Role of Maritime Strategy in National Security: a Case Study of Gwadar

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ROLE OF MARITIME STRATEGY IN NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF GWADAR

PhD DISSERTATION

AZHAR AHMAD

PhD/S-09/02

SUPERVISOR:

PROF. DR. PERVAIZ IQBAL CHEEMA

PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

FACULTY OF CONTEMPORARY STUDIES

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

PAKISTAN

2013 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION

We hereby recommend that the dissertation submitted by Azhar Ahmad titled “Role of Maritime Strategy in National Security: A Case Study of Gwadar” be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of PhD in the Discipline of Peace and Conflict Studies.

Prof. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (Supervisor)

______(External Examiner)

Countersigned By

______(Controller of Examinations) (Head of the Department)

SCHOLAR’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis submitted by me titled “ Role of Maritime Strategy in National Security: A Case Study of Gwadar” is based on my own original research work and has not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree.

Azhar Ahmad

Date: July 9, 2013 PhD Scholar

To a Peaceful & Prosperous Pakistan

Table of Contents

Abstract v

Acknowledgement vi

Abbreviations viii

List of Tables xii

List of Figures xiii

Introduction 1

Objective of the Study 4

Significance of the Research 5

Theoretical Framework 7

Research Methodology 9

Organisation 10

Chapter One Concept of National Power 14

Elements of National Power 17

Geography 18

Population 20

Natural Resources 22

Economy 26

Military 28

Intangibles 30

Chapter Two Maritime Strategy 34

Significance of the Seas 35

Economic 35

Military 38

Political 39

Understanding Maritime Strategy and Sea Power 40

Elements of Maritime Power 43

Ports and Harbours 43

Merchant Marine 46

Ocean Economic Resources 48

Combatant Naval Force 50

Chapter Three Application of Elements of Maritime Power to Pakistan 53

Exclusive Economic Zone 54

Marine Resources of Pakistan 56

Marine Fisheries 57

Mangroves and Sea Weeds 62

Marine Mineral Resources 65

Mercantile Marine 66

Ship-building and Repairs 73

Ship-breaking 74

Ports and Harbours 76

Karachi Port 77

Port Muhammad Bin Qasim 78

Gwadar Deep Sea Port 79 iii

Ormara Naval Base 80

Pasni Fishing Harbour 81

Jiwani Fishing Harbour 81

Combatant Naval Force 82

Pakistan Navy 82

Pakistan Maritime Security Agency 87

Chapter Four Historical Perspective of Gwadar 90

History of Makran Coast 90

History of Gwadar 95

Gwadar Port Project 101

Chapter Five Geostrategic Imperatives 104

Geographical Location 105

Interests of Regional and Extra-Regional Actors 111

United States 111

European Union 114

India 115

Persian Gulf States 119

China 120

Central Asia and Afghanistan 126

Pipeline Politics 131

Chapter Six Contribution to National Security and Prosperity 133

Maritime Importance 133 iv

Natural Resources 139

Economical Potential 140

Industrial Potential 141

Competitive Advantages 142

Shipping and Ship-building 145

Fishing and Related Activities 145

Investment Opportunities 150

Progress and Prosperity 151

Challenges and Obstacles 151

Conclusion 157

Recommendations 163

Bibliography 165

Abstract

Pakistan is a country blessed with a long coastline, a potentially resource rich EEZ and continental shelf. The country is strategically located at the cross-roads of Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East and China, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. However, despite all the ingredients of a maritime power, Pakistan’s maritime sector has remained neglected. The mercantile sector has declined since the 70s; ship building and ship breaking industries are in poor state. Fishing, that provides sustenance to a large coastal population, has failed to keep pace with modernization. There has been no progress in the offshore exploration, and the country lacks capability to explore and exploit seabed resources. Throughout its existence, Pakistan has depended entirely on a single port complex for economic and security purposes. Realizing the importance of additional/ alternative ports the country decided to build two ports on the thus far neglected Makran coast- a naval port at Ormara and a commercial port at Gwadar. Gwadar, a natural deep water port, is conceived as a regional hub port, providing transit access to Central Asia, Russia and China, and lending trans-shipment facilities to regional ports. However, due to its strategic location astride the energy jugular of the world, it has raised many an eyebrows. In Pakistan’s perspective Gwadar is extremely important from security as well as economic point of view. For a country like Pakistan with such a vast coast and geo-strategic location, it is imperative to have a vibrant and effective maritime strategy, to benefit from its maritime potential. Pakistan needs to revamp its maritime sector and Gwadar is just the right catalyst to provide the foundation, as well as the stimulus. With right planning and execution, the port should help strengthen all the elements of maritime power and contribute significantly in national security and prosperity.

Acknowledgement

I must start with a deep gratitude for the Almighty who blessed me with enough dedication, proficiency and health to sustain myself through the rigours of this research. I cannot thank my late parents enough for shaping my character and my fondness for knowledge. I hope they are proud of and watching over their son, from the heavens. I also owe my thanks to all my teachers in building the foundation upon which I have carried myself thus far. My career in Pakistan Navy has enabled me to understand and relate with the maritime sector; this dissertation is a token of my thanks to the service. It would be difficult to name all the friends, family members, colleagues who have contributed to my endeavour directly or indirectly, knowingly or unknowingly, but they all deserve my appreciation and thanks.

