cult to increase usage of formal care in Singapore. The fi rst lies in the pervasive ethos—backed strongly by the government—that the family should be the main caregiver for

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older members. The second issue is accessibility. In many cases, older women, who form the majority of the older population, are physically unable to join in formal activities due to disability or functional limitations. Older women are also socially disadvantaged; they are often widowed and very limited in their social interaction in the public sphere.

V Discussion

The support of older Singaporeans is a major area of concern as Singapore society ages. Older Singaporeans today are being cared for by their families. There is little reliance on formal systems of support, such as the CPF or nursing homes. This is, in part, due to the nature of the development of the CPF. Large numbers of Singaporeans used their CPF funds to pay for housing mortgages, resulting in an ‘asset rich, cash poor’ situation, and increasing the need to rely on family for old age ﬁ nancial support. However, fewer children available to provide support and increasing longevity necessitate the need for individuals to prepare for their own old age. The failure of Western social security tax-based systems has shown us that individual preparation is key. This requires more investor education and a change in mind-set among future older Singaporeans. In policy terms, the CPF system needs to be re-worked with a new time horizon in mind. The CPF needs to cater for at least 18 years of old age support, if a woman retires at 62 and lives to 80 years of age (using current life expectancy). One suggestion would be to raise interest rates on CPF funds, since the current guarantee of 2.5% nominal return does not even preserve the real value of contributions, as the longer term annual inﬂ ation rate in Singapore has been around 3% (Asher, 2002). Alternatively, individuals should be allowed to work for a longer period of time. A mandatory retirement age creates ageism by instilling the image of an older worker who is past his/her prime. It also creates a situation whereby employers are unwilling to hire older workers because they have ‘retired’ from an earlier job. Increasingly, older adults will be better educated and have more resources. They will have better health behaviour over their life course and thus live longer, healthier lives. This should enhance their ability to work and live independently in old age, thus lessening the pressure placed on the family to provide old age care. Future cohorts of elderly may prefer to live alone. In Malaysia, higher education and income

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levels are associated with a preference for privacy over living with children (DaVanzo & Chan, 1994). In Singapore, a survey of HDB residents in 1997 showed an overall preference for living independently among 75% of those middle-aged parents surveyed. If older adults choose to live alone, housing policies need to provide for more assisted living communities that contain the necessary facilities, e.g. medical. Older adults need to be provided with more housing options. At present, single-room fl ats are occupied by older adults from the lower income group. The provision of better equipped and attractive housing options will surely generate interest among incoming older cohorts. The demographic changes that Singapore is experiencing, including low fertility, increasing longevity, late marriage or non-marriage, increasing divorce rates, and migration, dictate the social network available to provide familial care for older adults in future. The news is not good, as the demographics translate into fewer caregivers available to assist older adults. In addition, increases in the cost of living will put pressure on families to care for the healthcare needs of their older members. Government policies that assist the family to care for the aged are needed now, more than ever. Perhaps more importantly, policies that facilitate the independence of older adults, both fi nancially and socially, are critical. The earlier we can instill personal independence and the longer we can forestall dependence, the easier it will be to sustain a mature society, both economically and socially. As one of the fastest aging countries in Asia, Singapore can take the lead in developing policies to enhance the quality of life of older individuals. The 2006 Committee on Aging (COA) report identifi es fi ve areas of focus in the next fi ve years: a) elder-friendly housing, b) employment, c) a barrier-free society, d) holistic affordable healthcare and eldercare, and e) the promotion of active lifestyles and well-being (COA, 2006). The report stresses the importance of family support and the need to continually foster strong bonds between generations. At the same time, the report acknowledges the importance of support for caregivers who generally fi nd caregiving for older adults an overwhelming responsibility. As global aging continues at an unprecedented pace and produces new situations, for which we have no experience, the basic values of respect, social awareness and parity will hopefully be the grounds on which policies for the aged are developed. New generations of older adults will be more capable of determining their own future. Indeed,

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the middle-aged policy makers of today are writing policies for their own old age. No one can escape aging, only the suffering of an ill- prepared old age.

References

Anh, T.S., Bui The Cuong, Goodkind, D. & Knodel, J. (1997) “Living arrangements, Patrilineality and Sources of Support among elderly Vietnamese” in Asia-Pacifi c Population Journal, 12: 69–88. Asher, M. (1996) “Financing Old Age in Southeast Asia: An Overview” in Southeast Asian Affairs, 70-98. —— (2002) “Pension reform in an affl uent and rapidly ageing society” in Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 43 (2): 105–118. Biddlecom, A., Chayovan, N. & Ofstedal. M.B. (2002) “Intergenerational Support and Transfers” in A.I. Hermalin (ed) The Well-Being of the Elderly in Asia: A Four-Country Comparative Study, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Biddlecom, A., Ofstedal, M.B., Hermalin, A.I., Chang, M.C. & Chuang, Y.L. (abbreviated correctly?) (2001) Tradeoffs between Public and Private Economic Support of the Elderly: Results from a Natural Experiment in Taiwan, Population Studies Center: University of Michigan, Comparative Study of the Elderly in Asia Research Report No. 01–58. Bloom, D.E., Canning, D. & Sevilla, J. (2003) “The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change” in Population Matters: A RAND Program of Policy-Relevant Research Communication, Santa Monica: RAND. Chan, A. (1997) “An Overview of the Living Arrangements and Social Support Exchanges of Older Singaporeans” in Asia-Pacifi c Population Journal, 12 (4): 35–50. ____ (1999) “The Social and Economic consequences of Ageing in Asia” in Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 27 (2): 1–8. Chang, M.C. (1999) “A Longitudinal Study on Living Arrangements of the Elderly in Taiwan” in Chaonan Chen, Albert I. Hermalin, Sheng-cheng Hu & James P. Smith (eds) Emerging Social Economic Welfare Programs for Aging in Taiwan in a World Context, Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. Chia, S.A. (2004) “Singapore aims to be a ‘plug-and play’ place” in Straits Times, 3 March 2004. Committee on Aging Issues. (2006) Report 2006, http://www.mcys.gov.sg/successful_age- ing/report/CAI_report.pdf, accessed on 27 June 2006. Committee on Aging Issues. http://www.mcys.gov.sg/successful_ageing/report/CAI_ MR.pdf, accessed on 16 May 2007. Cowgill, D.O. & Holmes, L.D. (eds) (1972) Aging and Modernization. New York: Appleton- Century-Crofts. Cox, D., Hansen, B.E. & Jimenez, E. (2004) “How responsive are private transfers to income: Evidence from a laissez-faire economy” in Journal of Public Economics, 88: 2193–2219. Da Vanzo, J. & Chan, A. (1994) “Living arrangements of older Malaysians: who co- resides with their adult children?” in Demography, 31 (1): 95–113. Department of Statistics. http://www.dos.gov.sg Fawcett, J.T. & Khoo, S.E. (1983) “Singapore: Rapid Fertility Transition in a Compact Society” in Population and Development Review, 6 (4) December: 549–579. Frankenberg, E., Chan, A. & Ofstedal, M.B. (2002) “Stability and Change in Living Arrangements of the Elderly in Southeast Asia” in Population Studies 26: 201–213.

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Frankenberg, E., Beard, V. & Saputra, M. (1999) “The Kindred Spirit: The Ties that Bind Indonesian Children and their Parents” in Journal of Social Science, 27: 65–86. Hermalin, A.I. (1997) “Drawing Policy Lessons for Asia from Research on Ageing” in Asia Pacifi c Population Journal 12 (4): 89–102. Inter-Ministerial Committee on Ageing Report. (1999) http://www.mcys.com.sg Internal Revenue Authority of Singapore. (2007) http://www.iras.gov.sg/ESVPortal/ iit/iitse1.1.6.5+parents+handicapped+parents+relief.asp, accessed 16 May 2007. Knodel, J. & Debavalya, N. (correctly abbreviated?) (1997a) “Living Arrangements and Support Among the Elderly in South-East Asia: An Introduction” in Asia Pacifi c Population Journal 12 (4): 5–16. —— & Chayovan, N. (correctly abbreviated?) (1997b) “Family Support and Living Arrangements of Thai Elderly” in Asia Pacifi c Population Journal 12 (4): 51–68. Lee, S.M., Alvarez, G. & Palen, J.J. (1991) “Fertility Decline and Pronatalist Policy in Singapore” in International Family Planning Perspectives 17 (2): 65–73. Lee, Y.J., Parish W.L. & Willis, R.J. (1994) “Sons, Daughters, and Intergenerational Support in Taiwan” in American Journal of Sociology 99 (4): 1010–1041. Martin, L.G. 1989 “Living Arrangements of the Elderly in Fiji, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines” in Demography 26 (4): 627–643. —— & Kinsella, K. (1994) “Research on the Demography of Aging in Developing Countries,” in Linda Martin and Samuel H. Preston (eds). Demography of Aging, Washington DC: National Academy Press. Natividad, J.N. & Cruz, G.T. (1997) “Patterns in Living Arrangements and Familial Support for the Elderly in the Philippines” in Asia-Pacifi c Population Journal, 12 (4): 14–37. Ofstedal, M.B., Chayovan, N., Chan, A., Chuang, Y.L., Perez, A. & Hermalin, A.I. (2001) “Policies and Programs Pertaining to the Welfare of the Elderly” in A.I. Hermalin (ed) The Well-Being of the Elderly in Asia: A Four-Country Comparative Study, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. ——, Knodel, J. & Chayovan, N. (1999) “Intergenerational Support and Gender: A Comparison of Four Asian Countries” in Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 27 (2): 21–42. Richardson, M. (2001) “A call to hire ‘Singaporeans First’” in International Herald Tribune, 3 November 2001. Saw, S.H. (1999) The Population of Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Schoeni, R. (2002) “Does unemployment insurance displace familial assistance?” in Public Choice 110 (1–2): 99–119. Shantakumar, G. (1999) “Ageing in the City-State Context: Perspectives from Singapore” in Ageing International, Summer, 1999, pp. 46–60. Singapore Census of Population (2000) http://www.dos.gov.sg Straits Times (2006) Alliance set up to stamp out job discrimination, 30 May 2006. Vasoo, S., Ngiam, T.L. & Cheung, P. (2002) “Singapore’s ageing population: social challenges and responses,” in D.R. Phillips (ed) Ageing in the Asia-Pacifi c Region: Issues, Policies and Future Trends, Routledge: London. Westley, S.B., “Asia is Next Challenge: Caring for the Elderly” in East-West Center, April 1998, No. 45, http://www2.eastwestcenter.org/pop/misc/p&p-45.pdf, accessed 20 May 2006. Westley, S.B., Lee, S-H & Mason, A. “Policy Options to Support Asia’s Growing Elderly Population” in East-West Center, July 2000, No 54, http://www2.eastwestcenter. org/pop/misc/p&p-54.pdf, accessed 20 May 2006. World Bank. (1994) Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

TONG_f5_73-96.indd 96 2/7/2008 5:06:10 PM EDUCATION, GLOBALISATION, AND INEQUALITY

Anne Rafﬁ n

This paper examines the current policy of the Singaporean government to turn Singapore into an international tertiary educational hub for Asia. The major drive for this evolution is the economic contribution of students to the local economy, as well as attracting foreign talent to the island—one means to compensate the low current total fertility rate of 1.24 births per woman. Such an approach—viewing education as a tool to promote the economy—is not new, especially in the Singaporean context.1 Rather, the novelty resides in counting on a large pool of foreign students as a generator of wealth and turning education into a lucrative industry. According to the government agency, the Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB): “70% of the demand for international higher education in 2025 is expected to come from Asia. What are you waiting for?”2 Likewise, a 2003 report by the Economic Review Committee stressed the “need to grow our services sector, to tap major new opportunities in Asia. We have to promote new, exportable services like healthcare, education and creative industries” as a tool to increase economic growth in the country.3 Whereas the purpose of education is much broader—manpower training, nation-building, etc—advent global education must be viewed as a two-tiered system distinguishing local from foreign students: Proposed strategy: A possible scenario would be to have a tiered system of universities. At the apex would be the World Class Universities . . . [which] would focus primarily on postgraduate education. . . . The next tier would be the existing universities NUS, NTU and SMU . . . providing the core of Singapore’s manpower needs, creating a regular talent pipeline of regional

1 On the topic see Tremewan, C. (1994): The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, New York: St. Martin’s Press; Ang, C.H. (2004): The Political Economy of Singapore’s Education Policy, unpublished honour thesis, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. 2 Singapore Economic Development Board, “Education Services,” http://ww.sedb. com/edbcorp/sg/en_uk/index/industry_opp/education_services.html. 3 Economic Review Committee, “New Challenges, Fresh Goals—Towards a Dynamic Global City” 6 February 2003, http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/ERC/frm_ERC_Default. asp?sid=150&cid=1487.

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scholars, and providing education as a public good. The third tier would comprise additional private universities. These universities would focus on teaching and applied research . . . They would receive the bulk of the additional foreign student population. The universities could be foreign or local in origin, with their own campuses. . . . Most of the international students would be paying full fees.4 This view has not evolved in a vacuum, but harks back to the recent past. In the mid-1980s the Economic Committee, directed by then Minister of State (Trade and Industry) BG Lee Hsien Loong, noted the role of education as an economic sector that could boost the local economy. Following such an assessment was the 1998 scheme by the EDB to attract at least 10 important universities to set up in Singapore. November 1998 saw the start of a collaboration between Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Singapore’s National University of Singapore (NUS) and Nanyang Technological University (NTU). A few months earlier, Johns Hopkins University had established Johns Hopkins Singapore to promote collaborative research and medical education.5 The 1997 ﬁ nancial crisis and the awakening of an economically powerful China have reinforced the trend to re-conceptualise education not only as a tool for the development of human capital, but also as a means to foster economic growth by tapping “the opportunities of emerging economies like China and India.”6 According to the expert Maryam Khelili, China and India are expected to be among the six richest countries in the world. If China’s annual economic growth stays at its current rate—more than 9%—by 2041, it will be the world’s top economic power (Ramonet, 2004: 1). Equally important, it is estimated that about 24,000 students leave India every year to study in foreign universities (UNESCO, 2003: 17). Consequently, as one local minister puts it, “China and India will be the countries to watch, as they are

4 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “Developing Singapore’s Education Industry” pp. 3, 5, www.mti.gov.sg. 5 Ministry of Trade and Industry, “Developing Singapore’s Education Industry” pp. 1, 13, www.mti.gov.sg. 6 Economic Review Committee, “New Challenges, Fresh Goals—Towards a Dynamic Global City.”

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projected to generate over half the total global demand [for international higher education].”7 After presenting the new features of Singaporean tertiary education, this paper will attempt to refl ect on the implications of a more global market-oriented higher education, as well as the latter’s present and future contributions to the building of wealth and inequality in Singapore and the rest of Asia. Glenn Firebaugh tells us that income inequality is declining across nations, while increasing within nations (2003). More precisely, it brings forward the question of equity and access to this global education. Who is going to benefi t from it? This paper introduces the rationales, the means, and the activities that defi ne the globalisation of higher education and its implication for economic growth and inequality.

I The Rationale Behind Turning Singapore into an International Educational Hub

The nature of education has evolved over the centuries. The ﬁ rst part of the 16th century in Europe embodied ‘the golden age of wandering scholars.’ However, the Reformation and the counter-Reformation slowed down such a movement, since various nations decided that foreign universities were seats ‘of religious and political contamination.’ To this marginal group of mobile students representing an ‘incidental and individual’ dimension of global education, contrast the present Singaporean case, where the State is putting forward a well-thought-out and organised effort to foster global education (de Wit, 2002: 9, 16). The rise of knowledge-based economies as well as the effects of accelerated globalisation in Asia are challenges for higher education, which has to adapt and produce graduates who can perform in this new environment. Crudely, the move from industrialism to post-industrialism demands a shift from machine technology, capital, and labour to intellectual technology, information, and knowledge (Bills, 2004: 84). Such an evolution, argues Szafran, needs a workforce demonstrating skills at

7 Speech by Dr Ng Eng Hen, Acting Minister for Manpower and Minister of State For Education at the opening session of the second general meeting on the Asia-Europe Meeting Education Hub, 3 November 2003, Singapore.

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social interaction and at exchanging and manipulating information (Bills, 2004: 105). The rhetoric of a global knowledge economy, requiring a global education and globally oriented people, is strong in Singapore. For instance, Minister of State for Education, Dr Ng Eng Hen, remarked that studying abroad “can also broaden their [students’] horizons, to immerse themselves in another culture to enhance their educational experience and give them an extra edge in the job market.”8 Interestingly, though, the demand of the labour market as a support for an internationalised higher education is open to argument. A study conducted by Hubert B. Van Hoof concluded, that an international educational background is, at best, the fi fth priority for a US company seeking employees for an international job. Thus, the need for staff with a global standardised education is not a priority for many corporations (Van Hoof, 1999). On the other hand, in Hungary—an ex-communist country making the transition to a market economy—12 business and industry representatives interviewed by Liduine Bremer viewed an overseas education as an asset, since it was presumed to promote language and communication skills. However, according to 683 former Hungarian students who studied abroad, their foreign training played only a minor role in helping them get employment. This disparity is probably due to a lack of contact between universities and industries (Bremer, 1998). The World Bank has had an infl uence in redefi ning the role of tertiary institutions in Singapore as a means to adapt to a post-industrial society and in pushing public universities to be less dependent on the State for funds (Mok & Tan, 2004: 76). More precisely, in a keynote address, EDB Chairman Teo Ming Kian argued, that intellectual capital produced by universities needs to be commercialised as a means for these institutions to foster and control some of the economic growth. He added: “Increasingly, universities worldwide are recognising the benefi ts of commercialising their own technology. The revenues will help fund student intake and research, which in turn leads to more intellectual capital.”9 Indeed, as Bok notes, commercial revenues have a specifi c merit because they can often be employed for any aim offi cials select (2003: 105). Still the commercialisation of university research can

8 Speech by Dr Ng Eng Hen, 3 November 2003, Singapore. 9 “Setting an international course,” Knowledge Enterprise, a publication of NUS, September 2004, p. 8.

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nurture unwanted ties. For instance, scholars from Harvard and the University of Minnesota found that more than half of all university scholars, who obtain gifts from drug or biotech companies, acknowledged that the donors counted on having infl uence over their research, from prior review of published works to patent rights for commercial discoveries (Huber, 2000: 107). Further, universities should be careful not to hire professors, because they can come along with important sums of corporate funding, or because they are researching a topic that has little scientifi c interest but can offer large commercial, and therefore, fi nancial returns. Otherwise, the quality of academic work would be affected (Bok, 2003: 106). Some social scientists contend that a number of public universities have been ‘privatised’ in the sense that they are increasingly responsible for raising their own funds (Ballantine & Spade, 2004: 453). Recent conceptions regarding higher education funding stress the necessity for students to pay for the cost of education, as policymakers increasingly perceive higher education as an asset favourable to the individual, rather than as a public good profi table to society. This new thinking, in association with a decrease in public expenditure in many nations, translated into harsh fi nancial diffi culties for universities (Ballantine & Spade, 2004: 453). However, the Singapore State is still substantially funding tertiary education as key to helping the island achieve its social and economic goals (Tan, 2004: 192). Indeed, the State has always set the foundation for economic growth and, in fact, directs the overall procedure (Castells, 1998: 73). Education is still perceived as a public good when it comes to Singaporean citizens. The internationalisation of education in the US after 1900 was motivated by the advancement of peace and mutual understanding, but today it is perceived as a means to invigorate the country’s economic competitiveness (de Wit, 2002: 22–23, 15). Such a view is embraced in Singapore, where the language of effi ciency and competitiveness is becoming more and more a part of the academic world. According to Jason Tan, the Singapore educational system has evolved from a ‘State control model’ to a ‘market-led model’ (Mok & Tan, 2004: 10, 18). The wealth generated by universities through foreign students is a key incentive to foster international education on the island. Examples such as the US, which announced that in the year 2000, its almost 500,000 foreign students contributed about US $9 billion to the US economy, have not gone unnoticed. The Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry’s website states its “vision is for Singapore to attract an

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additional 100,000 international full-fee paying students.”10 A step in this direction has already been taken. For instance, Singapore Polytechnic (SP) will take in its fi rst batch of 250 full-fee paying foreign students for its full-time diploma courses next year, and hopes to increase this number to 1,200 in fi ve years. These students will pay more than S$10,000 a year in fees, about fi ve times the subsidised fee of S$1,950 local students pay annually. . . . Temasek Polytechnic is launch- ing a two-year diploma in hospitality and tourism business for about 50 full-fee paying foreign students this December. The annual tuition fee is S$12,600.11 As Breton argues, knowledge is becoming a good that is sold and bought (2003: 27). In addition, bringing full-fee paying students reduces the role of the national government in financing higher education. It makes economic sense to attract foreign students, since they will indirectly plough money into the economy, by renting houses as well as creating a domestic demand for different products and services. Further, they are very likely to travel in the region and have their parents come to visit them, thereby generating even more revenue. The main difference between the US and Singapore is that the former has not invested actively in recruitment campaigns, living off its reputation (de Wit, 2002: 29–30, 91–92). In contrast, Singaporean offi cials have been diligent in recruiting potential students abroad, from participating in overseas education shows to establishing offi ces abroad to deal with student recruitment. The Singapore Tourism Board (STB) has been organising global education fairs, mostly in Asia. For instance, STB offi cials made 34 visits to Indian cities from April 2003 to August 2004. The agency had plans to organise such road shows not only in Asia, but also in the Middle East and Moscow.12 This active pace of educational fairs has been maintained until today with the recent ‘International Education Exhibition Tour,’ which was held in March 2007. During this tour, exhibitors visited 19 Chinese cities, drawing 830 institutions and organisations as well as 800,000 participants to their

10 http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/ERC/frm_ERC_Default.asp?sid=124&cid=1267. 11 Straits Times (2004) “Singapore Poly to take in full-fee foreign students,” 3 December. 12 Straits Times (2004) “S’pore education big draw abroad,” 30 August.

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events. In 2006, road shows were organised in India, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Korea.13 Apart from the economic input, de Wit speaks of internationally oriented tertiary education as a ‘diplomatic investment,’ where education becomes ‘the fourth dimension of foreign policy’ by promoting a better profi le of a nation, thus raising the image of the country (de Wit, 2002: 85).14 Indeed, education offi cials hope that students will go back to their country and some will become decision-makers in the future. The hope is that these students—especially those who benefi ted from scholarships—would remember the host country with gratitude and might, in the long run, play a role in re-inforcing social and economic ties between their home country and Singapore. Such students would become part of a network put out by the Singapore tertiary educational system, which is already moving towards building a regional identity by creating offshore schools and campuses in the region. In this case, some players are private companies launch- ing educational institutions. For instance, Singaporean companies such as Raffl es Campus, which specialises in providing education in Asia, have been setting up educational centres offering English language programmes as well as diplomas in business and hospitality management in Vietnam.15 Quite a few privately funded institutions function outside the mainstream and respond to the growing demand for higher education diplomas. Such a need is mainly the result of a still important correlation between the level of education and work income (Tan, 2004: 179). Offshore initiatives launched by mainstream educational institutions are more geared toward Singaporean students. For instance, in 2006, NUS opened its fi fth overseas college in Bangalore, India. The focal point of this college is IT (information technology), since the city encompasses more than 1,000 software and hardware companies. The overseas colleges—the fi rst one was created in 2001—are located in academic and entrepreneurial hubs—Silicon Valley, Philadelphia,

13 http://app.singaporeedu.gov.sg/asp/hig/hig0101a.asp?id=1202 14 Matthew Evans, counselor, education, science and training, Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur—phone interview, 7 October 2004. 15 Straits Times (2004) “S’pore companies launch new education centres in Vietnam,” 19 August.

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Shanghai, and Stockholm—and aim at promoting an entrepreneurial spirit and global mindset in selected Singaporean students.16 At the same time, the social rationale points to the key role of the ‘social learning’ that a student accumulates by studying in a different cultural environment. It is believed that personal and intellectual growth result from exposure to different cultures. Heavily subsidised student exchanges overseas are now available to local students.17 Admitting foreign students brings diversity home and challenges local students. As Alan Goh, the director of undergraduate admissions at Singapore Management University (SMU), says: “It [bringing students from abroad] allows our students to become global citizens who are able to work with all kinds of people and able to understand different ways of thinking and modes of behaviour.”18 Incorporating such knowledge for local students is important since their pre-tertiary education is quite rigid and mostly based on rote-learning, hampering the development of creativity. Further, Singaporeans rarely study with expatriated youngsters, who mostly go to international schools, thereby missing the opportunity to interact with a population having different world views.

II The Means and its Content

The organisational model in Singapore to promote tertiary education targetting foreigners shows how the Singaporean government is still very much involved in this new development. The Management Development Institute of Singapore studies the needs and evaluates different propositions regarding education, while two other State agencies play a key role: the EDB focuses on importing prestigious international universities to the island, and the STB, in February 2003, developed a branch specialising in education services. It is a four-pronged approach:

a) ‘basic education and higher learning’ from preparatory to tertiary education, b) ‘enrichment programmes’ i.e. overseas school trips to Singapore,

16 Maria Almenoar, “NUS to open 5th overseas college in Bangalore,” in Straits Times, 2 February 2006. 17 “Keep minds open,” Knowledge Enterprise, a publication of NUS, October 2004, p. 3. 18 Straits Times (2004) “Marketing S’pore Varsities Abroad,” 18 October.

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c) ‘corporate education’ from executive study missions to corporate and executive training, d) ‘student services.’

The task of the STB is to seek foreign students who can come to Singapore to study. Representatives of various tertiary institutions also get involved in the process of recruiting students abroad.19 The choice of the STB as a promotional agency rather than the Ministry of Education (MOE) was based on the fact that the MOE's key priorities are focused on meeting Singapore's domestic education needs. Moreover, the STB, when compared with other State agencies, emerged as a logical choice, since it had already accumulated many years of experience in being a people-oriented unit and had already developed a marketing network, with which such an international promotional effort could quickly dovetail.20 The structure includes International Enterprise Singapore (IE), formerly known as the Singapore Trade Development Board. Its mission is to assist companies to grow economically and become successful at the international level. One of its business services divisions is education. Its aim is to develop the education business in Singapore as well as abroad. The last component is the Standards, Productivity and Innovation Board (SPRING Singapore), which is in charge of standards and making sure that Singaporean institutions—both public and private—are offering quality education. Organisations that achieve the benchmark of quality are certiﬁ ed by SPRING Singapore and receive Singapore Quality Class Awards (Mok & Tan, 2004: 70). The Singapore Quality Class for Private Education Organisations has to be careful to assess not just the managerial capacity of these learning institutions and the grades/diplomas received by the students, but also the quality of courses offered to learners.21 Parallel to this top-down approach to developing tertiary education is the strategy of building regional and global academic networks and partnerships. Local universities have signed joint partnerships with

19 Straits Times (2004) “S’pore education big draw abroad,” 30 August. 20 Interview with Yeh Choy Yan, Assistant Director, Student Services Department, Singapore Tourism Board, 1 November 2004. 21 Sandra Davie, “Gaps are plugged—now to build on head starts,” in Straits Times, 10 September 2004.

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well-known foreign universities such as MIT, Johns Hopkins University, Technological University of Munich, and Shanghai Jiao Tong Uni- versity. Through such tie-ups with internationally recognised tertiary institutions, State offi cials hope to attract even more non-Singaporean students. Equally important, NUS is part of the Association of Pacifi c Rim Universities, a consortium of 35 leading research universities along the Pacifi c Rim. Singapore is also part of the ASEAN University Network, which promotes co-operation among universities in the region (Knight, Jane & Hans de Wit, 1998: 143). Technological developments are changing the nature of university education. After the establishment of Singapore’s reputation as an international centre for tertiary education, e-learning probably will be the next step. That would allow the island to go global and, therefore, reach more students. Online learning is also gaining momentum. For instance, NUS belongs to an international network, established in 1997, of 20 universities located in twelve countries called Universitas 21. Its goal is to promote collaboration and co-operation among the universities as well as to foster entrepreneurial opportunities on an international scale.22 The chief executive of Universitas 21 believes that such a programme “allows people to learn at their own pace without leaving their comfort zone.”23 To establish itself as an international tertiary educational hub, Singapore has to compete primarily with Australia, which has been very active in recruiting Asian students for its universities, and in establishing offshore campuses in Asia. The exportation of knowledge and recruitment of international students are now Australia’s number-one export product (de Wit, 2002: 92). Such dynamic behaviour has placed Australia as the third largest exporter of higher education internationally, right after the US and Great Britain. The STB is promoting a discourse stressing Singapore’s unique identity, which allows Singapore to offer a type of educational experience that Australia cannot. As one of the brochures put out for foreign students by the STB underlines: “Education in Singapore draws from the latest and best in knowledge around the globe, blending the fi nest from the East and the West.”24 Whereas the Australian system appears to offer only an Australian edu-

22 http://www.universitas21.bham.ac.uk/about/. 23 Straits Times (2004) “12 weeks into course, he ﬁ nally meets his classmates,” 3 May. 24 STB, “Education in Singapore: basic education and higher learning,” p. 3.

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cation, Singapore is hoping to attract foreign students with the fact that it has both foreign and local institutions. For instance, SMU, created in 2000, is the fi rst private university funded by the government. It is tailored after the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Since 2000, the prestigious French business school INSEAD as well as the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business have had campuses in Singapore. Such approach would hopefully help meet the EDB’s goal “of tripling the number of foreign students studying here to 150,000 within the next 10 to 15 years.”25 Further, State offi cials see the colonial heritage of Singapore’s educational system as an asset that allows Singapore’s education, and consequently the paper qualifi cation, to be recognised locally as well as internationally. For instance, Singapore’s secondary school education prepares students for the Singapore-Cambridge General Certifi cate of Education ‘Ordinary’ (GGE ‘O’) level or ‘Normal’ (GCE ‘N’) level examinations. Thailand, Malaysia, and even Vietnam are also looking at international tertiary education as a means to generate revenue. While authorities have not yet created or restructured universities to target foreign students, they are inviting foreign universities to set up in their countries. These three nations do not yet have the academic reputation of Singapore, but, in the long run, they might become strong competitors, by offering a cheaper tertiary education. The belief is that in this age of globalisation, individuals need to understand the world, be profi cient in foreign languages, and have knowledge of other cultures. Multi-cultural Singapore, with its bilingual educational system—English-Mandarin for ethnic Chinese, English- Tamil for Indians, and English-Malay for Malays—offers an environment that can respond to these needs.26 Indeed, one of the advantages of Singapore is that its lingua franca is English, the language of higher education. As P. Scott argues, universities today are challenged by globalisation, due to, among other reasons, their close association with national cultures (de Wit, 2002: 144). The fact that different ethnic groups in Singapore have maintained their traditions and culture is an asset in attracting other Asian students to the island, since they fi nd

25 Jane Ng, “Australian university to set up here,” in Straits Times, 21 August 2004. 26 The Singaporean population is composed of roughly 77% Chinese, 14% Malays, 8% Indians, and 1% others.

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the environment ‘familiar.’ One Indian father says his son’s reason for choosing Singapore rather than the US for his tertiary education was Singapore’s perceived attachment to “traditional Asian values,” which enables it to offer “a far safer place where Indian children will not get spoilt by Western values.”27 In addition, since Singapore is an international ﬁ nancial hub, STB is promoting it as the ideal place for getting a diploma in business. As the advertising stresses: “It is a great place to make friends from around the world, and build contacts for future networking possibilities.”28

III Asian Students’ Responses to the Singaporean Tertiary Educational Policy

Educational exchange is a 20th century phenomenon promoted by the Cold War, when both superpowers aimed at securing more knowledge about the rest of the world and enlarging their spheres of infl uence. The Third World especially benefi tted from this, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s. Up to now, the movement of students has been primarily from south to north, while the fl ow of faculty and funds has been from north to south (de Wit, 2002: 11–14). Singapore is intervening in this relation, trying to redirect some of the stream of students from south to south, i.e. mainly from the rest of Asia to Singapore. In addition, the number of international applications to graduate schools in the USA is still down 27% since 2003, when a more restricted visa policy for foreign students was implemented as a result of 9/11. This gave Singapore an opportunity to increase its recruitment of foreign students.29 Why would Asian students come to Singapore for tertiary education rather than the US, UK or Australia? A strong incentive is that the cost of study is much lower than in the US and Great Britain. As other studies have noted, the cost of living and the availability of fi nancial assistance are the fi rst concerns of students (Mazzarol & Soutar, 2001: 54). The STB advises international students to budget S$750 to S$2,000 monthly, i.e. approximately US$495 to US$1,320. This comprises not only living expenses, but

27 Straits Times (2004) “Indians throng S’pore education fair,” 13 September. 28 STB, “Education in Singapore: basic education and higher learning,” p. 3. 29 Rebecca Knight, “Foreign student applications rise in US,” in Financial Times, 17 April 2007, p. 5.

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also “books and stationery, as well as medical and hospitalisation insurance.”30 Universities offer interest-free study loans to foreign students. Undergraduate foreign students pay only 10% more than locals. In return for receiving an education subsidised by the government, they have to work three years in Singapore or in a Singapore registered company, anywhere in the world. If they refuse that option, they have to pay full fees. Such an offer is attractive, especially for students from poor countries. Meanwhile, Singapore gains by having these students contribute to the economy, without bearing the cost of their prior education (Tan, 2004: 187). The key reason that NUS, for instance, wished to have foreign students is to augment its talent pool. Thus the administration goes to great length to secure recruitment through subsidised fees, scholarships and guaranteed housing for at least two years, while they are studying in Singapore. Singapore also hopes to benefi t from the external perception of Singaporean education by Asian students. Surveys show that often foreign students perceive education in Singapore as industry-oriented, i.e. preparing good learners for the workplace. In addition, they see the island as offering a cosmopolitan environment that is good for business and networking. Finally, the country can give them a multi-cultural experience from being at the crossroads of Southeast Asia. Thus, foreign students come here for the opportunities. A survey conducted by The Times of London ranked NUS 18th among the top 200 universities worldwide. The results were published in The Times Higher Education Supplement on 5 November 2004. Such fi ndings help boost the reputation of this institution.31 A third-year Indian business student at SMU was quoted in the local newspaper: “I tell them [Indian students] that as the education I’m getting is comparable to what top universities in the US and Britain are offering, I’m getting amazing value for money.”32 Finally, Singapore is geographically closer to home for other Asian students. According to one advertisement, 2.8 billion of the world’s population are situated within a seven-hour fi ght from the island. This

30 STB, “Education in Singapore: basic education and higher learning,” p. 12. 31 “For the survey, the Times asked about 1,300 academics in 88 countries to name the best institutions in ﬁ elds they were knowledgeable about. The ranking then took into account the amount of cited research produced by faculty members as an indicator of intellectual vitality, the ratio of professors to students and a university’s success in attracting foreign students and internationally renowned academics.” “NUS beats top US varsities to rank No. 18,” Straits Times, 6 November 2004, p. 3. 32 Straits Times (2004) “Marketing S’pore Varsities Abroad,” 18 October.

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encompasses Southeast Asia, Australia, China, India, and Japan. Already Singapore has been quite successful in targetting and answering the needs of the region: 20% of the 22,000 undergraduates and 50% of the 9,000 postgraduates at NUS are non-Singaporeans.33 On the other hand, informal surveys among Singaporean students at NUS reveal an uneasy feeling, among local students, worrying about stronger competition from foreign talent for access to middle-class jobs. Such feelings are supported by Appold’s research, which argues that graduate migrants in Singapore have been beneﬁ tting from a policy, that gives them disproportionate high value-added jobs with strong wages (2005). This has been part of Singapore’s policy to attract foreign talents. Equally important, some foreign students and foreign staff have expressed concerns regarding the implementation of Singapore’s restrictive laws on assembly, speech, and press activities on campus, which led to the 2005 decision by Warwick University to cancel its plan for a Singapore campus. This Warwick incident has pointed to worries about academic freedom, a topic that the Singaporean government will have to tackle if it wishes to develop Singapore not only as an Asian educational hub, but also as an international one.34 Finally, the May 2007 decision of the Australian University of New South to terminate all its programmes on their new Asian Campus in Singapore only after a semester of existence, shows that foreign students want ﬁ rst to see results before joining a new educational venture. Indeed, one of the reasons for closing down this Asian campus was the lower than expected enrollment of students.

IV The Issue of Education and Inequality

Over the last few decades, the face of higher education has changed. We can wonder what the implications of these changes are on economic development in Singapore and the rest of Asia. Global education could be a valuable engine for economic growth on the island, by creating new jobs in various sectors. In 2000, “the education services sector contributed 1.9% of Singapore gross domestic product (GDP).” A

33 http://www.nus.edu.sg/osa/international/deans_message.htm. 34 John Burton, “Warwick’s decision disrupts Singapore’s plans,” in Financial Times, 20 October 2005. Ho Ai Li and Sandra Davie, “Academic freedom issues worried Warwick,” in Straits Times, 20 October 2005.

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well-thought strategy could lead to a contribution of 3 to 5% of the GDP, similar to Australia and UK.35 However, the ﬁ nancial viability of international education depends heavily on job placement. If an institution has strong ties to employers and can give graduates connections, it will do much better than if it gives an equally good education, but provides no job-search support. While the Singapore- MIT Alliance (SMA) does not give Asian students access to MIT’s job-search network, the SMA helps its students through active links with local employers. Participation in internship programmes has been a tool for companies to judge the quality of students before considering them as future employees. In addition, the Singapore-MIT Alliance Industry Consortium (SMAIC) “matches companies and research fellows specialising in similar research domains, initiating possible joint collaborations and facilitating interaction between the two.”36 Yet, can the local market absorb on a longue durée these future workers? In addition, the situation raises the question of whether Asian students join this programme as a stepping stone to an American or First World job. If the answer is yes, would it limit the expansion of such joint programmes? Further, as already mentioned, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam might become strong competitors to Singapore by offering a cheaper tertiary education. Regarding the relation between equality and education, presumably Singaporean students in elite international tracks—e.g. SMA and Johns Hopkins Singapore—would acquire advantages denied to other Singaporeans, with the familiar Bourdieu effects of distinction and reproduction (Bourdieu, 1997). Youngsters from privileged backgrounds would more likely be able to use their cultural capital and habitus to gain access to these educational channels. Various studies have demonstrated that school performance tends to differ strongly according to students’ resources, which are unevenly allocated along the line of class (Chang & Mani, 1995: 51). At the other end of the spectrum, Tan notes, the Malay and Indian ethnic minorities in Singapore are still lagging behind the Chinese community in terms of educational attainment. Would the promotion of an international education help such local minorities? “The 2000 population census showed evidence of minority under-representation

35 http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/ERC/frm_ERC_Default.asp?sid=124&cid=1267. 36 Singapore-MIT Alliance, annual report 2003–04, p. 61.

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in higher education enrollment. The ethnic breakdown of local students in local universities was as follows: 92.4% Chinese, 2.7% Malay (who constitute 14% of the total population), and 4.3% Indian (who constitute 8% of the total population)” (Tan, 2004: 190, 195). Bhalla argues that when the availability of quality education varies by class—in Singapore, minorities are more represented in the lower classes—and location—access to good primary and secondary educational institutions, in our case—inequalities can be reinforced (2000: 224). More precisely, if an important part of the strategy is to draw in foreign students from the region, then what will be the impact on the mobility of the local population? Will this widen the gap between the Chinese and the Malays/Indians? Levin argues that this new age, characterised by high-tech products and processes, will not require all workers to be highly skilled and well-educated. In fact, the majority of the new positions created in high-tech industries will demand high school diplomas—for assemblers, clerks, warehouse workers—and advanced education and training for only a minority of high-tech positions (1984: 574–574). Bills notes the same phenomenon when he contrasts a class of people employed in privileged knowledge-intense jobs with the growing, or at least enduring, number of low-skilled workers. In this bifurcated society, some would be left behind due to their lack of educational credentials (2004: 107). It seems that we are moving toward a dual educational system catering to different needs with social consequences: a hyper-successful sector with global linkages and a domestic sector for the less able. For instance, Senior Minister Goh recently indicated that talented Singaporean students could study in top universities in China for their undergraduate degrees and move on to the US for post-graduate studies. He added: “If they can succeed in doing that, then we’ll really have very top class bi-cultural Singaporeans, with knowledge of Chinese beyond just speaking, but knowing the culture, knowing how to express themselves in beautiful language, and of course (whose) English is very strong.”37 Such evolution is unlikely to reduce the gap between the Chinese and the two other minorities groups, which, most probably, will continue to lag behind. Education could also favour the economic development of the region, since higher education often enhances labor skills and productivity. For

37 Daniel Buenas, “PAP manifesto is the way forward: SM Goh,” in The Business Times, Singapore, 19 April 2006.

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instance, the Lew Kuan Yew School of Social Policy at NUS received in 2007 a donation of S$100 million from Hong Kong businessman Li Ka-shing. This contribution aims at training policymakers in Asia as a means to “raise standards of governance . . . in the region” in order to “keep pace with its economic growth.”38 Yet questioning Bloom’s ﬁ nding that globalisation would provoke the passage from a ‘brain drain’ era to a ‘more positive brain exchange’ for developing countries (2005: 25) is the work of Ng Kian Boon, which examines the phenomenon of Chinese nationals studying in Singaporean tertiary institutions, as a springboard to possible migration to First World countries. 39 A similar concern is raised regarding Third World countries, which could lose some of its newly acquired human potential to the global environment ( Jucevičienë & Vaitkus, 2007: 43). India represents another possibly adverse situation: too many students are enrolled in Indian universities in proportion to what the labour market will offer, resulting in the ‘over-production’ of ‘educated’ people ( Jayaram, 2006: 748). Further, a university education rarely imparts work skills useful for rural life (Bhalla, 2000: 226). Thus, global education might re-inforce trends that do not promote great economic returns. Charles Tilly argues that inequalities can be a durable phenomenon (1998). According to Tilly, durable inequalities appear when people are classiﬁ ed following categorical inequalities grounded on demographics, race, or gender, for instance, and one or a few groups use these categories to exercise their power over others. On an economic level, such predominance translates into the powerful groups’ capability to extract and control resources. Thanks to opportunity hoarding, those groups and their supporters get access to the best resources and rewards, such as education. Finally, inequality spreads within organisations, when the elite use these categorical inequalities to resolve organisational challenges. Looking at Asia, the emulation of existing models of recruiting potential tertiary students in cities, probably helps to maintain higher education as an urban phenomenon, often accessible only to the wealthier groups of society. Indeed, China and India, in spite of expanding enormously, have less than 5% of their university-age population enrolled in post-secondary institutions (Ballantine & Spade,

38 LKY School of Public Policy receives $1000 million from Li Ka-shing, Knowledge Enterprise, A publication of NUS, April 2007, p. 4. 39 Ng Kian Boon, Ph.D. candidate at the University of South Australia.

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2004: 450–453). Not only is there a situation of unequal outcomes, but also of unequal opportunities. Regarding the relation between gender and equity, Laurie Dougherty rightfully questions the assumption, that women make their human capital and labour market choices “with the full and equal liberty attributed to rational Economic Man, or are they trapped by the legacy of a patriarchal ideology?” (Dougherty, 2000: 237). Thus, we can wonder who would beneﬁ t from the global education offered by Singapore. In India and China—both the target of global tertiary institutions—gender discrimination exists when it comes to schooling, especially among poorer families and lower castes in India (Dougherty, 2000: 237). However, Jayaram notes an overall increase of women’s representation in higher education over the decades, amounting to about 40% of the total enrollment. Nevertheless, there appears to be some regional variations with low representation in states like Bihar (23%), for instance (2006: 752). Redistributive policies are needed in order that more females have access to primary and secondary schools, so that, later on, more of them could have access to higher international education. In addition, the closure of tens of thousands of lower-quality primary and secondary educational institutions re-inforces the existing geographical inequalities in the distribution of schools in rural China. This inequality exists also in India. Elite secondary schools monopolise resources from more egalitarian enterprises and favour urban students over rural. Chinese tertiary students rarely come from ordinary public schools, while the Indian elite urban public schools are molded after the British model and cater to the well-to-do. Meanwhile, a second tier of government and municipal schools serves underprivileged children (Bhalla, 2000: 226–227). Thus, such inequalities at the primary and secondary levels in both nations would presumably affect who gets to study in Singapore’s tertiary educational establishments. In addition, inequality to access to education seems to be the result not only of income inequality between the rural and urban population, but also between cadres and non-cadres (Bhalla, 1995: 278–285). A ﬁ rst step to correct this inequality has been taken by the Chinese government, which has decided to improve rural schooling as one means to bring some prosperity to the countryside. Better quality teachers and free tuition fees are part of the scheme to improve the quality of teaching in rural areas. By 2007, nine years of free, compulsory, basic education should reach 160 million students in the rural areas. The government

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realises that it needs to devise some policies leading to more equitable distribution of wealth in order to improve the living conditions of the rural population.40 Therefore, the relation between equity and tertiary education is very much linked to the larger political, social, and economic environment. Looking at the link between inequality and urban development, Douglas Massey notes how rapidly the developing world is urbanising: By 2010, 47% of its population is expected to be urbanised. Hence, the typical poor person is more likely to live in a large city than in a town or a village. In the past, rural migrants to cities had various opportunities for upward mobility, but since the 1970s there has been a decrease in the number of middle-income professions for the modestly educated. People, whose job is at the bottom of the urban economy, are now more likely to be stuck there (Massey, 2000: 155–156). More precisely, the industrial development from 1870 to 1970 produced a diamond-shaped economic structure, which allowed mass upward mobility and a decline of inequality. On the contrary, the post-industrial era since 1973, has promoted an hourglass economic structure, offering highly paid professions for the well-educated, a diminishing number of middle-income positions for the moderately educated and plenty of poorly paid employment for those with little schooling (Massy, 1996: 400). Therefore, generational upward mobility would be diffi cult, with descendants unlikely to benefi t from higher education abroad in the longer run. Looking at the Hungarian case, Bremer notes that the 271 tertiary students, who experienced a few months of international study in 1992–93 and 1993–94, when compared to those who did not go abroad, are inclined to have better-educated parents and to come mostly from the capital, Budapest, while females are slightly under- represented (Bremer, 1998: 42). Nevertheless, foreign students from the emerging middle class who come to study in Singapore, because they cannot afford an education in another foreign developed country, will most likely benefi t from the global educational policy put in place by the Singapore State. Such students will probably improve their economic and social status. Indeed, in 2000, the Task Force on Higher Education and Society convened by the World Bank and UNESCO concluded, “countries that are only

40 Straits Times (2006) “China to spend more on education, cut school fees,” 1 March. Straits Times (2006) “End of tuition-fee worries for poor rural students,” 11 March.

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weakly connected to the rapidly emerging global knowledge system will fi nd themselves at a disadvantage, in addition to rising inequality within countries” (de Wit, 2002: 148). Regarding e-learning, Rui Yang writes that, in 1999, purchasing a computer cost the average American only one month’s salary; in contrast, for the average Bangladeshi, it cost the equivalent of at least eight years’ wages. If e-learning is a cheaper avenue for global education than going abroad to study, it still raises the issue of equity and cost of distance learning (Yang, 2003: 281). In the same vein, globalisation does not mean equalisation when it comes to the Internet, despite the latter’s image as a tool that connects individuals across the world. Indeed, in 2000, 94% of the world did not have access to the Internet. More precisely, less than one person in 1,000 was using the Internet in South Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. Since the Internet does offer a huge amount of information and connections to millions of people, the impact of the rapid growth of the Internet is to promote worldwide information inequality (Tilly, 2005: 17). In short, looking at higher education in Asia and the Pacifi c, UNESCO points out that “access and participation, especially for women, non-urban populations and members of minority groups, remain a problem in the region” (UNESCO, 2003: 19). In this emerging knowledge-based society, new foundations of inequality are fi nancial capital, information, media, and scientifi c-technical knowledge. How much they would re-inforce inequalities will be determined by education, among other factors. So far the largest gap fostered by these emerging bases of inequality separates people with qualifying technical educations from everyone else: MBAs, JDs, computer science degrees, PhDs, and the like. . . . Not since the Chinese mandarinate, however, have specially educated people played so prominent a part in world affairs, and received rewards so defi nitively separating them from their neighbours. As Tilly concludes, the educational professional will have to strike a balance between training an intellectual meritocracy, regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, and nationality, and expanding the benefi ts of learning equally among different populations (Tilly, 2005: 27–28).

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V Conclusion

The globalisation of tertiary education targetting the Asian region is still at an early stage in Singapore. Therefore, it is difﬁ cult to predict the results emerging from such an evolution. So far, we can witness an Asianisation of education in the sense of building an Asian tertiary educational space on the island. Such a trajectory is not new in Singapore, where education policies have been shaped by economic needs. It seems that Singapore’s policy is, ﬁ rst, to develop the island as a tertiary educational hub for Asian students, and, second, to go global by exporting offshore campuses and promoting e-learning, that will target students who cannot afford to come to Singapore to study. In the long run, such an educational hub might attract not only Asian students, but also Europeans and Americans, motivated by a desire to better understand Asian thinking. However, cheaper competitors like Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam could take away some of these foreign students from Singapore. In addition, worries of limits on academic freedom would hamper the development of Singapore as a global tertiary educational centre. While price, location, and promotion have made Singapore tertiary institutions attractive, improvement needs to be made regarding the product. Nevertheless, the attraction of Asia has been able to overcome such an obstacle in the case of China, for instance. But foreign universities have been cautious not to commit themselves to large capital investment, since “foreign campuses are likely to be subject to political pressures of one kind or another.”41 Regarding Singaporean students, such an internationally-oriented educational system would respond to various needs with social consequences, a hyper-successful sector with global connections and a domestic sector for the less able. While global education will probably boost local and regional economies if it leads to sustain job growth, issues of equity and fair development have to be kept in mind in order not to nourish existing inequalities. Opting only for wealth-generating policies in the context of tertiary education would be a mistake. Universities should not abandon their traditional concerns with equity as a means to improve the lot of more citizens. Looking at future inequalities and how to correct them, Tilly remarks, “alteration of categorical differences in human capital

41 The Independent (2005) “Warwick’s Singapore ﬂ ing,” 1 September.

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through education . . . will affect categorical inequality but will do so chieﬂ y through their impact on the organisation of opportunity rather than their improvement of individual capacities” (Tilly, 1998: 244).

References

Ang, C.H. (2004) The Political Economy of Singapore’s Education Policy, unpublished honours thesis, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. Appold, S. (2005) “The Weakening Position of University Graduates in Singapore’s Labour Market: Causes and Consequences” in Population and Development Review, 31 (1): 85–112. Ballantine, J.H. & Spade, J.Z. (2004) Schools and Society: A Sociological Approach to Education, US: Wadsworth. Bhalla, A.S. (1995) Uneven Development in the Third World: A Study of China and Indian, New York: St. Martin’s Press. —— (2000) “Summary of Access to Education” in Frank Ackerman et al. (eds) The Political Economy of Inequality, Washington DC: Island Press, pp. 224–231. Bills, D.B. (2004) “Education and Work in the Postindustrial Society” in The Sociology of Education and Work, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publisher, pp. 83–111. Bloom, D.E. (2005) “Raising the Pressure: Globalization and the Need for Higher Education Reform” in Glen A. Jones et al. (eds) Creating Knowledge, strengthening nations: the changing role of higher education, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 21–41. Bourdieu, P. (1997) “Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction” in Jerome Karabel & A.H. Halsey (eds) Power and Ideology in Education, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 487–511. Bremer, L. (1998) “The value of international study of experience on the labor market: the case of Hungary: A study on the impact of Tempus on Hungarian students and their transition to work” in Journal of Studies in International Education, Spring, 1998, pp. 39–57. Breton, G. (2003) “Higher Education: From Internationalization to Globalization” in Gilles Breton & Michel Lambert (eds) Universities and Globalization: Private Linkages, Public Trust, France: UNESCO publishing. Castells, M. (1998) “The Developmental City-State in an Open World Economy: The Singapore Experience” in Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, Berkeley: California, University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper No. 31. Chang, J.H.-Y. & Mani, A. (1995) “Higher Education in Singapore: Dual Constraints of Less Competitive Groups” in Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 23 (2): 42–61. Derek, B. (2003). Universities in the marketplace: the commercialization of higher education, Princeton: Princeton University Press. de Wit, H. (2002): Internationalization of Higher Education in the United States of America and Europe: A Historical, Comparative, and Conceptual Analysis, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Dougherty, L. (2000) “Overview Essay” in Frank Ackerman et al. (eds) The Political Economy of Inequality, Washington, D.C.: Island Press, pp. 235–249. Firebaugh, G. (2003) The New Geography of Global Income Inequality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Huber, S. (2000) “Tough Customers: Business’ Plan to Corner the Student Market” in Geoffry D. White & Flannery C. Hauck (eds) Campus, INC., Corporate Power in the Ivory Tower, Amherst, NY: Promethus Books, pp. 106–118. Jayaram, N. (2006) “India” in James J.F. Forest & Philip G. Altbach (eds) International Handbook of Higher Education, The Netherlands: Springer, pp. 747–767.

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Jucevičienë, P. & Vaitkus, R. (2007) “The development of higher education for the knowledge society and the knowledge economy” in David Bridges et al. (eds) Higher Education and National Development: Universities and societies in transition, London: Routledge, pp. 43–54. Knight, J. & de Wit, H. (1998) Internationalisation of Higher Education in Asia Pacifi c Countries, Amsterdam: The European Association for International Education. Levin, H.M. (1984) “Jobs: A Changing Workforce, a Changing Education” in Education and Society: A Reader, Washington: Heldref Publications, pp. 574–583. Massey, D. (1996) “The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affl uence and Poverty in the Twenty-First Century” in Demography, 33 (4): 395–412. —— (2000) “Summary of the Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affl uence and Poverty in the Twenty-First Century” in Frank Ackerman et al. (eds) The Political Economy of Inequality, Washington DC: Island Press, pp. 155–158. Mazzarol, T. &. Soutar, G.N. (2001) The global market for higher education: sustainable competitive strategies for the new millennium, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Mok, K.-H. & Tan, J. (2004) Globalization and Marketization in Education: A Comparative Analysis of Hong Kong and Singapore, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Ramonet, I. (2004) “Chine mégapuisance” in Le Monde diplomatique 605: 1. Tan, J. (2004) “Singapore: Small Nation, Big Plans” in Philip G. Altbach & Toru Umakoshi (eds) Asian Universities: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Challenges, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 175–197. Tilly, C. (1998): Durable Inequality, Berkeley: University of California. Tilly, C. (2005) “Historical Perspectives on Inequalities” in Mary Romero & Eric Margolis (eds) Blackwell Companion to Social Inequalities, Malden, M.A.: Blackwell Publisher, pp. 15–30. Tremewan, C. (1994) The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, New York: St. Martin’s Press. UNESCO Asia and Pacifi c Regional Bureau for Education (2003) Higher education in Asia and the Pacifi c 1998–2003, Paris: UNESCO. Van Hoof, H.B. (1999) “The International Student Experience: A U.S. Industry Perspective” in Journal of Studies in International Education, 3 (2): 52–72. Yang, R. (2003) “Globalisation and Higher Education Development: A Critical Analysis” in International Review of Education, 49 (3–4): 269–291.

