The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal As Viewed from the Standpoint of Chosŏn* 1

International Journal of Korean History (Vol.17 No.1, Feb.2012) 29

The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as Viewed from the Standpoint of Chosŏn* 1

Mori Mayuko**

Introduction

The Sino-Japanese War was a watershed incident in the history of modern East Asia.1 Two different orders coexisted in East Asia prior to the Sino-Japanese War. One was the Sinocentric order centering on the Qing dynasty and the other was the treaty-based order rooted in international law. However, the former collapsed after the Sino-Japanese War and was in effect amalgamated into the latter. In this regard, attention should be focused on how the suzerain-vassal relationship between Chosŏn (Joseon) and Qing, which collapsed as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, was discussed during the outbreak of the Sino- Japanese War.

* This article is a modified version of an essay that was presented during a colloquium held by the Center for Korean History, Korea University and Research Institute for Korean Studies(RIKS), Korea University on July 9(Saturday), 2011. This work is supported by the Konosuke Matsushita Memorial Foundation. ** Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Area Studies, The University of Tokyo(Department of Korean History, Seoul National University) 30 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

The positions of Qing and Japan began to clash in 1882. While Qing regarded Chosŏn as its tributary state based on the suzerain-vassal relationship, Japan regarded Chosŏn as a state whose independence had been made evident by the signing of the Kanghwa (Ganghwa) Treaty of 1876. Having been deprived of some of its other vassal states by the Western powers, the Qing dynasty recommended that Chosŏn conclude a treaty with the United States in 1882, a move which Qing perceived as a means, through the use of the balance of power, to preserve the tributary relationship. Once the treaty was established, Qing dutifully informed the United States in a diplomatic note that Chosŏn was its vassal state.2 In addition, Qing responded to the Imo Mutiny of 1882 by dispatching its troops to Chosŏn to suppress the military revolt in its capacity as the suzerain state. Thereafter, in October 1882, it concluded the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Between Chosŏn and Qing (Ch., Chao Qing shangmin shuiliu maoyi zhangcheng; 朝淸商民水陸貿易章程), an agreement that effectively clarified the suzerain-vassal relationship between the two. The relationship between Chosŏn and Qing started to change from this point, moving more towards the traditional suzerain- vassal relationship 3 than the ruling of a tributary state based on international law.4 In this regard, ever mindful of Russia’s southward expansion, Japan, which did not accept the notion of a tributary relationship between Chosŏn and Qing, nevertheless pursued a basic policy of cooperation toward Qing that avoided any mention of the issue of tributary relations. At the same time, Japan perceived Qing as a potential rival, and proceeded to engage in a military buildup in preparation for a future confrontation with Qing over Chosŏn.5 Japan also raised the notion of a neutral Chosŏn under which a number of countries, including Qing and Japan, would be responsible for the protection of Chosŏn, with the intention placing Japan on an equal standing with Qing. However, this was not implemented amidst the passive attitude of Chosŏn and the outright refusal by Qing.6 While the international status of Qing in East Asia was greatly enhanced in the aftermath of the Convention of Tianjin of 1885, Mori Mayuko 31 established as a response to the Kapsin (Gapsin) Coup of 1884, Japan’s was degraded. The Convention of Tianjin was based on the equality of Qing and Japan, and stated that each side should notify the other in writing whenever an important incident emerged or either Qing or Japan decided to dispatch its army to Chosŏn. However, the Convention of Tianjin was followed shortly thereafter by the reaching of a secret agreement between Chosŏn and Russia (Cho Ro milyak; Jo Ro milyak) and Great Britain’s occupation of Kŏmun (Geomun) Island. Although the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Inoue Kaoru suggested a proposal for the joint protection of Chosŏn to Li Hongzhang,7 his proposal was refused by Qing and the status of Japan regressed. In addition, Li Hongzhang’s successful implementation of negotiations with Russia left Japan with no other choice but to cede responsibility for the security of Chosŏn to Qing. Thus, although the Qing-Japan relationship on the surface appeared to be one between equals in the aftermath of the Convention of Tianjin of 1885, in actuality Qing occupied a position of absolute superiority over Japan. In accordance with these international events, Qing proceeded to increase its degree of interference in Chosŏn. Qing’s strengthened policy toward Chosŏn after 1885 can be explained from two standpoints. One is that Qing’s Korean policy exhibited the characteristics of modern colonial rule. 8 The other is that rather than subjugation in accordance with international law, Qing’s Korean policy was rooted in the notion of suzerain-vassal relations. 9 Meanwhile, Chosŏn’s policy toward Qing can be regarded as an ‘anti-Qing policy’ in which under the former scenario modernity was the goal, while under the latter independence, even if this meant independence as a tributary state, was pursued. Various measures taken by Chosŏn after 1885 illustrate the anti-Qing course that was undertaken.10 However, Chosŏn never refused the suzerain rights of Qing. On the other hand, although Japan did not accept the tributary relationship between Chosŏn and Qing, it temporarily delayed the holding of discussions on the independence of Chosŏn because it did not regard the suzerain-vassal issue, which carried the possibility of starting a war with Qing, as a diplomatic matter. Therefore, 32 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~ the balance in international relations in East Asia after 1885 was maintained up until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War through a mixture of elements, namely Chosŏn-Qing relations based on the concept of the independence of a tributary state, the presence of superficially equal Qing-Japanese relations based on the Convention of Tianjin, and Chosŏn-Japanese relations that were based on an intentional delay on the part of the former of the raising of the matter of the former’s independence. In other words, Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan were able to preserve the peace by not raising any issues that might upset the delicate balance between suzerain-tributary relations and the treaty-based system. The commencement of the collapse of this balance during the process that led up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War resulted in the notion of the suzerain-vassal relationship between Qing and Chosŏn being outrightly refused in the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876. However, Japan identified the internal reform of Chosŏn rather than the suzerain-vassal relationship as the justification for the Sino-Japanese War. Given the importance of the suzerain-vassal relationship to Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan, why did the Japanese government not identify the suzerain-vassal relationship as one of the causes of the war? More to the point, how was the matter of the suzerain-vassal relationship discussed during the process that led to the outbreak of the war? The majority of studies that have dealt with the process leading up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War have been carried out in Japan. However, few studies have in fact analyzed the significance of the suzerain-vassal relationship. Seizaburo Shinobu 11 explained the relationship between the suzerain-vassal issue and the process leading to war as follows. He argued that Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu perceived a conflict with Qing as running the risk of causing frictions with Great Britain, which accepted the notion of the suzerain-vassal relationship, at a time when Japan was seeking to modify its treaty with Great Britain. While Kiyoshi Tabohashi identified the assassination of Kim Okkyun as the root cause of the Sino-Japanese War, he also made mention, albeit in a vague manner, of the relationship between the Mori Mayuko 33 suzerain-vassal issue and the Sino-Japanese War. 12 Although Akira Nakatsuka perceived the Sino-Japanese War as part of the historic flow that could be traced back to the first year of the Meiji Era,13 his study failed to explain how the suzerain-vassal issue influenced the onset of the Sino-Japanese War. Such an oversight should be seen as the result of the fact that he explained the war from the sole standpoint of Japan’s national history of a country. More recent studies have focused on the theory of unintended war, a notion that runs contrary to that of intentional war. These studies, which have focused on the actions of politicians such as Itō Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu, have concluded that the dispatch of the Japanese army to Chosŏn made in inevitable for Japan to engage in a war with Qing.14 However, the unintended war theory focused on revealing the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War in a detailed manner, thereby exposing the limits of perceiving the relationship between the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the suzerain-vassal issue from a historical context. Based on the above mentioned problem, awareness, and existing studies, the present study examines, with the main focus being on Chosŏn, how the suzerain-vassal issue was discussed during the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War, which resulted in the collapse of the existing balance between Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan after 1885. The present study focuses only on events within Chosŏn, and more specifically, the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn and the Chosŏn government. First, the study analyzes the responses of the Japanese Legation in order to identify what position Japan assumed regarding the suzerain-vassal issue during the process that led to the Sino-Japanese War. Such an approach, namely separating the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn from the Japanese government, is intended to facilitate discussion of the differences between the positions adopted by the two entities.15 Thereafter, given the fact that one of the causes of the Sino-Japanese War was the Chosŏn government’s request that, in accordance with the suzerain-vassal relationship, Qing dispatch troops to help quell the Tonghak (Donghak) Peasant Uprising, the study also delves into how the Chosŏn government treated the 34 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~ suzerain-vassal relationship during the process that led up to the Sino- Japanese War. In addition, the author of this study in fact majored in modern Korean history, and in particular that of Chosŏn, and can be regarded as being a relative outsider in terms of the study of modern Japanese history. To this end, it is hoped that researchers in the field of Japanese history can provide me with additional insight regarding the response of Japan.