I am thankful to the National Defence University for providing me the opportunity and environment to pursue my ambition. It was a blessing to have Prof. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema as my supervisor and I am grateful for his guidance and patience throughout the period of research. I must also thank Dr Muhammad Islam and Dr. A. Z. Hilali for providing us with necessary tools, during the course work, to undertake research. Dr. Islam was particularly helpful in preparation of the Research Proposal.

Due to lack of authentic published literature on certain aspects of the research, help from individuals and departments was crucial and I was fortunate that such help was forthcoming. The space here is not enough to name all those who helped me in the process; though some of them have been duly acknowledged in the dissertation. However, I must appreciate the kindness of Admiral Asif Sandila, the Chief of the Naval Staff, for sparing from his valuable time and furnishing comprehensive response to my queries. My cousin Naeem Iqbal was instrumental in introducing me to a number of officers in various ministries and departments including communications, commerce, ports and shipping, national highway authority, cabinet division etc, which immensely contributed to my work. I also owe a special thanks to the Director and staff of the National Documentation Wing in Cabinet Division, for assisting me in assimilating the archived data. The librarians in NDU and the National Library were also very helpful in locating the right material. vii

My research could not have been complete without an extremely educative and productive tour of Gwadar, where everybody received me with warmth and helped me in clearing the smog that I had carried with me from Islamabad. I am grateful to all the Gwadaris; fishermen, businessmen, academics, journalists, politicians, civil servants, and others for sharing their thoughts and affection. I pray that these fine people are blessed with prosperity and peace which they truly deserve. My stay at Gwadar was made comfortable due to first-rate hospitality of Pakistan Navy. Besides boarding and lodging the navy provided me with an exceptional guide and company, in the form of Lt. Cdr. Shakir Hussain. Without his social contacts and amiable company, it would not have been possible to meet so many people from all strata of life in the given time.

I am particularly grateful to my friend Capt. Sarfraz Hussain for “just being there” when I needed a friend and a respite. I must also acknowledge the trouble that my wife went through, during all these years, in managing the home during my often mental and sometimes physical absence. In the end, my gratitude and apology is due to my little princess Zaina. Despite my best efforts, during the course of this research, I was not able to give all the attention she deserved from a father and I hope I am able to compensate for that. She remains a source of energy and a reason for me to go on and, therefore, I dedicate my work to her, who symbolizes the future of Pakistan.

Despite my best efforts, there will be errors and omissions for which I take full responsibility.

viii

Abbreviations

AFPAK Afghanistan-Pakistan

AFRC Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee

AIP Air Independent Propulsion

BC Bulk Carrier

BCDA Balochistan Coastal Development Authority

BOO Built, Own, Operate

BOT Built, Operate, Transfer

CARs Central Asian Republics

CAREC Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation

CBR Controller Board of Revenue

CHINDIA China-India

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

C-in-C Commander-in-Chief

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CMCP Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan

CNS Chief of the Naval Staff

CSF Competitiveness Support Fund

CTF Commander Task Force

DWT Dead Weight Tonnage

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GDA Gwadar Development Authority

GDP Gross Domestic Product ix

GNP Gross National Product

GPA Gwadar Port Authority

ECNEC Executive Committee of the National Economic Council

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

EIA Energy Information Administration

EOI Expression Of Interest

ERF Extra-Regional Forces

FAC Fast Attack Craft

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization (of the United Nations)

FCSK Fishermen Cooperative Society Karachi

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

HMCR Hazardous Material Control Regime

HVU High Value Unit

IMF International Monetary Fund

IMO International Maritime Organization

ISECOM Institute for Security and Open Methodologies

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature

JCIC Jiwani Conservation and Information Centre

KKH Karakoram Highway

KPT Karachi Port Trust

KS&EW Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

LPI Logistics Performance Index

MFD Marine Fisheries Department

MOU Memorandum Of Understanding x

MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

MT Merchant Tanker

MV Merchant Vessel

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDU National Defence University

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NIO National Institute of Oceanography

NOC National Oil Company

NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

NSC National Shipping Corporation

NTC National Tanker Company

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

PAF Pakistan Air Force

PERAC Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation Limited

PIDC Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PMSA Pakistan Maritime Security Agency

PN Pakistan Navy

PNS Pakistan Navy Ship

PNSC Pakistan National Shipping Corporation

PNWC Pakistan Navy War College

PR Public Relations

PSC Pakistan Shipping Corporation

RCD Regional Cooperation for Development xi

SAR Search And Rescue

SINOPEC China Petrochemical Corporation

SLOC Sea Lines Of Communication

SMEDA Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority

TAP Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline

TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (Pipeline)

