NEW PARTIES/NEW POLITICS? a Case Study of the British Labour Party

Home , Dennis Skinner, Hugh Kerr, Margaret Beckett, National Policy Forum, Party conference

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PARTY POLITICS VOL 5. No.3 pp. 383–405

NEW PARTIES/NEW POLITICS? A Case Study of the British Labour Party

Patrick Seyd

ABSTRACT

Britain’s two major parties have rediscovered their members. For a variety of reasons both the Labour and Conservative parties have adopted pro-active recruitment strategies. At the same time, they have introduced direct democracy as an important part of their internal procedures. A detailed study of Labour’s reforms suggests various possible implications for the future, including the fact that the plebiscitarian party might be an increasingly common feature in modern democracies.

KEY WORDS Ⅲ direct democracy Ⅲ Labour Party Ⅲ party membership Ⅲ plebiscitary politics Ⅲ political parties

Labour believes in individual members having real power in the party (Labour Party, Welcome to Labour, 1995) We are going to make it a much more attractive proposition to join the Conservative Party. We are going to give our members a vote in the affairs of the party. (William Hague, Letter to Conservative Party members, 7 October 1997)

For some considerable time academic observers have been suggesting the demise of mass-membership parties. They argue that party membership is declining because individual lifestyles have altered, the political market- place is now full of other organizations competing successfully for individuals’ time and commitment, and party leaders have alternative, and more efﬁcient, means of communicating with voters. Contradicting these appar- ently inexorable trends of membership decline, however, Britain’s two major parties – Labour and Conservative – have adopted active membership- recruitment strategies linked with the introduction of intra-party direct democracy. Labour began the process in the late 1980s, followed by the

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Conservatives a decade later. In this article I propose to examine this strategic and structural transformation that has occurred during the 1990s. First, I consider the adoption of active membership-recruitment strategies and direct democracy in both parties and suggest reasons why it has been introduced. Second, I examine in detail the procedural changes that have been introduced by the Labour Party, involving the use of both direct democracy and more deliberative policy-making forums involving larger numbers of members. Finally, I conclude by assessing the impact that these changes might have on the nature of parties and the party system.

Introduction

Britain has been renowned in the past among comparative scholars for its mass-membership parties (Duverger, 1954; Beer, 1965). In the early 1950s both Conservative and Labour parties claimed individual memberships of over two and one million respectively. The accuracy of these figures is ques- tionable; nevertheless, there is no doubt that a significantly large number of people were individual members of both parties. However, neither party made serious attempts to maintain the numbers in response to the steady membership decline which began in the late 1950s. Periodic recruitment campaigns initiated from the 1960s onwards were more symbolic than real, essentially because both leaderships became steadily convinced of the unim- portance of members. The development of a new communications tech- nology, television and advertising in particular, meant that so long as parties could obtain the money for election campaigning they felt less need for human resources. Members were regarded as less efficient a means of communicating with voters than the TV ‘fireside chat’ or the mass advertising campaign. This attitude was strongly influenced by an academic consensus that members were unimportant in influencing electoral outcomes (Butler and King, 1966; Epstein, 1967; Butler and Kavanagh, 1988). However, after almost 40 years of relative indifference to members, a transformation in attitude has occurred in which both party leaderships have openly and publicly committed themselves to the expansion of membership as an important feature of their political strategies. Labour’s declared target is 500,000 members by 2001 (Labour Party, 1998) and, similarly, the Conservative’s is 1,000,000 by ‘the early years of the century’ (Conservative Party, 1998). After expanding membership from 305,000 in 1994 to 405,000 in 1997, Labour has not settled back in government and relaxed its recruitment campaign. It is noticeable the extent to which Prime Minister Tony Blair constantly emphasizes the importance of members as part of his long-term governing project (see, for example, Guardian, 1 May 1998). Similarly, the Conservative Party, after a disastrous haemorrhaging of its membership in the 1990s, is now intent on reproducing Labour’s recruitment successes. 384 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:52 pm Page 385

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This renewed commitment to members is linked to internal party change. Both parties have introduced major structural reforms. Over a period of 15 years the Labour Party has, first, abandoned the principle of delegatory democracy, which had prevailed since the party’s emergence as part of the labour movement in the late 19th century and, second, has modified the role of its annual conference in policy-making. More abruptly, following its election defeat in 1997, the Conservative Party became for the first time since its foundation in the late 19th century a single, constitutionally defined organisation rather than the ill-defined and separate parliamentary, extra- parliamentary and professional bodies. Most significantly, the century-old National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations has been abolished. Common to the internal reorganization of both parties has been the introduction of national membership ballots. Both party leaders are now elected by their individual members.1 In addition, Labour has used members’ ballots to approve major constitutional change (namely the reform of Clause 4), to endorse its 1997 general election manifesto and to elect one section of its National Executive Committee (NEC). Conservative leader William Hague first used a members’ ballot in 1997 to endorse his leadership and the broad principles of party reform which he proposed to introduce, then in 1998 to approve a range of fundamental, structural reforms to the party, and then again in 1998 to endorse his opposition to British membership of the European Monetary System. Further, he promises another ballot before the party issues its next general election manifesto. It might seem a paradox that the Conservative Party, for so long a party with a very powerful elite tradition, has now attempted to upstage the Labour Party’s democratic cre- dentials by resorting to direct democracy. Why this sudden commitment to the individual member, and to the ballot in particular? First, it has enabled party leaders to respond to the public’s growing political disaffection by demonstrating the renewal of their parties’ own grassroots. At least within their own organizations they are seen to be addressing the issue of the democratic deficit. Members may be a small minority of the general public but, by involving them directly in decision- making, leaders are demonstrating a commitment to openness and participation which might help to restore the political legitimacy of parties. Second, ballots may provide the means by which leaders can demonstrate to the public that they are in control of their party. So, for Blair, ballot vic- tories enabled him to undermine Conservative accusations prior to the 1997 general election of an ‘old’, dogmatic Labour lurking in the background. And for Hague, ballots have enabled him to demonstrate his popularity within the party and undermine support within the party for his two major rivals – Kenneth Clarke and Michael Heseltine. Third, and closely related to the previous point about the need for leaders to demonstrate control of their party, balloting the entire membership is a means of bypassing the activists if they appear to be unrepresentative of party voters. Increasingly 385 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:52 pm Page 386