Japan’s Perception of the Suzerain-vassal Relationship16

The Position of the Japanese Government

On February 14, 1894, Ōtori Keisuke of the Japanese Legation reported to his superiors that the Qing government intended to dispatch a minister to attempt to help oversee a political reform process in a Chosŏn where the fervor for such reform had reached new heights. He went on to add that the continuation of peace in East Asia would best be ensured by having Japan cooperate with Qing in implementing internal reforms in Chosŏn.17 This report, which revolved around Minister Ōtori Keisuke’s request for Qing-Japan cooperation, saliently exhibits the international status of Japan in East Asia after 1885. The recipient of this report, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu also promoted a policy of cooperation with Qing. Mutsu Munemitsu avoided implementing any policy related to the suzerain-vassal issue on the grounds that this could put Japan at odds with Great Britain at a time when Japan was trying to bring about the long-cherished national desire since the onset of the Meiji Era of amending its treaty with Great Britain.18 However, the assassination in China of Kim Okkyun, who had sought exile in Japan, on March 28 and the subsequent handling of his body based on the tenets of the suzerain-vassal relationship had the effect of exacerbating the conflict between Japan and Chosŏn-Qing.19 It was from this point onwards that Mutsu Munemitsu began to be cognizant of the Mori Mayuko 35 growing possibility of war with Qing. 20 In addition, using the assassination of Kim Okkyun as cover, the Japanese media began to inflame public sentiment as part of its hawkish attitude toward Chosŏn and Qing.21 As such, the suzerain-vassal issue, which had not been raised as a problematic diplomatic issue between the three countries since 1885, was suddenly brought to the forefront. On June 1, Sugimura Hukashi of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn sent a telegram to Mutsu Munemitsu in which he informed the latter that the Tonghak Peasant Army had occupied Chŏnju (Jeonju) and that the Chosŏn government would petition Qing to dispatch its troops to help suppress the uprising. 22 Upon reception of this telegram, Mutsu Munemitsu immediately asked and received permission from the Japanese Cabinet to dispatch troops to Chosŏn. The dispatch of Japanese troops to Chosŏn had as its primary goal the protection of the Japanese Legation and Japanese residents in Chosŏn. However, Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi was of a different mindset with regards to this matter. Having been informed in late May that the Chosŏn government was unable to suppress the Tonghak Peasant Revolt by itself, Itō had in fact decided before May 31st, that is prior to Qing, to dispatch Japanese troops to Chosŏn. However, upon hearing the news that the Chosŏn government would petition Qing to dispatch troops to Chosŏn, Itō determined that even though it had decided to dispatch its troops before Qing, Japan should purposefully take a back seat to Qing and allow the former to proceed first. Eventually, the Japanese government followed Itō’s line of reasoning. The Japanese government’s ability to become a secondary actor in this event was predicated on its reception, as agreed to in the Tianjin Convention of 1885, of a written document from Qing in which it informed Japan of its desire to dispatch troops to Chosŏn. However, as Qing had dispatched its troops in response to a request submitted by the Chosŏn king, the Japanese government also considered the possibility that no such written document would be forthcoming.23 Japan subsequently received information that the Qing government would in fact send such a 36 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~ written document by June 6, thereby removing any doubts which Japan may have had with regards to Qing’s intentions, but nevertheless proceeded to dispatch its own troops to Chosŏn.24 However, attention should be drawn to the fact that the Japanese government’s course of action was heavily dependent on Qing’s response. The Japanese government fully expected that Chosŏn would turn to suzerain Qing when it failed to suppress the revolt. It also regarded Qing troops’ protection of foreign residents in Hansŏng (Hanseong; Seoul) as suzerain Qing’s natural responsibility. 25 On the other hand, the Japanese government worried that the suzerain-vassal relationship would be used to infringe on the tenets of the Tianjin Convention. In this case, Japan would have to interfere in the suzerain-vassal relationship and risk starting a war between Qing and Japan that would lead to a collapse of the balance between Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan. The fact that the Japanese government worried about such things should be seen as a clear sign that Japan had no intention to start a war with Qing. Lastly, this study examines the logic behind the Qing government’s decision to dispatch its troops to Chosŏn and to send Japan written notification of its intentions. Above all, once it became clear that the Chosŏn government would request that Qing dispatch troops, Yuan Shikai determined that Qing, given its status as suzerain within the suzerain-vassal relationship that existed between Qing and Chosŏn, would have to oblige by helping its vassal state to quell an internal matter it had been unable to put down by itself in order to save its own face. 26 Although Qing wielded great influence in East Asia at the time, the three countries had routinely handled all diplomatic issues in a manner that avoided the suzerain-vassal relationship, which was perceived as a grey matter. To this end, Yuan Shikai perceived this matter as an opportunity to clarify the suzerain-vassal relationship that existed between Qing and Chosŏn once and for all.27 In addition, the combination of the relatively lower status of Japan at the time and Sugimura Hukashi’s statement that, “I hope Qing can immediately suppress the revolt,” left Yuan Shikai feeling rather optimistic that the dispatch of Mori Mayuko 37 troops to Chosŏn would not negatively impact Qing.28 Trusting Yuan Shikai’s assessment of the political situation and the report containing similar contents submitted by Qing ambassador to Japan, Wang Fengzao, Li Hongzhang decided to dispatch troops to Chosŏn. The dispatch of Qing troops to Chosŏn would inevitably have the effect of bringing the issue of the Tianjin Convention to the surface. However, because it perceived the dispatch of Qing troops to Chosŏn as being based on the suzerain-vassal relationship, Qing realistically believed, as it mulled over the format and method through which it should convey its written confirmation of its intentions to Japan, that such an action would not run contrary to the Tianjin Convention. The written confirmation of Qing’s intentions prepared in accordance with the tenets of the Tianjin Convention by Li Hongzhang was conveyed to the Japanese Government on June 6. In this diplomatic note, Qing essentially informed Japan that its dispatch of troops to Chosŏn was being undertaken in accordance with the suzerain-vassal relationship that existed between the two.29 Although the Japanese government initially requested that Qing modify the contents of this diplomatic note, it did not push this matter again in order to avoid making an issue of the suzerain- vassal relationship.30 However, the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn, which opposed the position of the Japanese government, intended to use the matter of this diplomatic note of intentions to induce war with China.

The Position of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn

A comparison of the attitudes of the Japanese government and the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn regarding the suzerain-vassal issue reveals that while the Japanese government attempted to perceive the issue based on the standpoint of global history, the Japanese Legation viewed the matter solely from the standpoint of Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan. Thus, the emergence of differences of opinions between the two parties over the suzerain-vassal issue was in many ways inevitable. Nevertheless, the 38 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

Japanese Legation was a subordinate of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which could not act independently of the decisions of Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu and Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi. However, the emergence of problems pertaining to the conveying of information occasioned by the disruption of the telegram system and the discretionary power granted to Minister Ōtori Keisuke of the Japanese Legation during the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War allowed the Japanese Legation to implement an independent policy.31 Rumors that Qing would dispatch troops to Chosŏn began to spread at a time when Minister Ōtori Keisuke was on his way back to Chosŏn from vacation and Sugimura Hukashi served as the acting Minister of the Japanese Legation. Sugimura Hukashi was a diplomat who was so well versed in the internal affairs of Chosŏn that Mutsu Munemitsu once said about him, “As he worked in Chosŏn for several years and had thorough knowledge about the national affairs of Chosŏn, the government fully trusted his report.”32 Thus, the Japanese government trusted Sugimura Hukashi inherently.33 The second son of the lower samurai clan Morioka, Sugimura Hukashi34 was born on February 16, 1848. Having worked for the Yokohama mainichi shinbun (Yokohama Daily Newspaper) as a reporter responsible for Chosŏn related issues, he arrived in Chosŏn in April 1880 after having been recommended by the Minister of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn, Hanabusa Yoshimoto. At first, he worked in Pusan (Busan) as a goyōgakari (officer in charge of special tasks). Thereafter, he worked in the Foreign Ministry’s Bureau of Commerce and Industry before being relocated to Seoul in April 1882. After working in posts such as that of Vice Consul (October 1882), he was appointed to posts in Inch΄ŏn (Incheon; December 1882) and Pusan (June 1883) before being placed in charge of the handling of the aftermath of the Kapsin Coup in Hansŏng at the end of March 1885. He was then appointed as the Secretary to the Legation in March 1886 before being dispatched to Vancouver, Canada (late 1889-early 1890) as Consul. In the autumn of 1891, he was appointed to the post of First Secretary in Hansŏng. It was while he Mori Mayuko 39 served as the acting Minister of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn that the first shots of the Sino-Japanese War were fired.35 Sugimura Hukashi was a man from a humble family who had been a reporter with an interest in Chosŏn and became to be deeply involved in intricate matters related to the country after he met Hanabusa Yoshimoto. The following can be regarded as the key points of his career that should be highlighted. First, he worked in Chosŏn from the very initial moments of the Japanese Legation there. Second, he worked not only in Hansŏng, but also in local areas such as Inch΄ŏn and Pusan. Third, he witnessed firsthand important historical incidents such as the Imo Mutiny and Kapsin Coup. Little is known about Hanabusa Yoshimoto’s perception of Chosŏn. However, given that he was a member of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, we can thus surmise that his perception of Chosŏn was not very different from that of the Japanese government’s when it comes to Chosŏn policy. Although Japan sought to maintain a balance between Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan for a time, it eventually wanted to use the theory of Chosŏn’s independence to secure Japanese hegemony in Chosŏn. This is evidenced by the document sent to Mutsu Munemitsu on May 22 in which he asked Mutsu’s opinion regarding the dispatch of Japanese troops to Chosŏn. He described the reasons for the dispatch of Japanese troops as being, “to protect the Japanese people living in Chosŏn and to maintain the balance between Japan and Qing in Chosŏn.”36 In addition, while he did not think about the possibility of war with Qing over this matter, he nevertheless desired that Japan restore its status in Chosŏn and acquire equal status with Qing.