TONG_f6_97-120.indd 119 2/7/2008 5:14:09 PM TONG_f6_97-120.indd 120 2/7/2008 5:14:10 PM MANUFACTURING HUMAN RESOURCES: THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL INVESTMENT STATE

Alexius A. Pereira

If social policies are the State’s direct expenditure on its people, then the Singapore government could be categorised as a ‘social investment state’ rather than a welfare state. This is because the Singapore government, in the words of former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Goh Keng Swee, has invested fi nancial resources “. . . to improve and upgrade human resources, mainly by providing mass education and training for all Singaporeans, so that they [would be] ready to enter the industrial workforce” (Goh, 1995: 32). Welfare states, on the other hand, spend mainly on social protection, welfare provision, and even economic redistribution (Esping-Andersen, 1994). The difference between the welfare state and the social investment state is that the latter is characterised by a logic of ‘economism,’ as economic growth is prioritised above all other social and political agendas. As a consequence, social investment states often use social policy for the purposes of manpower management. Critics of the social investment state argue that a ‘growth over welfare’ policy is detrimental to society, as resources are diverted away from social protection and welfare provision towards economic pursuits (e.g. discussion in Midgley, 1999). However, there are others who believe that social investments can have welfare benefi ts, especially if the investments are made in human resource or human capital development (Giddens, 1998: 99). This paper will examine the Singapore government’s social investment programmes implemented between 1965 and 2007. It evaluates, whether the main objective—preparing the necessary human resources to support the economy—has been achieved and, in the process, whether there have been welfare benefi ts. This essay is organised as follows: it begins with a brief theoretical discussion of the social investment state model. This is followed by an analysis of the social investment programmes, especially in the sphere of education and training, implemented during Singapore’s industrial transformation (1965–1980), industrial upgrading (1980–2000), and currently post-industrialisation (2000–present). It concludes with some views on the sustainability of the social investment state in Singapore.

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I The Social Investment State

Within any given State’s national budget is a proportion of fi nances set aside for ‘expenditure on people.’ For the archetypal social investment state, this expenditure is usually targetted at fi nancial investments for the purposes of developing or preparing human resources which are needed to support the economy. (Giddens, 1999) These investments may be necessary due to ‘market failure,’ or where individuals either do not have access to, or are unable to afford, the cost of education or training on their own. With the social investments, the State is essentially providing the necessary education and training, often at little or no cost to the individual, in order to encourage him or her to acquire these skills (Wilding & Holliday, 2003). The ‘problem’ with social investment states is not so much the fact that they are investing in human resources; indeed, any investments in education is always seen as being socially benefi cial. The ‘problem’ arises when the social investment state is informed by the logic of ‘economism.’ The term was originally used in Marxist studies of political economy, to describe how private enterprise might have an ideology which placed ‘profi ts over people,’ or how businesses exploited workers (Bessis, 1995). The term’s scope has since expanded to describe the State’s priorities. If the State is indeed informed by an economistic logic, then it will invest in policies that bring economic growth instead of funding social welfare programmes, especially if the State’s resources are limited. Therefore, the manner in which social investment states approach social policies will be different from those of welfare states, which prioritise ‘welfare’ or put people fi rst. Welfarist social policies generally tend to focus on social protection, provision or redistribution. Social investments, on the other hand: . . . involve a major shift in the conventional [welfarist] social policy thinking from the provision of consumption and maintenance-oriented services to interventions that enhance capabilities, invest in people, facilitate economic involvement and contribute positively to economic development. (Midgley & Tang, 2001: 251) As a direct example, while social investment states and welfare states will both view education as important, the social investment state will view education as being entirely for the purposes of supplying necessary skills to the economy. Welfare states, which have a ‘liberal’ or ‘welfarist’ logic, would view education provision—particularly higher

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or tertiary education—as an ‘entitlement’ and a ‘basic human right’ (Hega & Hokenmaier, 2002: 3). In welfare states such as Germany and France, university education is made available to everyone at the State’s expense, without considering the economic returns. However, for the social investment state, the provision of education is an ‘investment’ that must yield ‘returns.’ This economistic logic would have direct implications on the types of education that are provided in society, as well as on the access to education, assuming that education is a cost and a ‘scare resource.’ Hence, if a State adopted such an investment-oriented ideology, education in subjects that are deemed non-utilitarian for the progress of the economy—e.g. in the fi ne arts, music, or the classics— would be ‘sacrifi ced’ in favour of ‘useful’ subjects such as mathematics and science, as these would have so-called tangible returns. To recapitulate, social investment states will focus their resources on policies that are primarily designed to prepare human resources for the economy. As White & Goodman have argued, many East Asian States—post-war Japan, South Korean, Taiwan and Hong Kong—are social investment states, sharing an ‘overarching’ approach: the explicit subordination of social policy to economic ends (1998: 14). Although having the necessary economic or fi nancial resources is critical for the success of the State’s social investment programme, there is one other important contributing factor: State autonomy. The issue with educational and training programmes is that they normally are medium to long-term projects. They could take up to ‘one generation’ for such programmes to come to fruition. Thus, social investment states must be able to resist pressures from other interest groups, or even the electorate, to re-distribute State expenditure to other spheres. Hence, effective social investment states are able to de-prioritise welfare provision (as well as other social issues such as human rights and democracy) in favour of economic development without fear of public backlash. This is usually because of their political and economic dominance in society, which is a result of specifi c historic circumstances (Tang, 2000). This, as the later sections will show, will also apply to the case of Singapore. Given that social investment programmes are economistic, in that they prioritise the economic over social development, are they necessarily detrimental to workers? Ramesh argues that a social investment state is not necessarily bad for society. Firstly, if the social investment programmes bring economic growth, they can eventually improve the lives of the people (Ramesh, 2004: 15–16). The most obvious manner would be from the economic growth, that arises from the effectiveness of

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the social investment programmes; i.e. due to the availability of human resources, the economy grows, bringing about employment and wages to the local area. As people are kept employed and paid, their lives would correspondingly improve. Secondly, in addition to the economic beneﬁ ts, many observers have noted that the most important aspect of social investment in human resources is in the provision of education itself. This is because the State is ultimately investing in people. In this sense, the social investment state is comparatively more ‘welfarist’ than an authoritarian exploitative state.

II Industrialisation

Upon national independence in 1965, Singapore faced several immediate economic, political and social problems. Due to the acrimonious split from Malaysia, Singapore was effectively cut off from a large economic hinterland. Singapore’s only economic resource—people—was a potential source of growth, as well as a problem. The potential lay in the fact that labour was relatively abundant and cheap but, at the same time, the population was growing at a very rapid rate. If jobs were not created quickly enough, an economic problem would soon become a social problem. In employment terms, not only was Singapore’s commercial and trading sector already saturated, the country was facing a huge loss of jobs when the British administration withdrew its military and naval bases. Hence, in order to create jobs quickly, the Singapore government opted for industrialisation as a developmental strategy. Industrialisation was able to absorb surplus labour, as workers were required in factories. As there was a dearth of domestic industrial entrepreneurs or enterprises in Singapore at the time of independence, since most domestic enterprises were involved in commerce and trade at the time, the Singapore government implemented a wide range of economic policies, aimed at attracting multinational corporations (MNC) to set up factories in Singapore (see Mirza, 1986; Huff, 1994; Pereira, 2000). The State however needed to ‘prepare’ the human resources needed for industrial work. Unlike the agricultural worker, industrial workers must have some level of basic literacy. Towards this end, the Singapore government began its social investments in education.

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Industrial Transformation (1965–1980)

The [Singapore government’s] central concern that has evoked [its] thinking and prompted its policies in education has been the matter of human resource development. (Tham, 1989: 489) Between 1965 and 1980, the focus of the Singapore government’s social investment was to provide mass education, particularly primary education, which was the minimum requirement for industrial work. Although Singapore’s basic literacy rate at the point of independence— around 65% of the population—was relatively high, the colonial educational system was not conducive for industrial work. Not only was education during colonial times not centralised, there were English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil stream schools. Furthermore, the syllabus was not co-ordinated, as there were some schools that were using textbooks from Great Britain while others were using syllabi from China and India. Upon independence in 1965, the Singapore government took total control of the education system. Firstly, it eradicated ‘vernacular stream schools,’ installing English as the main medium of education (Tham, 1989). Secondly, it ‘nationalised’ all existing schools, and placed them under the purview of the Ministry of Education. This centralisation exercise was important because the State wanted to implement a standardised core syllabus, especially for primary schools, consisting of English Language, Mathematics, Science, and Second Language1 (later renamed Mother Tongue). Lastly, large numbers of teachers were recruited and trained in service to meet the dramatic increase in school enrollment. Thus the number of teachers rose from 10,590 to 17,184 in 1965 alone (Gopinathan, 1998). The primary school syllabus was structured entirely to support the industrialisation drive. Although English was the main language of communication for global business, its importance in Singapore was much more immediate and pragmatic. The State knew that it was critical for Singaporeans to be able to speak and write basic English, especially since many would be employed in factories owned by MNCss. In addition, industrial workers needed to have basic competency in science

1 All students were required to learn a Second Language, which would be Mandarin, Malay and Tamil for the Chinese, Malay and Indian students respectively. The ‘function’ of the Second Language was for the purposes of ‘cultural preservation’ so that Singaporeans do not lose their ‘Asian values’’ (see Hill & Lian, 1995; Vasil, 1995).

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and mathematics because of the nature of the work (see Gopinathan, 1998). While the State’s social investment in education was important in giving Singaporean labour the necessary basic skills to work in a multinational factory, there was another issue, which was probably more important: female education. Before independence, only a third of all women received some formal education. The low female literacy rate was mainly due to patriarchal ideologies, which viewed women primarily as homemakers and childbearers (Chan, 2000). As such, many believed that it would be a ‘waste’ of resources to educate females. However, Singapore’s ﬁ rst Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was a strong proponent of mass female education. He made the following comment in a speech to women at the National Trade Union Congress: Societies which do not educate and use half their potential because they are women are those which will be worse off . . . we cannot not educate and use the energy and ability of our women. (Low, 1998: 345) Although the Singapore government did not make national education compulsory, it made the cost of going to school low, through a system of State subsidies. This meant that school fees were around S$2 per month, which was fairly affordable in an era, when the average factory worker was earning around S$250 per month (Tham, 1989). As schooling costs were relatively low, many families were more willing to send their daughters to primary school. The State also began a programme to build many primary schools in the new housing estates, making access to schools more convenient as well. The last strategy that the State adopted was persuasion, as many of the leaders within the Singapore government went on personal missions around their constituency to encourage females to go to, and remain in, school. As a result, female enrolment in national schools immediately increased (see Table 1).

Table 1. Male-Female Literacy Rate (%) 1957–1990 1957 1970 1980 1990 % % % % Male 68.6 80.0 91.5 95.5 Female 33.6 60.0 76.2 84.4 Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistics, various years, compiled by Low, 1998: 347

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Within a decade of independence, women had become an important component of the workforce, particularly of the industrial workforce. It was found that in 1957, women only formed 17.8% of the (paid) workforce. Of the female labour force, half of them were involved in community, social and personal services (e.g. maids, nursing etc.), with only 14.6% of all females employed in the manufacturing sector. By 1980, the overall female labour participation rate doubled (from 1957) to 34.9%, with the manufacturing sector as the largest employer of women, accounting for 38.5% of all employed females (Low, 1998: 353). It could be argued that Lee Kuan Yew, or the Singapore government, might appear to be acting in an egalitarian or enlightened manner, by providing a gender equal educational system. However, the reality was that the Singapore government only viewed women as an economic resource. Indeed, many critics have consistently argued that the Singapore government, and Lee Kuan Yew himself, are archetypal ‘patriarchs’ that do not consider gender equality to be a priority (e.g. Chan, 2000). Instead, the State’s willingness to invest in women was a clear case of ‘economism’ as they, as a group, were considered to be critical components of the industrial workforce. Singapore’s education system was far below the standards of those in developed countries; e.g. between 1965 and 1975, it was riddled with high drop-out (also known as wastage) rates. By 1980, only about half the workforce had received schooling beyond the primary level, a proportion much lower than that of similarly industrialising societies, such as Taiwan and South Korea (Pang, Tan & Cheng, 1989: 132). It was, however, effective enough to create the minimum level of human resources required for Singapore’s initial foray into multinational manufacturing. The State’s offering of mass education, with basic competency in English, Science and Mathematics, created a workforce that was suited for the many simple, labour-intensive, and low-value-added manufacturing jobs in Singapore during that phase. Similarly, the State’s strategy of educating females did not initially raise the social status of women in society. Indeed, patriarchal norms, instead of disappearing, now extended into the manufacturing sector. Studies during that era have shown that women were often remunerated less than males, when performing identical tasks (see Lim, 1978 and Heyzer, 1987). Many reasons were given, including the practice that women only worked until they got married or had children, or that women only worked to supplement the husband’s income (Chan, [1981] 2001: 104). Hence, women did not need to have a ‘career path,’ and as such, there was

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Table 2. Singapore’s Economy by Sector (as % of GDP) 1960 1970 1980 1990 % % % % Manufacturing 12 20 28 28 Construction 4765 Commerce 33 27 21 16 Transport & Communication 14 11 14 13 Financial & Business Services 14 17 19 26 Others 24 18 12 12 Total 100 100 100 100 GDP (S$ billion) 2.1 5.8 25.1 67.7 Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistics, various years.

no need to pay them the regular wages, but only ‘marginal’ wages. Although these were typical ‘excuses,’ the real reason why women were often underpaid was because of their ‘abundance.’ As more women were receiving basic education, the overall numbers of women qualifi ed to enter the workforce also grew. This made women, as a group, easily replaceable, peripheral and expendable within the manufacturing sector. Therefore, it was much easier for the employer to release an existing employee rather than offer a pay rise, because it would be very easy to fi nd a new employee who would work at the entry level pay (see Heyzer, 1987). The State’s economic policies and social investments combined to effectively initiate industrialisation in Singapore. The manufacturing sector grew from 12% in 1960 to nearly 20% of Singapore’s GDP (gross domestic product) by 1970, and then to 28% by 1980 (see Table 2). However, did these strategies benefi t workers? The answer is ambivalent. Although working conditions for industrial workers, and females in particular, were not very good, they were still better than being unemployed. Also, remaining employed had ‘spillover’ effects, e.g. Singaporeans themselves contributed to consumption, which was critical for expanding the economy. With wages, Singaporeans could afford housing, and invest in education for their children. All these actions would have signifi cant welfare benefi ts.

Industrial Upgrading (1980–2000) Due to the presence of MNCs, many jobs were created. Singapore’s unemployment rate fell to below 4%, moving the country from a

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situation of labour surplus to labour scarcity in 1974 (Huff, 1994: 326). By the early 1980s, labour was so scarce that the government eased restrictions to allow foreign workers (mainly from the neighbouring State of Johor in Malaysia) to come to work in factories situated in Singapore. Between 1965 and 1980, Singapore’s economy grew annually at an average of 10% (see Lim, 1988). However, in the 1980s, the global economy underwent rapid change, which led to large-scale industrial restructuring in the Asia Pacifi c region ( Jomo, 1997). Many countries—including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and even communist China—began to open their economic borders to foreign investors. Some countries wanted to emulate Singapore in attracting MNCs as a strategy to encourage industrialisation, offering them very low cost factors of production (Tongzon, 1998). The reason why these countries had lower cost factors of production, such as labour and land costs, was because of their relative under-development and late entry into the global economy. In comparison, wage and land costs in Singapore had risen because of 15 years of economic growth. For example, in 1990, it was found that the overall operating costs in Johor, Malaysia or Batam, Indonesia were 75% lower than in Singapore (Kumar & Lee, 1991: 4). Singapore’s higher operating costs therefore, weakened the profi t margins for many industrial MNCs, especially those involved in labour intensive and low value-added manufacturing. Therefore, in the fi rst half of the 1980s, many MNCs began to relocate their lower value-added operations out of Singapore into these newly emerging industrial areas (Bello & Rosenfeld, 1990: 298). It was at this stage that the Singapore government introduced a new economic policy, the ‘Second Industrial Revolution,’ designed to upgrade Singapore’s industrial structure away from low-value-added manufacturing to capital-intensive and technology-oriented industrial production. As part of the economic policy, the State rolled out a whole series of monetary, fi scal and tax incentives, that encouraged MNCs to engage in higher-value-added production, and/or research and development activities. However, the availability of necessary human resources was critical to the success of the programme: hence, another round of social investment were required. Towards this end, the State’s investments were focused on providing higher technical and engineering education. In addition to expanding the Engineering Faculty at the National University of Singapore (NUS), the Singapore government also established a separate technological

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Table 3. A Comparison of Education Attainment of Singapore’s Workforce (1974 and 1985) (%) Total Male Female % % % 1974 Below primary 40.3 41.8 36.9 Primary 31.4 33.1 27.7 Secondary 19.7 16.4 26.8 Post-secondary 6.2 5.8 6.9 Tertiary 2.4 2.7 1.6 Others 0.1 0.2 0.1

1985 Below primary 22.8 23.2 22.2 Primary 31.3 34.7 25.3 Secondary 29.3 25.5 36.0 Post-secondary 11.0 10.5 11.8 Tertiary 5.2 5.6 4.3 Others 0.4 0.4 0.4 Sources: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1976 (Singapore: Ministry of Labour); Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1985 (Singapore: Ministry of Labour).

university—initially named Nanyang Technological Institute in 1981, later Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in 1991—to increase the number of technologically-skilled employees.2 In 1985, the total number of university-trained engineers in Singapore doubled from that in 1982 (Mirza, 1986: 65). The government also expanded the Singapore Polytechnic (originally established in 1954) and built three others—Ngee Ann, Nanyang and Temasek—with the aim of producing more tertiary-level engineers and technicians. Overall, many more people were attaining higher educational qualiﬁ cations (see Table 3). The proportion of people attaining university degrees and polytechnic diplomas doubled between 1974 and 1985. The expansion of tertiary education was clearly driven by economic, rather than social or political imperatives. In other words, the expansion was not because the State felt that the population had reached a certain level of educational maturity and, therefore, had more ambitious

2 Although a ‘new’ university, NTU was the resuscitation of Nanyang University, which was formed in 1955, and was Singapore’s only Chinese-language university. In 1980, Nanyang University was ‘closed’ through a merger with the Singapore University.

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aspirations. Neither was the expansion due to market demand.3 Instead, the expansion was designed to make Singapore’s workforce more competitive than its neighbours in the surrounding region. This could be validated by the fact that, technical and engineering education saw the greatest level of expansion within the education system, rather than any other educational discipline. Also, despite the expansion—the doubling of the proportion of those having tertiary educational attainment—the overall proportion of graduates within Singapore still remained signiﬁ - cantly lower than most other developed societies, and it was also lower than other industrialising Asian societies. For example, the proportion of people in Singapore with, at least, secondary education was around 40% compared to 81% in the US (see Table 4).

Table 4. Persons aged 25–64 with at least secondary education (1989–1990) Country % USA 81 Switzerland 80 West Germany 78 Japan 70 UK 64 Australia 57 Singapore 39 Source: Chen, 1996: 84

Singapore also lagged behind in the provision of tertiary education, despite the massive expansion of the 1980s, even among Asian countries (see Table 5).

3 There was also no signiﬁ cant expansion in the private sector provision of higher education, as the total number of private colleges (often offering distance learning degree programmes) did not change (see Chen, 1996). This, however, has changed signiﬁ cantly after the year 2000, when there was a huge increase in private sector higher education provision.

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Table 5. Proportion of People Attaining Tertiary Education (1992) (%) Country % Taiwan 18 South Korea 16 Hong Kong 15 Singapore 13 Source: Chen, 1996: 84

This ‘controlled’ expansion of Singapore’s higher education can be explained by the State’s logic of ‘economism,’ ‘scarcity’ and ‘social investment.’ Interestingly, education in Singapore was co-ordinated by the Council for Professional and Technical Education. The chairman of this council has always been the Minister for Trade and Industry (not the Minister for Education). The council has, therefore, always taken the lead from the macro-economic forecasts provided by the Ministry for Trade and Industry. As such, the expansion of tertiary education has always been tied to projected demand and supply of particular skills required by the labour market (see Chen, 1996). Given that most educational institutions in Singapore were directly controlled by the government, the State was therefore able to ‘reduce educational wastage’ and not oversupply the labour market with graduates without work (see Pang, Cheng & Tan, 1992). In this sense, the State—from an investment viewpoint—could maximise its returns on education. Higher education in Singapore was thus not socially driven (to fulfi ll the desires and aspirations of the people) but driven by how the State viewed future economic needs. While it was possible to bypass the Singapore educational system, this often involved pursuing higher education abroad, at very high personal fi nancial costs. The Singapore government was aware that the changes in formal education would not bear immediate results, as those that just entered the expanded tertiary education sector would take at least four to six years to graduate (two years at junior college plus four years at university). Thus, it also invested heavily in on-the-job training (and retraining), paid for by the State’s Skills Development Fund (SDF). The key to the SDF programme was the fi nancial assistance component generated from a government levy on employers (initially set at 4% of wages); however, employers could reclaim the levy from tax, if their workers

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underwent one of the many retraining programmes. The government also launched many programmes, including the Basic Education for Skills Training (BEST) programme, Modular Skills Training (MOST) programme, the Worker Improvement through Secondary Education (WISE) programme, the Training Initiative for Mature Employees (TIME) programme, and the Adult Co-operative Training Scheme (ACTS) programme, among many others. These programmes were aimed at those who were already in the workforce. According to some analysts, the number of people undergoing any one of these retraining programmes increased from 32,600 in 1982 to 405,600 in 1991 (Chen, 1996: 96). Although not immediately successful, the industrial upgrading programme ﬁ nally bore fruit in the 1990s, when the computer-related sector and the semiconductors sector—two sectors that required highly skilled workers—were expanding globally. MNCs from these two sectors were searching for locations, that had the ideal combination of high skills and wages lower than those in Europe, Japan and North America. As such, many of these companies found their way to Singapore once again. By 1993, Singapore became the (computer) hard-disk capital of the world, with all the giants of the computer peripheral sector—such as Conner, Maxtor, and Seagate—setting up high-value-added and capital-intensive factories (see McKendrick, Doner & Haggard, 2000). This would not have been possible if the State had not made earlier investments in tertiary level engineering education. Thus, in order to bring about industrial upgrading, the State shifted its focus, from providing mass education to expanding the tertiary education sector, especially in technical and engineering education, and supplemented this with on-the-job retraining programmes. However, it is worth repeating that the logic behind this provision remained purely ‘economic’ in motivation. Again, as growth was achieved, there were no negative consequences from this set of social investment. Any potential jobs shortfall from the relocation of MNCs in low-value-added production was negated by new jobs in high-tech production, which also happened to be better paying jobs.

III Post-Industrialisation Initiative

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Singapore government launched yet another national economic strategy. This time, the

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Table 6. Sectoral Employment Change (1995–2006) 1995 2000 2005 2006 Employment (’000) 1,823.2 2,171.1 2,319.9 2,493.2

By Sector (%) Manufacturing 24.5 20.5 20.5 20.7 Construction 12.7 14.2 10.1 10.3 Combined Services 62.1 64.5 68.7 68.4 Others 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Singapore Ministry of Manpower website, 31 January 2007, http://www.mom.gov.sg/publish/momportal/en/communities/others/mrsd/statistics/Employment.html

focus of the strategy was to deal with the process known as ‘post- industrialisation.’ In economic literature, it is common for industrial societies to experience post-industrialisation, when the proportion of manufacturing starts to decline, with usually the services sector growing in its place. Japan, the US and much of Western Europe have already have become post-industrial societies, as traditional manufacturing has moved out to industrialising countries (Block, 1990). The other predicted consequence of post-industrial society is the growth of the services sector (see Bell, 1973). Indeed, Singapore had previously beneﬁ ted from post-industrialisation in some of these countries. Therefore, the Singapore government knew that it was inevitable that the country would eventually face post-industrialisation. The proportion of jobs in the manufacturing sector had fallen from a high of 25% in 1990s to an average of around 20% after 2000 (see Table 6). There were many reasons for Singapore’s impending post-industrialisation. However, the most important reason was the continued hollowing out of manufacturing jobs—including high value added, capital intensive and technology oriented jobs—from Singapore to lower cost industrialising countries, such as Indonesia, China, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand. In economic terms, it was viewed as being ‘natural’ because the overall cost of operations in Singapore would be higher than in the rest of the region, since wage costs and land costs were comparatively high. Due to these circumstances, the Singapore government also predicted that the manufacturing sector—including high value added manufacturing—would continue to decline in economic importance in the medium to long-term. The State had two strategies

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to cope with this: the fi rst was to focus on one of the most diffi cult but profi table sectors, the biotechnology sector. The second was to prepare for the possible fallout of post-industrialisation, where the State hoped to shift workers from the declining manufacturing sector to the service sector. This strategy was required because it was not possible to simply upgrade the ordinary manufacturing employee to become biotechnology researchers, due to the very high level of human resources required for this sector.

Biotechnology Initiative In 2001, the Singapore government introduced a new industrial policy, known as the Biomedical Sciences Initiative (Tsui-Auch, 2004). The biomedical or biotechnology sector has been identifi ed as being one of the fastest growing and most profi table in recent times, mainly due to rapid advances in research, science and technology (see Chase- Dunn, Lara-Millan, & Niedmeyer, 2002). From a growth viewpoint, many governments have also attempted to catch the ‘biotechnology wave’ because, economically, returns to biotechnology production and development have been highly profi table historically. Also, despite some concern over the ethical aspects of the biotechnology sector, it is seen by many governments as being a highly desirable employment-creation engine, as the sector requires people with very high levels of specialised scientifi c education, which, in turn, is growth-yielding as their salaries tend to be also very high (Pownall, 2000). The Singapore government’s biotechnology strategy involved two thrusts: biomedical production, and biomedical R&D (research and development). Singapore has not had any history or experience in the biotechnology or pharmaceutical sector, beyond simple processing for some MNCs in the 1980s. The State realised that Singapore, at least within Southeast Asia, already had a head start for both thrusts. For biomedical production, the Singapore government’s experience with multinational manufacturing made the country an ideal location for the production of biotechnology and pharmaceutical products (Pereira, 2006). However, biotechnology production is capital intensive, rather than human resource intensive; as such, it would not be a major employment engine, although it would bring in large streams of revenue. Instead, it is the sphere of biomedical R&D that would be most socially benefi cial. The Singapore government hoped, that local scientists would (eventually) invent new drugs or biomedical products, in turn,

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bringing growth to the country. In this sense, Singapore society already has a ‘ﬁ rstcomer’ advantage because of the State’s earlier investment in tertiary education, which puts Singaporeans ahead of their peers in neighbouring countries. At the same time, an average Singaporean researcher would ‘cost less’ than a similar researcher in the developed world. As such, it would make ‘economic sense’ for the so-called ‘Big Pharma’ (large multinational biotechnology corporations) to relocate some R&D activities to Singapore, at least in theory. The only problem was with the ‘supply’ of scientists in Singapore. Towards this end, the Singapore government began to invest heavily in ‘manufacturing’ the necessary human resources needed for this sector. For example, between 2001 and 2006, 393 postgraduate scholars have been awarded overseas and local government scholarships to pursue doctoral programmes in various aspects of biomedical sciences, including molecular biology, biomedical engineering and translational medicine (A-Star press release, 6 Feb. 2007).4 According to the director of A*Star (Agency for Science, Technology and Research), which is statutory board tasked with promoting, among other activities, the biomedical initiative, each scholarship recipient is expected to cost the government about S$1 million (FDI Magazine, 5 August 2003). Also, the Singapore government announced, that it would spend at least S$1.2 billion in public biomedical research to support the broader initiative (Lim & Gregory, 2004: 353). Critical to the State’s biotechnology strategy was the attraction of ‘foreign’ biotechnology or biomedical research centres to Singapore to complement locally established R&D centres such as the Genome Institute and the Institute of Molecular Biology. Through a co-investment scheme (or subsidy), undertaken by the Economic Development Board (EDB), biomedical corporations as well as foreign research institutes could open R&D laboratories in Singapore. As of the year 2007, over 15 ‘foreign’ R&D centres have been set up at the Biopolis, NUS, NUS Science Park, and Tuas Biomedical Park. Recent examples include the Lilly Centre for Systems Biology, set up by Eli Lilly, for R&D into ‘translational medicine,’ GlaxoSmithKline’s Medicinal Chemistry Laboratory to research ‘neurodegenerative disorders’ and

4 Online source: http://www.biomed-singapore.com/bms/sg/en_uk/index/news- room/pressrelease/year_2007/6_feb_-_exceptional.html

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the Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases, which will do research on malaria vaccines.5 The Singapore government was willing to make large fi nancial social investments in order to catch the biotechnology wave immediately. Otherwise, the other emerging countries in the region—especially China and India—would ‘capture’ all the biotechnology R&D investments, leaving Singapore with nothing. However, the investment to produce researchers and scientists would only bear fruit in the medium to long- term, especially since it may take up to 10 years to proceed from a bachelor’s degree to a doctorate. To get the large multinational biomedical fi rms to start operations on the island immediately, Singapore had to amend its labour and immigration laws to encourage ‘foreign talent,’ especially those working in the biotechnology sector, to come to work in the sector or engage in research. Although there are no offi cial citizenship statistics for personnel involved in the biomedical sector, cursory research suggests that over 80% of biomedical researchers are non-citizens. The State has gone on record to say that ‘nationality’ is of secondary importance to ‘capability’ for the biotechnology sector, as the country’s economic future is at stake. The State has argued that this ‘imbalance’ is only a short-term issue, as Singaporeans are currently being groomed to take over some of these research positions in future. While this might sound comforting to some Singaporeans, the current reality is that the State awarded almost 30% of A*Star’s biomedical postgraduate scholarships non-Singaporeans (A*Star, press release, 21 July 2004). The Singapore government’s biotechnology initiative has been generally successful, especially in contributing to growth. For the year 2004, it was reported that the biotechnology sector grew 33% to S$15.8 billion; the value-added in the sector grew 48% to S$10.1 billion, and employment in the sector grew 6.7% to 9,225 persons (EDB press release, 31 January 2005). Within the sector, pharmaceutical production contributed S$13.9 billion, which accounted for 88% of the whole sector (ibid.). In the same report, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan, announced that the target for Singapore’s biomedical sciences sector was S$25 billion in manufacturing output and an employment of 15,000 by 2015 (ibid.). However, the biotechnology sector’s healthy growth numbers are currently due to production rather than R&D.

5 See Singapore Biomedical Sciences website, http://www.biomed-singapore.com/

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Still, it appears that the State’s social investment in R&D is reaping dividends, as Singapore has moved signifi cantly ahead of most other Asian countries, perhaps with the exception of Japan and South Korea. While economically promising, the biotechnology initiative could lead to social problems in Singapore. One concern is that the initiative is too growth driven, and not ‘people’ driven. This is not surprising, as the government continues to operate with an ‘economistic’ logic. One problem is that the social investments in the biotechnology sector go to a very small number of people, most of whom are currently Singaporeans but some are non-citizens. The average Singaporean might question the State, whether these massive investments in so few people will bring about the expected returns. Another concern is that biomedical research is currently undertaken mainly by foreign talent armed with PhD degrees. Regardless of whether these researchers are here in the long or short-term, the presence of foreigners has generated some tension within Singapore society. Many Singaporeans already blame foreign workers for local unemployment, whether it is justifi able or not. This is compounded by the fact many local residents have recently found themselves retrenched (see next section). Most of these layoffs have come as a result of the hollowing out of industrial production to cheaper regions, such as Thailand, China and even Indochina. Most of the retrenched are lowly educated, and cannot be retrained for jobs in the high-tech semiconductor sector, let alone the biomedical sector. Lastly, biotechnology researchers are among the best remunerated, earning up to four or fi ve times what an ordinary Singaporean industrial worker might earn every month. If people feel that the biomedical initiative does not have a trickle down effect of growth, it could lead to a social and political backlash.

Work Retraining Initiative As mentioned earlier, the manufacturing sector is losing its dominance within Singapore’s economy. As such, the direct social impact of post- industrialisation is that Singaporeans, who are currently employed in the manufacturing sector, are feeling a great deal of job insecurity, because they know that the company that operates their factory will one day relocate to a lower-cost country. The State knows that it is impossible to stop the industrial hollowing out. However, as the Singapore government does not want a situation of high unemployment, it has decided to invest heavily in ‘work retraining,’ which directly complements the

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Biomedical Sciences Initiative. If the biomedical initiative is targetted at highly educated Singaporeans, the workfare initiative caters to the opposite end of the spectrum, because it targets Singaporeans with lower levels of education. While the State has always been promoting industrial retraining, the Work Retraining Initiative was formalised in 2003. The State’s fi rst initiative was to create, in September 2003, the Workforce Development Agency (WDA), which is tasked to retrain retrenched industrial workers and to fi nd them gainful employment (see http://www.wda.gov.sg/). The WDA has also served as a co-ordination agency for other semi-governmental and non-governmental agencies that have retraining schemes. Some of these other agencies included the National Trades Union Congress, the Singapore Labour Federation, the Skills Development Fund (SDF), the Community Development Councils, and even community self-help groups such as Mendaki and the Chinese Development Assistance Council, amongst others. The main aim was to shift workers from the declining manufacturing sector towards the growing services sector. According to the WDA, the tourism, healthcare, fi nancial services, information and communications, and security services are currently seeing huge growth potential (WDA, 2006). However, as many of these jobs require specifi c skills, training and retraining were critical to fi ll these jobs. While WDA is given funding by the State for several retraining programmes, the interesting aspect of this agency is in the manner in which it encourages workers to upgrade their skills. Most of the time, WDA acts only as a consolidator among the individual, the employer and the training provider. The common practice would be for the WDA to refer an unemployed individual to prospective employers and training providers at the same time, through the ‘Place and Train’ or ‘Reskilling’ schemes. Here, when the individual agrees to undertake this retraining, up to 90% of the retraining fees (payable to the service provider) will be borne by the State (via the WDA). At the same time, the employer will received an ‘Absentee’ subsidy, where the State will subsidise up to 90% of the hourly wage, while the individual is attending training instead of working. This, in theory, allows the employer to pay for short-term cover for workers absent, when they are undergoing retraining at the service providers, without a signifi cant cost to the employer (see WDA website for details). The WDA even encourages individuals, who are currently employed in the manufacturing sector, to enrol in retraining programmes before being retrenched.

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The WDA’s Annual Report made the following claims about the retraining strategy between 2004 and 2005:

• “WDA’s outreach efforts through Place and Train programmes have been fruitful, with some 1,800 unemployed Singaporeans placed in new jobs, of whom 45% are workers about 40 years old” (p. 25); • “Some 1,400 unemployed Singaporeans have been retrained and placed into jobs such as healthcare, under WDA’s Strategic Man- power Conversion Programmes and other retraining programmes” (p. 26); • “In 2004, WDA and our Distributed CareerLink Network partners helped place more than 27,000 Singaporean job seekers in jobs. This comprised some 17,600 lower skilled workers with secondary education or below, and 15,000 workers over 40 years of age” (p. 28); • “The number of annual training places rose from about 11,000 in 1980 to some 550,000 in 2004. One in every four workers in the workforce is supported by the Skills Development Fund in their training. SDF-supported training paces for SMEs (small and medium enterprises) also increased from about 73,000 in 1991 to some 99,000 in 2004. Training places for workers aged 40 and above also climbed to 203,000 in 2004 from 15,000 in 1988” (p. 32); • “Since the launch of the programme in May 1998, the Skills Redevelopment Programme (SRP) has achieved 201,651 training places. The second phase of the programme runs for fi ve years from May 2003 to April 2008. As at 31 March 2005, the SRP achieved 79,939 training places or 53% of the fi ve-year target of 150,000 training places. In 2004, the SRP supported some 38,000 training places, out of which 60% went to workers above 40 years old and 61% went to lower skilled workers with less than ‘O’ Level qualifi cations” (p. 33).

In 2000, the Budget introduced several additional Work Retraining Initiatives. These included the S$40 million Job Re-creation Programme, where employers would be able to get grants from the State to re- design jobs away from low to high-valued-added; the S$30 million ADVANTAGE! scheme, where employers can get a subsidy speciﬁ cally for hiring workers aged over 40; and the S$100 million Workforce Skills Qualiﬁ cation System, where workers can attend part-time classes to gain literacy, numeracy and IT skills, amongst others. The State also pledged

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to add S$100 million to the existing Lifelong Learning Fund, which is set aside for retraining costs (see http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2006/ press_release/index.html). There are many more ongoing schemes, and it is expected that the State will continue to introduce additional retraining schemes, so long as there is revenue to fund these schemes. Much of the current revenue (2005–2007) is derived from the State’s budget surpluses, which are in turn generated from economic growth that averaged around 5% pa. The Singapore government has continued to show that its social investments are still heavily informed by the logic of ‘economism.’ The Work Retraining Initiative is a clear State investment in human resources, specifi cally for the purposes of mitigating the negative impact of post- industrialisation. More importantly, the State has constantly refuted suggestions that these schemes and initiatives are ‘welfare’ benefi ts. This is because the Singapore government believes that ‘welfarism’ will create a ‘crutch’ or ‘handout’ mentality among the population. Instead, the State would only help those that were willing to help themselves. In other words, the State refuses to give ‘fi sh’ but only ‘fi shing rods.’

IV Conclusion

This essay has considered the Singapore government’s social investment programmes. It has examined whether these investments have successfully supported the economy, and if they have impacted society positively. It has found that the social investment programmes have generally been successful in supporting industrial transformation (1965–1980), and industrial upgrading (1980–2000). For these two periods, the State was able to ‘manufacture’ the requisite human resources to support the economy, and that these investments did indeed beneﬁ t society as well. Judgement will be reserved on the post-industrialisation initiatives, which encompass the Biomedical Sciences Initiative and the Work Retraining Initiative. This is because both initiatives are still in their infancy. Unlike the earlier periods, where it was fairly straightforward to provide mass education, initially at primary and later at tertiary levels, for the period of post-industrialisation, mass education provision is clearly not enough. Instead, for the current period, the State is targetting its social investments much more narrowly. This paper has found that although the Singapore government seems to place ‘growth over people’ in every case, the overall effect on society

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has been generally positive so far. This was most evident in the industrialisation phase, when the State invested heavily in education—mass primary education and, later, technical education—which, in turn, brought economic growth and an improved quality of life for most Singaporeans. The only concern would be for the post-industrialisation phase, where the growth imperative might generate some negative sentiment, because, e.g. in the case of the Biotechnology Initiative, the State is investing heavily in a small group of people. Also, it seems that as Singapore’s economy is moving away from mass manufacturing towards a much more diversiﬁ ed service economy, the State cannot make ‘blanket’ investments to encourage retraining. This suggests that there might be limits to both the degree to which a State might invest in people, and to the level of welfare beneﬁ ts that could be generated, as the economy becomes more mature.

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Bell, D. (1973) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, New York: Basic Books. Bello, W. & Rosenfeld S. (1990) Dragons in Distress: Asia’s Miracle Economies in Crisis, US: Institute of Food Development Policy. Bessis, S. (1995) From Social Exclusion to Social Cohesion: Towards a Policy Agenda, Geneva: UNESCO, UNESCO Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Policy Paper No. 2. Block, F. (1990) Postindustrial Possibilities: A Critique of Economic Discourse, Berkeley: University of California Press. Chan, H.C. ([1981] 2003) “Notes on the Mobilisation of Women in to the Economy and Politics of Singapore” in Commentary, 19: 94–116. Chan, J. (2000) “Status of Women in a Patriarchal State: The Case of Singapore” in Edwards, L. & M. Roces (eds) Women in Asia: Tradition, Modernity And Globalisation, St Leonards: Allen & Unwin: pp. 39–58. Chase-Dunn, C., Lara-Millan, A. & Niedmeyer, R. (2002) Biotechnology in the Global Political Economy, e-paper, http://irows.ucr.edu/research/biotech/isa04biotech.htm. Chen, G. (1996) “The Graduate and Skills Labour Markets: Dimensions of Manpower Management” in C.Y. Lim (ed) Economic Policy Management in Singapore, Singapore: Addison-Wesley, pp. 83–104. Da Silva, E., Baydoun, E. & Bardan, A. (2002) “Biotechnology and the Developing World,” in Electronic Journal of Biotechnology, 5 (1): 64–92. Esping-Andersen, G. (1994) “Welfare States and the Economy,” in N. Smelser & R. Swedberg (eds) Handbook of Economic Sociology, (1st ed) Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 711–32. Giddens, A. (1999) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Malden: Polity. Goh, K.S. (1995) Wealth of East Asian nations: Speeches and Writings of Goh Keng Swee, Singapore: Federal Publications. Gopinathan, S. (1998) “Education and Development in Singapore,” in J. Tan, S. Gopinathan & W.K. Ho (eds) Education in Singapore, Singapore: Prentice Hall, pp. 33–53.

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Kumar, R. & Lee, T.Y. (1991) “Growth Triangle: A Singaporean Perspective,” in T.Y. Lee (ed) Growth Triangle: The Johor Singapore Riau Experience, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 1–35. Jomo, K.S. (1997) Southeast Asia’s Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy And Economic Development In Thailand, Malaysia And Indonesia, Boulder: Westview Press. Hega, G.M. & Hokenmaier, K.G. (2002) “The Welfare State and Education: A Comparison of Social and Education Policy in Advanced Industrial Societies,” in German Policy Studies, 2 (1): 1–29. Heyzer, N. (1987) Women Workers in South-east Asia: Problems and Strategies, New Dehli: ILO/ARTEP Working Paper Series. Hill, M. & Lian, K.F. (1995) The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore, London: Routledge Huff, W.G. (1994), The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lim, C.Y. et al. (1988) Policy Options for the Singapore Economy, Singapore: McGraw-Hill. Lim, L.Y.C. (1978) Women Workers in Multinational Corporations: The Case of the Electronics Industry in Malaysia and Singapore, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Lim L. & Gregory, M.J. (2004) “Singapore’s Biomedical Science Sector Development Strategy: Is It Sustainable?” in Journal of Commercial Biotechnology, 10 (4): 352–362. Low, G.T. (1998) “Women, Education and Development in Singapore” in J. Tan, S. Gopinathan & W.K. Ho (eds) Education in Singapore, Singapore: Prentice Hall, pp. 343–359. McKendrick, D., Doner, R. & Haggard, S. (2000) From Silicon Valley to Singapore: Location and Competitive Advantage in the Hard Disk Drive Industry, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Midgley, J. (1999) “Growth, Redistribution, and Welfare: Towards Social Investment” in Social Service Review, 73 (10): 3–21. Midgley, J. & Tang, K.L. (2001) “Introduction: social policy, economic growth and developmental welfare” in International Journal of Social Welfare, 10 (4): 244–252. Mirza, H. (1986) Multinationals and the Growth of the Singapore Economy, London: Croom Helm. Pang, E.F., Tan, C.H. & Cheng, S.M. (1989) “The Management of People” in K. Sandhu & P. Wheatley (eds) Management Of Success: The Moulding Of Modern Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 128–143. Pereira, A.A. (2000) “State Collaboration with Transnational Corporations: The Case of Singapore’s Industrial Programmes (1965–2000)” in Competition and Change, 4, 423–51. ____ (2006) “Biotechnology Foreign Direct Investment in Singapore” in Transnational Corporations, 15 (2): 99–124. Pownall, I.E. (2000) “An International Political Economic View of the Biotechnology Industry” in Electronic Journal of Biotechnology, 3 (2): 120–139. Ramesh, M. (2004) Social Policy in East and Southeast Asia: Education, Health, Housing and Income Maintenance, London: Routledge Curzon. Tang, K.L. (2000) Social Welfare Development in East Asia, London: MacMillan. Tham, S.C. (1989) “The Perception and Practice of Education” in K.S. Sandhu & P. Wheatley (eds) Management of Success: The Moulding of Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Tongzon, J.L. (1998) The Economies of Southeast Asia: The growth and development of ASEAN economies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Tsui-Auch, L.S. (2004) “Bureaucratic Rationality and Nodal Agency in a Developmental State: The Case of State-Led Biotechnology Development in Singapore” in Inter- national Sociology, 19 (4): 451–477. Vasil, R.K. (1995) Asianising Singapore: The PAP’s Management of Ethnicity, Singapore: Heinemann Asia.

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Workforce Development Agency (2005) Annual Report 2004–5. Singapore: WDA. White, G. & Goodman, R. (1998) “Welfare Orientalism and the search for an East Asian welfare model” in R. Goodman, G. White & H.J. Kwon (eds) The East Asian Welfare Model. London: Routledge, pp. 3–24. Wilding, P. and Holliday, I. (2003) “Welfare Capitalism in the Tiger Economies of East and Southeast Asia” in I. Holliday & P. Wilding (eds) Welfare Capitalism in East Asia: Social Policy in the Tiger Economies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–17.

TONG_f7_121-144.indd 144 2/7/2008 5:14:40 PM MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN MANPOWER

Md. Mizanur Rahman

Since the establishment of Singapore as a British trading port by Sir Stamford Rafﬂ es in 1819, “the history and fortunes of Singapore have been closely intertwined with migrants and migration” (Yeoh, 2007a). Singapore, a former British Colony, gained its independence in 1965. We can broadly identify two waves of migration into Singapore: pre-independence migration, which was principally for permanent settlement, and post-independence migration, which is largely for temporary work with non-resident status.1 Since political independence in 1965, Singapore’s economic growth has attracted this new wave of non-resident foreign manpower from high-end to low-end positions. The non-resident population increased from 2.9% in 1970 to 5.5% in 1980 (Yeoh, 2004: 19). This group made up 10.2% of Singapore’s total population of then 3.05 million in 1990, but swelled to make up 18.8% of the population of 4.02 million in 2000 (Business Times, Singapore, 1 September 2000).2 The recent data shows that the non-resident population makes up around 26% of the population in Singapore (Straits Times, 12 January 2007).3 The contribution of foreign manpower to the Singapore economy is well-documented (see Low, 2002; Pang & Lim, 1982; Hui, 1997). According to one study in 2001, foreign workers contributed a hefty 36.9% of Singapore’s economic growth over the past 10 years.4

1 The non-resident population holds passes for short-term stay in Singapore and includes the employment pass, work permits, dependent pass, student pass, long-term social visit pass etc. In 2006, there were 875,000 non-resident foreigners in Singapore (Straits Times (2007) “A Great Place to Live” 10 March or Li Xueying, “Non-resident population on the up and up” in Straits Times, 7 December 2006). 2 The number of permanent residents (PR) more than doubled in the last 10 years, to 290,118 from 112,132. PRs make up 7.2% of Singapore’s population, compared to 3.7% a decade ago. The number of Singapore citizens grew by just around 350,000 in 10 years, to 2.97 million (Business Times, Singapore (2000) “Singapore Population Crosses 4 Million Mark” 1 September). 3 Straits Times (2007) “Helping foreigners ﬁ t in: do not just focus on talents” 12 January. 4 Foreign workers contributed 36.9% of the total GDP growth from 1991 to 2000. In contrast, local labour accounted for only 14.1% of the total growth. For details, see

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Managing migration, as Doomernik et al. (2005) suggest, is “meta- phorically akin to walking a tightrope,” because the government has to try to keep the domestic population’s aspirations and economic needs in balance. Singapore’s government makes every effort to increase public awareness about the growing importance of immigration for Singapore’s economy and society. For instance, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew recently commented that foreigners add dynamism to Singapore, which cannot afford to remain static in a changing and globalised world (Straits Times, 23 April 2007).5 The Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, in his National Day Rally speech in August 2006 made it clear, that Singapore needs foreign manpower for economic growth and prosperity. The Deputy Prime Minister, Wong Kan Seng, in a recent speech stated: “Singapore’s 4.5 million population faces two troubling trends that spell demographic doom without immigration: it is aging and there are not enough babies” (Straits Times, 3 March 2007).6 The reason for hiring foreign manpower should be principally seen from an economic point of view, i.e. the gap between a limited pool of local labour and a high rate of employment creation. Hui (2002) reported that Singapore’s economic growth between 1990 and 1998 averaged 7.9% p.a. Over this period, more than 604,000 new jobs were created against an increase of about 300,000 in the domestic labour force (Hui, 2002: 33). Based on this data, Hui (2002) maintains that, without the inﬂ ow of foreign manpower to supplement the domestic labour force, the phenomenal growth in employment and gross domestic product (GDP) over that period would not have been possible. In addition, there are some other studies that have discussed the raison d’être for hiring foreign manpower in greater detail (see Chew & Chew, 1995; Wong, 1997; Low, 2002; Pang & Lim, 1982; Hui, 1992, 1997). In this context, Singapore has devised a sophisticated migration policy, based on a ‘demand-driven system’ to allow regular circulation of foreign labour.

Agence France Presse (2001) “Foreign workers made hefty contribution to Singapore economy: Study” October 31. 5 Straits Times, (2007) “MM: My job to look after those who built nation” 23 April. 6 “Country faces demographic doom if door is shut to them. . . . This is because Singapore’s 4.5 million population faces two troubling trends that spell demographic doom without immigration: it is ageing and there are not enough babies” Straits Times (2007) “S’pore needs immigrants to avert population decline” 3 March.

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There is a lack of published data on the numbers and sources of migrants in Singapore as they are deemed “confi dential and politically sensitive” (Low, 2002). However, there is a “greater expression by way of policy and strategy than quantitative empirical evidence” (Low, 2002: 96). And, considering the number of migration scholarships available, it is perhaps safe to argue that migration research in Singapore is fairly healthy. In Singapore, migration has been constantly debated by academics and policy makers, and scrutinised by local universities and different ministries in the form of delegating funds for research, workshops, and the establishment of several migration clusters in the universities. The signifi cance of, and demand for, foreign manpower, in conjunction with other pertinent issues, such as immigration, foreign talent, dual citizenship, assimilation, and integration, often hogs the headlines of the ‘The Straits Times’, the leading English daily of Singapore. All these have contributed to the development of a healthy scholarly debate on this crucial and expanding fi eld. While it is not feasible to offer here, an individual treatment of all major works that deal with migration in Singapore, this chapter provides a brief overview of the trends in migration research and discourse in Singapore. It begins with Pang Eng Fong, one of the pioneering migration scholars in Singapore, whose early work dates back to 1976. Pang’s earlier works discussed migration, public policy and social development in Singapore (Pang, 1976, 1979). One of his major works on migration was published with Linda Lim in 1982. They largely focused on foreign labour and economic development in Singapore (Pang & Lim, 1982). Two years later, in response to Pang & Lim (1982), Stahl published detailed empirical fi ndings pertaining to the benefi ts and costs of foreign labour and other migration related issues in Singapore (Stahl, 1984). In the migration literature, the chapter identifi es an emphasis on cost-benefi t analysis of foreign labour import, along with other broader issues, e.g. the philosophy behind immigration policy, imbalance between labour supply and employment creation, evolution of foreign labour policy and implications of foreign labour (Pang, 1992, 1991, 1994; Hui, 1992, 1997; Low, 1995, 1994; Sullivan, 1992; Toh, 1993; Chew & Chew, 1995; Yap, 1992, 1999, 2001; Chiew, 1995; Wong, 1997; Rodgers, 2000). Since the 1990s, in conjunction with all these relevant issues, research on emigration orientation and emigration of Singaporeans (Tan, 2005; Tan and Chiew, 1995; Low, 1994; Hui, 1997, 1998; Leong, 2007), foreign talent (Yeoh & Huang, 2003; Koh, 2003; Low, 2002; Hui, 2002; Poon, 2003), irregular migration (Sullivan et al., 1992), foreign

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construction workers (Ofori, 1997; Ofori & Debrah, 1998; Debrah & Ofori, 2001; Prompiam, 1996), Thai labour migration (Wong, 2000; Pattana, 2005a, 2005b; Wong, 2000), and Bangladeshi labour migration (Rahman, 2003, 2004, 2000; Rahman & Yeoh, 2007; Rahman & Lian, 2005; Lian & Rahman, 2006; Foo, 1999), dominate the migration scholarship in Singapore. Besides, a variety of issues on international migration in Singapore, such as the comparative study of migration policies (Ruppert, 1999; Seol, 2005; Yoo, 2004; Ruhs, 2002; Chan & Abdullah, 1999), Chinese-Malaysian transmigration (Lam & Yeoh, 2004; Lian, 1995; Lam, Yeoh, & Law, 2002) and the relationship between foreign manpower policy and population policy (Wong, 1997), have been discussed. With the ‘feminisation of migration’ in Asia in the 1990s, scholars, like Brenda Yeoh, Shirlena Huang and others, have addressed the different aspects of gender migration in Singapore and beyond (Yeoh & Khoo, 1998; Yeoh, Huang & Katie, 2000; Yeoh et al. 1999; Yeoh, Huang & Devasahayam, 2004; Huang & Yeoh, 2003; Ogaya, 2004; Wong, 1996; Poon, 2003; Kobayashi, 2004; Tisa, 2005; Bell, 2001; Noor, 2005; Piper, 2006; Hasegawa, 2007). In addition, other works, which are not immediately associated with foreign manpower, but broadly linked to immigration matters, like diaspora, transnationalism, multi-culturalism, national identity, nation-building and citizenship, further contribute to the enrichment of our understanding of immigration in Singapore (Yeoh & Kong, 1996; Chua, 2003; Yeoh, 2004; Kong, 1999; Lam & Yeoh, 2004; Lian, 1995; Chiew, 1983; Hill & Lian, 1995; Ooi, Tan & Soh, 2003; Lai, 1995; Yeoh, Charney & Tong, 2003; Yahya, 2007; Ho Lynn-ee, 2007; Kaur, 2007; Kelvin, 2007; Liew, 2007). Despite the abundance of research on the dynamics of migration, we are not suffi ciently aware of foreign manpower policy, in relation to its management, especially the fi nely-tuned micro-aspect of policy. The management of foreign manpower is vital for any labour importing country, as failure to ensure effi cacy in the achievement of labour migration policies and programme goals often generates a whole range of unintended consequences, like xenophobia, politicisation of migration, irregular migration, and eventually, cessation of labour migration programmes (see Lian & Rahman, 2006; Marmora, 1999; Castles & Miller, 1998). Therefore, this study examines the foreign manpower policy and its implementation mechanisms, to highlight the importance of careful and comprehensive policy and transparent management. The discussion is divided into fi ve sections:

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I. explains brieﬂ y the nature of labour migration policies, II. elaborates the administrative and legal frameworks, III. describes classes and policies of foreign worker passes, IV. illustrates some of the salient features of low-skilled foreign worker policy, V. provides conclusions.

