Code Nurrfber '22 • ZR-1933.
INDIVIDUAL RE8EARCH STUDY
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OP TURKISH MILITARY^ OPERATIONS DURING VHB PALESTINE CAMPAIGN, 1917-1918.
Submitted "by
Captain Infantry•
The Command and General Staff Sohool Fort Leayenworth, Kansas• Fort LeavenvTorth, Kansas, 12 May 1933.
Memorandum f i* 3eoond Year Olas s. The Command Y*^^ffe»Vrai ^tft.ff School, Fort Leavenworth,
eoti A;Cifitlpl* toalysis of\ Turkish Military,&•,<: O®t: ^*^ur"tfngtfrePales t ine Canpalgn, ; iih a ahtort reaume 'of Conditiona( land military''p^'ior' to 191*7«
I. Papers Accompanying« 1, A BiblloSgraiiy s^6r this et-udy. So Maps I Humbere x to 9, inclusive.
TT; The Study Presented.-- A Critical Analysis of Turkish Military Operations during the Palestine Campaign, 1917-1918V vith a short resume of conditions, 'political and ai iitary p'rior to 1917•
III. Ritorioal Faota Relating to the &wl)Jeott«
Politioal Conditional Excluding BUropean Turkey the population of Asiatic Turkey, at the 'beginning of the World War in 1914; Approximated 20,000,000 souls. Of this number, the Turks are generally held to have numbered from 9,000,000 to 10^000, o 000 't Arab stook some 6,000,0001 Kurds 1,500,000 j Greeks 1,500,000;Armenians 1,000,000 and miscellaneouo 2,000,000* Prom the viewpoint of furthering the politleal destiny of the •'Turkis! '--•-•":: :' '•••.':':''h ; Brapir'.• ." : '•••:•e • • nin• ' + • •:•'•••••e or;.'••' te• n' • ' •millio • » • > ; ' ' . - \ V ' ! n ' . - . ' Turk! . • •'s •-,•••mus' •!,'•••t ' b: ''e ; considere' " . . ' •.••-d . as ' tne wllilng ^bearers of:',tJie!mi^itaty.-burdeTi.'-The" of the population nae mainly a hostilo element vrhioh did hot regard it«? destiny to be the same as that of the Empire, (l) At theXbeginning of the war the offioiai form of government in Turkey was parliamentary. The Sultan was the (I) ;7-28,50! i i
1. head of the atate with a government, or oabinet, reapynoible to the parltment. Parltment consisted of two houses? the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate wa# appointed by the Sultan and the Chamber of Deputies elected by the people in an indirect *nd oomplioated manner. The Governments
1 v : i i ! ; : • ' ' ••'••''•• .'-••." • • "•'•,,''••' ' " \ - , ; . V ^ ' ; - > : ' • < • • : ' • • . . •" " " , . • • . ' • • / > ' • ' ' • • ' • ' ' / A , •••,;;,,'•:, ' power was extremely centralized. All Oovernbra of rprovtnoes , and other off iq lala • 'j* ere app o int ed by the Ooxeniment and could be changed at any.time. The political party, or foroe, : y." oommonly known as the "Young Tu/ka*, oarae into power in 1909 and their policy remained in force throughout the war. The real governing foroe throughout the war became th* trfuwir ate, BnTer, Tallaat, BJemail withBriyer, tha military leader,:
1 ! v havin, . ••:••.;•• g fira".' :••."• t• " : • place' . • . •••It. ' :..is. •• 8ai'•:•• d • • of' . < . 'Knve • • • ' • 'r / . • • ' .tha : \ t . he••• ' carrie' • • ' d on the war as an independent diotator. Talaat held eway in politics and goveruient affairs* Bjemal held a oabinet post, became the Commander of the Fourth Army in PaleoMne, and became the actual and autocratic ruler of Syria and Palestine!.* During the war there gradually gre? u? a new and axtra-Itgal General Council whioh absorbed and controlled the non-military affairs of the government. By the year 191? the central law* ful"government had lost all power to a group of party ohief tains who had oreated extra-legal bodies that supported tho party leaders, and who must, in turn* be supported by the leaders. The resulting ohary and irresponsibility led natur ally strong leadera of the provinces to establish themselves as little leaa than aeparate rulers. These prcvinoial leaders^ acted independently and obeyed tha general government edlots only as expediency and self-interest seemed to dictate. The saturation in Smyrna, under Rahmi Bey, its Governor, and of Bjemal in Syria and Palestine were notable examples of this. (1). The following general warning issued by the Government (1) 12-96,106*22-308,309.
2. , on Ootober 20,1916, to all governors seems to be an ample indication of the internal political situation! • The Oovernment atunda for a strict application of laws* Many offioials are Indulging in lawless acts* The right of property is interfered with in many arbitrary ways, in vidl ation of the existing laws. The'personal*freedom of the oit izen is violated in many plaoes in incredib'le fashion. In some provinces taxes are raised and popular subscriptions opr ened in violation of the constitution* As the Government conceives of the constitutional prinoiple as one and equal and strict application of laws, it has resolved, with this in view to break down all obstacles in its way* • < A Officials, whether great or small, who are found guilty of violations of the laris will be dealt with energetically* And' , in the case of all, this is the final warning** The above quotation was followed by tho authors remark* * But this warning was hot of muoh effect* On the contrary, chaos assinned larger proportions the longer the war went on*.(i) the Young Turks continued thfi policy of Turkifying the subject races even after the beginning of the World War. The aasaacres, deportations and transplanting of the Armen ians, Jews and Arabs continued throughout the war*(2) As an indication of what raay be termed the normal! turbulent conditions among the many raoial strains of the
: x ; ; ; : : i -.Turkis ' • ' • ' • • ' • 'h • ' . Empir' " v " 'e . - , . th, . e " followin* : ; v ; . , , ; ; ^ g • •i • • •s • • • •quote • ; : V / ' " d ' fro• • ' m th-'" e ^£ 1 1 1 1 Suropea.•; ;• n i- Turke*,.,.••.•.. y • ari••-' di - ' ,sout " . < • ,•-.''••h .•'.•('••.•.••::>>•'•'•..•",• of Constaninople•;.'.'::• ^ V f . v ; . ' ; , ? , ^ ' wit' . : ' . V : h , •.•.;••,.th; M -e . ••Thir. d Army in the vicinity of Erserum, just west of the Cauoasus• A Fourth Array was formal in'/8yrla'= in Hoyemb&r 1914.. The Fifth Army,"' for the defenseX6f the Dardarieliesi was formed in March 1915. The Sixth Army was formed i4 Lake, line. Fourth Arrcyt Palestine, 8yria. Pifth Armyt Prom Media,on the Blaok 8et», to A'&ja,on the Mediterranean. Sixth Army-Mes opotomia• 15th Army Corpst (m h and 2Cth Divisions) Oalioia. 6th Am^y Corpsi (15th,26th and 26th Divisions) Roumania. 20th Army Corpsi(60th and 46th Divisions) Bulgaria. 177th Turkish Infantry Regimontt With Below»s Army Group. 7th Army CorpsI (39th and 40th Divisions) Yemen. 21et i)tvisiont Assur. The strength of the i^bove unite were variable and compared tc 1916 the quality of i\ll units had been greatly im aired by th6 Turkish mistakes,p6\itioal,ejonomic and tactical. WiU to 1BC| 12-73J P4-62 J26-280. Terrain. A description of the terrain over whioh the Turkish military operations in the Palestine area were oonduoti 5d fal?.e naturally into three sub-divisions»- Sinai,Palestine Syria. Unai? Phe tri^ngaalr shaped 8inai Peninsula, 140 wiles long from lorth to south and approximately 120 miles from east to west, osf the base of the triangle, is one of the most desolate portions of the inhabited world* To the north a belt of sand luneS parallels the coast* The oontral seotion is a barren plateau rising to a height of 3000 feet. The supply of water precarious at all times, except after the winter rains have rilled the ancient cisterns. With the exception of small at El Arish,on the coast, and Nelkhl, in the southf i fewnomad Bedouins are the sole inhabitants. The summer heat Lefloo'^ching. In the winter high eold winds and dand storms =*re frequent, (i) Three roads, or trails, led across this area LA the general direction ?uez Canal-Palestine. None of these roads had sufficient water, or were suitable in any way, for the movement of large forces of troops. (2h Palestine. Palestine is made up of a great mountain ridge running north and south, rising to 3,500 feet. On the east it falls steeply bo the trough of tile Jordan River and the banin of the Dead 3ea. On the west, spurs, jutting out a right jangles to the nain ridge, run down gradually to the plain of Philistia. one road traverses this mountain range from south to north, Reersheba, Reb/on and Jerusalem to Nablus. The Judean Hills Jrain aorose the Plain of Philistia to the Mediterranean and cut a series of deep stream beds,orWadis, all of which are 34-52. t. dry during the summer months• The mo*t important of these are the Wadi Rozzo(Ohuzzi), and the Wadi Sehman(Valley of Aijalon) The Wadi Rozze runs northwest across southern Palestine and enters the sea six miles south of Gaza. The Valley of Aijalon, starting from the plains around Oezer, rims northeastward into the nountaine, and if as, in ancient tines, the principal routie to Jerusalem* The coastal plain of Philietia, on the southwea^ and south of the Jordan hills', is for the most part rolling | downland. Between Qaza and Beersheba, the two historical gato« ! ways to Palestine, the Plain has a width of some thirty-five | miles. It gradually narrows tc the north until, at Haifa) the prpmontory at Carmerpraotioaily effaces the plaint There are many |raolks overHhis area ^hlohi'i in #ry weather, a re passal> 14 to Vehloieai^ The prihoip&l roads run'from Oaza to Beerehebaj Qazatd Jerusalem* Oaaa to Jaffa; All of theae roads were metalled in parts but were unfit to carry heavy traffic. J«ru* salem lies high up, soire 2,500 feet above the Mediterranean. The terrain around Jerusalem is one continual succession of hills and valleyof the hillsides ateep and rooky, the valleys deep and strewn with boulders. In general Palestine is open to the influence of the Mediterranean and, in the winter, the western winds bring very heavy rains. In the suunertho hot dry winds from the eastern deserts are filled with dust and the heat is intense, occasionally reaching 100 degrees P. (1) northern Palestine and Syria. Bast of the Bead 8ea and the Jordan Valley rise the mountains of Moab, 3,000 ts 4,000 i'eet high, with range upon range of inaccessible looking heights. The approaches to the plateau of. Hoab all go up affluents of the Jordan. The only practicable (i) 26-6128-37,47,53,CO) 30-116I29-197|13-5 to 6| 22-71,72,8li road, for vehicles, from Jerioho leads through Ea 8»lt to Amman,on the HudJaz railway. Beyond the Ifoab mountains lies the waterlees desert. The River Jordan, hemmed in between Moab and tlie hills of Judea an tthe sea. This branoh is from 1200 to 1500 feet high, very Vough d forms the 'southern boundary of the Oi»eat Plain of Eedraelon* Che same sequence of river, mountain and plain continues on the