Realizing that the situation of Chosŏn was a complex one, I set out to use this situation to achieve all our ends in Chosŏn. . . . My goals at the time were to restore the status of Japan in Chosŏn, to achieve an equal status with Qing, and to reform the internal affairs of Chosŏn. I never anticipated that this would lead to the waging of the decisive battle for hegemony in Chosŏn in the form of the onset of the Sino-Japanese War.37 40 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

The use of expressions such as restore and equal status with Qing can be explained by the fact that the influence of Japan had been on the decline since 1885. As the Japanese government regarded this situation as being a temporary one and fully intended to confront Qing over Chosŏn in the future, his three goals can be seen as having inevitably involved a confrontation with Qing. To this end, we can conclude that his goals in fact extended to the onset of a war with Qing through the raising of the suzerain-vassal issue. Upon his return to Chosŏn on June 10, Minister Ōtori Keisuke received a directive from the Japanese government ordering him to search for a peaceful resolution to the crisis. He thereafter initiated and successfully concluded negotiations with Yuan Shikai over the simultaneous withdrawal of troops from Chosŏn. However, the Japanese Legation, including Hanabusa Yoshimoto, opposed this decision. Senior Legation officials such as Motono Ichirō and Matsui Keishiro held a secret conference during which they decided, “We need to find a way to rupture the negotiations over the simultaneous withdrawal of Japanese and Qing troops. Japan should use the present opportunity to determine the matter of the independence of Chosŏn, even if this means having to go to a war with Qing.” This line of reasoning was subsequently conveyed to Minister Ōtori Keisuke. 38 Here, attention should be paid to the fact that the suzerain-vassal issue was raised. While Ōtori Keisuke responded to these entreaties by asserting the need to resolve the political situation in a peaceful manner, Hanabusa Yoshimoto asserted that Japan should force a conclusion to the matter that was based on military power and the theory of Chosŏn independence if Qing refused the simultaneous withdrawal of troops. Hanabusa Yoshimoto’s efforts eventually resulted in Minister Ōtori Keisuke leaning toward war.39 Here again, special note should be taken of the fact that Hanabusa Yoshimoto openly referred to the suzerain-vassal issue. Having accepted the opinions of the officials from the Japanese Legation, Minister Ōtori Keisuke suggested that the Japanese government use the suzerain-vassal issue as an excuse to initiate a war with Qing on Mori Mayuko 41

June 17.40 As this official letter only arrived in Japan on June 26, the Japanese Legation naturally had not received any instructions from the Japanese government as of this point in time. However, Minister Ōtori Keisuke nevertheless discussed the suzerain-vassal issue with Yuan Shikai on that very day.41 In addition, on June 26, Consul Uchida also submitted an opinion piece to the Japanese government in which he argued that Japan should support Chosŏn’s independence and criticized the notion of Qing’s suzerain rights over Chosŏn.42 On June 27, Minister Ōtori Keisuke sent a plan which called for the raising of the suzerain- vassal issue and the urging of internal reform to the Chosŏn government to Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu.43 In short, by adopting a basic policy that revolved around the raising of the suzerain-vassal issue, the Japanese Legation in effect advocated the advent of war with Qing. Meanwhile, the Japanese government adopted a different position. The Japanese government sought to avoid the suzerain-vassal issue developing into a political matter for the following reasons. Raising the suzerain-vassal issue as the foundation for a diplomatic dispute could be regarded as the stirring up of long-accepted facts. In addition, Japan’s starting of a war over this issue could potentially provide the Western powers with an opportunity to blame Japan for having sought to reopen an old wound in order to start a dispute. 44 Thus, on June 27 the government responded to the official letter sent by Minister Ōtori Keisuke by instructing its people to only raise the issue of the internal reform of Chosŏn and forego any mention of the suzerain-vassal issue.45 Here we can see that while the Japanese government had in fact decided to start a war, its justification for doing so was the pursuit of the internal reform of Chosŏn. However, Russian involvement in the attempts to regulate the conflict caused the Japanese government to abandon the plan to start a war altogether on June 30. The Japanese Legation, which had received a directive to cease moving ahead with the plan, openly disregarded the instructions it had been given. The Japanese Legation dispatched one of its officials Motono Ichirō along with Lieutenant Colonel Yasumasa Fukushima to Tokyo to garner support for war with Qing. The opinions of 42 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~ the Japanese Legation, as conveyed by Motono Ichirō, revolved around the fact that the suzerain-vassal issue lay at the very heart of any effort to implement internal reform in Chosŏn.46 Thus, we can once again see that the Japanese Legation intended to bring about war by raising the suzerain- vassal issue. Having ruled out the possibility of Russian or British interference, the Japanese government finally reached a decision on going to war on July 12. The Japanese government instructed the Japanese Legation of its intention to start a war with Qing. However, it rejected the position advocated by Minister Ōtori Keisuke and made no directives regarding Chosŏn policy. The Japanese Legation received contrasting directives in the form of a secret order sent by Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu on July 19, which stated, “The most pressing task of our time is the incitement of a clash between Japan and Qing. Take any actions necessary to see this task through.”47 The following day it also received an order proscribing any occupation of the royal palace.48 Desiring to start a war with Qing, the Japanese Legation decided to adhere solely to the secret order of July 19 and proceeded with the occupation of Kyŏngbokkung (Gyeongbokgung). Upon being informed about the occupation of Kyŏngbokkung, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu sent a telegram to Ōtori Keisuke in which he listed the reasons that should be given for the taking of such action and the plan for the future.49 Hidenao Takahashi has pointed out that this series of events resulted from the Japanese government’s loss of control over the Japanese Legation and the latter’s taking of independent measures based on its discretionary power.50 What is in fact being inferred when we discuss the independence of the Japanese Legation? The occupation of Kyŏngbokkung was carried out on the grounds that the Chosŏn government had failed to adequately respond to two inquiries sent by the Japanese Legation. One of these two inquiries was related to the suzerain-vassal relationship.51 In other words, the Japanese Legation had proceeded to initiate war by raising the suzerain-vassal issue, something that the Japanese government had steadfastly been opposed to doing. Mori Mayuko 43

On July 23, a battle erupted in Chosŏn over Japan’s occupation of Kyŏngbokkung. Then, on July 25, 1894, the Japanese and Qing navies clashed in the Battle of P’ungdo (Pungdo; Ch., Fengtao). On July 31, the Japanese government informed the Western powers about the onset of war with Qing. It officially proclaimed war with Qing on August 2, 1894.

Perceptions of the Chosŏn Government

Although the Sino-Japanese War emerged in Chosŏn and was about Chosŏn, existing studies have focused on the conflict between Qing and Japan, while by and large ignoring the position of Chosŏn.52 The Chosŏn government’s request that Qing suppress the Tonghak Peasant Uprising based on the suzerain-vassal relationship provided the spark that ignited the Sino-Japanese War. The attitude that the Chosŏn government adopted toward the suzerain-vassal relationship thereafter remains by and large unclear. Let us now examine how the Chosŏn government implemented its foreign policy during the period spanning from the stationing of Qing and Japanese military troops in Chosŏn to the occupation of Kyŏngbokkung.