I Nature of Labour Migration Policies

Broadly, international labour migration policies can be divided into supply-driven and demand-driven systems (Yoo et al., 2004). While a supply-driven system is widely employed in the developed countries to invite foreigners (immigrants) to live and work permanently, a demand- driven system is generally followed in comparatively developed (or developing) economies, to hire foreign workers of all skills levels and employ them temporarily to fulfi ll short-term manpower needs. In the supply-driven system, potential migrants introduce themselves in the host countries’ screening processes, on the basis of some objective criteria, and the host countries select the best quality foreign workforce from the pool of potential (im)migrants. Traditional immigrant countries, like Canada, Australia and New Zealand, follow the supply-driven policy to attract foreign manpower. Foreigners with suffi cient points are chosen to immigrate with the permit of residency and work. The supply-driven system is skills-biased, in the sense that it excludes low-skilled manpower from developing countries. More importantly, this system contributes to the brain-drain from developing countries. On the other hand, in the demand-driven system, employers from the host countries, play a vital role in the overall process of introducing foreign workers, of skilled and unskilled categories, to the host governments for approval (Yoo et al., 2004). In general, employers use recruiting agencies to hire the right workers from overseas. Recruiting agents contact their counterparts in emigration countries to fi nd interested individuals. Once they meet the right migrants with the necessary skills and experiences, they inform the original employers for offi cial procedures, like visa application, air tickets and so on, and upon the receipts of approval from governments, they bring in foreign workers for temporary appointment. In general, this demand-driven system, which underlies foreign worker policy in Asia, can be broadly summarised as follows: limiting labour migration, limiting the duration of migration

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and limiting integration (Piper, 2004: 75). The demand-driven system is based on “the logic that employers are in the ideal position to make the best decisions on the economic contribution of foreign labour” (Yoo et al., 2004). Singapore, as well as some other labour-importing countries, follows the demand-driven system, albeit with some variations (Lian & Rahman, 2006). Singapore’s demand-driven system serves both parties—employers and migrants. On one hand, it is effi cient in satisfying the needs of employers and, therefore, is capable of generating higher benefi ts for the host country. On the other hand, it is economically benefi cial for the migrants and their home countries, because it spawns remittance direct to the migrant families, who really need it often “bypassing costly bureaucracy and corrupt government offi cials on the sending side” (Kapur, 2003: 7). As Jones (1998) notes, “there is probably no other more ‘bottom-up’ way of redistributing and enhancing welfare among populations in developing countries than the remittances.” More importantly, it opens up opportunities for even low-skilled migrants from developing economies to earn skills and relevant working experience in host countries and employ these skills and experience upon return.

II Administrative and Legal Frameworks

Migration policy needs adequate governance through the harmonisation of demands, expectations, objectives, and implementation (see, Marmora, 1999). Marmora (1999: 238) suggests that one of the important conditions of good migration governance is ‘effi cacy,’ in the achievement of migration policies and programme goals. He suggests that three fundamental tools support effi cacy: a) awareness of the migration process, b) realistic objectives, and c) administrative effi ciency. Awareness of the migration process involves analysis of migration patterns, causes, features and consequences. Marmora maintains that realism implies harmonisation among the goals of strategies, actions, norms, and available means of enforcement, while administrative effi ciency ensures execution of international migration policies and programmes. Singapore has developed a transparent administration and formulated comprehensive legislation to ensure such effi cacy in the management of migration. The Ministry of Manpower (MOM) manages foreign manpower in Singapore. It is responsible for devising and implementing foreign

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manpower policy in Singapore.7 Within MOM, there are two divisions in charge of foreign manpower issues in Singapore. They are the Work Pass Division and the Foreign Manpower Management Division. The objectives of the Work Pass Division are to develop an efﬁ cient, effective and dynamic foreign manpower admission framework, that caters to the needs of the Singapore economy. It facilitates and regulates the employment of foreign nationals by administering three types of Work Passes, discussed in the next section. The Work Pass Division comprises the Work Permit and Employment Pass Departments. The Work Permit Department serves the low-skilled foreign manpower, while the Employment Pass Department serves highly skilled foreign manpower. On the other hand, The Foreign Manpower Management Division (FMMD) is in charge of the welfare of foreign workers during their working stint in Singapore. The FMMD works closely with the other departments within the Ministry, in particular the Foreign Manpower Employment Division, Occupational Safety and Health Division, Labour Relations Division and Corporate Communications Department. The core functions of FMMD include:

a) management and protection of foreign manpower, b) professionalism of the employment agency industry, and c) strengthening of enforcement capabilities.

The FMMD is structured around four departments:

a) the Employment Inspectorate Department seeks to foster effective management of foreign manpower, through policing, in partnership with other enforcement agencies and the business community, b) the Policy and Regulations Department focuses on drafting and implementing policies for the division’s management of foreign manpower, c) the Well-Being Management Department focuses on the management and protection of foreign manpower, and d) the Corporate Management Department supports the entire division in the area of ofﬁ ce management.

7 Information regarding different departments and their responsibilities is compiled from the MOM website, accessed on 3 January, 2006, at 2:30 am www.mom.gov.sg.

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Singapore’s policy towards solicited migrants has always been positive, but, towards unsolicited migrants, its policies are aimed at reducing their arrival to a minimum and to controlling and preventing unwanted fl ows. The government has introduced several laws for the effective management of foreign manpower since the 1980s. Some relevant legislation are the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Chapter 91), Immigration Act (Chapter 133), Employment Agencies Act, Employment of Foreign Workers (levy order), Employment of Foreign Workers (Fees) regulation, Work Permit (exemption) (consolidation) notifi cation, Employment of foreign workers (security measures at workplace) notifi cation. While these legislations provide the legal framework for regulating the import, management and return of foreign manpower, the administrative structure ensures the execution of foreign worker polices and programmes. Both contribute to the effi cient management of foreign manpower in Singapore.

III Classes and Policies of Foreign Work Passes

Singapore’s foreign labour management relies on immigration regulations in the forms of work passes, and the government has adjusted the work pass schemes, according to market demand. Prior to September 1998, foreigners working were divided into two main categories: employment-pass holders, who were skilled professional and managerial workers, and work-permit holders, who were low-skilled migrant workers. However, the work pass system that came into effect in 1998 provides a three-tiered migration scheme: Classes P, Q and R. The three major classes are each divided into two sub-categories, for a total of six classiﬁ cation levels (i.e. P1 and P2, Q1 and Q2, and R1 and R2). However, with effect from July 2004, a new category of work pass, namely S Pass,8 has been introduced to replace the Q2 pass of Q Class. Presently, the work passes consist of Employment Pass (EP) (mainly the P1, P2, Q1 and PEP passes), S Pass, and Work Permit

8 The large gap between EP and WP means that is difﬁ cult for some companies to bring in middle level manpower, resulting in an unﬁ lled demand in some industries for such middle level skills sets, which local manpower has not been able to meet adequately. With the S pass, employers will have access to middle level talent, such as specialised workers and technicians from any country. However, a skilled levy of S$50 per month is imposed on the company for each S-pass holder they employ. Retrieved from MOM website, in June 2004 www.mom.gov.sg.

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(WP)—R1 and R2. Presently, there are around 620,000 foreign workers and professionals (Sunday Times, Singapore, 13 November 2005). Of the 620,000 foreign workers and professionals, 540,000 are WP holders and the remaining 80,000 are EP holders.9

EP/S pass for Highly Skilled Foreign Manpower Singapore has an open door policy for skilled and professional foreign manpower (Table 1). They are also the primary source of permanent residents and of future citizens in Singapore. P passes are issued to foreigners, who hold professional qualifi cations and are seeking to work in a professional, managerial, or administrative capacity. They are also issued on a case-by-case basis to investors and entrepreneurs, who can contribute to the economy of Singapore, as well as to persons of exceptional ability in the arts, sciences, and business. There are two categories of P passes: P1 and P2. P1 is issued, if the applicant’s monthly basic salary is more than S$7,000. P2 is issued, if the applicant’s monthly basic salary is between S$3,500 and S$7,000. Q1 is for those foreigners, whose monthly salary is more than S$2,500, but less than S$3,500 and who possess acceptable degrees, professional qualifi cations or special skills. S pass is for foreigners, whose monthly basic salary is at least S$1,800. S pass is issued, taking into account multiple criteria, including salary, educational qualifi cations, skills, job type and work experience. The EP and S-pass holders can apply for permanent residency. Thus, migration policy is also a component of population policy. Recruitment of skilled and professional foreign manpower is relatively easy and direct. Once employers fi nd a suitable candidate, they apply to MOM for an EP on behalf of the prospective employee. The passes are offered on the basis of objective criteria discussed above. In addition, to these regular work passes, there are also some special passes that fall under the EP category, e.g. Short-Term Employment Pass, Training Visit Pass, EntrePass (Employment Pass for Entrepreneurs), Dependent Pass or Letter of Consent, and Long-Term Social Visit Pass. An EP holder (P1, P2 and Q1) is eligible to apply for Dependent Passes for his/her spouse and for unmarried or legally adopted children under 21 years of age. An EP holder (P1, P2) may apply for Long-Term Social Visit

9 Sunday Times (2005) “No Fee subsidies for foreigners at policlinics from next year” 13 November.

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Passes for his/her parents, parents-in-law, step children, spouse, handicapped children and unmarried daughters aged above 21. Singapore has recently introduced the Personalised Employment Pass (PEP) to facilitate the contributions of global talent to Singapore. Currently, the issue of an Employment Pass (EP) is tied to a specifi c employer. Any change of employer requires a fresh application. If an EP holder leaves his employer, his EP is cancelled and he must leave Singapore within a short time, unless he fi nds a new job. The new PEP is not tied to any employer and is granted on the strength of an EP holder’s individual merits. A PEP holder is entitled to remain in Singapore for up to six months in between jobs to seek new employment opportunities.10 The PEP is valid for fi ve years and is non-renewable. EP holders are allowed to marry locals or bring their immediate ‘dependents’ to Singapore. Hui (1992) argues that Singapore’s immigration policy towards the skilled and professional foreign manpower may be regarded as liberal. The economic motivation for this liberal policy is to “capitalise on the benefi ts of savings in human capital investments and to facilitate technology transfers” (Hui, 1998: 208–209). The professional and managerial workers are usually referred to as ‘foreign talent’ in both government and pubic discourse (Yeoh, 2004: 8) and the latest State strategy has been to make Singapore a ‘talent capital,’ where industries can fi nd the skills and expertise for their activities (MOM, 1999: 18 cited in Low, 2002: 110). The International Manpower Division of MOM is engaged in attracting international talent as well as Singaporean talent, working or studying overseas, through the international network of “Contact Singapore.”

WP for Low Skilled Foreign Manpower Before 1968, no unskilled workers were permitted to enter Singapore to work (Low, 1994). After 1968, unskilled foreign labour fl owed into Singapore in signifi cant numbers, as a result of rapidly growing wage employment opportunities (Stahl, 1986: 37). Hui (1999) identifi es three contributory factors for the sustained demand for low-skilled foreign manpower in Singapore:

10 MOM website, accessed on 20 April 2007, at 5.52 pm http://www.mom.gov. sg/publish/momportal/en/communities/work_pass/PEP/about_the_pass.html

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a) tight domestic labour supply, b) an increasingly qualiﬁ ed workforce (one in three hold post-secondary qualiﬁ cations), and c) a general aversion among Singaporeans to jobs, that are considered dirty, dangerous and demeaning.

The government’s policy on low-skilled workers is comparatively restrictive and has remained committed to ensuring that “low-skilled foreign manpower is managed as a temporary and controlled phenomenon” (Yeoh, 2004: 19). In other words, the low-skilled foreign workers are “relegated to the most transient of categories—subject to the ‘use and discard’ philosophy” (Yeoh et al., 2000: 151). In 1981, it was announced that foreign workers would be phased out by 1991 (Hui, 1992). However, it was soon realised that “reliance on foreign labour was indispensable for sustained economic growth” (Hui, 1992). Presently, the emphasis has shifted from complete independence from foreign workers to issues like monitoring infl ow, increasing productivity, and fi ne-tuning restrictions to moderate demand (Hui, 1997). Low-skilled foreign workers, who wish to work in Singapore, are offered WP. Within this category of pass, there are two sub-groups: R1 and R2. R1 is issued to skilled foreign workers who possess at least a SPM (Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia) qualifi cation or its equivalent, or a National Technical Certifi cate Grade 3 (Practical) or other suitable qualifi cations (Table 2). R2 is issued to unskilled foreign workers. Foreign workers are required to carry their WP cards with them for identifi cation at all times. Foreign workers, who fail to carry their WP card, are liable to have their WP cancelled, be repatriated and barred from employment in Singapore. Employers are not allowed to retain their workers’ WP cards and, those who do so, may be debarred from employing foreign workers.11

11 MOM website, http://www.gov.sg/mom/fta/wp/ftawp.htm.

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Table 1. Management of Skilled and Professional Foreign Manpower: EP and S Passes Type of Qualifi cations Range of Spouse Long- Comments Passes and Nature of Salary Passes term Employment passes P1 For foreigners who More than Yes Yes I. P, Q and hold acceptable S$7,000 S-pass holders are degrees, eligible to apply for P2 professional More than Yes Yes Permanent residency. qualifi cations or S$3,500 and Permanent residents specialist skills up to S$7,000 are considered future and are seeking citizens of Singapore professional, administrative, II. No restrictions executive or on nationality, managerial jobs. maximum duration of employment Q1 For foreigners who More than Yes No in Singapore, and possess acceptable S$2,500 but maximum age degrees, less than of employment professional S$3,500 (subject to prevailing qualifi cations or retirement age) of P, specialist skills Q, S-pass holders

S Multiple criteria More than Yes No III. P.Q.S passes are including salary, S$1,800 (conditional) granted for speciﬁ c educational employer and prior qualiﬁ cations, permission is needed skills, job type and for the change of work experience. employer

PEP P1, P2 and Q1- A ﬁ xed salary Yes – IV. PEP holder is not pass holders are of at least tied to any employer eligible. $30,000 in and is able to remain P pass-holders the preceding in Singapore for must have at year up to 6 months in least 2 years, and between jobs Q1-pass holders 5 years, working experience with the concerned pass. Source: Compiled from information found in the MOM website, http://www.mom.gov.sg/publish/momportal/en/communities/work_pass/employment_pass/about_the_pass.html accessed on 9 January 2006 at 2:05 am and 23 April 2007 at 8.05 pm.

TONG_f8_145-172.indd 156 2/7/2008 5:08:12 PM management of foreign manpower 157 Comments I. R-pass holders’ salary will be below S$1,800 II. Security bond of S$5,000 for and PRC NTS, workers NAS (including maids) III. No marriage allowed No reunion IV. of family unskilled For V. workers, opportunity for skills upgrade in Usual Sources People’s People’s ofRepublic China (PRC), Malaysia, North Asian sources (NAS) NAS, non- NAS, traditional source (NTS), Malaysia, PRC NTS, NAS, NAS, NTS, Malaysia – Monthly Levy Monthly Levy (S$)* Skilled S$100 Unskilled S$240 Skilled S$100 Unskilled S$310 Skilled/ Unskilled S$500 Skilled S$100 Unskilled S$470 Skilled S$100 Unskilled S$295 Skilled S$100 Unskilled S$295 Ceiling* Up to 40% of the total workforce Between 41% Between and 50% of the total workforce 50% Between and 60% of the total workforce 1 local full-time to 4 worker workers foreign 1 local full-time to 3 worker workers foreign 1 local full-time to 3 worker workers foreign Manu- facturing Construc- tion Marine Process Duration Sector*Duration Dependency Up to 15 years Up to 15 years (construction) Up to 4 years (construction) Table 2. Management of R Passes Manpower: Table Skilled Foreign Low cate cate cate ﬁ ﬁ Education/ Skills SPM, for NTC3; construction: Basic Skills Certi (BSC), Skills Evaluation Certi (SEC) NTS BSC For workers (construction) Permit/ Permit/ Worker R1 Pass skilled for workers R2 Pass unskilled for workers

TONG_f8_145-172.indd 157 2/7/2008 5:08:12 PM 158 md. mizanur rahman employers employers orientation course for employers, accident insurance of S$10,000 for six- maids, monthly medical test Comments Singapore domestic VI. For safety maids, course awareness maids, for – NTS, Malaysia Indonesia no PRC but & NAS Usual Sources Malaysia, Malaysia, NAS, ed ﬁ ed crew ed ﬁ (marriage parenthood package) Certi S$100 Non-certi S$240 crew Monthly Levy Monthly Levy (S$)* Skilled S$100 Unskilled S$240 Skilled/ Unskilled S$500 harbour + craft license) × 2—the lower quota will apply Ceiling* of the total workforce 31% Between and 40% of the total workforce 1 local full- time worker to 9 foreign workers/ ofNo. crews on (shown MPA Domestic Not Applicable S$295/200 Service Up to 30% Harbour craft Duration Sector*Duration Dependency Issued usually and 2 years for extendable Education/ Skills 8 years of8 years schooling, MOM- test stipulated in Singapore .) cont MPA—Maritime & Port Authority of & Port MPA—Maritime Singapore

Table 2 ( Table 2006 1:38 am http://www.mom.gov.sg 2006, accessed 9 January Updated on 1 Jan update, * Based on MOM recent Note: Some sub-headings follow Ruppert, 1999 + Permit/ Permit/ Worker R2 Pass for for R2 Pass Domestic Maids

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IV Features of the Low Skilled Foreign Manpower Policy

In the following discussion, the chapter illustrates some of the basic features of low-skilled foreign worker policy in Singapore.

Selection of Migrant Workers Singapore places priority on personal traits, especially skills and age, when it hires low-skilled foreign workers, including domestic workers. Singapore has always encouraged the import of skilled migrant workers, even in the bottom-rung jobs, and, therefore, favoured skilled migrant workers over unskilled ones. The BSC (Basic Skills Certifi cate) and SEC (Skills Evaluation Certifi cate) schemes were implemented in 1998 to raise the skills level of the construction workforce. The BSC and SEC are certifi cates issued to non-traditional source (NTS) workers who have passed the required skills tests in their home country. The scheme sets a minimum skill standard (BSC) as an entry criterion for workers from NTS countries. If a worker has obtained the SEC, he is placed on a low levy and can work up to 15 years. On the contrary, if the worker has obtained only the BSC, he will not be allowed to work for more than an accumulated period of 4 years (A Guide on Work Permits—Construction Section). A work permit holder (male migrant) must be at least 16 years old. In the case of foreign domestic maids, they must be at least 23 (up to 50) years old. In addition, they have to produce recognised educational certifi cates, as documentary proof that they have had a minimum of eight years of formal education. With effect from 1 April 2005, all fi rst-time foreign domestic workers are required to pass a written test within three working days of their arrival in Singapore. Foreign domestic workers, who fail to pass the test within three working days, are not issued a work permit and must be repatriated (Foreign Domestic Worker Entry Test). Until recently, skills upgrading was available for male unskilled workers in different sectors. However, the government has recently introduced skills upgrading opportunities for foreign domestic workers in the area of elderly care. The Foreign Domestic Worker Association for Skills Training (FAST) is conducting an elementary course on elderly care for foreign domestic workers. FAST, an organisation supported by the MOM, was formed in March 2005 to provide skills training for foreign domestic workers (Foreign Manpower News Alert No. 44, 20 December 2005).

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Source Countries From 1968 until the late 1970s, unskilled foreign workers were recruited mainly from neighbouring Malaysia, which is referred to as a traditional source country for Singapore. Owing to its geopolitical location and historical and ethnic links, Singapore privileges Malaysian nationals for work. In the late 1970s, it was difﬁ cult to recruit unskilled labour from Malaysia. As a result, administrative measures were taken in 1978 to facilitate the limited importation of unskilled labour from NTS countries, like Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Thailand (Wong, 1997, 143). In addition, Singapore hires low-skilled foreign workers from two other sources: North Asian sources (NAS) and PRC (People’s Republic of China). NAS includes Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and South Korea. Presently, the four sources—traditional, non-traditional, North Asian, and PRC—provide the low-skilled labour for Singapore. While low-skilled workers from Malaysia are allowed to work in all sectors, NTS workers are generally allowed to work only in the construction, shipbuilding and harbour craft industries. Low-skilled migrants from NAS countries and PRC are allowed to work in construction and almost all other non-construction sectors. The preference of low-skilled workers from traditional source, NAS, PRC over NTS is probably a cultural consideration. There exists a fear among the policy makers, that the presence of a large foreign worker population, whose culture and work ethos are distinctly different from those of the local workforce, may create social problems. In addition, Singapore presently hosts around 140,000 foreign domestic workers (Yeoh et al., 2004: 11). The approved sources for foreign domestic workers are Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. PRC and NAS nationals are not permitted to work in the domestic service sector. The exclusion of PRC and NAS nationals is probably due to the perceived fear of family disruption.

Foreign Worker Levy Scheme In the 1980s, Singapore devised a new immigration policy to control the inﬂ ow of foreign workers, using a “levy’ price mechanism (Chew, 1995; Chew & Chew, 1992; Fong, 1992, 1993). The levy puts a price on the employment of a foreign worker. The levy is paid monthly by the employer for each foreign worker employed, including domestic workers, and it is payable for the period the temporary work permit is

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valid. It serves to moderate demand for foreign workers and to narrow the wage gap between local and foreign workers. The levy was fi rst introduced in 1980, when a fl at rate levy of S$230 was imposed on non-Malaysian workers, employed in the construction sector (Hui, 1992). The levy scheme was enlarged in 1982 to encompass all NTS workers and Malaysian block permit construction workers (Toh, 1993: 5). Singapore has imposed a two-tier levy since 1992 (Low, 1994: 254). In this two-tier system, the levy for a skilled worker is lower than that of an unskilled worker, which affi rms Singapore’s priority for comparatively skilled workers, even in the low-skilled foreign manpower category.

Dependency Ceiling Singapore introduced a dependency ceiling as an instrument to regulate the employment of foreign workers in 1987 (Toh, 1993: 6). The dependency ceiling stipulates the proportion of foreign workers a ﬁ rm can hire. Currently, all sectors, except domestic service sectors, have a dependency ceiling. This prevents employers from relying too heavily on foreign workers, at the expense of local employment. The ceiling has varied with economic conditions. For instance, in November 1988, to discourage employers from depending too heavily on foreign workers, the government reduced the maximum percentage of foreign workers in a ﬁ rm from 50% to 40% (Pang, 1994). With effect from 1 July 2005, the government has increased the manufacturing sector dependency ceiling from 50% to 60% and the services sector dependency ceiling from 30% to 40%12 (Table 1). Foreign workers hired above the existing dependency ceiling pay a higher levy, which is currently S$500. The higher levy of S$500 goes towards ensuring, that companies make judicious use of foreign workers, and also narrows the wage gap between local and foreign workers.13

Recruitment As discussed earlier, Singapore has adopted a demand-driven system to hire low-skilled foreign workers, in which the process of introducing foreign workers begins, when employers in Singapore request permission

12 MOM website, accessed on 30 December 2005, at 9 pm http://www.mom.gov. sg/PressRoom/PressReleases/20050310–MOMFineTunesForeignWorkerPolicy.htm 13 MOM website, accessed on 30 December 2005, at 9 pm http://www.mom.gov. sg/PressRoom/PressReleases/20050310–MOMFineTunesForeignWorkerPolicy.htm

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to employ foreign workers. In accordance with the Employment Agencies Act, Singapore allows licensed employment agencies to import and manage foreign workforce, on behalf of employers.14 In addition to residency status in Singapore and the possession of the Certiﬁ cate of Employment Agencies (CEA), the applicants for licensed employment agencies must furnish a security deposit of S$20,000 in the form of a banker’s guarantee and must not have any record of previous court convictions (particularly under Women’s Charter, Children and Young Persons Act, Penal Code, Employment Agencies Act and Employment of Foreign Workers Act). These strict measures help to ensure transparency in the recruitment process. There are around 1,300 licensed recruiting agents to serve employers in Singapore.15

Man-Year Entitlements The Man-Year Entitlement (MYE) allocation system is a work permit allocation system for construction workers from the NTS countries and the PRC. The allocation formula has been used since April 1998, and each year, there have been cutbacks. The number of foreign workers permitted to work in any construction project is determined by the MYE allocation formula. In general, when a project is higher in value, the contractor can hire more foreign workers. For example, if his entitlement is 100 ‘man years,’ then he may have 100 men on one-year contracts, or 50 men on two-year contracts (Straits Times, 14 March 2002). The main contractor is allocated ‘man-years’ for a project. He can then distribute the MYEs to his sub-contractors. MYEs are then converted into one or two-year work permits. The system is designed to give the main contractors better control over the allocation of foreign workers and greater responsibilities over foreign worker management by their subcontractors.16

14 MOM website: www.mom.gov.sg 15 MOM website, accessed on 5 January 2005 http://www.mom.gov.sg/NR/ rdonlyres/39FA6C75–EC3D-47B9–9078–CAD2812C09F0/6679/EAlistupdateda- sat22Dec05.pdf 16 MOM website, accessed on 28 September 2007, at 8.23 am http://www.mom.gov. sg/publish/momportal/en/communities/work_pass/work_permit/application/requirements/construction_sector/Man__Year_Entitlement.html#what

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Responsibility of Employers During a foreign worker’s employment in Singapore, the employer is generally responsible for:

a) paying the foreign worker levy, b) arranging for the worker to be certiﬁ ed medically ﬁ t and free from contagious diseases and drug addition by a Singapore-registered doctor, when requested by the Controller of Work Permits, c) ensuring that the worker does not engage in any form of free-lancing arrangements or self-employment, d) providing basic terms and conditions of employment as stipulated in the Employment Act, e) resolving all employment-related disputes with the worker amicably, f ) providing workman’s compensation for the worker, and g) sending the worker to the safety orientation course, if the worker is a construction worker.17

For a non-Malaysian worker, the employer is also responsible for a) the upkeep, maintenance and cost of the worker’s eventual repatriation, b) providing adequate housing, c) putting up a S$5,000 security bond, and d) buying a personal accident insurance with a minimum coverage of S$10,000, if the worker is a foreign domestic worker. The employer should ensure the worker’s welfare and interests are well looked after. These include non-statutory requirements such as proper orientation, medical care, hospitalisation expenses and providing for the worker’s social and recreational needs.

Termination of WP Singapore follows some strict rules to reduce the social and economic costs of using foreign manpower, and violation of these rules may result in the cancellation of the WP and immediate repatriation. The Work Permit Division of MOM revokes a worker’s permit when he or she violates WP provisions. The violations include:

17 MOM, accessed in June 2005 http://www.mom.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/6F8D2FB5– 30DA-466C-A2C1–D0C495EAE8C6/6131/AGeneralGuideonWorkPermits17Nov05. pdf

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a) changing job or engaging in occupations other than those specifi ed in the work permit, b) engaging or participating in any business or behaving as a self- employed person, c) deserting the workplace, d) becoming pregnant (in the case of domestic workers), contracting venereal diseases or being certifi ed by a Singapore registered doctor as medically unfi t, e) marrying a Singaporean without the prior approval of the Controller (Yoo et al., 2004).

The foreign worker is obliged to return his or her WP and leave Singapore, within seven days of the termination of service. However, foreign workers, who have pending salary or compensation claims or are required as prosecution witnesses, are usually issued special passes by the Ministry, for a limited period to allow them to remain in Singapore.18 They are also allowed to work during this period.

Prevention of Irregular Migration Unlike other host countries in the region, Singapore is relatively free from irregular labour migrants, due to the government’s strong crackdown on irregular employment. Singapore has enacted several laws to penalise irregular migrants, users (employers of irregular migrants) and human smugglers. The Employment of Foreign Workers Act came into effect in 1991 and puts a check on illegal migrants, by punishing employers caught employing foreigners illegally (Toh, 1993). Under the Employment of Foreign Workers Act, any person caught employing foreigners without valid permits is liable to be charged in court. A fi rst-time offender faces a minimum fi ne, equivalent to two years of the foreign worker levy, and a maximum fi ne of up to four years’ levy for each foreign worker, or imprisonment of up to one year, or both.19 Besides stepping up enforcement actions, the Ministry has

18 MOM website, accessed on 31 December 2005, at 2:39 pm http://www.mom. gov.sg/PressRoom/PressReleases/20051130–52IllegalForeignWorkersNabbedInCof- feeShops.htm 19 MOM website, accessed on 28 September 2007 at 8.28 am http://agcvldb4. agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-91A&doctitle=EMP LOYMENT%20OF%20FOREIGN%20WORKERS%20ACT%0a&date=latest&m ethod=part

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also intensiﬁ ed its efforts to educate employers and foreign workers on employment and immigration rules and regulations, so that they can play their part to minimise such offences.20

V Conclusion

Singapore’s high growth rate policy has resulted in its labour demand exceeding the supply from the local population. This imbalance has forced the policy makers to pursue a pro-active foreign worker policy. Instead of, what de Haas (2005) calls, “uselessly and harmfully trying to stop inevitable migration,” Singapore, based on a demand-driven system, has devised a sophisticated foreign manpower policy, to hire foreign workers of all categories from high to low skill levels. Singapore adopts a liberal policy for skilled and professional foreign manpower, in contrast to low-skilled foreign manpower. However, this paper has shown that Singapore’s demand-driven system accommodates both the highly skilled professionals and the low-skilled foreign workers. Although dictated by economic imperatives, Singapore’s foreign worker policy provides these low-skilled migrant workers a place to work and acquire skills during an extended stay, thus contributing to improved human security and development in the source countries (see, Rahman, 2007; Rahman & Lian, forthcoming). I broadly identify two criteria for admission of low-skilled foreign workers: economic and cultural. By economic criteria, I mean skills, age, education, and working experience and by cultural criteria, I mean primarily cultural compatibility. While Singapore does not compromise with economic attributes for work, it favours cultural and ethnic compatibility, especially in certain sectors of the economy, like the manufacturing, service or marine sectors. However, the issue of ethnic compatibility is important in the sense that it reduces social tensions. All migrant workers are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection under the law. Issues like occupational safety, workplace violence, or sexual harassment are taken seriously. To make the migrant workers’ stay comfortable and memorable, Singapore pursues policies to improve the working and living conditions of migrant workers, including domestic

20 MOM website, accessed on 31 December 2005, at 2:39 pm http://www.mom. gov.sg/PressRoom/PressReleases/20051130–52IllegalForeignWorkersNabbedInCof- feeShops.htm

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workers. To facilitate remittance transfers, Singapore has permitted international companies, like Western Union and MoneyGram, to operate here. In addition, Singapore has allowed some labour-sending countries to open exchange houses for transfers of remittances from their nationals (Rahman & Yeoh, forthcoming). The trend in foreign manpower policy, in general, is thus one of a move towards liberalisation and humanisation. However, more attention should be paid to low-skilled migrant workers, including domestic workers, students, and dependents (see Yeoh, 2007b). These foreigners are more loyal to Singapore than skilled workers or foreign talent, and their contribution is, by no means, less than those at the higher end. Therefore, one of the policy suggestions is to offer more privileges and rights to low-skilled migrant workers, especially those who have developed multiple skills or taken care of Singapore’s families, at the cost of their families back home and adjusted to Singapore culture over time. Such a policy change will produce a group of trained, dedicated and culturally compatible foreign workers, who will be more likely to work in Singapore as transient migrant workers, during their whole working life-cycle, benefi ting Singapore for a long time. Good migration management depends on effi cacy in achieving the goals of migration policies and programmes. Unlike other host countries in the region, where the management of foreign workers is usually assigned to other Ministries rather than the MOM (e.g. Ministry of Home Affairs in Malaysia and Ministry of Justice in Korea and Japan), Singapore empowers MOM to oversee foreign manpower, an outstanding recognition of their contribution to the Singapore economy. MOM in Singapore makes every effort to meet the local population’s aspirations and economic needs, by increasing public awareness of the migration process, setting realistic goals, and fi nally, achieving effi cient implementation. The Singapore case shows, that a pro-active policy and transparency in migration management is necessary to reduce the undesirable consequences of employing foreign manpower, and to maximise the benefi ts of temporary migration, for both receiving and sending countries. Singapore’s achievement in managing foreign manpower, therefore, sets an example for others in the region and beyond.

Acknowledgement

I wish to thank Lian Kwen Fee for his helpful suggestions and critical comments on an earlier draft. I also wish to extend my thanks, in

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particular, to Habibul Haque Khondker and Brenda S.A. Yeoh for their support and encouragement.

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TONG_f8_145-172.indd 171 2/7/2008 5:08:14 PM TONG_f8_145-172.indd 172 2/7/2008 5:08:14 PM HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AS A MODERATOR IN SINGAPORE’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Euston Quah and Lim Sze How

Economists have argued for many years that ignoring household production introduces a bias in various areas of economic analysis. Early pioneers, Mitchell et al. (1921), Kuznets (1944) and Clark (1958) have pointed out, that national income is considerably under-estimated if household production is excluded. Kende (1975) noted that ﬁ nal consumption as captured by present national income accounting is misleading, when the goods and services produced by the household are excluded. Weinrobe (1974) and Bloom & Williamson (1997) argued that an increase in women’s labour participation results in the upward bias of growth rates. Walker & Gauger (1973) pointed out, that since women account for two thirds of all housework, the economic contribution of women is understated. Nordhaus & Tobin (1972) questioned the limitations and the use of GNP (gross national product) as an indicator of the national income and product accounts because of this exclusion for economic welfare. Recent studies on time-use have also shown that, on average, women engaged in household production work as long hours as women in market work (Hill, 1983; Chadeau 1992; Goldschmidt-Clermont & Pagnossin-Aligisakes, 1995) and studies from North America, Europe and Asia show that the GNP values of household production range from 5 to 61% of their GNP (Quah, 1993; Ong, 2005; Quah, 2006). Singapore enjoyed a high growth of 6.89% annually over a 25 year period from 1975 to 2000 as GDP (gross domestic product) increased from S$25,258.8 million to S$162,62.3 million.1 Corresponding to this growth is an increase in women’s labour force participation from 29.6% in 1975 to over 50% in 2000.2 This paper seeks to account for this shift from women working in the household to the market, during the course of Singapore’s economic development, and the changes in

1 Department of Statistics, Singapore (2005). 2 Ministry of Manpower, Singapore (1975 and 2000).

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the trajectory of growth, due to the inclusion of household production. There has been no study on this phenomena in Singapore to date. The paper is organised as follows: Section I of this paper reviews the methodological and empirical literature on valuing household production and Section II presents a summary of sectoral shifts of the labour market in Singapore during its economic growth stage and their implications. Section III describes the methodology and simulations used to portray growth and structural change in extended (market plus non-market) GDP in Singapore. The model of household labour allocation used to assess the monetary value of unpaid production by women is also introduced in this section. The results and implications of the simulations are discussed in Section IV and Section V concludes.

I Measuring Non-Market Household Production

The methodological work in this fi eld has focused on making estimation procedures commensurable with measures of market production used in the system of national accounts (Goldschmidt-Clermont, 1993a). However, problems of defi nition and identifi cation of household production often add diffi culties to obtaining accurate assessments of household production (See Quah, 1993, 2006).

Valuing household production There are two main approaches to valuing non-market household production—output and input-based.

Output-based approaches Output-based approaches value the products of non-market work by using the price of close market substitutes, often subtracting the cost of raw materials to obtain net value added. To apply the output-based approach, it is necessary to ﬁ rst identify the goods and services produced by the household and its market substitutes. Household production is thus the total of the market prices of the market substitutes as seen in (1)

(1) ph = ∑ Q i P i i

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where: ph is the dollar value of household output at market price

Q i is the quantity of goods or services i produced annually by a household

Pi is the price of market substitutes of goods or services i

Output-based methods have been used in studies for France (Chadeau & Fouquet, 1981), UK (Clark, 1958) and Finland (Suviranta, 1982), although market substitutes were treated differently. For example, market substitutes for house cleaning varied from cleaning services in childcare centre for Finland to hotel services in France and institutions providing full board and lodging in UK.

Input-based methods Due to the difﬁ culties in obtaining reliable data and other weaknesses, the output approach has been used in only a few studies, with most studies using input-based methods, which value the labour time devoted to non-market production using one of two options:

1. the replacement cost method, which is further divided into two categories—‘specialist substitute’ and ‘generalist substitute.’ and 2. the opportunity cost method.

The replacement cost method uses the price of hiring a market substitute, either ‘specialised,’ which uses the going wage for the variety of services provided in the household, as in (2),

j ph = ∑ gi t i (2) i where: ph is the dollar value of household output at market price

gi is the market wage for a specialist worker for the market substitute of activity j j t i is the time spent on non-market household production activity j by household member i

or ‘generalised,’ that uses the wage for a general housekeeper as in (3).

ph = ∑ gti i (3)

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where: ph is the dollar value of household output at market price g is the market wage for a general housekeeper

ti is the time spent on non-market household production by household member i

The opportunity cost method is derived from microeconomic theory of time allocation. It reasons that the choice of allocating time to household production rather than to wage employment implies that the household values the household work more than the market wage given up, and thus the opportunity wage forgone is a measure of the value of the household production. A general expression of the approach is given in (4).

ph = ∑ wi ti (4) i where: ph is the dollar value of household output at market price

wi is the amount of market wage forgone by the household member i

ti is the time spent on non-market household production by household member i

Issues facing valuation methods All methods discussed above have their drawbacks. Although the output-replacement method is often cited as the best method, because it is an extension of that used for valuing goods and services produced for own ﬁ nal use and included within the SNA (System of National Accounts) production boundary (Goldschmidt-Clermont 1993a, 1993b), its advantage is also a weakness as activities without close market substitutes are not included. So important activities of non-market household production, like childbearing, or production, like paid childcare, in developing countries where such markets have not yet developed, are excluded (Pyatt, 1993). In addition, the data requirements for this method are high, in terms of measurement in physical quanti- ties of household production and of ﬁ nding the equivalent household production’s market substitutes.3

3 In order to lessen the data collection burden in countries where time-use data are available, Goldschmidt-Clermont (1993) proposed a shortcut, which was successfully tested in an experimental projected in Nepal (Acharya, 1995).

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Although used more often than output methods, input methods face several issues and drawbacks. Although ‘generalist substitute’ is sometimes cited as a second-best solution (Goldschmidt-Clermont, 1993a), because it provides the most conservative estimate and seems closest to the supposed fi rst-best output methodology, its most salient weakness seems to be making the unlikely assumption, that an unqualifi ed housekeeper could perform all household tasks. However, reverting to the ‘specialist substitute’ method brings with it the problem of assessing value for time that is spent on multiple tasks, such as looking after children while preparing the evening meal. Finally, both market replacement methods do not take into account effi ciency differences between the hired worker and that of the homemaker in performing household chores.4 Another problem is that systemic wage differentials between women and men are transferred to valuations of work in the home. In addition, most studies use average or median female market wage as an estimate of the potential wage of the homemakers. Studies have shown that women, who are in the labour force, tend to be more educated and possess more work experience than full-time homemakers (Ferber & Burnbaum, 1980). Thus, one can argue that the opportunity cost of full-time homemakers is lower than that of the median or average income of women working in the market. Regardless of the particular input method, resulting estimates are very sensitive to wage rates used. Using opportunity cost tends to give the highest value and the global substitute method the lowest (Quah, 1989, 2006; Chadeau, 1992) although Hawrylyshyn (1976) shows that, if the net wage is used instead of the gross wage, the opportunity cost method and the market replacement method yield similar results. Still, in light of the fact, that assessments based on household outputs require data, that simply are not available in most cases, input-based methods remain the most popular methodology. For the study on Singapore presented in this paper, data limitations necessitate using opportunity cost principles to value women’s non-market time in the household.

4 See Quah (1993) where he propose taking into account the relative efﬁ ciency between household members and hired help, when evaluating household production by the replacement cost method.

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II Sectoral Shifts of the Labour Market and the Household Production Sectors: Some Descriptive Statistics

Figure 1 compares market labour force participation rates (LFPR) for men and women with the ‘homemaker’ labour force participation rates in Singapore, between 1977 and 2004. The latter is measured as the number of homemakers divided by the female population over 15 years of age.5 LFPR for men has remain largely constant at around 80% since the 1970s, save for 2003 when there was a marked drop to 75%, (which can be largely attributed to the poor outlook for the labour market). Women’s LFPR, on the other hand, has steadily increased from 38% to over 50%. This increase was most signiﬁ cant for the prime working ages of 25–54 years (Figure 4.2), with the outward shift more pronounced for the 45–59 age group, which suggests that more females are returning to the workforce when their children are older.

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004

Male Female Homemakers

Notes: The series “Male” and “Female” indicate number in the market labour force/population over 15 years old. “Homemakers” measures number of housewives/population females over 15 years old. Source: Calculation based on data from Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years. Figure 1. Labour Force Participation, 1977 to 2004

5 Since “too old/retired” is a separate category, one can conclude that elderly women do retire from household production.

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100 90 80 70 2003 60 50 1997 40 1977 1987 30 20 10 0 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65 & Over

Source: Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years. Figure 2. Age Speciﬁ c LFPR for Females for 1977, 1987, 1997 and 2003

Economic characteristics of Singapore’s female population From 1977 to 2004, the educational profi le of Singapore’s workforce improved signifi cantly, with degree holders constituting 20.5% of the labour force in 2003, compared to 3.2% in 1977, and the proportion of the workforce with less than primary school education dropping from 45.5% in 1977 to 17.9% in 2004. In tandem with the general improvement of the educational profi le is that of the females. From 1977 to 1998, the number of female undergraduates in local universities increased by almost four times, while female polytechnic students jumped by 10 times (Singapore Department of Statistics, 1998). The percentage of economically inactive females with post secondary education, also increased from 4.3% in 1977 to 16.7%—of which 5.9% are degree holders—in 2004. This increase in the educational qualifi cation of females can also be seen from Figure 2, where the LFPR for females aged below 25, dropped between 1987 and 2004, due to the rising pursuit of tertiary education. This has resulted in there being no signifi cant differences between the mean of schooling of males and females of the younger generation (age below 35) in the past 10 years. With the improving educational level and a growing demand for better skilled workers, the proportion of the female workforce in professional and technical jobs grew from 16% in 1987 to 29% in 1997

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for females aged below 40. A similar trend occurred for females aged 40 and above. This has brought about an increase in the median wage for females from S$235 in 1977 to S$1,500 in 2003. There has also been an increase in dual career couples in Singapore (93% from 1980 to 1990), as the opportunity cost of giving up one’s career and being a homemaker increases over the years. Thus, the general declining ‘homemakers’ LFPR over the years (from 48% in 1977 to 27% in 2004), as seen in Figure 1, can be explained by this increase in the educational proﬁ le of the female population, which resulted in an increase in the demand for them in the labour force. In view of this decline, we investigate the size of the unpaid domestic service sector relative to other sectors in Singapore.

Sectoral Composition of the Labour Force in Singapore Table 1 details the sectoral composition of the Singapore labour force, including housewives, at various points in its industrial development. In 1977, the unpaid domestic service sector was the largest and it remained so till recently, when the community, social and personal service sector overtook it. Even though the proportion of women working solely in the home declined, as seen in Figure 1, the early dynamics of the demographic transition guaranteed continued expansion in the home sector.

Table 1. Sectoral Composition of the Singapore Labour Force (Hundreds)

1977 1987 1997 2003 Manufacturing 2,455 3,386 4,141 3,648 Construction 420 971 1,261 1,145 Commerce 2,127 2,967 3,982 4,248 Transport & 1,056 1,285 2,100 2,160 communication Financial & business 597 1,123 2,735 3,477 service Community, social and 2,043 2,726 3,907 5,480 personal services Household production 3,807 3,827 4,734 5,053 Others 341 210 179 178

Note: Data coded using Singapore Standard Industrial Classiﬁ cation of various years Source: Calculation based on data from Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years.

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Table 2 shows the sectoral shift of the market labour force over the same time period. Despite Singapore’s post-independence industrialisation policies, the community, social and personal services sector remains a signiﬁ cant size (largest in 2003), with the share of the manufacturing sector actually declining over the years (from 27% to 18%), and the ﬁ nancial and business services sector picking up the slack. If household production were to be incorporated into the category ‘community, social and personal services,’ social services would be the primary sectoral employer in Singapore, with the second largest sector less than half of its size (Table 4.3) for the past 30 years.

Table 2. Sectoral Composition of the Market Labour Force 1977 1987 1997 2003 % % % % Manufacturing 27 27 23 18 Construction 5 8 7 6 Commerce 24 23 22 21 Transport & 12 10 11 11 communication Financial & business 7 9 15 17 service Community, social and 23 22 21 27 personal services Others 4 2 1 1

Note: Data coded using Singapore Standard Industrial Classiﬁ cation of various years. Source: Calculation based on data from Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years.

From the above discussion, it can be seen that, although the homemakers’ LFPR has been decreasing over the years, the absolute number of women involved in household production has actually increased and, until today, remains a signiﬁ cant proportion when compared to other market sectors. The next section will thus quantify the value of household production and its growth in terms of the value of its labour inputs to assess its impact on economic development.

III Modelling Household Production

The method taken to model the household in this study is one based on the idea ﬁ rst formalised by Gary Becker (1965), that the household

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Table 3. Sectoral Composition of the Market Labour Force (Percent of Paid and Unpaid Workers) 1977 1987 1997 2003 % % % % Manufacturing 19 21 18 14 Construction 3 6 5 5 Commerce 17 18 17 17 Transport & 889 9 communication Financial & business 5 7 12 14 service Community, social and 46 40 38 41 personal services Others 3 1 1 1

Note: See Table 2, except for the category of “community, social and personal services” which now includes those involved in household production. Source: Calculation based on data from Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years.

is both a unit of production and consumption, and we use a variant of the methodology ﬁ rst used by Wagman & Folbre (1996) and Braunstein (2002). Due to the absence of direct measures of quantity and value of housewives’ services, we calculated their value based on the opportunity cost of foregone income, as represented by the market wage for women’s labour and the distribution of women’s time between market and non-market labour.

Household Production Model We assume household utility is derived from the consumption of goods and services (both home-produced and market) and time spent on leisure by its members. The allocation of time between labour and leisure will thus reﬂ ect the trade-off between leisure and work. Another assumption is that market and home-produced goods and services are perfect substitutes. These assumptions allow the allocation of time of household members to be treated individually. We further assume that men do no housework6 but women can engage in the market and/or household work, thus allowing us to exclude men’s allocation of time.

6 This is not unrealistic since most surveys in time-use in the household seems to reveal that it is the wife who does much of the housework.

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Letting C be the consumption of all goods and services (both home-

produced and market) in the household by women and tl, their leisure time. The household utility function, U, is:

U = U(C, tl ) U' > 0; U'' < 0 (1)

The goods and services consumed can either be produced by women in the household h or be bought from the market g. Because h is a product

of time spent in household production th, as seen in (2), C is hence a

function of th, market labour time tg, their market wage w and prices for market goods and services p, as formulated in (3)

h = h(th ) h' > 0; h'' < 0 (2) C = h + g wt = h(t ) + g (3) h p Substituting (2) and (3) into (1), the household’s objective function is obtained, as shown in equation (4)

U = U(h(t ) + wt g , tl ) (4) h p

The household thus allocate tg , th and tl to maximise U subject to T =

tg+ th + tl where T is the total number of hours per day available for the three activities. Maximising U will gives the following ﬁ rst order conditions: w U w U h' = = h' = (5) p tl p tl

Equation (5) shows that at an optimum, the marginal product of a women’s household labour time should be at least equal to the opportunity cost of her time, which is deﬁ ned by the market wage forgone and also equal to the marginal utility derived from spending another unit of time on leisure. In order to estimate the value of household production, it is necessary to specify the functional form of the household production function. Following Wagman & Folbre (1996) and Braunstein (2002), a standard Cobb-Douglas form was chosen, shown in (6), where b and α are con-

stants and ki’s are capital factors of household production.

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a 1–α h' = bt h k i 0 < α < 1 (6)

Taking the ﬁ rst derivative of (6) with respect to t and combining it w h with h' = p from (5) results in equation (7).

wt ph(t ) = h (7) h α Equation (7) shows the dollar value of household production in terms of forgone market wage, the elasticity of output with respect to labour input in the household and the optimum amount of time spent on household production. Since there is a less than proportional decrease in the time spent on household production, when women enter the labour force, the rate of substitution between household production and market work is assumed to be a constant λ, which is less than 1. This relationship can be derived from differentiating the ﬁ rst-order condition in (5):

2 U 1 2 = – h" (8) tl dt* 1+ h dt*g

2 And since U <0, implies that 2 tl dt* dt* –1< h <0 h = λ –1< λ<0 dt* dt* g g (9)

As there is no data available on the allocation of women’s time spent between leisure, household production and market work in Singapore from 1978 to 2004, the distribution of women between market and non-market labour is used as a proxy. Thus, the total amount of time λ spent on household production, th , can be divided into L and (1+ )tg where L is the total time spent in household production by house- λ wives and (1+ )tg that of time spent in household production by women in the labour force. Substituting this into equation (7) results in equation (10)

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w(L + (1 + λ)t ) ph(t ) g where –1<λ<0, 0<α<1 (10) h = α Equation (10) shows the value of household production in terms of forgone market wage, the productivity of labour input in household production, the rate of substitution between household and market labour and women’s employment rate.

So far, we have assumed that the labour market clears i.e. full employment and efﬁ cient, which is highly unlikely. Thus, if unemployment exists, and we assume that unemployed women allocate their labour time to household production, than the ﬁ nal total value of household production will be equation (11). w(L + t + (1 + λ)t ) ph( t ) ue g (11) h = α

where tue is the time spent on household production by unemployed women and –1<λ<0, 0<α<1.

Discussion of perimeters: w, α and λ As w and α both hold important assumptions about the level and trend of the productivity of household work, and λ signiﬁ cantly affects recorded declines in the household sector’s labour time, the choice of these variables are discussed below.

Discussion on w (market wage) As the opportunity cost method is used in the estimation of the value of household production, the market wage is used as a proxy for w. The implication of using market wage is that productivity gains experienced in the market is present in the household sector, and that the factors driving labour productivity in the market sector are also responsible for labour productivity in the household sector. To determine if this is the case, consider that labour productivity is determined by three main factors:

a) quality of labour, b) capital availability, and c) the efﬁ ciency with which labour and capital are used.

First is the quality of labour. Declines in mortality and increase in life expectancy after post-independence, imply improved health among the

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Singapore population. Education, which has been shown to have considerable effects on how women value their own household productivity (Gronau, 1973), has also become more prevalent since post-independence as general literacy rate increased from 82.3% in 1980 to 92.5% in 2000. This, together with the educational characteristic of Singapore’s female population, shows that the average quality of labour engaged in household work, as measured by health and education, has increased considerably, through the course of Singapore’s industrialisation. Next is the issue of capital availability. Although, household production generally tends to be undercapitalised as compared to market work (Dixon-Mueller & Anker, 1988), Singapore’s economic growth has resulted in an increase in household income and expenditure, which allows higher ownership of time-saving appliances like washing machines and refrigerators by individual households.7 Also the building of public housing fl ats by the government resulted in widespread availability of piped water, gas and electricity to many households. Thus, it can be seen that there has been an increase in the availability of capital for household production since the 1970s, as Singapore’s economy grew. Finally, we consider the argument that the effi ciency of labour in household production has kept pace with that of the market sector. The evolution of household technology and its increase in availability as discussed earlier, has increased the level of substitutability between market goods and time spent on household production, thus leading to a greater responsiveness of women’s labour supply to changes in wages and a greater effi ciency in household labour allocation ( Juster & Stafford, 1991). Also, the median wage is chosen over the mean wage as the mean wage is signifi cantly higher than that of the median wage.8 This is to reduce the upward bias due to the fact, that women who are in the labour force are more educated and possess more work experience than full-time homemakers.

7 Household with washing machines increased from 73.5% in 1988 to 80.5% in 1993 and 90.8% in 1998 (Department of Statistics, Singapore, 2001). 8 Mean wage for 1980, 1990 and 2000 were S$568, S$1,510 and S$3,114 respectively, as compared to the median wage of S$400, S$1,094 and S$2,234 for 1980, 1990 and 2000 respectively (Department of Statistics, Singapore, 2000).

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Discussion on λ (rate of substitution between market and housework) For the rate of substitution between market work and household production, a number of time-use studies have clearly shown that working for pay often results in a double day for women, where they accommodate increased market participation with less leisure time (Chadeau, 1992 and UN, 1995). The extent to which this situation applies to Singapore probably varies over the course of development. One can probably deduce that the rate of substitution between market and non-market work was probably higher in the early years, when single women with fewer domestic responsibilities, moved into the market labour force. But, as more married women were drawn into market labour, one would expect more of a decline in leisure time than unpaid domestic labour. With no solid longitudinal data on time-use that would allow for such an estimate, the value of –0.75 is used, which implies that for every hour worked in the market, household labour time declines by 45 minutes. This rate is probably high and will lead to more conservative estimates of non-market work time. Other values are explored using sensitivity analysis.

Discussion on α (elasticity of household output with respect to labour inputs) In his original work on the Cobb-Douglas production function, Paul Douglas used a value of 0.75 (Douglas, 1948). In his growth decom- position analysis for Singapore between 1966 and 1990, Alwyn Young (1995) found a value of 0.511 for the market sector. Due to the lack of information on Singapore’s household production function, a more conservative 0.75 is used with sensitivity testing done using other values including 0.5.

IV Findings and Implications

For the following discussion, the values of λ and α used will be –0.75 and 0.75 respectively, as discussed in the earlier section. Discussion with regard to the perimeters used in the simulation (choice of wage for opportunity cost etc.) has also been covered in the earlier section. Sensitivity testing of the simulation with other values will be covered in the later part of this section.