TEU Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit

UAE United Arab Emirates

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade And Development

UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

USA United States of America

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWF World Wildlife Fund

YASREF Yanbu Aramco Sinopec Refining Company Ltd

xii

List of Tables

4.1 Resource Potential of Fisheries 59

4.2 List of ships at the time of merger of NSC and PSC (1979) 70

4.3 Present fleet of PNSC (May 4, 2012) 73

4.4 Present and Projected Strength of Pakistan Navy 86

6.1 Proven Reserves of Central Asia (2011) 127

7.1 Competitive Advantages of Gwadar 143

7.2 Assessment of Industry Sectors Suitable for Gwadar 144

7.3 Fish Landing Sites in Balochistan 146

7.4 Fishing Boats Statistics of Balochistan 148

xiii

List of Figures

4.1 Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone 54

4.2 Marine Living Resources (Nektons and Benthos) 56

4.3 Marine Fishing Zones 58

4.4 Comparison of Contribution of Pakistan’s EEZ in marine fishing 60

4.5 Mangrove found on Pakistan’s Coast 63

4.6 Types of Seaweed found in Pakistan 64

4.7 Offshore Exploration Map of Pakistan 65

6.1 Map Showing Gwadar and Central Asia 106

6.2 Distances of Regional Ports from Turkmenistan 107

6.3 Distances of Regional Ports from Uzbekistan 107

6.4 Distances of Regional Ports from Tajikistan 108

6.5 Sea and Land Routes Between China and Persian Gulf 110

7.1 Map Showing Military Importance of Gwadar vis-à-vis Gulf SLOCs 134

7.2 Comparison of Trade Forecasts for Pakistani Ports 135

7.3 Gwadar Port Traffic Forecast 137

7.4 Pakistan Port Traffic Throughput Forecast 137

7.5 Short Term Contribution Sector-wise 138

7.6 Short Term Contribution Cargo-wise 138

7.7 Short and Long Term Traffic Forecast of Gwadar Port 139

7.8 Map of Balochistan Coast showing “Clusters” of Fish Landing Sites 147

INTRODUCTION

Historians generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues has consequently been overlooked1

Pakistan is blessed with abundance of nature, all weathers and a truly diverse geography. A maritime state, astride the North Arabian Sea, it is bestowed with a vast coastline. The entire coast is provided with the bounties of nature; beautiful beaches, deserts, rocky mountains, mangrove forests, bays, natural ports and all that is associated with a coast. Pakistan shares maritime boundaries with Iran, Oman and India; claims an enormous Exclusive Economic Zone) of 240,000 sq km and a continental shelf giving an additional 50,000 sq km. Despite a tremendously rich coast and a huge mass of water at its disposal, the country has not been able to develop into a true maritime nation. Majority of the world’s population is concentrated around the coasts, however, in case of Pakistan, most of the coastline is scarcely inhabited. Throughout its existence Pakistan has depended on one port i.e. Karachi. Port Qasim having established in the Seventies is essentially an extension of the Karachi port due to its proximity. As for as security is concerned, Karachi and Port Qasim may be considered as a ‘Single Port Complex’, rather than two separate entities. Due to non-investment on other ports, the Makran coast (and the entire Baluchistan province) has remained under-developed. Realizing the need of alternative port for security, trade and development of the coastal areas, the government of Pakistan undertook to develop a deep water port at Gwadar. The first phase of the port having completed, the port was made operational in 2007.

Gwadar port is envisaged to offer diverse benefits to Pakistan. Firstly, it rids the country of its traditional security dilemma being farther away from the vulnerable Karachi port complex. Karachi port complex, being very close to the arch rival India, remains vulnerable to sea and air intervention. Karachi/ Bin Qasim together handle more than 90% of the country’s total trade and, therefore, the threat encompasses both, the security as well as the economy. Secondly, Gwadar being close to the Gulf, the ships bound for Pakistan can be brought safely to the havens of

1 Alfred T Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, 1965 ed. (London: Methuen, 1890), v. 2

Gwadar instead of travelling all the way to Karachi during periods of tension or war. Gwadar is a natural deep sea harbour and an ideal location for a regional hub port. It can provide access to Central Asia, China and even Russia, to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, via the best transit route. Additionally, it could serve as a transshipment port for a number of countries/ports around the region. However, due to lack of a cohesive maritime policy and long term vision 2, the country is yet to reap benefits from this port despite it being in operation for the last five years. This calls for a maritime strategy to complement national security and development.

For a country like Pakistan with such a vast coast and geo-strategic location, it is imperative to have a vibrant and effective maritime strategy to make the best use of this enormously beneficial resource. The word ‘maritime’ encompasses all that is related to the sea or its uses e.g. ports and harbours, merchant marine, ocean economic resources and naval forces. Management of these maritime assets in the best possible manner, in the interest of the country and its people, is the domain of the maritime strategy. The political, economic and technological environment prevailing in a country, have a direct bearing on its maritime strategy. In short, maritime strategy uses the sea to exploit its resources and geography to the advantage of a littoral. Thus the main playground of maritime strategy is the sea, and the possessor of this capability is called a ‘Sea Power’ which is broadly defined to include all relevant aspects of national power, both civil and military. A strategy to enhance national sea power accordingly promotes and coordinates all aspects of maritime activity, civil and military, to optimize the use of available resources3.