north of the Plain of EsdraeIon through all Syria, (hi the nre81, along tHe coast, lies the Plain of 8huron, marshy and }arial. This plain is traversed by a partly metalled road from fdffa to Kablue. Fair roads exist from Haifa up the coast to Tyre and Sidon* The coastal strip of Syria has the best 3limate, being exposed to the moderating influences of the sea* Iftiere the sea breezes are shut off Toy mountains, as at )ama8ous and Aleppo, the heat becomes intense* The Plateau regions of 8yri& have little rainfall the year round and there Is frost and snow amoung the mountains in the winter. (1) 1(1) 13-Q|35-715j28-60-87|32~112,113 Operational January 1 to Include April 19.1917; At the beginning of January,1917, the Turkish foroed in Palestine were.grouped An various positions from Gaza toy; Beersheba, with the mass'(of 'jheir forces in, and in rear of, (>aza. There was a detachment of about 2000 men at Rafa, which is, located in EgyptianV,terr'iiory• During the 8th and 9th of JanuaryV this force at Rafa was surrounded and baptured by British", who were base^. on El Arieh, This was the last Turkis posit ion in Egypt ian territ ory• (1) During the remainder of January, February and early March the British forces gradually pushed their forces closer and oloser to the city of Oazac The Turkish forces in front of Oaza retired to the line Gaza-Beorsheba, with the center of gravity well to the right towards Gaza. (2). On Maroh 26,1917 the British attacked Oaza, surround ing the city and making debperat'e efforts to capture it. The Turkishgarrison consisting of the 79th and 125th Infantry^ Regtmente, the 2nd Battalion, 81st Infantry Regiment, support** ed by maohlnA guns and artillery , put tip a stubborn defense. The movement of Turkish reinforcements from Dsehemajne and Tell •'.••' I'S'.v* ?•'-..','•'[:,'• ••.••• •- '' "'WJ'VV-'.:/''..; ;• ^kri..:' - f-^'O'.,-.1 '•• •• '/:'-^- -v>";. '.' •:'•.' •W;- • ;•' 3heri£. forced the British to discontinur e the attack and with draw to the weat bank of the Wadl Rosse (Ohusse), resting thelir 8ou^b(r'ightl flank on Tell Bl »ara,(3) As a result of the friction developed in the move* ment cf the Turkish reserves during this first battle of Oaza the Turkish forces found it expedient to regroup themselves in a manner requiring less mobility and offens ive strength. A continous line of defense was Selected from Oaza through Tell Sheria to Beereheba. By the middle of April the Turkish forces on this line were disposed as follows I X) 1-164113-67 »16-506. 2) 14-96U3-84. I 3) l-166,167|13-79,80. 3rd Infantry ^ItJSWtfrwlO^ija.t B3rd Infantry Diyieion— between Oaza-Tell Sheria* 16th Infantry J>$X4Mvfc*''T? I* Sheria, 54th Infantry Divi8ioh--Beerahel>a. ,7th Infantry Division—enroute to this front. 3rd Cavalry Division-- Dsohemame* (1) Of the above forces, the 3rd Cavalry, the 16th,54th and 7th Infantry Divisions are new troops to this area. The 3rd Cav alry Division arrived.in January* The 16th Division arrived in February and the 54th Division in March. The 7th Division was en-route from ConGtaniople* The Turkish line from Gaza to Tell Soheria was strengthened by trenches, redoubts and some wire, making an enoiroling movement against Gaza impossible without first mking a decided breakthrough on a well develop ed defensive line* (2) On 19th AprVI tho British renewed their attack in trie 3econd Battle of Gaza.'The principal attaok come between Gaza and Tell Sheria, Against f.he 53rd Turkish Division, in an effort to break tine Turkish line* The Turkish line held, using counter-attaQksi with the bayonet to regain local positions where the British had suooeeded in establishing themselves* An advance to the south, by the 3rd Turlciah Cavalry Division, and a Turkish detachment from Beersheba, caused the British right flank cavalry to fall back* By nightfall the British had relinquiuhed the attack, end the battle was a Turkish «riotory» (3) 8uffleeer and Pall. 1917* Following the Second Battle of Gaza, the summer and fall of 1917i up to October 26th, was occupied by both the British and Turkish ariuies in reouporating, reinforoing and in general re-organization for the intensive efforts that 'were to follow* The battle lines settled down to a period of jtrenoh warfare* Several atrorg raids were made, by the British1* against Beersheba but were without any real results* The •Turkish line, considered strong by British officers prior 1) l-166|15-Map 14| 13-85. t;go jth 14-102|13-85,86e Seoond Battl.e of Oaza, was further strengthened » - I j until it comprised several trenoh linen with suitable switches and communicationtrenches• In the eand dunes breastworks were made of sand bagsV but no dugouts were conetruoted. At other points, and especially at Beereheba , concrete shelters were constructed. Wire entanglements ware poor and comparatively inadequate, due to a lack of material. During the sunnier a' second position was started north of Gaza,a series of strong points oast of Tel Soheria, a 8ingle line railroad was "built from II Tineh to Huj and a number of wells sunk. There vere no serious hostilities on either side during this period* The English artillery fire was more sustained and effective than the Turks, but the Turksr with German aviation forces, were able to maintain air superiority* (1) The comparative quiet on the military front , in Palestine, was directly opposite to the politico-military battles engaged in by the Turkish-German military-political groups back of the lines* In order to regain lost prestige , aid for military ,political and religious reasons reaching far back into the middle ages, the young Turks desired to reconquer Baghdad. Oermany, for political and economlo reas ons, saw eye to eye with the young Turks in this matter* As a result^he so oalled Jilderim foroe was ordered*organised, for operations against Baghdad* This foroe was to consist of a German Command, General Palkenhayn, and a complete German Staff, with a comparatively large force of German combat trsope, and a still larger supply,or communications^ column from the ^eman Army* The Army group was to consist of Turkish armies, to which German troops and auxiliary fownat ioru-> were to be attached* The picked Turkish divisions serv ing in European theatres, two in Oalicia, two in Bulgaria and three in Roumania, were to be released to this force* (l)l<5-508|17-lU7-2,para., 5|13~113|18~9* 10 !before this plan could be well started,the Turkish commander,Ahmed Jemal, and the German Commander, Kress Von '•,'''''•'• • ' , • ' • ' ' ' ' • • • ' ' • • • ' ''•••••• • ' ^ . ' i 1 KreBsentein, the troop commanders in Palestine, demanded reinforcements for the Gasa-Beersheba front* Apparently Xinon Ton 8anders, who up to this tine had been the main German representative in Turkey, agreed with Ahmed and Colonel Kressentein• The young Turks,in poll11cal control, still desired to move against Baghdad but the key to the Baghdad area lay at Aleppo, where the railway line supplying that area turned east. It was plain to the military command ers that Aleppo must be secured against capture Toy the Brit* ish| operating through Palestine, before any serious operat ions could bs conducted against Baghdad* In view of the Brit ish attitude in front of Oaza-P«ereheba, the only way Aleppo eould be secured was to reinforce the Oasa front sufficiently to guarantee its holding, or to drive the British out ot Palestine* The forces at the disposal of the Turks were in sufficient to execute the first plan, and it was determined to drive the British out of Palestine* This deoiflion, onoe arrived at; it then become necessary to adjust the command. Keither Jemal, or Kustapha Kenal desired or would serve under German command. Eventually it was deoided the Jilderim was to take over the Palestine front| that the new Seventh Amy was to proceed to that front, and that the Fourth Army was to be broken up* Jemal was to remain Cosaiander-in-Chief north of the 8anjak of Jerusalen and of the Turkish forces in Arabia, falkenhayn was to ootaaand on the Oa*a-Beereheba front north to inolude Jersulea and the operations in Hes.o potamia. (1) Prior to October 26th,19IT, Turkish reinforcements for the Palestine front were initiated as followst (1; 18-i711-173 to 180|15-113Jl«-609|14-107,108. 11. Seventh Army|consisting oft Thi^d Jtrwy Corpsi 7th and? 14th Divisions. Fifteenth ArayCorps 119th and 20th Divisibns; 60thi Division, moving from Maoedonia on June 20th• 24th Divisionn, moving from the Dardanelles in early July* 69th Division, moving fro* Aid in oo August 18th* 42nd Division, moving from the Dardanelles in September* 48th Division, marching from Turkish Third Army (Russian front) during the susmer* Caucasian Cavalry Brigade, marching from Third Army during stuner» 26th Division, ft.,v:'••.•".;.•;••enrout; e from Roumania on October 26th* Jilderim Headquarters transferred to Aleppo at the end ct August. All of the Turkish units «ere under strength, one of the regiments of the 26th Division, according to Ton Kress, unnbering only 498 rifles* Ton Kress also states that the army was losing in slclc and wounded, during this period, 3000-4000 men per month, and that about 25% of its strength were always in hospital* This shortage of men prevented relief fran front line duty for frequent training and rest periods* This condition, coupled with the growing British superiority, prompted Colonel Kress to recommend that the Oaza*Beersheba line be shortened by moving the left back to the hill north of Beersheba* This request was refused* On 28th SepteaJber, command of the Eighth Army was transferred to falkeahayn* Jtalkenhayn immediately started collecting his main forces around Aleppo, preparatory to an advance against the British as planned* 8ome of his forces arrived before, some during, but most of them after,the third British attack on Oaxa. On the 6th of September the Turkish forces met a great loss when the Ammunition Depot at Haldar Paaha was blown up* (l) (1)16-568,509 fl*183«184 fl6~697fl3~109,110* 12. The Third Battle of Gaza and the Retreat to the Jaffa* , . •'• •' ".,;'•... j "• Jerusalem line* j. On 28th October 1917, just prior to the Third Battle of Gaza line appears to have been as follows* OflQ i Aleppo* General Falkenhayn, Cosvaanding* Seventh Armyf;In*process of being formed around Aleppo* Slghth Army I Comoand Post- Bttlelkat•; Colonel Ton Kresaen tein, CoBtr^ojdiog. XXII Corps t 53rd and 3rd Divl8ions~Oasa« XX Corpsi 54th,26th and 16th(less one regiment) Division) on the line Oasa9exeluslTe9 to Beersheba^ exeloslTe* Corps Reservet 24th Dlvis'lonfless 2nd Beglnent) at