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50.00% 600,000 45.00% 500,000 40.00% 35.00% 400,000 30.00% 25.00% 300,000 20.00% 200,000 15.00% 10.00% 100,000 5.00% 0.00% 0

1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 % o GDP Homemakers LFPR no of housewives

Source: Calculation based on data from Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years. Figure 3. Growth of the Household Production Sector

Size of household production sector, LFPR and homemaker numbers Starting with the relative size of the household production sector, the simulation indicates that the size of the household production sector has ﬂ uctuated within a rather narrow band from 9.56% to 12.33% with two peaks in 1985 and 1998, both of which correspond with negative GDP growth. This is in spite of the signiﬁ cant decrease in homemakers’ LFPR from 47.9% in 1978 to 26.94% in 2004, as mentioned before. Figure 3 shows the trend of homemakers LFPR, growth in number of homemakers and household production as a percentage of GDP. Notwithstanding the decrease in homemakers’ LFPR, the number of females involved in household production has remained stable at around 380,000 to 390,000 from 1978 to 1985, when it increased to slightly over 400,000 (due to economic recession), before dropping back to below 400,000. But from 1989 onwards, there was a marked increase in the number of females involved in housework: it increased from 383,668 in 1988 to 426,358 in 1989 and 505,284 in 2003 before dropping back to 487,628 in 2004. An interesting point to note is that, unlike the earlier increase in 1985, which was accompanied by an increase in the LFPR, this increase in homemakers in the late 1980s till the early 2000s saw a continuous

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decrease in LFPR. The 27.1% increase in the number of homemakers from 1988 to 2004 was also marked by a much smaller 0.64% increase in the size of the household production sector relative to the GDP, that is, from 9.62% to 10.26%. The decrease in LFPR can be explained by the higher annual growth of the female population, as compared to that of the homemakers, 3.09% to 1.51%, annualised between 1988 and 2004.9 The comparatively smaller increase in the household production sector is due to the high economic growth during the same period. Value of household production increased by 7.90% annualised between 1988 and 2003, with market growth increasing by 6.43% annually in the same period. Thus, although there is a signiﬁ cant increase in household production in absolute terms (S$6,208 million in 1988 to S$18,517 million in 2004) the high market growth results in a much smaller increase, when valued relative to GDP.

14.00%

12.00%

10.00%

8.00%

6.00%

4.00%

2.00%

0.00%

1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

% of GDP % of GDP (homemakers only) Difference

Source: Calculation based on data from Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years. Figure 4. Growth of Household Production vs Homemakers (% of GDP)

9 The higher female growth rate is further ampliﬁ ed by its higher base as compared to that of the homemakers. Thus from 1.15 million in 1989, the female population grew to 1.81 million in 2004, as compared to 426 thousands to 487 thousands of homemakers in the same period.

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Including only homemakers (leaving out the issue of the rate of substitution between market and household production work), the size of the household production sector ranges from 6.48% to 9.02%. Due to the substantial decline in household production work, that is assumed in this model, when women enter the labour force, and the low level of unemployment save for 1985 and the late 1990s onwards, full-time homemakers dominate the trajectory of household production for the early part of the period studied. In fact, re-running the simulations with only homemakers slows down household sector growth by an average of 0.98% (see Table 4) with the annualised fi gure for combined per capita growth at 6.83%, as compared to 6.89% for total household production. However, as the number of female unemployed increases, the infl uence of the unemployed on household production increases signifi cantly, from the initial 2.20% to 3.78% of the GDP, as seen in Figure 4 and Table 4.

Table 4. Growth of Household Production vs Homemakers % of GDP Difference Year % of GDP (homemakers only) % 1978 11.22 9.01 2.21 1979 10.89 8.63 2.26 1980 9.92 7.73 2.19 1981 9.56 7.34 2.22 1982 9.75 7.40 2.35 1983 10.29 7.74 2.55 1984 10.45 7.83 2.62 1985 11.94 9.02 2.93 1986 12.05 8.91 3.14 1987 10.84 7.93 2.91 1988 9.62 7.01 2.62 1989 9.93 7.38 2.55 1990 9.90 7.36 2.53 1991 9.95 7.27 2.68 1992 10.05 7.18 2.87 1993 9.73 7.00 2.74 1994 9.60 6.88 2.73 1995 9.97 7.16 2.81 1996 10.63 7.41 3.22 1997 10.81 7.53 3.28 1998 12.33 8.45 3.87 1999 11.44 7.60 3.84 2000 10.69 7.05 3.64 2001 11.72 7.73 3.99

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Table 4 (cont.) % of GDP Difference Year % of GDP (homemakers only) % 2002 11.73 7.69 4.03 2003 11.69 7.54 4.15 2004 10.26 6.48 3.78 Average: 10.63 7.64 2.99

Source: Calculation based on data from Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years and Department of Statistic, Singapore, Per Capita GDP at Current Market Price, 2005.

Household Production and Market Growth To what extent has the growth of domestic production affected the combined GDP of market and household production growth, (M+H)? Table 4 and Figure 5 present the per capita real growth rates of market and household production, and extended (M+H) production from 1978 to 2004. Accounting for the household sector pulls down overall growth by an average of 0.04% per year between 1978 and 2004. This seemingly low average, however, does mask the true impact of household production, as the effect varies signiﬁ cantly in magnitude (0.01% to 1.39%) and direction over time.

Table 5. Per Capita Real Growth Rates of Market, Household Production, and Extended (M+H) Production M % N % N % M+H Differences Year (market (household (homemakers % % growth) production) only) 1978 8.51 4.85 3.39 8.13 0.38 1979 9.41 6.24 4.75 9.09 0.32 1980 9.70 –0.07 –1.65 8.74 0.96 1981 9.73 5.75 4.14 9.37 0.36 1982 7.13 9.22 7.96 7.31 –0.18 1983 8.51 14.55 13.56 9.05 –0.54 1984 8.33 10.04 9.52 8.49 –0.16 1985 –1.44 12.65 13.57 –0.11 –1.33 1986 2.14 3.06 0.90 2.24 –0.10 1987 9.73 –1.30 –2.37 8.55 1.19 1988 11.31 –1.17 –1.57 10.09 1.22 1989 9.92 13.41 15.67 10.22 –0.31 1990 9.03 8.66 8.86 8.99 0.03

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Table 5 (cont.) M % N % N % M+H Differences Year (market (household (homemakers % % growth) production) only) 1991 6.76 7.33 5.40 6.81 –0.05 1992 6.69 7.78 5.42 6.79 –0.10 1993 12.26 8.71 9.33 11.93 0.32 1994 11.40 9.91 9.51 11.27 0.13 1995 8.04 12.15 12.48 8.40 –0.36 1996 8.17 15.36 11.93 8.82 –0.65 1997 8.56 10.37 10.34 8.74 –0.17 1998 –0.76 13.20 11.42 0.60 –1.36 1999 6.83 –0.86 –3.94 5.99 0.84 2000 9.64 2.48 1.67 8.90 0.73 2001 –1.95 7.45 7.49 –1.04 –0.91 2002 3.17 3.24 2.69 3.18 –0.01 2003 1.36 1.03 –0.72 1.33 0.03 2004 8.41 –4.86 –6.75 7.02 1.39 Annualised: 6.93 6.56 5.58 6.89

From 1978 to 1981, the slower household production growth lowered the combined GDP growth by around 0.35%, save for 1980, when combined GDP was lowered by 0.96%. This resulted from the negative growth of household production of – 0.07% in 1980, compared to 6.24% in 1979. This drop in household production was due to the decrease in the number of homemakers and the unemployed (which dropped by –1.28% and –10.34% respectively) as homemakers LFPR dropped dramatically. The years between 1982 and 1986 saw a change in the direction of the effect of household production, as it grew faster than the market. This period also saw a year of negative economic growth, as the economy shrunk by –1.44% in 1985. Household production, on the other hand, grew strongly in that year, with the number of homemakers growing by 5.58% and total household production by 12.65%. Hence, household production contributed 1.33% to GDP growth, thus bringing the combined GDP to – 0.11%. The subsequent two years saw a reversal of the previous ﬁ ve years, as household production experienced negative growth, whereas the market economy grew strongly: 9.73% in 1987 and 11.31% in 1988.

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20.00%

15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00%

1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 –5.00%

–10.00% M (market Growth) N (household production) M + N

Notes and Source: See Table 6.2. Figure 5. Per Capita Real Growth Rates of Market, Household Production, and Extended (M+H) Production

The drop in household production was due largely to the lack of growth of homemakers, as the number of homemakers decreased once the recession was over, dropping by –1.85% in 1986 and –3.66% in 1987 before experiencing a marginal growth of 0.25% in 1988. The number of female unemployed showed a similar trend as it decreased by –23.68% in 1987 and –32.02% in 1988. The sharp rebound in household production growth of 13.41% in 1989, which exceeded that of the market’s growth of 9.92%, can be seen as due to two main factors. First is the decrease of homemakers for the previous three years, which might have led to a case of excess female labour in the market force. The second reason could be due to the fall of 1.82% (the largest drop in all of the 26 years) in real wages in 1989, which resulted in a lower opportunity cost for women to shift from market to home. This result would be consistent with the argument that the female labour market is pro-cyclical. When the economy slows down, women shift from the market labour force to the household sector and vice- versa. Further evidence of this can be seen from 1997 onwards, as Singapore’s economy ﬂ uctuated greatly from crisis to crisis.

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As seen from Figure 6.3, market growth suffered a sharp drop in 1998 due to the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis, falling from 8.56% to –0.76%, whereas household production grew from 10.37% to 13.20% in 1998. The economy recovered quickly from the crisis to post positive growth in both 1999 and 2000, whereas household production turned negative in 1999, before recovering to achieve a growth of 2.48% in 2000. The second recession in 2001, where market growth slipped to –1.95%, saw household production growing from 2.48% to 7.45% thus moderating the combined GDP growth to –1.04%. The economy recovery in 2004, once again, showed how women moved out of the household sector to enter the market when the economy picked up: the market grew by 8.41%, compared to a –4.86% drop in household production.

Implications and Analysis The above discussion has shown that the case of the female labour market being pro-cyclical is largely true. This implies that the household sector, besides being a signiﬁ cant component of the total economy, as seen by its relative size to GDP and number of people involved, is also an important moderator to the economy. In periods of high market growth, the lower household production growth helps lessen the strains on an overheating economy, as women exit from the household sector to the market sector to alleviate labour constraint. And the converse happens in periods of poor market growth, as women exit the market sector to enter the household sector. Another key result is that despite the trend of declining LFPR for homemakers between 1978 and 2004, the household sector (homemakers only) continued to grow at a per capita average of 5.58%. This continued growth is, to a large extent, due to productivity improvements (as measured by opportunity wages) in the household sector and, to a lesser extent, due to the age structure effect, where despite the decline in the housewife participation rate, the number of women engaged primarily in unpaid housekeeping has continued to increase since the late 1980s.

Sensitivity testing In view of the above, it will be useful for the simulation to be re-run under different conditions to examine the impact of each perimeter on the overall result.

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First, assuming there is no productivity growth in the household, which implies the wage used to measure the opportunity cost remains the same, average per capita growth in the household sector would decline to –0.31% annually—a signiﬁ cant drop from 6.56%—when productivity is allowed to increase in tandem with the market sector. Per capita combined GDP (M+H) growth would decline to an average of 6.57% a year, as compared to the 6.89% combined growth and 6.93% market growth in Table 6.2. This difference is signiﬁ cant, although not as much as one would expect, in view of the dramatic declines in the LFPR of homemakers. Next, is the issue of how sensitive these estimates are to the parameters used, λ and α. The simulation was re-done: using three different values for λ (–0.75, –0.5, and –0.25) and using three different values for α (0.75, 0.5, and 0.25). Referring to Table 6.3, lower values for λ, the rate of substitution between household production and market work, do not have much effect on (M+H) growth: the average growth for combined per capita GDP is 6.89% when λ is set at –0.75, 6.94% when at –0.5 and 6.98% when at –0.25. The results for household production growth alone, however, are more sensitive to changes in λ. Looking at changes in per capita household production, the values for growth over the period 1978 to 2004, when λ is set at –0.75, –0.5 and –0.25, are 6.56%, 7.01%, and 7.31% respectively. Using a higher value for the rate of substitution between market and household production work gives lower estimates (as the more the women who work in the market lower their household production labour time, the higher the value for λ). Thus, the more conservative value of –0.75 is used for the main analysis.

Table 6.3. Sensitivity Testing of Λ and Α

λ = –0.25 λ = –0.5 λ = –0.75 Household M+H Household M+H Household M+H α = 0.75 % % % % % %

1978–1980 5.76 8.76 4.86 8.71 3.67 8.65 1981–1983 11.14 8.78 10.60 8.68 9.84 8.58 1984–1986 8.19 3.70 8.35 3.62 8.58 3.54 1987–1989 4.88 9.54 4.37 9.58 3.65 9.62 1990–1992 8.81 7.66 8.45 7.60 7.92 7.53 1993–1995 10.04 10.49 10.12 10.51 10.26 10.53 1996–1998 14.15 6.55 13.69 6.31 12.98 6.05 1999–2001 4.04 4.66 3.65 4.64 3.03 4.62 2002–2004 1.59 2.16 1.80 2.20 2.14 2.25

Annualised: 7.31 6.98 7.01 6.94 6.56 6.89

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Table 6.3 (cont.) Α = 0.75 Α = 0.50 α = 0.25 Household M+H Household M+H Household M+H λ = –0.75 % % % % % %

1978–1980 3.67 8.65 3.67 8.42 3.67 7.82 1981–1983 9.84 8.58 9.84 8.63 9.84 8.76 1984–1986 8.58 3.54 8.58 3.77 8.58 4.35 1987–1989 3.65 9.62 3.65 9.32 3.65 8.58 1990–1992 7.92 7.53 7.92 7.55 7.92 7.59 1993–1995 10.26 10.53 10.26 10.52 10.26 10.49 1996–1998 12.98 6.05 12.98 6.37 12.98 7.16 1999–2001 3.03 4.62 3.03 4.52 3.03 4.30 2002–2004 2.14 2.25 2.14 2.25 2.14 2.23

Annualised: 6.56 6.89 6.56 6.88 6.56 6.84

Shifts in α, the elasticity of household output with respect to labour inputs, have insignifi cant effects, at least, on the combined per capita growth. Based on the combined per capita growth fi gures in Table 6.3, average growth is 6.89%, 6.88% and 6.84% respectively, when α moves from 0.75 to 0.5 to 0.25. This result, however, hides the considerable effect the elasticity of household output, with respect to labour inputs has on household production. Again, changing α from 0.75 to 0.5 to 0.25 (where λ = –0.75), the real value of household production in 2004 increases from S$18,518 million to S$27,777 million to S$55,554 million. Compared to α, increasing λ from –0.75 to –0.5 to –0.25 results in household production increasing from S$18,518 million to S$24,091 million to S$29,665 million, a far smaller increase compared to α. As can be seen from the above, varying opportunity wages—and household productivity—gives the most signifi cant changes and indicates that, in the immediate future, it is crucial to improve this data, by using household surveys to get accurate assessments of opportunity wages. In general though, the simulation can be deemed to be robust, as the estimates are not extremely sensitive to changes in the parameters and conservative choices have been used wherever possible.

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V Conclusion

Economists have argued for many years, that failure to account for household production introduces a bias in various areas of economic analysis. This bias ranges from the underestimation of national income to understating the economic contribution of women. This paper has examined and shown the effects of the shift of women’s work from the household to the market during the course of Singapore’s economic development and the changes in the trajectory of growth, due to the inclusion of household production. The results of the simulations indicate that household production plays a signifi cant role in Singapore’s economic growth, due to its signifi cant size—its share of the GDP averages 10%—and its counter- cyclical nature. Inclusion of the household sector pulls down overall growth by an average of 0.04% per year between 1978 and 2004. This seemingly insignifi cant average, however, hides the true effect of household production as the effect varies considerably in magnitude (0.01% to 1.39% of GDP growth) and direction over time. The counter-cyclical nature of the household sector is best seen from the three recessions (1985, 1998 and 2001) and the following economy recoveries during the period studied, where it has been shown to be an important moderator to the economy. In the periods of poor market growth, the high household sector growth helped to reduce the fall in combined GDP growth, as women exited the market sector to enter the household sector. The converse could be seen during the economic recoveries: the fall in household production growth indicates women exiting the household to enter the market sector, thus reducing the strains on a growing economy by relaxing the labour constraint. Another key fi nding is that, despite the trend of a declining labour force participation rate for homemakers, the household sector (homemakers only) continued to grow at a high per capita average of 5.58%. This continued growth is argued to be, to a large extent, due to productivity improvements in the household sector, and, to a lesser extent, due to the age structure effect, where the number of women engaged primarily in household production has continued to increase, especially from the late 1980s onwards. This means that many of the factors driving market growth are also critical for household sector growth, thus implying that benefi ts of productivity-enhancing public investment in human (education and

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healthcare) and household (public utilities) capital are not limited to the market sector and, hence, could have been underprovided. This argument warrants further research, since there are signifi cant policy implications, because the other factor driving household production—the number of women joining the household sector—could slow down, and even reverse, in the near future, as Singapore’s fertility ratio drops below the replacement level. This, together with the aging population, which implies possible signifi cant changes in the composition of household production as the demand for elderly care increases, demands more careful thinking about how the composition of care affects the productivity of household production, and how policy can help ensure, that the increased demands on the household sector are met by increases in the productivity level, rather than by a greater work load for women. Finally, due to data limitations and the fact that varying opportunity wages (hence household productivity) gives the most signifi cant changes, another area for further research is that of improving the data, by using household surveys to get accurate assessment of opportunity wages.

References

Adler, H.J. & Hawrylyshyn, O. (1978) “Estimates of the Value of Household Work, Canada 1961 and 1971” in The Review of Income and Wealth, 24: 333–355. Braunstein, E (2002) Shifting from the home to the market: Accounting for Women’s Work in Taiwan, 1965–95, Taipei, Taiwan: Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper Series. Becker, G.S. (1965) “A Theory of the Allocation of Time” in Economic Journal 75: 493–517. Bloom, D.E. & Williamson, J.G. (1997) Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Chadeau, A. (1992) “What is Household’s Non-market Production worth?” in OECD Economic Studies, 18: 85–103. Chadeau, A. & Fouquet, A. (1981) “Peut-on Mesurer Le travail domestique?” in Economie et Statistique, No. 136, INSEE, Paris, August. Chadeau, A. & Roy, C. (1986) “Relating household’s ﬁ nal consumption to household activities: substitutability or complementarity between market and non-market production” in The Review of Income and Wealth, December 4: 387–407. Clark, C. (1958) “The economic of housework” in Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics, May 1958. Dixon-Muller, R. & Anker, R. (1998) Assessing Women’s economic contribution to development, Geneva: International Labour Ofﬁ ce. Douglas, P.H. (1948) “Are there Laws of Production?” in The American Economic Review, 38 (1): 1–41. Goldschmidt-Clermont, L. (1993a) “Monetary valuation of non-market productive time; Methodological consideration” in The Review of Income and Wealth, December 39: 419–33.

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—— (1993b) “Monetary valuation of unpaid work: Arguing for output measurement” in Bulletin of Labour Statistics, 4: 11–18. Goldschmidt-Clermont, L. & Pagnossin-Aligisakes, E. (1995) Measures of Unrecorded Economic Activities in Fourteen Countries, Human Development Report Offi ce, United Nations Development Programme. Gronau, R. (1973) “The Effect of Children on the Housewife’s Value of Time” in Journal of Political Economy, 81 (2): 168–99. —— (1980) “Home Production—A Forgotten Industry” in The Review of Economics and Statistics, 62 (3): 408–416. —— (1986) “Home Production—A Survey” in Handbook of Labor Economics, 1 (4). Hawrylyshyn, O. (1976) “The Value of Household Services: A Survey of Empirical Estimates” in The Review of Income and Wealth, 22: 101–131. Hill, M.S. (1983) “Pattern of time use” in F.T. Juster and F.P. Stafford (eds) Time, goods and well being, Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan, Survey Research Centre. Juster, F.T. & Stafford, F.P. (1991) “The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings, Behav- ioural Models, and Problems of Measurements” in Journal of Economic Literature, 29: 471–522. Kende, P. (1975) “Vers une évaluation de la consummation réelle des ménages” in Revue Consommation, No. 2, CREDOC, Paris. Kuznets, S. (1944) National Income and its Composition, 1919–1938, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Ministry of Manpower (1975 to 2004) Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Singapore: Ministry of Manpower. Mitchell, W., King, W.I., Macaulay, F.R. & Knauth, C.W. (1921) Income in the United States: Its Amount and Distribution, 1909–1919, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Nordhaus, W. & Tobin, J. (1972) “Is Growth Obsolete?” in Economic Growth, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research, fi ftieth Anniversary Colloquium V. Pyatt, G. (1993) Beyond the production boundary, New York: Human Development Report Offi ce, United Nations Development Programme. Quah, E. (1988) Value of Household Production in Singapore, Singapore: Heinneman Publishers. ____ (1989) “Country Studies and the Value of Household Production” in Applied Economics, 21 (12): 1631–1646, December. ____ (1993) Economics and Home Production: Theory and Measurement, London: Ashgate Pub Co. ____ (2006) “The Quagmire of Calculating the Value of Housework” in The Strait Times, March 16. Singapore Department of Statistics (1998) Social Progress of Singapore Women, Singapore: Department of Statistics. —— (2000) Progress of Our Nation, Singapore: Department of Statistics. —— (2001) Trends in Household Expenditure and Asset Ownership, 1988–1998, Singapore: Department of Statistics. —— (2005) Per Capita GDP at Current Market Price. Website: http://www.singstat.gov. sg/keystats/hist/gdp.html, accessed on 20 March 2005. Suviranta, A. (1982) “Unpaid housework: time use and value” in Housework Study, Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Part VIII. United Nations (1993) System of National Accounts, New York: United Nations. —— (1995) The World’s Women 1970–1990 Trends and Statistics, New York: United Nations. Wagman, B. & Folbre, N. (1996) “Household Services and Economic Growth in the United States, 1870–1930” in Feminist Economics 2 (1): 43–66.

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Walker, K. & Gauger, W.H. (1973) “Time and its dollar value in household work” in Family Economic Review, 62, pp. 8–13. Weinrobe, M. (1974) “Household production and national production, an improvement of the record” in The Review of Income and Wealth, 20: 89–102. Young, A. (1995) “The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience” in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3): 641–80.

TONG_f9-173-200.indd 200 2/7/2008 7:07:19 PM STRENGTHENING THE NATION’S ROOTS? HERITAGE POLICIES IN SINGAPORE

Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Shirlena Huang

I The Emergence of Heritage Policy: From State Amnesia to State-driven Heritage Conservation

In the immediate post-independence period and for at least two decades after, Singapore’s preoccupation with constructing a new nation-state based on a vision of modernity required the erasure of traces of the past on the urban landscape, thought to impede the work of the new order (Kwok et al., 1999: 6). During these years, landscape change was dominated by a demolish-and-rebuild ethos, where urban slums and rural kampungs were excised to make way for skyscraper offi ce and retail complexes and high-rise apartments. Having emerged from almost 150 years of British rule as well as the traumatic interlude of the Second World War and its turbulent aftermath, ‘forgetting’, rather than ‘remembering’, was integral to projects of nation-building and the construction of national identity for the new nation-state (Devan, 1999: 22). In fact, the “unremitting narrative of survival, which became the national text of collective identity in the fi rst decades of the nation- state’s political existence, was completely anchored in the present” (Wong, 2001: 230). In this context, this chapter fi rst gives attention to the emergence in the mid-1980s of a State-crafted heritage policy and its subsequent development in the next two decades. This is followed by an examination of signifi cant heritage initiatives and projects, including the conservation of historic and cultural districts, heritage centres related to World War II, and a variety of museums. Drawing primarily on a nationwide survey conducted in 2002, this paper then turns to exploring popular attitudes towards various aspects of the State’s heritage policy and heritage activities before drawing the key issues to a close in the light of post-industrialisation. By the mid-1980s, in contrast to the systematic amnesia of the earlier decades, a growing nostalgia for the past was beginning to set in. Chua (1995) argues that such a harking back to the past during the 1980s and 1990s was rooted in a sense of loss, which, ironically, accompanied

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Singapore’s phenomenal success as a newly industrialising economy. Remembering the past was in this sense a reaction to, and resistance against, the relentless drive towards economic development, the frenetic pace of life, high stress levels, the corruption of new-found materialism and the consequent ‘industrialisation of everyday life.’ At the same time, the groundswell of public opinion valorising the past coincided with State evaluation of the dangers of ‘forgetting to remember.’ From the mid-1970s, the governing elite had noted with great apprehension, the increasing Westernisation of Singapore society. While Westernisation had served Singapore well in its quest for industrialisation, it was felt that it had also created a ‘moral crisis,’ bringing in its wake values, which were perceived to be incompatible with traditional Asian values. Political leaders took pains to highlight the dangers of Singaporeans losing their Asian roots and the consequences for society. Lee Kuan Yew, then Prime Minister, warned Singaporeans of becoming ‘deculturalised’ in his National Day Rally speech of 1978 (quoted in Clammer, 1997: 502). A decade later, Lee Hsien Loong (1989: 33), then Minister for Trade and Industry and Second Minister for Defence, continued to stress the need to retain our heritage but examine them for values which need to be modi- ﬁ ed, and scrutinise foreign traditions for ideas which can be incorporated but do so cautiously. Our roots are important. We should not be root- bound, but neither should we abandon our roots. They anchor us, and will help us grow. The late 1980s also saw the development of a set of national ‘core’ or ‘shared’ values, incorporating key elements of Singapore’s cultural heritage, attitudes and values intended as a blueprint for the development of a national ideology that all Singaporeans could subscribe to and live by (Ong, 1990: 1).1 It is in this context that Singapore’s ‘Asian

1 The State’s attempt to ameliorate what was seen as social ills brought about by Westernisation began with the introduction of a Moral Education programme based on ‘Asian values’ in 1979, along with the promotion of bilingualism and the use of the mother tongue. In 1984, Religious Knowledge as a compulsory subject was also introduced for upper secondary school students to re-inforce the teaching of moral values. By the late 1980s, fears of religious revivalism led to the scrapping of the Religious Knowledge programme and its replacement by a secularised form of ‘civil religion’ based on shared national values. Five ‘shared values’ were ultimately distilled in the White Paper of 1991: a) Nation before community and society before self, b) Family as the basic unit of society, c) Community support and respect for the individual, d) Consensus, not conﬂ ict, and e) Racial and religious harmony.

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heritage’ became valorised as a form of social and psychological defence against the perceived ‘westoxifi cation’ of society. In 1988, a National Advisory Council on Culture and the Arts was established to encourage greater awareness of culture, the arts and collective heritage among Singaporeans. The Council, in turn, convened four committees to explore various aspects of culture and the arts, including a Committee on Heritage to “assess the progress made in identifying, preserving and disseminating awareness of our heritage” and to “propose measures which will encourage Singaporeans to be more widely informed and appreciative of our multi-cultural heritage” (The Committee on Heritage Report, 1988: 12). Singapore’s “unique heritage”, reported the Committee, “can play a vital part in nation building” for an understanding of one’s roots and the lessons of history can help younger Singaporeans “balance our Asian values and Western infl uences”, appreciate and “draw inspiration” from the city’s multi- cultural diversity and “constantly renew work values and maintain the adaptiveness which underlies our economic success” (The Committee on Heritage Report, 1988: 6–8). According to the Committee, Singapore’s ‘heritage’ comprises fi ve categories:

a) nation building heritage derived from the experience of living under British colonial administration, the Japanese Occupation, the post-war struggle for independence and the “struggle against Communism,” b) heritage of economic success which focuses on “the values of our migrant predecessors who came to Singapore and their economic achievements,” c) multi-cultural heritage “expressed in the lifestyles, customs and traditions of the different ethnic communities,” d) heritage of the built environment comprising buildings, landmarks and other “visible and tangible links to our past [in] the physical landscape,” and e) heritage of the natural environment “which deﬁ nes our territorial identity and our location within the Southeast Asian ecological region” (The Committee on Heritage Report, 1988: 27–29).

Heritage thus does not stem solely from British colonial imprint nor is it of purely local import, but consists of both tangible and intangible forms bequeathed by the past, which are perceived to contribute to

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“our shared experience of becoming a nation” (The Committee on Heritage Report, 1988: 22). Like elsewhere in the world, where heritage has become an ‘industry’ in its own right, the impetus to valorise heritage is also propelled by economic concerns. As noted above, the Committee on Heritage Report (1988: 8) identifi es “economic heritage” as an important category, a reminder to inherit the work ethics and attitudes of their forebears in working towards economic success. The Report (1988: 30) also recommended that other aspects of Singapore’s heritage be viewed as “national assets”, with “monetary value as antiques and works of art” and as “a valuable tourism asset” that “makes [Singapore] different and interesting for visitors.” Indeed, the ‘heritage question’ became more, and not less, important in the mid-1980s, when new economic diver- sifi cation strategies were needed in response to a slowdown in manufacturing, shifts in the international division of labour and the erosion of Singapore’s competitiveness in labour-intensive operations (Kong & Yeoh, 2003). As part of the city’s strategy to carve out a specialised niche as an international business and service centre, strengthening the tourist industry played an important role. During the 1985 recession, the expansion of tourism projects, for example, was recommended by a ministerial committee as a means of reviving the fl agging construction sector and absorbing the country’s high level of savings (Chang, Milne, Fallon & Pohlmann, 1996). The recession also came in the wake of a sharp 3.5% fall in tourist arrivals in 1983. Part of the remedy to these economic ills gave impetus to preservation, as a means to repair the ravages of development and enrich the cityscape as the fall was blamed in part on “the lack of colour in the increasingly antiseptic city-state” (Burton, 1993: 36). In 1984, one of the three main problems for the tourism industry, as identifi ed by the Tourism Task Force, was the attri- tion of tourist attractions as Singapore has lost its “Oriental mystique and charm best symbolised in old buildings, traditional activities and bustling road activities” in its effort to construct a “modern metropolis” (Wong et al., 1984: 6). There is little doubt that while “past times” and “past landscapes” were beginning to gain some signifi cance alongside the advent of ‘Asian values’ from the mid-1970s, it was the economic potential—particularly their role in boosting urban aesthetics and tourism—that provided the impetus for, and materially shaped, Singapore’s heritage policies from the mid-1980s onwards. The recommendations of the Tourism Task Force included the conservation of cultural areas and historical sites and these were later

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incorporated in the Tourism Product Development Plan of 1986 (Pannell, Kerr & Forster, 1986). The plan included the expenditure of US$223 million for the redevelopment of, inter alia, ethnic enclaves, such as Chinatown, Little India and Kampong Glam, the Singapore River, a Heritage Link which encompasses all historic buildings in the city area of colonial origin, as well as specifi c projects, such as the upgrading of Raffl es Hotel (the grande dame of colonial hotels in Singapore), the redevelopment of Fort Canning (formerly a fort turned park, museum and arts centre), the restoration of Emerald Hill and the re-creation of Bugis Street (formerly an open-air site famous for its raucous street life and local food). Thus, in the words of Teo (1994), “tourism played a very signifi cant role in the rethinking process” spurring on the conservation of urban heritage. Conversely, “heritage conservation constituted one element of multi-faceted redevelopment strategies designed to cater to tourist demands for uniqueness on the one hand, while providing an opportunity to improve urban aesthetics on the other” (Chang, Milne, Fallon & Pohlmann, 1996). The interest in reclaiming heritage is as much prompted by pragmatic as by purely aesthetic or psychological reasons. Indeed, heritage conservation “means business” and should be “economically viable if not profi table, adding to the economic assets of a country in the same way more conventional landscapes of industrial production do” (Perry, Kong & Yeoh, 1997: 281). While the State remains the prime mover of heritage conservation in Singapore, it has, from the outset, actively encouraged the involvement of the private sector in conservation projects. In designated conservation areas, for example, the principle strategy is one of ‘adaptive reuse’—i.e. modifying a place to suit current usage, while minimising the loss of national, historical and cultural signifi cance—and dependence on market forces to throw up activities in conservation schemes (Lee, 1991: 3–4). Public-private partnership in heritage conservation is also the modus operandi in many recent developments, where the State had opened up opportunities for private developers willing to devote energy and expertise, in revitalising or redeveloping historic and cultural streets and places as creative sites of consumption, such as the offi ce, hotel and retail complex at Bugis Junction (side by side with the lower-end shopping outlets at Bugis Village) and the Clarke Quay food and entertainment complex fl anking the Singapore River. In short, ‘heritage’ as a source of local difference may be conjoined to ‘enterprise’ as a means to attract and satisfy increasingly sophisticated consumers in innovative profi t-making ventures.

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In the 1990s, a critical juncture in the move to increase heritage consciousness could be found in the establishment, in 1993, of the National Heritage Board (NHB) as a statutory board under the Min- istry of Information, Communications and the Arts, with the mission of fostering “nationhood, identity and creativity through heritage and cultural development” (NHB, 2004a). The Board was tasked with seven major roles:

a) to explore and present the heritage and nationhood of the people of Singapore in the context of their ancestral cultures, b) to promote public awareness, appreciation and understanding of the arts, culture and heritage, c) to promote the establishment and development of organisations concerned with the national heritage of Singapore, d) to provide a permanent repository of records of national or historical signiﬁ cance, e) to conduct records management programmes for the Government, f ) to record, preserve and disseminate the history of Singapore, and g) to advise the Government in respect of matters relating to the national heritage of Singapore (NHB, 1993–94, np).

It operates eight leading heritage institutions, including the national museums, conducts museum exhibitions, outreach programmes, travelling and online exhibitions, educational events, and others, participates in the preservation of national monuments, marks historic sites, develops heritage trails, and provides heritage consultancy services. Some of these heritage projects will be explored in the next section.

II Urban Heritage Projects

Of the different categories of heritage, it is often argued that heritage inscribed in the built environment is of particular signiﬁ cance as without “visual landmarks,” “all other records of the past remain abstract notions, difﬁ cult to understand and link to the present” (The Committee on Heritage Report, 1988: 46). Even in the earlier years before the awakening of heritage consciousness, singular buildings of “historic, traditional, archaeological, architectural or artistic interest” were preserved as national monuments under the auspices of the

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Preservation of Monuments Board (PMB) established in 1971 (Kong & Yeoh, 1994: 249).2

Conservation areas: historic and cultural districts By the mid-1980s, Singapore’s growing aspirations to become a global city in the ranks of the ﬁ rst league, also created some anxiety that the city will lose its distinctive identity in the face of homogenising tendencies that accompany globalisation: [ F ]or our city to be truly great, we cannot rely only on modern architecture, which is restrained by the economics of efﬁ cient construction, the use of new technology, and the pervasive international architectural style of the 20th century. It is inevitable that our new developments suffer the fate of looking like the new buildings in other cities of the world. The only way that gives our city a distinct personality is our historic past through the selective conservation of old districts and buildings (URA, 1985: 1). The creation of heritage landscapes was thus seen as a source of visual identity to ensure that the city rises above the homogenisation exerted by forces of technology, modernity and globalisation. The importance of built heritage was also given prominence in the Committee on Heritage Report (1988: 46) which argues “that the conservation of buildings, structures and other districts, which provide the sign posts from the past to the present, is critical to the psyche of a nation.” Already in December 1986 the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) had publicly announced its Conservation Master Plan (MND Annual Report, 1987: 35). In 1989, the Planning Act was substantially amended and the URA was made the national conservation and central planning authority. The amended Act formalised the URA’s main tasks with regard to conservation (in effect, what the URA had already been doing for the past three to four years). These included identifying buildings and areas of historical interest for conservation, preparing a conservation master plan, and guiding the implementation of conservation by the public and private sectors (Sections 10(6)(c), 13, 14 and 15, Planning Act, 1990). The Conservation Master Plan covered more than 100 hectares, including Chinatown, Kampong Glam

2 Since its inception, the Preservation of Monuments Board (PMB) has gazetted over 40 buildings as National Monuments including a mix of religious, civic, institutional and commercial buildings.

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(identifi ed as a traditional Malay enclave), Little India, the Singapore River, Emerald Hill (a residential street distinguished for Peranakan3 architecture), and the Civic and Cultural District (the former colonial heart of the city, a precinct comprising museums and other civic and cultural buildings). ‘Ethnic quarters’ in the heart of the city take pride of place among the conservation areas. The Chinatown conservation area covering approximately 23 hectares, for example, has been accorded high priority in the State’s creation of heritage landscapes. Identifi ed with the pioneering spirit and enterprise of early Chinese immigrants to Singa- pore and showcased as a distinctively Chinese cultural area, Chinatown is depicted as a veritable repository of tradition, history and culture, providing relief from the monotony of a high-rise cityscape as well as serving the socio-political purpose of binding Singaporeans to place—to the city, and ultimately and vicariously, to the ‘nation’ (Yeoh & Kong, 1994). In the late 1990s, the Singapore Tourism Board unveiled a S$97.5 million plan to “revitalise” and “enhance the Chinatown experience.” The proposed “facelift” aimed “to bring out the full fl avour of the place’s sights, sounds and smells” and includes an interpretative centre (the Chinatown Heritage Centre was opened in July 2002), a new theatre for wayang performances, street performances—from puppet-making demonstrations to martial arts shows—fi ve ‘themed’ gardens, a food street with open-air cooking and dining, and a new market square selling fresh produce (Straits Times, 22 November 1998). Other ethnic quarters, which have been designated conservation areas in the late 1980s include Kampong Glam and Little India. Probably named after a native tree called the gelam, Kampong Glam was “the historic seat of Malay Royalty in Singapore” where both the Sultan’s Palace (or istana) and the Sultan Mosque (a gazetted National Monu- ment) are located (URA, 1995: 15). “Steeped in Islamic tradition,” Kampong Glam survived into the post-independence era as an area well-known for “traditional businesses,” from Muslim eating houses to shops selling rattan handicrafts, textiles and religious paraphernalia (URA, 1988: 20–22). The conservation landscape—totalling about nine hectares—is centred around the area’s “historic hub” comprising a Malay heritage centre at the site of the Sultan’s Palace, a Malay res-

3 “Peranakan” or “Nonya and Baba” culture is a local hybrid comprising Chinese, Malay and colonial British elements.

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taurant at No. 73 Sultan Gate, the former residence of the bendahara (one of the Sultan’s ofﬁ cials), a “festival street” (Bussorah Street) and a “trading spine” (Arab Street); as well as the Alsagoff Arab School (URA, 1988: 25–26). In like manner, Little India became a conservation district showcasing Singapore’s Indian heritage. The core area of Little India stretches along Serangoon Road from the junction of Bukit Timah Road to Veerasamy Road and is also referred to as ‘Tekka’ or ‘Tek Kia Kha’ meaning ‘the foot of the small bamboos’ for the many bamboo clumps that used to grow on either side of the Rochor Canal, which is in the vicinity (Savage & Yeoh, 2003). Thematic development, associated with the conservation efforts, has brought in a new wave of retailers, including Jothi, Mustafa, Kormala Villas and K.S. Mohamed Haniffa, which started off as small shops or hole-in-the-wall enterprises but have diversiﬁ ed and kept up with the times, by offering traditional goods and cuisine, sold supermarket or fast-food-style and in air-conditioned comfort. Apart from the ethnic quarters, conservation has also transformed the colonial core of the city into a ‘civic and cultural district,’ housing important historic civic buildings and war memorials as well as the residential, entertainment and commercial focus of the island’s entrepot beginnings. Major landmarks in the district include the Padang, Supreme Court, City Hall, Parliament House, the Singapore Cricket Club, Victoria Memorial Hall and various museums, signposts of a shared history belonging to all Singaporeans, regardless of ethnic origins.

War heritage Along with the shift in heritage policy from a ‘demolish-and-rebuild’ philosophy to the conservation of old buildings and whole districts, another signiﬁ cant change centred on the place of World War II in the national consciousness. Silence over the war was ﬁ nally overturned in the 1990s, when war commemoration became a prime item on the nation’s agenda

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(Wong, 2001). National amnesia4 gave way to national remembrance, as the ‘heritage’ of war was pressed into the service of nation-building (Muzaini & Yeoh, 2005a). The “master narrative of war” was reworked into “a prelude to nationalism, the event that liberated the nation from the Western colonialism and awakened Singaporeans to the need not to depend on others for [the country’s] defence” (Muzaini & Yeoh, 2005b: 347). While war commemoration efforts up to the late 1980s were mainly shaped by the demands of returning veterans of war and their families for their comrades and loved ones to be honoured in situ (Blackburn, 2000), the work of remembering the war in the last two decades became increasingly written into discourses of nation-building, intended to remind Singaporeans of the hardships of past times and the need to protect the nation’s future. In 1992, a special committee was set up by the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), together with the Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA) and the Singapore Tourism Promotion Board, for the purpose of reminding the younger post-war generation the major events and signiﬁ cance of the war.5 Eleven locations associated with the war, such as battle sites, memorial sites and those associated with civilian experiences of the Japanese Occupation were identiﬁ ed and marked by commemorative plaques.6 This project was also drawn into commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of the war in 1995 (Brunero, 2002). A further impetus to the ‘nationalisation’ of the war heritage in Sin- gapore came in 1997, with the introduction of the National Education (NE) programme in schools, aimed at teaching the post-independence generation about Singapore’s history, and, in particular, the “struggles as a nation for both independence and survival and the values that have enabled [Singapore] to succeed” (Nexus, 2005). Since the 1990s, there has been a host of commemorative activities, taking a variety of forms from written accounts to televisual re-enactments of the war years. The state has also increased its involvement in spearheading or

4 Many war-related sites during the early years were either neglected or demol- ished altogether, or re-adapted for other uses, including the demolition in 1980 of the YMCA building (where Japanese secret police tortured many suspected dissidents), the re-adaptation of war-related British installations for military (e.g. Selarang Camp) and commercial purposes (e.g. Ford Motor Factory), and the neglect of many of the gun batteries around the island (e.g. Labrador Park). 5 The committee initially set up by MINDEF evolved into the Historic Sites Unit (HSU) in 1996 under the ambit of National Heritage Board. 6 The number of war sites marked has since doubled.

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commissioning commemorative projects, including the setting up of new war-themed museums (e.g. Battlebox), the preservation of historic sites (e.g. Johore Battery), the marking of more sites and the organisation of remembrance ceremonies. The collective remembrance of the war years has become a major platform to develop national consciousness and identity in order to bind Singaporeans into a nation.

Museums Alongside the heightened commemoration of the war heritage, the last decade has also seen an unprecedented increase in museum building and development of various sorts. In 1996, a new Singapore Art Museum dedicated to the collection and display of 20th century Singaporean and Southeast Asian modern and contemporary art was opened at the restored 19th century St Joseph’s Institution building along Bras Basah Road (NHB, 2005a). The ﬁ rst wing of the Asian Civilisations Museum at the site of the former Tao Nan School building in Armenian Street opened in April 1997 (NHB, 2005b), followed by a move of the National Archives to new premises in 1997, and the completion of a new Central Repository for the joint collections of the National Museums in 1998. The second phase of the Asian Civilisations Museum located at the historic Empress Place Building by the Singapore River opened in early 2003, while the Singapore History Museum was closed in the same year for extensive renovations and extension work, and re-opened in December 2006 as a ‘new-generation museum’ and a ‘one-stop centre’ for Singapore history (NHB, 2005c). These museums7 come under the purview of NHB, along with the National Archives, the Heritage Conservation Centre, the Singapore Philatelic Museum and Reﬂ ections at Bukit Chandu, a World War II interpretative centre dedicated to commemorating the valour of the Malay Regiment in the defence of Singapore against the Japanese invaders. The newest museum to be opened to the public at the time of writing is another World War II centre housed in the former Ford Motor Factory along Upper Bukit Timah Road, the site of the British surrender to the Japanese on 15 February 1942.

7 Including these museums under the direct purview of NHB, there are 25 museums and heritage galleries in Singapore. All the museums belong to a network called the Museum Roundtable, which was formed in 1996 with the aim of bringing museums closer to the public and instilling greater awareness and appreciation of heritage, culture and the arts among Singaporeans and tourists (Museum Roundtable, 2004).

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Not only do museums—many of which are housed in historic buildings—add to the distinctive character of the urban landscape, they are expected to play an important role in fostering a sense of place and history among Singaporeans. For example, Rivertales, an interactive exhibition, opened in August 2003, aims to educate Singaporeans about the nation’s development through tales associated with the Singapore River while a wide range of exhibitions on ethnic cultures and festivals at the various museums hopes to “engender a greater sense of belonging, racial and religious harmony, resilience and innovation amongst Singaporeans” (NHB, 2004b). The Singapore River interpretative centre, which was established in December 2000 and comprises an open air display of tableaux of sculptures (depicting various aspects of the river’s past activities) along the length of the river, hopes to achieve the same goals (Chang et al., 2004: 430–431) but in a more causal and spontaneous fashion. The next section assesses public involvement in, and support for, the various heritage activities and State policies on heritage preservation. In particular, it examines the notion that heritage and heritage landscapes contribute towards the rooting of citizens to the nation. The analysis draws from a large-scale face-to-face questionnaire survey of 903 Singaporeans aged between 15 and 69 years, conducted in 2002. The sample was stratiﬁ ed by age, gender and race as representative of the national population, and controlled for socio-economic status and geographical spread in terms of place of residence in Singapore.

III Singaporeans’ Attitudes Towards Heritage8

The survey revealed that there is generally a high level of appreciation of the importance of heritage and the need to preserve it among Singaporeans. However, this awareness is more often in the form of passive support, rather than active involvement in heritage activities and its transmission. This may be a reﬂ ection of the low levels of civic organisation and participation in Singapore, as well as a perceived image of heritage as a specialised subject.

8 The survey data used in this chapter are drawn from a 2002 Heritage Awareness Survey commissioned by the National Heritage Board (NHB). We are grateful to NHB for giving us special permission to use the data and ﬁ ndings for this chapter.

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Support for State Rhetoric and Policies The range of heritage sites and activities spearheaded by the NHB and other public agencies in recent years was, on the whole, positively evaluated by the public (Table 1). Singaporeans generally supported the notion that it is vital to preserve all aspects of Singapore’s heritage for posterity and, although preservation efforts in many cities have been criticised as resulting in either a ‘disneyfi cation’ or ‘museumisation’ of what is preserved, Singaporeans resisted the suggestion that heritage preservation is pointless because of this. Instead, heritage preservation was perceived as suffi ciently signifi cant for the government to invest in, regardless of the economic situation. In fact, there was general agreement that every Singaporean should be personally involved in heritage activities. The strongest advocates of these views were the non-Chinese, the more highly educated and the economically better off,9 while those most likely to disagree were those who claimed a weak sense of belonging to Singapore10 and/or a preference to be identifi ed by their ethnic group rather than as Singaporeans. Not surprisingly, an overwhelming majority (four out of fi ve) of the public rated the government’s overall performance in improving heritage activities in the last fi ve years as a success to varying degrees (compared to fewer than one in ten who considered the government’s efforts as totally unsuccessful). Non-Chinese surveyed were consistently more likely to consider the efforts as successful, while the more economically well-off, the tertiary-educated and those claiming a weaker sense of belonging to Singapore tended to be more critical. Given the low rates of visitorship to and/or participation in most of Singapore’s heritage sites and activities (discussed in the next section), such assessments are more likely to have been shaped by secondary sources of information (such as through hearsay and media reports) than through primary experience.

9 Interestingly, however, those in the highest income brackets (earning S$8,000 or more per month) were considerably under-represented (47.4%), with respect to the sentiment that heritage activities should be a part of every Singaporean’s life. 10 Respondents were asked to rate their own level of belonging and belonging to Singapore on a four-point scale of very strong, strong, weak and very weak.

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Table 1. Support for Heritage Preservation in Singapore Agree Disagree Don’t know Statements (n = 903) No. % No. % No. % It is vital to preserve all 820 90.9 83 9.2 — — aspects of Singapore’s heritage for current and future generations. There is nothing of value 138 15.3 764 84.7 1 0.1 in Singapore to preserve. It is important for the 645 71.4 258 28.6 — — government to continually invest money in preserving Singapore’s heritage, regardless of the economic situation. Heritage preservation is 239 26.5 657 72.8 7 0.8 useless because anything that is preserved becomes artiﬁ cial. Every Singaporean should 620 68.7 283 31.3 — — be personally involved in heritage activities. Source: 2002 Heritage Awareness Survey.

Most Singaporeans also seemed to have bought into the government’s ‘narrative of survival’ and its rhetoric on nation-building and a multi- cultural society as important pillars of heritage preservation. There was a clear preference for commemorating Singapore’s more recent history—the struggles during the Japanese Occupation, the sweat and toil as well as the rewards and successes of the current period of independence and, to a lesser extent, the difﬁ cult period between World War II and independence—rather than the pre-colonial and colonial periods (Table 2). In particular, teenaged respondents (15–19 years) displayed the greatest preference for the Japanese Occupation and independence periods, while being the group least likely to consider the pre-colonial era as the most important period to preserve.

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Table 2. Time Periods Deemed Most Important to Preserve Time Period (n = 903) No. % Pre-colonial (pre-1819) 45 5.0 British colonial (1819–1942) 43 4.8 Japanese Occupation (1942–1945) 196 21.7 Post-World War II and 147 16.3 Pre-Independence (1945–1965) Independence (post-1965) 188 20.8 All are equally important 275 30.5 None of the above are important enough to 9 1.0 preserve

Source: 2002 Heritage Awareness Survey.

There was also broad support for the idea of preserving heritage that belongs to all Singaporeans, regardless of race, language or religion rather than that which belongs to either a speciﬁ c cultural, ethnic or religious group or a particular individual (Table 3). Notably, however, a large majority (82.5%) of those surveyed observed, that it is more important to be historically accurate than to ensure that all four of Singapore’s racial categories are more or less equally represented in heritage activities. Singaporeans also strongly endorsed the government’s efforts in employing the built environment as a crucible of the nation’s memories. High levels of approval were accorded to the efforts put into preserving the nation’s historic and cultural districts (88.4%), national monuments (85.8%), and the marking of heritage trails and sites (73.2%) within the city. A large majority (70.4%) also deemed the preservation of natural heritage sites to be very successful. State efforts directed at museums

Table 3. Scope of Heritage Deemed Most Important to Preserve Scope of Heritage (n = 903) No. % Heritage that belongs to all Singaporeans 495 54.8 regardless of race, language or religion Heritage that belongs to a speciﬁ c cultural, ethnic 89 9.9 or religious group Heritage that belongs to a particular individual 23 2.5 All are equally important 288 31.9 None of the above important enough to preserve 8 0.9

Source: 2002 Heritage Awareness Survey.

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were also deemed very or partially successful by most, whether in terms of establishing new museums (80.0%), improving the collections and exhibits in the museums (74.5%), or upgrading existing museums (69.7%). Nevertheless, Singaporeans are not without criticism of the government’s efforts at heritage preservation and promotion (Table 4). Many who were surveyed, particularly the non-Chinese, felt that the government’s interest in heritage activities has been primarily targetted at the tourism industry and/or was too commercialised. There was also general agreement that heritage preservation in Singapore was too much of a top-down process and there was widespread agreement, that the government should consult the public more, regarding what aspects of Singapore to preserve.

Table 4. Assessment of the Current State of Heritage Preservation in Singapore Agree Disagree Don’t know Statements (n = 903) No. % No. % No. % The government is interested 555 61.4 342 37.9 6 0.7 in heritage activities mainly for beneﬁ t of tourists rather than Singaporeans. Heritage preservation 535 59.3 357 39.6 11 1.2 in Singapore is too commercialised. The government should 790 87.5 113 12.6 — — consult the public more regarding what aspects of Singapore to preserve.

Source: 2002 Heritage Awareness Survey.

The considerable level of public domain activity in heritage development, and the general support for and the desire to be consulted more with regard to such efforts are, however, not matched by an equivalent level of personal involvement and individual responsibility. As we go on to demonstrate, while heritage is valued as positive for the nation, this appreciation does not translate into personal actualisation at the everyday level for the majority of Singaporeans.

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Involvement in Heritage Activities While Singaporeans are generally positive about the value of heritage to the nation, they are less convinced that it has a concrete role in their individual lives. Only three out of ﬁ ve Singaporeans in the survey could discern a positive role for heritage in their everyday lives. Perhaps as a consequence, Singaporeans’ levels of involvement in heritage activities—as measured by their formal membership of heritage organisations, their frequency of visits to heritage sites and participation in heritage activities—were, in the main, low (Table 5).

Table 5. Frequency of Visits to Heritage Sites in Singapore within the Last One Year

Several times At least At least a year but less Never once a Heritage sites (n=903) once a year than once a month month No. % No. % No. % No. %

Museums 803 88.9 88 9.7 10 1.1 2 0.2 Historic districts 514 56.9 167 18.5 181 20.0 41 4.5 Heritage buildings, 814 90.1 68 7.5 19 2.1 2 0.2 memorials, statues and monuments Heritage trails and 849 94.0 42 4.7 9 1.0 3 0.3 tours Travelling exhibitions 827 91.6 59 6.5 14 1.6 3 0.3 Natural heritage sites 790 87.5 87 9.6 23 2.5 3 0.3

Source: 2002 Heritage Awareness Survey.

Not many Singaporeans surveyed had visited heritage sites for the primary purpose of appreciating history and heritage in the previous year. Historic districts were the most preferred type of heritage site amongst Singaporeans; far fewer visited natural heritage sites, museums, heritage buildings, memorials, statues and monuments, travelling exhibitions and heritage trails and tours. Not surprisingly, participation in heritage activities was even lower than visitorship to heritage areas. Beyond the fact that the overwhelming majority of respondents (99.2%) were not members of any formal heritage bodies or organisations (such as Friends of the Museum, Singapore Heritage Society, and clan associations), only a handful (between 2% and 6%) of the respondents had attended

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activities such as traditional performing arts and cultural shows, grassroots cultural activities, school-based heritage programmes, heritage festivals, commemorative activities as well as public talks, seminars and workshops on heritage, or participated in online heritage websites on Singapore. Notably, among those who had either visited heritage sites or participated in heritage activities in the last one year, the vast majority (88%–100%) were of the view, that their awareness of the nation’s history and heritage had been enhanced by these visits or activities. Overall, ethnicity and age affected visitorship to heritage places and participation in heritage activities. Historic districts as well as heritage buildings, memorials, statues and monuments were more commonly visited by non-Chinese and teenagers (15–19 years old). The high—and regular—visitorship rates of teens to historic sites are most probably linked to the many ﬁ eld trips students make yearly within Singapore, often as part of ‘Learning Journeys,’ a school-based heritage programme which brings school children to various locations11 in Singapore—including many heritage sites such as heritage centres and associations of various ethnic groups, museums and Parliament—to help them understand Singapore’s road to nationhood and economic success. It is likely that because of the large and pro-active role taken by the State in promoting heritage, heritage transmission is viewed by most Singaporeans as an activity best achieved in the public domain rather than as a personal, family or community responsibility. This is particularly ironic, given the expressed desire by almost nine out of 10 Singaporeans that they desire a greater opportunity to have a say in what is to be preserved in Singapore (as discussed above). The local educational system received the strongest endorsement, with most Singaporeans viewing formal education as the best means of trans- mitting heritage knowledge and values; indeed, 84.9% ranked schools and other educational institutions as one of their top three means by which they felt heritage was best transmitted. Heritage transmission

11 For a site to qualify for the Learning Journeys programme, it must satisfy at least two of the following four criteria: a) instill pride in Singapore’s achievements, b) contribute to a better understanding of the challenges and constraints facing Singapore, c) build conﬁ dence in the country’s future, and d) promote the idea of Singapore as home (http://moe.calendarone.com/about_lj/aboutlj.htm#rationale; accessed 1 April 2006). There are currently over 120 sites in the Learning Journeys Programme.

