The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal As Viewed from the Standpoint of Chosŏn* 1
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International Journal of Korean History (Vol.17 No.1, Feb.2012) 29 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as Viewed from the Standpoint of Chosŏn* 1 Mori Mayuko** Introduction The Sino-Japanese War was a watershed incident in the history of modern East Asia.1 Two different orders coexisted in East Asia prior to the Sino-Japanese War. One was the Sinocentric order centering on the Qing dynasty and the other was the treaty-based order rooted in international law. However, the former collapsed after the Sino-Japanese War and was in effect amalgamated into the latter. In this regard, attention should be focused on how the suzerain-vassal relationship between Chosŏn (Joseon) and Qing, which collapsed as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, was discussed during the outbreak of the Sino- Japanese War. * This article is a modified version of an essay that was presented during a colloquium <A Reinterpretation of History of Korea and East Asia in 1894; The Kabo Reforms, the Sino-Japanese War, the Tonghak Peasant Uprising> held by the Center for Korean History, Korea University and Research Institute for Korean Studies(RIKS), Korea University on July 9(Saturday), 2011. This work is supported by the Konosuke Matsushita Memorial Foundation. ** Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Area Studies, The University of Tokyo(Department of Korean History, Seoul National University) 30 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~ The positions of Qing and Japan began to clash in 1882. While Qing regarded Chosŏn as its tributary state based on the suzerain-vassal relationship, Japan regarded Chosŏn as a state whose independence had been made evident by the signing of the Kanghwa (Ganghwa) Treaty of 1876. Having been deprived of some of its other vassal states by the Western powers, the Qing dynasty recommended that Chosŏn conclude a treaty with the United States in 1882, a move which Qing perceived as a means, through the use of the balance of power, to preserve the tributary relationship. Once the treaty was established, Qing dutifully informed the United States in a diplomatic note that Chosŏn was its vassal state.2 In addition, Qing responded to the Imo Mutiny of 1882 by dispatching its troops to Chosŏn to suppress the military revolt in its capacity as the suzerain state. Thereafter, in October 1882, it concluded the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Between Chosŏn and Qing (Ch., Chao Qing shangmin shuiliu maoyi zhangcheng; 朝淸商民水陸貿易章程), an agreement that effectively clarified the suzerain-vassal relationship between the two. The relationship between Chosŏn and Qing started to change from this point, moving more towards the traditional suzerain- vassal relationship 3 than the ruling of a tributary state based on international law.4 In this regard, ever mindful of Russia’s southward expansion, Japan, which did not accept the notion of a tributary relationship between Chosŏn and Qing, nevertheless pursued a basic policy of cooperation toward Qing that avoided any mention of the issue of tributary relations. At the same time, Japan perceived Qing as a potential rival, and proceeded to engage in a military buildup in preparation for a future confrontation with Qing over Chosŏn.5 Japan also raised the notion of a neutral Chosŏn under which a number of countries, including Qing and Japan, would be responsible for the protection of Chosŏn, with the intention placing Japan on an equal standing with Qing. However, this was not implemented amidst the passive attitude of Chosŏn and the outright refusal by Qing.6 While the international status of Qing in East Asia was greatly enhanced in the aftermath of the Convention of Tianjin of 1885, Mori Mayuko 31 established as a response to the Kapsin (Gapsin) Coup of 1884, Japan’s was degraded. The Convention of Tianjin was based on the equality of Qing and Japan, and stated that each side should notify the other in writing whenever an important incident emerged or either Qing or Japan decided to dispatch its army to Chosŏn. However, the Convention of Tianjin was followed shortly thereafter by the reaching of a secret agreement between Chosŏn and Russia (Cho Ro milyak; Jo Ro milyak) and Great Britain’s occupation of Kŏmun (Geomun) Island. Although the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Inoue Kaoru suggested a proposal for the joint protection of Chosŏn to Li Hongzhang,7 his proposal was refused by Qing and the status of Japan regressed. In addition, Li Hongzhang’s successful implementation of negotiations with Russia left Japan with no other choice but to cede responsibility for the security of Chosŏn to Qing. Thus, although the Qing-Japan relationship on the surface appeared to be one between equals in the aftermath of the Convention of Tianjin of 1885, in actuality Qing occupied a position of absolute superiority over Japan. In accordance with these international events, Qing proceeded to increase its degree of interference in Chosŏn. Qing’s strengthened policy toward Chosŏn after 1885 can be explained from two standpoints. One is that Qing’s Korean policy exhibited the characteristics of modern colonial rule. 8 The other is that rather than subjugation in accordance with international law, Qing’s Korean policy was rooted in the notion of suzerain-vassal relations. 