The Law of the Sea4 grants a large area of sea, including the EEZ and the continental shelf, under the control of the coastal states for exploitation. The availability of modern technology has made it possible for all the countries to benefit from the bounties stored by the nature in the seas. Rights over areas of sea, and access to technology have made it easier even for the developing nations to protect their interests and build up their economies. Access to the ocean wealth lying in the sea has enhanced the importance of all the elements of maritime power.

2 Pervaiz I. Cheema, Pakistan’s Defence Policy 1947-58, (London: Macmillan, 1990), 1-5, 179. Professor Cheema explores the reasons leading to neglect of maritime sector. 3 For more discussion on Maritime Strategy and Power see J. R. Hill, Maritime Strategy For Medium Powers, (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1986), 30; and Muhammad Anwar, Role of Smaller Navies: A Focus on Pakistan’s Maritime Interests, (Rawalpindi: Army Press, 1999), 9. 4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. 3

Pakistan has substantial maritime resources and interests. However, lack of insight in understanding the importance of these strategic gifts and, poor or non-existent strategy to exploit these resources, is a major obstacle in the development of maritime sector.

Pakistan’s coastline extends 960 km from the Indian border in Sir Creek to the Iranian border. Until now, the country depended solely on the Karachi/ Qasim port complex for its defence, trade and fishing industry. Pakistan’s merchant fleet, which once consisted of more than 70 ships, has been reduced to only nine ships, capable of carrying less than 10% of the country’s trade, and is in constant slum. While Pakistani ship owners own fleets registered in other countries, there is not a single privately registered ship in Pakistan. There is preponderant dependence on ‘Flag of Convenience’ vessels which are either not available during war or tension, or charge excessive insurance premiums.

United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 (UNCLOS)5 has invoked enormous avenues for countries like Pakistan to benefit from ocean economic resources. However, in Pakistan, these valuable resources are extremely under explored/ utilized. There is little progress in the offshore exploration for hydrocarbons and minerals. No survey crafts are available to study the nature and potential of resource. Fishery is depending on the same traditional age-old methods and obsolete, poorly equipped crafts; data is not available or unreliable, and implementation of existing rules is poor. Pakistan has one of Asia’s largest mangrove forests, which are fast depleting due to negligence. The country has an old shipyard which once built ships on order even from foreign customers, but was for some years looking for minor orders due to bad management and inconsistent policies of successive governments. Pakistan navy has provided a temporary relief to the shipyard by giving orders for building some naval crafts, which needs to be sustained in the long term. There was once a thriving ship breaking industry in Gaddani contributing vital foreign exchange to the national exchequer that is in doldrums. The entire coastline, except around Karachi, remains neglected and underdeveloped. Natural harbours like Gwadar, Pasni, Jiwani etc which have been in use for centuries were, until recently, reduced to minor fishing villages contributing little to the prosperity of the country or even the local populace. Due to the continental mindset of the rulers, the navy, which is the custodian and flag-

5 Text of UNCLOS available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. Also see J. R. Hill, op.cit. 4 bearer of a country’s maritime power, has remained the most neglected of the defence forces. Confronted with the marring policy and economic constraints since inception, the force has been striving to retain a deterrent edge over the ever-expanding arch rival, the Indian navy.

History is witness to the fact that nations which neglected their maritime sector often remained at the mercy of others. Pakistan’s state of awareness and exploitation of its maritime sector i.e. its maritime strategy and its implementation needs a serious review. Maritime sector is a huge source of economic potential and a formidable element of national security and deserves appropriate treatment. Presently, due to decades of neglect and low priority, Pakistan’s maritime sector is inadequately configured to meet the challenges posed by the prevalent maritime environment.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The objective of this research is to study the impact of maritime strategy on the overall development of national economy and security, with a special focus on Gwadar, leading to practical recommendations for a viable maritime strategy.

UNCLOS has given a large area of the sea i.e. EEZ and continental shelf, under the control of the coastal states for exploitation of ocean economic resources. The emerging technology has made it easy for the human beings to exploit ocean resources which are lying in abundance in the sea. These resources can provide a viable opportunity to the developing nations to build up their economies. In order to exercise their legitimate claim over the ocean resources, these countries need to invest in the development of infrastructure. No maritime activity can take place without ports and harbours; it is therefore, must for Pakistan to develop its ports to match the future maritime ambitions of the country. This perspective will be dealt here with particular reference to the potential and role of Gwadar in the overall maritime framework of Pakistan.

The ocean wealth lying in the EEZ, continental shelf and the deep sea bed has also enhanced the importance of naval forces all over the world. Pakistan has an EEZ rich in these resources and we need to guard our riches and use them for economic and strategic advantages. It is but natural to expect a country with such large reservoir of resources and strategic geo-political location, to have a rational and vibrant maritime strategy, corresponding to the available 5 resources. Promulgation of National Maritime Policy of Pakistan6 and development of Gwadar port are steps in the right direction. Still, there is much more to be done to ensure timely actions and exploitation of other areas of maritime development as well. The development and operationalizing of Gwadar so far has been marred with corruption and incompetence and leaves a lot to be desired. The current economic situation in the country and development of Chahbahar Salalah in Iran and Oman respectively, as potential competitors to Gwadar, demand immediate measures. Therefore, there is a dire need to discover the true potential, study the existing policies and practices, identify the strengths and weaknesses in the existing system, establish its relationship with the overall security and development of the country, and recommend the way forward. This study is also aimed at providing a base for future researchers to dwell in depth on individual elements of maritime importance.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