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through government programmes and campaigns (61.0%) and via the media (58.2%) was ranked second and third respectively. Methods of transmission depending on individual, family or community efforts were ranked as the least effective means. Not surprisingly, therefore, many were keen for the government to play an even more active role in promoting heritage through public education and community outreach, the collection of heirlooms and artefacts from the public, the organisation of travelling exhibits into the heartlands of public housing estates, and the establishment of heritage programmes and corners in schools. This desire stems not only from a recognition by Singaporeans themselves, that they are unlikely to actively transmit such heritage knowledge, but also from an appreciation of the role that heritage plays in rooting one to the nation.

“Rooting” Citizenry through Heritage Singaporeans do indeed discern a role for heritage as a factor which roots one to the nation (Table 6). There was general agreement that a better understanding and appreciation of Singapore’s history and heritage increases one’s sense of belonging to Singapore and that efforts at preserving local heritage must be given more emphasis as Singapore moves towards global city status. Consistent with the earlier fi nding that Singaporeans tend to be passive supporters, rather than active participants of heritage, it is not surprising that the percentage of those affi rming the role of heritage as a ‘rooting’ factor declines when we move beyond these two indicators of passive understanding and valorisation of heritage, into measures of active involvement in heritage activities (such as visiting museums) as anchoring one to the nation, whether through contributing to a greater personal sense of belonging to Singapore or in inhibiting emigration. The proportion that valorised heritage as a means of rooting Singa- poreans was highest among the teenagers (15–19 years old), affi rming what has already been earlier determined about the strong role of formal education in this regard.12 More specifi cally, beyond personal benefi ts

12 This ﬁ nding is supported by another study which looked at 274 students, between 14 and 16 years of age, in government schools in Singapore; the study found that almost nine out of every 10 students surveyed found that ﬁ eldtrips made on the Learning Journeys programme did indeed help to instill them with a sense of pride and identity as Singaporeans, and that “the more [they] know Singapore through the places . . . visited, the more [they] feel [they] belong to the Singapore homeland” (Chen, 2004: 54).

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Table 6. Assessment of the Importance of Heritage as a “Rooting” Factor Agree Disagree Don’t know Statement (n = 903) No. % No. % No. % A better understanding and 745 82.6 133 14.7 25 2.8 appreciation of Singapore’s history and heritage will increase my sense of belonging to Singapore. Preserving our local heritage 743 82.3 127 14.0 33 3.7 will become more important as Singapore moves towards becoming a global city. Participating in heritage 612 67.7 240 26.5 51 5.6 activities and visiting museums will help me develop a greater sense of belonging to Singapore. If more Singaporeans were 463 51.3 405 44.8 35 3.9 involved in heritage activities, fewer would migrate overseas.

Source: 2002 Heritage Awareness Survey.

(such as increasing one’s own general knowledge and knowledge of one’s ancestry and culture), respondents acknowledged the role of heritage in educating the younger generation about their roots, inculcating one’s national identity and pride in being a Singaporean, and, ultimately, increasing one’s national sense of belonging. Somewhat expectedly, Singaporeans professing an already weak sense of belonging, were more likely to feel that heritage has no signiﬁ cant role in their lives.

IV Conclusion

Knowing and strengthening our roots is key to our survival as a nation. As a young country, our identity must be drawn from the rich cultures and histories of our various ethnic groups Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 2005a As Singapore strategises to achieve its aspirations of “remaking” itself into “a vibrant global city” (Lee, 2005b)—most recently reiterated by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in his 2005 National Day Rally

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speech—its policy makers are concerned that this will result in a country whose citizens are rootless, hence threatening the nation’s survival. As expressed in Singapore 21,13 Singapore’s ‘compass’ to navigate the 21st century, the challenge presented to the nation by the forces of globalisation, modernisation and increased mobility, is the need to ensure that its citizens’ national bonds are strengthened. Amongst the ‘tools’ identifi ed in the Singapore 21 document to help Singaporeans develop such necessary “emotional and social anchors” and a sense of “shared values, shared history and shared destiny” is the “need to identify, promote and retain areas and buildings which make Singapore unique” and to encourage “society as a whole [to] be involved in heritage conservation” (Singapore 21 Committee, 1999: 42). In assessing the extent to which these ‘tools have been put in place, this chapter has reviewed the heritage policies and actions that the Singapore State has undertaken to promote public awareness of the country’s history and heritage, and ultimately, whether such efforts have contributed towards a greater sense of emotional rootedness to the nation among Singaporeans. The range of heritage sites and activities spearheaded by NHB and other public agencies in recent years, particularly the historic and cultural districts found across Singapore’s urban landscape, are regarded positively on the whole, and there is general consensus that a better understanding and appreciation of Singapore’s history and heritage does increase one’s own sense of belonging to Singapore. Indeed, most Singaporeans appear to have imbibed the State’s narratives of survival and nation building. As such, it suggests that the State’s current policies on heritage are generally on the right track, because heritage does indeed matter to Singaporeans and their identifi cation with the nation. However, there are also some aspects in which the policies have not yet achieved their desired outcomes. For one, there is considerable skepticism as to whom heritage preservation in Singapore is targetted. Indeed, there is widespread perception that it is too often undertaken for commercial and touristic goals. If Singaporeans are to be convinced that Singapore’s heritage is fi rst and foremost for the sake of locals, then heritage policies need to better demonstrate that heritage

13 Based on discussions with “some 6,000 Singaporeans from all walks of live”, the Singapore 21 document sets out “what Singaporeans want for the future of [the Singapore] nation” (Singapore 21 Committee, 1999: Preface) as it enters the 21st century.

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is not simply a “valuable tourism asset” which “makes us different and interesting for visitors” (The Committee on Heritage Report, 1988: 30) and that the State’s interest in reclaiming heritage is not purely dictated by pragmatic ends but also directed at serving the needs of local communities. Over and above the larger histories of the nation commemorated in sites concentrated in the city centre (arguably the main target of the tourist market), heritage activities also need to be brought into Singapore’s heartlands—regardless of whether they are commercially viable—by focusing on the place histories of everyday neighbourhoods that are important to local communities. Another dilemma facing policy makers lies in achieving a balance between playing a paternalistic role in leading the charge on heritage conservation and stepping back to encourage individuals as well as local groups and communities to play a larger part. While NHB, as the prime government agency, should provide the vision and leadership in the development of heritage activities and places, there is a need for a broader base of community-level bodies and networks—such as ethnically-based organisations and community centres—to tap into the potential groundswell of public interest, community support and individual resources. While the currently low level of personal and active involvement of Singaporeans in heritage activities may prove a large hurdle, such a move is necessary if heritage is to evolve from an essentially government-led initiative to a community activity, anchoring the people to local places as well as to Singapore as a nation. Heritage issues in post-industrial cities will become more important as these cities compete to attract and retain local and foreign talent characterised by increasing mobility. The growing middle class—with high disposable incomes and service-oriented jobs—in these cities will demand not only more amenities, better access to arts and culture, and a higher quality of life, but will also be more willing to move to cities which offer these qualities. As former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (1999) noted: Whether we like it or not, more Singaporeans will take wing, given the pace of globalisation and their own personal mobility. As Singaporeans become even more cosmopolitan, the issue of concern to us is whether they will become less rooted to Singapore. We now have to compete for the hearts of Singaporeans against attractions elsewhere. The ‘heritage question’ will continue to increase in signiﬁ cance as the forces of globalisation enhance transnational mobility (Kong & Yeoh,

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2003: 135). For heritage to act as a rooting factor in the face of such countervailing forces, Singapore needs to move beyond merely providing State-propelled heritage landscapes as visual reminders of the nation’s history to making heritage a truly community project.

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TONG_f10_201-224.indd 224 2/7/2008 7:45:42 PM CULTURE AND THE ARTS: INTRUSION IN POLITICAL SPACE

Chua Beng Huat

In April, 1989, commenting on the commissioned Report of the Advisory Council on Culture and the Arts, chaired by then Second Deputy Prime Minister, the late Ong Teng Cheong, the then soon-to- be Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, said: “We [Singaporeans] have reached a stage in our economic and national development when we should devote greater attention and resources to culture and the arts in Singapore. Culture and the arts add to the vitality of a nation and enhance the quality of life” (quoted in Renaissance City Report (RCR): 11). After he assumed the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁ ce, Mr Goh, made the building of a more ‘gracious’ society as part of the goal of his government. The 1989 Report framed the importance of culture and the arts in the following terms:

a) to give the nation its unique character, b) to broaden our minds and deepen our sensitivities, c) to improve the general quality of life, d) to strengthen the social bond, and e) within the economic pragmatism of the PAP (People’s Action Party) government, deﬁ nitely last but not least, to contribute to tourist and entertainment sectors.

Furthermore, beﬁ tting a country that is driven by planning and obtaining tangible results, the Report suggested that “the vision of a culturally vibrant society, deﬁ ned as one whose people are well-informed, creative, sensitive and gracious” should be achieved “by 1999” (RCR: 12). Alas, we are now past the target date by close to a decade and while development of the arts has come quite along way, I would not say that we have achieved the vision. Indeed, to achieve a culturally vibrant society is a long-term goal and may in fact be always a ‘work-in-progress.’ Nevertheless, the concrete achievements since 1989 are palpable.

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The Advisory Council was cognizant of the woeful lack of funds, knowledge, qualifi ed professionals, cultural facilities, educational opportunities and publicity for cultural and artistic development and the need for educational, organisational and infrastructure development. Follow- ing its recommendations, a whole slew of institutions were successively established within the government: the Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA) in 1990,1 its mandate includes the ‘promotion of the arts,’ the National Arts Council (NAC) in 1991, the National Heritage Board and an Arts Education Program for secondary schools in 1993. New buildings housing arts institutions were also built: a new Singapore Art Museum and an Asian Civilisations Museum were established in two retrofi tted colonial buildings; major renovation was undertaken for the older Singapore History Museum; a new campus for the Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts (the oldest fi ne arts teaching institution) was completed in 2004 and 2007 saw the completion of a new campus for the other art institute, LaSalle Art Institute. In terms of performance venues, the Esplanade—Theatres on the Bay, at the downtown-waterfront, costing hundreds of millions in construction and boasting state-of- the-art acoustics, opened as scheduled in 2002. A new National Library has been completed. Direct and in-kind fi nancial assistance to artistic groups and individual artists have also been increased. The NAC has an ‘arts housing scheme’ that provides highly subsidised premises (at 30% of the market value) to house arts organisations, such as theatre groups, and individual practicing visual artists. Direct fi nancial grants have also been increasingly provided for theatre companies with a sustained track record of annual productions—enabling some of the theatre practitioners to earn a ‘living wage.’ These institutional and physical infrastructure developments were further augmented by the government’s acceptance of the proposals of a commissioned study of ‘Singapore as a Renaissance City.’ The study brief was to envision “Singapore as a world-class city supported by a vibrant cultural scene, and outlines the strategies required to take Singapore there” (RCR: 4). Using contemporary Hong Kong and Melbourne as the immediate horizon of comparison, the Report recommended, among other suggestions for the enhancement of programmes already in place, increased efforts to “go international” by

1 Since 2004, Ministry of Information and the Arts have been renamed Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts (MICA).

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promoting Singaporean artists overseas. This has resulted in increased funding for Singaporean artists who are invited to exhibit their works overseas. The NAC also has memoranda of exchanges with galleries and embassies of other countries for mutual support for funding each others’ visiting artists. The RCR (page 7) also recommended the establishment of “a new biennial mini arts festival” and a “Sculptural Biennale to showcase sculptures from all over the world.” These recommendations have engendered Singapore’s participation in the Venice Biennales, beginning in 2001. It has also led to the initiation of Singapore’s own international biennales of contemporary visual arts, in August 2006. This event was scheduled to coincide with the meetings of the World Bank and Inter- national Monetary Fund, which saw the world’s top ﬁ nancial movers and shakers and the global media entourage descending on Singapore en masse. As a ‘trial’ run for this big event a smaller exhibition, SENI: Art and the Contemporary, was organised for the two months of Octo- ber and November, 2004, which opened with an event of 48 hours of continuous performance arts. In tandem with the intense building of institutions and infrastructure for culture and the arts in the last decade, is the spread of education training programmes, theatre and music performances and visual arts exhibitions. Among the major annual events on the arts calendar is the now, multi-million Singapore dollar, annual Singapore Arts Festival, with a focus on showcasing Asian and international performances in music, dance and theatre. Mega-art exhibitions at the Singapore Art Museum have also become more commonplace e.g. 2004 saw the exhibition of Taiwanese sculpture Zhu Ming and the huge and rotund sculptures of Latin American sculptor, Botero and the major solo exhibitions of local artists: the calligrapher, poet and painter, Tan Swie Hian, who represented Singapore in the 2003 Venice Bieannle and the late Liu Kang. On a smaller scale, it can now be said that, with the increase of art groups and practitioners, one can watch a new play or dance performance every week, if not with greater frequency. The ‘high’ culture industry has certainly gained much visibility in Singapore and generated positive international publicity for Singapore. Taking notice of these developments, the New York Times characterised the arts scene in Singapore as “from invisible to explosive” (25 July 1999, quoted in RCR: 15). In the same period, the cover story of Time Magazine, Asian edition (19 July 1999), declared that “Singapore Swings;” inside, it writes “the city-state is getting competitive, creative

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and even funky”—music to the ears of the PAP leadership, who were hitherto been known largely for their straitlaced, no-nonsense, morally righteous manners and government. The then Prime Miniser Goh declared in the annual state-of-the-nation, National Day Rally speech of the same year: “But having fun is important. If Singapore is a dull, boring place, not only will talent not want to come here, but even Singaporeans will begin to feel restless” (quoted in Kwok & Low, 2002: 149). What is signiﬁ cant in this statement is how the ideas of ‘fun’ and ‘culture and the arts’ are being re-inscribed in the economy, signiﬁ ed by the single concept of ‘talent.’

I The Arts and the Economy

As a habit of the PAP government, beyond the desire for a gracious society, economic considerations are part of the motivation behind the initiatives of developing culture and the arts. The economic motivation is most succinctly stated by then Acting Minister for MITA, George Yeo, who categorically declared: “We need an artistic culture”: We want to make Singapore a centre for the arts partly for its own sake and partly because we need the arts to help make us a centre for brain services. We want talent from all over the world to meet here, to work here and to live here. They must enjoy being here—the people, the food, the music, the cosmopolitan air. We cannot work the magic without the arts. This is why we will be spending quite a lot of money—about a billion dollars—over the next ﬁ ve years building new cultural facilities and expanding existing ones.2 There are three ways in which the development of the arts may assist in furthering economic development in Singapore. Most directly, culture and arts may become a focal point for enhancing tourism. Second, as the Minister spelt out, it is absolutely necessary for producing the ‘cosmopolitan air’ that global economic players—international ﬁ nancial industry and high-technology executives—need to breathe, to live and to work. Finally, development of culture and the arts may constitute the foundation for engendering creativity in the population. The latter two factors are essential, as Singapore’s economy evolves into a ‘knowledge-based economy.’

2 Quoted in Chai, 2002: 11.

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From the tourism point of view, the development of culture and the arts has a very narrow focus, tied to bringing tourists to Singapore. What gives the Singapore Tourist Board (STB) confi dence in the promotion of culture and the arts is that a commissioned research in 1998 suggested that “by 2002, the multiplier effect of the arts and entertainment industry will be 2.8,” that is, “for every dollar spent directly on the arts, another average S$1.80 of income [is] generated elsewhere in a related industry” (RCR: 30), such as travel, hotels and restaurants. One source of tourist arrivals is, therefore, to be achieved by bringing big shows from the West to perform in Singapore, in the hope of attracting regional audiences, who would double up as tourists. Here, big shows would mean Broadway musicals or popular musicians; a good example, was the performance of the ‘King of Pop’ Michael Jackson, in 1996, which drew a very signifi cant audience from Malaysia and Indonesia. Long running and popular Broadway and West End musicals continue to be staged here, among others, Les Miserables, Phantom of the Opera, and Cats. West Side Story and Rent were brought in, in 2006, and others continue to arrive. In addition, rock stars and other pop music performances, including East Asian pop musicians, such as Rain from Korea and S.H.E. an all female vocal group from Taiwan, are now frequent, with each trying to top the precedent performer in ticket prices. For example, in October 2004 alone, together with regular performances of the local theatres, there were, in the ‘high’ culture category, the annual Ballet Under the Stars evenings by the Singapore Dance Company, the performance of the New York City, black, modern dance company, Alvin Alley Dance Company, and the closing of the exhibition by the renown Taiwanese sculptor, Zhu Ming. In the popular culture sphere, there was one concert by the aging rock band, the Eagles, one concert by the black, female jazz singer, Alicia Keys, both part of their world tours, and an eight-hour, open-air rock concert, Euphoria 04, which attracted an audience of 200,000. Euphoria was sponsored by the local beer company, Tiger Beer, in celebration of its 75th anniversary, featuring artistes from England, US and currently ‘hot’ young East Asian singers from Thailand, Taiwan and Korea (Straits Times, 1 October 2004). On the other hand, ‘globalisation’ of local content by bringing Singapore theatre overseas—another of the professed strategies of the STB –has been decidedly less supported, fi nancially speaking. Indeed, one of the most ambitious theatre production, a ‘pan Asian’ rendition of Shakespeare’s Lear, by Singaporean theater director, Ong Keng Sen,

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was funded by the Japan Foundation in its world tour, including its performance in Singapore. However, some changes are afoot: in 2005, the NAC inaugurated the ‘Singapore Season in London,’ which showcased Singapore’s leading theatre company Theatre Works, Singapore Dance Company, Singapore Chinese Orchestra and the Tang Quartet, in addition to Singapore fi lms. The Singapore Season is planned to be an annual offering in London’s cultural calendar. Since the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis, Singapore has stepped up the re-direction of its economic development to what has come to be conventionally known as a knowledge-based economy, i.e. industries in which knowledge and information is the primary tool, but is also a com- modity. Some of the industries that are highly dependent on knowledge and information and the speed of their transmission and utilisation are international fi nance, biosciences and pharmaceuticals and high-tech. By the early 1980s, it was increasingly obvious to the economic planners that, although labour-intensive industries had been instrumental in the early phase of economic development, Singapore was not going to be able to compete in this activity in the future. Consequently, industrial policies have been progressively shedding labour-intensive industries and encouraging capital and knowledge-intensive industries. Promotion of knowledge-based industries has led the government to initiate a manpower policy for scouring the earth for ‘foreign talent,’ given the smallness of the local population and its implied scarcity of skilled labour in these industries. Major government-owned corporations, such as those in banking, shipping and fi nancial management, have recruited foreigners to be at the helm e.g. the Development Bank of Singapore, the Neptune Orient Line and even the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the de facto central bank of the country, have all had foreigners as deputy managing directors. Furthermore, the Economic Development Board (EDB) has been promoting Singapore as a bioscientifi c industrial hub, with the development of the ‘Biopolis.’ The government itself invests heavily in research and development in science and engineering, through a new statutory board, the Agency for Scientifi c and Technological Research (A*Star), with an annual research fund worth S$1 billion. The result is that many of the world’s top scientists in biosciences, genetic-engineering and nano-technology have either taken up full-time work or consultancy in Singapore, for the long-term or for short stints. Taking the cue from sociological research on the Californian Sili- con Valley, which argues that milieu of work and living environment

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are important considerations to the high-tech workers, the Singapore government believes that high-end, globally marketable and highly in demand individuals in these industries make equally high demands on their living and working environment. As this would include demands for ‘culture and the arts,’ the need to develop this area of social life arises in order to encourage, as the Minister of Information and the Arts puts it, “talent from all over the world to meet here, to work here and to live here.” Hence, the development of all the high-end, visual art and performance art infrastructure, which took up a very signifi cant portion of the S$1 billion spent. A further and future demand of the knowledge-based economy is, of course, to improve and intensify the ‘creativity’ of Singaporeans with ability. Here, a fundamental mindset of the government of Singa- pore has to be changed. Until recently, education was concerned with producing graduates for the bureaucracy of either the civil service or multinational corporations and, by extension, social obedience and intellectual complacency. If Singapore is to scale the ladder of the knowledge-based economy, education will have to encourage greater creativity among the students. Furthermore, schools will not be able to achieve this task of increasing the ‘creative’ quotient of society on their own. The entire social and cultural environment will have to contribute to the effort, hence, the need to encourage and invest in culture and the arts. As a result of the government’s perception of direct and indirect benefi ts, it has invested heavily in the development of culture and the arts in the past decade and a half. The result is a very palpable change in Singapore’s contemporary cultural and artistic landscape, described above. Singapore has indeed come a long way from the cultural ‘desert’ that it was in the fi rst three decades of sustained industrialisation and economic pragmatism.

II Technology without Cultural Content

Beyond tourism, economic interest is focused on intensifying the production capacity of the highly technology-driven cultural industries and their multiplier effect in business opportunities. Such production capacity would intensify the skills of all media related business like the advertisement and computer gaming industries. In terms of speciﬁ c programmes, the EDB has invested directly in the ‘creative industries.’ In 2003, it entered into partnership with both

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the National Geographic and Discovery channels, on a 50/50 partnership for a period of fi ve years and a total of budget of US$35 million, to fi nance documentary projects, which are to be produced in Singapore. These two foreign partners were chosen because they produce ‘factual’ documentaries, such as wild life, engineering and science and exotic ‘anthropological’ theme programmes. Technicians and professionals from both channels, covering the entire range of skills in production work, are being brought in to work with local practitioners. The resulting, well-fi nanced, one-hour programmes—costing approximately US$1 million per programme, compared to about S$35,000 per hour of local television drama—have been of very high quality, winning awards internationally and a few have even made their way into the prized US market. Such ‘factual’ documentaries have an assured international market. One obvious and, perhaps more important, reason why they are produced is to seek technology transfer to enable Singapore to become a technical production site. In 2004, the EDB also partnered Lucas Laboratory, of Star Wars fame, to set up an animation production house in Singapore. This is seen as a coup among industry players because the partnership, with EDB in the minority, will develop a US$300 million animation production factory, along with the professionals that it will bring to Singapore. Again, content is not an issue. This emphasis on production has led one industry player to put it, rather disparagingly, as making Singapore a high-tech production ‘sweat-shop.’ Heavy investments in infrastructure and production technology have come at a cost, i.e. negligence of the possibility of exporting Singa- pore-based cultural productions. The consequence is that Singapore remains largely a space of cultural consumption, rather than of cultural production. It continues to be a market that imports cultural products, when it comes to popular culture. In this sense, the economy minders of Singapore, unlike their counterparts in the rest of East Asia, have yet to realise that the export of popular culture export has mega economic spin-offs. The result is a thoroughly undeveloped popular culture industry, in spite of superior production technologies in the present and envisaged future. For example, given its 75% ethnic Chinese population, Singaporean Mandarin-speaking artistes, in principle, can and should have access to the Chinese-speaking audience/consumers within what may be called the East Asian popular culture sphere (Chua, 2004). However, to gain access to this audience, they would have to leave Singapore, either

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for a period of time or for specifi c projects elsewhere in the Chinese- language speaking locations; currently, Taiwan seems to predominate in producing television and music artistes. Kaira Kong is a good example. The 20-something is gifted with a good voice. In her fi rst year at the local university, she won a student organised talent contest and was ‘discovered’ by a local Chinese language music producer. The producer, a lyricist and she, formed a music company. Pragmatic sensibility made her complete her undergraduate studies, although she continued to write melodies. She has a preference for singing in English and still hopes to be able to do so professionally in future, but is realistic enough to accept that she stands a better chance, at the beginning of her career, to sing in Mandarin for an East Asian audience. This also means a change of musical preference, from rock music to ballads.3 By mid-2004, one year after completing her studies, she was ready to release her fi rst album. Although all the music writing work and the technical recording work on the album were done in Singapore, the company signed a contract for the release of the album with a major Taiwanese record company. (Indeed, many Taiwanese artistes would come to do recording with specifi c Singaporean producers because of their technical skills.) The reason is simple: there is no record company in Singapore, which is willing to invest in the huge publicity cost that is needed to promote the debut album, in the hope of creating a ‘star.’ For Mandarin music, record sales of 10,000 copies would be considered a massive success in Singapore, compared to sales in the hundreds of thousands in Taiwan. If sales of the debut album were good, she will return to Singapore to promote the album, following the well-trodden path for many Singapore singers, from the very successful to those who have failed. In late 2004, Kong left Singapore for Taipei to prepare for the launch of her very fi rst album, which was issued one year later. Since the 1960s, Singapore has had no fi lm industry. In the mid- 1990s, occasional independent fi lms of varying quality were produced; notably two fi lms which featured the ‘underbelly’ of Singapore society, Meepok Man (1995) and 12 Storey (1997), by director Eric Khoo made it to international festival circuits. Khoo has established his own production

3 Mandarin music has long been dominated by romantic ballads, in part because the language is difﬁ cult to set to rock music. However, in recent years, some Taiwanese singers have adopted Hip Hop or Rap rhythms to Mandarin lyrics with great popularity, see Seck F.Y.Y. (2004).

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company and has since backed some young fi lm makers, most notably Royston Tan, whose fi lms, such as 15 and 4:30, straddles art-house and commercial release. On a commercial scale, with the establishment of Raintree Pictures, a subsidiary of the government-owned media enterprise, MediaCorp, production has become more frequent, although still small in number. As a sign of increasing economic stability and security, fi lm studies are no longer a no-go area for young Singaporeans and a new crop of documentary fi lm makers is emerging at the beginning of the 21st century. They include Tan Pin Pin, whose fi lm Singapore Ga Ga has gone on the international festival circuit and Grace Phan, whose documentary of Timor Leste A Hero’s Journey won the Amnesty International’s award for Movies that Matter, in 2006. The fi lm director who has benefi ted most from the fl edgling fi lm industry is the television-comedian-turned-fi lm-director, Jack Neo, who, at his best, has been able to critically thematise the struggles of lower income strata Singaporeans. His best received fi lms are those which feature the predominant use of the Chinese language, Hokkien, with a mixture of Mandarin and English. With the banning of all Chinese languages other than Mandarin in broadcast media, Hokkien, like other Chinese languages, has become and remains a language of the economically, socially and culturally marginalised.4 Hokkien is, therefore, the ideal vehicle for depicting the lives of the lower income Singaporeans, amidst an affl uent national economy with First World incomes and living standards. Neo’s fi lms refl ect the daily life of the local audiences; consequently, he has been the only director whose movies consistently make a profi t at the local box offi ce. Neo’s fi lms have also a modicum of success with audiences in the region, particularly Malaysia, which shares many cultural similarities and continuities with Singapore. His fi lm I Not Stupid, about the very stressful life of a group of academically low- achieving primary school students from different family backgrounds, was particularly successful in Hong Kong because it resonated with the competitive education there. It was well received as a fi lm about the importance of ‘education,’ in contrast to it being perceived, by a

4 Hokkien, also known as Minnan has been adopted by Taiwan independenists as the ‘Taiwanese’ language; for a comparative analysis of the ideological and political position of Hokkien/Minnan in ﬁ lms see Chua (2003).

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signifi cant segment of the Singapore audience, as a fi lm which is critical of the Singapore government’s education policies.5 The regional signifi cance of Raintree Pictures is its collaboration in fi lm production with other individuals and industry players, through joint ventures, co-productions or direct fi nancing with participants in the pan-ethnic Chinese segment of the East Asian popular culture. Some of the more notable box offi ce successes are the three-fi lm series Infernal Affairs, a Hong Kong-based detective thriller, and the two episodes of a ‘ghost’ story genre, The Eye. In each of these series, the writers, directors and actors were drawn from the region, rather than exclusively from one location. Signifi cantly, no Singaporean actors appeared in these box offi ce successes, signalling that these fi lms were more profi t-motivated commercial transactions, rather than motivated by the desire to train and promote Singaporean artistes and develop the local fi lm industry. In a different mode of regional collaboration, in 2005, Raintree produced local director, Kelvin Tong’s The Maid, a ghost story set within the annual ‘Hungry Ghost’ festival observed by Singaporean Chinese. It starred a popular Filipino actress, Alessandra De Rossi, as the Filipina domestic maid, who was destined to be sacrifi ced by her Singaporean Chinese employer. In all these endeavours, Raintree operates as a business enterprise, with an eye on box offi ce, rather than nationalist sentiments in promoting Singaporean content. In contrast, the Singapore Film Commission and the Media Develop- ment Authority are directly involved in promoting the media industry of Singapore and they have taken steps to promote the fl edgling Singapore fi lm industry in European fi lm festivals and markets, including a week of screening of Singapore fi lms at the Cannes Film Festival in 2006 and supporting Singapore fi lms that have been selected for screening and competition in the Festival. What the future holds for this fl edgling industry is too early to tell. Of all the popular culture media, local television programme production is the most active in Singapore. The prime-time slots of the two free-to-air Mandarin language channels are dominated by locally

5 The other noted Singaporean director is Eric Khoo who has successfully produced two ﬁ lms, Mee Pok Man and 12 Storeys, for the international festival and art house circuit; for a local comparative reading of the ﬁ lms of Neo and Khoo, see Chua & Yeo (2003).

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produced drama series, variety shows and local interest programmes.6 There are at least three one-hour drama serials on the two channels every weekday evening. The content is decidedly local and consistently retains the highest audience ratings among Singaporeans. These drama serials generally centre on family drama, much like those in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea. However, in spite of the relatively ‘similar’ programme contents, Singapore has not been successful in marketing its drama series elsewhere in East Asia. Distributors in Singapore suggest that this is largely due to the inferior quality of Singapore programmes, in scripting, acting, costumes and locations, caused by low budgets, compared to those of the other three locations. The weakness of the scripts, however, is not simply technical nor ﬁ nancial but also cultural. Under the paternalistic and watchful eye of the long-governing PAP government, local media is prohibited from reporting alternative lifestyles, such as gays and lesbians. Violence is rare but, when it happens, the news coverage ‘sanitises’ it by withholding any visual images—one will only see where the blood has stained the ground, rather than the body that has been injured or otherwise violated. Although there are extremes in incomes and standards of living, these social and economic inequalities are not paraded by the rich in public. There is no ‘society’ page in the daily newspapers; the glitzy parties of the rich are only photographed and reported in low circulation local versions of foreign magazines, such as Bazaar. The local culture is one of middle-class ‘homogeneity,’ one which is ideologically preferred and promoted by the government, with the assistance of the mass media, including television drama programmes. Without edginess of any kind, the drama serials are bland to non Singaporeans but appeal to locals, perhaps because it is a mirror for Singaporeans themselves, especially since these serials are quick to incorporate government policies into their scripts. Since early 2000, as an attempt to secure portions of the regional market, the television stations have initiated various modes of collaboration with Hong Kong and Taiwan artistes and production companies: Hong Kong actors and actresses star in Singapore studio produced

6 The format of the variety shows have increasingly adopted that of Taiwanese programmes, which, in turn, has borrowed from Japan—with zany, rapid-ﬁ re speaking hosts and hostesses, whose entire focus is to make fun of, and even embarrass, the participants on the show, in front of the studio audience.

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programmes, with Singaporeans playing support roles;7 Singaporean actors are placed as co-stars with Chinese actors from Hong Kong, Taiwan or PRC in a drama series; fi nally, Singaporean actors/actresses may be placed in a joint production fi lmed outside Singapore. In all these collaborative instances, Singapore’s artistes tend to take second place in the programme, as if they are apprentices to the other ethnic Chinese stars, vicariously sharing some of the popularity of the latter. Meanwhile, steady streams of family drama programmes from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea continue to be imported and screened after 10 pm till early morning. All programmes that are not originally in Mandarin are dubbed.8 Hong Kong series have had a constant presence since the beginning of television broadcast in the early 1960s. In the early to mid-1990s, Japanese series dominated and since the early 2000s, Korean series are the most watched. Channel U, which started broadcasting in 2000, acquired the rights of a store of the earlier Korean series and released these from the very beginning of its broadcast. After familiarising the Singaporean audience with the earlier series, it released the hugely popular Autumn in My Heart, the fi rst in a trilogy, which included Winter Sonata and A Scent of Summer. The strategic use of Korean drama series worked well for Channel U: they enabled it to capture and establish an audience quickly.9 With the amalgamation of the two television companies, MediaCorp and MediaWork in 2003, Channel U has become even more dependent on drama series imported from the rest of East Asia. As a consequence of the closure of its own studios, daily broadcasts have been reduced to less than 12 hours on weekdays, of which, frequently, up to half is imported dramas or variety shows, particularly from Taiwan.

7 In 2002–3 was the courtroom drama series, Innocently Guilty, an oxymoronic trans- lation of the Chinese title There Are Fair Weather Days in the Law (Fa nei you qiang tian), a reference to the generalised Chinese belief that the court is to be avoided at all costs. It stars the Hong Kong actress, Anita Yuen. 8 Signiﬁ cantly, in movies, Taiwan, Korean and Japanese movies are not regular features. However, some of the popular Korean and Japanese movies, along with the more ‘art-house’ ﬁ lms, have been featured on Wednesday nights on the also free-to-air arts channel, Art Central. 9 In contrast, the English language channel, Channel i, launched six months after Channel U, by the same company, failed miserably in its attempts to establish an audience through its own in-house, locally produced programmes. Its production studio shut down after two years and the channel switched to broadcasting predominantly imported programmes from the West, and subsequently shut down completely.

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Like audiences elsewhere in East Asia, imported programmes from the region have become part of the daily television diet of Singaporeans (Chua, 2004). As a result, the Singapore popular culture sphere is very well integrated into the regional East Asian popular culture. In addition to the above mentioned collaboration with regional players in ﬁ lm and television, the most popular Mandarin music station, 93.3 FM, dedicates hours to Japanese and Korean pop music weekly and uses the voices of different Chinese singers to repeat its advertising tag-lines throughout the day. Singers from the entire Chinese subset of East Asian popular culture are increasingly incorporated into local entertainment events: the annual Golden Melody Awards includes contestants from all the locations with predominantly ethnic Chinese population—People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore—although there is a set of awards reserved exclusively for Singaporean artistes. Finally, beyond broadcasting, the annual National Kidney Foundation and the Ren Ci Hospital fund-raising television variety shows now invite actors, singers and other artistes from Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC to perform. In sum, Singaporean Chinese popular culture may be said to have rather seamlessly incorporated the entire Chinese sub-set of East Asian popular culture into its own site and space. Here, like every aspect of Singaporean economy, Singapore needs the rest of Asia, even if the rest of Asia does not need Singapore.

III The Irony of Culture Promotion: Theatre as Politics

Under the government’s concerted effort to create a Singapore with a vibrant artistic and creative community as essential to the next phase of economic growth, the fl ourishing of the arts in Singapore has an ironic political twist. As mentioned above, the NAC has been set up to channel funds to deserving artists and artistic institutions. Among the benefi ciaries are local theatre companies, which have been given highly subsidised offi ce and performing spaces and fi nancial assistance in specifi c projects. In addition, a few theatre companies have been given sustained annual grants, enabling their directors to fi nally earn a decent wage. Signifi cantly, while the arts have been incorporated into the government’s economic developmental calculus, they do not prove to be easily digestible. Art, whether visual, performance or in other modalities, has the privilege of being the arena, in which the complexities of social life

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are examined, issues raised and boundaries of conventions tested and transgressed. Visual artists and theatre groups have been able to push the limits of mainstream ideological concepts that are propagated by the government. At their most signifi cant, such efforts challenge the often reductionist offi cial defi nitions of an increasingly complex social reality. Such testing of ‘offi cial’ reality resonates deeply with a Singaporean public that has always seen itself as ideologically suppressed. The tensions between the artistic community and the sponsoring State as politics of the arts are played out very explicitly at the level of censorship. At every instance in which an art object or aesthetic practice pushes conventional ideological boundaries, some government agency is being publicly tested. If the relevant authorities ignore the challenge and let the artistic criticism pass without comment, it is tantamount to liberalising the specifi c area of cultural practices and social life, within which the criticism is insinuated, such as homosexuality, life within a particular ethnic community or the alienation of youth. If the same authorities choose to suppress the display of the art-object or try to enforce modifi cation, then, they show their repressive hands in censorship and, by extension, disclose the repressive mechanisms of the State, thereby calling attention to the issue at hand and raising public interest and debate. Hence, in spite of its ideological and moral conservatism, the PAP government has become increasingly reluctant to exercise censorship in the aesthetic sphere.10 As of the early 1990s, established theatre groups no longer have to submit their scripts for censorship clearance. This, however, is a double- edged sword, because, while the exemption is a measure of freedom, it is also an invitation to self-censorship as a means of retaining the ‘trust’ of the State authorities. Nevertheless, many of the hitherto suppressed topics have been aired publicly in local theatre: violence against women in the households, gay and lesbian lifestyles and anguish, AIDS, nudity, specifi c instances of political repression, racism, intensifi cation of the human cost of high economic growth, memories of victims of the Sec- ond World War. In most of these instances, every little governmental

10 Of course, rumours abound of the government banning books that are critical of the PAP government, when the absent of circulation of such books are the self-censoring acts of book distributors, who do not want to get into trouble with the government.

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intervention immediately engendered public debate.11 The same is true, although, less frequently in the case of the visual arts. In response to the greater artistic freedom in theatre performances, segments of society that see themselves as targets and chastised by specifi c plays are beginning to protest, to ‘fi ght’ back. The freedom of the arts and the protest of its targeted individuals and groups have engendered new developments in civil society politics, with the government seeing a need to maintain, for want of a better phrase, ‘social peace.’ The recent instance of the banning of the play Talaq (Islamic word for divorce) illustrates this. Talaq, a monologue, is composed from “true life experiences of voice- less minority Indian (Tamil) Muslim women in Singapore. It explores the issue of adultery, marital violence and rape, oppression and culture of silence forced upon these women by their kith and kin, dominant males and community” (Thenmoli, 2001: 188).12 It was fi rst staged in the Tamil language, on 24 December 1998, to rave reviews.13 Issues emerged when it was staged a second time three months later: the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (Majlis Ugama Islam Singa- pura, MUIS) had expressed concerns regarding parts of the play and the South Indian Jamiathul Ulama (SIJU) called on the authorities to ban the production. The rumblings turned into an uproar, when the theatre group, Theatre of Fire (Agni Kootthu), applied for a public entertainment license to stage the play in English and in Malay, separately, in October 2000. Aware of the earlier protests of the two Muslim organisations, the NAC ‘requested’ a preview, before it advising the Public Entertainment Licensing Unit (PELU), a unit of the Police Department, whether to grant the permit to stage the play.14 On the appointed preview evening, Theatre of Fire’s president, Ms S. Thenmoli, objected to the presence of

11 For a very comprehensive survey of the issues that have been explored on the stage by theatre groups in Singapore, see Peterson (2001). 12 The press coverage and the various statements of the personalities and agencies surrounding the banning of the play have been collected in the inaugural issue of Forum On Contemporary Art and Society (FOCAS), published by The Necessary Stage, a theatre company that is active in social commentary through theatre. The substantive portion of this section draws heavily from these documents. 13 Tamil, a south Indian language, is the language spoken by the majority of Singapore’s Indian population and one of the four ofﬁ cial languages of the country, along with Mandarin, Malay and English. 14 It should be noted that in 1999, the NAC had funded the publication of the play in English and Tamil and the second staging of the play.

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two men from the council of SIJU, who were not regular members of the Drama Review Committee of the NAC. Consequently, the preview was cancelled and the license to perform denied on grounds of ‘religious sensitivities.’ The theatre company decided to video-tape a full-dress rehearsal at the theatre space, ostensibly for archival purposes. This was denied by the NAC, which is the landlord of the theatre premise. When the theatre group refused to vacate the premises, Thenmoli was arrested, but was released after several hours without criminal charges.15 Like other instances of censorship, this instance was immediately shifted out of the artistic community into the larger public sphere by local and international media.16 This particular banning provides an opportunity to examine the learning process of civil society activists and government agencies in a liberalising public sphere, which is itself a consequence of the State’s promotion of culture and the arts. As a national institution, the NAC cannot escape the conventional sensitivities of national political and ideological sentiments, which has always included avoidance of race and religious issues. It should be said, that having earlier provided funding for the publication of the play in English and Tamil, the NAC had no desire to ban the play. It had invited the members of the two Muslim religious organisations to the preview, in hope of arriving at a satisfactory arrangement that would allow the play to be staged and the Muslim organisations appeased. Thus, it could be said that the NAC was forced to recommend banning, by the theatre group’s uncompro- mising resistance to the attendance of the men from the Indian Muslim organisation, as it perceived that their presence would lead either to serious censorship or to outright banning of the play.

15 The arrest was reported in the BBC news and other international media, which tend to read this instance as yet another occasion of the repressive nature of the PAP government; see FOCAS. 16 Another important instance in the annals and collective memories of the artistic community was the Fifth Passage Gallery all night festival held on New Year’s Eve of 1993, in which an actor turned his back to the very thin audience and snipped some of his pubic hair during a performance, as a gesture of protest against the then frequent harassments of gays by the police. The actor, Josef Ng, was subsequently ﬁ ned $1,000 for obscenity but, more importantly, was banned from performing in Singapore for life, although the legality of this life-long ban was unclear and never challenged in court. He now performs in Thailand. The events and related issues of artistic freedom, censorship, democracy and liberalism surrounding this instance are well documented in the collection of essays edited by Sanjay Krishnan et al. (1996).

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The eventual banning of the play unavoidably subverted both the credibility of NAC, as an arts supporting agency, and of the government’s national project of promoting culture. It also affected the hitherto positive publicity the efforts of the government had reaped in changing the image of Singapore as a ‘cultural desert’ and a repressive nation into a culturally ‘vibrant’ city. In the end, the losses were borne by:

a) the NAC, which came out of the episode as a ‘bad’, repressive agency, b) the Theatre of Fire, because its play was banned, and c) the theatre-attending public, who were deprived of seeing the play and learning about one of the dark sides of Singapore society.

The only winners are the conservative religious organisations, particularly the SIJU. This episode reﬂ ects the nascent state of the development of civil society politics in Singapore. During the negotiations prior to the banning, the theatre company president, Thenmoli (2001a: 185), took up the issue of representation and insisted on women being represented on the review committee. The NAC, having itself not thought of this, should have conceded to the demand. However, like most government agencies that have long operated under the illiberal PAP regime, the NAC was, and is still, learning about representative politics. This led to it being forced by Thenmoli’s insistence on women representation to recommend banning the play. From this episode, it is clear that government agencies and civil society organisations still have much to learn about the politics of representation, difference and pluralism and about developing negotiation skills and the spirit of tolerance, and even, of compromise. Such political developments are important in a larger political arena, that is completely dominated by the single party, which has governed Singapore since 1958 without signiﬁ cant parliamentary opposition. Ironically, such developments are results of the same government’s economically motivated promotion of culture and the arts as an essential ingredient in the next phase of economic development as a mature capitalist economy.

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IV Conclusion

Decades of rapid and sustained economic development has propelled Singapore from an undeveloped declining economy without any signifi cant industrialisation to a mature capitalist economy. At the dawn of the 21st century, Singapore has moved into the league and arena of mature capitalist economies. It now faces economic challenges, that are very different from those of a nascent industrialising economy. The new developmental directions that the Singapore government has embarked on are in the areas where ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ drive economic productivity and growth. These include industries driven by speed of information fl ows and exchanges, such as international fi nance and banking, by high-end computer mediated processes and communication, such as medical imaging processes and, by very capital intensive scientifi c researches in biosciences and material sciences. In many of these industries, being the fi rst is absolutely essential to gain ‘fi rst mover advantage’ in highly competitive enterprises. There is, therefore, intense competition among nations for the globally marketable, skilled professionals in these areas. With its very substantial economic resources, the Singapore government has been able to jumpstart many developments in all these new enterprises, either directly fi nancing the research or in joint venture with foreign companies or in providing the most conducive and economically benefi cial conditions for foreign enterprises to set up their operations in Singapore. In this global competition, the Singapore government believes that a vibrant contemporary cultural scene is an important ingredient in making Singapore attractive to the globally marketable professionals. This, among other interests such as the tourism industry and the cultural development of Singaporeans themselves, has spurred the generally tight-fi sted PAP government, under the immediate past Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, to embark on the development of ‘culture and the arts’ in an otherwise widely- known, arid cultural environment which, was governed by too many restrictions and censorship laws. Since the early 1990s, many institutions for the arts have been established under a new Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts. In the fi rst fi ve years of the 1990s, annually about S$1 billion was earmarked for developing infrastructure, training, scholarships and other fi nancial support for aspiring and practicing artists and arts organisations. With such concerted efforts, the arts and culture scene in Singa- pore has undergone a very signifi cant transformation, a development

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that is recognised by both locals and international travellers and jour- nalists. It can thus be said, without too much exaggeration, that the PAP-Singapore government has relatively successfully incorporated contemporary arts into its economic and social administration and policies. What is equally signifi cant is that this relatively successful incorporation also has some unintended consequences. The promotion of the arts cannot be done without simultaneously loosening up the administrative restrictions and moral censorship that have been in place for the past 30 years and rationalised by the need to maintain social harmony, for the sake of economic growth. Consequently, many, but by no means all, of the restrictions and strict censorship regulations have been removed. This has resulted in very much expanded spaces for artistic expression, which, as in the very character of aesthetic practices, regularly challenge the offi cial construction of social reality. This has very directly contributed to the opening up of the cultural sphere, not only in professional artistic circles, but also in popular culture production and consumption. It has thus contributed to destabilise the offi cial version of the Singaporean ‘reality’ and introduced new public intervention and discussion on social issues, under the unchanging political structure of the single-party dominant parliamentary system, fashioned single-handedly by the long ruling PAP. In sum, the liberalisation of the cultural sphere has, until now, not affected the iron-clad control that the PAP has over the political arena and this is unlikely to change in the conceivable future.

References

Chia, K.H.K. (2002) Selling a World-Class Act: Tourism and the arts in Singapore unpublished Masters thesis, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. Chua, B.H. (2004) “Conceptualizing an East Asian Popular Culture” in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 5 (2): 200–221. —— (2003) “Taiwan’s future/Singapore’s past: Hokkien ﬁ lms in-between” in Chua Beng Huat (ed.), Life is Not Complete without Shopping, Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 156–166. Chua, B.H. and Yeo, W.W. (2003) “Cinematic critique from the margins and the mainstream” in Chua Beng Huat (ed.) Life is Not Complete without Shopping, Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 177–189. Kwok, K.-W. & K.-H. Low (2002) “Cultural policy and city state” in Diane Crane, Nobuko Kawashima & Ken’ichi Kawasaki (eds) Global Culture: Media, Arts, Policy and Gobalization. London: Routledge, pp. 149–168. Krishnan, Sanjay et al. (1996) Looking at Culture. Singapore: Artres Design and Com- munications.

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Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA) (2000) Renaissance City Report: Culture and the Arts in Renaissance Singapore, Singapore: MITA. Peterson, W. (2001) Theatre and the Politics of Culture in Contemporary Singapore, Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press. Seck, F.Y.Y. (2004) Defying Oppression: New myth builders of the Chinese pop music industry, unpublished Bachelor thesis, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. Thenmoli, S. (2001) “Intimidated by the National Arts Council” in Forum On Contemporary Art and Society, 1: 182–187, edited letter to the Arts Community e-group.

TONG_f11_225-246.indd 245 2/7/2008 7:21:32 PM TONG_f11_225-246.indd 246 2/7/2008 7:21:32 PM CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: SOCIAL ORDER, RISK AND THE ‘GOVERNMENTAL PROJECT’

Narayanan Ganapathy

The task of this paper is to ‘make sense’ of the inter-relationships between socio-political context, criminological theory, criminal justice policy, speciﬁ c institutional practices and wider strategies of social control in Singapore. Central to the analysis will be a critical grasp of the varying deﬁ nitions of and discourses on the nature of ‘risk’, in what Garland (1994) has termed the ‘governmental project’: the institutional licensing of ‘experts’ by the State to offer authoritative knowledge on ‘risk information’ involving various forms of coercion (Foucault, 1977). From this starting point, certain key questions emerge: what is the relationship of crime prevention and crime control to the maintenance and transformation of social order? What is the relationship between criminological theory and criminal justice’s response to the problem of crime? In tandem with the themes raised in this book, social policy on crime has been primarily conceptualised as constituting the criminal justice response to the phenomenon of crime.

I Singapore Criminal Justice System in Context

The experience of political and social upheavals in the immediate pre-independence and post-independence years effected major changes on the Singapore State, particularly on its social control apparatus. The period marked the intensification in the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) and the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1955 to ensure an orderly transition to eventual independence. While the latter primarily empowered the executive to incarcerate the common criminal indeﬁ nitely, the former, which has its roots in the Emergency Regulations of 1948 introduced by the British in Malaya and Singapore, dealt with the problem of communism, subversion, and racial and religious extremism. These regulations allowed the police to arrest anybody suspected of having acted or being likely to act in a way that could threaten security, without evidence or warrant, hold them incommunicado for investigation and detain them indeﬁ nitely without

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the detainee ever being charged with a crime in a court of law. The chief priority of the criminal justice system then was to address public order offences. The use of the ISA and Criminal Law Act was primarily designed to contain the twin problems of communism and commu- nalism, and the violence associated with Chinese secret societies in Singapore, which rose phenomenally in the immediate post-war period (Narayanan, 1995). The Maria Hertogh riots of December 1950, the 1964 communal riots between the Malays and the Chinese in Singapore sparked off during a religious procession on the birthday anniversary of the Prophet Mohammed, and the 1969 race riots in Kuala Lumpur are reminders of the traumatic origins of Singapore, underscoring the need for robust formal and informal control institutions to ensure social order in the newly formed multi-racial and multi-religious State. The national priority of economic and political stability was diffused into the ideology and practice of the criminal justice system, in the aftermath of Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965. The modern criminal justice system in Singapore, as an ex-colony, is based on the British model of law and jurisprudence. Many of the functions, which the police perform, are similar to those of the British criminal justice system: prevention of crime and disorder and preservation of public peace (for community security), and protection of life, property and personal liberty (for individual security). Section 8 of the Police Force Ordinance of 1958 outlines the Singapore Police Force’s role as maintaining law and order, preserving public peace, preventing and detecting crime, and apprehending offenders. In a survey of the existing literature on comparative policing systems, Reiner (1995) suggests that two aspects make it possible to identify four ideal types of policing models, which are based upon “the respective place of societal goals and political aims in the functioning and organisation of a policing system” (Loubet del Bayle, quoted in Monjardet, 1995: 49). The four models are:

a) a ‘minimal’ policing model where the societal and political dynamics that inﬂ uence it are equally weak, b) an ‘arbitrational’ model where these two dynamics are equally strong, c) a ‘community’ model where a strong societal dynamic dominates a weak political dynamic, and d) an ‘authoritarian’ model where a strong political dynamic dominates a weak social dynamic (Monjardet, 1995: 49).

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The Singapore model of policing is akin to the ‘authoritarian’ typology: its centralisation under the direct and almost exclusive authority of the executive power makes it a State police. As a consequence of this direct connection with the political, it is characterised, a) by an orientation dominated by an absolute priority to order maintenance in police missions, and b) immortalised by the Internal Security Department (ISD), by a function of political policing, ‘high policing’ in Brodeur’s (1983) terms. Such a police function is institutionally and explicitly attributed to maintaining a particular conception of social order, and one that, proactively yet insidiously, intervenes through the observation and analysis of the domestic political arena. The Singapore State’s credence in prioritising order over justice—as witnessed in the various detention orders and the perceived limited transparency that such a process offers through the work of the Criminal Law Advisory Committee, Criminal Law Review Board and the ISA Advisory Board—underscores a police role that regards order-maintenance as its primary objective. Given the paternalistic and authoritative regime (Chan, 1996) of the Singapore State, it is extremely diffi cult, if not, impossible to detach crime and criminal justice data from the broader social, economic and political contexts, and sieve out the theoretical relevance of separating issues of ‘crime’ from ‘crime control’ (Beirne & Nelken, 1997). It is thus useful to contextualise any investigation into, and appreciation of, the ‘crime problem’ in relation to the sources and constructions of knowledge on the nature and extent of crime, as well as specifi c objectives of crime control in particular socio-historical periods. This becomes especially important in the Singapore context, as the State is the only entity that has the legitimate authority and moral mandate to collate and communicate crime data to its citizenry (Narayanan, 2005). In the absence of alternative sources of knowledge to offi cial statistics, compounded by the paucity of literature on crime in Singapore, knowledge of the ‘crime problem’ and issues of ‘crime control’ remain primarily State-defi ned and ideologically circumscribed. Yet, despite the authoritarian character of the Singapore state, it is equally important to acknowledge that its model of formal policing attests to the Anglo-Saxon model of ‘community’ policing based on the idea of ‘policing by consent’ (Reiner, 1985). This categorisation, fundamentally fl ows from the assumptions that policing in Singapore is:

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a) high on accountability, b) undertaken with public consent, which does not mean acquiescence but a broad tolerance, indicating a satisfaction with the helping and enforcement roles of policing; its organisational structure allows the public to express their policing wants and needs, and c) last but not least, the Singapore Police Force’s (SPF) professional culture is epitomised by the ofﬁ cer on the street, close to his community and patrolling his beat with the consent of the general public.

The 40% of citizen-initiated arrests in the major crimes of outraging of modesty, robbery, housebreaking, motor-vehicle theft, rape, and murder for the year 2005 (Singapore Police Force, 2006), and the apparent success of community policing (Quah & Quah, 1987; Bayley, 1989), could be attributed to the ‘community’ model of policing adopted by the government.

II ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’: The Deterrent Model of Justice

The Singapore State’s credence in prioritising order over justice is best exemplifi ed in the crime control model of justice (Packer, 1968), which drives the operation of the criminal justice process, as opposed to the ideals of due process. The crime control model operates on the assumption that the primary purpose of criminal process is to repress crime and, therefore, endorses procedures that effi ciently screen suspects, determine guilt and secure appropriate punishment for those convicted of crime. In contrast, the organising matrix of the due process model is the proposition that the State has to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt to a judicial tribunal, by overcoming evidential and procedural obstacles. While the crime control model favours extra-judicial and administrative procedures, that will expedite the securing of the conviction of a suspect, the due process model is concerned to minimise the possibility of investigative powers such as arrest, detention and questioning being misused, or used oppressively. The salience of a crime control perspective is compellingly captured in the Central Narcotics Bureau’s (CNB) drug enforcement policy of entrapment. Entrapment is a policy, which is often used, when enforcement agencies receive intelligence about an individual committing an offence, but against whom the securing of material evidence is diffi cult.

