Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law LARC @ Cardozo Law Articles Faculty 2011 Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose? Michelle Adams Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 Iowa Law Review 837 (2011). Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/308 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, please contact
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[email protected]. Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose? Michel/,e Adams* ABSTRACT: Is integration a form of discrimination? Remarkably, recent Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the answer to this question may well be yes. In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court characterizes-for the very first time-government action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability and to integrate the workplace as "race-based, " and then invalidates that action under a heightened /,evel of judicial review. Consequently, Ricci suggests that the Court is open to the "equiva/,ence doctrine, " which posits that laws intended to racially integrate are morally and constitutionally equiva/,ent to laws intended to racially separate. Under the equiva/,ence doctrine, integration is simply another form of discrimination. The Court has not yet fully embraced this view. Ricci contains a significant limiting princip!,e: To be actionab/,e, the government's action must create racial harm, i.e., sing/,e out individuals on the basis of their race for some type of adverse treatment.