The Use of the Suzerain-vassal Relationship

One such policy approach was to make active use of the suzerain-vassal relationship. As mentioned above, the Chosŏn government intended to use its suzerain-vassal relationship with Qing to suppress the Tonghak Peasant Uprising. However, the Chosŏn government continued to try to make use of this relationship even during the period that led up to the actual onset of the Sino-Japanese War in order to resist Japan. This was carried out by submitting a request for Qing to dispatch additional troops made through Chu Jin tongni (駐津督理; Ju Jin tongni; Ambassador to Qing)53 in Tianjin.54 44 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

Chu Jin tongni, Yi Myŏnsang,55 left for Tianjin on July 6.56 Upon his arrival, Yi received three telegrams from the Governor of P΄yŏngan (Pyeongan) province, Min Pyŏngsŏk, on July 29.57 The first was related to the Japanese army’s desire to learn more about Qing intentions, the dispatch of 2000 Qing troops to Chosŏn, and questions about when Yuan Shikai, who had left Chosŏn on July 19, would return to Chosŏn. The second telegram was related to the protection of P΄yŏngyang from a Japanese attack. The last message reported on the arrival of the first of the 2000 Qing troops and the shortage of food in P΄yŏngyang. On the same day he received this telegram, Yi Myŏnsang sent a message to Sheng Xuanhuai requesting the dispatch of Qing troops to Ŭiju (Euiju).58 Yi exchanged written conversations with Sheng Xuanhuai regarding the additional dispatch of Qing troops on July 30th.59 Here, it should be noted that Yi emphasized the suzerain-vassal relationship as the basis for his request for the dispatch of Qing troops in his written conversations with Sheng Xuanhuai.60 As no materials remain, the answers Sheng Xuanhuai gave to Yi Myŏnsang during these written conversations are unknown. However, looking at the telegram that Yi Myŏnsang sent to Min Pyŏngsŏk on July 29 or 30,61 one can see that an attempt was made to convey the political situation in Qing. “I (Yi Myŏnsang) have heard that Li Hongzhang ordered Qing troops to advance to Chosŏn and the latter should soon arrive in P΄yŏngyang,” and “although the exact period has yet to be determined, Yuan Shikai will promptly leave for Chosŏn.” To this end, we can surmise that such information had been passed on to Yi Myŏnsang by Sheng Xuanhuai. Next, although there are no exact dates, Min Pyŏngsŏk sent a telegram to Yi Myŏnsang at the end of July62 in which he notified the latter that Japanese troops had advanced from Inch΄ŏn to Hansŏng and occupied Kyŏngbokkung, and requested an immediate dispatch of Qing troops. Yi Myŏnsang responded by urging Sheng Xuanhuai to dispatch Qing troops to P΄yŏngyang. They also engaged in conversations about other matters.63 In addition, during this same period, Yi Myŏnsang also included a request Mori Mayuko 45 that Sheng Xuanhuai dispatch Qing troops in the diplomatic box64 that he sent, which included the news that a secret envoy acting as a representative of the king had come to visit.65 Although doubts can be raised as to the reliability of this information, the possibility that the king of Chosŏn dispatched a secret envoy to Tianjin in order to request the support of Qing after the Japanese occupation of Kyŏngbokkung cannot be overlooked. However, contrary to Japan, which was on the rise, the situation in Qing was an increasingly difficult one. Growing increasingly nervous, Yi Myŏnsang once again engaged in an exchange of written notes with Sheng Xuanhuai on August 1 in which he requested the dispatch of additional troops. Yi also used expressions that emphasized the suzerain-vassal relationship.66 As such, a closer look at the documents of the Chu Jin tongni reveals that while the Governor of P΄yŏngan Province, Min Pyŏngsŏk, conveyed the political situation in Chosŏn to Chu Jin tongni, Yi Myŏnsang, the latter discussed these matters with Sheng Xuanhuai of the Tianjin Customs Office. In other words, during the initial stages of the Sino- Japanese War, an information conveyance structure based on the suzerain-vassal relationship and which ran from the Governor of P΄yŏngan province to Chu Jin tongni and the Tianjin Customs Office (and Li Hongzhang), was firmly in place. The Chosŏn government’s operation of this line of communication was designed to obtain the support of Qing. This fact is also evidenced by a look at the records of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn: “The Chosŏn government intends to dispatch Chu Jin tongni, Yi Myŏnsang, to Tianjin in order to secure the dispatch of troops through negotiations with the Qing government.”67

The Use of the Treaty System

The other foreign policy approach employed by the Chosŏn government was the active use of the treaty system. Shortly after the arrival of the two countries militaries in Chosŏn, the Chosŏn government began to call for their withdrawal68 and requested the mediation of the 46 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

Western powers based on its treaty relationships. In other words, the Chosŏn government sought to ensure the withdrawal of Qing and Japanese troops and to avoid conflict through the mediation of the Western powers. On June 18, the Office for General Control of Diplomatic and Commercial Affairs (T’ongni kyosŏp t’ongsang samu amun; T’ongni gyoseop t’ongsang samu amun) let it be known to the ministers and consuls of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and France that the Tonghak Peasant Uprising had been suppressed.69 In a note sent to the representatives of the Western powers on June 24, Chosŏn criticized the fact that both countries’ troops remained in Chosŏn despite the fact that the Tonghak Peasant Uprising had been suppressed and requested mediation to bring about the withdrawal of both militaries.70 Here attention should be drawn to the fact that Chosŏn requested the mediation of the Western powers based on the notion of ‘good offices’71 that had been included in its treaties with the Western powers. In short, the Chosŏn government sought to use the treaty system to forge ahead with the withdrawal of the militaries of Qing and Japan from Chosŏn. In addition, attention should also be paid to the fact that Chosŏn criticized the Japanese troops stationed in Chosŏn on the grounds that it violated international law. In other words, while Chosŏn implored Qing to dispatch its troops by emphasizing the suzerain-vassal relationship, its requests for mediation by the Western powers was based on treaties and international law as an independent state. Here, we can see that the Chosŏn government’s foreign policy during the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War was not very different from what it had previously been. The representatives of the United States, Russia, France, and Great Britain sent a jointly signed note to convey the Chosŏn government’s opinions to Yuan Shikai and Ōtori Keisuke.72 However, Yuan Shikai and Ōtori Keisuke replied that the current situation rendered the withdrawal of their respective military troops difficult. 73 The king requested the mediation of the representatives of the Western powers in Hansŏng. As Mori Mayuko 47 the Minister of the French Legation reported to his government, the representatives of the Western powers did not possess the necessary qualifications to successfully see through such mediation. Such mediation should be conducted by governments.74 In reality, as the governments of the Western powers had already started to mediate between the Qing and Japanese governments, it became futile for ministers and consuls in Hansŏng to try and mediate between them.75 However, the Chosŏn government treated the United States differently. While it sent out the note to all the Western powers, Chosŏn sent a separate request for mediation to the United States. Previous studies have explained the Chosŏn government’s decision to single out the United States for assistance as having been based on the close relationship that existed between the Chosŏn government and the American Legation.76 On July 5, the Chosŏn government sent a directive to the Ambassador to the United States, Yi Sŭngsu, to directly request the U.S. President’s mediation of the issue of Japanese troops.77 This directive included two documents.78 One was a telegram sent to Yi Sŭngsu titled, “The Palace,” on June 28, which contents were similar to those found in the note sent out on June 24. The other implored the ambassador to request that the U.S. government instruct the Qing, Japanese, and American Legations in Chosŏn to make efforts to bring about the withdrawal of the Qing and Japanese troops. However, as the U.S. government had adopted a favorable attitude toward Japan, it did not actively consider this request for mediation.79 Li Hongzhang received Yuan Shikai’s report regarding the request for mediation submitted by the Chosŏn government to the Western powers and conveyed it to the Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen (總理各國事務衙門, Office in Charge of Affairs of All Nations). Having received no specific instructions from the Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen, Li Hongzhang decided to accept Yuan Shikai’s conclusions regarding matters related to mediation.80 Thus, the issue of mediation did not impact Qing’s policy. Meanwhile, no historical materials pertaining to the matter of whether the Japanese Legation reported the issue of mediation to the Japanese 48 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~ government have been uncovered yet. However, there are records showing that the American and Russian Legations in Japan conveyed this matter to the Japanese government.81 In addition, the Russian Legation in Japan also conveyed the Chosŏn government’s request for mediation to Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. 82 However, as the Japanese government had already subjected itself to mediation attempts by Great Britain and Russia, there was no further reason for Japan to consider changing its policy because of mediation. The matter of the possible interference by Western powers having been settled, the Japanese government subsequently proceeded to occupy Kyŏngbokkung, with the Japanese Legation at the forefront of this movement, and wage war on Qing. The occupation of Kyŏngbokkung came at a time when the Chosŏn government was still seeking to use the treaty system to avoid the outbreak of war between Qing and Japan. The Chosŏn government criticized Japan’s actions right after the Japan’s occupation of Kyŏngbokkung and, based on the treaties it had signed with Western powers, petitioned the ministers and consuls of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to initiate mediation so as to avoid war.83 This note, which was essentially the same as the note of June 24, was also prepared based on the mediation (good offices) clause found in the treaties with the Western powers. However, because Western powers had already attempted to mediate the conflict, this particular request for mediation failed to achieve any results. Thus, during the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War, the Chosŏn government sought to avoid war in Chosŏn by using both the suzerain-vassal relationship as well as the treaty-based system. In other words, rather than using either the suzerain-vassal relationship or treaty- based system, the Chosŏn government set out to maintain a balance between these two different orders. Here, one cannot overlook the fact that the Chosŏn government’s use of the treaty-based system was motivated by the mediation clauses that were included in its treaties with the Western powers. While the Chosŏn government had great Mori Mayuko 49 expectations regarding this clause, mediation was regarded by the Western powers as nothing more than an empty provision. 84 The measures taken by the Chosŏn government during the period that immediately preceded the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War were exactly the same as those it undertook during the Kapsin Coup that occurred ten years before. At that time, it also did not receive any effective mediation from the Western powers. 85 In short, the Chosŏn government developed an identical foreign policy that revolved around misplaced importance on this clause even though over ten years had passed since it had first been incorporated into the treaty system. As far as the Chosŏn government’s use of the treaty system is concerned, it is necessary to further analyze this matter from the standpoint of Chosŏn. In other words, rather than an evaluation based solely on the modernization of diplomacy, consideration should also be given to the fact that it also made active use of the suzerain-vassal relationship.