Jenmaae. Ill Corps f 27th DiTloion|46th Reginent, 16th Diyisionj 2nd R«gi»ent,24th Blvision, all in the Beerahela area* Back ot the III Corps the 3rd Caralry Division (less one reginebt-V wv: in reserre* Amy Group fieserret XV Corps with the 7th Division at Deir Sneid, the 19th Division at Iraq El Venshlvev The 12th Depot Begl«ent vas apparently attached to this Corps* The 20th Division vas moving towards the front on lines south of Aleppo* The 143rd Beginent was located in the hills about six miles northwest of Beersheba* (1) 8ee also Map Xo 1* As a result of a Turkish raid,Initiated -on the 26th October, to cut the British railroad line southwest of Tell 8h6rla,&nd which was met and driven back hy British forces,the garrison of Beersheba was reinforced by six battalions.four batteries and three squadrons of cavalry. On the 27th the British started bombarding G&xa, and increased the bombardment |1) i~i839)ft~810*511| 17-118116-54 to 36,42(note) ,61(note) 69f j 15-U4.115J by using naval Xoroeu on<. the 30th* At daybreak 3let October the British developed their main effort against Beersheba,and by dark had gained the town. The Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division withdrew to the north; while the infantry withdrew to the west on Tel1. Sheria* The garrison lost heavily, 13 guns and 2000 men falling to the British. General Falkerihayn, on hearing of the attack, order ed that Fevzi,Pash, G.O.C. Seventh Turkish Army, who was in < • the area on reconnaissance prior to taking over the eastern, Beersheba, portion of the line, would at once assume command of the eastern front to include Tell Sheria* Orders were also issued that Beersheba would be retaken,either by the Seventh Army, or failing that, by the Eighth Army* This last order proved imposs^)le of execution, although Colonel Von Kres did move the 16th Division to Tell Sheria area ready to make the attempt. The force,weight and direction of the British attack came as a complete surprise to the Turkish command.(l) On the Gaza front, Colonel Kress commanding the Eighth Army had made every effort in preparation for a main British attack. On the nights of November 1,2 and 3rd the British attacked and carried the first line of Turkish trenches together with part of the main position* Due to continued British attacks against the left of the line, the Eighth Array( sent one of its reserve divisions to that sector to assist the Seventh Army* Von Kress states that by this movement"the situation there-ton the left) was secured for the moment1* (2) Von Kress now asked that he be permitted to retire to the Wadi Hesse line,where a reserve battle position had been organised, or laid out* GHQ agreed to this withdrawal,and the evaouation of Gaza was begun on the 6th of tfoV^mbar.(3) ll 16-510|18~61,62,616-51071 3 and Koto* 13-124* 2) 16-510, i3J 16-508,,510! » 14 On the 6th November,the British attacked again on the front east';'of Tell SoherlaY ^ back and captured Tell Soheria. The 26th Turkish Division stopped the Bfitlsh advahoe in this area, and,by the morning of the 7th Noveniberfthe eyaouation of Gaza was successfully otanpleted with very little lose. Part of the XXII Corps, the original garrison of Gaza, was sent off to reinforce the left of the line near Tell Soheria* The remainder of the corps ooouppied the prepared position at Wadi Hesse* Von Kress states that it had been assumed that the centre of the line, Tell Soheria area, would also be drawn back to this new line, but that the Army Group command ordered the Tell Soheria line be1 held, and that an effort be made to retake Tell 8oher* ia* The position of the Turkish troops, on the right, after withdrawing from Gaza:.was as follows t The 53rd Division Was sent to assist the 7th Army>the 3rd Division was sent to vicinity of Beit Hanon in order to protect the railhead and the left flank, while the 7th Division bocuppied the hew line at Wadi Hesse* Only a small force could, have been assembled for the oounter attack, and the Britinn beat them to it by attacking on the 7th November, breaking the line and pushing strong cavalry forces inthe directio& of Jemmame. This compel led the withdrawal of all Turkish troops in front of the towri of HuJ* Oh the same day, 7th November, a Sr'itfrji attack 6n the Wadi Hease line, After overcoming what the British oon oldere• L; . ••••'. d... , a• very, . stron: g '.defense k Y i , seoured, a foothol< . • ••:•••d on theA righ/ , t of that line and a further extensive withdrawal to the line of the Wadi Kosseir had to be undertaken by the Turkish forces* (3) The Turkish forces now assumed what may be desoribed as an aotive defense position* The Eighth Arm,; holding the Wadi Kdsseir, while the Seventh Army assembled in the hills I) 17-5|16-510. 2} 17.BJ16.511. S 3) 17-5|16-510. 15 around Beit Jibrin. From this position the Seventh Army oould attaok, in flank and rear, any British movement against the Turkish Eighth Ari^; The Turkish line at this tirae,l^th-12th November,can l>e fairly aoourately determined as shown on Hap 2, attached hereto* The British attaoked the front of the Eighth Army, and the Turkish forces determined to oounter attaok, with the Seventh Army, against the British flank and rear as planned* The attaok was made on the 12th November, with the 53rd and 26th Divisions in line and the 16th Division in reserve* The attaok of the main force was almost due south. The left of the 54th Division was to take part in the attaok, while the 19th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division, located on the extreme left and well to the rear of the British forces! were to attaok almost due west* See map 2* During the 12th, the oounterattaok made good progress, driving the British baok about four miles and demonstrating a clear lunkioh superiority on that flank; however the 3rd Cavalry Division and the 19th Division seems to have waited for a more or lesti complete revreat of the British before attacking, and as this retreat did not come, the full foroe of the strenght arid "tactical position of the 19th infantry and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were never developed* On the day of the Turkish counter-attack : : ;i ; : : the Britis..-, 'i '' %^)-' •'•••••'•'•'h * als'• ok attaoke,.••'.• . • ••'• d ••'.an '•• • d brok•'e• th'..•;', ••e '. 'fron ^ \ i ' ' ^ y t' . '\of1 •:•••• • the Turkish Eighth Army at Burga and Brown Hill. Turkish Headquarters considered it necessary to move the 16th Division,reinforced, from the Seventh Army to the Eighth Army, and,as a result, the counter-attack of theSeventh Array could not be renewed on the lith» (I) During the night of 12-13 the Turkish Sighth Army withdrew and reformed on the El^uehihe-BlUaghar-Sl Uemsiye line to defend Junotion Station* The 3rd>7th and 54th Divisions were in line from the right.On the 13th, the British attaok (2) 16-B1O115-136,141|18-92,154,166|16-509to 512*13-116 to 153* (1) 16-511|19-Map No 9| 17-itep No 13* 16 to seouro Junotion Station was developed. By dark,the Turkish foroeslbf the Eighth Army were in full retreat. Von Kress did, apparently, dedide to make an effort to save the situat ion by an attack at Meamiye with the newly arrived 16th Divieion(from the oounter attaok foroes of Seventh Army) but,according to one Turkish writer, "due to the tiredness and demoralization of the Army headquarters*, it was unable to find the division and whatever opportunity there may have been of saving the situation was lost (l) On the 13th, Falkenhayn, whose headquarters' was now in Jerusalem, ordered the two armies to withdraw to a more favorable line* The withdrawal was completed by the 15th November and the Turkish line then stood! lighth Array i-Jaffa-Yehudiye-Iydda. Seventh Armyi-In touoh with the Eighth at Iydda, thence to Yutta.(fi) On the 15th ,fydda was oaptured by the British mounted foroes, and The Eighth Army oontinued to retreat.7or the time being the IO'JS of lydda marked the separation of the Turkish foroes int of/two parts* The desire to hold Jerusalem dictated 1 J 1 the holding''o• V ••' j! •'f th: •e Sevent'• " '"h Arm'•'.••y o• n. "tha »•• 't V -fron ' . \ t' '•"-••whil '•''•,,e ,•.,•th• e5 ; Eight'''••••'•'•:'. h t Army must, '•'Holi f - d th'' e coasta• l'.-••',.'..•.'• plain and • proteot th.e ,.Jerusale , ' '•••; ' 1 "'••'••m " vallhead t,t Nablua, from which the Seventh Army must draw all its aupp/.iee* (3). 'Ay the 20th November the Turkish lines are again fairl*/ well definable as follows» 0f/«- Nablua. /iUghti h Arrayi From the sea,at mouth of Mahr el Auja, thence generally southeast along Wadi Deir Ballut to a point about ten miles northeast of lydda.The 3rd,7th,16th and 64th Divisions ave in line from the right. A gap of about 15 miles* 3ev|nth Armyi III Corpsf3rd Cavalry and 24th Division) west [X,., . 18-164,16ZM0t18-164,16ZM0tee Ij 2; 18-I83note. [5) 17-7|18-217notejl6-Blljl8-184, 1? of Bir«V XX Corps(63rd Division \ih lino,26th Division in aupport) oh the loft of the til Q6rpaf, while ttie 3rd Cavalry Division and the 27th Infantry Division was south of Beth lehem. The 19th -"ivisIon,enroute to Na"blua, was probably tuidor oontrol.(l) The Operations around Jerusalem. aKdto include December 50th Digging in,on the line given above,the Turkish forces set themselves for a desperate defense of Jerusalem. Expect ing re inf or cements. Von Jalkenhayn apparently decided to re- leave the pressure on the Seventh Army by attacking the British forces on the edge of the piains country* The 19th Division was given to the Eighth Army and,on the 27th, the Turkish 19th Division,3rd Cavalry Division and 24th Division attacked the hinge of the British line where it turned south towards Jerusalem. The attacks,while undoubtedly cooling the ardor of the British foroes, had little sucoess. The attack was continued on the 28th with the 54th^ 19th,3rd Cavalry, 24th and the newly arrived 20th,Divisions participating. The attacks were made with considerable dash and , according to British acoounts, were several timeB olose to a considera ble suocees- In the end the aotual lines of battle had only shifted at minor points. The attacks did succeed in forcing the British to readjust themselves, move troops hurriedly and to unplanned positions*(2) On the 25th t)ie right flank of the Turkish Eighth Army counterattacked a British effort to secure a bridgehead on the north of the Nahr el Auja, and were successful in forc ing the British back to the south bank. The Turks did not pursue. (3). 19-Maps 9,10,11J 18-189,eketbh IS|18-21?|17-Plate 18,19,20. 