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The policy came under scrutiny recently, when a medical doctor was lured into selling illicit drugs to undercover drug agents, whom he had met over a chat line (Straits Times, 9 June 2006). Arrested and prosecuted for the charge of drug possession, the doctor was eventually found guilty and sentenced to eight months in jail and eight strokes of the cane. Unlike countries such as US, Australia, Canada and Great Britain, where evidence gathered through entrapment is illegal, evidence obtained through any method of entrapment is lawful in Singapore. While both the chairman of the Law Society’s Criminal Practice Committee and the president of the Association of Criminal Lawyers expressed ‘discomfort’ over the continued reliance of enforcement agencies on entrapment methods, they conceded that “reform in Singapore may take awhile . . . and in the meantime judges can indicate in their verdict their dissatisfaction with the current entrapment laws, in the hope of inspiring legislative change . . . as for the judiciary, their hands are tied as the law is very clear” (Straits Times, 9 June 2006). Two other notable laws with a strong bias toward crime control are the Misuse of Drugs Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act, which operate on the basis of the presumption clause, in that a person is deemed guilty unless otherwise proven. For example, in the case of the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA), the law does not distinguish between drug traffi cking and drug possession, as any person found to have the proscribed drug in his/her possession is deemed to be involved in traffi cking. In other words, the onus to prove innocence resides with the accused, while the infallibility of the prosecution process is beyond doubt. The execution of these laws invariably raises other important related considerations, such as access to legal resources during police investigation, protection of civil liberties, adherence to principles of due process, and, last but not the least, the contestation between administrative (executive) prerogatives of effectiveness and effi ciency and the ideals of legal justice. An important variant of the crime control model, which has made signifi cant inroads into the local criminal justice policy, is seen in the police adherence to the Social Disciplinary Model of Policing (McCon- ville & Mirsky, 1995; Choongh, 1998), where it eschews concern for both legal and factual guilt, concentrating instead on the task of subjugating certain groups, who are viewed as anti-police and can pose a potential threat to public order. From the outset, these cases are defi ned as police rather than criminal cases, where policing is not geared towards enforcement of the criminal law but towards the achievement of police-defi ned

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objectives. In researching street corner gangs in Singapore, Narayanan & Lian (2002) document how the social disciplinary model is expounded in the way the police exercised authority over working-class ethnic minorities, who are disproportionately represented in street corner gangs. Street corner gangs are considered by the police as a ‘problem population’ of the criminal underworld and, therefore, merit particular attention in the form of stop and search practices, detention without trial, detention in police stations, ‘questionings,’ ‘status degradation ceremonies,’ extracting deference and infl icting summary punishment (Narayanan & Lian, 2002: 141). This exposing of an alternative ‘communicative’ feature of the criminal justice system, one that is designed to communicate police contempt for a particular social category, and to demonstrate that the police have absolute control over those who may challenge the right of the police to defi ne and enforce ‘normality’ (Choongh, 1998: 626), is also witnessed in the recent introduction of a police ‘curfew’ on youths below the age of 17 who hang out in public places after 11 pm (Straits Times, 17 February 2006). According to the police, “youths found in places that are isolated from busy areas or are deserted and also in crime prone areas, and youths who are tender in age and in the company of adults other than their families or legal guardians” are identifi ed “as requiring special attention” (http://intranet.spf.gov.sg/). The police would then take the initiative to inform the youths’ parents via letters about their children’s activities and associates. The police initiative is meant to address the rising rate of juvenile delinquency, where youths, aged 19 and below, comprised 22% of the total number of all arrest cases in 2005, although they are only 15% of the total population. Although from the police perspective, such a measure was necessary to arrest the rising rate of delinquency, particularly among ‘high-risk’ children, it might spell the widening of the ‘social net’ and subsequent expansion of criminalisation contrary to the ideals espoused by the Juvenile Court in dealing with (pre)delinquents. A graver concern is the manner in which police offi cers exercise their discretion to select individuals for questioning, as the use of police powers has historically revealed a certain pattern by which it is organised, most notably, along the lines of social class and race/ethnicity. This invariably gives rise to notions of differential and discriminatory policing (Reiner, 1985; Cashmore & McLaughlin, 1991; Banton, 1964), and such an alternative ‘communicative’ feature of the justice system, stands in contrast to the

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ideals advocated by the due process model, which are concerned with the protection of the individual’s rights. The prevalence of the social disciplinary model of justice, which informs the process of plea-bargaining practices in the Singapore judiciary, is arguably responsible for the impressively effi cient clearing of backlog cases of its lower courts. Plea-bargaining, to put it simply, is a (semi) judicial process where the prosecution ‘bargains’ with the defendant to enter a guilty plea, in exchange for a reduced sentence, primarily for not having wasted the time and resources of the courts, and in cases involving ‘vulnerable victims’, for avoiding the trauma of a trial. This system of justice was fi rst documented by McConville & Mirsky (1995), when they observed how a New York City court extracted guilty pleas from defendants. Basically it involved “a highly coercive drama in which defendants are fi rst shown (by being made to watch others) that they will suffer greatly increased penalties if they refuse to plead guilty, and in which they are given their 15 seconds to accept or reject the pleas and sentences offered to them by ‘calendar judges’ ” (McConville & Mirsky, 1995). The researchers noted that the facts of the case were of little consequence to judges and lawyers, witnesses were not called to testify, and the propriety of policing and reliability of police evidence routinely went unquestioned by presiding judges. While the Singaporean court system is not as extreme as the one witnessed by McConville & Mirsky (1995), and does have suffi cient safeguards to protect the rights of the defendant, Senior Minister of State of Law and Home Affairs Ho Peng Kee’s revelation in Parliament, that the prosecution enjoyed a high success rate of 98%, and that defendants had admitted guilt before commencement of any judicial inquiry in 97% of all cases that had entered the court system between 2004 and 2006, must be critically appreciated in light of the deeply-institutionalised plea-bargaining process in the Singapore judiciary (Straits Times, 13 February 2006). The current sentencing regime in Singapore courts is largely based on judicial benchmarks and is prescribed by statutory stipulations. Geared towards attaining the penal objectives of prevention (i.e. incapacitation), deterrence (i.e. of the offender and other likely offenders [general deterrence]), retribution (i.e. just desserts) and rehabilitation, the general approach of the courts is to rely on the use of incarceration as a criminal justice tool (Steering Committee on Deterring Crime and Recidivism, 2004). Governed by a punitive-based, retributive judicial

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philosophy, coupled with the reliance on mandatory minimums (where presiding judges do not have the discretion to decide on sentencing options) and the lack of experimentation with alternatives to custody, the courts have signifi cantly contributed to the growing prison population, which stood at more than 17,000, in 2003 (Steering Committee on Deterring Crime and Recidivism, 2004). Figures from the World Prison Population List, released by Britain’s Home Offi ce in 2003, revealed that Singapore has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world, where for every 100,000 people, 359 are in prison (Straits Times, 31 March 2003), and are indicative of the premium placed on deterrence as the cornerstone of Singapore’s criminal justice system. Deterrence, as a crime prevention strategy has its roots in the work of the legal theorist Cesare Beccaria (Hughes, 1998: 26). The essence of the Beccarian thesis was to develop a rational, systematic and effi cient means of delivering justice, rather than understanding the nature of criminality. The assertion was that the control and prevention of crime lay in more rational, just and humane means of punishment and forms of preventive deterrence. This is a ‘governmental project’ as postulated by David Garland, directed at the problems of governing, by managing and regulating crime and criminals (Garland, 1994: 17–18). Although classicism offered new and humanitarian ways of addressing the issue of punishment, the Singapore criminal justice system, despite its strong affi nity to the Beccarian ideas of justice, has not broken from its traditionally retributivist perspectives on crime control, best exemplifi ed through its continued reliance on capital and corporal punishment. For example, Singapore’s legal response to drug use has become increasingly punitive since 1998, with the introduction of the Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act (Section 33A, Cap 185). Before the Act was passed, the offender could be detained for a maximum of three years at a Drug Rehabilitation Centre (DRC), without a penal record. With the amendment, an opiate user caught for the third time since October 1992, is charged in court as a ‘hardcore addict’ and sentenced to long-term detention (LTD) from 5 to 7 years, and caning of 3 to 6 strokes (known as LT1). If, upon release, the offender is caught for opiate consumption again, the drug user would be incarcerated between 7 and 13 years and caned 6 to 12 strokes (known as LT2). The introduction of harsh punishment was perceived to be responsible for the decrease in the population of DRC inmates from 8,856 in 1994 to 154 in 2004 (Straits Times, 10 September 2005). The number of arrests of illicit drug users, conversely, fell from 6,165 to 955 in the same period,

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with heroin users marking the most signifi cant fall from 5,933 to 111 (Chua, 2006). Further, penal laws, such as preventive detention, which provides the (moral) mandate for the courts to punish an offender, not for his/her last committed crime, but for a future offence the offender is likely to be committing—determined primarily through actuarial risk models—is a clear violation of the Beccarian principle on punishment being ‘proportionate’ to the harm done. Underpinning Beccaria’s work is the doctrine of free will or the capacity of each individual to control his or her life by means of rational thought and action. Alongside this doctrine is the corresponding obligation to bear responsibility for the consequences of exercising control, including full criminal liability for illegal acts. Such a view of human nature thus prescribes that the best way to prevent crime is by deterring the individual from committing crimes. “It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them. This is the ultimate end of every good legislation” (Beccaria, 1764: 93 quoted in Hughes, 1998). Corollary to Beccaria’s perspective of the state of humanity, is the overwhelmingly Hobbesian world view held by the Singaporean political elite (Narayanan, 2005), which assumes that human beings are essentially asocial, despite being able to exercise rational thought. This provides the fundamental justifi cation for the State to strengthen formal law, in order to achieve both general and specifi c deterrence (Narayanan, 2005). This Hobbesian view of the citizenry has been the rationalisation for the introduction of preventive legislation such as the Internal Security Act (ISA) and Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act. Political discourses on the possibility of another 1964 race riots, which killed 13 and injured more than 100, the 1969 race riots, the ‘Marxist conspiracy’ of May 1987, and more recently, the arrest of the local Jehammah Islamiah ( JI) cell members linked to the Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation, are cited as justifi cations for maintaining these laws, and the use of draconian, repressive powers. To queries raised by Nominated Member of Parliament, Chandra Mohan, former president of the Law Society, on the lack of transparency in the use of the ISA, Deputy Prime Minister and Co-ordinating Minister for Security and Defence, Tony Tan Keng Yam defended the ISA when he addressed Parliament on 20th of July 2004: “We will also not amend the Internal Security Act. It is necessary for Singapore now. Without the ISA, we would not have been able to disrupt the plot in December 2001. Seven car bombs—each of them with three tones of ammonia nitrate—would have been detonated instantly against the US, British, Australian and

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other embassies, some of our military camps and MRT stations. Sin- gapore will not recover from such an attack. So, to do away with the ISA would be an extreme act of foolishness” (Straits Times, 21 July 2004). Of late, the Criminal Law Act has also been mobilised to detain drug traffi ckers and loan sharks (illegal money lenders) against whom gathering testimonies and material evidence are often diffi cult. These laws are thought to exemplify the ability of the State to ensure preventive deterrence, preserve social order and provide the opportunity for its citizens to take pleasure in the perceived safety and security, for which Singapore is regarded internationally. That Singapore is an orderly, regulated and highly disciplined society, relative to Western liberal democracies, provides the basis for a ‘zero-tolerance’ attitude towards perceived acts of non-conformity. Perhaps, it is here that the most controversial aspect of its social control machinery lies, especially in its emphasis on the criminalisation of even minor public order offences and incivilities that purportedly escalate the tendencies of real crime. Critics might invoke the Durkheimian perspective and suggest that what will follow from this premise is a continuing need to further escalate and expand the defi nition of crime (possibly invent new crimes), in order to maintain the collective conscience, by constantly enforcing its moral contours and boundaries. Criminal categories in Singapore, consonant with the ‘disorder equals crime’ equation, have thus ranged from major crimes like murder, robbery, theft and rape to those minor crimes and regulations affecting individual life-styles and personal etiquette, such as personal grooming (e.g. acceptable length of hair for males), fl ushing of public toilets and even chewing of gum. The description provided by Austin (1989: 916) is illustrative: Other regulations, which were necessarily imposed due to the extreme size and density of the populations, pertain to littering behaviour. Trash dropped on the sidewalk may bring a S$500 fi ne. Spitting on the street or walkway is likewise seen as littering as well as a health hazard nuisance. The mobility of the citizen, whether on foot or in a vehicle, is highly regulated. Jay-walking may result in a S$50 penalty . . . Queuing for taxis is highly organised, and in parts of the city a taxi-driver can be fi ned for picking up passengers at any point along the road other than at a queuing station. Further examples of community regulations are prohi- bitions against fruit or fl ower picking on any public land on the island, and a curfew against noise, generally in effect after 10 p.m . . . All citizens on reaching the age of 12 years are required to be fi nger-printed and to carry offi cial identifi cation. Any change of address must be reported to

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the authorities within two weeks or the violator is subject to a S$5000 fi ne, two years imprisonment, or both . . . It is this feature of Singapore society, the image of a highly regulated and disciplined society, which is usually cited in local and international literature as contributing to a low crime rate in the city-state. Offi cial statistics relating to crime must always be interpreted with caution, before being used as assumed ‘reliable’ indictors for comparative purposes ( Jupp, 1989: 92–101). This is the case with Singapore, where offi cial statistics are a product of the Police Intelligence Department (PID). Independent studies, however, do indicate that the crime rate in Singapore is far lower than in most countries in the West and elsewhere in Asia (Clutterback, 1985; Ong, 1984; Austin, 1989; Quah, 1994). Crime statistics released by PID for the year 2002 showed that the crime rate was the second lowest in 15 years after 2001, despite a 9% increase in total seizable offences (cases where the police could effect arrest without a warrant according to Schedule Criminal Procedure Code). Total recorded crime rose to 31, 971 from 29, 077 cases in 2001. Theft and related offences constituted more than half (52.9%) of the total seizable offences, with offences in this category witness- ing an 8.6% increase from 15, 573 to 16, 920 cases in 2002. Juvenile crime—which has always been an area of concern for the police—saw a 55.8% increase in the number of juveniles arrested for the year 2002 (Straits Times, 30 November 2006).

III Expanding the ‘Social Net’: The Role of Informal Social Control

The comparatively low crime rate, which Singapore enjoys, cannot be simply attributed to its deterrent and punitive criminal justice policies, but needs to be appreciated, in terms of the State’s wider strategy to have social measures implemented to tackle what it sees as the ‘root causes of crime.” It calls for socialisation agencies and community institutions to implement broad social policies intended to promote respect for moral values and increase community solidarity, improve police/public relations, reduce criminogenic inequalities and provide diversionary facilities for ‘alienated’ youth (Heal & Laycock, 1988: 238). Strengthening socialisation agencies and community institutions is also, to a large extent, about the rejuvenation and development of

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informal social control networks in the prevention and control of crime. Fundamentally, the basic theoretical assumption, which social control subscribes to, is that anti-social behaviour is a product of anti-social conditions. Here, the legacy of the Chicago school for Singapore’s crime prevention and control policy is signiﬁ cant in three respects:

a) it provides a conceptual link between crime and socially disorganised and disadvantaged communities and suggests that the distribution of both crime and social disorganisation within communities can be inﬂ uenced by social policies formulated to alter the urban condition, b) measures against offenders should somehow seek to socialise and integrate residents, especially youths, into a shared set of norms and standards of behaviour, and c) it maintains that ordinary members of the community, community institutions and informal social control networks comprising family and kin are effective resources to accomplish this aim.

The role of the criminal justice system, thus, is in the maintenance of social order, rather than in the direct control of crime. One popular version, the ‘broken windows’ model (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), suggests that it is important for the police to intervene early in the cycle to clean up the environment and reduce incivilities—the metaphor being, that unrepaired damage encourages further broken windows (Hope & Shaw, 1988: 16). The parable suggests that if disorderly behaviour, such as that of public drunkenness or rowdy youth is not controlled, the neighbourhood enters a spiral of decline, in which law abiding citizens emigrate from the area, informal social controls weaken, and crime itself begins to rise. Police involvement in ‘order maintenance’ facilitates, in the long run, crime control and crime prevention (Young, 1994: 99). It does so by jumpstarting the informal social control system, in areas where it has broken down and which are, ipso facto, high crime areas (Young, 1994: 101). Interestingly, the concept of ‘stakeholding’ (Chua, 1997), which the cautionary ‘broken windows’ model suggests, is exempliﬁ ed in the Singapore government’s provision and conduct of its national public- housing programmes. The state’s public-housing agency, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) which started modestly as an agency entrusted with building one and two-room rental ﬂ ats for the poor in

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1961 (Chua, 1997), had, by the mid-1990s, constructed more than half a million high-rise fl ats, housing more than 87% of the 4 million population resident in the island-nation. Offered as 99-year leasehold properties to the tenants, public housing in Singapore is also an opportunity, in which every household, as stakeholders in the property market, is able to make signifi cant fi nancial gains, through buying and selling of the leases on the fl ats. This has prompted every household to participate actively with the HDB to improve, develop and maintain basic and ancillary facilities in the housing estates, with a view to enhancing the value of their property. This, in turn, has promoted the sustenance of informal social mechanisms. Consequently, formal policing emphasises its involvement in the activities of the community organisations. For example, Residents’ Commit- tees (RCs), which were formed in 1987 in public-housing estates, provide the vital social-infrastructure responsible for the police management of crime prevention and control (Ong, 1984). One of the most important developments in the course of this partnership was the establishment of the Neighbourhood Watch Zones (NWZ) described in its offi cial brochure as “an informal arrangement among a few immediate neighbours to help each other protect themselves against robbers, thieves and molesters by looking after each other’s home and well-being.” Presently, there are 546 NWZs, and more than 95% of the RCs in Singapore have adopted the NWZ Scheme (National Crime Prevention Council, 2004). Since 1997, with the launch of the Community Safety and Security Programme (CSSP) by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the People’s Association, the platform for mobilising and organising pro-active community self- help activities, has been considerably widened. Through the CSSP, members of the local community work together with enforcement agencies to identify local safety and security concerns and devise solutions to tackle these problems. In 2003, local communities, including 132 schools, have worked together with the various enforcement agencies to craft and implement over 800 CSSP projects (Steering Committee on Deterring Crime and Recidivism, 2004).

Youth and the Criminal Justice System An important constituent in the criminal justice response to crime involves the youth. The pervasiveness of the problem of juvenile delinquency, since the 1970s, has helped to heighten ofﬁ cial and media concerns over this emerging trend, although arguably, the ‘visibility’ of

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their infractions could simply be attributed to the increased deployment of criminal justice resources, or a function of changing public attitudes towards perceived acts of non-conformity by young people. Nevertheless, in view of the particularly phenomenal increase in youth crime, which saw a rise from 983 juveniles being arrested in 1984 to 2,572 in 1995, the government responded to the problem, by way of establishing the Inter-Ministry Committee on Juvenile Delinquency in 1995, to co- ordinate and implement preventive and rehabilitative measures in the family, school, and community spheres to combat juvenile delinquency (Narayanan, 2000; Steering Committee on Deterring Crime and Recidivism, 2004). In 1998, the committee widened its target scope to include youths up to 19 years of age and was re-named Inter-Ministry Committee on Juvenile Crime (IMYC). Chaired by Ho Peng Kee Senior Minister of State (Law and Home Affairs), the IMYC, consisting of members from the Ministry of Community Development, Sports and Youth, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore Police Force, National Council of Social Service, National Crime Prevention Council, Singapore Prison Service and the Subordinate Courts, managed to arrest the rising trend of juvenile crimes until 2001, since when there has been an upsurge. In 2005, for example, a total number of 4,594 youths were arrested and accounted for 22% of total persons arrested, which is a slight decrease from the 26% registered in 2004, but still higher than the proportion of the youth population in Singapore (Straits Times, 30 November 2006). The establishment of the IMYC in response to the youth problem was reminiscent of the inﬂ uential Goh Report on Education in 1979, which, amongst other things, identiﬁ ed a ‘moral crisis’ caused by a perceived increase in crime, juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, abortion and divorce rates. Typically, practitioners and politicians were once again targetting their efforts at the ‘decadent’ Western culture (Kuo & Wong, 1979), which they perceived to be responsible for the moral crisis (Narayanan, 2000). To stem the tide of moral decadence, the IMYC introduced several programmes and initiatives, some of which include the National Mentoring Network, Honorary Volunteer Special Constabularly, Peer Mediation Programme, Project Bridge, Streetwise Programme and the Guidance Programme (Steering Committee on Deterring Crime and Recidivism, 2004). The Guidance Programme is worth mentioning in detail. Formerly called the Police Caution Case Guidance programme, the Guidance programme, which was launched in 1997, is a diversionary criminal justice tool, which aims to place

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juvenile offenders, who commit petty crimes with mitigating factors, on a six-month supervision and counselling programme involving their parents. The objective of the programme is to help juvenile offenders recognise the seriousness and consequences of their actions and to acquire life skills in self-control. It also seeks to equip parents of juvenile offenders with necessary skills and knowledge in effective parenting. Upon successful completion of the programme, these juvenile offenders may be cautioned by the police in lieu of prosecution. The problem of juvenile delinquency has led to important experi- mentations with the concept of restorative justice by the Singapore judiciary, which seems to signal a shift of emphasis from retribution to rehabilitation. Fundamentally, restorative justice recognises that crime is an offence against human relationships, not the State; it stresses the repairing of harm done to victims and communities. Since the early 1990s, restorative justice has made signiﬁ cant inroads into the juvenile justice system, where community-based options have been explored for juvenile offenders, while retaining institutionalisation only as a last resort (Steering Committee on Deterring Crime and Recidivism, 2004). Alternatives to incarceration, such as Community Service Orders (CSO), Family Care Conferencing and the Home Detention Scheme, are an important step in this direction. CSO requires the offender to perform a number of hours of community service without restitution, thus allowing the offender to make amends to the community for the (private) wrong he/she has done and to develop a sense of civic consciousness. Family care conferences require the offender to meet with his/her victim, his/her own family and peers to discuss the impact of the offence and to make resolutions for the future. This initiative was “introduced to strengthen family units, empower parents and the community to regain control of the juvenile and encourage the juvenile to take responsibility of his/her behaviour” (Steering Committee on Deterring Crime and Recidivism, 2004). A Subordinate Court study of 144 cases, which underwent family care conferencing, revealed that there was a re-offence rate of only 6% in the period between 1994 and 2004, compared to the national average recidivism rate of 12.4% for the 1999 cohort of juvenile probationers (MCDS, Study on the Conduct After Probation for Cohort of Probationers discharged in 1999, 2003). The Home Detention Scheme was introduced in May 2000 to promote the re-integration of amenable offenders into society, with the help of the community. The scheme is also meant to protect ﬁ rst-time offenders and minor offenders from ‘contamination’ by hardened criminals.

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Between May 2000 and December 2003, 3,500 prisoners beneﬁ tted from the scheme, of whom 99% successfully completed the programme (Steering Committee on Deterring Crime and Recidivism, 2004).

IV The Emerging Discourse of the ‘Criminogenic’ Family

The renewed offi cial concern over the problem of juvenile delinquency after 2001, has paved way for a new preventive discourse, which subsequently found expression in the ‘correctionalist penal-welfare policy’ (Garland, 1994: 53), leading to pro-active intervention in the lives of the ‘problem population.’ In the Singaporean context, such a rehabilitative ideology has a strong political appeal, as it invites a more powerful and yet benevolently paternalistic State, to intervene authoritatively in an ever-increasing number of areas of social life. One key social institution, which came under increasing scrutiny and social surveillance, was the family, in particular, families, which were deemed ‘criminogenic’ or ‘pathological,’ because they had been identifi ed as the single cause of crime and delinquency in Singapore (Narayanan, 2002; see also Williams, 1958; Vasoo, 1973; Ngien, 1977; Miao & Kong, 1971; Woon, 1976; Kwa & Purushotam, 1974). The identifi cation of the ‘pathological’ family was propelled by the individualising discourse and growing infl uence of the ‘psy’ sciences (psychiatry and psychology) (Foucault, 1977) as well as the expansion of the medico-welfare professions—such as social work—as ‘preventive agencies’ from the late 1970s, which sought to ‘normalise’ dysfunctional families through reducing risk and increasing protective factors. Considering the importance placed on the family as ‘a source of moral values’ (Hill & Lian, 1995: 156) to promoting conformity, and ‘bearing the responsibility for socialising the children in the virtues of the rugged society’ (Kuo & Wong, 1979: 11), the family thus became an important and legitimate site of intervention, treatment and rehabilitation. The former Chief Justice’s keynote address at the Subordinate Courts 7th Work plan (1998/99) was rather illustrative: Our own analysis of available data shows that parenting practices are critical to behaviour patterns of the young and that positive parenting leads to stronger attachment to the family, lower likelihood of associating with negative peers, higher moral values and more positive attitudes towards authority fi gures. These social factors appear to be closely related to juvenile delinquency.

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This message was re-iterated subsequently by Abdullah Tarmugi, Minister for the then Ministry of Community Development and Sports (MCDS), when he declared that “the primary responsibility of instilling wholesome and socially responsible values must lie with the parents” (2000). Recognising the role families play as important gatekeepers in youth crime prevention, MCDS, together with Family Service Centres and Voluntary Welfare Organisations (VWOs), initiated a number of preventive, developmental and remedial initiatives targetted at ‘high-risk’ families. For example, the Healthy START Programme is directed at infant and pre-school children to detect and intervene early in ‘at-risk’ families, so as to reduce family stresses and potential family ‘dysfunction- ality.’ In other words, intervention in families considered ‘criminogenic’ begins at the birth of the child. Other programmes, such as the Parents’ Skill Enhancement Workshops and the Young Ones Programme, are primarily designed to equip parents with effective communication and management skills, so as to build healthy parent-child relationships. Further, persuaded by the fi ndings of two local studies, conducted by the Singapore Prisons and Save the Children of Singapore (STCS) in 2001 and 2000 respectively, that there exists a positive correlation between having one incarcerated parent and a pre-disposition to juvenile delinquency, both organisations have introduced several programmes such as the Play and Wait Programme (PAW) for children visiting incarcerated parents as well as conducted classes in effective parenting skills for inmates, in preparation for their release. In examining the academic discourse on crime in Singapore, Naray- anan (2002, 2005) noted the salience of the social control theory in explaining the delinquency problem, which gives relative importance to the family as the causative factor: “The family is considered to be the single factor most important in exercising social control over the adoles- cent” (Nye, 1964: 19). One of the most celebrated pieces of empirical research, using longitudinal designs, which indicated the important infl uence of early family socialisation and family circumstances, was provided by the Cambridge Study of Delinquent Development (West, 1982). A central aspect of its fi ndings related to the identifi cation of fi ve clusters of items, which had some statistical relationship to subsequent delinquency. They were:

a) low-income family, b) large-sized family,

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c) having parents considered by social workers to have performed their child rearing practices unsatisfactorily, d) having below average intelligence, and e) having a parent with a criminal record (West, 1982; West & Far- rington, 1973, 1977).

Social policies on the family in Singapore, refl ecting the academic discourse on crime, have been designed to not only curb the growth of the working class but also to restrict the size of each working-class family, as they are perceived to be related with crime. For example, this was achieved through the management of the Small Families Improvement Scheme, which was introduced primarily to “help low-income couples improve and upgrade themselves by keeping their families small ” (Ng, 2003). This provides cash grants for women who agreed to undergo sterilisation (Hill & Lian, 1993: 153–154). This policy refl ects the concerns of the political elite, who believe that every society has approximately 5% of its population, who are more than ordinarily endowed, physically and mentally, and that every care must be taken to ensure that this ‘elitist group’ receives the best nurturance that the State can offer (Rodan, 1996). Concomitantly, equal effort must be expended to reduce the size of the physically, intellectually and culturally anaemic population (Ng, 2003). The Small Families Improvement Scheme received further legitimation through concerns, expressed by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1993, that most drop-outs from the educational system—about 1.7% of the total cohort (Straits Times, 16 August 1993)—are from large families, living in a one or two-room Housing and Development Board (HDB) fl ats, and having parents who had not attended secondary school (Hill & Lian, 1995: 153). Limiting the size of the working- class family also refl ects a greater concern of the government that, as mediator of moral values between the State and the family, it is the middle-class or the bourgeoisie, rather than the working-class family, that will play a more effective role (Berger & Berger, 1983: 189, quoted in Hill & Lian, 1995: 157). The offi cial perception and response to the problem of crime and delinquency in Singapore raises two important issues, which need to be historically and conceptually problematised. First, the emphasis on staging proactive responses and interventionist strategies, albeit within a positivist model, into the lives of the ‘problem population,’ call for a widening of the social net, which might lead to subsequent criminalisation of previously tolerated behaviours, practices and activities

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(Cohen, 1996; Becker, 1995). The recent decision to impose a police curfew on youths found in public places after 11 p.m. is illustrative of such a concern. Further, such an imposition of values and standards are invariably linked to social class, as social and probation workers who evaluate ‘problem families’ tend to come predominantly from a middle-class background. The disproportionate representation of working-class children in the statistics on juvenile delinquency should be critically appreciated, in terms of the incompatibilities of class values and ideologies between the evaluator and those being evaluated, amongst other variables. Also, the response of the State and its agencies to crime operates on the basis of assumed benevolence. Although the intent (i.e. reversal of deviant behaviour and values) is so, the consequences of such a response may dictate worse consequences for the individual labeled as ‘problematic’ (Erickson, 1997). No statement could starkly capture such dynamics better than the words of Frank Tannenbaum in his classic work, Crime and the Community (1938): The person becomes the thing he is described as being. Nor does it seem to matter whether the valuation is made by those who would punish or by those who would reform. In either case the emphasis is upon the conduct that is disapproved of. The parents or the policeman, the older brother or the court, the probation offi cer or the juvenile institution . . . Their very enthusiasm defeats their aim. The harder they work to reform the evil, the greater the evil grows under their hands. The persistent suggestion, with whatever good intentions, works mischief, because it leads to bringing out the bad behaviour that it would suppress. The way out is through a refusal to dramatise the evil. The less said about it the better. The more said about something else, still better. Second, the almost compulsive focus on the individual deviant (and his/her family) to ‘locate’ the cause of criminality has resulted in a marked reformulation of positivism, from a social to an individual focus. For example, the identifi cation of the ‘pathological’ family propelled by the individualising discourse and growing infl uence of psychiatry and psychology, as well as the expansion of social work as ‘preventive agencies’ seeking to ‘normalise’ dysfunctional families, have served to defl ect attention from wider structural conditions, that produce criminality and radically alter the prospects for policies based on social intervention. The most the State does—which can be vaguely considered to be ‘social’ in nature—is to introduce an array of programmes, that are aimed to instill ‘good’ values and promote the quality of parent-child relationship, particularly among families identifi ed to be ‘problematic.’

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The medicalisation of social problems, which such a response denotes, has gained increasing prominence, since the late 1990s in Singapore, especially in the ‘treatment’ of juvenile offenders. It has also provided the material basis for the experimentation of certain criminal justice sanctions, such as corrective training and preventive detention (these will be discussed later). The ‘medical’ approach was most telling in the words of the Head Social Worker of Boy’s Town, an institution which caters “to orphans, fi nancially disadvantaged and ‘youth at risk,’ ” when she stated: “We are getting more challenging cases these days—for example, those with attention defi cit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defi ant disorder” (Straits Times, 25 March 2006). Such medicalisation of social problems corresponds to the orientation of the Singapore State, which, politically and ideologically, articulates itself as non-welfarist. Responding to the structural conditions of crime i.e. unemployment, income inequalities, poverty etc., requires the commitment of State funds and redistribution of tax dollars beyond what the State is prepared for, despite its commitment to reverse ‘anti-social conditions.’ In other words, responding to the structural problem of social inequality is far more problematic than merely tackling vandal- ism by technical means. Elsewhere, historically, Steven Box (1980) excellently captured this shift in criminological thinking, when he attempted to make sense of the discovery of the disease ‘hyperactivity’ in children in Great Britain: By the end of the seventies the promise of sociological positivism was either seen as counterfeit because programmes based on it failed to reduce delinquency and youthful behaviour or totally impractical because they required social reform on a scale the dominant class was quite unprepared to contemplate. Thus, whilst, lip service was still being paid to these types of programmes, there was already a preparedness to look elsewhere for alternative solutions to the delinquency problem. One of these . . . was a new version of biological determinism—the conception that delinquents and pre-delinquents were essentially ill, either mentally or, as in the case of hyperactivity, physically and organically, and required treatment, especially drug therapy.1 Interestingly, offi cial response to the ‘crime problem’ is not only individu- ated (Hughes, 1998), but tends to be politically articulated, in terms of the various ethnic/racial groups of Chinese, Malays and Indians. This is

1 Box 1980: 116–117.

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perhaps due to the perception, amongst the general public and political elite, that there are no distinct class differences in Singapore (Noordin, 1992; Benjamin, 1976). A particular advantage that the State has, by defi ning and transposing the crime problem as a predicament intrinsic to specifi c ethnic/racial communities, is to devolve the responsibility of searching for the (structural) causes of criminal behaviour and the best possible solutions to crime, which are reckoned to be ethnic/race specifi c, to the respective ethnic-based self-help organisations, namely the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC), Mendaki (for Malays) and the Singapore Indians Development Association (SINDA). Further, any construction of the relationship between ethnicity and crime also makes it possible for the State to depoliticise any criminal activity, or that of a criminal group, by merely projecting the ‘crime problem’ as constituting a peculiar ‘community’ character, thus defl ecting attention from the wider structural, economic and social inequalities, generated by State institutions and policies. The Malays, for instance, have historically been an important target in the State’s anti-drug efforts (Abdullah, 2004), “largely due to the contention that Malay addicts have the practice of taking drugs in groups on a sharing basis” (Straits Times, 21 February 1988) and who have been variously described from being “more artistically inclined and talented” to “long-haired unwashed youth in dirty clothes” (Straits Times, 25 June 1973). For example, the formation of the Malay Working Group (MWG) to steer the Malay/Muslim community’s efforts in crime prevention, and the Healthy Marriage Programme, which reaches out to Malay/Muslim teenagers and their parents to inculcate healthy values and positive views on marriage and family, allude to the fact that the problem of crime has specifi c ‘ethnic’ dimensions, which are best dealt with by the community concerned. The State, on the other hand, intervenes only when it needs to take coercive action against the ‘underclass’ of particular ethnic/racial communities, on behalf of all ‘respectable’ members of that community and that of the wider citizenry.

V Risk, Social Control and ‘Dangerousness’

The emerging idea of risk in the Singapore criminal justice arena is marked by the ascendance of what Feeley & Simon (1992) have described as the ‘new penality,’ where the objective of the criminal justice system is ‘managerial’ and not necessarily ‘transformative.’ The

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task of the criminal justice system is one of preventing the occurrence of a crime event based on risk and actuarial justice, not removing the causes of crime nor attempting to ‘normalise’ the motivated criminal. This section illustrates how the discourse of risk is articulated through the perspectives of the deterrence and incapacitation theses, where they have formed an important basis of the Singapore criminal justice system’s response to crime. Deterrence as a crime prevention strategy is about providing rational, self-interestedly calculating individuals with reasons and opportunities not to commit crime. This assumption provides the theoretical link between the Beccarian views of preventive deterrence and contemporary thinking on situational crime prevention (Young, 1994; Bottoms, 1994). Underscoring such a crime prevention policy is the notion, that the occurrence of a crime event can be prevented by structural barriers, such as through the use of CCTVs and biometrics, and greater surveillance from, for e.g. the Neighbourhood Watch Schemes. The public can prevent crime more directly and cost-effectively through ‘target hardening,’ which refers to the pro-active self-measures taken to ensure that one does not fall prey to victimisation. The potential risk of crime is thus to be managed rationally, either through the manipulation of the physical and social environment in order to deter the equally rational criminal, or through devising ‘risk aversion’ strategies initiated at the personal level. Such a conceptualisation of risk is in line with Ulrich Beck’s theory of the risk society, where there has been a shift from class society, which dealt with the problem of the distribution of wealth, to a ‘new paradigm of risk society,’ where the focus has become that of the distribution of negative risks (Beck, 1992: 19). In such a conceptualisation of society, “one is no longer concerned with attaining something ‘good’, but with rather preventing something worse”, for indeed, the “utopia of the risk society is that everyone should be spared from poisoning” (Beck, 1992: 49). The prudential human is expected to make the correct and rational choice, once given the right information by experts. The primary site of intervention of risk management is thus the individual. Kemshall (2003) notes: Citizens who do not make the desired choice are recast as imprudent and reckless, blameworthy and responsible for their own misfortune. Disadvantage and exclusion are reframed as matters of choice and not of structural processes, crime itself becomes a matter of irrational and imprudent choices.

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In his article on Crime Prevention: Singapore Style, Quah (1994) outlines the Singapore Police’s philosophy towards crime prevention as one concerned with the “anticipation, recognition and appraisal of crime risk, and the initiation of action to remove or reduce those risks.” It is therefore not uncommon for the police to sponsor slogans such as ‘Crime Does Not Pay’, ‘Pay for YOUR Crime’, ‘Do Crime, Do Time’, ‘Crime Prevention Is YOUR Responsibility’, ‘Is Your Home Burglar Proof ’, ‘Avoid Returning Home Alone’, ‘Don’t Be An Easy Target For Criminals’, ‘Are Criminals Shut Out’ and ‘Keep Your Handbags Away From Snatch Thieves’ where there is an implicit appeal to the homo prudens view of risk actors. Whether the message is intended for the would-be criminal or the potential victim of crime, there is a certain element of ‘responsibilisation’ (Kemshall, 2003) for the crime event. Not only is crime effectively depoliticised, but the responsibility for one’s security is (unequally) privatised, as each citizen is expected to assume responsibility for his safety. As Chua (2006: 42) notes: Singapore has traditionally advocated personal responsibility and meritocracy over welfarism, and instilling neurotic anxiety in the public instead of liberal values ( Jones & Brown, 1994). Singapore’s ideological orientation towards upholding ‘Asian values’, which stresses the citizen’s obligations to moral values, family ties and discipline integrates well with that of responsibilisation in crime prevention. Further, it absolves the State from addressing structural causes of crime, such as unemployment and poverty co-related to variables of class, race and ethnicity for the ‘cause’ of crime is now to be located in imprudent individuals. Although direct State coercion is reduced and individual freedom apparently espoused, micro systems of power have emerged and are exercised through the mesh of daily life: employment, family, leisure, geographical locale and the responsibilities of citizenship (Rose, 1996), where the State, paradoxically, assumes greater powers of intervention and regulation over its subjects. This is primarily achieved through the licensing of experts and technocrats to produce authoritative knowledge/discourses on the nature of criminality and how it could be best prevented. An important consequence of the modernist expert discourses of crime was the transformation in the depiction of the criminal, from a kind of folk hero preying on the powerful, to a “statistically veriﬁ able omnipresent threat to all” (Pratt, 2000: 37). By such means,

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the social enemy was transformed into a deviant, who brought with him the multiple danger of disorder, crime and madness. The carceral network linked, through innumerable relations, the two long, multiple series of the punitive and the abnormal.2 Nowhere is this more evident than in the positivist discourse on crime which will be examined next. The most infl uential paradigm in criminology, which also spawned a discourse of crime prevention institutionalised by the modern State, was founded by Cesare Lombroso. The centrality of the positivist discourse on crime is inextricably associated with the science of crime causation and prevention, based on the search for, and cure of, the ‘criminal man’ (Lombroso, quoted in Hughes, 1998: 37). The objective of the ‘Lom- brosian’ project is chiefl y that of developing a scientifi cally-informed regime for the prevention, treatment and elimination of criminality, untrammelled by classical concerns with formal egalitarianism (Hughes, 1998: 41). As Morrison (1995) notes, In ideal form positivism side-steps the issue of criminal justice . . . it substitutes concerns for social justice . . . social protection and social management . . . crime is only a symptom, an outward sign of pathology. You do not need a trial and representation by lawyers, due process is not involved: instead you require a hearing by a committee of social scientifi c experts.3 The implications of risk for the administration of the criminal justice system, which the ‘Lombrosian Project’ gives rise to, have been much discussed (Pratt, 2000; Rose, 2000; Sparks, 2000). In many jurisdictions, the modernist disciplinary agenda based upon penal-welfare techniques has been paralleled, if not replaced, by the emergence of a ‘new penality’ based on risk and actuarial justice models. For Feeley & Simon (1992; 1994), this represents a signifi cant paradigm shift from an ‘old’ penology “concerned with individual, guilt, responsibility, obligation, and the diagnosis and treatment of individual offenders to a ‘new’ penology based upon actuarial justice and acceptance of ‘deviance as normal” (Kemshall, 2003). In a rather pessimistic view of crime control, they see the role of penology as transformed from a mechanism of guilt attribution and reformation, to a merely administrative function of risk categorisation and the regulation and management of

2 Foucault 1978: 300–301. 3 Morrison 1995: 121; emphasis original.

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‘dangerous individuals.’ With the demise of the liberal reformative ideal, the containment and incapacitation of these ‘dangerous’ individuals has come to the fore. The transition from ‘old’ to ‘new’ penality and the shift from individualism to individualisation are well captured by Garland (1985): There has been a move from calibrated, hierarchical structure (of fi nes, prison, death), into which offenders were inserted according to the severity of their offence, to an extended grid of non-equivalent and diverse dispositions, into which the offender is inscribed according to the diagnosis of his or her condition and the treatment appropriate to it. Central to this shift is the use of the ‘psy’ disciplines—with the premise that criminality is an innate disorder—to assess and individuate the criminal offender, and the consequent expansion of such techniques based on risk and actuarial assessments. In Singapore, the expanding role of psychiatry in the criminal justice arena is witnessed in its contribution to identifying, explaining and even treating the ‘dangerous’ offender. Tham (2006), for example, notes that, up to 1974, all individuals charged with homicide were remanded under the custody of then Woodbridge Hospital for psychiatric examination. Such ‘psychiatrisation of crime’ (Foucault, 1978, quoted in Tham, 2006: 31) has been extended to emerging forms of ‘dangerousness’, especially with reference, in the 1980s, to sexual offenders, (Straits Times, 3 November 1986) who were identifi ed as having ‘chemical and neurological dysfunction’ (Straits Times, 20 October 1988). Since 2000, the use of both clinical and actuarial tools of risk assessment for criminal offenders has become the main tool employed by prison psychologists in the pre-sentencing, pre-release and other requested assessments of offenders and inmates. The main objective of using actuarial risk models, such as the LSI-R (Level of Service Inventory), is to offer a prediction of the offender’s general risk, which is usually expressed in terms of statistical probability of re-offending in the next two years (Tham, 2006). The ‘dangerous offender’ is not only sentenced proportionate to the crime he/she has committed, but according to the perceived degree of ‘dangerousness’ to society identifi ed, assessed and predicted in terms of its potential and latency. For example, Section 7 of the Pre-Sentencing Report on offenders, clearly attests to the importance placed on criminal recidivism: “LSI-R score places the offender in the moderate-high risk of criminal re-offending. The offender belongs to the group of prisoners with a 41% to 55%

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chance of recidivism within one year of release based on Singapore norms” (Pre-Sentencing Report 2004, Singapore Prison Service). As risk management is cost effective and calls for the optimal use of rehabilitative resources, the attractiveness of risk and actuarial justice models cannot be over-estimated. For example, advocating long-term imprisonment for habitual drug abusers who “refuse to change,” the Minister of Home Affairs, in the Second Reading of the Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill stated: So why do we have an amendment like this in our law? It is for these people who just simply refuse to change . . . rather than wasting our time . . . and CNB’s [Central Narcotics Bureau] professional resources on such people, we have decided that the only way to treat these addicts is to imprison them for a long time. The slant towards the use of custodial sentences has led to three notable penal practices in the Singapore criminal justice system, each exempli- fying the incapacitation (i.e. removal of the offender from circulation in legitimate society) rationale for punishment:

a) corrective training, b) preventive detention, and c) criminal proﬁ ling.

These penal developments operate on the basis that the offender is either incapable of rehabilitation or unable to because of his/her innate criminality, and, therefore, needs to be ‘warehoused.’ Corrective training as a strategy of crime management aims not to reform individual offenders but to redistribute the risks away from society to prison, a sentencing policy recently intensifi ed by the use of selective incapacitation, aimed at high-risk offenders and targetting the small number of persistent offenders perceived to be responsible for the majority of crimes (Halliday, 2001). According to the Steering Committee’s Report on Deterring Crime and Recidivism (2004), about 20% of criminals commit approximately 80% of all crimes. Preven- tive sentencing, including the preventive use of custody, has paralleled selective incapacitation, with sentencing driven by risk factors and not by the seriousness of the offence. In such a sentencing policy, the determination by expert witnesses (i.e. psychiatrists, probation offi cers, prison social workers) of the future risk posed by the offender, plays a signifi cant role. In 2001, Judicial Commissioner Amarjeet Singh, upon

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passing a 30-year sentence on a rapist added: “you are a very dangerous young man who needs to be kept out of circulation in the interest of the public for a long, long time” (Straits Times, 2 September 2000). This seems to echo Chief Justice Yong Pung How’s own pronouncement of maid abuser Asha Verma as a “most dangerous person who needed to be put out of business for a long time” (Straits Times, 30 June 2000). Criminal proﬁ ling has also expanded the use of risk factors in identifying likely offenders and likely criminal situations, resulting in ‘high- crime areas’ targetted for intensive policing and use of surveillance resources. This is evident in much current work on youth crime and delinquency, where the term ‘pre-delinquency’ is increasingly being used to identify and possibly segregate those juveniles, who exhibit certain ‘problematic’ symptoms, such as truancy, poor academic performance, lack of concentration in class, etc. In one of the schemes under the rubric of ‘community-policing,’ schools are known to provide the police with the list of ‘problem children’ for the latter’s targetted policing and ‘early’ intervention. The ‘scientiﬁ c’ basis upon which such a practice has been instituted, however, is not only methodologically problematic but raises important ethical issues concerning the legitimacy of such criminal justice intervention for the juvenile, who has yet to commit any violation of legal norms.

VI Conclusion

The national theme of remaining economically and politically sturdy has diffused into the ideology and practice of the modern criminal justice system in Singapore. This is particularly witnessed in the State’s credence in prioritising order over justice, which is best exempliﬁ ed in the use of the crime control model. Judicially, the current sentencing regime in the Singapore courts is primarily geared towards attaining the penal objectives of prevention and deterrence, where it has placed an emphasis on the use of incapacitation as a criminal justice tool. The logic of the criminal justice system is thought to exemplify the ability of the State to ensure preventive deterrence, preserve social order and provide the opportunity for its citizens to take pleasure in the perceived safety and security, which has come to characterise much of modern Singapore.

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The renewed offi cial concern over the problem of juvenile delinquency and the emergent ‘criminogenic’ family have paved a way for a new preventive discourse, leading to pro-active intervention in the lives of the ‘problem population.’ Such a rehabilitative ideology has a strong political appeal, as it invites a more powerful and yet benevolently paternalistic State to intervene authoritatively into all areas of social life. The identifi cation of the ‘pathological’ family, propelled by the individualising discourse of psychiatry and psychology and the expansion of social work as ‘preventive agencies’ seeking to ‘normalise’ dysfunctional families, have not only served to defl ect attention from wider structural conditions that produce criminality, but have led to a marked reformulation of positivism from a social to an individual focus. Importantly, the medicalisation of social problems, which such a shift denotes, corresponds to the orientation of the Singapore State, which politically and ideologically articulates itself as non-welfarist. The articulation of risk in the criminal justice arena, conceived either in terms of the rational management of ‘risk aversion’ strategies or identifi cation of ‘dangerous’ offenders through risk and actuarial assessments, serves a dual function in the Singapore criminal justice system to both individualise through responsibilisation of the individual and fragmentation from traditional social bonds, and to identify and objectify individuals through aggregation and classifi cation. Risk thus both individuates and objectifi es, a combination that has reduced the individual to little more than a collection of risk factors, a risk inventory to be managed. The role of penology is thus transformed from a mechanism of guilt attribution to a merely administrative function of risk categorisation and the management of ‘dangerous people.’ As the cost of changing and reforming prisoners is expensive compared to merely ‘containing’ them, the appeal of the ‘new penology’ is clearly evident.

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TONG_f12_247-278.indd 277 2/7/2008 7:36:43 PM TONG_f12_247-278.indd 278 2/7/2008 7:36:43 PM DECODING SEXUAL POLICY IN SINGAPORE

Laurence Wai-Teng Leong

I Policy Hierarchy and the Sublimation of the Sexual

The term ‘social policy’ has been conventionally associated with welfare states, which are obliged to make minimal provisions to citizens, because of the failure of the market to deliver basic services to subjects, who are disadvantaged in the social structure (Clarke, 2004). Even in countries like Singapore, which refuse the ‘welfare state’ label because of its socialist connotations and fears of public dependency on handouts, State ofﬁ cials have instituted policies to house the majority of the population, to care for the elderly, to provide for health facilities, education and community development. If social policy is connected with social welfare and social development, its components are neither universal nor all-inclusive. Every country has a ‘policy hierarchy’ in which some items are prioritised over others, and others are neglected. Because policy involves allocation of resources, such as funds to create and sustain agencies and services, a policy hierarchy reﬂ ects not just the resource-capacity of a given country, but also the political choices of decision-makers. In the ‘policy hierarchy’ of Singapore, housing is at the apex, in which political elite successfully wins consent of the electorate, by offering affordable public accommodation to over 80% of the population (Chua, 1991). The political stakes are high, when the recipients or clients of policies also constitute the voting electorate. Thus, social security through the Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions and health are matters of fundamental importance to the adult population (Ramesh & Asher, 2000). And for an ageing society, policies on the elderly are mandatory. In recent years, with the change of a new prime minister, generational outreach is deemed essential to win the younger population. Hence, the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCDYS) is a harbinger of a new proliferation of youth policies. When housing, social security, health, the aged, and youth receive the limelight, we tend to identify these as typical examples of the nation’s social policy. But a ‘policy hierarchy’ ignores, excludes or represses other

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concerns. Sexuality is a case in point. State offi cials in many countries do not clearly articulate a coherent programme that deals with sex, sexual orientation and sexual identities. Sexuality forms an indomitable part of the human project of life, regeneration, intimacy, and social connectivity, and yet, sexuality is rarely conceptualised as part of social policy. Issues of sexual health, sexual reproduction, sexual recreation, and sexual self-determination are also issues of social welfare and well- being of individuals. People do not just live in fl ats, save money and grow old; they have sexual lives, needs and wants. Besides the welfare function, social policy has an ameliorative role to prevent social problems. In Norway, the Directorate of Immigration runs cultural orientation programmes for refugees. Anthropologists are hired to counsel refugees who have sexual problems in the host country because of dislocation and changing gender norms. The sexual welfare of refugees is thus seen as part of a mental health effort to integrate them into a new society. Such an enlightened policy of catering to the sexual needs of the marginalised is unheard of in Singapore. Indeed, as this paper will show, Singapore’s social policies tend to regulate sexuality and social relations, rather than empower the sexual lives of individuals. Since sexuality is repressed in the policy hierarchy, I will attempt to excavate various sites to uncover sexual policies, in terms of their constituent elements and their rationale. The fi rst site to look for sexual policies is law. Laws that touch on sexuality in Singapore are invariably prohibitive and punitive: they do not encourage sexual expression, they do not protect individuals from discrimination on the grounds of sexuality, they do not ratify freedom of sexual association. In other words, laws on sexuality in Singapore are criminal laws, rather than civil rights laws. The criminality of sexual laws stems from the repressive model of Victorian England, where sexual codes were shaped by Christianity and middle-class conservatism (Hall, 2000). England transported these moral standards to the colonies in the form of the ‘Penal Code,’ imposed on all the Commonwealth ter- ritories. In 1991, Hong Kong removed some of these ‘sexual offences’ (except for molest and rape) from the legal statutes. On the other hand, Singapore, Malaysia, India and Sri Lanka continue to criminalise certain sexual activities between consenting adults (Laurent, 2005). Sexual policies in Singapore can also be gauged by offi cial statements made by the political elite, by police action, and by censorship efforts of media authorities. Relying on these range of sources, I will attempt to capture the elusive by drawing a picture of what sexual policies look

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like in Singapore today. My discussion will not be exhaustive, as I will exclude sexual harassment in the form of molest, rape, child sexual abuse, or sexual traffi cking. These are criminal acts of coercion with victims involved and laws in every country punish the aggressors. The more interesting questions revolve around non-coercive sexuality. When sexual acts and relations involve the consent of partners, particularly if they are adults, why should these acts be defi ned as criminal? Who is the victim in a consensual transaction? What is the role of the State in the intimate lives of people? What are the underlying assumptions behind the refusal to decriminalise consensual sexual relations, when many societies have already done so? What are the implications of such policies on Singaporeans as ‘sexual citizens’? Citizenship was once perceived in terms of legal membership of a nation-state with entitlements, such as voting, welfare benefi ts, etc. More recent conceptualisations of citizenship take into account broader questions of belonging and inclusion, incorporating the sexual facets of being and recognising that citizens have sexualities that matter in public life (Isin & Wood, 1999; Weeks, 1999; Plummer, 2003). Diane Richardson (2000: 98) has theorised ‘sexual citizenship’ as a status entailing a set of sexual rights and duties, covering:

a) sexual practices, b) sexual identities, c) sexual relationships, and d) sexual consumption.

I will delineate sexual policies in Singapore using these four aspects of sexuality.

II Sexual Practices: “Unnatural”, “Indecent”, “Offensive”

The criminalisation of consensual sexual acts is etched in legal stone under the infamous Section 377 and Section 377A of the Penal Code: S. 377 (Unnatural Offences): Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable to ﬁ ne. Penetration is sufﬁ cient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence in this section.

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S. 377A (Outrages On Decency): Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the commission by any male person, of any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years. These two sections do not make allowances for ‘consenting adults’ or for ‘acts of privacy.’ It is immaterial whether the sexual acts take place in public or private, or whether there is consent between the partners involved, or whether the participants are adults capable of their own sexual self-determination. Given no line of defence, the acts themselves are unlawful and the punishment is rather severe, involving a jail sentence and/or ﬁ ne. As the language of ‘unnatural,’ ‘indecent,’ and ‘offensive’ was born out of 19th century England, these terms confound operationalisation in the modern world. The onus lies on the police to interpret the charge against an accused, and in the courts to adjudicate the case and mete out the punishment. In jurisprudence, the gap between law in the books and law as being practised is widened by an obscure and archaic terminology that is anachronistic of social reality.