The proposed topic has theoretical and practical significance alike. It has become even more important in light of the recent decision to handover the operations of the port to the Chinese and special emphasis on the port by the Prime Minister of Pakistan in his inaugural speech on June 05, 20137. Mahan one of the greatest maritime strategists believed that sea power was essential to the growth of national strength and prosperity. He develops and justifies his views by testifying the example of Britain. His thesis further validates its strength as America became a super power primarily because of its sea power. In recent times, the development of United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Singapore as economic hubs became a reality after they fully exploited their strategic commercial strength and geographical maritime significance. With the ever shrinking resources on land, growing populations and global interdependence, the sea will continue to play an increasingly important role for the well being and prosperity of mankind. A country which aspires to become a significant player in the comity of nations, or wishes to prosper economically, must evolve a skilful maritime strategy to possess a credible and potent sea power and employ it to her advantage. The geo-strategic environment of Arabian Sea has changed since 9/11 thus, putting further pressure on the littorals, particularly Pakistan to review and strengthen

6 National maritime policy was promulgated in 2001. 7 Muhammad Anis and Asim Yasin, “Drones Chapter must be Closed Now: Nawaz,” The News International, June 6, 2013. 6 its maritime security. Presence of Extra-Regional Forces (ERF) and emergence of India as a new major global player is likely to further complicate the existing situation for Pakistan.

Our seas, oceans and inland waterways are of huge importance in terms of resources, the environment and conservation of nature, trade and industry, marine sciences and leisure activity. The geo-political and economic situation in Pakistan dictates that we realize the maritime potential and pay special attention to development and operations of Gwadar and other ports, in order to exploit the gifts of nature which lie in abundance all along the coast and beyond. The transferring of port operations to the Chinese is a new development which has again brought the port in the limelight, making the research timelier and apt. Pakistan also needs a strong combatant force to protect its maritime wealth and sovereignty. As stated by the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), “our next war will be decided on the waters of the Arabian Sea rather than on land”. Development of ports and harbours is a pre-requisite as all maritime activity of a country originates from, or revolves around its ports.

Little academic work has been undertaken in Pakistan in the maritime sector. Researches carried out in selective areas have only addressed individual fields with limited objectives. Therefore, such studies appear disjointed and fail to connect the maritime elements. No researcher has attempted to address the maritime elements of power with a view to highlight their influence on the country’s economic and military security. This study tries to bridge this gap and introduces the maritime sector as a vital whole essential for future development and security of Pakistan. Gwadar incorporates all the elements of sea power and, therefore, acts as a test case, as well as a catalyst in the evolution of an appropriate and viable maritime strategy for Pakistan.

The study explores the hypothesis: “The development of maritime sector in general and the Gwadar port in particular has a positive relationship with the security of Pakistan.” It attempts to explain the role of maritime strategy in the overall security of Pakistan and how developments in maritime sector, particularly Gwadar, can influence progress and prosperity in the country.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

An important concept that is necessary to understand terms like strategy and security is that of power. There is no dearth of material on power or sea power, though most of the work on the later is related to the military aspect of sea power where as in thesis a more comprehensive view of sea power is adopted. Famous thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and Kautilya have also explained power in their own way which is discussed in the paper, however, the theory of power propounded by Alvin Toffler in his book Power Shift: Knowledge, Wealth and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century is made the basis to understand and build on the thesis. Toffler suggests that power is manifested in three different ways that are, violence, wealth and knowledge. Each successive kind of power represents a more flexible kind of power- violence being the lowest quality of power and knowledge, the highest8. This helps us in understanding the application of power in international relations and different elements of national power. The same theory at the end helps us in determining that the country should pursue the highest form of power that is knowledge; wealth and influence will automatically follow.

For the understanding of the terms Sea Power and Maritime Strategy, as well, works of a number of naval and military thinkers have been studied. Alfred T Mahan is considered as the architect of modern naval thinking. Margret Sprout in Makers of Modern Strategy portrays Mahan as the “Evangelist of Sea Power”9. Therefore, it is natural to base the maritime theory of this research on the foundation provided by Mahan. Mahan was so obsessed with sea power that the entire theme of his most famous book aims at “estimating the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations”. Mahan’s work primarily revolves around the naval power which like other historians he has conveniently called sea power. However, Mahan was cognizant of this fact and, therefore, in his much quoted book The Influence of Sea Power upon History, he concedes that the history of sea power is largely a military history. Throughout his book, Mahan emphasized the importance of sea power in the shaping of national destinies. He explains that sea power is different from naval power and is vital to national growth, prosperity and security of a nation. Mahan has dilated in some length on three of the elements

8 See Alvin Toffler, Power Shift: Knowledge, Wealth and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century (New York: Bantam Books, 1990). 9 See Margaret T. Sprout, “Evangelist of Sea Power,” in Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, (Rawalpindi: Army Education Publishing House, 2004), 415. 8 which he considered important for maintaining a sea power. These are the ports and harbours, mercantile marine and the navy. However, with advancements in technology and better access to the treasures of the sea, later thinkers added a fourth element: “Ocean Economic Resources”, which is becoming increasingly significant in human life.

