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Mobile Application Part Interface (MAPI) Specification

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Mobile Application Part Interface (MAPI) Specification Mobile Application Part Interface (MAPI) Specification Mobile Application Part Interface (MAPI) Specification Version 1.1 Edition 7.20141001 Updated October 25, 2014 Distributed with Package openss7-1.1.7.20141001 Copyright c 2008-2014 Monavacon Limited All Rights Reserved. Abstract: This document is a Specification containing technical details concerning the imple- mentation of the Mobile Application Part Interface (MAPI) for OpenSS7. It contains recommendations on software architecture as well as platform and system applicability of the Mobile Application Part Interface (MAPI). It provides abstraction of the Mobile Application Part (MAP) interface to these components as well as providing a basis for Mobile Application Part control for other Mobile Application Part protocols. Brian Bidulock <[email protected]> for The OpenSS7 Project <http://www.openss7.org/> Published by: OpenSS7 Corporation 1469 Jefferys Crescent Edmonton, Alberta T6L 6T1 Canada Copyright c 2008-2014 Monavacon Limited Copyright c 2001-2008 OpenSS7 Corporation Copyright c 1997-2000 Brian F. G. Bidulock All Rights Reserved. Unauthorized distribution or duplication is prohibited. Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.3 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled [GNU Free Documentation License], page 405. Permission to use, copy and distribute this documentation without modification, for any purpose and without fee or royalty is hereby granted, provided that both the above copyright notice and this permission notice appears in all copies and that the name of OpenSS7 Corporation not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of this documentation or its contents without specific, written prior permission. OpenSS7 Corporation makes no representation about the suitability of this documentation for any purpose. It is provided \as is" without express or implied warranty. Notice: OpenSS7 Corporation disclaims all warranties with regard to this documentation including all im- plied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non-infringement, or title; that the contents of the document are suitable for any purpose, or that the implementation of such contents will not infringe on any third party patents, copyrights, trademarks or other rights. In no event shall OpenSS7 Corporation be liable for any direct, indirect, special or consequential dam- ages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with any use of this document or the performance or implementation of the contents thereof. i Short Contents Preface ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 1 Introduction:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 7 2 The Mobile Application Layer :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 9 3 MAPI Services Definition :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 23 4 MAPI Primitives :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 29 5 Diagnostics Requirements :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 373 6 References ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 375 Addendum for 3GPP Conformance:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 377 A Mapping MAPI Primitives to 3GPP TS 29.002:::::::::::::: 379 B State/Event Tables::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 389 C Primitive Precedence Tables :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 391 D MAPI Header File Listing :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 393 Licenses :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 395 Index::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 413 iii Table of Contents Preface:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 Notice ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 Abstract ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 Purpose :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 Intent :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 Audience ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 Revision History ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 Version Control ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 4 ISO 9000 Compliance :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 4 Disclaimer :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 4 U.S. Government Restricted Rights ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 4 Acknowledgements ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 4 1 Introduction :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 7 1.1 Related Documentation ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 7 1.1.1 Role ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 7 1.2 Definitions, Acronyms, Abbreviations ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 7 2 The Mobile Application Layer :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 9 2.1 Model of the MAPI ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 9 2.2 MAP Services ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 10 2.2.1 Local Management ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 10 2.2.2 Common Services ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 10 2.2.3 Specific Services :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 10 2.3 Service Categories ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 12 2.3.1 Mobility Management :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 12 2.3.1.1 Location Management Services::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 12 2.3.1.2 Paging and Search ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 12 2.3.1.3 Access Management Services::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 12 2.3.1.4 Handover Services ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 12 2.3.1.5 Authentication Management Services :::::::::::::::::::::: 13 2.3.1.6 Security Management Services ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 13 2.3.1.7 IEMI Managment Services ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 13 2.3.1.8 Subscriber Management Services ::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 13 2.3.1.9 Identity Management Services ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 13 2.3.1.10 Fault Recovery Services::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 13 2.3.1.11 Subscriber Information Services::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 13 2.3.2 Operation and Maintenance::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 13 2.3.2.1 Subscriber Tracing Services :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 14 2.3.2.2 Miscellaneous Operation and Maintenance Services::::::::: 14 2.3.3 Call Handling :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 14 2.3.3.1 Call Handling Services ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 14 2.3.4 Supplementary Service :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 14 2.3.4.1 Supplementary Service Services :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 14 2.3.5 SMS Management Services:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 15 2.3.5.1 Short Message Service Management Services ::::::::::::::: 15 2.3.6 Network-Requested PDP Context Activation :::::::::::::::::::: 15 iv Mobile Application Part Interface (MAPI) 2.3.6.1 Network-Requested PDP Context Activation Services :::::: 15 2.3.7 Location Service Management::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 15 2.3.7.1 Location Service Management Services ::::::::::::::::::::: 15 2.4 MAP User Entities :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 15 2.4.1 Mobile Switching Centre (MSC) Service Sets :::::::::::::::::::: 15 2.4.2 Home Location Register (HLR) Service Sets::::::::::::::::::::: 17 2.4.3 Visitor Location Register (VLR) Service Sets:::::::::::::::::::: 18 2.4.4 Equipment Identity Register (EIR) Service Sets ::::::::::::::::: 19 2.4.5 Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) Service Sets :::::::::::::: 19 2.4.6 Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN) Service Sets::::::::::::: 20 2.4.7 Interworking MSC (IWMSC) for Short Message Service Service Sets ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 20 2.4.8 Gateway MSC (GMSC) for Short Message Service Service Sets :: 20 2.4.9 Gateway Mobile Location Center (GMLC) Service Sets:::::::::: 21 3 MAPI Services Definition :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 23 3.1 Local Management Services Definition:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 23 3.1.1 MAP Information Reporting Service :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 23 3.1.2 MAP User Bind Service::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 23 3.1.3 MAP User Unbind Service :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 24 3.1.4 Receipt Acknowledgement Service::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 24 3.1.5 Options Management Service ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 24 3.1.6 Error Acknowledgement Service ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 24 3.2 Dialogue Handling Definition::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 24 3.2.1 Dialogue Establishment Phase :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 25 3.2.1.1 User Primitives for Successful MAP Dialogue Establishment ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 26 3.2.1.2 Provider Primitives for Successful MAP Dialogue Establishment ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 26 3.2.2 Dialogue Component Transfer Phase :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 26 3.2.2.1 User Primitives for Component Transfer ::::::::::::::::::: 26 3.2.2.2 Provider Primitives for Component Transfer ::::::::::::::: 27 3.2.3 Dialogue Termination Phase :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 27 3.2.3.1 User Primitives for Dialogue Abort :::::::::::::::::::::::: 28 3.2.3.2 Provider Primitives for Dialogue Abort ::::::::::::::::::::
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