Conclusion

Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan’s hesitance to discuss the suzerain-vassal issue in the aftermath of the Tianjin Convention of 1885 helped to maintain the balance of power in East Asia. The process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War can be perceived as one in which this balance of power collapsed. Although the suzerain-vassal issue was in fact raised in Japan after the assassination of Kim Okkyun, the Japanese government actually used the matter of the internal reform of Chosŏn as its excuse to wage war, not the suzerain-vassal issue. The Japanese government determined that the suzerain-vassal issue was not only an ancient matter, but also a weak reason to go to war. The fact that the suzerain-vassal issue was not used as the excuse for the Japanese government to start the war with Qing shows that Japan’s priority was to secure hegemony in East Asia, with the intention of resolving the suzerain-vassal issue later. 86 However, the Japanese Legation desired to start a war with Qing by 50 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~ raising the suzerain-vassal issue. The disruption of communication networks made it such that the Japanese government and Japanese Legation could not iron out their differences of opinions. Consequently, the Japanese government could not submit any clear instructions regarding its Chosŏn policy at a time when war with Qing was looming. Using the discretionary power vested in the Minister of the Japanese Legation, the Japanese Legation proceeded to raise the suzerain-vassal issue as a cover for its occupation of Kyŏngbokkung. During the process that led to the Sino-Japanese War, the Chosŏn government sought to maintain the existing order based on the suzerain- vassal relationship and the treaty-based system. After the arrival of Qing and Japanese troops in Chosŏn, the Chosŏn government used the line of communication that ran from the Governor of P΄yŏngan Province to Chu Jin tongni and the Tianjin Customs Office (and Li Hongzhang) to petition Qing for help. Here, the fact that Chu Jin tongni emphasized the suzerain- vassal relationship in his request to Qing for the dispatch of additional troops cannot be ignored. On the other hand, the Chosŏn government also tried to use the mediation clause found in its treaties with Western powers to get their representatives in Hansŏng to mediate the withdrawal of foreign troops from Chosŏn. Two separate requests for mediation were made, namely immediately after the stationing of Qing and Japanese troops in Chosŏn and Japan’s occupation of Kyŏngbokkung. However, as the governments of the Western powers had already started mediation between Qing and Japan, mediation through the representatives of the Western powers in Chosŏn failed to have an impact on the main parties’ decisions. Nevertheless, the Chosŏn government’s intention to maintain the suzerain-vassal relationship and treaty-based system prior to the actual outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War can be construed to mean that Chosŏn’s foreign policy cannot solely be seen as having been based on the modern construct called the modernization of diplomacy. Mori Mayuko 51

Notes :

1 Takashi Okamoto, Zokukuni to jishu no aida (Between tributary and independence) (Nagoya Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 2004). 2 Song Pyŏnggi, Kŭndae Han Chung kwan΄gyesa yŏn΄gu (Modern History of Korea-China Relations) (Seoul: Tandae Ch’ulp’anbu, 1985); Kwŏn Sŏkbong, Ch΄ŏngmal tae Chosŏn chŏngch΄aeksa yŏn΄gu (The history of Qing policies towards Chosŏn during the final period of Qing) (Seoul: Ilchogak,1986). 3 Kim Chongwŏn, “Cho Ch΄ŏng sangmin suryuk muyŏk changjŏng ŭi ch΄egyŏl kwa kŭ yŏnghyang (The conclusion of the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Between Chosŏn and Qing) in Chosŏn hugi taeoe kwan΄gye yŏn΄gu (The foreign relations of late Chosŏn), eds. Kim Chongwŏn and Yi Yangja (Seoul: Hanul, 2009). 4 Toshio Motegi, “Li Hongzhang no zokukuni shihaikan”(Li Hongzhang’s perceptions of ruling vassal states), Chūgoku-Shakai to bunkai (June 1987). 5 Moriyama Shigenori, “Ni Shin sensōteki no Nihon gunbu no tsui Chō seisaku” (The Korean policy of the Japanese military at the time of the Sino-Japanese War), Doku kyō hōgaku 43 (March 1996). 6 Naoko Hasegawa, “Jingo gun ran ato no Nihon no Chōsen chūritsuka kōsō (Japan’s concept of Chosŏn neutrality after the Imo Munity of 1882,” in Senshi kenkyūkai ronbun syū 32 (October 1994); Hiroaki Osawa, “Chōsen eisei chūritsuka kōsō to kindai Nihon gaikō” (The concept of the permanent neutrality of Chosŏn and modern Japanese foreign policy), Shin kyū gakushutsu ronshū 12 (March 1998); Takashi Okamoto, “Chōsen chūritsuka kōsō no ichikōsatsu” (A study on the concept of Korean neutrality), Rakuhoku shigaku 8 (June 2006). 7 Moriyama Shigenori, Kindai Ni Chō kankeishi kenkyū (Modern History of Japan-Korea Relations) (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1987), 13; Hiroaki Osawa, 217. 8 Ku Sŏnhŭi, Han΄guk kŭndae tae Ch΄ŏng chŏngch΄aeksa yŏn΄gu (The history of Qing policy in modern Korea) (Seoul: Hyean, 1999); Kirk W. Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850- 1910 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 9 Takashi Okamoto.. 52 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

10 Yŏn Kapsu, Kojong dae chŏngch΄i pyŏndong yŏn΄gu (Political change during the reign of King Kojong) (Seoul: Ilchisa, 2008); Han Ch΄ŏlho, Han΄guk kŭndae Kaehwap΄a wa t΄ongch΄i kigu yŏn΄gu (The Enlightenment Party and governmental organizations in modern Korea). Sŏnin, 2009). 11 Seizaburo Shinobu, Ni Shin sensō (The Sino-Japanese War) (Fukuda Shobō, 1934). 12 Kiyoshi Tabohashi, Ni Shin sen ato gaikōshi no kenkyū (A diplomatic history of the Sino-Japanese War) (Toyo Bunko, 1951). On page 563 of this source, it states that the first edition of this book was released in March 1940. An enlarged and augmented edition was released in October 1944. 13 Akira Nakatsuka, Ni Shin sensō no kenkyū (A study on the Sino-Japanese War) (Aoki Shoten, 1968). 14 Hiyama Yukio, “Itō naigaku no Chōsen shuppai jiken ni tsuite, I II” (The Itō cabinet’s dispatch of Japanese troops to Chosŏn, 1 and 2), Chū Kyō Hogaku 18, #1-3 (1984); “Chōsen shuppai jiken to kagai hahei hei taisei no keisei” (The dispatch of Japanese troops to Chosŏn and the structure of the dispatch of Japanese troops abroad) Chū Kyō Hogaku 18, #4 (1984); “Dai ichiji Chōsen hahei jiken ni tsuite 1” (The first dispatch of troops to Korea 1), Chū Kyō Hogaku 20, #3-4 and 21, #1-2 (1986-1987); Hidenao Takahashi, Ni Shin sensō he no dō (The road to the Sino-Japanese War) (Sōgensha, 1995). 15 Ku Sŏnhŭi dealt with the issue of the vassal state during the process that led up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In this regard, Ku identified Minister Ōtori Keisuke as the main actor for Japan. See Ku Sŏnhŭi, “Ch΄ŏng Il chŏnjaeng ŭi ŭimi” (The implications of the Sino-Japanese War), Han΄guk kŭn hyŏndaesa yŏn΄gu 37 (Summer 2006). However, the Japanese government and the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn were of a different mindset regarding the suzerain-vassal issue at the time. The two parties were unable to iron out their differences over this issue because their lines of communication were in fact temporarily severed. Thus, the suzerain-vassal issue should be discussed in a manner that involves a clear separation of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn from the Japanese government. 16 The Sino-Japanese War was the first modern international war that Japan experienced. During the war, Japan was able to establish a nation-state by mobilizing its people around the emperor. Hiyama Yukio, Ni Shin sensō to Nihon (The Sino-Japanese War and Japan); Tō Ajia kindaishi kagukai, ed., Ni Mori Mayuko 53