Homosexual Acts In principle, S. 377 and S. 377A appear to be laws against homosexual acts, but in practice, homosexual activities in the last 20 years were tried under other sections. Since condemnations against same-sex relations have historically constructed homosexuality as ‘unnatural’ (Cocks, 2003), there is a common myth that S. 377 (unnatural offences) targets homosexual acts. But in fact, S. 377 includes men and women, and covers bestiality (sex with animals) and almost anything, other than vaginal intercourse. More heterosexual cases are tried under this section than homosexual. S. 377A speciﬁ es male subjects and makes no provisions for women. It clearly concerns male homosexual activities (gross indecency with another male person). Between 1985 and 1994, men were arrested and punished for homosexual acts, but, most of the time, they were not tried under S. 377A (Leong, 1997). The key to this puzzle is police decoys. During this period, arrests for homosexual activities were mostly secured through undercover agents, who dressed or behaved seductively, to entice men to make advances at them. Since S. 377A involves two willing parties, the role of the agent provocateur in the case of police entrapment renders this section inappropriate to charge men

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who solicit sex from men. S. 377A implies that the policemen would be liable to guilt even if they act as decoys. So, in lieu of S. 377 or S. 377A, men arrested for ‘homosexual acts’ with an agent provocateur were mostly tried under Section 354 (molest or outrage of modesty). In a strict sense, no homosexual interaction had taken place at all. Upon touching the buttocks or genitals of the decoy, the man would be arrested for outraging the modesty of the policeman. S. 354 has conventionally been applied to men harassing women, for which caning is a mandatory part of the punishment. In other words, a law largely intended for an heterosexual offence of non-consensual activity, was being used to target the population of men seeking sex from men. From 1990–1994, there were 50 reported cases in the newspapers of men being charged under this section, and the punishment was two to six months imprisonment, including three strokes of the cane. Besides the molest clause, other laws not intended specifi cally for homosexual activities were also invoked. Some men were charged under S. 19 of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act, involving soliciting in a public place. This section is meant to cover prostitution (where money is involved) or soliciting ‘for any other immoral purpose’ (where money is not involved). Under this clause, 11 cases of soliciting were reported in the news between 1990–1994 and fi nes ranged from S$200–S$500. Another clause is S. 294A of the Penal Code. Originally meant to be used for ‘obscene songs,’ it was wide enough to include the commission of any obscene act in any public place to the annoyance of others, such as a symbolic gesture a person propositioning sex may use to signal sexual intention. From 1990 to 1994, at least six cases of obscene acts were tried in this context and they were fi ned between S$200–S$800. A fourth legal tool to outlaw homosexual acts is S. 20 of the Mis- cellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act, which covers ‘riotous, disorderly or indecent behaviour’ in a public setting, that is subject to a fi ne not exceeding S$1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding a month. This law gives the police discretionary power to conduct raids and create a climate of fear and intimidation. In 1994, the High Court heard the case of Tan Boon Hock who was arrested in an anti-gay sting operation and sentenced by the magistrate to four months jail and three strokes of the cane. Tan appealed against the sentence, and Chief Justice Yong Pung How reversed the original

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sentence and substituted a ﬁ ne of S$2,000. The Chief Justice opined: “I found it somewhat disquieting that an accused arrested as a result of such police operations should subsequently be charged with having outraged the modesty of the police ofﬁ cer he came into contact with.” S. 354 implies the use of criminal force to outrage a person’s modesty, whereas police entrapment presupposes consent of both police and civilian. The Chief Justice also felt that the gender of the so-called victim was important: in that case, the police decoy was not a vulnerable, unsuspecting female, but a young male out to lure other males. This Chief Justice ruling therefore consigned S. 354 (outrage of modesty) back to its heterosexual niche for cases where force is exercised against a woman’s will. Henceforth, the tactic of police entrapment to arrest men, who solicit men for sex ,was no longer operative, and no more arrests were made.

Heterosexual Acts Paradoxically, while criminal prosecution of homosexual behaviour waned after 1995, there was an increase in court cases of males being sentenced for certain behaviour in consort with willing females. This heterosexual turn was not due to a redeployment of police resources, but to a messy and confused application of an archaic S. 377. And the cases referred to involved oral sex. In PP v. Victor Rajoo (1995), the accused was charged for abduction, rape, theft and robbery of a woman. He was acquitted of all these charges, but convicted for having oral sex with the woman. The judge felt that the woman’s testimony was weak and inconsistent, and that she had probably consented to sexual intercourse. But since she performed fellatio on the accused, the court convicted him of an oral sex charge under S. 377, and sentenced him to 6 months jail and S$2,000 ﬁ ne. This ruling implied that a person can be charged for having oral sex, even if consent is given, and the act is performed between heterosexual adults in privacy. It also implied that sexual acts, other than vaginal intercourse, are ‘unnatural’ and punishable under S. 377 (Li, 1995; Tan, 1995). During the same period, another case of oral sex appeared in court. In PP v. Tan Kuan Meng (1996), the accused was charged with rape, extortion, and forcing the woman to perform fellatio on him. The defense lawyer raised the hypothetical issue of consensual oral sex, cit- ing evidence that in 1982, 43% of 1,012 women surveyed admitted to

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performing fellatio. He asked the court to rule, in the interests of the public, whether oral sex between two consenting heterosexual parties is an offence (Straits Times, 19 August 1995). Justice Lai Kew Chai replied that “an act of fellatio, which is performed between a man and a woman as a lustful substitute for, and not a prelude to and enhancement for, natural sex between them, is carnal intercourse against the order of nature.” The question of ‘natural sex’ was not addressed until two years later. In PP v. Kwan Kwong Weng (1997), the court of appeal elaborated: “It was a biological fact that there had to be coitus of the male and female sexual organs for there to be natural sexual intercourse and it was only natural sexual intercourse which was in the order of nature. However, oral sex was an act practised in Singapore. Thus, when couples engaged in consensual sexual intercourse, willingly indulge in fellatio and cunnilingus as a stimulant to their respective sexual urges, neither act can be considered to be against the order of nature and punishable under S. 377 of the Penal Code. In every other instance the act of fellatio between a man and a woman would be carnal intercourse against the order of nature and punishable under S. 377.” In November 2003, public outrage and international media attention were drawn to the case of Annis Bin Abdullah v. PP (2003). The 27-year-old police coast guard sergeant was sentenced to two years jail for receiving oral sex from a consenting female. As the news reported the girl to be 16 years old, i.e. above the age of consent in Singapore, readers were mortifi ed that oral sex between consenting adults continues to be outlawed (Bangkok Post, 2003; Fong & Sim, 2003). Letters to the news forum poured in, condemning the law for being archaic, anomalous, unrealistic, demeaning, and an affront to privacy (Lim KG, 2003; Lim SP, 2003; Tan ML, 2003; Tan ZM, 2003; Tan BH, 2003a). To propitiate the angry readers, the Home Affairs Ministry revised its version of events, by admitting that the public prosecutors had made a mistake on the age of the girl, who was in fact 15 at the time the act was committed. The discourse shifted to one of protection of the underage: “the sergeant had trawled Internet relay chatrooms to fi nd the victim. Oral sex took place on their fi rst outing. As a police offi cer, he should have taken care of the girl. Instead, he took advantage of her. . . . The court stated that although no coercion was involved, the participation of the girl was the result of the corrupting infl uence of the appellant. . . . Every responsible member of society accepts that children and young persons must be protected from their immaturity

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and vulnerability in their interactions with adults, in their social life” (Ong-Chew & Devi, 2003a). This offi cial twist, however, did not close the debate. The age of the girl was considered to be irrelevant to the case, since the prosecutors fi led the case, without consideration given to age, and S. 377 makes no specifi cations for age. Calls were made to review and amend, if not abolish, the 200-year old sex laws (Chia, 2003; Dean, 2003; Loh, 2003; Tan BH, 2003b). In February 2004, Chief Justice Yong Pung How halved the two-year sentence of Annis Abdullah (Chong, 2004), but upheld the prohibition on oral sex as safeguarding Asian standards of decency: “It ought to be recognised that our society is still essentially Asian in nature with certain basic values and social mores that is a refl ection of the delicate balance between the many varied interests of various races and religions in our society” (Annis bin Abdullah v. PP: Appeal, 2004). He was quoted to have said that there were “certain offences that are so repulsive in Asian culture. There are countries where you can go and suck away for all you are worth. People in high places do it for all they’re worth. I’m not an expert, but you read about it in the papers. But this is Asia. That is why originally it was life imprisonment.” (Baker, 2004). Although the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Law pledged in November 2003 (Ong-Chew & Devi, 2003b) to review the oral sex law, legal reform was marked by inertia (Nation, 2004). Members of parliament had to raise the issue twice—in January 2004 and March 2004—to urge the government to speed up the long overdue reforms (Chong, 2004). One option tabled was the decriminalisation of consensual oral sex between heterosexual adults above 16 years of age (Yeo, 2004). This proposal, however, made no mention of male homosexual acts. Gay activists made emotional appeals to MPs for legal reforms to be more inclusive, but these fell on deaf ears. One MP averred: “I think the mere statistical presence of homosexuals among us does not make it the right thing to do and certainly does not imply fundamental shifts in societal norms.” Another sealed the discussion with a fi nal word: “As a policy maker, it is benefi cial to listen to all views. It is our aim to cultivate an open political culture. But we cannot rule by consensus.” (Soh & Chia, 2004; Singam, 2004).

Deep Throat: The Deep Structure of Oral Sex Policy The debate on oral sex policy in Singapore reveals an underlying structure of issues that are not just ethical but also sociological. Any

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policy on sexuality is more than just about sex; it is a regulatory force that informs us of the social organisation of relations based on gender, youth, class and sexual orientation. Besides the question of the role of State intervention in the intimate, private lives of individuals, the oral sex law or S. 377 involves a range of issues that go beyond sex. If S. 377 is solely a normative matter of sexual practice, then we would expect all consenting adults in Singapore, who have performed oral sex or sodomy, to be criminally liable. The fact that the law is differentially applied to some, but not all, Singaporeans suggests that not only is sexual policy confused or contradictory, but more importantly the contradictions serve broader purposes of social control and power. In legal and ethical theory, punishment for a crime must commensurate with the harm caused. What social harm is perpetuated by oral sex? How can life imprisonment or a jail term of up to 10 years be justifi ed? The severity of punishment puts oral sex in the league of crimes such as culpable homicide not amounting to murder, attempted murder and attempted infanticide. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to someone carries a lighter penalty. If oral sex is illegal, except as a prelude to vaginal intercourse, what is the legal status of condoms? Many condoms, easily available in sun- dry stores nationwide, are laced with fruit fl avours, that cater to the taste buds of the fellator, rather than the vaginal or anal walls of the penetratee. Would the sellers of fl avoured condoms be guilty of abetting the crime of unnatural sex? Should sex manuals that valorise the pleasures of oral sex be banned because they treat sex for pleasure’s sake as an end in itself ? These moot questions would embarrass policymakers, but far more consequential is the structured inequalities evident in the differential enforcement of S. 377. An examination of all the oral sex cases tried under S. 377 reveals certain patterns. Firstly, the gender of the accused matters. If sex is social interaction between at least two parties, can a woman who performs oral sex on a man also be charged with abetting a crime? Technically, S. 377 is gender-blind, but, in practice, it is only the man who is penalised and never the woman. The female may be the bestower of oral sex, but it is the recipient who has to go on trial. But prosecutions are not predicated on simply giver or receiver roles: the type of oral sex makes a difference. If oral sex is narrowed down to oral stimulation of male genitalia (fellatio) or oral stimulation of female genitalia (cunnilingus), can a man who performs cunnilingus be charged for a crime, even with the full consent of the female receiver?

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Cunnilingus has never been the object of legal proceedings, even if it is comparable with fellatio as an act ‘against the order of nature.’ It seems that the penis is the main source of legal trouble in sexual policy. S. 377 states: “Penetration is suffi cient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence in this section.” While it is not specifi ed if penetration may involve the tongue, fi nger or object like carrot or dildo, the penis is usually the implied point of reference. Thus, two lesbians may use various options, other than a human penis, to stimulate their female genitalia, but there is no legal precedent of oral sex between two women. In the context of S. 377’s origins, Queen Victoria refused to admit lesbians existed and the myth of passionless women (Matus, 1995) meant that women were exempted from legal regulations on matters of sexuality. Consequently, sexual policies in Singapore neither cover nor convict lesbian behaviour: lesbians are conspicuous by their absence from legal codes. Secondly, the convicted cases of S. 377 fall into two broad categories: a) where the accused had applied or threatened to use force in obtaining oral sex, or, at least, the court understood that the complainant did not consent to the act, and b) where the consenting partner was below 16, the age of consent (Chua, 2003). Looked at from a different perspective, these lie outside what Gayle Rubin (2002: 202) calls the ‘charmed circle’ of heterosexual, married, monogamous, procreative and vanilla sexuality. As the S. 377 cases unfold in court, a morality tale is spun about the ‘unnaturalness’ of oral sex, with or without consent, outside the institution of heterosexual marriage. Since married couples have never been convicted for oral sex, S. 377 has been applied to those, who use coercion or deception, or those who cross generational boundaries. In both categories, apparent contradictions exist. If no consent is involved (e.g. Kanagasuntharam v PP, 1992; PP v Tan Kuan Meng, 1996; PP v Kwan Kwong Weng, 1997; Lum, 2004c), then S. 254 (outraging of modesty) should be the proper charge for a person who coaxed another to perform oral sex: “Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage the modesty of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fi ne, or with caning, or with any two of such punishments.” In the second category, if the accused has transgressed age limits (e.g. PP v Raymond Pok, 2003; Annis Bin Abdullah v PP, 2003; Ho, 2004; Lum, 2004a; Lum, 2004b), then he should be tried under Section 140

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(1) (i) of the Women’s Charter, which defi nes the offence of ‘carnal connection’ as having sex with a woman under 16. If the girl is under 14 years old, sexual relations (even with her consent) would constitute ‘statutory rape’ under S. 375 of the Penal Code. That several cases have been prosecuted under S. 377 instead of the other three more appropriate sections illustrates the confusion, inde- terminacy and contradictions of the Singapore courts, when dealing with matters of sexuality. Sex with a minor as ‘carnal connection’ or ‘statutory rape’ is narrowly defi ned by the law as vaginal intercourse, and these statutes make no provisions for the variety of sexual acts that human beings ingeniously engage in. On the other hand, the ‘unnatural offences’ of S. 377 is so broadly vague that anything other than vaginal intercourse is brought within its rubric. And S. 377 serves to make moral judgements on sexual acts by classifying them as natural or unnatural. When S. 377 is so amorphous, it leaves room for prosecutorial discretion. Without checks and balances typical of liberal democracy, such as media watchdogs, civil liberties unions or NGOs (non-governmental organisation), prosecutorial discretion threatens to be arbitrary or absolute. Such prosecutorial power may in turn lead to the danger of ‘proxy prosecution’ (Hor, 2005). A particular charge is made against a person for reasons other than the apparent motives or norms of that charge. These other reasons may range from discrediting a person’s reputation, stretching the resources of a person embroiled in legal defence, to simply punishing the person, when no other just cause for punishment is warranted. Proxy prosecution is best exemplifi ed by the case of Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia. The former Deputy Prime Minister, supposedly fi rst in line to succeed Mahathir Mohammed, was accused in September 1998 of sexual misconduct and abuse of his offi ce to cover up allegations of illicit sex. In 2000, he was sentenced to nine years in prison for sodomy. It is clear that the concern of Mahathir was not really the alleged sodomy offences of Anwar. In the backdrop of differences between the two leaders over economic policy and the 1997 fi nancial crisis, the sodomy trial merely served as a proxy to incapacitate a rival, who was popular enough to potentially become the next leader of the country. Sexual policies of a country that criminalises consensual sex and enables prosecutorial discretion, provide multiple alibis for proxy prosecution. For example, a police squad raids an apartment in pursuit of drugs or gambling, fi nds no evidence of these, but discovers

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pornographic materials, and so prosecutes the owner for possession of outlawed materials. Or when a gay person joins opposition politics, the government stakes out his apartment. The moment he engages in consensual same-sex activities, he is charged with unnatural sex or gross indecency. The sexual materials and the sexual acts, in both cases, are secondary issues, but, nevertheless, serve as important surrogates for broader kinds of prosecution. In January 5, 2005, Straits Times (2005a: H6) reported the case of a couple convicted for having oral sex on a staircase. A cleaner who did not witness, but heard the noises alerted a security guard. Each was fi ned S$500 for ‘indecent behaviour.’ A reader (Au, 2005) pointed out that the couple was wrongly charged because their intimate affair was conducted at level 3 of a staircase, not intended for public gaze. Closer analysis of the case may suggest proxy prosecution at work here. The location of the couple’s tryst was Orchard Towers, which is infamous for sex-work catering mostly to tourists. The woman was a Filipina maid: what was she doing at 7.30 p.m. in this place? The police probably suspected that she was soliciting for sexual services, but fi nding no evidence of that, they nevertheless wanted to prosecute her. Since the Annis Abdullah’s case that caused public discontent over S. 377, which was now ostensibly under review, the prosecutors convicted the couple for indecent behaviour under the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act. For the fi rst time in legal history, a woman was being criminalised for oral sex. Proxy prosecution appears to target the woman, a maid, who supposedly had no reason to be in a red-light district. Proxy prosecution highlights the fact that sex laws are not really all about sex. Sex laws form part of a complex of power that can be used to discipline unruly women, to stymie political opponents, to moralise against behaviour outside the charmed circle of heteronormativity. In July 23 2001, three undercover policemen entered a gay bathhouse called One Seven, climbed over a cubicle and arrested two men for intimate activities. Meanwhile, the rest of the bathhouse clients were left undisturbed. There was no newspaper coverage of this event, but eyewitness accounts were circulated widely on the Internet. If no one other than these two men were targetted, sex was not the issue. Insider information revealed that the police were trailing one of the men for security clearance purposes (Wee, 2002). Accordingly, the two were charged under Section 20 of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act.

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III Sexual Identities

Sexual identity is distinct from sexual behaviour: males who have sex with males in school, the military, the monastery, the prison, etc. may not consider themselves, and may not be considered by others, as homosexual. Identity formation is the process in which an individual learns to reconcile the self with notions of being straight, gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Singapore’s social policies presuppose the norm of heterosexuality. Incentives for women to procreate and family policies all privilege heteronormativity. The key question then is: do policies recognise, incorporate or further marginalise sexual minorities? Government policies on sexual minorities can be looked at through the lens of public sector employment: the civil service and the special case of the military. Whereas America has adopted a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ stance towards gays and lesbians serving the military, Singapore takes a more pragmatic approach. Given a local population that does not seem to reproduce itself demographically, all the able-bodied men, regardless of sexual orientation, are conscripted at the age of 18. During the initial medical examination, recruits who declare themselves as gay, are further screened by psychiatrists and counsellors. The Ministry of Defence adopts a medical model of homosexuality in the old European psychiatric tradition, that, at the same time, confl ates gender with sexuality: the male homosexual is thought to be a male trapped in a female body. The military doctors have a manual with a section on ‘Homosexuality and Transexuality.’ Interviews follow a protocol in which the fi rst question is: “Have you had sex with men?” This is followed by a series of cross-examining probes: “Do you cross-dress? Are you the man or the woman? Do you have anal sex? Are you active or passive?” In the second stage of the medical review, the self-declared gay conscript is obliged to bring one or both of his parents, who will then be queried about the son’s sexual preference and gender status. The military thus lumps gays with transgendered people. There is a scale to measure effeminacy (the recruit is asked to walk a straight line, and non-verbal mannerisms are being observed), and the results are taken as an indicator of the gay-transgendered confl ation. Homo- sexuality and transgenderism are listed in the Singapore Armed Forces ‘directory of diseases’ (Chong, 1999). The gay person is ascribed a label ‘302.’ Generally, those classifi ed as 302 cannot serve in the capacity of an offi cer. They will be ‘Other Ranks,’ like corporals. Also, they are not assigned vocations involving

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front-line combat, commando or command positions. This is very similar to the experience of women in the military, where they are consigned to clerical, and service posts, like logistical support and administrative duties. In this way, category 302 feminises gays in the military. In July 2003, the then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong announced that the civil service government employs gays in various positions: “In the past, if we know you’re gay, we would not employ you but we just changed this quietly.” This was the fi rst time a leader has publicly embraced sexual minorities, representing a shift towards greater tolerance. However, Goh maintained that the laws against homosexual acts were still in place, and no attempt was made to decriminalise homosexuality. Taking the case of the military and Goh’s proclama- tion together, the offi cial policy is one, in which it is not a crime to be a homosexual, but it is a crime to engage in homosexual acts. This stance parallels the Christian edict of loving the sinner, but hating the sin, the assumption that the soul can be separated from the fl esh, the person from the act. The context of Goh’s pronouncement is important: he was being interviewed in Time magazine rather than a local newspaper (Elegant, 2003). Targetted to an international audience, the message was that Singapore has liberalised its position towards gays. This concession was part of a wider package of loosening up: bungee jumping, bar- top dancing, little bohemian enclaves of hip and cool lifestyles (Ariff & Soh, 2002). In part an effort to attract foreign professionals and to keep talented locals from emigrating to countries with more liberal climates, it is also, in part, an effort to ward off the stodgy image of Singapore as clinically antiseptic, an anathema to fun tourism. The motivating factor underlying this policy of sexual glasnost was mostly economic. Richard Florida (2002), a Carnegie Mellon university professor published a book that became popular. Analysing statistics of the fastest growing cities in America, Florida constructed indicators such as ‘gay index,’ ‘bohemian index,’ ‘diversity index,’ and demonstrated that the secret of a thriving city is having large, gay and immigrant populations. These groups constitute a ‘creative class’ of thinkers and artists, who drive economic growth and innovation. Florida argued that politicians, who seek to attract young families as their top priority, are losing out. Instead, they should encourage gays and immigrants in order to enrich the creative capital and cultural diversity of cities. In this sense, the Singaporean attempt to establish little bohemias, fun culture and acceptance of gays (up to a point) welds sexual policy with economic policy.

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The economic advantages of accepting gays are recognised by corporations that try to tap into the potentially lucrative ‘pink economy’ (Sender, 2004). Without children and traditional families to worry about, gays and lesbians are characterised as upwardly mobile, successful in popular cultural industries, having high purchasing power and indulg- ing in fabulous lifestyles of consumption (shopping, leisure and recreation). In Singapore, a network of gay bars, clubs, saunas, spas, travel agents and shops has mushroomed in the last seven years, particularly within the Chinatown district. The proliferation of such gay stores is an indicator of ofﬁ cial tolerance—at least from the business point of view. Sexual minorities are ﬁ ne, if they just spend money to fuel the economy (Chasin, 2000).

IV Sexual Relationships

Goh’s policy of accepting gays in the public sector of employment is a circumscribed one, that does not fully embrace what it means to be a member of a sexual minority. It stops short of recognising gay and lesbian families and consciously distances itself from ‘the West.’ Gay marriages are legal in Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands, Belgium Spain and Canada. Countries that do not recognise such unions (e.g. Germany, France, Great Britain and New Zealand) may nevertheless offer domestic partnership rights, such as tax breaks, inheri- tance, travel allowance and pension beneﬁ ts. Singapore recognises only heterosexual marriage as a legal union. The fruition of sexual relationships often rests on living arrangements. Public housing in Singapore is allocated on a scale that gives priority to extended families, stem families, and nuclear families. Single parents and unmarried persons have lesser priority and must wait longer for public housing. For a long time, unmarried persons were not eligible to purchase HDB (Housing and Development Board) apartments, except when registered with their aged parents. In the late 1980s, the increasing supply of HDB units opened up some opportunities for single persons to purchase public apartments. But eligibility criteria apply: in the Single Singapore Citizen Scheme, a single person must be a citizen, at least 35 years of age, and can only purchase small resale units in locations that tend to be less desirable in the public housing range. Under the Joint Singles category, two unmarried persons can buy jointly a resale HDB unit, but they must be at least 35 years old, need not be related, and may be of the same or

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different gender. This policy, while offi cially not an acknowledgement of, or concession to, gay or lesbian couples, provides them with access to public accommodation. This housing policy is mostly a pragmatic response to economic forces of demand and supply in the property market. In May 2005, singles and permanent residents were allowed to purchase unoccupied (as opposed to resale) fl ats but in designated areas (Tan, 2005). Many units in Jurong West, Bukit Panjang and Sengkang have been unsold and vacant for over four years. Then in July 2005, it was announced that unrelated singles could jointly use their provident fund savings to fi nance a property (Low, 2005). An oversupply of public housing and a sluggish property market compelled the State to relax its housing policies. Singles, single parents, cohabitating couples, gays and lesbians, who were previously constrained in their access to public housing, now have newer opportunities. However, this development is a consequence of economic forces, rather than a conscious policy to free housing for non-traditional family households. And the latter must contend with properties in less than prime or choice locations.

V Sexual Consumption

Sexual policies concern not just behaviour, identities and relationships, but also sexual goods and services. Sexual consumption involves the partaking of sexual materials not only for entertainment, but also for information that may be crucial for sexual health. Sexual consumption also includes identity-based lifestyles, such as gay parties, gay ﬁ lms and gay music. The demand for sexual services in the sex industry forms a third aspect of sexual consumption.

Sexual goods: The Materiality of Sexual Desires Increasingly, in late capitalism, individuals see themselves as not only producers but also consumers, with their own expectations of rights and entitlements. For example, prisoners in a federal penitentiary ﬁ led a class-action law suit against the State of Philadelphia when they were prohibited from viewing R, X and NC-17-rated movies (Liptak, 2002). Ofﬁ cials held that prisons should be places of detention and punishment, but prisoners felt that their First Amendment rights were violated. The movies in the R-rated list were Schindler’s List, Amistad,

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Glory, and The English Patient. If prisoners are a special case of people, what about the rights of general people to consume materials with sexual themes? There is a popular saying that in the military, young people can kill enemies and die for a nation, but are not permitted to watch R-movies, if they are below 21 years of age. The Media Development Authority (MDA) is the gatekeeper of information in Singapore, regulating erotic material and all forms of mass media: “In Singapore, censorship plays a role in creating a balance between maintaining a morally wholesome society and becoming an economically dynamic, socially cohesive and culturally vibrant nation. It helps to protect the young against undesirable infl uences and safeguards central values, such as the sanctity of marriage, the importance of the family, respect for one’s elders, fi lial piety, moral integrity, and respect for and tolerance towards different racial and religious groups. . . . Based on the censorship criteria, fi lms that are not allowed in Singapore include fi lms that depict explicit or perverted sex, nude scenes that are exploitative or obscene, fi lms that encourage drug abuse, and fi lms that denigrate any particular religion or race” (Ministry of Community Development and Sports, 2000). The MDA is particularly strict about positive media depictions of same-gender relations. In June 2003, it fi ned MediaWorks S$15,000 for broadcasting an interview on Channel i with American actress Anne Heche, who openly talked about her lesbian relationship with comedienne Ellen Degeneres. “Broadcasting programmes, which glamourise and promote lesbianism, is considered a major breach of the (Free-To-Air TV Programme) Code” (MDA, 2003). To avoid such fi nes, television programmers have to censor shows like Buffy the Vampire Slayer, because the two female protagonists express intimacy and affection for each other. Similarly, censors cut the gay sub-plot of the cable series Six Feet Under (BBC News, 2002) and an episode of Ally McBeal where Ling fantasises about Ally’s lips and ends up giving her a peck on the cheek (Sng, 2000). Local fi lmmaker Eric Khoo’s fi lm, Be With Me, explored love at different stages of the life-cycle through the telling of three short stories. A promotional poster depicting a scene of two teenage girls embracing each other was banned by MDA for displaying ‘lesbian intimacy.’ This was replaced by a heterosexual image of a man necking one of the girls (Chia, 2005). Although a Censorship Review Committee is formed once every decade to make policy recommendations, the 2002 Committee’s report

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does not fundamentally alter the 1992 version. In practice, what may appear to be a loosening up of restrictions often reverts back into greater control. Thus, since 1992, most fi lms slated for screening at the Singapore International Film Festival have been granted some degree of immunity from censorship: these fi lms would be restricted to the festival and would otherwise not make it to the mainstream cinemas. However, in the last three years, with the appointment of a new director of media content, more fi lms for the Festival have been cut or banned. In 2005, two were banned and two were cut. The fi lmmakers of the cut fi lms withdrew their fi lms in protest. In the 2004 fi lm festival, local fi lmmaker Royston Tan’s fi lm, 15 was subjected to 27 cuts (for nudity, drugs and swearing). Traumatised, he made a 12-minute musical, Cut, that lampooned Amy Chua, the director of MDA (Wong, 2004). Meanwhile, his 15 fi lm travelled internationally with a cult following. Its banned status means Singaporeans are prohibited from watching a Singaporean fi lm, while foreigners have greater access to it. The same pattern of toleration followed by harsher censorship is repeated in the print media. The female magazine, Cosmopolitan, was banned in 1982 for ‘promoting sexual permissiveness.’ Even though it did not carry images of nudity or explicit visuals, the articles were deemed too racy and inappropriate for women. In 2004, the ban was lifted and each of the 100 copies of the British and American editions were sold out (Swee, 2004). But in June 2005, the Spring issue of Colors, a magazine published by fashion house United Colors of Bennetton, was banned (Straits Times, 2005b: H3). The theme of this issue was lust, covering lust in all its myriad forms (lust for power, food, fashion, collectibles, money, the tallest building in the world, etc.). But it was the topic of lust for sex, along with visual illustrations and photographs of two males kissing, that MDA objected to. The internationally popular series, Sex and the City, shown for many years on national television in Indonesia, on cable in Thailand, and in most other Asian countries, was banned in Singapore because it allegedly featured ‘promiscuous’ women. When the ban was lifted in 2004, all the six seasons of the series had ended their run, and lost their steam. And even then, certain episodes were edited out on cable television. In keeping with the growth of a pink economy, a local magazine called Manazine appeared in mid-2003. Targetted at gay consumers, Manazine worked within the MDA guidelines (no frontal nudity). It was a glossy magazine, with suggestive advertisements and visuals, that

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were more tongue-in-cheek than homoerotic. But it was distributed free at gay and gay-friendly establishments and so MDA sought to limit its access (Nirmala, 2004). It is now available only through mail subscrip- tion. Although not a complete ban, restricting access is one of the more subtle ways of media regulation. With limited circulation, advertisers have fewer incentives to market their products in the magazine, and so declining advertising revenue would determine the fate of Manazine. Sexual materials need not always serve prurient interest; they may have educational value by informing and empowering the reader. Thus, information about contraception, AIDS, and sexually transmitted diseases are necessary for sexual health and growth. Sexual policies must then incorporate some amount of sex education, particularly for young people (Measor et al., 2000). In an examination-oriented society, schools in Singapore do not have a concerted policy of sex education. If offered at all, sex education ranges from one extreme of being taught clinically from a biological perspective to the other extreme of being moralistic, preaching absti- nence from a Christian perspective (Tan TH, 2003; Ng, 2005). Young people have to cope with sexual identity, negotiating between sexual desires and opportunities, fears and freedom. But no curriculum in Singapore schools has managed to cover these issues in a dispassionate but realistic manner. Since sex education in a non-moral and non-clinical style is missing, youth are prone to ﬁ nd their own sources of sexual information. And the tabooed status of most sexual materials fuels a desire for them in the way limited supply generates high demand. In 2004, 17 boys, aged 14, from Kent Ridge Secondary School were caught viewing pornographic video-discs. Before being handled over to the police, the students were subjected to seven hours of investigation, without any break for food or drink (Ng, 2004). One student suffering from Hirschsprung’s disease was hospitalised for food deprivation. Even though the school authorities were aware of his condition, he was not granted a break. The principal’s harsh and panicked reaction signalled an approach that was sex-negative, and inadvertently reinforced the idea that guilty pleasures constituted part of sexual consumption.

Sexual Lifestyles: Identity Consumption For sexual minorities, sexual consumption includes identity-based lifestyles. In 2001, Fridae.com, a web portal serving gays, lesbians, bisexuals

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and transgendereds (GLBT), ran a Nation party on National Day at Sentosa resort island. With an initial turnout of 1,500, the dance rave became a ‘circuit party’ attended by GLBTs from all over the world, to the tune of 8,000 in 2004. Time magazine hailed Nation as “a three-day fest of international proportions” (Price, 2003: 8). Nation was so successful that another party was held around Christmas time called Snowball. The Wall Street Journal reported that Singapore was “becoming an unlikely center of gay culture in Asia” (Fairclough, 2004: A1). Bangkok was once the gay capital of Asia with its parties, clubs and gay-friendliness, but under Thaksin’s ‘law and order’ campaign that led to early closure of bars, Bangkok was losing its party zing. Singapore’s gay parties held between 2001–2003 drew foreign media attention and garnered for the country the title of ‘Asia’s new gay capital’ (Wan, 2003). But Nation and Snowball parties became victims of their own success. The in-your-face ﬂ amboyance of men kissing each other, of men ﬂ aunting their gym-toned bodies, of men unapologetically proud of their sexuality, all began to test the limits of government tolerance of gays. In December 2004, the police denied a license for the Snowball party. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong revealed that the margin of tolerance had narrowed: We allowed it and we made it quite clear that it had to be a party which was not targetted at gays alone. As the party turned out, our sense of it was that it was beyond what we were prepared to accept. So we said no. . . . I think it’s a matter of balance . . . of how we can have space for this group of people who are gays, whom we accept as Singaporeans. But at the same time, it’s about respecting the outlook, values and perspectives of the majority of Singaporeans, who know Singapore to be a certain way and do not want to see it changing suddenly, and I think they have a point. (Straits Times, 20 Dec. 2004) Lee’s position represented a reversal of Goh’s earlier, gentler, kinder approach to sexual minorities. In a short span of time, the Nation party ban hit Singapore’s reputation as a gay-friendly metropolis and entertainment-hub (Coloma, 2005). Lee’s decision set the tone for other policies to deny gay consumption. In March 2005, Safehaven, a Christian network and AIDS support group, applied for a license to hold a fundraising concert. Because the main performers were a gay couple, MDA denied the permit: “Based on the duo’s website and reports of their performances in the United States, it is assessed that

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their performance will promote a gay lifestyle which would be against the public interest” (Lim, 2005: H8). A gay lifestyle, which two years ago was begrudgingly tolerated for its contribution to a pink economy and bohemian culture, is now rejected for being ‘against the public interest.’ This shift in policy stance was the result of the State’s conﬂ ation of gays with AIDS. The Health Ministry released ﬁ gures that pointed to a rise in HIV infection among gay men. Although the majority of HIV cases was heterosexual (80%), the rate of infection was increasing among men having sex with men (Arshad, 2004: 6). The Nation parties were blamed for this rise in new AIDS cases (Koh, 2005: 1), and, henceforth, gay parties and concerts were banned. This logic of blame is not in keeping with advanced AIDS policies that have evolved humanely. More than 10 years ago, scholars (Feld- man, 1994; Theodoulou, 1996) have advanced our knowledge that AIDS policy should focus on unsafe sex practices, rather than groups like gays or straights. Because HIV is an equal-opportunity virus, it is unsafe sex practices, and not sexual orientation, that leads to HIV infection. Associating gay men with AIDS merely stigmatises them and creates an illusion that AIDS is a gay disease, which non-gays need not worry about. Dividing the world into gay or straight is sometimes not helpful for AIDS policy, because there are ‘men who have sex with men,’ who do not identify themselves as gay. These are often men who are married, with children, religiously inclined and not part of the gay lifestyles of bars, parties and saunas (Humphreys, 1975). Singling out gays in an AIDS prevention policy would leave out this group of people. Rather than attributing blame to circuit parties and banning them, policy makers could use these parties as ideal sites to distribute condoms and health information. The AIDS-charity concert banned by MDA could have raised AIDS-awareness. A ban on parties would drive the participants either underground or overseas, where they would be harder to reach and educate. Indeed, the Nation party has moved to Phuket, where goers would party with a vengeance.

Sexual Services: The Industry of Desires The alarm over an impending ‘AIDS epidemic’ (Khalik, 2004: 1) was being fed by statistics of new and rising cases, but little was said about the sex industry, that includes trans-border sex tourism of neighbouring

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districts like Batam, Bintang and Johor (Darwin et al., 2003). With porous borders characterised by fl ows of Singaporeans into nearby regions and non-Singaporeans coming in to service clients, the sex industry in Singapore is a seedbed of multi-cultural nationalities. The prostitution policy in Singapore takes a pragmatic approach that attempts to balance health concerns with matters of social propriety. It has built on the British colonial policy, which was not adverse to prostitution, given the unbalanced sex ratios of an immigrant society. Offi cials today see prostitution as a ‘necessary evil’ (Ong, 1993: 259): it is not only impossible to eradicate, but also serves certain social functions, such as acting as a safety valve for some, and recreation for migrant guest workers, who are predominantly male. As the sex industry is deemed an acceptable outlet for male sexual needs, prostitution is not illegal in Singapore; it is merely regulated under relatively tight controls. Thus, while prostitution is recognised as legitimate sex work, the circumstances in which it operates are clearly spelt out. Street trade is prohibited by the Minor Offences Act, that criminalises solicitation in public places. Massage parlours, hair salons and spas are offi cially not allowed to offer ancillary services, that are not stipulated in the license or lease. Traffi cking of women and pimping that exploits the earnings of the sex worker are crimes. All these leave brothels as the legally recognised sites of sexual services. Regulating the infrastructure of the sex industry involves geographical containment and informal control. Partly to reduce the public visibility of the sex service sector, and partly to optimise the economy of policing, operating sites for prostitution are territorially delimited as ‘Designated Red-Light Areas’ (DRAs), such as Geylang, Flanders Square, Keong Saik Road and Desker Road. Only within these zones can brothels function legitimately. And brothel owners are entrusted to self-regulate their operations. As long as there is minimal social order and rule compliance, they can run prostitution like any other business. Otherwise, sanctions such as raids, closure of brothels, fi ne or jail would be imposed on those who fl out the rules or fl aunt their improprieties. In this way, brothel owners have to work in tacit symbiosis with enforcement agents. The monitoring of sex workers is secured largely through yellow cards. A yellow card is really a license to work in the sex industry, based on eligibility criteria of age, nationality and medical history. As the mix of male guest workers come from Thailand, India, Bangladesh Sri Lanka, Mynmar, the Philippines, and China, so too, a smaller quota

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of work permits is given to females of these countries to service men according to their respective origins. More importantly, the yellow card functions as a tool for health screening of sex workers. Regular medical checkups are required for the holder of a yellow card, and any sign of sexually transmitted disease or HIV would result in seizure of that document. However, the net cast by the yellow card system does not capture all sex workers, because the industry has grown so vastly and become so diverse, that it poses a challenge to even deﬁ ne who a sex worker is. Thus, women from China may enter Singapore with valid student passes, or as ‘study mamas’ (sending their children to Singapore schools), but work freelance in the sex industry. Thai males may come for tourism but also work as gay escorts. And Internet advertising makes prostitution a mobile kind of industry, with no street cruising required, no borders, bypassing the DRAs and the system of yellow cards. What is sorely needed, in conjunction with an AIDS prevention policy, is an agency to counsel sex workers and sex clients. And this body must be staffed by multi-lingual speakers to cater for the multi- cultural sex industry. Since the Singapore State is neither pro-active nor cutting-edge in sexual policies, the gap is ﬁ lled by a non-governmental organisation, Action for AIDS (AFA). AFA works with a spectrum of people on AIDS awareness, social support, outreach programmes, and counselling, but its resources are limited by donations and voluntarism (Leong, 1995).

VI Irrationalising Sexual Policies

The sexual policies of the Singapore government can be summed up as: confused and messy laws governing sexual acts, particularly in relation to archaic notions of ‘unnaturalness,’ unrelenting non-accommodation towards sexual minorities, censorial and repressive approach towards sexual consumption of materials, and pragmatic regulation of the sex industry. Policies or policy positions require ideological justiﬁ cation, especially in the face of challenges from various segments of the population. The most prevalent discourse to justify particular sexual policies or justify the refusal to change sexual policies is the rhetoric of ‘Asian values’ (Barr, 2002). Asian virtue is pitted against Western decadence, Asian conservatism against Western liberalism. Such constructions rely on an

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‘occidentalist’ reading of the West as enemy (Buruma, 2004) or as foil for the (mis)representation of Asia. Justice Young Pung How, in his defence of the oral sex law, said: “This is Asia . . . there are certain offences against Asian culture” (Chong, E, 2004). At the World Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993, Singa- pore Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng claimed: “Homosexual rights are a Western issue, and are not relevant at this conference.” (Wong, 1995) Echoing this view, former Foreign Service offi cial Kishore Mah- bubani (1999: 95) said: “. . . some of the demands of these (Western) human rights activists would be unacceptable under any conditions. Most Asian societies would be shocked by the sight of gay rights activists on their streets.” In a December 11, 1998 CNN live interview, a viewer phoned in to ask Lee Kuan Yew the prospects of accepting gays in future. Lee replied: “Well, it’s not a matter which I can decide or any government can decide. It’s a question of what a society considers acceptable. And as you know, Singaporeans are by and large a very conservative, orthodox society, a very, I would say, completely different from, say, the United States and I don’t think an aggressive gay rights movement would help” (Sunday Times, 1998). Before relinquishing his post as prime minister, Goh Chok Tong made his fi nal National Day Rally speech on August 17, 2003. There, he said: “Let me stress that I do not encourage or endorse a gay lifestyle. Singapore is still a traditional and conservative Asian society” (Goh, 2003). In April 2007, Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged that some people are genetically destined to be homosexual; he then questioned the criminal code against homosexuality in Singapore: “If in fact it is true, and I have asked doctors this, that you are genetically born a homosexual—because that’s the nature of the genetic random transmission of genes—you can’t help it. So why should we criminalise it?” Lee conceded that the government should not play the role of moral policeman, but, at the same time, must take into account the concerns of conservative citizens (Straits Times, 2007). All the leaders in Singapore have so consistently re-iterated the same mantra over the years, that it is hard to distinguish any real or fundamental, as opposed to cosmetic or superfi cial, change in sexual policies: “Offi cials say they have eased up on social policies to satisfy a generation more exposed to overseas infl uences. But they also insist

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Singapore’s generally conservative citizenry cherishes order and wants censorship and government involvement in social affairs to preserve it” (Yeoh, 2005). The ‘conservative Asia’ buzzword ignores history and misrepresents the present. Gulik (1961) has detailed a rich sexual tradition in Ancient China. Sociologist Liu Dalin (1992: 56) from Shanghai has maintained a sex museum that ﬂ eshes out explicit sexual representations in art and material objects throughout China’s history. Diverse forms of sexual behaviour were accepted in Imperial China (Hinsch, 1990; Wu, 2004). The Kama Sutra celebrated sexuality to the heights of spirituality, spawning off tantric sex cults in India (Dehejia, 1986). Japan’s past and present are replete with expressive sexualities that manifest themselves in pornographic prints of the Edo period (Screech, 1999), manga cartoons (Allison, 1996), popular lore (Buruma, 1984), fashion (Richie, 2003), sadomasochism (Bornoff, 1991) and a thriving sex industry (Allison, 1994). Anthropologists have documented the widespread acceptance of diverse sexualities in India, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia in general (Murray, 2000; Murray, 1992). Anyone who has journeyed to one or more urban centres in Asia would seriously doubt the myth of Asian sexual conservatism. If ‘Asian conservatism’ is not empirically grounded, the idea can be further deconstructed by zooming in from the general to the particular. Perhaps it is not Asia, but Singapore, that is conservative? Perhaps it is not the majority of Singaporeans, but a loud minority (e.g. religious lobby) in Singapore that is conservative? Perhaps it is not even religious fundamentalists, but political leaders, who are conservative? Whatever the answers may be, ‘Asian conservatism’ is an ideology of the status quo. As part of a wider discourse on ‘Asian values,’ it leaves out, or is antithetical to, issues about human rights (Brems, 2001). The scale is tipped off-balance towards social responsibilities and against individual rights. And the ironic claim that Asian culture is sexually conservative is at odds with the fact that laws which regulate sexuality in Singapore are in fact Western, drawn from Victorian England.

VII Conclusion: Sexual Polices and Sexual Citizens

Singapore leaders have taken great pride in engineering economic success and accolades for having the No. 1 airport, No. 1 airline, No. 1

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public housing programme, etc. are much sought after. Sexuality and human rights do not constitute part of the agenda. Sexual policies follow the legacy of British rule: these laws prohibit rather than empower, they criminalise rather than protect civil liberties. Instead of being subjected to reform, the laws are being invoked for purposes of social control of selected groups of people. If citizenship involves questions of belonging and inclusion, then sexual minorities and sexual consumers may feel excluded when a State does not recognise diverse sexualities, and does not acknowledge the rights of consumers. If citizenship involves entitlements and social beneﬁ ts, then sexual minorities who do not get tax shelters, access to accommodation, health coverage for partners that others enjoy may feel that they have been sidelined as second or third class citizens. In Singapore, there is a clash of economic liberalism and political conservatism. Economic development encourages individuality: individual drive to excell in school or at work, individual work performance, rewards for individuals, individual entrepreneurship and material well- being. But outside the spheres of work and economy, the individual screams for self-expression, strives for autonomy, and may even insist on the right to consume. And if money or ﬁ nancial success gives people the choice to buy whatever they want, choice underlies individuality. We choose who to partner, who to marry, and who not to. We choose to have children, or not to. We choose the type of erotic life and with whom (Weeks, 1999). Political conservatism, as expressed through repressive sexual policies, puts a damper on self-expression and autonomous choice. Frustration runs high, when choices are constrained and when individuals are prevented from achieving their goals, such as self-actualisation and the right to be whoever one chooses to be (i.e. identity politics). Sexuality is now widely recognised as an important aspect of social policies (Atkinson, 1999; Carabine, 2004; Herdt, 2004; Macgillivray, 2004; Swan, 2004). It would be in the interest of States to not only recognise the sexual dimensions of citizenship, but also formulate enlightened policies that take into account the sexual well-being of all. In the near future, there will be a scorecard, in which governance would be assessed, not just in terms of economic indicators, but also according to how minorities are treated, how sexuality is regarded, and how the intimate lives of individuals are nurtured.

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Cited Court Cases in Singapore

Kanagasuntharam v PP (1992) 1 SLR: 81–86. PP v Victor Rajoo (1995) 3 SLR: 417–432. PP v Tan Kuan Meng (1996) http://www.geocities.com/law4u2003/tankuanmeng.htm. PP v Kwan Kwong Weng (1997) 1 SLR: 697 http://www.geocities.com/law4u2003/ kwankwongweng.htm. Annis Bin Abdullah v PP (2003) http://www.geocities.com/law4u2003/annisabdul- lah.htm. Annis Bin Abdullah v PP: Appeal (2004) http://www.geocities.com/law4u2003/anni- sabdullahappeal.htm.

TONG_f13_279-308.indd 308 2/7/2008 7:22:49 PM CONVERGENCE WITH A TWIST: EAST ASIAN WELFARE CAPITALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE*

Volker H. Schmidt

At one level of analysis, all social entities are ‘historical individuals’ (Streeck & Yamamura, 2001), defying generalisation and requiring a thorough reconstruction of their evolution, as well as a description of their peculiarities, in their own terms. Social policy or welfare regimes are no exception. There are probably no two systems of welfare provision around the world that are exactly alike. This observation gives occasion for the rejection of any categorisation of such systems in terms of overarching regime types. For once particular systems are subjected to close scrutiny, it becomes apparent that no pure type exists in the real world, that all systems are syncretic composites of mostly rather heterogeneous elements, whose development simply does not follow any clear-cut logic, as the language of regime types would seem to imply (Kasza, 2002). However, the observation, while correct, is not without its own quandaries. For even if we abstained from fi tting particular systems into broader typologies, we would still have to spell out the sense(s) in which these systems are unique, and their uniqueness becomes visible only through comparison. But as soon as we start to compare, we will detect similarities and differences; more similarities with some and greater differences from other systems, and in order to capture and express them, we have to categorise our various systems. Some categorisation is therefore inevitable. To analyse, we need concepts, and concepts categorise. There will, of course, always be differences among the chosen representatives of a given (ideal) type, but, if our concepts are well construed, then these differences will be family differences, less signifi cant than those the group at large exhibits vis-à-vis the members of some other group. If, on the other hand, our concepts turn out to be fl awed or too simplistic, then we must revise them. But we cannot discard them altogether, for if we did, we would be stepping out of (social) science itself.

* Portions of this paper were presented at a public forum on health policy, organised by the City University of Hong Kong, 25–26 November 2004.

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It is with these provisos in mind that the present paper speaks of East Asian welfare capitalism as a distinct variety of welfare capitalism. East Asian welfare capitalism is a relatively recent arrival, having emerged in the real world only during the past 40 years or so, and hitting the radar screens of social analysts even later. True, Japan had begun to modernise much earlier, and given its spectacular success, particularly after the Second World War, its rise had not gone unnoticed even in Europe—quite the contrary. The same happened with the no less phenomenal rise of the four little ‘tigers’—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore—which set in a few decades later. But it was only with the publication, beginning around the mid-1980s to early 1990s, of various studies that grouped all fi ve countries together that the notion of East (or Southeast) Asian welfare capitalism gradually began to take root in the literature. Now, it has become increasingly clear that neither Japan’s rise, nor that of the four ‘tigers’ were isolated phenomena. Rather, these countries were spearheading the development of a whole region, paving the way, fi rst, for a third generation of Asian growth economies (comprising mainly Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) and later, even a fourth such generation (China and Viet- nam), set to lift themselves right into the centre of the world economy, and thus eventually to transform the whole world order. Moreover, the countries in question seem to be following relatively similar patterns of development, not unlike those of earlier ‘late’ developers in continental Europe, such as Germany in the 19th century, with the State playing a substantial role as nurturer and ‘governor’ (Wade, 1990) of the market, as well as of other institutional sectors of society. The present paper deals exclusively with social policy arrangements found in the region, and it restricts itself to the fi ve presently most advanced exemplars of East Asian welfare capitalism, i.e. Japan and the four ‘tigers.’ Both the history of the respective policies and their main characteristics are well documented by now (see, e.g. Jones, 1993; Goodman et al., 1998; Ramesh, 2000; Holliday & Wilding, 2003; Walker & Wong, 2005; Aspalter, 2006). Less clear are these systems’ future prospects in the face of mounting adaptation pressures. All economically advanced countries have sophisticated welfare mechanisms in place that address the (basic) needs of their citizens. But some of these mechanisms perform better and/or seem more sustainable than others against the background of growing external competition and internal problems, thus offering more lessons for the designation of viable reform options. Following a brief discussion of the key com-

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monalities and differences of the ﬁ ve countries’ social policy regimes, this question is at the centre of the paper’s interest, and an attempt is made to venture some tentative answers.