9 Meanwhile, Chosŏn’s policy toward Qing can be regarded as an ‘anti-Qing policy’ in which under the former scenario modernity was the goal, while under the latter independence, even if this meant independence as a tributary state, was pursued. Various measures taken by Chosŏn after 1885 illustrate the anti-Qing course that was undertaken.10 However, Chosŏn never refused the suzerain rights of Qing. On the other hand, although Japan did not accept the tributary relationship between Chosŏn and Qing, it temporarily delayed the holding of discussions on the independence of Chosŏn because it did not regard the suzerain-vassal issue, which carried the possibility of starting a war with Qing, as a diplomatic matter. Therefore, 32 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~ the balance in international relations in East Asia after 1885 was maintained up until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War through a mixture of elements, namely Chosŏn-Qing relations based on the concept of the independence of a tributary state, the presence of superficially equal Qing-Japanese relations based on the Convention of Tianjin, and Chosŏn-Japanese relations that were based on an intentional delay on the part of the former of the raising of the matter of the former’s independence. In other words, Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan were able to preserve the peace by not raising any issues that might upset the delicate balance between suzerain-tributary relations and the treaty-based system. The commencement of the collapse of this balance during the process that led up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War resulted in the notion of the suzerain-vassal relationship between Qing and Chosŏn being outrightly refused in the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876. However, Japan identified the internal reform of Chosŏn rather than the suzerain-vassal relationship as the justification for the Sino-Japanese War. Given the importance of the suzerain-vassal relationship to Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan, why did the Japanese government not identify the suzerain-vassal relationship as one of the causes of the war? More to the point, how was the matter of the suzerain-vassal relationship discussed during the process that led to the outbreak of the war? The majority of studies that have dealt with the process leading up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War have been carried out in Japan. However, few studies have in fact analyzed the significance of the suzerain-vassal relationship. Seizaburo Shinobu 11 explained the relationship between the suzerain-vassal issue and the process leading to war as follows. He argued that Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu perceived a conflict with Qing as running the risk of causing frictions with Great Britain, which accepted the notion of the suzerain-vassal relationship, at a time when Japan was seeking to modify its treaty with Great Britain. While Kiyoshi Tabohashi identified the assassination of Kim Okkyun as the root cause of the Sino-Japanese War, he also made mention, albeit in a vague manner, of the relationship between the Mori Mayuko 33 suzerain-vassal issue and the Sino-Japanese War. 12 Although Akira Nakatsuka perceived the Sino-Japanese War as part of the historic flow that could be traced back to the first year of the Meiji Era,13 his study failed to explain how the suzerain-vassal issue influenced the onset of the Sino-Japanese War. Such an oversight should be seen as the result of the fact that he explained the war from the sole standpoint of Japan’s national history of a country. More recent studies have focused on the theory of unintended war, a notion that runs contrary to that of intentional war. These studies, which have focused on the actions of politicians such as Itō Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu, have concluded that the dispatch of the Japanese army to Chosŏn made in inevitable for Japan to engage in a war with Qing.14 However, the unintended war theory focused on revealing the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War in a detailed manner, thereby exposing the limits of perceiving the relationship between the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the suzerain-vassal issue from a historical context. Based on the above mentioned problem, awareness, and existing studies, the present study examines, with the main focus being on Chosŏn, how the suzerain-vassal issue was discussed during the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War, which resulted in the collapse of the existing balance between Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan after 1885.