17-Plate 23» 18-221,to 229 inolueive. [II 17-Plet e ?U 18.217note, 18 On the 8th Booem'ber. the British XXth Oorpo attacked oh the v :: : /; : ? 1 Jerusale^^^••••^^'i^'^''"'m front-^ ^ ' ••'. ^'|^";'•This -^.V.attack,whil: ;,v.,-:x:••„-- •V^vfefe succeedin .. A>.*;'^ g 'a .<-t'••.'*:•': some points • ••;•,;•;•,., -:'k was not particularity successful and the British seem to have been considerably surprised to find that the Turks, on this front, had completely withdrawn by daylight the 9th•' Von Kress states that a false report, magnifying & small success, caused Ali Tuad, the commander; in Jerusalem, to wltlidrav on Jericho, in accordance with previous plans* Jerusalem was surrendered on the 9th Deoembei 1917. (1). Following the loss of Jerusalem, Turkish headquarters concentrated on reorganizing their forces and in planning a oounter offensive in order to regain that oity. The plan to stage a counter offensive seems to have been formed prior to the loss of Jerusalem. Major Von Papon, on Nov 23,1917 states that an asBUalt group composed of the 19th,20th and 54th Infantry Divisions will be formed by the end of November at Tul Kerara* This same- officer gives a picture of the demoralization of the Turkish foroes at this time* Re states, in an offioial report, "the VIII Army bolts from every cavalry patrol" and that in Jerusalem alone "we arrested 200 offioers and 5,000 to 6,000 men deserters" (2). Between December 10-20th the British foroes suooeso fully attaoked on the Jaffa front in order to push the Turk ish linen beyond gun range of Jaffa* Similar looal operations were oonduoted north of Jeruaalem with a view to seourlng better defensive lines and a jump off line for a maximum British attack, (3) At dawn on the 27th,the Turkish oouuteroffensive to reoapture Jerusalem jumped off* The attaok was oountered by a British attaok in the same area, and the Turks were foroed to abandon their attaok and assume the striot defensive* [1)16-512119*250,201,252I17-10. 2)l7-faoing plate 22. (3)36-49,50|13*1699170. 19 British attacks were auooessful in pushing the Turkish lines to the north and thus securing a larger bridgehead north of Jerusalem, On Deoember 30th, 1917 the opposing foroes were located as shown on lletp 3 .(l) January 1*1918 to August 31.1916. fhe period January 1-February 17,1918 was a period of quiet and reorganization for both armies. British sources show little or no ohange in the lines for this period, but do indioate oonsiderabl* reorganisation of the Turkish units, although no major ohanges are given. On February 16th, the British initiated an attaok up the Jordan valley to capture Jerioho. Turkish forces resisted the advance step by step, but Jerioho was ooouppied by the British on the 81st February* (2) On February 24th,1918, General Von 8anders left Constantinople enroute for Palestine to assume ooramand of the Turkish forces in Palestine. He releaved General Von Falkenhayn ,at Kasareth, on March 1,1918. On assuming conn and, Von Sanders found the Turkish foroes in line as shown on Map * • The length of the Turkish position, in an air line, was 75 kilo meters from the sea to the Jordan River. Administratively, the Turkish foroos, aooording to Von 8andera, were in the midst of a major ohange* The ntaff of the 8eventh Army was enroute from Nablua to Amman( on tho Hedjas railroad, oast of the Jordan) where it was to assume conmand of all forces east of Jordan* The Sighth Army was engaged in taking over all foroes west of Jordan* Voh 8anders at onoe issued orders revoking all these ohangee, re-establishing Seventh Army headquarters at Hablus, and ordering the XXth Arny Corps to reoross the Jordan to the west bank,where it was to oooupy the 20 kilometer gap (1) 17-11,12,13,and plate 30; 18-283,290,291 notet 20-118. (2) 13.178130-92. 80 that existed between the left:ffiahk of the III Corps and^the Jordan River* The movement of the XXth Corps was successfully oarried out; the gap ooouppied; and the Turkish line present ed a oonneoted front from the seai'to the Jordan* * on Sanders* k . , - ;.^ •..•;.,.'.•.,;.„ :•• '.••.'-: , • •'.••.•".•'.' •^-'••yi-r ••;•* '••• • • ' • ; V ' e ^ ^ > i l ' ' ; ' ' 1 • '•• • • • ' • ^ • • V 1 '" ': likewise,stopped the movement of Army Group Headquarters, and reestablished it at Nazareth. He seems to have ordered all detachment•• i 1 • " • • ' •, s' h••"•e' ooul' • !-.. >d • • la• '•'•:y hand. '•• : s , ' o' n••' t•'• o' •'••th• e; ' suppor- " ' •'.... t; • o.'f' •: .th l . oi ••II• • . ' • V I 1 < Corps* The 11th Division, at Damasous, was ordered to expedite its mar oh on.Na'blus.tl) On Maroh 9th,the .British attaokediwith two oorpB astride the KaVius Road. The British offioial reports show > ( :;; vvvi..' ••:••••••••• •^•/••••:,:,;^.w: : ;;:;:^..,: i ••>••: - - • v .,••.••-- •'••:••+ ;:•••*• a highly auooeatrful limited objective attaok, other British 8ourcea pass over the three or four days fight lightly* Yon Sanders'•.'' .••'.;•;"-, : o.•'.••n1. 1.th1' .'•••."..e othe; \ ;..'..r' hand s t ,a t thae s t ,fro ."••'•'•••'.''•m order.s .•••.'•foun• '••'••(:;d o• n.\"'• Britis• is.:, h dead it was indloated that the attaok was intended to go through and capture Hablus* At any event,it seems olear that for an attaok of two British corps it was unsuccessful, except in minor details, and that Von Sandere defense was successful* (2) Immediately following the above actionythe Turkish 11th Division, coming up from Damasous, releaved the Turkish 24th Divioion. The 24th was withdrawn to Kubalan in reserve, and to be reorganized. Van SanderB states that this "was the only division of the Army Group which was sometiaes available as a reserve during the ensueing months'*(3) Turkish headquarters immediately started work on im proving the Turkish communications, and reorganising the H.Ast Jordan sector* Regrouping of the Turkish cavalry In the Jordan valley flank was immediately started. The relief and movement of these units was slow, due to laok of replacement, but was eventually completed without interference*(4) 1-199 to 803113-178,1796 * 1£05131781920126117-16, 17U9-326,»27. ?ftOB. l-£06«£67,208. 21 During the first few weeks of his command,yon Sanders states that he replaced many of the German staff oflficera with Turkish officers with the object of bringing the line and staff into more complete sympathy and aocord (l). On March 26th,the British foroes started their first trans-Jorftan raid with the object of destroying the railway, ,viaduot and tunnel at Amman, As soon as Turkish GH<1 recognized theBritish objective,it ordered all troops and replacements in and around Damascus and east of the Jordan to be sent to Aramam. The Seventh Army was ordered to threaten the British lines of communication and the 3rd, Cavalry Division advanoed againBt the British lines o;f communication at Es Salt* The Turkish defense was successful, and the Brit ish were foroed to withdraw. By April 2nd»they were again west of the Jordan, maintaining a small bridgehead on the east bank of Jordan, just east of Jerioho.)2) • After the unsuccessful British raid on Amman, Turkish GH0» deoided that the British would make further attempts in that direction and throughout .April preparations were pushed to meet this expected move* The VIII th Army Corps,Fourth Army ,wa8 "brought forward from Amman, reinforced, formed into two divisions and entrenched oh the strong Tell Nimrin position facing the Jordan River. See Kap P «This oorps was reinforced by German and Austrian artillery and the 4th Company,146th German Infantry Regiment. Headquarters of the Fourth Turkish Army was established at Ss Salt, with Major Von Papen as its Chief of Staff* Means for orossing the Jordan, in order to reinforce the Poutth Army,were assembled under oover south of Ed Jamije* The mass of the Turkish oavalry was concentrated in the valley of Jordan* The left of the Seventh Amy, XXth Corps ,wa8 instructed to push artillery forward to cover the valley of the Jordan* (1)1-809. (2)17.10, ,213* 22 There was little aotion during April, and none of any real importance (1). On the Hth,Turkish forces made an attaok on the British Bridgehead, but were repulsed. An attack by thd British on the 9-10th was successfully repulsed on the front of the Asia Corps. Throughout this period the Arab forces wero making raids on theHedjaz Railroad. On the 18th,the British staged a demonstration against the Tell Himrin position to assist, the Arabs* It was a failure* (2) At 4»30 AH April 30th,the British launched their second attack across Jordan* The attack came as a complete surprise to the Turkish forces* The Turkish forces held on the Tell Himrin position but were forced to give up Ea Salt by dark 30th April. On this day,GHQ ordered the 24th Turkish Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division, at that time preparing for an attack on the British position at Xesallabe, to move to the Jordan prepared to cross and assist the lourth Army. They crossed Jordan during night 30th Apri1-1 Hay* At daybreak 1st Kay the 24th Division advanced southeast against the north flank of the British forces attacking Tell Himrin. The 3rd Cavalry Division attaoked due east towards £• 8alt* The Turk* ish movement was very successful and they captured nine un damaged British guns during the morning* The Turkish forces at Tell Himrin successfully maintained their position, and by the 3rd of May > Turkish reinforcements from Amman and the 3rd Cavalry Division were ready for a decisive counter attaok. The attaok was Made by these foroes during night of 3rd May and was successful in retaking Bs Salt* The British began their retirement to west of Jordan during this same night* Due to lack of fresh reserves,the Turkish forces were unable to make a forceful pursuit, and the British made a successful retire ment* (3)* :iJ 17-Plate 37936|l~2l6,217fl8«352,362,367* 2) 17-36t| l-21?»18-363|17-20. 3) 17-20,21|1-221 to 231} 18^92,393,394* Pollcmlng the battle of Es 8alt-Te 11 Nimrin^the Foiurth 'Army executed additional field works in thla area, and the : : ; 'garriso; . • • . ' : ' • • < • • nw a s strengthene• .•.'-•'••;''•• ;'•,'.'•"• •.';..'d. •.:b, y• th' Ce :+ additio, ,-.•.. '", n 'o . .•..'f• ;•th ' e. :newl. • y arrived \ 14(5 : •' 1h'•'. Oermaf ^ ' n.:.;. Infantr• ••':••.'••• • • ! • • - y'.• • Regiment• • , • • . • Th•.• e' ; " 24t • . h•••• • Turkis• •'•• • • • " h• ' / • . Divisior f : ; ; - : - : " : ' : . n ,after receiving replacements, was again placed in reserve near Maf id Dsohazele. The 3rd Cavalry Division was assembled near Ed Jamije. (1) The remainder of May passed with few movements. The Ara£s were active in executing raids against the Hedjez Rail jr«ad9destroying 25 bridges between Mayl-19th. On the 29-30 May British attacks of some strength developed along the ooast^ Jseotor, but were unsuccessful.