Shin sensō to Tō Ajia sekai no henyō I (The Sino-Japanese War and changes in East Asia, I) (Yumani Shobō, 1997). As various factors are involved in the outbreak of a war, any discussion of this issue that is limited to the actions of the main actors runs the risk of simplifying what is in essence in a complex process. However, as this study seeks to analyze the discussions over the suzerain-vassal issue during the process that led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, it does in fact limit itself to the role of the main diplomatic actors. 17 Michio Fujimura, Ni Shin sensō (The Sino-Japanese War) (Iwanami Shoten, 1973), 44. 18 Seizaburo Shinobu, 98. 19 Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 98. 20 Kawamura Kazuo, Ni Shin sensō to Mutsu gaikō (The Sino-Japanese War and Mutsu Diplomacy), Gunji shigaku 112 (December1992). 21 Mizuno Kobayashi, “Ni Shin sensō kaisen zenya shisō jōkyō” (The logic behind a justification of the Sino-Japanese War), Aoyama Gakuin Joshi Tanki Daigaku Kiyō 64 (December 2010). 22 For a more vivid description of the process leading up to the Sino-Japanese War, please refer to Hidenao Takahashi, section II, chapters one and two. 23 Akira Nakatsuka, Kenkenroku (騫騫錄) (Iwanami Shoten, 1894), 32-36. 24 For more on the process through which Japan decided to dispatch its troops to Chosŏn, please refer to Hidenao Takahashi, 320-328. 25 Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 87. 26 Tae Tongyang, “Kabo Chung Il chŏnjaeng kigan Ch΄ŏng chŏngbu ŭi tae Il chŏngch΄aek (The Qing government’s Japan policy during the Sino-Japanese War), in Ch΄ŏngil chŏnjaeng ki Han·Chung·Il samguk ŭi sangho chŏllyak (Seoul: Tongbuka Yŏksa Chaedan, 2009), 258. 27 Sugimura Hukashi, Meiji niju shichi hachinen zaikan kushinroku (Yukisha, 1932), 4. 28 Ibid. See also, Tae Tongyang, 260. 29 Gaimushō, ed., Nihon Gaikō Bunsho: Meiji 27 nen 2 (Japanese Foreign Policy Documents: Meiji year 27, vol. 2) (Tōkyō: Gennandō, 1953), Document 518. 30 Tae Tongyang, 267-268. 31 Hidenao Takahashi, 315-316. 378. 386. 32 Akira Nakatsuka, Kenkenroku, 23. The first edition of Foreign Ministry described Sugimura Hukashi’s personality as one that was profound and 54 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

accurate. (Ibid., 376) While there are no materials related to any direct relationship between Mutsu Munemitsu and Sugimura Hukashi, the fact that Okamoto Ryunosuke, who was from the same hometown as Mutsu Munemitsu and was a personal representative of the latter (Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 182), frequently visited the Japanese Legation at the time raises the possibility that the two of them had in fact established a relationship through Okamoto Ryunosuke. For more on Okamoto Ryunosuke, please refer to Seizaburo Shinobu, 124-126, 138, 448-449, 466-467. 33 Kiyoshi Tabohashi also pointed out that the opinions of Sugimura Hukashi, who had thorough knowledge of the situation of Chosŏn, wielded great influence not only within the Japanese Legation but also the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 95-96. 34 Materials related to Sugimura Hukashi include his own Niju shichi hachinen zaikan kushinroku (明治廿七八年在韓苦心錄) and Sugimura nikki (Sugimura’s diary) found in Sunaga Bunko (須永元文庫), a work housed in the Sano Folk Museum in Tochigi Prefecture. Sugimura’s diary consists of memos regarding the assassination of Queen Min and diary entries dated from April 1882 to September 1885. Each diary entry generally consisted of approximately one line pertaining to his health, the weather, the entry of ships and vessels, and banquets. His grandson, Fukushima Shingo retyped these diary entries and added explanations. The incidents of 1882 and 1884 as well as the assassination of Queen Min are in Sugimura’s diary in “Jingo kōsin Min hi jiken kanren no Sugimura nikken,” (The incidents of 1882 and 1884 as well as the assassination of Queen Min in Sugimura’s Diary), Senshu Shigaku 22 (April 1990). 35 Upon his return to Japan on October 30, 1895, Sugimura Hukashi was confined in Hiroshima Prison for his role in the assassination of Queen Min. He was subsequently released and appointed to the post of administrative official within the Government-General of Taiwan (April 1896), Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry within the Foreign Ministry (June 1899), and the Minister for Brazil (April 1905). He died in Brazil on May 19, 1906. “Jingo kōsin Min hi jiken kanren no Sugimura nikken,” (The incidents of 1882 and 1884 as well as the assassination of Queen Min in Sugimura’s Diary), Senshu Shigaku 22 (March 1989), 53-54. 36 Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Document 497. 37 Hanabusa Yoshimoto, 12-13. Mori Mayuko 55

38 Hanabusa Yoshimoto, 14. 39 Hanabusa Yoshimoto, 13-16.; Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 130-131. 40 Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Document 559. 41 Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Document 378. 42 Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Document 379. 43 Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Document 384. 44 Akira Nakatsuka, Kenkenroku, 129-133; Hidenao Takahashi, 404. 45 Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Documents 382 and 385. 46 Hidenao Takahashi, 423. 47 Akira Nakatsuka, Kenkenroku, 136. Hidenao Takahashi pointed out that this secret order was an arbitrary action on the part of Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu that ignored the general opinions of the Japanese government. Hidenao Takahashi, 472-475. 48 Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu wanted to occupy the palace but the Cabinet was opposed to this move. Hidenao Takahashi, 427-431. 49 Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Document 420. 50 Hidenao Takahashi, 439-440. 51 Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Document 422. 52 Attention should be drawn to the fact that Pak Chonggŭn dealt with the occupation of Kyŏngbokkung and the assassination of Queen Min in a manner that focused on the relationship between the Sino-Japanese War and Chosŏn. However, the concept of the independence of Chosŏn advocated by Pak was one that encompassed only the anti-Japanese or anti-imperialist movements. Pak did not accept the independence of the enlightenment forces that implemented reforms of the existing Chosŏn government as well as the Kabo Reforms. Pak Chonggŭn, Ni Shin sensō to Chōsen (The Sino-Japanese War and Chosŏn) (Aoki Shoten, 1982). In this regard, Ŏm Ch΄anho identified the response of the Chosŏn government during the process that led up to the onset of the Sino-Japanese War as one that involved measures such as the Chosŏn government’s request to Qing for the dispatch of troops and the request to both Qing and Japan that they withdraw their troops. He also identified Japan’s response as one that revolved around the pushing through of internal reforms and the reaching of a consensus on the waging of war. However, Ŏm did not make any mention of either the suzerain-vassal relationship or the treaty-based system dealt with in this study. Ŏm Ch΄anho, “Ch΄ŏng Il chŏnjaeng e taehan Chosŏn ŭi taeŭng” 56 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

(The Chosŏn government’s response to the Sino-Japanese War), Han Il kwan΄ gyesa yŏn΄gu 25 (2006). 53 In accordance with the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Between Chosŏn and Qing (朝淸商民水陸貿易章程) reached in 1882, the position of Chu Jin tonggni (駐津督理) was changed to that of Chu Jin taewŏn (駐津大員). For more on the Chu Jin taewŏn and Chu Jin tonggni, please refer to Han Ch΄ ŏlho, “Han΄guk kŭndae Chu Jin taewŏn ŭi p΄agyŏn kwa unyŏng (1883-1894)” (The dispatch and management of Chujin taewŏn in modern Korea: 1883- 1894), Tonghak yŏn΄gu 23 (2007); Kwŏn Hyŏksu, Kŭndae Han Chung kwan΄ gyesa ŭi chaejomyŏng (Revisiting the history of China-Korean relations in the modern era) (Seoul: Hyean, 2007). However, the author of the present study is now in the process of preparing a study that involves a standpoint different to the one employed in these studies. 54 This is evidenced by various records included in the Sheng Xuanhuai Dang An (Records of Sheng Xuanhuai) written by a member of the Tianjin Customs Office named Sheng Xuanhuai, which is currently housed in the Shanghai Library. The Sheng Xuanhuai Dang An included the documents exchanged with the Korean Legation in Tianjin called the Chosŏn sangsŏham chŏllokchon (朝鮮商署函電錄存). As such, one can find the letters and notes exchanged between the Chu Jin tongni, acting Chu Jin tongni, Sheng Xuanhuai, and the Governor of P ΄ yŏngan Province. However, in many instances, the spoken instructions of Sheng Xuanhuai were not included in the notes and letters that were exchanged. This study referred to the Jiawu Zhong Ri zhanzheng II (The Sino-Japanese War of 1894), which is a printed version of the Sheng Xuanhuai Dang An. 55 Yi Myŏngsang served as Chu Jin tongni from March 7 to August 28, 1893 and June 13, 1894 to May 3, 1895. 56 Koryŏ Taehakkyo Asea Munje Yŏn’guso, ed., T΄ongsŏ ilgi (統署日記) III (Seoul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 1972-), June 3 of the 31st year of King Kojong; Koryŏ Taehakkyo Asea Munje Yŏn’guso, ed., Ku Han΄guk oegyo kwan ΄ gye pusok munsŏ 5 (Documents related to the international relations of old Korea, vol. 5) (Seoul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 1972). 57 hen Xulu, Jiawu Zhong Ri Zhanzheng II (The Sino-Japanese War of 1894) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1892), 484-489. 58 Ibid., 92. 59 Ibid., 92-94. Mori Mayuko 57