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well-educated activists, operating in a less hierarchical and deferential culture, make the tasks of political leadership more difficult. One of the dilemmas for leaders is that, in an increasingly non-partisan electorate, they face the danger that their activists, if dominant, and if extreme in their opinions, could consign the party to permanent opposition.2 Fourth, party leaders still need members as both campaigners and fundraisers. For all the sophistication of campaign specialists, the legal restrictions on local campaign expenditure and the absence of large-scale state funding ensure that human resources remain vital. British parties are unable to purchase local campaigners and therefore there is no substitute for committed members. Recent academic studies suggest that members play a significant role as election campaigners and help to determine constituency election outcomes (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et al., 1994; Johnston and Pattie, 1995, 1998; Denver and Hands, 1997). Many political actors and academic commentators argue that a reason for the introduction of direct democracy is to strengthen party leaderships. For example, the Conservative Charter Movement has commented that, as a consequence of the recent reforms, ‘the Conservative Party is set to become an authoritarian, “top-down” structure’ (Charter News, 53, March 1998). Tony Benn has argued that Labour’s recent structural reforms will result in ‘all effective power in the party ... vested in a new elite around the leadership’ (Tribune, 3 April 1998). Two ex-Labour MEPs, Ken Coates and Hugh Kerr, claim that ‘the new rules and structure of New Labour, pushed through in the 1997 post-election honeymoon, prevent Labour members and Con- stituency Parties having any control of, or even influence on, New Labour policy’ (Coates and Kerr, 1998) and they have described new Labour as ‘New Autocracy’ (Tribune, 9 October 1998). Such conclusions by some internal party critics are reinforced by Mair, who claims that the empower- ment of individual members bypasses the knowledgeable activists and enfranchises those who ‘are at once more docile and more likely to endorse the policies (and candidates) proposed by the party leadership’ (Mair, 1997: 149). He suggests that ‘democratization on paper may ... actually coexist with powerful elite influence in practice’ (1997: 150). Whether the above claims are accurate is open to interpretation however. The structural reforms within both parties contain proposals which will strengthen leadership powers but others which provide the potential for a significant expansion of members’ influence. The impact of the reforms depends crucially upon the attitudes and behaviour of the members. On the one hand, if members are as docile as Mair suggests, then leaders’ powers could be strengthened. Furthermore, if newly recruited members differ from their pre- decessors in both their opinions and their motivations, they may be willing to tolerate more authoritarian parties and, if not, ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’ could be their more likely option (Hirschmann, 1970), in which case leaders can afford to ignore them. On the other hand, if members remain opinion- ated, giving them more powers could create problems for the leaderships. 386 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:52 pm Page 387

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Here, I propose to examine the Labour Party’s recent structural reforms in order to test some of these assertions. The reason I concentrate upon the Labour Party is that, ﬁrst, in contrast with the Conservative Party, it is a well-established membership organization with deep-rooted traditions of internal democracy. And, second, the Labour Party was once regarded as a model branch party likely to have a contagious effect upon other parties (Duverger, 1954: 25). It is therefore worth considering whether the party is now adopting the characteristics of a plebiscitarian party and whether this is likely to be contagious.

Labour Party Structural Reforms

By moving from a system of delegate democracy to a direct democracy, structures must ensure that the party’s mass, grass-roots membership, rather than unrepresentative groups of activists, has the greatest say in the agreement of policies and the election of its leaders. (Mandelson and Liddle, 1996: 215)

The Labour Party was established as an offspring of the trade unions and throughout the 20th century it is they who sustained it in terms of voters, funds and members. As part of a broad labour movement, the party shared with its trade union allies common customs and traditions (Minkin, 1991). One of the most distinctive of these was the notion of representation. The principle of delegatory democracy has been a paramount feature of trade unionism, with every member having the right to participate in union affairs and to help determine policies. Participation has been by attendance at branch meetings – ‘the focal point of union democracy’ (Minkin, 1991: 291). From the branch, delegates have been mandated to a national assem- bly whose decisions on the resolutions submitted by branches have consti- tuted the policy of the union, to which all ofﬁcers have been bound. Until the 1980s similar principles and procedures prevailed within the Labour Party.3 The structures of the party enabled individual members to participate in branch meetings, to elect and, where necessary, mandate delegates to constituency general committees and from there to annual conferences. Party policy, whatever its source, needed to be conﬁrmed at the annual party conference by delegates, often mandated by their constituency parties or trade unions prior to the conference discussions. In practice, there have always been tensions between the norms of parliamentary democracy, stressing the deliberative wisdom of the individual, elected representative, and the collective traditions of the British, working- class, labour movement (McKenzie, 1964; Minkin, 1978). Nevertheless, these norms and procedures of delegatory democracy prevailed in the party’s decision-making structures until the 1990s, when the party leadership became increasingly intent on communicating directly with the individual member and bypassing the delegates of both the direct and indirect 387 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:52 pm Page 388