(2) During June,only omall and local actions oocurred on the Palestine front. Turkish GHQ brought forward their depot regiments and initiated an effort to form a replacement division. The Arabs continued their raiding attacks on the Bast Jordan country. (3). During this month the dissension between Von Sanders, the Turkish Government and%to some extent^ the German General Headquarters in Europe beoame aggravated and Von Sanders submitted his resignation, which was refused. In JulyjGHQ planned and executed their delayed attack against the British position at Mesallabe. The purpose of this attack, originally soheduled for early May but delayed by the British Ss Salt raid, was to regain the oontrol of the Jordan River to the Dead Sea and thus deny the British aocess to the Bast Jordan country. IT successfulfthis would allow Turkish forces to be transferred from East Jordan to West Jordan, strengthening the main Palestine front, and provide some troops for a general reserve* The attack was to oonsist of three efforts* The main effort direotly against and enveloping the 1-233,235,236. *,1-237|17-22,23 negative* 3'17-22J1-258 to £48. '* 1-238 to 846* 24 flanks of the Ifesallabe position. There was to be a eeoondary attack down the west bank of the Jordan, while the third effort was to be made by the Fourth Army against the British bridgeheads on Bast Jordan* The attack was Made on 14th July and resulted In a complete failure. German units formed the spearhead of the main attack and both German and British sour ces agree that the Turkish forces failed lamentably in support- the attack of the German units* Ton 8anders atates that* The things that happened here would have been impossible with 'any of my troops in former years* The utmost that could be expected from the present condition of the deteriorated regi ments, nas that they night hold their ground against attack.I therefore gars up the idea of retaking some sand dunes in the •foreground of the coast sector** Further action on the Palest ine front during July were of indecisive oharacter* Arab troops continued to raid the Redjes railroad* Mauy experienced Turkish j . ,: >.. . , ' . < I[officer * s ver e transferred away from t he Palestine front during' ftthie period. (1). During August very little military action occurred. The British made several ralde and one considerable attack but the < • • . • effect on Turkish dispositions was of no importance* During this month the leading units of the 47th and 37th Caucasian Divisions began arriving in Palestine* The supply of artillery ammunition, food and grain continued Inadequate, and Turkish morale became lower and their desertions greater* Yon 8andera became convinced that a great British attack wee coming and Predisposed his troops to meet it. The 24th Division was placed •in line just west of the Jordan River, but under control of the Fourth Army, thus giving the Fourth Array troops on both sides ]'•''• , • . '/ < of Jordan* The 3rd Cavalry Division was also placed under con trol of the fourth Army* (2). Ill] 1-248 to 254J21-426113-191* jf2) 1-255 to 2671 13-1941 21-453Kote|21-427-455. 26 September 1.19 IB to the Armlet ice. During the period SepttKber 1-18 very little important activity occurred on tbe Pale -atine front* Ton Sanders states that during the 'beginning of this month,he considered making a Toluntary retiranent to a position with his right abreast the Lake of Tiberiast center and left in the Tan Valley. Re discarded the idea because the Turkish governments instruct ions were to hold Balestinefbecause it would have osant abandon ing the HedJas Railroad and the east of Jordan sectors and ^because of its effect on the Arab population in rear of the i Turkish armies.(l) In addition#the poor marching ability of the Turkish troops and the lack of sufficient troops to estab it , * ' . ',• [' v •• f • liah a rear position to stop the retreat on caused hlta to de cide that *the holding of our positions to the last gave us more favorable prospects"(2). On September 17th,a sergeant of an Indian regiment surrendered to the Turkish Eighth Army and" gave, what seems to have been* the first real information secured, or deduced, by the Turkish forces that a serious attack in the coastal sector was in immediate prospect,(3).Yon Sanders immediately ordered all available men, in rear of the battle position, to be collected and sent to Deraa. Major Viliner; a fteraan officer newly Joined, was placed In command at Deraa. The importance of Deraa lay in the fact that all the supplies for tho entire Palestine front passed through this railroad Junction. On the 18th the Bigth Army ordered its only available reserve, the 46th Division, to a prepared position in the battle line at £t Tire, and placed its local reserves in readiness* On this date,the 18th, the Turkish line of battle was as shown on Map 6,» (•) On the night of September 18-19,the attack developed n the front of the Seventh Army and at 3t30 AM 19th,a heavy l) 1*2731 *•'-*?• 2)1-273, f 1-271,2761 17 Plate 41. 26 artillery preparation opened on the entire front of the Sightv Antor. British airplanes flying low boMbe* corps and anvy eoanunieatlon systems and headquarters so effect ire ly that by 7tOO AX the Eighth Army was out of touch with GHH, and all coarsunications throughout the any group badly disrupted. The British attack on the coastal front was a ooaplete success, and by 10a00 AM the 8eventh Aray reported that strong cavalry forces were through the lines and advtuicing northward along the coast* YOB Sanders,at oncetordered the Asia Corps* Tla Seventh Army headquarters, to protect the right flank by soring forces towards the railroad and road at SCa Kiliyo8(Kalkilieh). The 7th Division,XXII Corps,Eighth Anqr, with its right rest ing on the sea,had apparently utterally collapsed. Von Sanders states that "they had completely disappeared •-•If or did I ever, during the retreat, see officers or small parts of this divisional). About lOtOO AM cowtunications between GH0* and the 8eventh Any was cut and renained out until about noon, when a report cane through to GHQ, that all parts of the coast sector had fallen and parts of the Eighth Army appeared to be retreating frost U K Tul Kerasi,, where headquarters Eighth Army had been located, due east and that there was no comunlcation with the Eighth Amy at Tul Koran. 3eventh Amy reported at this tine that it was holding its front fairly well, but would retire Its right (the III) Corps to the rear in order to gain connection with the Asia Corps* Ton Sanders approved this step, and ordered the Seventh Aray to send troops to the defile at Anabetailocated just east of Tul Keraa.This defile dominat ed the Bain route froa the coastal sector to the rear of the Asia Corps,the Seventh Amy and the cosnunlcations center at Messudie. Von Sanders also improvised a force under Major Prey , Inspector of pioneers of the Army Group, to protect the defile at LeJJun. another defile leading froa the coast to the (1) 1-277| 13*205,206 ,207,208. 27 rear of the Seventh Army. In the afternoon of the ^ Seventh Array was being heavilly attacked and the Asia Corps, ,Eighth Army,being pressed both front and rear. At 3i30 PM GH<1 sent telegraphio instructions assigning routeo of retreat for the Asia Corps, the Seventh Army and the Fourth Army to be used in case retreat became necessary* Towards evening of this day>the Seventh Army was forced to retreat. During this day,the Eighth Army had been completely disrupted.Its left, the Asia Corps and the 16th Division had made a good defense .retreating step by.'step, but With fairly good order. The Seventh Army and the 24th Division of the Fourth Army,while not so heavily engaged,had been able to retreat in good order when forced to do so. (1) On the morning of the 20th, a British cavalry force suddenly attacked the Army OHQ at Nazareth. After some fight ing, the|cavalry were driven out,but Von Sanders moved his headquarters to Tiberias,reaohing thereat 3I3O PM on that day. At Tiberias, Von Sanders, gained touch with the Fourth Army. The* ir report showed that the Seventh and Eighth Armies ,'; ; tv, • "'V'.: v •'•'••;;:-V-^t.;'-; ;,; v \-': ' : •'.''"''•}::'^;i::^A: ':^ ' .' •>i': ;::. 1; .•,'.:•• > '.•'";.'-;.••' were being force; d in an easterly direction to thf e Jordan Valley. Von Sanders instructed the Fourth Army to withdraw at once, and directed it to send a sufficient force to Beisan(a crossipg on the Jordan) to secure the crossings of the Jordan for the use of the retreating armies* QH<1 then set about organizing a new front on the line Lake Rule-Lake Tiberias-Deraa.(2) On the 21st,OH<1 was again able to communicate with the Fourth Army but oould not get in direct touoh with the Eighth or Seventh* Von Sanders claims to have sent (word to the Fourth Army to ooouppy the new line between Deraa and Irbid, and for the remainder of the Seventh and Eighth Armies to ooouppy the flj 1-269 to 2801 17-27 to 31 and Plate 141 21-4951T6te, (2) 1--267J | 21-511,527* 28 southern face from Irbid to Sariach. The Fourth Army, accord ing to Von Sanders, was again ordered to withdraw to this line without delay. On this day^it was learned that the 3rd Cavalry Division had failed to hold the orossIngs at Beiaan, as had been ordered by the Fourth Army, and that this oroseing was held by the British, (l) During the morning of the 22nd September,the Fourth Army withdrew froi: its Es Salt line;using the 146th German Infantry Regiment as its rear guard. Prom the 20th to the 22nd none of the orders issued by Von Sanders seem to have reached the Eighth Army, and that army did not know of the new front selected by Von Sanders. On the 22nd,Von Sanders left Deraafor Damascus,the new GHQ, in order to make the necessary arrangements for the Lake Hule-Tiberias-Deraa line* Prior, to leaving Deraa,Von Sanders had apparently.- organized a skeleton line for the receipt of the retreating troops as foilowsi Deraa-Samach sector with Major Willraer in command. Major Ludloff, senior officer in Tiberias , seems to have had command of the seotor from 8amach north to Lake Rule, with particular responsibility for the crossing of the Upper Jordan at Jacobs Bridge* Baoh of these officers was to receive and, where possible^reorganize fugatives from the various Turkish organizations, and attempt!to build up their part of the new line. (2) On arriving at Damascus,Von Sanders directed subsistance and medical supplies to the new front and made every effort to seoure troops for this front. Suoh units as could be formed were sent to the new line by trucks* General Ali Risa,Fanha, was placed in oommand of the new line with headquarters at SI Kurieitra and given orders to make a strong resistance.