The father of modern Soviet navy, Admiral Gorshkov, a respected naval thinker and writer, while referring to these elements of sea power states10:

Nation’s sea power is determined not only by the weapons and armed forces with which it can affect events at sea but also by its merchant marine, its fishing and oceanographic fleets, and its maritime outlook and tradition.

Professor Till notes that sea power is not just required for colonization, but it encompasses other benefits that were not visible to earlier writers. In his masterly work, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear age, he explains that the adoption of the UNCLOS has provided a whole new meaning to the term sea power by giving rights and responsibilities to coastal states11.

Having a power in itself is not enough; it requires a strategy and skill to apply power in the most effective manner. All proponents of sea power unanimously agree that the ascendency of United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA) owes primarily to their sea power. A detailed study of military history would reveal that it was primarily because of sea power that a tiny island nation such as Britain could rule the entire world. The word ‘maritime’ is a composite term that represents all the constituents such as the ports and harbours, merchant marine, ocean economic resources and naval forces. All these elements contribute towards the maritime or national power of a littoral state and, maritime strategy is the management of all the maritime assets in the best possible manner. In his book Role of Smaller Navies: A Focus on Pakistan’s Maritime Interests, Muhammad Anwar defines maritime strategy as “the conviction of a nation to put to use her political, social, economic and maritime assets with the aim to promote her maritime interests”12. Maritime strategy is not determined in a vacuum but in a real world of constantly changing conditions, and the works of great thinkers such as Mahan, Corbett

10 S G Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979), 2. 11 Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, Second ed. (London: MacMillan, 1984), 203-208. 12 Anwar, op.cit., 3. 9 and Till can be seen as a record of the way in which maritime strategy has developed by those changes.

Security is another concept which is traditionally used in the narrow sense of physical security. Security is the degree of resistance to, or protection from, harm. The Institute for Security and Open Methodologies (ISECOM) defines security as “the degree of protection, to safeguard a nation, union of nation, persons or person against danger, damage, loss and crime.” For the purpose of this research national security encompasses both, traditional military security as well as economic security.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The thesis is an analytical and qualitative survey of Pakistan’s maritime sector, particularly the Gwadar port, and its contribution in the security and development of the country. Both primary and secondary data has been collected in pursuit of this study. The works of prominent writers such as Alvin Toffler, Mahan, Gorshkov, Till have been used to devise the theoretical framework of the thesis. There is a lack of genuine research publications on Pakistan’s maritime sector. Articles published in newspapers or internet are generally short of objectivity and insight. Moreover, Pakistan’s maritime sector is not a well documented sector. A lot of data has been collected from the studies conducted by international organizations and NGOs, but it was the official documents and personal interviews that proved most valuable in verifying available information as well as in bridging the gaps.

Major stake holders interviewed for the thesis include the Chief of the Naval Staff (who is also the advisor to the government on maritime affairs), Chairman Gwadar Port Authority, ex- Chairman Gwadar Port Implementation Authority, Director General (Operations) Gwadar Port Authority, Chairman Gwadar Development Authority, DG Marine Fisheries Department, Fisheries Development Commissioner, DG National Institute of Oceanography, DG Petroleum Concessions Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Resources, Chairman Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, Deputy Commissioner Gwadar, master mariners; senior officials of relevant ministries, Pakistan Navy, Gwadar Port Authority, National Highway Authority; local and Chinese scholars; politicians, intellectuals, fishermen, and members of civil society in Gwadar. The researcher travelled to Karachi and Gwadar in order to observe the on ground situation first 10 hand and interview various stake holders. Where the interviewees allowed to be named, or provided written answers, they have been quoted as such. However, in certain cases the individuals were reluctant to be named, therefore the knowledge obtained from those discussion has been used as general observations without naming the source. Secondary sources of research include media, news reports, analysis and scholarly works of a wide range of academicians.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This research addresses different concepts to prepare the reader to understand the objectives and final outcome of the research. Some of these concepts have already been published and explained clearly by previous writers, and therefore, the same have been explained in light of the already published work. However, there have been certain aspects of this study, where published material is lacking or is based on superficial or frivolous research. A brief account of some of the literature examined during the research and found relevant to the discourse is enumerated in the subsequent paragraphs.

In Power Shift: Knowledge, Wealth and Violence at the Edge of 21st Century, Alvin Toffler explains the application of power in three different forms which are knowledge, wealth and violence. Toffler explains with examples his assertion that violence is the lowest form of power, while knowledge is the most effective and therefore, higher form of power. He also explains that the nature of application of power is transitory. In the pre-industrial era, violence was the dominant form of power; while in the post industrial period application of power through wealth became the norm. In his opinion, knowledge is now taking over as the overriding form of power, since knowledge serves to enhance both wealth and force. Toffler also draws our attention to the emerging power of non-state actors; religions, corporations, terrorists etc. He forewarns that in the 21st century power will be in the hands of those actors possessing and applying knowledge.