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(i.e. trade-union affiliated) sections of the party, as a means of diminishing the powers of both activists and trade unions. The danger, however, of reducing the collective power of the trade unions was that it was from this section of the party that the traditional defenders of the leadership against the constituency party activists had come and, therefore, only by reducing the activists’ powers would a reduction in the collective role of the trade unions be feasible. Labour’s abandonment of delegatory democracy came about in stages following the party’s savage electoral defeat in 1983, and then the subsequent electoral defeats in 1987 and 1992. In the opinion of the new leader, Neil Kinnock, and then after 1992, John Smith, the party’s electoral unpopularity was due in large part to the fact that it had been captured by unrepresentative activists. Activists were the assiduous attenders of branch and constituency meetings with wide-ranging powers, including those of selecting and reselecting parliamentary candidates, determining constituency parties’ votes for leader and deputy leader in 1983 and 1988 and in the annual elections of the constituency and women representatives to the NEC, drawing up the resolutions and amendments submitted annually to the party conference and, finally, determining the voting behaviour of constituency parties’ delegates to the annual conference. Both Kinnock and Smith believed that non-meeting-attender members needed to be more involved in these decisions, on the assumption that the views of such inactive members were more representative of potential Labour voters. Initially, the reforms introduced to bypass the meeting-attender activists’ powers concentrated upon the selection of personnel, in particular, the party’s parliamentary candidates, its leader and deputy leader and then, finally, the members of the NEC representing local parties and women members. The selection of parliamentary candidates was partially opened up to all local members in 1987, and completely in 1993, since when all the party’s candidates have been decided by ballots of individual members rather than local delegates. No longer is it the case that a member not attending party meetings is disenfranchised; all paid-up members in a constituency are balloted. Since 1993 the participation of the collective, affiliated trade union membership in the choice of candidates has been terminated; only individual members now participate.4 Labour Party leaders had been elected solely by their parliamentary colleagues until in 1983 an electoral college consisting of parliamentarians, constituency and trade union delegates for the first time chose both the leader and deputy leader. In 1988, when the election of both leader and deputy leader was challenged, constituency parties were given the option of balloting all their members before delegates decided how to cast their votes. This option was offered by the NEC in an attempt to undermine the ‘hard left’ challenge which, it correctly assumed, had more support among constituency party delegates than among members. Four years later in 1992, when Kinnock and Roy Hattersley resigned and were replaced by Smith and 388 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:52 pm Page 389

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Margaret Beckett, constituency parties were required to conduct ballots of their individual members, but then their delegates still met in the electoral college to cast the votes. Finally, in 1993 new party rules were approved abolishing the electoral college and obliging trade unions to ballot their political levy-payers and constituency parties their members in leadership elections and then divide their votes accordingly. This new procedure was used to elect Blair and John Prescott in July 1994. In 1994 the election of the constituency and women representatives on the party’s NEC was reformed to give all individual members the choice. Previously the seven representatives of constituency parties on the NEC had been elected solely by the votes of constituency party delegates attending the annual conference. From the 1950s onwards this section of the NEC was dominated by those on the left of the party. None of these reforms were adopted without considerable intra-party opposition. Kinnock had first attempted to introduce new parliamentary candidate selection procedures in 1984 but had been forced to back down; eventually, he only succeeded in a compromise proposal in 1987. Smith’s success in establishing the complete one-member-one-vote procedure in 1993 was only secured after a long and bitter campaign, by making the reform an issue of personal confidence, and by a slender conference majority. Opposition to these one-member-one-vote reforms came, first, from many of the trade unions opposed to the elimination of their collective role within the party and, second, from those on the left who feared that members, who were perceived as less knowledgeable than delegates, would be swayed by a right-wing media. After Blair’s election as party leader, balloting of members was extended beyond the selection of personnel to also cover the choice of policies as part of his commitment to the creation of a very different type of Labour Party. At the 1994 party conference Blair announced his intention to reform the clause in the party’s constitutional objectives which committed it to ‘the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange’. Hostility to his proposal from activists, and the increasing likelihood of Blair’s defeat, forced him to appeal directly over their heads to members. Every individual member was sent a copy of the proposed new clause – ‘Labour’s Aims and Values’ – and asked: ‘Do you agree that this statement should be adopted in the Party rules as Labour’s new aims and values?’, with a straight yes/no choice. Ballot forms had to be returned to local parties in time for the votes to be counted prior to the special party conference held to debate the reform, which alone had the constitutional power to amend the constitution. The ballot was a means of pressurizing the constituency and trade union delegates to the special party conference to support the reform. On the day of the special party conference Blair suggested that, by balloting its members, the party ‘had freed itself from the vanguard politics of the Eighties’ (Guardian, 1 May 1995). Party publicists at the time claimed a resounding victory for Blair and in the votes cast there was a significant 389 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:52 pm Page 390

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majority in favour of reform. However, less than one in three party members voted.5 A further membership ballot was used after the 1996 party conference had approved the election manifesto. A short summary of the document was sent to all individual members asking them for a yes/no response to the statement: ‘I support Labour’s manifesto, New Labour new life for Britain’.6 The simple nature of the document, the question asked, and the pressure placed upon members to vote,7 reveal that this was more a public relations exer- cise as part of the election campaign than a serious attempt to involve members in policy-making. This was confirmed by Blair who stated that it would give members ‘an opportunity to actively pledge ... support for Labour’s programme for government’ and claimed that it would ‘put to rest forever any doubt that we are anything other than a strong and united party’ (Blair, 1996: 17). The use of ballots to give all members the powers to elect their leaders, parliamentary candidates and NEC members was supplemented by reforms to the party’s policy-making procedures immediately after Labour had been elected to office in 1997. The impetus for the reforms came from two sources. First, in the late 1980s Kinnock had wished to improve annual conference procedures and this had been developed by the party’s General Sec- retary, Larry Whitty, into a broad-ranging document, Democracy and Policy Making for the 1990s (Labour Party, 1990), arguing the need for a thorough change to the whole policy-making process. However, the proximity of a general election campaign and then Kinnock’s replacement as party leader in 1992 resulted in a loss of momentum for these particular proposals. Second, as the party’s prospects of electoral victory grew after 1994, Whitty’s successor, Tom Sawyer, stressed the need to avoid the strained relationships between the party of government and the party outside government which had occurred on the last occasion when Labour had been in office. Whitty’s initiative, drawing upon the practices of European sister parties, had resulted in the creation of a national policy forum in 1993, with nominated representatives from all sections of the party, as part of the NEC, Shadow Cabinet and annual conference policy-making process. Between then and the 1997 general election the forum met on eight occasions to discuss a wide range of policy documents. However, ambiguities over its formal constitutional status and financial constraints meant that it was limited in both its size and its impact. Since the Labour government was elected in 1997 the forum has become a significant feature of a new set of policy-making procedures. In 1995 Sawyer established the ‘party into power’ project ‘to consider what steps should be taken to help the Party and a future Labour Govern- ment work together’ (Labour Party, 1997a: 2). This wide-ranging NEC examination of ‘the predominant ethos, atmosphere and attitudes in the Party, its major symbols and defining characteristics’ (Labour Party, 1997a: 2) concentrated upon four specific topics – the role and structure of the 390 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 391