(3) ilJ 17*28,3011-285 to &90* 2) 17-31,32|1.289,290,286. [3) 1-292,293,294. On the 23rd,the leading units of the troops retreating in the East Jordan sector began arriving on the Deraa line and some of these troops were sent to positions along the line Deraa-Sanach. The 24th division of the Fourth Army was now east of the Jordan and was moving in the direction of Irbid, It had not, apparently, reoeived word of its place in the new line* The Seventh Army had also crossed the Jordan and was moving in the direction of Irbid. The Asia Corps of the Eighth Army crossed theJordan on the 23rd and marohed on Deraa. Thusj by the evening of the 23rd^the remnants of the Seventh and Eighth Armies were east of the Jordan retreating to the north* eaat, while the Fourth Army,leas 24th Division, btill in fairly good shape was retreating north along the Deraa-Araman railroad. Its rear guard was still on the Ea Salt-Amman line. The British entered Haifa on the 23rd, and the small Turkish forces at that point retreated to the north along the coast line* During the period 18-23 September^bhe Arabs had made oonstant raids on the Hedjez railroad and rendered the rail road south of Deraa of very little use"to the retiring Turkish forces* They also raided the line north of Deraa and strictly limited the value of the Damascus-Doraa line. For approximate ositions on the 23rd arid the line Lake Hule-Deraa see Map 7. 1) On September 24th the British attacked the Samaoh hinge of the Lake Hule«Ciberias-Deraa line• By noon the 25th the town of Samach had fallen. On the same day>Tiberias was surren dered. On the 26thfVon Sanders ordered a new front on the line Rajak-El Kunoitra-Es Sunamein, Thin line was to be defended' by groups. It wasfroughly,a great semicirole to the southwest and south of Damascus.The right was southwest of Rajak defend ing that important railroad Juno t ion with the left resting at a point on the Damaabus -Deraa railroad about 50 miles south (1) 17-29»31,plates 41 to 4ft| 21-311(5461 1-280 to 295* 30 of Damascus* The critical point of this line lay between Bl Kuneitra and Rajak where an enemy penetration would cut off all troops south of Damasous. Djemal Pasha, Commander of the Fourth Army, was placed in command of the Deraa area, and was instructed to send efficient troops to Damascus where QHQ would distribute them on the new. Rajak, front. On the morning of the 26th .the Asia Corps of the Eighth Army reached Deraa* Von Sanders states that U6% of the effectives available to••:••:• •tha •'•"•'•••'. • V ; > , ;.••: ' •• v ;:."V.;-. ; .' • -'' "; •.••:• '" • • • V ^ . ' V 1 ,: ;• '••'<' : ^"•/•••. -{, , ,; •.•.,,.•;' was still acting as rear guard' for the Fourth Army,' and other Turkish groups preached SrRamtheh, southwest of Deraa, on the 26th. The Turkish forces retreating along the coast from Haifa reached Beirut on the 26th and was ordered to leave rear guard detachments in the mountain passes and march to Rajcuc, On the evening of the 25th|Von Sanders ordered the Army Group Staff, less a small command group, to move to Aleppo. Bn the 2?th,the rear of the retreating armies orosse'd the Deraa line ; '•l'^..-:'; • ' : ' . ; ' v : '."•/., \ - ••'•/{'/. '•• •..". -..• .... .-. ••>.. --•••:•..•.•'!. •.'•„• • '•'-... V ' • ; ; < • ;.•• •• •• '•'.':'',":•, , v ' , :''.'/:,•. with British cavalry and armored cars in close pursuit* On this day,Von Sanders proceeded to Rajak with his command group. At :: 1 1 thi••'•• ' s\ .tim , ' " ve ' V th,;/•'.'o• situatio^ . V ; ; . ' :• n •••,..wa' s • :••'as• • - • . .follow • • • • ' • ; • • •s : : . "t " Th: . e' & • remnant••.•.;:/. .•.••.'• s of the [ : : Turkis.••••.•. ,.JV.V'':••h arriies• ':'//• ,' •covere ••:• - > rd ' - 'by ^ y V -th r ^ e'•" 146t r'-h' : Germa• n' •:'••••>•Infantr' ^b.'- y'' .•••••.••Regimen ''•:-• t were retreating north from Deraa areato Damascus about 80 Kilometers away/ Above lake Tiberias, on the Upper Jordan, a Braall Turkish force was covering theVTiberias-Damasous road* This force was also about 60 kilometers distant' from Damascus* in a oouthwesteriy direotion. The British controlled the sea port of Beirut', arid it was entirely possible to land troops at that port to out the Turkish line of retreat north of Aleppo* 31 The AsiaCorps was being moved to the R&jak area in order : 1 1 1 ; ; f ; : t•••^:o protec< •j ^ .:;-///!t th :. ' e•> railroa/•'/' V . d' : lin.:s >;e .....,'"and ,;,••:•th"e ',',','7righv . -t . ••'•;»•:•,•/'.flanki •. , :.Vo' . n:• .•"•Sander •' ' s states that he sent , or ordered, additional troops to the Upper Jordan line to protect that critioal point by a step by step rearward action in order to allow the armies to pass through Damadous towards Rajak. The reinforcements, were hot sent and it became a race between the British and the mass of the retreating Turkish armies to reach Damasous. The retreating mass lost a great many men but the mass did succeed in passing through Damascus, The 146th German Regiment of Infantry reached Damascus on 30th September, On,or about, the 25th September Von Sanders states that he ordered the Headquarters of the Eighth Army to proceed to Constantinople as "in view of the slight remnants of its troops there was no further use for it* (l). About the 22nd of Sept ember, the Second Army, which had been guarding the coastal frontier from a point halfway be tween Haifa and Beirut to the Gulf of Alexandretta and Mereina# was placed under Von Sanders command. Von Sanders states that he immediately requested that the Army send'all available troops to Damascus but that the Second Army Commander, while willing, could only'send a few Arab battalions, due to his limited means* These Arab units were used to protect Damascus from Arab troops during the retreat, and to cover the Barada Valley(route from Damascus to Rajak)• The approximate locat ion of Turkfceh-British forces shown on Map A • (§)• On Ootober let>the Turkish situation was as followst The Asia Corps, with the 42nd Division, Seoond Army, ooouppied a eemi-oirole around Rajak* Turkish foroes retreating from /; Damascus were streaming through the lines and an attempt was being made to regroup and re-organise these masses into oombat ant units. These attempts met vtith little euocess. The 146th Oerman Regiment was moving north on the roud Damascus-Horns [1) 1-297. [8) 1-896to 305117-32,33|21-56? to 580,595|17-I>late 47 to 51« ,proceeded by disorganized Turkish forces,followed by British t*bopsand attacked in flank by the Arab army. On October 1st the British oocuppied Beirut, (l). On this day, Von Sanders, states that he gave orders that the retreat would be contin ued to Horns. DJemal Pasha was given command of Horns, with orders to collect the disordered columns and form new units. Mustapha Kemal- was to command the troops at Rajak, and follow to Home. The Second Army sent troops to Hasja, on the Damae ; CUB-HornV , , v ' s••.'••• road, ^ . - ", < to, , : . protec/ - v •••-': t .th - • . > •e / . • • troop• • . / . v , s . ; . ) , -retreatin . . - . v ^ - / > ; \ > g : • vi : . a . that road.; In the late evening of Ootober 2nd,the As'ia Corps, forming the rear guard, began its withdrawal from Rajak' position{they were unmolested by the British.(2)« On October 2nd,Von Sanders states that he proceeded to Horns, and that a new defensive line, Tripolis-Rae Baalbek- point on the DamasouB-HoDi8 road was laid out* Von Sanders gives DJemal Pasha great credit for his energetic reorganizing of the shattered Turkish units. Kustapha Kemal was ordered to proceed to Aleppo and to reorganize the Seventh Army in the towns south of Aleppo. The Asia Corps, Colonel Von Oppeh, was also ordered to proceed direct to Aleppo,and report to Vustapha Kemal, with all other troops of the Seventh Army then in Horns* The Fourth Army was to hold the Horns position, covej* ing the reorganization of the Seventh Army. On Obtober 6th Von Sander8/r.**rived in Aleppo, and on that day directed the Second Army t6 move its headquarters to Adana, protect the Aleppo- Constan i op le railroad, (the armies only line of communications,, restore order, and organize the defenses against an enemy landing in the Gulf of Alexandra. At about that time.the 146th •••. •'v-.v; " ,' , •'•',' , ):••:• ,;; .••. •;•>:• v;-v;.iii v '• Oerman Regiment was moved from Horns to Aleppo*(3) On the 4th of Ootober ,the Turkish flierfifthere were .••••.•.'•, -.'•'.'i'1 '••'••,••„.•.•,'•:. "•;-'..'' , ' '••'! . • . • ' • . : • , ' , • • ' ' " ' ' , f . " •., I 1 . • • . ; > ; . . . • : • • • . ' '• ' !'. • • r three Turkisi '*'. .'. •'h 'y''+'t airnxane'* y V i & / ^ , ''••"•' '.'' '' s '' available~ ' '•'' ,",•/•'' ) reporte•, •'.' "'" •'' V;'i'"'':, i '..'•''d i ,tha i : t•;' [-/i th• •• e•, British X) 30513061 lt^5i 2) 1-30G,307|17-33 negative| 21-600 negative. ! 3) 1-30^ to 318|l7-33 negative. 33 were moving large forces north from Damascus. By the 11th» reports showed the head of the British pursuing ociumns at Baalbek. On this date headquarters of the Fourth Army left Horns, followed by the rear guard of that army, moving on Hamah* By thistime, apparently the 11th or 12th, Mustapha Kemal had oompleted the organization of the new let and 11th Divisions and these units were posted on a line;Wudehi-Aleppo. The Asia Corps and the 146th German Regiment was moved to the Adan••' ^•'•-a area,reportin•.,. • ^ • •'•• g t' o ' the•.•'• •Sebon .! d' 'Army '•••••/••• . ' Th^ t Ae v ^ Fourt ' .