Kautilya’s Arthashastra is considered as one of the most comprehensive works on state power. Ilhan Niaz in his paper, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Governance as an Element of State Power,” reviews the work of Kautilya. According to him the relationship between governance and overall power of the state is multidimensional. One of these dimensions is the maintenance of internal peace, a prerequisite for other attainments, which according to Kautilya, are primarily 11 economic wealth and military power. The most important lesson drawn from Arthashastra, according to Ilhan is the role of governance in the rise or fall of state power. Kautilya also emphasizes the importance of religion as a force to depoliticize the masses.

Mearsheimer in his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, examines the relations and behavior of great powers. Following the tradition of realist thinkers such as E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthou, and Kenneth Waltz, he concludes that having dominant power is the best means to ensure one’s own survival. Since all the great powers are apprehensive of each other, they compete for power as an insurance for survival. Mearsheimer proposes five assumptions to explain why great powers vie for power and hegemony. The first assumption, derived from realism, says that the international system is anarchic. The second is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which makes them potentially dangerous to each other. The third assumption says that states can never be certain about other’s intentions. The fourth assumes that survival is the main objective of great powers. The last assumption is that great powers are rational actors.

Rosen and Jones in the Logic of International Relations explain that power is the ability of international actors to use all the available resources at their disposal in a manner to achieve favourable outcomes. This clearly proposes a relationship between power and influence, whereas power is manifested in the form of influence to persuade or manipulate others to act in a manner desired by the actor exercising power. According to Rosen and Jones, possession of power is meaningless if it is unable to bring about results which enhance the actor’s satisfaction. Rosen and Jones also emphasize the importance of intangible (behavioural) power in assessing the overall power of a country. They also explain different elements of power (which they call components of power) by dividing them under three groups i.e. natural sources of power (geography, natural resources, population), social and psychological (national self image, political socialization, public support and cohesion, leadership), and synthetic components of power (industrial capacity, military preparedness).

David Jablonsky in his paper, “National Power,” draws support from Morgenthou and Hobbes to explain the basic concept of power. He argues that power is relative, dynamic and interrelated with other factors. Unlike Rosen and Jones, he classifies the elements of power (which he calls determinants of power) in two groups only i.e. natural determinants (geography, 12 resources, population) and social determinants (economic, political, military, psychological, informational). But he also cautions that it is not possible to make a clear distinction between natural and social elements because these are interrelated and interdependent.

Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations, argues that power is the currency of politics and should be the chief concern of the states. However, he argues against use of unlimited power and believes in the balance of power. Morgenthau segregates the elements of power into those which are considered relatively stable (geography, natural resources) and those which are may be subject to constant change (population, industrial capacity, military preparedness, national character, quality of diplomacy, quality of government, national morale etc). He credits diplomacy to be one of the most important of these elements because it translates all other elements into functional power. Morgenthau also cautions that none of these elements alone represents power, rather they have to act in concert to achieve the desired results, He calls this as, “fallacy of the single factor”.

In Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice, Couloumbis and Wolfe explain elements of national power in terms of tangible (population, territory, natural resources and industrial capacity, agricultural capacity, military strength and mobility) and intangibles (leadership and personality, societal cohesiveness, bureaucratic-organizational efficiency, type of government, reputation, foreign support and diplomacy, accidents).

Although the previous writers have used different terms to explain the elements of power, there is little difference between them and more or less cover all relevant ingredients. Of course, with passage of time and advancement in knowledge and technology elements of power continue to add. The latest addition to the category of elements of power is the informational, which is propounded by contemporary writers such as Raymond Lamb, Dick Cheny, David Alberts, Dennis Murphy and others.

One of the greatest maritime strategists, Mahan, in his classic work, the Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, provides a theoretical foundation of sea power and its constituent elements. He segregates sea power from naval power and explains various factors that affect sea power of the state. He asserts that sea power is vital to national growth, prosperity and security. Though his work is primarily focused on the history of naval warfare and its effects 13 on the course of history, he proposed six fundamental factors that influence the development and maintenance of sea power. These factors are: population, geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, national character and governmental institutions. Mahan credited the rise of the British Empire to its sea power. Besides naval power, Mahan also realized and underlined the significance of other elements of sea power such as the merchant marine and the ports and harbours.

Geoffrey Till, has composed a number of treatises on sea power which include; Modern Sea Power: An Introduction; Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age and Sea Power: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. In narrating the elements of sea power, in his earlier works, he agrees with Mahan and previous maritime strategists in realizing the importance of merchant marine, geography, political background and resources as an important element. However, by resources he did not mean the resources accrued from the sea but those resources (wood, iron, coal, steel etc) of a country which can be used in maintenance of sea power such as building of ships. He asserts that, “the sea has always been important for human development as a source of resources, and as a means of transportation, information-exchange and strategic dominion.”