I East Asian Welfare Regimes: Historical Roots and Present Policy Mixes

Widespread agreement exists on the following characteristics of East Asian social policy regimes. These regimes are said to be a) fairly residual, offering only very limited statutory protection, b) hardly socially redistributive and, therefore, also c) strongly status maintaining, d) investment rather than consumption oriented, e) predominantly regulatory, f ) commodifying rather than decommodifying, g) pragmatically devised (and incessantly modifi ed) rather than principle-driven, and h) lean yet effective and successful—if success is measured by parameters such as longevity, good health and educational attainment of the population (all of which are remarkably high in the region), levels of (un-)employment, absolute deprivation and extreme poverty/misery (which are low and/or virtually absent), as well as social stability and integration (low crime, high cohesiveness). In short, they cost little and still deliver. The latter point is usually brought home by highlighting East Asia’s comparatively low levels of public spending on welfare, both in terms of government expenditure and gross domestic product (GDP) share. However, even though it is certainly true that especially Northwest European countries tend to spend a much higher proportion of their GDP for social purposes than do their East Asian counterparts, the respective fi gures must be read with caution. For one thing, comparisons are diffi cult because the regulatory mechanisms in the two regions are quite different, so that not everything that would fall under public fi nance in Western countries would be deemed such in the East (see, e.g., Kwon, 1998 with reference to Singapore). For another, social security development in East Asia obviously set in much later than in regions that industrialised earlier, i.e. it is basically a post World War II phenomenon there (Hort & Kuhnle, 1990: 165), whereas the earliest traces of such developments in (continental) Europe date back to the late 19th century. This has to be taken into account if one is to arrive at a sound judgement. Contrary to the conviction held by some social policy analysts, lower levels of spending do not necessarily refl ect purposive strategies of ‘social dumping,’ despite widespread

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anti-welfarist rhetoric among the local political elites. Rather, they refl ect fi rst and foremost lesser progression of ‘developmental time.’ Of course, European welfare states, and even American social policy mechanisms, emerged chronologically earlier than those in East Asia. But when considering levels of social and economic modernisation at the point at which Asian countries introduced their fi rst social security programmes, then these countries actually appear to have started them earlier than most European nations, not later. They also seem to be following a ‘remarkably similar (. . .) sequence’ (ibid.: 166) of programme development—with measures of occupational injury protection, some form of health insurance and old age security provision coming fi rst and generally preceding the establishment of unemployment benefi ts and/or family allowances. Thus, one should not read too much into numbers alone. Whereas much of East Asia is still building up its social security/policy systems, and experimenting with various models and mechanisms, Europe and North America have of late begun to re-orient and partly retrench theirs because the ‘mature’ welfare states (Pierson, 2001) that now exist in that part of the world, have, to a certain extent, become a part of the problem they were meant to address. One often noted (and sometimes deplored) observation is that unemployment protection was virtually absent, or at least miniscule, in East Asian welfare regimes until very recently. However, so was unemployment itself (Chan, 2001), in economies that grew at double- digit numbers for decades and, hence, suffered less from the lack of protection of workers who were unable to fi nd a job, than from a shortfall of employable labour—which was overcome partly through the importation of foreign labour and partly through a rapid expansion of female labour market integration, much along the lines of earlier Western developments. In 1994, Japan was the fi rst East Asian country to introduce unemployment insurance, following the extended stagnation of its economic growth at the beginning of that decade. In 1995, South Korea and Taiwan followed suit, just before the onset of the Asian fi nancial crisis in 1997/8, which hit South Korea particularly hard (on South Korea, see Shin 2003). By regional standards, unemployment skyrocketed during that crisis, temporarily reaching levels close to 7% in Korea and Hong Kong, but still staying below 5% in the three other countries. In Hong Kong, this development gave rise to calls for the introduction of some form of unemployment insurance in this special administrative region too, but, given the less than fully democratic nature of its political system, such calls could be more eas-

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ily fended off there than in South Korea and Taiwan, both of which experienced a rapid extension of their social policy programmes after democratisation. Like Hong Kong, Singapore has no unemployment insurance to this date—but while unemployment continued to hover around 6% in Hong Kong since the late 1990s and even surged above 8% in the early years of the new millennium, in Singapore it rarely exceeds the 4% mark; in December 2005 it had, in fact, dropped as low as 2.5%, bringing the rate for the whole of that year down to 3.2% (Straits Times, 2 February 2006). Since then, it has stayed below 3%, due to continuous high economic growth. The ‘objective’ need for unemployment insurance remains, therefore, less pronounced here than elsewhere in the region, even though there is now growing awareness in Singapore, that structural unemployment, especially among the unskilled or low-skilled segments of the workforce, as well as the elderly, is gradually becoming a permanent problem that will not go away by itself, due to rapid tertiarisation of the economy and the departure of industries utilising predominantly cheap labour. There are two main strategies the Singaporean government pursues to address this problem: a) by upgrading the skills of those affected to make them re-employable (complemented by very active job counselling), and b) by upgrading the job profi les in fi elds, that Singaporeans, spoiled by decades of ‘miracle growth’ (World Bank, 1993), previously shunned—i.e. by introducing various workfare programmes that, coinci- dently, have recently made a surprising comeback in most Western countries as well (Saunders, 2005). In 2007 it added an income supplement scheme that boosts the incomes of some 438,000 low-wage earners by 10% or more annually through tax-fi nanced government top-ups (Straits Times, 16 February 2007). To people outside the workforce, on the other hand, Singapore offers only very minimal protection that barely helps them get by: occasional (and discretionary) grocery vouchers, a letter of support asking utility providers to stall payment requests if someone temporarily cannot pay his or her bills, etc. Moreover, it offers shelter and highly subsidised public housing as well as public health, so that people’s most basic needs are taken care of. But the main source of support for the truly needy is supposed to be each person’s family that is morally and legally entrusted with this responsibility. The strong emphasis on the family is not unique to Singapore or, for that matter, East Asia as a whole. Its best known European equivalent is the Roman Catholic Church’s doctrine of subsidiarity, which is particularly infl uential in Southern Europe and, generally, in parts of

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Europe where Catholicism traditionally had a strong foothold, including Germany, where, as in Singapore, parents can sue their children if the latter are unwilling to carry out their fi lial duties. The Nordic or Scan- dinavian countries, on the other hand, where such traditions are weak and which also form the most secular part of contemporary Europe, have gone furthest in socialising such responsibilities, by shifting them to tax-fi nanced (cradle to grave) public care facilities and through the instituonalisation of generous public health and pension systems. This makes their welfare states very costly, but also quite women-friendly, as care-giving in the home continues to be seen as (primarily) women’s work. Given the existence of public facilities and their cost, it is not surprising that the Nordic countries also enjoy the highest rates of female labour market participation in the world. Their welfare systems both facilitate this and make it fi nancially necessary for families who wish to enjoy the living standards that many Westerners have become accustomed to. Female employment is now also quite high in East Asia and will, in all likelihood, stay high in the foreseeable future, in Singapore, for example, the female labour force participation rate was 50 per cent in 2003 (Human Development Report 2005), and in Japan the respective fi gure was 48.3 per cent in 2004 (Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communication, 2005). This has numerous implications, not the least of which is growing pressure towards the introduction of more family and women-friendly work and welfare arrangements (see e.g. Roberts, 2005 on the Japanese case; for a discussion of such arrangements in the German context, see Schmidt, 1992). Like all welfare states, East Asian social policy regimes were initially premised on the reality and desirability of the male-breadwinner-female, housewife family model. However, this model is increasingly being eroded, both empirically and normatively. With growing levels of education, come new aspirations. Hence more and more women seek paid employment not just to top up the family budget, but also for the intrinsic gratifi cations it has to offer, which include earning an income of one’s own, the challenges of a career and the pleasures of participating in the ‘public sphere,’ to which employment gives (much improved) access. Housework must therefore be done during the ‘second shift.’ But if both husband and wife work full-time in paid employment, then the rationale, underpinned by what are essentially pre-modern (and hence outdated) value systems, for segregating family duties along gender lines begins to lose its plausibility. Part-time work, on the other hand, is typically associated with various

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disadvantages in paid employment, including lower career ceilings. As long as traditional gender relations prevail and women view their engagement in the labour market as merely supplementary to that of their husbands, such segregation may work. But as they move on to pursue their own careers, they increasingly begin to question it—less sternly as yet in Asia than in the West (Bulbeck 2005), but considering, once again, the passing of “developmental time” rathen than simply making synchronic comparisons, the trends are visible enough. Moreover, having an independent income also gives women greater bargaining power in the family, including a genuine exit option if the husband (or spouse or partner) proves unresponsive to their concerns. The results are rising divorce rates and increasing levels of singlehood, which are still low by Western standards, but nevertheless moving in directions familiar to Western observers (for some recent trend data on Hong Kong, see Estes, 2005; for the region as a whole, see Jones, 2005). Another trend, which has basically the same background, is a steep fertility decline (Feeney & Mason, 2002). Fertility is low (in fact, mostly below the replacement level) in all economically advanced countries, but it tends to be lowest in countries whose public care services are least developed. Not only do families have fewer children than in the past, they increasingly make a conscious choice to stay childless, and so do women who want to have a career but ﬁ nd themselves in an environment, that offers too little support for the reconciliation of paid work and family responsibilities. In Japan, for instance, they are increasingly “deferring and even forgoing marriage and childbirth to pursue work and career, or because they fear marriage will constrain them to traditional gender roles and limit their freedom” (Peng, 2003: 215). Low fertility means greater wealth for the individual (single or family) household in the short-term, but fewer people to secure this wealth in the long-term, as well as rising dependency ratios and growing care burdens for families. So, at the same time that the demand for care rises (due to increased longevity, and, therefore, growing numbers of frail elderly), the capacity of families to provide such care diminishes, because fewer children have to shoulder greater ﬁ nancial and in-kind burdens of care delivery. Moreover, rising numbers of family break- ups through divorce also mean more and more people—both men and women—are living alone in old age, so that there will be nobody in the household to resort to when care is needed; for women, this problem is, paradoxically, exacerbated by their higher life expectancy, because they often outlive their husbands even if the couple stays married

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until parted by death, thus experiencing a higher incidence of ‘solitary survivorship.’ To be sure, East Asia continues to have high rates of co- residency, i.e. three-generation families, where elderly people live with their children. In Japan, for instance, this is true of more than half of all elders to this date (Peng, ibid.: 217), compared to just over 10% in Germany. But such arrangements are coming under growing strain and are, in fact, on the decline in Japan no less than they are elsewhere in the developed world (see Yamato, 2006). Eventually, the ‘nuclearisation’ of families and the shrinking of household sizes will lead to problems that cannot be ignored, especially as and when people (including the elderly) are becoming more politically conscious and vociferous. One solution is to open one’s borders to immigration and/or one’s labour markets to foreign labour. In much of Asia, many menial household tasks and care services are being relegated to cheap, readily available live-in maids. The region will probably continue to tap this resource in the foreseeable future, not least to release middle class women into paid work (see Chan, 2006, focusing on Hong Kong). But this policy has its limitations too (there is, for instance, growing concern among families about the degree to which they can, or should, entrust maids with the raising of their children), and to the extent that it does, it will have to be supplemented by other measures—collective welfare measures such as those found in Scandinavia where fertility rates are higher than anywhere else in Europe precisely because of their women-friendliness. Generous welfare states are not just a drain on a country’s purse. When well devised and intelligently constructed, they can also absorb some of its problems and prepare it for a sustainable future. A marked future-orientation is indeed one of the cornerstones of all East Asian welfare regimes, expressing itself in high government spending on education and, at least initially, on public health care as well. Thus, in Hong Kong, education is “the largest policy area in terms of public expenditure,” accounting for roughly 23% of the government’s budget (Mok, 2003: 60f.). In Singapore, where education’s share comes second only to national defence, the ﬁ gure is 21.4% (in 2004: see Ministry of Finance, 2005). South Korea and Taiwan also invest heavily in education and so does Japan (for details on South Korea, see Shin, 2003; for Taiwan, see Holliday, 2005). As a result, East Asia’s workforce is now regarded as one of the best trained in the world. But given that manufacturing is gradually moving out of all these countries, even more will have to be done in future if they want to compete globally at the highest level, as they are determined to do.

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The trend in health care provision, on the other hand, offers a more mixed picture. During the mid-1960s, health care’s proportion of overall government expenditure peaked at just under 20% in Singapore (Lim, 1989). Thereafter, it declined steadily, although in real terms, government health expenditure continued to grow; it now amounts to less than 5% of the total budget and 1.6% of the country’s GDP (Khan, 2001; Singapore Department of Statistics, 2002; UNDP, 2006). While basic health services and facilities are heavily subsidised, the burden of paying for care was nevertheless increasingly shifted to the private sector, mainly employers and the clients themselves. In Hong Kong, the emphasis of State-provision is on secondary care rather than primary care, i.e. on more costly in-patient treatment, which is almost free for all citizens. Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP was about 4.5% in Singapore in 2003 (UNDP, 2006: 301) and amounted to 3.7% in Hong Kong during the late 1990s (Holliday, 2003). But in Singapore, roughly two thirds of these costs are borne privately, whereas in Hong Kong the government takes charge of the bulk of the bill; in the fi rst few years of the new millennium, health care consumed 12.7% of public expenditure (Government of the HKSAR, 2003: 20). Both Taiwan and South Korea are spending more on health care than the two cities, i.e. around 6% of GDP, of which about half is fi nanced collectively and the rest privately (UNDP, 2006; Holliday, 2003). In Japan, which spends slightly less than 8% of its GDP on health, three quarters of the costs are borne publicly (UNDP, 2006). Throughout the region, health expenditure is rising not only because of population ageing, but also because of growing prosperity and increasing demand for, as well as supply of, services that were previously unaffordable or did not exist at all—medical technologies keep pushing the boundaries of the profession’s capabilities. But the approaches taken to fi nancing such care are quite diverse. Taiwan introduced a national health insurance programme guaranteeing every citizen access to health care ‘as a social right’ (Kwon, 1998: 50), whose premiums the government covers up to 40 percent for low-income groups, in 1995 (Son, 2001). Programmes existing during pre-democratic times had covered only groups deemed essential to the support of the State. South Korea had a national health insurance, fi nanced through contributions paid jointly by employers and employees, in place as early as 1977. Ten years later, the programme was extended, with the government paying half the contributions for those previously not covered (Kwon, ibid.). Yet, with large co-payments and out-of-pocket expenses,

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a sizeable fraction of the actual costs (61% for out-patient and 39% for in-patient treatment) must still be borne by the patients themselves (Kwon, 2002). Similar provisions are in place in Taiwan (Ku, 2003). Japan had achieved universal health insurance coverage by 1961, “well before many other industrialised countries” (Oberländer, 2003: 88). Originally modelled on the Bismarckian system of Wilhelmine Germany, the system combines universal coverage with a uniform fee schedule for all providers. It is fi nanced primarily through employee and employer contributions, which are kept low because the government subsidises the insurers. Hong Kong’s system is largely tax fi nanced and essentially “a slimmed-down version of Britain’s National Health Service” (Holliday, 2003: 76). And in Singapore the key mechanism for fi nancing costly inpatient services is the Central Provident Fund (CPF), inherited from its former colonial master and forming the centrepiece of the country’s entire social policy framework. In addition, various very cheap (and voluntary) insurance schemes exist to cover parts of the costs of expensive catastrophic diseases. The main function of Singapore’s CPF, which is a compulsory savings scheme for employees, is to set aside a limited amount of money that can be drawn upon after retirement. Despite its multi-purpose nature, it can thus be seen as a rudimentary pension scheme, although nobody believes the amounts that scheme holders are obliged to keep in the fund will suffi ce to secure them a decent living once they retire. It is, however, better than nothing, with which the elderly were left in Hong Kong until recently, were no public retirement scheme existed before the government introduced the Mandatory Provident Scheme in 2000 as a vehicle for individual savings, to which employees and employers each contribute 5 per cent of the wage or salary (Lui, 1999). Korea established a national pension scheme in the 1980s, but coverage had reached no more than 27% of the working population by 1994 (Kwon, 1998: 52). Following various extensions, it is now said to cover the entire population (Kim, 2003). Taiwan had been planning a national pension system following the introduction of health insurance, but delayed it in the wake of the 1997/98 Asian fi nancial crisis; it took, therefore, until July 2005 before the system was fi nally introduced through the implementation of the National Pension Act. And Japan has a two-tiered system that guarantees a basic, tax-fi nanced pension to every citizen and that is supplemented by an earnings-related employee pension. Despite the sometimes bewildering diversity of the concrete measures taken and policies practised, several analysts argue that East

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Asian welfare regimes have enough in common to warrant subsump- tion under a common category. While earlier efforts to typify an East Asian welfare model focused on shared cultural roots (as in the notion of a Confucian welfare model proposed by Jones, 1993), the approach preferred here is forward-looking and emphasises the goal-orientation of social policies, their directionality in terms of some overarching objective(s) towards whose realisation these policies are all ultimately geared: economic growth. It is for this reason that Holliday (2000) calls East Asian social policy systems ‘productivist regimes.’ In such regimes, says Holliday (ibid.: 709), “all aspects of State policy, including social policy,” are subordinated “to economic/industrial objectives,” from which everything else fl ows. They are welfarist “by any reasonable yardstick” (ibid.: 711)—and they are even more so if one extends, following Luhmann (1981) and Schnapper (2005), the notion of a welfare state beyond its classical conceptualisation as an agency in charge of providing social security proper. Their strong orientation towards fostering economic growth and creating wealthy and strong nations arguably makes them unique in the world of welfare capitalism. And although the 21st century will doubtless bring about new challenges that they, like any welfare system, will have to tackle, Holliday believes “it highly unlikely that they will move beyond productivist welfare capitalism in the foreseeable future” (ibid.: 721; see also Holliday, 2005). The region has fared extremely well with its brand of welfare capitalism, and the age of globalisation may indeed turn this brand into a model for the rest of the world. The present paper shares this assessment—with two qualifi cations. First, Japan’s dismal economic performance during the last one and a half decades suggests that its variety of welfare capitalism may prove as unsustainable as the ‘German model’ with which it shares many characteristics and which distinguish both systems from the liberal, Anglo-American world of welfare capitalism that appears set to dominate the stage for years to come (Streeck & Yamamura, 2003). In other words, East Asian welfare capitalism is not just a model for success, but also in need of adaptation to new economic realities, and this is true particularly of its most developed exemplar. However, the point, if true, confi rms Holliday’s line of reasoning rather than putting it into question, as it is precisely those elements of the Japanese (and German) systems whose function it was to shield their economies to a certain extent, from market pressures that are now increasingly seen as brakes to dynamism. Removing them would make Japanese welfare capitalism

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more, not less productivist, and this is precisely the direction that recent reform initiatives have taken in Japan (Schoppa, 2006). Second, the remarkable recovery of the Nordic countries, which underwent a deep crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, suggests their variety may prove a viable and attractive alternative to purely productivist welfare capitalism—provided they debunk the idea of ‘politics against markets’ (Esping-Andersen, 1985) that originally drove the development of social policies in these countries, because such politics cannot stem the tide of an increasingly open, integrated world economy. That is exactly what the Nordic countries are doing. Their example shows that it is possible to combine economic dynamism and innovation with low levels of social inequality and hence, to provide signiﬁ cant social security even in the face of growing market pressures and competition. In other words, not all is lost to the cause of social solidarity (see Stjernø, 2005).

II The Enabling State: Work, Health, and Education

Gilbert (2002) has argued that the (Western) welfare state is undergoing a transformation that goes beyond mere adjustments, because it changes its very nature. The aggregate result of two decades of incremental change amounts to a paradigm shift in the Western world of welfare capitalism: from consumption to investment, from passive accommodation to active moulding, from welfare to workfare. Gilbert calls the new system that is beginning to take shape in the West the ‘enabling state.’ The ‘enabling state’ is concerned about making its clients ‘fi t’ for successful participation in the market, rather than taking them out of the market and supplying them with (income-substituting) safety nets if they prove unemployable under prevailing conditions. On the one hand, this entails the removal of protection rights enjoyed by the insiders of the labour market that raise labour costs, and thus, indirectly, serve to exclude growing numbers of outsiders who cannot be effi ciently employed at such ‘distorted’ rates, as well as of disincentives to work, such as high and/or long lasting unemployment benefi ts that make it rational for individuals to decline job offers considered unat- tractive. On the other hand, it entails a concerted effort to upgrade a country’s human capital stock through offering state-of-the-art, lifelong education at the highest level and, thus, opportunities to attain skills enhancing workers’ employability and competitiveness. In short, the

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‘enabling state’ prepares workers better for the market while at the same time, pushing them into it. To the world of productivist welfare capitalism none of this is new. But the changes go well beyond labour market reforms: they affect, indeed, the whole range of social policies, and they generally involve a shift of responsibility for people’s welfare from collective mechanisms to more individualised, market-based solutions. Thus, State-adminis- tered or funded pension systems are gradually supplemented by private savings schemes designed to compensate for income losses accruing from inevitable cuts in public pension levels; several Western countries have accumulated pension commitments that are virtually unrealisable (Giddens, 2000). The response to this cannot simply be to raise taxes because that may well become self-defeating. Not only does it discourage capital investment that holds the promise of creating desperately needed jobs (and of enlarging one’s fi scal revenue basis), it also encourages middle-class fl ight to ‘greener pastures,’ as exemplifi ed by several hundred thousand French who have migrated to Britain to save taxes (Gilbert, 2002: 35f.). But when the most productive segments of one’s workforce, those whose services are actually demanded in the market, leave, while the weakest stay, then one’s capabilities of caring for the latter also diminish. So the only feasible response appears to consist in a policy package, which combines a lowering of public pension entitlements to a modest level of ‘suffi ciency’ (Kersting, 2000) with improved possibilities of self-help, in the labour market and beyond. Another problem that needs to be brought under control is the constantly rising health care costs. Germany, for instance, not only spends more on old age security than do most other OECD countries (Eurostat, 2005), it also has one of the world’s most costly health care systems into which the country channels around 11 percent of its GDP annually, second only to the United States. At the same time, it has been neglecting its education system for decades, severely compromising the quality of its once world-class universities and producing constantly rising numbers of ‘functionally illiterate’ youths whose future prospects are more than gloomy. A veritable generation confl ict is thus looming; and if this confl ict is not addressed soon, the young may well respond by voting with their feet: a recent survey of what has been baptised ‘generation good-bye’ revealed that close to 60% of the students currently enrolled at German universities thinks it likely that they will (have to) emigrate, because neither Germany nor, for that matter, continental

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Europe as a whole, holds suffi ciently attractive economic opportunities for them (Spiegel, Online 2005). Health care and education are two fi elds in which East Asia can teach continental Europe important lessons. The most signifi cant of these is the confi rmation of an insight that has been widely known for decades, but has not been suffi ciently heeded by European policy makers and social science health care analysts: the fact that health care’s impact on people’s health status is remarkably small (Williams, 1990; Castilla, 2004), at least if this status is measured by commonly used indicators such as infant mortality rates at birth, life expectancy and so forth. Various estimates suggest that medical care accounts for no more than between 10% and 20% of the 20th century gains in life expectancy, which probably refl ect the greatest jump in the history of humankind (Wildavsky, 1977; Easterlin, 2000; Economist, 2004). The rest is believed to be attributable to better nutrition, sanitation, hygiene, housing, various environmental factors, personal behaviour or lifestyle, and, last but not least, education (McKeown, 1979; Pincus et al., 1998; Puska, 1999; Lleras-Muney, 2005). This conjecture seems to be supported by the observation that rich countries or special administrative regions like Singapore and Hong Kong, that spend relatively little on health care, fare no worse on these indicators than do the US and Germany (UNDP, 2006: 315). In fact, a recent ranking of health care systems by the World Health Organization (2000), using eight standard measures, put Singapore at number 6, whereas the German and the American systems made it only to numbers 25 and 37, respectively (Hong Kong, which was not included in the ranking, seems to perform even better on these indicators than Singapore; see Estes, 2005). Further support for the conjecture comes from the experience of several much poorer regions or countries, such as Costa Rica, Kerala in India, Sri Lanka, and China before its transition to capitalism, which have been enormously successful in improving longevity rates without being able to pour vast amounts of money into health care. What they have done instead, was to secure relatively cheap basic health care for all (Sen, 1999). Of course medical care delivers more than just longer lives. It improves the quality of people’s lives, e.g. through greater mobility, enhanced vision and pain relief, to name but a few. And while it is true that Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s populations are still much younger than those of the average West European nation, that argument has its limitations, because Britain, which until recently spent signifi cantly less on health care than its continental European counterparts, achieved

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results quite comparable to them, and Japan, which also spends much less, but has the oldest population of all OECD countries, enjoys the highest life expectancy in the world and has a health care system that is judged to perform well despite receiving less than the OECD- average GDP share ( Jeong & Hurst, 2001; World Health Organization, 2000). In other words, while there is doubtless room for expanding the public health care budgets of Singapore (Phua, 2002)—a view that seems to be confi rmed by a signifi cant boost in government spending on health care in 2007 (Straits Times, 16 February 2007)—and Hong Kong, especially because their demographic transitions are still largely matters of the future, their experience, in conjunction with those of several other countries, shows that very high health standards are attain- able despite low spending. This is a lesson not just for high spenders but for all countries. But the lesson does not end here. For not only is health care’s impact on people’s health status limited; it also has a fairly limited effect on people’s life chances more generally. To see this, it is probably best to ask oneself what one should expect of health care in the fi rst place, what one wants it to achieve. This, in turn, raises the question as to what constitutes a good or meaningful life, and how much one can expect the community to contribute to one’s ability of leading such a life. Following the renowned ethicist Norman Daniels (1996), one can expect quite a bit, but not much more than what is required to guarantee fair equality of opportunity to pursue a life plan one has reason to value. To this end, however, one needs more than just good health care, for instance a good education. Education enables us to develop our general capabilities to function in the contemporary world, and, in this sense, enhances the range of options that become available to us. Health care contributes to these freedoms, as it helps us maintain or restore normal species-typical functioning threatened or compromised by ill health. Yet, like all factors that have a role to play in this, its contribution is a limited one. Therefore, despite our inclination to seeing health care as special, in our budget allocations we have to trade it somewhat for other valuable goods and services, and the prudent course of action would be to restrict its share to the minimum required for securing this limited purpose. This normative argument for rationing health care receives further support from an empirical observation. In a world economy characterised by fi erce competition, ever shorter product replacement cycles coupled with rapid technological innovation and knowledge re-invention,

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education assumes greater importance both for society at large and for the individual. Without a good education, people are increasingly marginalised in the labour market, and this is true especially of high- wage economies, because in such economies many unskilled or low- skilled workers become virtually unemployable. (Re)training is their only chance of (re-)integration, and such training is costly. Given the growing signifi cance of education and the limited impact of health care on people’s health status, priorities have to be set accordingly. East Asian countries seem to be making the right trade-offs by prioritising education over health care—their governments spend more, or at least as much, on the former than they do on the latter. Interestingly, their Scandinavian counterparts are moving in the same direction. Thus, while spending more in both areas—between 5.7% to 8.6% of the GDPs on health care and 6.5% to 8.4% on education (UNDP, 2006: 301; 319)—the governments of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark are making similar trade-offs by emphasising investment into the future more strongly than several continental European countries, especially Germany, which spends just over half as much on public education as on public health care, namely 4.8% versus 8.7%, respectively. In preparing people to succeed in the market, a government may, indirectly, even enhance their health status, as safe/safer employment, higher incomes and a good education tend to be associated with health conscious lifestyles (McMurray, 2004), a better ability to understand health risks, less docility towards doctors trying to deny certain patients scarce (but effective) treatment (Aaron & Schwartz, 1984), etc. At the same time, they reduce the risks of unemployment-related disease, psychological stress, social status loss and even premature death: the long-term unemployed suffer signifi cant declines in life expectancy (Kieselbach, 2000). Once a decent level of basic care is secured for all, the health-enhancing effect of education may thus be greater than that of additional health care (Fuchs, 1979; Lleras-Muney, 2005). This is not to deny that there are signifi cant inequalities in the access to proper health care—in East Asia and elsewhere. However, it is more than doubtful that an expansion of (public) health services beyond the level of basic care would actually benefi t the weakest sections of the population (Castilla, 2004); the main benefi ciaries of the British National Health Service are, for instance, not the worst-off but the middle classes because they are in a much better position to utilise the facilities it offers (Goodin & Le Grand, 1987). So even if one were concerned primarily about the plight of the poor and the protection

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of the vulnerable, one would still be well advised to prioritise (more and better) education over (more and better) health care should it prove diffi cult to fi nd both sectors equally well. But while East Asia seems to be making the right trade-off between investment- and consumption-oriented welfare policies, not everything is well with its social realities. For instance, even though one fi nds nothing in the region that resembles the extreme misery suffered by inhabitants of the North American inner city ghettos or South American favelas, there is no dearth of relative poverty, especially in Singapore and Hong Kong, whose income distribution is highly skewed in favour of the well-off. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Singapore recently introduced a new income supplement programme to give its poor a leg-up (Straits Times, 16 February 2007), and while measures such as these certainly help, a country whose per capita income ranks amongst the highest in the world would certainly be capable of doing more without endangering its economic competitiveness. This is a fi eld in which East Asia could learn more from Europe, and once again, primarily from Nordic Europe, because Scandinavia not only ranks high on economic competitiveness (World Economic Forum, 2006), it also has the lowest poverty rates in the OECD, coupled with acceptable (and declining) levels of unemployment, good public health and pensions (Kuhnle et al., 2003; Bonoli, 2006) and remarkably low income disparities (Fritzell, 2003). On top of that, its variety of welfare capitalism is very women- friendly, as mentioned before. These and other virtues/attributes (e.g., its children-friendliness) have repeatedly earned it the highest scores in intra-European justice evaluations of welfare regimes (Merkel 2001; Berlinpolis, 2005). The Nordic countries appear to be moving in a direction that may well refl ect a healthy balance between productivist and non-productivist (Offe, 1992) elements of a well-designed social policy package. During the past 15 years or so, they have strengthened the workfare elements, demanding greater fl exibility of the labour force. At the same time, they have retained strongly solidaristic and universal health care and pension systems addressing the basic needs of the whole population. And they seem to have found an answer to the demographic transition as well, consisting of a high level of female labour market integration combined with the setting up of quality childcare and old age facilities that turn care into a profession, rather than depending on the unpaid ‘labour of love’ by women who are rightfully demanding equality of status and recognition.

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As is well known, learning from others rarely means importing/copy- ing their solutions wholesale and implementing them one-to-one at home. Rather, it involves the willingness to think beyond the present and familiar, and to probe one’s ‘received’ solutions or established policies in the light of alternatives, which, upon reﬂ ection, may be partially adopted and locally adapted. But while in the past such learning was largely unidirectional, the East—East Asia—now has to teach the West important lessons too. Beyond what has already been indicated, these lessons cannot be spelled out in detail here. But one example deserving serious consideration for such cross-continental fertilisation of reform debates is certainly the Singaporean health care system, which, while not without its own problems, offers very interesting clues as to how one can build an effective, yet comparatively cheap system that balances an inevitable degree of paternalism protecting people against their own weakness of will and short-sightedness with a high degree of liberty, permitting those, who are able and willing to care for themselves to make their own choices (Schmidt, 2004).

III Conclusion

In conclusion, it seems that developments both in East Asia and in the West by and large confi rm a hotly contested argument of Wilensky (1975; 2002), i.e. that virtually all countries that grow affl uent as a result of successful industrialisation of their economies will sooner or later establish some mechanisms for collective, State-run/regulated welfare provision. Nowadays, one might add that the installment of some such mechanism could be one of the very conditions of success itself, as a comparison between Latin America, which was well ahead of Asia other than Japan after World War II, and East Asia suggests. Latin America is not only the region with the highest levels of inequality in the world, it has also left its poor almost completely unprotected (Barrientos, 2004) and unprepared to play any signifi cant role in economic/industrial development (de Ferranti et al., 2004). East Asia, on the other hand, pursued the opposite strategy and is now one of the pillars of the world economy, no longer a ‘peripheral’, dependent participant, but a key member of the ‘core.’ The region enjoys unprecedented prosperity, and even though its welfare regimes are only marginally redistributive, all segments of society have benefi ted from its ‘shared growth,’ so that everyone’s living standards are now much higher than those of their

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ancestors. Looking more speciﬁ cally at the design of welfare regimes, it seems that Europe is presently moving in the direction of Asian productivism, but there are also signs that East Asia may eventually need a greater dose of European non-productivism (Gough, 2004; see also Low & Aw, 2004 for the idea of introducing a ‘participation income’ that recognises non-economic contributions to society’s welfare), adding to the North Atlantic liberalism that has been the strongest force shaping the world’s socio-economic development during the past 20 years. The overall pattern is therefore one of growing convergence—not to be understood as sameness or identity, but as increasing similarity of welfare regimes and of the polities and policies of socio-economically advanced countries more generally (Schmidt, 2006), which, in turn, is a result partly of adaptations to similar environmental conditions and partly of mutual learning across regime types and world regions.

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Aaron, H.J. & Schwartz, W.B. 324 Biomedical Sciences Initiative 135, Abdullah, N. 267 139, 141 Action for AIDS 301 Biopower 24 Adult Co-operative Training biotechnology 135–138, 142 Scheme 133 birth rates 2, 38 Agency for Science, Technology and Blackburn, K. 210 Research 136, 230 Block, F. 134 aging Bloom, D.E. 113 population 2, 12, 14, 16, 26, 77, Bloom, D.E., Canning, D. & Sevilla, J. 198, 317 73 society 2 Bloom, D.E. & Williamson, J.G. 173 AFA see Action for AIDS Bonoli, G. 325 anti-welfarist 14, 19, 311 Bourdieu, P. 111 Appold, S. 110 Box, S. 266 Ariff, S & Soh, N. 292 Bremer, L. 100, 115 Arshad, A. 299 Brems, E. 303 Asher, M. 86, 93 Breton, G. 102 Asian Brodeur, J.P. 249 conservatism 18, 301, 303 Brunero, D. 210 culture 47, 286, 302–303 BSC see Basic Skills Certifi cate social policy 18, 28, 311, 314, 319 Bullbeck, C. 315 values 26, 32, 73, 108, 125, Burton, S. 204 202–204, 269, 301, 303, 305 Buruma, I. 302 Au, D. 290 Austin, W.T. 256 Cashmore, E. & McLaughlin, E. 252 Castel, R. 24 Baby Bonus Scheme 7, 14, 49, 54, 75 Castells, M. 101 Baker, M. 286 Castilla, E.J. 322, 324 Ballantine, J.H. & Spade, J.Z. 101, 113 Castles, S. & Miller, M.J. 148 Banton, M. 252 CDAC see Chinese Development Barr, M.D. 30, 31 Assistance Council Barrientos, A. 326 CEA see Certifi cate of Employment Basic Education for Skills Training 133 Agencies Basic Skills Certifi cate 159 Central Narcotics Bureau 250, 272 Bayley, D.H. 250 Central Provident Fund 29, 63, 76, 82, Beck, U. 268 279, 318, see also CPF Becker, G. 181 Certifi cate of Employment Becker, H. 265 Agencies 162 Beirne, P. & Nelken, D. 249 Chadeau, A. 177, 186 Bell, D. 2, 134, 301 Chan, A. 12, 78, 80, 84, 87 Bello, W. & Rosenfi eld, S. 129 Chan, J. 126, 127, 249 Bessis, S. 122 Chan, R 312 BEST see Basic Education for Skills Chang, J.H.-Y. & Mani, A. 111 Training Chang, T.C., et al. 204, 212 Bhalla, A.S. 112–114 Chasin, A. 293 Biddlecom et al. 83 Chew, S.B. & Chew, R. 160 Bills, D.B. 99, 100, 112 Chia, E. 295

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Chia, S.A. 92 and the arts 231 Chia, S.Y. 3 of dependency 2, 19 Chiew, S.K. 160 Children Development Account 54, 75 Darwin, M. et al. 300 Chinese Development Assistance Darwinism 33 Council 139, 267 DaVanzo, J. & Chan, A. 94 Chong, C.K. 291 de Ferranti, D. et al. 326 Chong, E. 302 de Haas, H. 165 Choongh, S. 252 de Wit, H. 99, 101–103, 106–108, 116 Chua, B.H. 11, 16, 37, 201, 232, 258, Deheja, V. 303 259 democratic socialism 6, 30 Chua, B.H. & Yeo, W.W. 235 demographic dividend 73 Chua, K.S.L. 288 demographic patterns 4 Chua, M.Y. 255, 269 Department of Statistics 49, 50, 58, citizenship 10, 12, 21–22, 35, 40, 137, 65–66, 71, 74–75, 128, 179, 317 147–148, 281, 304, see also social Derek, Bok 100–101 citizenship Designated Red-Light Areas 300 Clark, C. 173 developmental states 13, 26 Clarke, J. 279 Devan, J. 201 CNB see Central Narcotics Bureau Deyo, F.C. 26–27 COA see Committee on Aging DINKS see “double-income, no kids” Cocks, H.G. 282 Dixon-Mueller, R. & Anker, R. 186 Cogwill, D.O. & Holmes, L.D. 78, 82 Donzelot J. 46, 49, 63 Cohen, A. 265 Doomernik et al. 146 Coloma, R. 298 “double-income, no kids” 62 ComCare 7 Dougherty, L. 114 Committee on Aging 73–74, 77, 94 DRAs see Designated Red-Light Areas communism 203, 247–248 DRC see Drug Rehabilitation Centre communitarian citizenship 22, 35 Drug Rehabilitation Centre 254 Community Safety and Security dysfunctional families 79, 262, 265, Programme 259 274 confucian welfare model 319 Conservation Master Plan 207 e-learning 106, 116–117 conservative-corporatist regime 5–6, East Asian 8, 26 economies 18, 23, 27 corporatist welfare regime 39 popular culture sphere 232, 238 correctionalist penal-welfare policy 262 social policy 18, 311, 314, 319 Council for Professional & Tech. 11 social policy regimes 311, 314 Cox, D., Hansen, B.E. & social policy systems 319 Jimenez, E. 83 welfare 18, 25–26, 40, 309–312, CPF 8, 29–31, 34–37, 39–40 63, 76, 316, 319 82, 85–87, 279, 318 welfare capitalism 18, 310, 319 criminal welfare regime 25, 40, 312, 316 justice policies 17, 247 economism 121–122, 127, 132, 141 justice system 17, 247–248, 252, economic 254, 259, 267–268, 270, 272–274 heritage 204 Law (Temporary Provisions) Act 247 liberalism 17, 304 criminalization 252, 256, 264, 281, pragmatism 225, 231 286 productivity 52, 70, 73, 91, 243 criminological theory 247 welfare 9–10, 173 CSSP see Community Safety and Economic Review Committee Security Programme 97–98 Culture EDB see Educational Development and technology 231, 232 Board

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educational talent 15–17, 91–92, 97, 110, hub 11, 15, 97, 99, 106, 110, 117 137–138, 147, 154, 166, 222, 230 institutions 103, 112, 114, 132, 218 Foucault, M. 24, 257, 262 policy 15, 108, 115 Frankenberg, E. et al. 85 system 15 Frankenberg, E., Chan, A. & Ofstedal, Educational Development Board 97, M.B. 81 136, 230, 231 Fritzell, J. 325 Eickson, K. 265 Fuchs, V.R. 324 Employment Agencies Act 152, 162 Employment of Foreign Workers Garland, D. 247, 262, 270 Act 152, 164 “Gays, Lesbians, Bisexuals and Employment of Foreign Workers (Fees) Transgendereds” 298 regulation 152 GDP 3, 13, 110–111, 146, 189, 173, Employment Pass 152 194, 311, 317, 321 enabling state 320–321 gender Enhanced Child Relief 52 equality 5, 127 EP see Employment Pass migration 148 Esping-Andersen, G. 1–4, 23, 26–27, (role) socialization 67 38–39, 121, 320 Giddens, A. 121–122, 321 Estes, R.J. 322 Gil 22, 40 European welfare state 312 Gilbert, N. 320, 321 export-oriented industrialization 26, 31 GLBT see “Gays, Lesbians, Bisexuals and Transgendereds” Fairclough, G. 298 global family 45, 58, 79 economy 14, 24, 26, 57, 64, 129 ideology 45, 47, 49, 56 knowledge economy 100 planning 11, 49–51, 73 globalization 7–8, 13, 19, 23, 73, policies 7, 42, 45–51, 53, 55, 291 97–99, 107, 113, 116–117, 207, policing 46 221–222, 229, 319 Family Planning and Population and tertiary education 117 Board 50–51 Goh, C.T. 7, 55, 222, 225, 292 FAST see Foreign Domestic Worker Goh, K.S. 121 Association for Skills Training Goldschmidt-Clermont, L. 177 Fawcett, J.T. & Khoo, S.E. 4, 75 Goodlin, R. & Le Grand, J. 324 Feeley, M. & Simon, J. 267 Goodman, R. & Peng, I. 27 Feeney, G. & Mason, A. 315 Gopinathan, S. 125–126 Feldman, D. 299 governmental project 247, 254 female labor force participation 4, 45, Graduate Mothers’ Priority Scheme 37 127, 314 Grandparent Caregiver Tax Relief 54 feminization of migration 148 Great Marriage Debate 51 fertility decline 75, 315 Gronau, R. 186 Firebaugh, G. 99 Gross Domestic Product 3, 92, 110, Florida, R. 292 128, 146, 173, 189, 311 FMMD see Foreign Manpower Gulik, R.H.V. 303 Management Division Fong, T. & Sim, G. 285 Halliday, J. 272 Foreign Han, F.K. et al. 33–34 Domestic Worker Association for Hawrylyshyn, O. 177 Skills Training 159 Hays, S. 62–64 maid levy 54 HDB 8, 36–37, 47, 52, 54, 77, 82, Manpower Management 86, 94, 258–259, 264, 293 Division 151 Heal, K. & Laycock, G. 257 manpower policy 148, 159, health expenditure 317 165–166 Hega, G.M. & Hokenmaier, K.G. 123

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Heng, G. & Devan, J. 38 Information and Communications Heritage Technology 23 conservation 205 Information Technology 103 awareness survey 212, 214–217, Inter-Ministerial Committee 73, 75–76 220 on Aging Population 77 museums 211 Inter-Ministerial Committee on Aging policy 201, 209, 221 Report 73–74 preservation 12, 16, 212–214, 216, Inter-Ministry Committee 221 on juvenile crime 260 Singaporeans’ attitude 212 on juvenile delinquency 260 Hermalin, A.I. 80, 82 intergenerational Heteronormativity 290–291 support 78, 83, 85 Heyzer, N. 127–128 transfers 74, 78, 80, 83–84 Hill, M. & Lian, K.F. 22, 32, 36–37, Internal Security Act 247, 255 262, 264 International Enterprise Singapore 105 Hindess, B. 9, 40 international migration 80, 148, 150 Hinsch, B. 303 ISA see Internal Security Act Hochschild, A.R. 61 Islamic Religious Council of Singapore Holliday, I. 318–319 see MUIS Homosexuality 17, 239, 282, 291–292, IT see Information Technology 302 Hor, M. 289 Jayaram, N. 113–114 Hort, S.E.O. & Kuhnle, S. 311 Jemaah Islamiah 255 Household production 173, 174, 181 Jeong, H.-S. & Hurst, J. 323 input-based approaches 175 JI see Jemaah Islamiah market growth 191–195, 197 Jomo, K.S. 129 model 182 Jones, C. 25–26, 319 output-based approaches 174 Jones, G.W. 315 Housing Jones, R.C. 150 Development Board 8, 36, 47, 258, Jucevuciene, P. & Vaitkus, R. 113 293, see also HDB Jupp, V. 257 policies 22, 47, 52, 55, 94, 294 Juster, F.T. & Strafford, F.P. 186 Huang, S. & Yeoh, B.S.A. 54, 61 juvenile delinquency 252, 259–263, Huber, S. 100 265, 274 Huff, W.G. 3, 124, 129 Hughes, G. 253, 266, 270 Kapur, D. 150 Hui, W.-T. 145–146, 154–155, 161 Kasza, G.J. 28, 309 Human Development Report 314 KBE see Knowledge-Based Economy human capital 1, 3, 25, 28, 31, 79, 98, Kemshall, H. 25, 268, 270 114, 117, 121, 154, 320 Kende, P. 173 Humphreys, L. 299 Kersting, W. 321 hyper-competition 23 Khalik, S. 299 Kieselbach, T. 324 ICT see Information and Kim, M. 318 Communications Technology Knodel, J. & Chayovan, N. 84 IE see International Enterprise Knight, J. & de Wit, H. 106 Singapore Knowledge-Based Economy 2, 23, IMC see Inter-Ministerial 228, 230–231 Committee 82 Koh, L. 299 immigration 91–92, 137, 146–148, Kong, L. & Yeoh, B.S.A. 204, 207, 152, 154, 160, 165, 280, 316 222 Immigration Act 152 Krishnan, Sanjay et al. 241 income inequality 99, 114 Ku, Y-W. 318 industrialization 124 Kuhnle, S. et al. 325

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Kumar, R. & Lee, T.Y. 129 Maintenance of Parents Tribunal 47 Kuo, E.C.Y. & Wong, A.K. 260, 262 Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 240 Kuznets, S. 173 Malays 1, 38, 91, 107, 112, 248, 266, Kwon, H-Y. 311, 317–318 267 Kwok, K.W. et al. 201 Malay Working Group 267 Man-Year Entitlement 162 labour manpower policy 151, 230 force participation rates 178 Maria Hertogh riots 248 migration policy Marmora, L. 148, 150 demand-driven system 146, Marshall, T.H. 9, 21, 27, 40 149–150, 161, 165 Martin, L.G. 80 supply-driven system 149 Martin, L.G. & Kinsella, K. 78 Laurent, E. 280 Massachusetts Institute of Lavalette, M. & Pratt, A. 9, 22 Technology 98 Lee, H.L. 7, 38, 56, 86, 98, 202 Massey, D. 115 Lee, K.Y. 32–33, 38 Mauzy, D. & Milne, R.S. 32 Lee, S.M., Alvarez, G. & Palen, J.J. 75 Mazzarol, T. & Soutar, G.N. 108 Lee, Y.J., Parish, W.L. & Willis, R.J. 79 McConville, M. & Mirsky, C. Lennon, M.C. & Rosenﬁ eld, S. 60 252–253 Leong, W.T. 17, 282, 301 McMurray, W. 324 Leow, B.G. 46 MCYS see Ministry of Community Levin, H.M. 112 Development, Youth and Sports Lewis, G. & Fink, J. 30 MDA see Media Development Authority LFPR see labor force participation Measor, L. 297 rates 178, 180, 189 Medisave 52–53, 78 Li, M.K. 284 MENDAKI 267 Lian, K.F. 11, 13 Media Development Authority 295 Lian, K.F. & Rahman, M.M. 148, 150 Merkel, C. 325 liberal democracy 27, 289 middle class 27, 35–36, 39–40, 110, liberal-welfare state 5–6 115, 222, 236, 254, 265, 280, 316, liberalisation 17, 166, 244 321, 324 Lien, L. 52 Midgley, J. 121 life expectancy 74, 93, 185, 315, Midgley, J. & Tang, K.L. 122 322–324 migration 16, 78, 80, 94, 113, 137, Lim, L. 299 145–150, 152–154, 164–165, 166, Lim, L. and Gregory, M.J. 136 219 Lim, L.Y.C. 127 MINDEF see Ministry of Defence living arrangements 45, 52, 74, 80–81, Ministry 88, 293 of Community Development, Youth Lleras-Muney, A. 324 and Sports 45, 47, 54, 55, 279 Lodge, G. 25 of Defence 210, 291 Lombroso, C. 270 of Education 11, 105 Lopata, H.Z. 60 of Information and the Arts 210, low fertility 2, 14, 16, 37, 52, 78, 94, 225–226 315 of Manpower 46, 150, 153, 159 Low, G.T. 126–127 of Trade and Industry 92, 132 Low, L. 23, 145, 147, 154, 161 Mirza, H. 124, 130 Low, L. & Aw, T.C. 30, 33, 35 Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order Luhmann, N. 319 and Nuisance) Act 283, 290 Lui, F.T. 318 Misuse of Drugs Act 251 Lund, B. 23, 33 Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act 254 maid levy 7, 54 MIT see Massachusetts Institute of Maintenance of Parents Act 47, 79 Technology

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MITA see Ministry of Information and Nordhaus, W. & Tobin, J. 173 the Arts NTU see Nanyang Technological Mitchell, W. et al. 173 University MNC 1, 15, 124–125, 128, 133 nuclearization 316 Modular Skills Training 133 NUS see National University of MOE see Ministry of Education Singapore Mok, K.-H. & Tan, J. 100, 105 NWZ see Neighborhood Watch Zones MOM see Ministry of Manpower Nye, I.F. 263 Monjardet, D. 248 Morrison, W. 270 Oberlander, C. 318 MOST see Modular Skills Training OECD see Organization for Economic MUIS see Majlis Ugama Islam Co-operation and Development Singapura Offe, C. 325 Mullard, M. 21 Ofori, G. 148 Multi-National Corporations see MNC Ofstedal, M.B. et al. 78 Multi-Tier Family Housing Priority old age dependency ratio 4, 73, 85, 92 Scheme 47 old penology 270 Muzaini, H. & Yeoh, B.S.A. 210 Ong, A. 24 MWG see Malay Working Group Ong, J.H. 300 MYE see Man-Year Entitlement Ong, T.C. 202, 225 Ong, S.C. 259 NAC see National Arts Council Ong-Chew, P.W. & Dewi, S. 286 NACA see National Advisory Council on Organization for Economic the Aged Co-operation and Development 85, Nanyang Technological University 98, 321 130 Narayanan, G. 17, 248–249, 255, 260 Packer, H. 250 Narayanan, G. & Lian, K.F. 252 Penal Code 162, 280–281, 283, 285 nation building 16, 27, 97, 148, 201, Pang, E.F. 147, 161 203, 210, 214, 221 Pang, E.F. & Lim, L. 145, 147 National Pang, E.F., Tan, C.H. & Cheng, Advisory Council on the Aged 76 S.M. 127 amnesia 209 Pannell, Kerr & Forster 205 Arts Council 226, 230, 238 PAP see People’s Action Party Drama Review Committee 241 patriarchy 45, 51, 58, 69 Crime Prevention Council 259 PELU see Public Entertainment Day Rally Speech 51, 55–56, 146, Licensing Unit 202, 221, 228, 302 Peng, I. 315–316 Heritage Board 206, 211, 226 Pereira, A. 11, 15, 124, 135 Trade Union Congress 126 People’s Action Party 1, 21, 25, 29–30, University of Singapore 98, 129 225 Nativadad, J.N. & Cruz, G.T. 84 PEP see Personalized Employment Pass Neighborhood Watch Zones 259 Perry, M., Kong, L. & Yeoh, neo-confucian values 13, 25 B.S.A. 205 new penality 267 Personalized Employment Pass 154 new penology 270 Petersen, W. 240 Ng, E. 264 Phua, K.H. 323 Ng, Eng Hen 100 PID see Police Intelligence Department NGO see Non-Governmental Pierson, C. 5, 32 Organization Pierson, P. 312 NHB see National Heritage Board Piper, N. 150 Nirmala, M. 297 PMB see Preservation of Monuments Non-Governmental Organization 11, Board 92 Police Force Ordinance 248

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Police Intelligence Department 257 Savage, V.R. & Yeoh, B.S.A. 209 policy hierarchy 279–280 Saw, S.H. 51 political conservatism 17, 304 Schmidt, V.H. 18, 314, 326 population Schnapper, D. 319 control policies 45–46, 50, 52, 57 Schoppa, L. 320 diamond 34, 37, 39 SDF see Skills Development Fund growth 10–12, 14, 29, 37–38, SEC see Skills Evaluation Certiﬁ cate 48–50, 57 Second Industrial Revolution 129 policies 48–49, 52–53, 55–56 Seck, F.Y.Y. 233 post-industrial Sen, A. 322 economy 2, 8 Sender, K. 293 society 1–3, 5, 7–8, 15, 21, 23–24, sex education 297 38, 130, 134 sexual Pratt, J. 269 citizens 281, 303 Preservation of Monuments Board 207 citizenship 281, 294, 297 ‘productivist’ social policies 13 consumption 281, 294, 297, 301 Prevention of Corruption Act 251 identity 291, 297 Price, D.C. 298 lifestyles 297 pro-family policies 47, 55 policies 17, 280, 281, 288–289, 292, pro-natalist policies 76 294, 297, 301–302, 304 progress package 8, 18 sexuality 10, 17, 51, 239, 280–282, Prompiam, J. 148 287–289, 291–292, 298, 302–304 Public Entertainment Licensing Shantakumar, G. 86–88 Unit 240 Shin, D-M. 312 public health 73–74, 313–314, 316, Siberstein, L.R. 60 323–325 SINDA see Singapore Indian public order offences 248 Development Association Pugh, C. 29 Singam, C. 286 Pyatt, G. 176 Singapore aged 76, 80 Quah, E. 16, 177 arts and the economy 228 Quah, J.S.T. 269 Census of Population 39, 74–75 Quah, S. 46 Department of Social Welfare 29 Quah, S. & Quah, J.S.T. 250 economy 3, 145, 151, 153, 168 education system 101, 127 Rafﬁ n, A. 10, 15 foreign manpower/labor 14, 146 Rahman, M.M. 11, 16, 165 Indian Development Ramesh, M. 28–29, 33, 123 Association 267 Ramesh, M. & Asher, M. 279 Indian heritage 209 Ramonet, I. 98 Management University 109 RC see Residents’ Committee MIT Alliance 111 rehabilitation 253–254, 261–262, MIT Alliance Industry 272 Consortium 111 Reiner, R. 248–249, 252 Planned Parenthood Association 51 religious education 10 Police Force 250 Renaissance City Report 225 popular culture sphere 238 Residents’ Committee 259 Quality Class Awards 105 Richardson, D. 281 social citizenship 9, 10, 21 Richardson, M. 92 social (policy) planning 10, 12 risk 2, 4, 17, 24–25, 38, 247, 252, 255, Tourism Board 102, 108, 208, 210, 262–263, 266–274 229 Rodan, G. 39, 264 Trade Development Board 105 Rose, N. 269 underclass 7, 39 Rubin, G. 288 welfare policy 28

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welfarism 7 Talaq 240 workforce 179 Tan, H.Y. 294 females in 179, 194 Tan, J. 101, 103, 112 21 Committee 221 Tan, O.B. 284 Skills Development Fund 139 Tang, K.-L. 26, 35–36, 123 Skills Evaluation Certiﬁ cate 159 Tannenbaum, F. 265 Skills Redevelopment Programme 140 Teo, P. 205 SMA see Singapore MIT Alliance tertiary education 4, 37, 57–58, 97, SMAIC see Singapore-MIT Alliance 99, 101, 103–108, 111, 114–115, 117, Industry Consortium 123, 130–133, 136, 179 SMU see Singapore Management tertiary institutions 15, 100, 105–106, University 113–114, 117 Smyth, P. 28, 31 TFR see total fertility rate SNA see System of National Accounts Tham, D.W. 271 Sng, S. 295 Tham, S.C. 125 social The Committee on Heritage amelioration 2, 21 Report 203, 206–207, 222 Development Unit 37, 51 Thenmoli, S. 242 Disciplinary Model Theodoulou, S. 299 of policing 251 Third Child Priority Housing of justice 253 Scheme 54 engineering 13 Tilly, C. 113, 116, 118 heritage 9–10, 22 TIME see Training Initiative for Mature integration 12, 21, 27, 35, 77 Employees investments 121–122, 124, 127, Titmuss 9, 21, 40 137–138, 141 Toh, R. 161, 164 investment state 121–124 Tongzon, J.L. 129 mobility 12, 13, 39 total fertility rate 4, 50, 51, 64–65, Soh, W.L. & Chia, S-A. 286 75, 97 SPPA see Singapore Planned Parenthood Tourism Product Development Association Plan 205 SPRING see Standards, Productivity and Tourism Task Force 205 Innovation Board Singapore Training Initiative for Mature SRP see Skills Redevelopment Employees 133 Programme Tremewan, C. 35 Stahl, C.W. 147, 154 Tsui-Auch, L.S. 135 stakeholding 258 Turnbull, C.M. 29 State police 249 Standards, Productivity and Innovation UMNO see United Malays National Board Singapore 105 Organization State’s Skills Development Fund 132 UNDP see United Nations Development state welfarism 1 Programme STB see Singapore Tourism Board UNESCO 116 Steering Committee on Deterring Crime United Malays National and Recidivism 259 Organization 1 Straughan P. 11, 47, 62, 66–67 United Nations Development Straughan, P., Huang, S. & Yeoh, Programme 317 B.S.A. 61 Urban Redevelopment Authority Streeck, W. & Yamamura, K. 309, 207–208 319 Suanders, P. 312 Van Hoof, H.B. 100 Swee, D. 296 Vasoo, S., Ngiam, T.L. & Cheung, System of National Accounts 174, P. 76–77 176 vernacular stream schools 125

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Vogel, E. 25 Wilding, P. & Holliday, I. 122 Voluntary Welfare Organizations 7–8, Williams, D.R. 322 29, 263 Wilson, J.Q. & Kelling, G. 258 VWO see Voluntary Welfare WISE see Worker Improvement through Organizations Secondary Education Wong, A.K. 50 Wade, R. 309 Wong, D. 209 Walker, K. & Gauger, W.H. 173 Wong, K.C. et al. 204 Wan, G. 298 Wong, K.H. 296 WDA see Workforce Development Wong, T. & Yeoh, B.S.A. 50–52 Agency Work-Life Works! 59 Wee, K. 290 Work Permit 151–153, 155, 159–160, Weinrobe, M. 173 162–164, 301 welfare Worker Improvement through and social policies 5, 122 Secondary Education 133 capitalism 18, 309–310, 319–321, Workforce Development Agency 139 325 World Bank 78, 83, 85 models World Health Organization 322–323 social democratic 5–6 WP see Work Permit conservative-corporatist 8 Wu, C. 303 liberal-welfare 5–6 programme 18, 21, 28–29, 122 Yamato, R. 316 state 1, 4–6, 21, 23, 25–28, 31–33, Yang, R. 116 40–41, 121–123, 279, 312, 314, Yeoh, B.S.A. 145, 154–155 316, 319–320 327 Yeoh, B.S.A. et al. 155, 160, 164 welfarist turn 7, 39 Yeoh, B.S.A. & Huang, S. 11, 16 West, D.J. 263 Yeoh, B.S.A. & Kong, L. 208 Westernization 13, 16, 25, 32, 202 Yeoh, E-L. 303 White, G. & Goodman, R. 26, 28, Yoo, et al. 149–150, 164 123 Young, J. 258 White, G., Goodman, R. & Kwon, H.-J. 26 Zelizer, V.A. 62

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