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NEC, the relationships between a Labour cabinet, the parliamentary party and the NEC, the democratic structures and processes of the party and, finally, the individual membership. The reports of the four working parties, incorporated into Labour into Power: A Framework for Partnership, were published in January 1997 as a basis for consultation in the party.8 Then, after 6 months’ consultation, the final document, Partnership in Power, was approved at the 1997 conference. A detailed discussion of the final report, the shifts in proposals between the first and final reports, the responses to the proposals generated within the party and, finally, the campaign mounted within the party to delay implementation of the reform proposals, is not possible here; instead, I concentrate solely upon the proposals to improve the policy-making procedures. In 1976 a party policy document had commenced by claiming that ‘in the Labour Party, policy is made by the members’ (Labour Party, 1976), a claim based upon the structure in which members could play their part, either by initiating resolutions at their local branches, which might then proceed via constituency party management committees to the annual conference agenda and then, via a compositing process, to debate and approval by the delegates or, alternatively, by their elected conference delegate representing their views on all issues being debated on the conference floor. In practice, the policy-making procedures were very complex and intricate, making such a claim difficult to justify in all but the broadest of senses. Partnership in Power explicitly acknowledged this fact, arguing that the system was flawed because ‘very few of the party’s members participate in the party’s policy discussions’ (Labour Party, 1997b: 5) and, furthermore, because ... complex issues are given very little time for debate, there is a tendency for Conference to have the same debates year in year out, very few delegates have the opportunity to participate directly in debates, the debates are focused around composite resolutions which delegates see for the first time on the Monday of Conference, and there is little inter- action with party spokespersons. (Labour Party, 1997b: 7) The intention, therefore, of party reform should be to ‘give more opportunities for a bigger cross-section of party members to get involved in the party processes and debates, widening their rights to engage in policy development through a more deliberative and extended procedure, without detracting from the sovereign powers of annual conference’ (Labour Party, 1997a: 6). Within 12 months of being elected to office the party introduced new policy-making procedures (Figure 1) based upon Partnership in Power which significantly modified the structural arrangements that had prevailed over the previous 80 years. A joint policy committee, a national policy forum and eight policy commissions were part of the new framework. The joint policy committee9 is charged with the ‘strategic oversight of policy development’ (Labour Party, 1997b: 8) and the national policy forum10 391 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 392

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External organizations & individuals

Policy National Joint National commissions Policy Policy Executive Conference Forum Committee Committee

Branches CLPs Policy forums Trade unions Individuals

Figure 1. Labour’s new policy-making process

‘with overseeing the development of a comprehensive policy programme from which will be drawn the manifesto for the next election’ (Labour Party, 1997b: 14). Eight policy commissions11 are now reporting directly to the policy forum and 45 local policy forums were arranged in the summer months of 1998. A 2-year cycle of policy-making has been established in which in the first year the policy commissions consult both within the party but also outside the party with community groups, voluntary organizations and businesses on the priorities for policy development. Their reports are discussed, first, by the national policy forum and then by the joint policy committee, before being submitted by the NEC to the annual conference for further discussion. The second year of the cycle is more formal and internal, culminating in a draft policy document to the national policy forum. After this has been agreed by the national policy forum it will be widely distributed through the party for formal consultation. Submissions and proposed amendments to the policy commission will be invited and it will then draw together a final report to the national policy forum. The national policy forum report, which might include alternative proposals representing different points of view, will be submitted to the conference for debate. In contrast to the past, where policy statements ‘have been presented to Conference on an all-or-nothing basis’ it is proposed that with this new rolling programme ‘Conference would for the first time be able to have separate votes on key sections and proposals in the policy statement’ (Labour Party, 1997b: 15). Partnership in Power reaffirmed that ‘annual conference remains the sovereign policy- and decision-making body of the Labour Party’ and therefore ‘no statement would become party policy without being approved by Con- ference’ (Labour Party, 1997b: 7). But the hope is that the annual conference 392 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 393

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will become a more constructive institution. Labour into Power stated that ‘party conference is a showpiece’ (Labour Party, 1997a: 13) and went on: Because of its overall importance in the Labour Party and of its particular significance when Labour is in government, any problems or limi- tations in the working of conference loom particularly large and deserve attention. The more controversial or significant the debates and other events at Party Conference, the more they attract sensational press attention. Gladiatorial contests and deeply divisive conflicts particularly capture attention, irrespective of their true significance; and the alleged power and influence of key individuals, unions or groups are empha- sised. As far as possible, and without detracting from the democratic decision making powers of the Conference, we need to beware of providing opportunities for external opponents and critics of the Party to pinpoint Conference as an example of difficulties for the Party in power. (Labour Party, 1997a: 14)

What is being asserted here is that, in this media-dominated age, intra-party democracy has to be tempered by party management in which the some- times rumbustious and unpredictable public annual conference is replaced by the private, more discursive and reflective policy forum. A key role of the annual conference in the past has always been as a ‘bell- wether’ of party opinion. The conference agenda has reflected the immediate concerns of all sections of the party and has therefore been a simple, if crude, means of assessing grassroots activists’ opinions. This is no longer the case. Resolutions on subjects being considered by policy commissions will go to them and will therefore be excluded from the conference agenda. The existence of policy commissions means that ‘all year round there are bodies to which branches, CLPs, affiliated organizations can express views and concerns in all areas of policy and through which the party is able to have a continuous dialogue with government’ (Labour Party, 1997b: 17). But constituency parties and affiliated organizations will be able to submit one resolution to the conference on a topic not covered in the on-going work of the national policy forum and therefore not addressed on the conference agenda and delegates will vote to decide the priority of topics for debate at the conference. At the party’s 1998 conference debates were held on four topics determined by delegates’ votes. The new structures are in the first stages of implementation and it is therefore difficult to make conclusive statements about the distribution of power within the party. Only when the party’s manifesto for the next general election is finalized will it be possible to draw some firm conclusions. To what extent there is a continuous dialogue between the membership and the party leadership in which the latter respond to the former’s opinions will take time to assess. However, some immediate observations are possible.12 First, in the preliminary discussions of policy documents at the national policy forum, the imbalance of power between the well-resourced ministerial team and others is very apparent. Initial drafts, in which the parameters of policies 393 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 394