• •• h Army headquarters, at Hamah, was dissolved and its troops,retreat ing on Aleppo, made a part of the Seventh Army. On October 17, Hamah was evacuated by the Turkish forces and oocuppied by the British on the 19th. Theformation of two other divisions, the 24th, north of Aleppo, and the 43rd near Muslemije, pro ceeded rapidly, while XKX Von Sanders credits the new 1st and litn Divisions with making rapid progress in fighting efficien cy; On the 24th of October, the hostile Arab situation was so bad, in Aleppo, that a state of siege was declared. On the 24th, or about that dt.te, yon Sanders gave some reinforcements to the Sixth Army* retreating from the Mosul area. On the 25th serious fighting occurred south of Aleppo and Von Sanders re ports that the Turkish troops "stood well*. In the evening of the 25thjMuatapha Kemal evacuated Aleppo, withdrawing to the northwest where the 1st and 11th Divisions formed a line 21 Husenije-Hujuk. In the next few days the Seventh Army grad ually fell back to the position Marata-Babulit-Halebli-Tennib -Djibrin whioh was held with the 24th Division, the XXth Corpb (1st and 11th Divisions) and the 43rd Division i*i line from the right* Here I on October 3let, news was received df the Turkish-Allied armistice, and the Palexstine campaign became history* 8ee Sketoh Map 9 . (1J 1-312 to 319j17-34 and faoing plate 53|21-601 to 618* 34 Between September 19th and October 26th,1918 the British captured, according to their official report, some 75,000 prisoners, 360 guns and the transport and equipment of three Turkish armies* Machine guns,motore,animals were captured on a similar scale* At the beginning'of September states that he considered the total enemy strength,south of Beirut as 104,000 men. Von Sanders states that on the 15th September the Turkish divisions averaged about 13,00 rifles, and shows ten divisions and some cavalry forces, with a small number of German and Austrian forces* The British Official History of the War states that a captured return of the Turkish frr 21-454Note. 35. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM. An analysis of the Turkish Military operations in Palestine during 1917-1918 is extremely difficult and apt to be misleading unless there is constantly in mind the basic fact that there never was a true military policy governing the aotions of the military forces in Palestine. By the above is meant that the government of Turkey did not arrive at a olear conception of the relative value of Palestine in relat ion to the war effort of the governmentv nor did it indicate clearly to the military leaders the role assigned to the forces in Palestine* (1) In January 1917 the disposition of Turkish forces clearly indicate a role of minor importance assigned to the forces in Palestine* The faot that lines of coranunicat ion leading to the Gaza-Beersheba area from Constantinople, and the interior, had been neglected, and were allowed to re main inadequate for a large force show that there was nc oon oeption of Palestine as a oritioal and vulnerable point in the defenses of the Turkish Empire arid its war plans. (2) This laok of a policy, or objective, is nowhare more clearly indic ated than in the 7th paragraph of the epilogue of Von Sanders book "Five Years in Turkey" where he statest • Turkey was expected not only to defend the straits and protect her front iers at immense distances, but conquer Egypt, make Persia in dependent, prepare the creation of independent states in Trans* Caucasia, threaten India from Afghanistan if possible, and in addition furnish aotive assistance in European theaters*. (3) During the suntner of 1917, at the insistance of the local military leaders in Palestine, a partial realization of the military significance of Palestine led the government to per mit the diversion of troops to that area with a defihate 1-para 8,page 326I 1-20• 1-326* 36 mission. See page 11, supra. (1) After the defeats df 1917 in the Oasa-Boersheba-Junction Station area the government changed military leaders in Palestine and soon embarked on a military adventure on a new front (2) and relagated, by their actions, the Palestine front to a minor defensive role, attempting to strip it of troops and officers*(3)* The Government support of the Palestine armies, at this time, became so ineffective as to lead their oommander to believe that his army was immobilized due to lack of supplies and men.(4) Any policy adopted after September 19,1918 could have had no effect on the fate of the armies in Palestine on that date* The Gaza-Beer8heba,aotion and the subsequent retreat, illust rates the penalty for disregarding the prinoiple of economy of force and the prinoiple of mass* The bulk of the Turkish forces,certainly not more than 45,000 rifles and probably much less,was disposed about equally along the 30 mile front. As a result reserves,local and general, were small and die persed. Thus the Turkish army had no force with which to strike a hostile penetration, or breakthrough, in flank, and teven more serious, had no fresfr, forces available to cover a • • „ • • ' ' •', • . * * * • ' " withdrawal.-A similar mistake was made by Von Sanders in his •''"•• - •' • ''•: » i "»' • dispositions on September 18,1918(6). As a result, when the . •!.. . • . . . British immediately broke through the main Turkish position, there were ho Turkish foroes available to oounterattaok or to interpose themselves between the British pursuing forces and the oritioal lines of communication,Turkish armies* An elastic; iefonso, employing the prinoiple of ooonomyof force to seoure a reserv15-109»16«509e macs, \woul 1-179d undoubtedl. y have allowed Von Sanders to 1-210,241J20-445. 20-445^1-247 and 254,25?|13-193. 1-273I13-193i20-445^ 13-115 and note$17-2,4»36-76|17-4. retire hia armies,in fair shape,to soue new line. As it was the cordon defense, once ruptured, gave the attacking forces superior mobility, allowing them to reach the rear areas un molested, and turned what should hare been a retirement Into a disaster* It is to be noted, in connection with the policy of commiting the mass of available troops to the front line, that the quality of troops so engaged deteriorates rapidly. There being no troops available to permit of reliefs,for training and rest, the morale, combat training and physical stamina of the troops are so lowered as to seriously affect their-fighting efficiency and mobility, (l) The Principle of Unity of Command was violated by the Turkish forces on two important occasions, in the sunnier of 1917, when it was deoided to move the Jilderlm force to Palestine, all of the forces in Palestine, south of Aleppo, should have been retained under one command. Instead of this General Fa He en hay n was given command of the Seventh and. Sight h Armies, while Jemal was to command north of Jerusalem and in Arabia* Jemal, rather unfriendly to Palkenh&yn and the officer that had previously oonmanded in Palestine, aotually controlled Iblkenhayn's lines of communication. Heither Falkenhayn or Ton Sanders(prior to the loss of Damascus) was ever in command of all the troops In the theater of operations,and therefose it was never aotually possible to apply the principle of economy of foroe and aaas to the troops that were aotually in the theater of operations south AT Aleppo,(8) The division of ooumand , Oaxa-Beereheba Battle, cm the first day of the British attaok(3) was indefensable, and in a leader of Yon iii 1-249,275l 16-^508. (2) !•.180,202,893: , Talkenhayn's experience unexplainable* The Principle of Security was repeatedly violated by the various Turkish commanders* The two outstanding examples being the laok of knowledge of British probable intentions, and troop dispositions ,just prior to the Beersheba-Gara Battle(l) and the complete lack of knowledge of British troop dispositions prior to the 18th September 1918*(2) If it was' impossible to secure definate information as to enemy probable; intentions .and troop dispositions by normal means, it would stillhave been possible to avoid surprise by so placing the Turkish troops that the weight, direction and force of the British attack would be disclosed before it struck the main Turkish masses* the Turkish leaders evinced every desire to carry out the principle of the offensive* However the violation of other principles of war left the Turkish forces without the power to ex.eroiee offtasive aotion* The Immobilisation of the mass of Turkish forces in the various lines of defense denied the possibility of training,in offensive aotion, impaired the * morale and resulted in a defensive, rather^than an offensive, frame of mind* Improper supply also had Its share in reducing the offensive spirit* (3) The Principle of Surprise was illustrated many tines in this eampaign* The success of the British attack on the Gasa- Beeraheb* line in October 1931 was largely due to the surprise element contained in thfct attack. The direotion,weight and scheme of maneuver was concealed from the Turkish forces by means of positive aotion, the early bombardment of Oata, by I) 16-5101 17-3. C) 1-274»17-27 and plate 40, S 3) 1-249,£73. 39 Beans of faked messages and plans;by means of camoflauge, simulating active camps ]where none existed, and by concealed night troop movements.(1) In gaining the surprise element,on the 18th of Septenber 1918, the British used the sane general methods as at Gaza, adding a greater use of troop demonstrat ions and feints. (2) The British attack, by the 52nd Division, to force a crossing of the River Auja on December 20-21st affords an illustration of surprise gained by bold ness of action. (3) These three actions illustrate some of the varied ways by which surprise nay be attained. There were many other successful actions, both local and general, in which success was gained and casualties reduced by the proper, use of the surprise element. The German and Turkish Comnanders cannot be to severely criticized for their repeated failures to avoid surprise* The correct application of the Principle of Mobility is the outstanding characteristic of the British campaign in Pale stine* The reverse is true of the Turkish side of the campaign. The painstaking care and foresight exercised by Alleriby and his staff to provide the necessary joeans to permit full nobility is an excellent example of the administrative requirements involved in the tern "mobility"• The care, rest and training of his troops indicate that General Allenby fully appreciated the fact that mobility depended upon the physical stamina of the troops.The resistance of General Allenby to the War Cabinet*s desire for an luaediate continuation of the attack shews the Co&rander refusing to move until conditions were such that mobility was possible. (4) The immobility of the 36-67 |17-T^. 36-63|1?«£7« 36-66|15-273,274. 15-263,S9fe,293,894,295U7.6,8,9,ll,14. 