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Roster of Attendees, Economic Symposium The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City hosted its first economic policy symposium in 1978 in Kansas City, Mo. After three years with an agricultural focus, the first monetary policy symposium was held in 1982 in Jackson Hole, Wyo. The location is the northwest corner of the Tenth Federal Reserve District, which includes western Missouri, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Colorado, and northern New Mexico. Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium Hosts Thomas M. Hoenig President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Esther L. George First Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Gordon H. Sellon, Jr. Senior Vice President and Director of Research Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Craig S. Hakkio Senior Vice President and Special Advisor on Economic Policy Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Diane M. Raley Senior Vice President, Public Information Officer and Secretary Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Attendee Muhammad Al-Jasser Governor Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Sinan Alshabibi Governor Central Bank of Iraq David E. Altig Senior Vice President and Director of Research Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Attendee Edmund L. Andrews Economics Correspondent The New York Times Shuhei Aoki General Manager for the Americas Bank of Japan Alan J. Auerbach Professor University of California, Berkeley Jeannine Aversa Economics Writer The Associated Press Martin Barnes Managing Editor, The Bank Credit Analyst BCA Research Steve Beckner Senior Correspondent Market News International Ben S. Bernanke Chairman Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Richard Berner Managing Director, Co-Head of Global Economics and Chief U.S. Economist Morgan Stanley Nils Bernstein Governor Danmarks Nationalbank Alan S. Blinder Professor Princeton University Attendee Alan Bollard Governor Reserve Bank of New Zealand Henk Brouwer Executive Director De Nederlandsche Bank N.V. Alan Budd Senior Adviser Brevan Howard Asset Management James B. Bullard President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Ricardo J. Caballero Professor Massachusetts Institute of Technology Mark J. Carney Governor Bank of Canada Jaime Caruana General Manager Bank for International Settlements Stephen G. Cecchetti Economic Adviser and Head of the Monetary and Economic Department Bank for International Settlements Todd E. Clark Vice President and Economist Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Attendee Luc Coene Deputy Governor National Bank of Belgium Lu Córdova Chief Executive Officer Corlund Industries Andrew Crockett President JPMorgan Chase International Dave Cummings Chairman of the Board Tradebot Systems, Inc. Charles H. Dallara Managing Director Institute of International Finance Troy A. Davig Assistant Vice President and Economist Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Paul DeBruce Chief Executive Officer DeBruce Grain, Inc. José De Gregorio Governor Central Bank of Chile Servaas Deroose Director European Commission Mario Draghi Governor Bank of Italy Attendee William Dudley President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of New York Robert H. Dugger Managing Partner Hanover Investment Group LLC Elizabeth A. Duke Governor Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Charles Evans President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Martin Feldstein Professor, Harvard University President Emeritus, NBER Mark Felsenthal Correspondent Reuters Miguel Fernández Ordóñez Governor Bank of Spain Camden Fine President and Chief Executive Officer Independent Community Bankers of America Stanley Fischer Governor Bank of Israel Arminio Fraga Founding Partner Gávea Investimentos Attendee Jacob Frenkel Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Group of 30 Ardian Fullani Governor Bank of Albania William G. Gale Vice President and Director, Economic Studies The Brookings Institution Thomas D. Gallagher Head of Policy Research International Strategy & Investment Group, Inc. Mark Gertler Professor New York University Svein Gjedrem Governor Norges Bank Morris Goldstein Senior Fellow Peterson Institute for International Economics Charles Goodhart Professor London School of Economics Austan Goolsbee Chief Economist, President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board Member, Council of Economic Advisers Krishna Guha Chief U.S. Economics Correspondent Financial Times Attendee Angel Gurría Secretary-General Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Keith Hall Assistant Governor, Banking and Payments Reserve Bank of Australia Mojmir Hampl Vice Governor Czech National Bank Gerd Häusler Senior Advisor and Member of the Board of Directors RHJ International Philipp Hildebrand Vice Chairman Swiss National Bank Jon Hilsenrath Chief Economics Correspondent The Wall Street Journal R. Glenn