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are being determined, are coming from ministers. It remains to be seen whether later submissions to the policy commissions from inside and outside of the party have the authority to challenge these assumptions. Second, the workshop discussions at the national policy forum are guided by facilitators who then produce summary reports of the proceedings, which are the basis for the ﬁnal statement. This gives considerable interpretative powers to facilitators, who are senior personnel in the party organization. Third, the election rather than the nomination of the constituency representatives to the national policy forum has introduced an element of accountability to the process. But the lack of communication between these elected representatives and their electorate minimizes any sense of accountability. Fourth, the national policy forum meets in private, which has the advantage of allow- ing criticisms of the leadership to be voiced without accusations of under- mining party unity; nevertheless, it makes it difﬁcult to mobilize any organised campaigning. Finally, the format of the national policy forum, with an emphasis upon small-group discussions and dialogue, is one in which middle-class professionals feel at ease and are likely to predominate.

Impact of the Reforms

What has been the impact of this attempt to involve members in party affairs through ballots and policy forums? The evidence so far is limited and con- tradictory. There are instances in which the more extensive participation has increased support for the party leadership. For example, evidence reveals that constituency parties which supported the ‘hard left’ challenge of Tony Benn and Eric Heffer to the party leadership in 1988 were less likely to have balloted their members, and those which balloted their members were more likely to have voted for the incumbent leadership (Guardian, 3 Oct. 1988). Another such example would be the reform of Clause 4 of the party constitution, when early responses among activists to the proposed change were hostile (Tribune, 16 Dec. 1994) but the ballot was overwhelmingly supportive. In contrast to these two examples, votes cast for the constituency representatives on the NEC since 1994 suggest an independence of attitude among members which does not accord with the leadership’s wishes. Analysis of the vote is complicated by the party rule that has required one place among the seven in 1994, and three since, to be reserved for women. But Dennis Skinner, associated with the ‘hard left’, was elected from 1994 to 1997, and Ken Livingstone, a long-standing critic of the leadership, who was elected in 1997, would also have been elected in the earlier years but for the female quota rule. Then, in 1998, a very powerful campaign by the leadership to ensure that a slate of ‘loyal’ nominees was elected as the constituency representatives on the reorganized NEC13 was foiled by an equally powerful campaign by a left-wing ‘grassroots alliance’. Four of the six elected were from this left-wing grouping. The number of members participating in these NEC 394 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 395

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elections has ranged from 25 to 30 percent, revealing only limited interest, but clearly members are still willing to support candidates with distinct opinions independent of the leadership. Apathy rather than docility seems to be a characteristic of many current party members, making it less easy for leaders to control their parties by using direct democratic methods. We do, however, have more speciﬁc evidence of members’ attitudes,14 enabling us to test Mair’s assertion that the inactive member is more docile and more likely to support the party leadership. The Labour Party’s reforms since Kinnock ﬁrst initiated them in the late 1980s have been based upon the belief that the meeting attenders differ in their attitudes from the non- meeting-attenders. We can test whether this is accurate. We can also test whether the erosion of incentives for activists has contributed towards the de-energization process that has taken place within the Labour Party during the 1990s. It is very apparent (Table 1) that members overwhelmingly approve of the use of national ballots: 84 percent of them agreed in 1997 that postal ballots ‘strengthen party democracy’. No doubt members approve of postal ballots because they might help to reduce their sense of marginalization: 77 percent believed that ‘the amount of work done by ordinary party members is very

Table 1. Labour Party members’ attitudes, 1990–7 (%) Strongly Strongly Question agree Agree Neither Disagree disagree ‘The party leadership doesn’t pay a lot of attention to ordinary party members’ 1990 10 29 17 39 5 1997 7 28 24 38 3 ‘The amount of work done by ordinary party members is very often unrecognized’ 1990 27 58 9 6 1 1997 19 58 14 9 1 ‘A problem with the Labour party today is that the leader is too powerful’ 1990 6 9 15 54 17 1997 6 14 21 48 12 ‘Postal ballots of all individual members strengthen party democracy’a 1997 41 43 9 5 2 aNot asked in 1990. Source: Surveys of Labour Party members 1990 and 1997. 395 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 396

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often unrecognized’, and 35 percent believed that ‘the party leadership doesn’t pay a lot of attention to ordinary party members’. It is also the case that the reforms introduced so far have done little to minimize members’ sense of political impotence. Between 1990 and 1997 there have been reduc- tions in the proportions of members agreeing that their work goes unrecognized and that the leadership does not take much note of their opinions, but the drops are small. Furthermore, the proportion agreeing that their leader is too powerful has increased. In the context of the Labour Party’s previous decision-making procedures, meeting-attenders’ powers have been extended to non-meeting-attenders. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that by giving those members who do not attend party meetings a voice in party matters the leadership will be afforded greater freedom of manoeuvre. In 1997, 71 percent of members ‘never’ or ‘rarely’, and 29 percent ‘frequently’ or ‘occasionally’, attended party meetings and yet on a very wide range of policy issues concerning the European Union, relations with the USA, privatization and public ownership, taxation and public expenditure there are no significant differences between them (Table 2). Similarly, there are no significant differences between the two groups on issues concerning the party’s electoral strategy. Only on the question of the role of the trade unions in society and in the party, and on some matters concerning party structures and procedures, are there differences. The majority of members believe that trade unions should be affiliated to the party, but meeting-attenders feel much more strongly in favour of this institutional arrangement. Meeting-attenders also hold a stronger belief that trade unions should not be more strictly regulated by law. Simple majorities of meeting-attenders agreed that ‘the party conference should be the ultimate source of authority’ in the party, and that ‘the party leadership doesn’t pay a lot of attention to ordinary party members’; in contrast, simple majorities of non-meeting-attenders disagreed with these statements. Overall, these data do not confirm the general assertion that more docile and deferential members have been enfranchised. These are the opinions of current members. There is, however, the exit option for those who disagree with the changes within the party. Some exit is likely as those attracted to the party in the heady pre-election months fail to renew their membership as the realities of government begin to appear. Critics of the leadership suggest a more deep-seated and fundamental opposition to the government’s policies, particularly among long-standing members, which is leading to significant exit. These critics point to the drop in membership of 21,000 (Observer, 21 July 1998) since the general election as confirmation of members’ disillusion. There is no published research evidence on the reasons for this decline, but a survey of 2,500 exitors in 199215 reveals that most left for political reasons, with 29 percent citing a particular policy and 23 percent referring to the party’s shifting principles as the most important reason for their resignation; a further 18 percent pointed to an organizational feature of the party. Although there is some 396 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 397