60 天朝之体恤敞邦, 視同內服, 深仁厚澤, 淪洽東土, 今三百有年矣. 且小邦服事之城, 亦可以昭日星而貫金石矣. 今若倭夷敢抗大邦, 先自藩籬而入, 其宅心傾詐, 至凶絶潜, 此天下臣民之所共憤, 非獨朝鮮一國之憤恨也. 幷此諒燭. Ibid., 93-94. 61 Ibid., 485. 62 Ibid., 485. 63 Ibid., 485-486. 64 Ibid., 487-490. The date is recorded as the “end of July.” 65 今有敝邦近密臣奉寡君命, 變服隨英人搭輪到津 (ibid. 489 (10)). 66 閣下俯怜也, 且保東即保上國也, 如無朝鮮, 殆同撤藩籬離而缺唇齒, 開門塀而防賊人也, 幷此諒燭. Ibid., 486. 67 Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., Chu Han Ilbon kongsagwan kirok I (Records of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn, vol. 1) (Seoul: Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, 1987), 108, 410. 68 Ŏm Ch΄anho, 298-305. 69 T΄ongsŏ ilgi (May 15 of the 31st year of King Kojong); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Mi an 2 (June 18, 1894; no. 1255); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Yŏng an 1 (June 18, 1894; no. 1029); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Tok an 1 (June 18, 1894; no. 1409); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Ŏ an 1 (June 18, 1894; no. 589); and Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Pŏp an (June 18, 1894; no. 577). 70 T΄ongsŏ ilgi (May 21 of the 31st year of King Kojong); The notes sent out to the Western powers were changed from “寔與万國公法違背” to “實與万國公法違背” and from “請按條約, 從中設法善爲調處” to “應請從中設法, 善爲調處.” Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Mi an 2 (June 18, 1894; no. 1257); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Yŏng an 1 (June 18, 1894; no. 1031); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Tok an (June 18, 1894; no. 1411); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Ŏ an 1 (June 18, 1894; no. 590); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Pŏp an 1 (June 18, 1894; no. 558); and Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: I an (June 18, 1894; no. 48). 71 若他國有何不公輕藐之事, 一經照知, 必修相助, 從中善爲調處, 以示友誼關切. While the actual expressions are somewhat different for each country, the U.S.-Chosŏn Treaty was referred to in this study because the main contents are similar. Ch ΄ oe Tŏksu, Choyak ŭro pon Han ΄ guk kŭndaesa (Modern Korean history as viewed through treaties) (Seoul: Yŏllin Ch’aek Tŭl, 2010), 779. 58 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

72 See appendix one, inclosure one in number 16 from Foreign Relations of the United States (1895; reprint, NY: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1968). See also, Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, ed. P’ŭrangsŭ oemubu munsŏ: Chosŏn, 1893- 1894, 6 (French foreign affairs documents, 1893-1894, vol. 6) (Seoul: Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, 2007), 77. The king requested that the representatives of the Western powers mediate the withdrawal of the military troops of Qing and Japan. Annex 2, 167-168. In terms of the representatives of the Western powers in Hansŏng, attention should be drawn to the fact that they held meetings to determine whether the Japanese Legation’s request regarding military action at Inch΄ŏn Port was acceptable. During these meetings, which were held on July 7, 10, and 16, the Consul General of Great Britain called for the neutralization of Inch΄ŏn port, a denouement which was disadvantageous to Japan. However, as Russia was opposed to this proposal, the neutralization of Inch΄ŏn Port was consequently not accepted. T΄ongsŏ ilgi (June 3-5, 8, 14 of the 31st year of King Kojong); Kikuchi Kenzo, Chōsen Ōkoku (Chosŏn dynasty) (Minyusha, 1896), 425-426. 73 Foreign Relations of the United States, Appendix 1, No.18; Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Series E, Asia, Vol. 4 (University Publications of America, 1989), Doc. 308-Doc. 313; French Documents on Foreign Affairs 6, Annex 3 and Annex 4, 168-170. 74 French Documents on Foreign Affairs 6, 165-166. 75 For more on the mediation of the Western powers, please refer to Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 189-265; Guan Jie, “Kōgo Chū Ni sensōki no Tō Ajia no kokusai kankei” (The Sino- Japanese War of 1894 and East Asian relations), in Ni Shin sensō to Tō Ajia sekai no henyō I, ed. Tō Ajia kindaishi kagukai (Yumani Shobō, 1997). 76 Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 245. Kiyoshi Tabohashi claimed that the Chosŏn government’s action of sending a note to the Western powers on June 24 was undertaken based on the recommendation of American Minister to Chosŏn, John M. B. Sill, to ensure that no one would complain when they discovered that the United States would mediate between Qing and Japan. However, he did not suggest any grounds for this assertion (Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 247). John M. B. Sill actually responded to the request of the Chosŏn government and attempted to mediate the withdrawal of Qing and Japanese troops. (Ku Han΄ guk oegyo munsŏ: Mi an 2 (July 3, 1894; no. 1259.) The close relationship Mori Mayuko 59

between the United States and Chosŏn can be explained by the fact that the United States supported the independence of Chosŏn from the beginning of the establishment of its legation and that the United States occupied the presidency of the foreign representatives in Hansŏng. Son Chŏngsuk, “Han΄ guk kŭndae chu Han Miguk kongsa yŏn΄gu: 1883-1905” (The American Legation in modern Korea: 1883-1905), Han΄guk sahak (2005). 77 Foreign Relations of the United States, Appendix 1, No. 20. 78 Foreign Relations of the United States, Appendix 1, Inclosure 1 in No. 20. 79 Guan Jie, 116. 80 Li Hongzhang quanzhi (Collected writings of Li Hongzhang) (Shanghai: Shanghai Remin Chubanshe, 1986), 726-727. 81 Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Documents 628 and 633. 82 Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwonhoe, ed., Chu Han Ilbon gongsagwan kirok 4 (The Records of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn 4 (Seoul: Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwonhoe, 1987) 559-560. 83 T΄ongsŏ ilgi (June 21 of the 31st year of King Kojong). Among the notes sent to the Western powers, the following can be identified: Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Ŏ an 1 (July 23, 1894; no. 596); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Pŏp an 1 (July 23, 1894; no. 562); and Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Tok an 1 (July 23, 1894; no. 1413). 84 Katsumi Watanabe, Sen Bi Shūkō Tsūshō Jōyaku Kōshōshi (History of the Korea-U.S. Treaty of 1882 Negotiations) (Tokodo Shoten. 1941); Nagata Akihumi, Seodoa Rūzuberuto to Chōgoku (Theodore Roosevelt and Korea) (Miraisha1992). 85 T΄ongsŏ ilgi (October 19 of the 21st year of King Kojong); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Mi an 1 (December 6, 1884; no. 123); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Yŏng an 1 (December 6, 1884; no. 136); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Tok an 1 (December 6, 1884; no. 51). Although no distinct responses of the Western powers regarding this request have been uncovered, a note written by the British consul to the Chosŏn government stating that the mediation should be conducted by the government rather than ministers or consuls has been found. (Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Yŏng an 1 (December 25, 1884; no. 147.) The Chosŏn government’s direct request to the U.S. government for mediation may be based on this reply. 86 The Japanese government did not accept the suzerain-vassal relationship. However, the signing of the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade 60 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

Between Chosŏn and Qing (朝淸商民水陸貿易章程) in 1882 based on the suzerain-vassal relationship had the effect of bringing about a balance of power between Chosŏn and Japan. See Han Sŭnghun, Ilbon e taehan kwanse chajugwŏn hoebok ŭl sido hada (Attempt to recover customs independence from Japan), and Ch΄oe Tŏksu, 135. Here, we can see that while the Japanese government refused the suzerain-vassal relationship, it nevertheless used this unique relationship to its own advantage. During the process that led to the Sino-Japanese War, Japan regarded its hegemony in East Asia as being more important than the abandonment of the suzerain-vassal relationship. However, this position should be regarded as one that is entirely rooted in Chosŏn history. It is hoped that researchers in the field of Japanese history will be able to shed some light on how Japan actually perceived the securing of hegemony in East Asia and the abandonment of the suzerain-vassal relationship. 2