Hubbard Dean Graduate School of Business, Columbia University John Hurley Governor Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Stefan Ingves Governor Sveriges Riksbank Neil Irwin National Economy Correspondent The Washington Post Attendee Radovan Jelasic Governor National Bank of Serbia Jae Chun Kim Deputy Governor The Bank of Korea Donald L. Kohn Vice Chairman Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System George Kopits Chairman Fiscal Council, Republic of Hungary Jeffrey Lacker President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Jean-Pierre Landau Deputy Governor Bank of France Scott Lanman Reporter Bloomberg News Jens Larsen Head, Monetary Instruments and Markets Division Bank of England Mickey D. Levy Chief Economist Bank of America Steven Liesman Senior Economics Reporter CNBC Attendee Erkki Liikanen Governor Bank of Finland Justin Yifu Lin Senior Vice President and Chief Economist The World Bank Lawrence Lindsey President and Chief Executive Officer The Lindsey Group John Lipsky First Deputy Managing Director International Monetary Fund Dennis P. Lockhart President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Maya MacGuineas President Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Brian F. Madigan Director, Division of Monetary Affairs Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System John H. Makin Principal Caxton Associates, Inc. Philippa Malmgren President Principalis AM Tito T. Mboweni Governor South African Reserve Bank Attendee Henrique De Campos Meirelles Governor Central Bank of Brazil Allan Meltzer Professor, Carnegie Mellon University Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute Yves Mersch Governor Central Bank of Luxembourg Loretta Mester Senior Vice President and Director of Research Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Laurence H. Meyer Vice Chairman Macroeconomic Advisers Zanny Minton-Beddoes Economics Editor The Economist Frederic S. Mishkin Professor Graduate School of Business, Columbia University Michael H. Moskow Vice Chairman and Senior Fellow on the Global Economy The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Ewald Nowotny Governor Austrian National Bank Paul F. O'Brien Head, Fixed Income Strategy Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Attendee Athanasios Orphanides Governor Central Bank of Cyprus Guillermo Ortíz Governor Bank of Mexico Sandra Pianalto President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Charles I. Plosser President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia James Poterba President, National Bureau of Economic Research Professor, MIT Maya J. Randall Journalist Dow Jones Newswires Robert H. Rasche Executive Vice President and Director of Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Martín Redrado Governor Central Bank of Argentina Jean-Charles Rochet Professor University of Toulouse Kenneth S. Rogoff Professor Harvard University Attendee Christina Romer Chair Council of Economic Advisers David Romer Professor University of California, Berkeley Harvey Rosenblum Executive Vice President and Director of Research Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Eric Rosengren President and Chief Executive Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Jean-Pierre Roth Chairman Swiss National Bank Brian Sack Executive Vice President and Open Market Desk Officer Federal Reserve Bank of New York Roberto Salinas-León President Mexico Business Forum Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel Professor Catholic University of Chile Mark Schweitzer Senior Vice President and Director of Research Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Nathan Sheets Director, International Finance Division Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Attendee Masaaki Shirakawa Governor Bank of Japan András Simor Governor National Bank of Hungary Allen Sinai Chief Global Economist Decision Economics, Inc. Slawomir Skrzypek President National Bank of Poland Michelle A. Smith Assistant to the Board and Division Director Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Jürgen Stark Member of the Executive Board European Central Bank David J. Stockton Director, Division of Research and Statistics Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Daniel Sullivan Senior Vice President and Director of Research Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Daniel K. Tarullo Governor Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System John B. Taylor Professor, Stanford University Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution Attendee Umayya S. Toukan Governor Central Bank of Jordan Joseph Tracy Executive Vice President and Director of Research Federal Reserve Bank of New York Jean-Claude Trichet President European Central Bank Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell Member of the Executive Board European Central Bank José Darío Uribe Governor Central Bank of Colombia Chris P. Varvares President National Association
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