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Table 2. A comparison of Labour meeting-attenders and non-meeting-attenders, 1997 (%)a Strongly Strongly Statement agree Agree Neither Disagree disagree ‘Trade unions should no longer be affiliated to the Labour Party’ Attender 4 11 15 45 26 Non-attender 3 18 20 42 16 ‘The party conference should be the ultimate source of authority in the Labour Party’ Attender 19 29 18 27 7 Non-attender 10 24 24 34 8 ‘The party leadership doesn’t pay a lot of attention to ordinary party members’ Attender 11 34 18 34 3 Non-attender 6 25 26 40 3 ‘The government should introduce stricter laws to regulate trade unions’ Attender 3 9 12 32 45 Non-attender 2 10 16 37 35 at-tests indicate significant differences between meeting-attenders and non-meeting-attenders for each question at the .05 level. Note: Respondents were asked: ‘Thinking back over the last year, how often have you attended a local (e.g. branch, constituency) Labour party meeting?’ and the four options were ‘not at all’, ‘rarely (once or twice)’, ‘occasionally (three to five times)’ and ‘frequently (more than five times)’. Meeting-attenders are categorized as those who answered either ‘frequently’ or ‘occasionally’, and non-meeting-attenders are those who answered ‘rarely’ or ‘not at all’. Per- centages have been rounded. Source: Survey of Labour Party members 1997.

evidence of personal factors playing a limited part in resignations, with 14 percent referring to a change of employment or house, a family illness, or increasing age, this research suggests that many of those who have recently left the party did so because they are opposed to the policies and principles of the party in government. What are the signs of voice and loyalty among members? Since Labour’s return to government there have been more signs of loyalty than voice. At the party’s 1997 conference the leadership suffered no platform defeats and the tenor of debates was harmonious. The fact that this was the ﬁrst opportunity for many to celebrate publicly the party’s election victory, combined with strong stage management, reinforced the sense of unity. The 1998 conference, very different from previous ones as a result of the structural reforms referred to earlier, provided further conﬁrmation of loyalty rather than voice, 397 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 398

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although the opportunities for voice had been significantly reduced. In addition, however, the first two meetings of the national policy forum held since the 1997 general election, where there is far greater scope for voice since the meetings are in private, were distinctive more for loyalty.16 There is evidence of a de-energizing process at work among members which has been masked to some extent by the recruitment of larger numbers between 1994 and 1997. This decline in party activism was first noted in 1992, when the mean number of hours in a month that members worked for the party dropped over 2 years from 1.96 to 1.82.17 However, while the decline in hours worked for the party is interesting, it gives little insight into the changes which have taken place in particular types of activities. In Table 3, members are classified as more or less active over time in relation to eight specific political activities. It can be seen that a significant decline occurred in the relatively time-consuming activities such as canvassing voters, deliver- ing election leaflets and attending meetings. A further survey of members in 199718 revealed a distinct difference in activity rates within the party between those recruited before and after Blair became party leader (Table 4). During the 1997 general election campaign, those members who had been recruited since 1994 (defined for this purpose as ‘new’ Labour members) were less active than long-standing members (defined as ‘old’ Labour members). Old Labour members were nearly three times more likely to do considerable door-to-door canvassing, and twice as likely to be actively involved in telephone canvassing, than new Labour members. They were nearly four times more likely to help with several fundraising events, and almost twice as likely to deliver leaflets frequently, than new Labour members. Part of the explanation for these difference may be socialization; new members have not yet been fully integrated into the local party organization. However, even after taking into account such socialization, it appears that

Table 3. Changes in Labour Party members’ activities 1990–2 (%) More active More The Less minus less Activity active same active active Displayed an election poster in a window 13 74 13 0 Signed a petition supported by the party 11 58 32 –21 Donated money to party funds 31 51 19 +12 Delivered party leaflets in an election 13 66 20 –7 Attended a party meeting 13 61 26 –13 Canvassed voters on behalf of the party 14 62 24 –10 Stood for office in the party 11 76 14 –3 Stood for office in a local or national election 7 87 7 0 Source: Surveys of Labour Party members 1990 and 1992. 398 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 399