Submission Date: 2011.12.12 Completion Date of Review: 2012.1.19 Accepted: 2012.1.20 Mori Mayuko 61

The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as Viewed from the Standpoint of Chosŏn

Mori Mayuko

The Sino-Japanese War was a watershed incident in the history of modern East Asia. Two different orders coexisted in East Asia prior to the Sino-Japanese War. One was the Sinocentric order centering on the Qing dynasty and the other was the treaty-based order rooted in international law. However, the former collapsed after the Sino-Japanese War and was in effect amalgamated into the latter. In this regard, attention should be focused on how the suzerain-vassal relationship between Chosŏn (Joseon) and Qing, which collapsed as a result of the Sino- Japanese War, was discussed during the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. This study analyzes this issue from the standpoint of Chosŏn. The present study focuses only on events within Chosŏn. To be more specific, the present study focuses on the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn and the Chosŏn government. Although the Convention of Tianjin reached in 1885 outwardly expressed the equality of Qing and Japan, Japan experienced a slight lowering of its status. Meanwhile Qing saw its international status within East Asia heightened after 1885. Buoyed by its enhanced standing, Qing proceeded to strengthen its interference in the internal affairs of Chosŏn. Chosŏn responded to this by implementing a foreign policy that was based on the notion of its independence in its capacity as an independent vassal state. For its part, Japan refused to accept the suzerain-vassal relationship between Qing and Chosŏn. However, as its priority was to amend the unequal treaty with Great Britain, it did not want to create a conflict with Qing by openly questioning the suzerain-vassal relationship. As such, 62 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

Japan could not overtly put an end to the talk about independence that was taking place within Chosŏn. The international order in East Asia after 1885 was one in which a balance was maintained through the interaction of factors such as Qing- Chosŏn relations that were based on the independence of the vassal state, the superficially equal Qing-Japan relations stipulated by the Convention of Tianjin of 1885, and Chosŏn-Japan relations that resulted in the delaying of the independence of Chosŏn, prior to the Sino-Japanese War. However, the assassination of Kim Okkyun and the dispatch of the Qing army to Chosŏn to suppress the Tonghak (Donghak) Peasant Uprising in 1894 had the effect of spurring the Japanese government to lean toward war. Weary of the Western powers, the Japanese government avoided mentioning the suzerain- vassal issue during the process that led up to the outbreak of the war, and instead highlighted the fact that its focus was on internal reform within Chosŏn. Meanwhile, the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn sought to induce war by raising the suzerain-vassal issue and highlighting the independence of Chosŏn. However, the disruption of their communication networks ensured that the Japanese government and Japanese Legation could not air out the differences in their respective positions. Eventually, the Japanese Legation fired the proverbial shot that led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War by proceeding to use the discretionary rights it had been granted by the Japanese government as its cover to occupy the royal palace. This study also analyzes the Chosŏn government’s responses during the same period. The Sino-Japanese War was set off by the Chosŏn government’s request that, in accordance with the suzerain-vassal relationship that existed between the two, Qing dispatch troops in order to quell the Tonghak Peasant Uprising. In accordance with the tenets of the Convention of Tianjin, Japan responded to Qing’s dispatch of troops to Chosŏn by sending in its own troops. The two armies continued to be stationed in Chosŏn even after the Tonghak Peasant Uprising had been suppressed. Desiring to induce the support of Qing based on the suzerain- vassal relationship, the Chosŏn government opened a line of communication that ran from the Governor of P yŏngan (Pyeongyang) province to the Ambassador to Qing and the Tianjin Customs (and Li Hongzhang). At the same time, based on the articles pertaining to intervention found in the treaties it had signed with the Mori Mayuko 63

Western powers, the Chosŏn government implored the representatives of both countries to withdraw their troops from Chosŏn. But, the Chosŏn government’s attempts failed to prevent the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. However, the Chosŏn government’s desire to maintain the dual international order composed of suzerain-vassal relations and the treaty-based system right shortly before the outbreak of the war implies that Chosŏn’s foreign policy cannot be understood solely from the standpoint of the modernization of diplomacy.

Keywords: Sino-Japanese War, suzerain-vassal relations, treaty-based system, Chosŏn government, Japanese government, Japanese Legation in Chosŏn

64 The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~

<국문초록>

조선에서 바라본 청일전쟁 개전 과정과 종속문제

모리 마유코 (도쿄대학 총합문화연구과 지역문화연구전공 박사과정· 서울대학교 인문대학 국사학과 박사수료)

청일전쟁은 동아시아 근대사의 분수령이 된 사건이다. 청일전쟁 이전의 동아시아 에는 청조를 중심으로 한 중화질서와 국제법을 기반으로 한 조약체제의 두 가지 질서 가 공존했는데, 전쟁 이후에는 전자가 붕괴되고 후자로 일원화되었던 것이다. 따라서 청일전쟁의 결과 무너진 朝鮮과 淸朝의 宗屬關係가 개전 과정에서 어떻게 논의되었 는지를 밝히는 것은 중요하다. 본고는 이 문제를 조선에 주목하여 분석한 논문이다. 여기서 조선이라 함은 지리적인 관점을 의미하여 구체적으로는 駐朝鮮日本公使館과 조선정부에 초점을 맞추었다. 1885년의 天津條約에서는 표면적으로는 청과 일본의 평등성이 표명되었지만, 1885년 이후의 동아시아 정세에서 청조가 국제적인 지위를 높여갔던 반면에 일본의 지위는 상대적으로 낮아졌다. 청조는 이러한 국제관계를 배경으로 조선에 대한 간섭 을 강화하였는데, 이에 대해 조선은 ‘屬國自主’의 ‘自主’를 바탕으로 대외정책을 전개 하였다. 일본은 朝淸의 종속관계를 인정하지 않았지만 영국과의 불평등조약 개정을 우선하였기 때문에 종속문제를 거론함으로써 유발되는 청조와의 대립을 원하지 않았 고, 따라서 조선독립에 대한 논의도 끝낼 수 없었다. 이에 1885년 이후의 동아시아 국 제질서는 ‘屬國自主’가 拮抗하는 朝淸關係와 天津條約에 의해 표면상 대등한 淸日關係, 그리고 독립론을 보류한 朝日關係가 뒤섞여 균형을 이룬 채 청일전쟁 전까지 유 지되었다. 그러나 1894년에 김옥균 암살과 동학농민운동에 대한 청조의 출병이 이어지면서 일본정부는 점차 청일개전으로 기울어졌다. 다만 일본정부는 구미열강의 눈을 의식 하여 개전 과정에서 종속문제를 거론하는 것을 기피하고, 대신에 조선내정개혁을 그 명분으로 삼았다. 한편 駐朝鮮日本公使館은 조선의 독립을 명확하게 하기 위해 종속 문제를 거론함으로써 개전으로 유도해가고자 하였다. 그러나 일본정부와 공사관은 통신망의 불통으로 이러한 입장 차이에 대해 충분히 상의할 수 없었다. 결국 공사관 Mori Mayuko 65

이 정부에서 부여된 재량권을 바탕으로 왕궁점거를 단행하여 청일 개전의 단서를 열 었다. 다음으로 같은 시기의 조선정부의 대응을 살펴보았다. 청일전쟁의 원인은 조선정 부가 동학농민운동에 대해 종속관계에 기탁하여 청조에 원병을 요청한 데에 있다. 청 병의 출병으로 인해 天津조약에 따라 일본군도 조선에 출병하였고, 동학농민운동이 수습된 후에도 청일 양군은 그대로 조선에 주둔하였다. 이에 대해 조선정부는 일본군 을 철병시키고자 종속관계에 의거하여 ‘平安道監司―駐津督理―天津海關道(-李鴻章)’라는 정보 전달 라인을 가동하고 청조의 원조를 이끌어내고자 하였다. 동시에 조 선정부는 구미열강과 체결한 조약 중의 居中調整 조문을 활용하여 駐朝鮮 각국 대표 에게 청일 양군의 철병을 조정해줄 것을 요청하였다. 조선정부의 이러한 시도는 청일 개전을 막는 데에 큰 영향을 미치지 못했다. 하지만 개전 직전에 조선정부가 종속관 계와 조약체제의 두 가지 질서를 유지하고자 한 것은 조선의 대외정책을 외교의 근대 화라는 근대성만으로는 이해할 수 없을 것임을 시사한다.

키워드: 청일전쟁, 종속관계, 조약체제, 조선정부, 일본정부, 駐朝鮮日本公使館