40. Turkish Any, in September 1918, due to lack of proper administrative arrangements for supply and to faulty tactical dispositions! that did not permit proper rest and training, is a striking example of the necessity for careful planning in order that mobility may be retained. The destruction of the Turkish fourth, Seventh and Eighth Armies shows what may be expected to happen when an inferior force violates the principle of mobility. That the Turkish armies were destroyed largely due to a lack of mobility is the authors oun con clusion* To substantiate this conclusion attention is invited to the fact that the Asia Corps, according to Von Sanders, maintained its unity and 70% of its streugth throughout the entire retreat from the Jaffa-Jerusalem line to Deraa, and its unity to the end of the campaign. The 146th German Infantry Regiment acted as rear guard for the Fourth Turkish Array, and also large remnants of the Seventh and Eighth Armies, and still maintained its unity and fighting ability. See pages 27 to 34 supra* Leadership. The following quotation found in a footnote on Page 311 of Volume II, Part I of the Offlcial History of the War (British) , Egypt and Palestine, and given ,there, as coming from a Tur Irish Officer who had served under both commanders, is so concise,descriptive and so much in agreement with the writers own conclusions that it is given In totoi • The Policy of Falkenhayn was defense by maneuver!that of Liman defense by resistance in trenohea. Falkenhayn n^ver fully realised how ! • > . • . ' • • . i . --. • ' ••'• ; :• •-• '... V ' ' ••• .-••.:•' ••. •• •, ' diffioult maneuver was to troops short of transport on bad roads | Liuan never realised that ground in Palestine had not the value It had had at Gallipoli,» 41 Yon Bander* quick grasp of the situation on March 1,1918, on aualuiiing oommand in Paloatine, his firm decision to stop the disorganization then proceeding, his quiok deoision to retain the mass of hie troops west of Jordan and the rapid execution of these decisions is a olear indication of firm oonfldent leadership, See pages 20,21 supra* Von 8ander'fl organization of the east Jordan seotor shows careful planning, a true conception of the importance of the East Jordan oountry and excellent execution. 8ee page 22, supra. Von Sander's relief of German etaff officerc and their re placement by Turkish officers in order to improve and insure cooperation between line and. staff, while probably resulting in a weaker staff, demonstrates his broadmindedness and practical sense of relative military values* See page 22, supra* Von 8ander's plans and extemporaneous gathering of means during the retreat from 18th September 1918, to the armistice furnish a pioture of the military mind functioning co»8istantly, logically and preoisely under most hopeless conditions* Unfortunately it also indicates a weakness in foresight and planning* Prom the evidence of his own book, it is almost certain that Von Sander's had never made plans that envisioned the retreat that was forced upon him. If plans were made, and there is no evidence that indicates that any were made, they were never communicated to his army commanders. As a result, when communications brokedown, the army commanders had nothing to fall back on and the retreat was without direction or coordination. See pages 28 to 34, supra# 42. IV C0HCLU8I0K8 OP THE AUTHOR, Turkey,ae a nation, violated the principle of the objective, In Palestine there never was a true objective that would give direction to the entire campaign. Therefore it cannot(Justly, be oharged that the military leadere violated the prinoiple of the objective* However, Von Sander's, did know the true military objective and, regardless of the polit< loal objective, should never have allowed his armies to be come so involved as to endanger his true military objective* following In explanation* of the above the statement, by the author* is offered as both Falkenhayn's and Von 8ander*s conception of the true military polioy to be pursued in Palestinei The Palestine front is of minor importance as an offensive front* Defens'vely it is desirable that the line, Beereheba-Oaza, be held , not only to seoure the resources of Palestine to the nation, but as a means of Immobilizing large British forces on the Suez Can al.Due to political and religious reasons the oity of Jerusalem is to be given greater weight |)ian the importance of the city would indioate, Aleppo,and the railroad lines leading therefrom,is of primary import ance and will be held at all costs* As we have seen, Von Sander's allowed his armies to be so badly beaten,oh the Jaffa-Jerusalem'line,thatit was im possible to make any serious attempt to hold Aleppo* Von Sanders fought his decisive battle some 300 miles south of his true objeotivet thereby disregarding the Principle of the Objective* In the above discussion the German objeotive of - "'"' '.!;1'"'' ^ ; V V " ". ;.'•. •"•''• : >:-1 '.V: ' il-^..: :'.f v i;'f'^V^ftl'/1 ::-,1 ' :•'''•'.•-•'•!' '-^ v\7'V:V-v 1 1 1 V ; : : | •''•••• ' ' • ( i i''"' '" ' •.•.",•' ':' ' ; - V . ' ;': •'• '••''• • > • : ' • ; ' • • '.' •• '• /• •• ' ' '< " '-. • . , ' •'... •' < ' • '••.;•'''' ".'. '•'•" ^ .•'•'•,.,:•. V > " l because it should not have been allowed to dominate tactical operations,after the Britlah were on the offensive in superior numbers* 43* A study of the Third Battle of Qaza and of the battle on September 18,19, 1918 , indioato, to the author, that the application of the principle of economy of force in order %o eeoure a mass of maneuver applies with peoular foroe to troops that are faced by a superior enemy* That experienced oomnand ers failed to apply these principles, and relied on a passive or oordon defence, indicates that the application of these principles to the conduot of an Inferior foroe should be stressed* In addition the result of these battles tend towards proof that the oordon defense is never suitable* The results of a breakthrough at any one point are so extremely disaster* ous that any value to be derived from a oordon defense is probably offset by its risks* Considering the relative forces available, the character of the oountry and the objective in vie* the author, oonoludes that the Turkish military operations in Palestine should have been a highly mobile,elastio defense characterized bycounter* attaoke and counter-offensives at every opportunity*'^hat as a general principle a force inferior in numbers, morale and equipment cannot afford to allow itself to beoome immobilized*; That the Prinoiple of Mobility is the mainstay of the defense*. Judging from the aotione of the experienced leaders in Palestine, the author believes that the domination of the Principle of Security should be so enlarged as to embrace the prohibition of any commander from plaoing his force, or allowing it to beoome immobilized, in a position where a superior enemy has the ability to bring all his forces to bear on the mass of the defending forces in a short period of t ime • 44 V. RE0aAnSNDATIONS,--None required, VI• C0N0URR2NCE8.— Hone required* 45, 2I££100R££Si Koyi (1-13) la Ho 1 Text,below, page 13. 1* yiYe Yeare in Turkey,(Translation) General Liroan von Bandore* U.8, Naval Institute. 1987 Annapolis, U«8,A* 8. La Ouerro X914-1918. Leoturee E'Gole de Ouerre. Duffour, Colonel* 1V231O24 3* The Hatione of Todayt Roumania. john Buohan. Houghton Mifflin Co* 14 Boston* 4« Hen Larned History* Volume VI. C,A,Niohole Publishing Co. 1923. Springfield, Maes. 5* The JTe* Zealandera in 3inai and Palestine* Lt.Ool, 0* Ouy Ponies* Whitoom"b and Tombs* 1922. Aukland, 6. Souroe Reoorda of the Oreat War* Horn and Austin. The National Alumni* 7* Turkey, a Past and a Future. A,t'^* ^oyirtiee. Oeo H. Doran Co, 1917i New York, 8, Stateeman Year Book 1915* MaoMillan & Company. 1915* London* 9. Turkish Empire, Ite Growth and Decay, Lord Ever8ley. T. Piehcr Unwin. 1917* London* IPLO. With the Turks in Palestine* Alexander Aaronshn. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1916. Boston. lit Vodern Turkey• Billot 0, Meare, MacMlllan Company. 19241 Kew York, 12. Boonomlo and 8ooial History of the World War* Turkish 8eriesl Turkey in the World War. Ahmed Kmln# Yale University Press* 1930 • Hew Hayen, Conn. 13• The Palestine Campaigns• Col. A.P.Wayell. Constable and Company, Ltd. 1929. London. 141 The Kmpire at War. Volume V. Sir Charles Luoas. Oxford University Preset 1921. London. 10i Official History of the Wart Military Operational Egypt and Palestine! Volume Zt MAPS. Compiled by Major A.P. Beoke. Hie Majesty's Stationery Offioe. l?S8 16t Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. Volume 6?* Colonel Kress Yon Dreaeenatein. Campaign in Palestine from the Enemy's Side.(Translation] 1922. 17. The Advanoe of the Egyptian Expeditionary force* General Allenby. Oovernment Prets and Survsy of Bgypt. 1919. Cairo, Sgyptt 18. Official History of the WariXilitary Operations! Egypt and Palestine! Volume X» Compiled byi Otneral Sir George MaoMunn. His Majesty's Stationery Offioe. 1928. Londont 19. Offiolal History of the WartMilitary OperationstBgypt and Palestine! Volume lit MAPSt Compiled by Major A.P.Beoke. KlS Majesty's Stationery Office. 1930t London. 20* British Campaigns in the Hearer Bast I Volume III 1914-18. Edmund Dane. Hadder and Btoughton. 1919. Iibndon. 47 81, Offiotal History of the Wan Military operationsiSgypt and Palestine I Volume II» Compiled byI Captain Oyrll yallof His Majesty1* Stationery Offioe* 1930. London. 22, The Oreat Wart Causes and Motives* George H. Allen* Oeorge Barrio'e 8one, Philadelphia. 23, The Hew Larned. History, Volume X, 0. A» Niohole Publishing Co. 1923* Springfield, Mass* 24* The Desert Mounted Corps. U. Col* R, M* F* Preston* Hough ton Uitftin Company. 1981* Boston* 23, History of the Oreat War* Volume IV, John Buohan. Hough ton ififf l in Company» 1922 • Boston, 20* The Influenoe of Military Qeography on the Palestine Campaign in the World War. Carl J. 3mith, Individual Researoh Ho 61. Connand and Oeneral Staff 3oho41. Vort Leavenwortb* 27. Allenbyf8 Final Triumph, W,T,K*eeey. B,P. Dutton and Company. 1920. 28* Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns* General M.0.B* Bowman-Kanifold. W*T. Maokay, 1922* London* 29* Bnoyolopedia Amerioanna. Volume 2U Palestine* 30* Bnoyolopedia Britanhloa- Volume 171 Palestine. 31. Enoyolopedia Britannioa- Volume 20i Sinai* 32. With the British Army in the Holy land. H.Oi Look* Robert 8oott. 1919* London* 93* Work of the Royal Engineers in the Bu.royean War. Bgypt and Palestine Water Supply* 8eoretary Institute Royal Bngineere* W.J.Maokey and Company, 1921* 48 34« 8ir Archibald Murray's Dispatches, J»M,Dent and 9on»» 1980 London, 35. Br.oyoloi>«dia Brltannioa* Volume 21. Syria. Th« Bgypt and Palestine Campaigns At Kearsey« Oalo and Polden. Londoni 49, SEA 11 MKV 33fc>*. October %%, • < \ s v •'.' -' i MlP 1. 1 < ••MEOITERJ HAHEAN / \ \ "•—*«*— < 4 // M 7 I /%. w W J ''x\ it over* i! MAP MAP /fo..3 •<«•>«• MAP N0.4 MAP NO. 5 ^rrT MAP No. DVr»\%» S) 9'hV«i HiVfaL «a; (Nt»ir«tk •£^* rt Irb',4 WAI l^.'f . fe1 JtmKj svv uat \) Sept. M, I / ••• Bill f 1 A — —~ . _ _.. . MAP MO. 7 HAPW? % > to at i o MAP NO. Tvr k»»h ia