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Labour has been recruiting a new type of member from 1994 onwards – willing to identify with and give money to the party but expecting others to engage in the work that will sustain the party (Whiteley and Seyd, 1998a, b, c). The Labour Party may be encouraging this de-energization by adopting more of the characteristics of the mail-order organization and less of the campaigning, grassroots party.19 This de-energizing process was already emerging before Blair’s New Labour project. The process of bypassing the activists, first begun in the late 1980s, has contributed to this by providing them with fewer incentives to give time to the party. Their rewards – the exclusive powers to select parliamentary candidates, elect NEC representatives and help to determine policies by framing and deciding resolutions – have been withdrawn. In addition, electoral defeat in 1992 resulted in fewer collective benefits being on offer and therefore less incentive to be active. But Labour’s shift from a reactive to an active membership recruitment policy since 1994 has resulted in a new type of member joining the party. It is difficult at this stage to make a final judgement on the impact of this new form of politics – individual rather than collective, direct rather than delegatory. Ballots have empowered individual members by enabling them to participate directly in choosing personnel and in recording their opinions on policy. An important question, however, is who decides when direct democracy shall be invoked, what the terms of direct participation are and what should be the nature of the choice offered. The party constitution states: The NEC shall have the power to require constituency parties to hold ballots of individual members on such matters as they deem to be appro- priate; such ballots where considered necessary by the NEC or where provided for in these rules, shall be conducted by means of a one- member-one-vote ballot on ballot papers provided by and to a timetable and procedure laid down by the NEC.20

So the membership has no power to initiate a ballot; only the NEC can call one. Nor are there any stipulations regarding choice of wording in a ballot, expenditure limits or campaigning procedures. In a classic commentary on the procedures of the British labour movement at the beginning of the 20th century, Sidney and Beatrice Webb wrote: If the Executive could choose the issues to be submitted, the occasion on which the question should be put, and the form in which it should be couched, the referendum, far from supplying any counterpoise to the executive, was soon found to be an immense addition to its power. Any change which the executive desired could be stated in the most plausible terms and supported by convincing arguments, which almost invariably secured its adoption by a large majority ... The reliance of Trade Union democrats on the referendum resulted, in fact, in the virtual exclusion of the general body of members from all real share in the government. (Webb and Webb, 1902: 26)

Their comments remain relevant at the end of the 20th century. 399 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 400

PARTY POLITICS 5(3) 8 8 6 1 39 Old 11 22 15 3+ 3 4 2 3 8 6 1 21 New ———— occasions 2 2 6 4 5 0 10 43 Old wice T 8 3 1 1 3 3 3 0 New ————– 8 2 4 9 4 6 1 14 Old Once 8 2 2 7 3 5 0 11 New ————– 74 43 88 Old 88 74 70 75 98 83 63 93 New Not at all ————– 95 87 86 86 99 -to-door? eet stall? ets? ty members during the 1997 election campaign (%) ty rally? ty leaﬂ ganize a str elephone canvass voters? T Did members: Attend a par Help or Deliver par Help with a fundraising event? Help with mailings? Canvass voters door Help with telephone fundraising? 82 Old 33 48 21 23 15 68 es Y 8 7 72 New ————– 17 40 10 61 oom? ences between old and new Labour for all the activities, with one exception of help telephone fundraising. fer ty members 1997 cant dif Rates of activism among old and new Labour Par ty election funds? ty election day committee r Table 4. vey of Labour Par un a par : Sur : t-tests indicate signiﬁ ce ake numbers at a polling station? Sour T Display an election poster? Note Did members: Remind voters on polling day to vote? Drive voters to the polling station? Help r Donate money to par Attend the counting of votes?

400 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 401

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Conclusions

Numerous assertions have been made over the past 2 decades that parties are declining in importance and falling party memberships have been cited as one crucial dimension of this decline. Labour and Conservative party leaders’ indifference towards, and tolerance of, membership decline appeared to confirm these assertions. Now, however, both major British parties are making great attempts to recruit members, and the success of Labour’s recruitment strategy since 1994 runs counter to this particular aspect of the party decline thesis.21 There are various explanations of this significant reversal of previous strategies. First, in Britain, where there is an absence of extensive state funding of parties, and where the use of money to buy professional campaigning is strictly regulated, parties need members as local electoral campaigners. In the contemporary electoral-professional party (Panebianco, 1988: 262–78) the professional policy and campaign experts increasingly dominate but they require a stage army of amateurs at election times. Certainly local campaigning matters; it has a significant impact upon electoral outcomes. Party members who can be mobilized into sustained activity prior to general elections are of critical importance. Part of the explanation for the Conserva- tive Party’s electoral debacle in 1997 was its inability to mobilize an active campaigning membership in key constituencies. Similarly, the Liberal Demo- crats’ electoral successes in 1997, in which it won additional seats in the House of Commons although its overall share of the national vote dropped, were due in part to successful local constituency campaigning by active party members. Second, the recruitment of new members and the introduction of direct democracy may help to reinforce party leaders’ powers. By dealing directly with members, leaders can appeal to the democratic spirit while ensuring that the answers arrived at are in accord with their wishes. However, parties are living bodies in which individuals with various motivations and opinions will join and participate. Recruiting new members brings in such a range of people and it is not easy to predict their behaviour. Research on Labour and Conservative party members confirms both the range and diversity of their opinions, and the resilience with which they hold them (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et al., 1994). The new members and the new structures need to be closely observed over the next few years leading up to the production of the party election manifestos in order to assess this argument. Third, these new structures are the first stages in the development of a new, plebiscitarian type of party in which vertical, internal communications between members from the leadership and headquarters to the member at home replace horizontal communications within areas, regions and constituencies. Parties with national membership databases target their members with regular financial appeals. One consequence of such appeals is likely to be that members’ money flows nationally rather than locally, 401 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 402

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meaning that local parties’ ﬁnancial resources will diminish, leaving them more reliant upon the party at the centre. Consultations with members will increase but the terms of the consultation and the rules will be set by the party leadership.22 Face-to-face contact and discussion within the party diminishes, the powers of activists are limited, and the distinction between members and supporters is less clear cut. In this sense, the Labour Party remains a contagious model, as Duverger predicted over 50 years ago, but one very different from his earlier suggestion. The fact that similar organizational initiatives are taking place elsewhere, for example in Canada and Germany, suggests that the plebiscitarian party is likely to be an increasingly common feature of the future.

Notes

1 Labour’s leader and deputy leader are elected by three sections of the party – Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), individual members, and members of affiliated organizations who have indicated their support of the Labour Party. Both individual and affiliated members cast their vote on a one-person-one-vote basis. (Rule 5, 3C5.3, Consol- idated Rule Book, Labour Party, 1995). When William Hague resigns as Conservative leader or loses a vote of no confidence among his parliamentary colleagues his successor will be nominated by members of the parliamentary party and, after ballots among the parliamentarians have reduced the number of candidates to two, the membership will choose the new leader on the basis of a one-member-one-vote system (Conservative Party, 1998: 26–7). 2 Evidence suggests that Labour and Conservative leaders are incorrect in assuming that their activists are extremists. While activists often hold views more intensely, they do not fundamentally differ from non-activists (see Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et al., 1994). 3 The only exception being constituency parliamentary candidate selection meetings at which the rules explicitly forbade preliminary mandating of delegates. In practice such mandating among trade union delegations occurred. 4 Locally affiliated trade unions may still nominate parliamentary candidates. 5 The votes cast were as follows: in favour of the new statement 73,288; against the statement 12,588. Assuming an individual membership of 320,000 at this time, as claimed by the party’s Director of Organization (Tribune, 31 March 1995), this meant that only 26.8% voted. 6 A total of 380,688 ballot papers were issued: 218,023 voted ‘yes’ and 12,378 voted ‘no’ or spoiled their ballot paper; 61% voted. 7 Individual members were telephoned from Labour headquarters on more than one occasion and canvassed to vote in favour. 8 380 constituency parties, 362 branches and 25 affiliated organizations submitted responses to the report. 9 The joint policy committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and is composed of eight members of the government and the NEC respectively and three elected members from the national policy forum. 10 The national policy forum is made up of 175 members, elected for 2 years, 402 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 403

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representing constituency parties (54), regional parties (18), trade unions (30), the PLP (9), the EPLP (6), the government (8), local government (9), and socialist societies, the Cooperative Party and black socialist societies (9). In addition, all 32 members of the NEC are automatically members. 11 Eight policy commissions, composed of three representatives each from government, NEC and the national policy forum respectively, have been established covering the following subjects: economic and social affairs, trade and industry, environment, transport and the regions, health, education and employment, crime and justice, democracy and citizenship and, finally, Britain in the world. 12 These observations are based upon the author’s attendance at meetings of the national policy forum. 13 Since 1998 constituency parties elect six representatives, none of whom can be MPs. 14 Two national surveys of party members were conducted in 1990 and 1997. The 1990 survey was a two-stage stratified random sample of members. The first stage involved selecting a total of 480 constituencies as sampling points. The second stage involved selecting a systematic random sample of members. The response rate of 62.5% gave a sample size of 5065. The 1997 survey was a two- stage stratified random sample undertaken shortly after the general election. The first stage consisted of a random sample of 200 constituencies in Great Britain. The second stage involved selecting a random sample of members within those constituencies. The response rate of 62.9% gave a sample size of 5761. The sampling frame on both occasions was the national membership database held at Labour Party headquarters. For further details of both surveys see Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and Whiteley and Seyd (2000). 15 A systematic random sample of one in two of the 5,286 members who failed to renew their subscription in 1991 was conducted in 1992: the response rate was 44 percent. See Whiteley and Seyd (forthcoming). 16 This observation is based upon the author’s attendance and observation at the policy forums held in London and Warwick in 1997/8. The tenor of the discussions was harmonious; disagreements were apparent on particular issues, but these did not dominate the sessions. 17 The evidence is based upon a panel survey of party members carried out in 1990 and 1992. The details of the 1990 survey are contained in note 14. The second wave of the panel, conducted immediately after the 1992 general election, obtained a response rate of 60.8%. Interlocking weights for social class and trade union membership were applied to ensure that the second wave was representative of members in general. The question asked was: ‘How much time do you devote to party activities in the average month?’ 18 The details of the 1997 survey are contained in note 14. 19 However, before the 1997 general election, the NEC-inspired ‘party-regeneration project’ attempted to develop an alternative local, active, campaigning grassroots party model. Similarly, since the general election, the NEC ‘healthy party working group’ has members who wish to encourage a more participative party model. 20 Labour Party Constitution, Clause VIII (j). This was added to the constitution after approval at the 1995 conference. 21 Individual membership figures are: 305,189 (1994); 365,110 (1995); 400,465 (1996); 405,238 (1997) (Source: NEC annual reports). 403 07 Seyd (to) d/k 26/5/99 3:53 pm Page 404

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22 The Labour Party issued ‘An Annual Survey of Supporters’ Opinions’ in September 1998. In an accompanying letter, the party’s General Secretary wrote: ‘I would like you to turn to the consultative survey I have sent you. This is where you and all our members can play a vital role by speaking out on the issues that matter to you. Your views are critical to the principles of our party and will be given very serious consideration, so do please take some time to complete and return your survey.’ However, the nine questions posed were all exceedingly bland and almost guaranteed to produce supportive statements. For example, the question on education was: ‘Do you agree that our investment of £19 billion to cut class sizes over the next 3 years will help deliver a world class education service, offering opportunity for all to reach their full potential?’

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Panebianco, Angelo (1988) Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seyd, Patrick and Paul Whiteley (1992) Labour’s Grass Roots: The Politics of Party Membership. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Webb, Beatrice and Sydney Webb (1902) Industrial Democracy. London: Longmans Green. Whiteley, Paul and Patrick Seyd (1998a) ‘New Labour – New Grassroots Party?’, Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Political Studies Association, University of Keele. Whiteley, Paul and Patrick Seyd (1998b) ‘The Dynamics of Party Activism in Britain: A Spiral of Demobilization?’, British Journal of Political Science 28: 113–37. Whiteley, Paul and Patrick Seyd (1998c) ‘New Labour, New Party?’, Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. Whiteley, Paul and Patrick Seyd (2000) The Dynamics of the British Party System. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Whiteley, Paul, Patrick Seyd and Jeremy Richardson (1994) True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

PATRICK SEYD is Professor of Politics, and co-director of the Centre for the Study of Parties, at the University of Sheffield. ADDRESS: Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Elmfield, 130 Northumberland Road, Sheffield S10 2TU. [email: p.seyd@sheffield.ac.uk]

Paper submitted 15 September 1998; accepted for publication 20 November 1998.

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