Other maritime strategists such as Admiral Colomb, Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Herbert Richmond have also deliberated on the concept of sea power with similar conclusions. However, their concentration like most writers of sea power has remained on the military aspect of the sea power. Despite the fact that Corbett claims in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy that his subject is ‘maritime rather than naval’, the entire discourse is focused on maritime warfare ignoring other elements of maritime power propounded by Mahan. Corbett also differs with Mahan in the degree of emphasis on maritime. He integrates maritime power with land power instead of allowing overwhelming importance to the sea.

Another writer who has contributed significantly to maritime literature is Admiral Gorshkov. In his book, The Sea Power of the State he agrees with Mahan and other strategists in concluding that sea power is not determined by weaponry and military forces alone but also by its merchant marine, fishing and oceanographic fleets, as well as, its maritime outlook and tradition. Furthermore, he suggests that, “sea power is a constituent of economic power; It must be regarded as the capacity of the state to place all the resources and possibilities, offered by the seas, at the service of man and make full use of them to develop the economy, the health of 14 which finally determines all facets of the life of a country including its defence capability.” He further prophesizes that the significance of military aspect of sea power is only transient, and will continue to wane as world peace becomes more secure.

Role of Smaller Navies: A Focus on Pakistan’s Maritime Interests is perhaps the only book written by a Pakistani author that deals adequately with the subject of maritime strategy and sea power. The author Muhammad Anwar makes a clear distinction between maritime and naval strategy. He states that sea power encompasses all the military, civil and political potential available to the country in safeguarding its maritime interests. Sea power according to Anwar draws strength from various elements, such as ports and harbours, merchant marine, shipping industry, ocean economic resources, skilled manpower and a combatant navy. Naval power, therefore, is only one of the various components of the sea power. The author agrees that Pakistan has substantial maritime resources and interests, but the maritime sector has remained neglected due to correct perception of the importance of this vital sector. Like all previous writers on the subject Anwar has also highlighted the centrality of ports and harbours in maintenance of maritime power. He also underscores the significance of viable maritime strategy for a country like Pakistan, to harness the available potential and protect its maritime interests. Anwar asserts that Pakistanis are not a sea-faring nation, and have neglected the maritime sector due to their land-locked mentality.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in Pakistan’s Defence Policy 1947-58, provides an in-depth analysis of the imperatives surrounding Pakistan’s defence thinking during its earlier years as an independent country. Professor Cheema laments that Pakistani leadership could not evolve a decent understanding of the importance of the sea “despite having two wings separated by a thousand miles of hostile territory,” and connectable only through the sea. In his opinion, this neglect owes primarily to the initial planners’ pre-occupation with land threat from its eastern (and northern) borders, and a dominant army influencing the decision-making at the national level. In his opinion, the uncertainty of the regional hostile environment and the global bipolarity distracted Pakistan from making a well thought out defence policy, which resulted in relegation of the navy and the maritime sector as a whole.

In 2006, Lt. Col. Christopher J. Pehrson of the U.S. Air force wrote a paper titled, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenges of China’s Rising Power across the Asian Littoral.” The paper 15 published by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, gave currency to the term ‘string of pearls’ and spurred an international debate on Gwadar. The port became a controversial subject and focus of attention because of an incorrect assertion that China is building a naval base at Gwadar. Pehrson though admits that there is no evidence of China’s hegemonic or confrontational ambitions, and this may just be a propaganda by the US to undermine China’s intentions. He also warns that the future behaviour of China cannot be predicted and therefore, US and its allies should be prepared for any eventuality. He adds that, “the String of Pearls is more than a naval or military strategy. It also is more than a regional strategy. It is a manifestation of China’s ambition to attain great power status and secure a self- determined, peaceful, and prosperous future.” However, the expression String of Pearls has been used by China’s rivals to predict more ambitious maritime objectives. The paper claims that the port is a win-win project for both, China as well as Pakistan, and acknowledges China’s need for a secure energy/ trade route and Pakistan’s obligation to have a an alternative port from security as well as economic perspective.

Nadir Mir in Gwadar on the Global Chessboard, explains the vision of Gwadar while highlighting its strategic and economic importance. Mir does not consider Gwadar to be port serving a country or region. In his opinion Gwadar has global connotations and if developed on the right lines it has the potential of becoming a symbol of global economic cooperation. Mir has also dwelled on the conception and details of the Gwadar master plan, which is not considered in detail in this dissertation due to limits of scope. However, like other writers on Gwadar, Mir has also not attempted to link Gwadar’s potential with different elements of maritime power. His treatment of the security factor is also not very elaborate due to the emphasis on strategic and economic characteristics.

Two gazetteers namely The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran) and A Gazetteer of Baluchistan provide a very good account of Makran’s history including the Gwadar area and the prevailing environment at the time of writing the history which is the beginning of the twentieth century. However, both these documents fail to highlight the role of the British and the circumstances which helped the Sultan of Muscat to retain the Gwadar enclave. The researcher did not find a document that discusses the subsequent attempts by Kalat and subsequently Pakistan, to regain the possession of Gwadar. The published articles mostly state mere fact that 16

Pakistan purchased Gwadar from Muscat in 1958, but again the role of the British and the details of the agreement have remained concealed. These details have, however, been discovered by the researcher during research through declassified documents of the time. These documents have also been helpful in revealing that even the British at that time realized the importance of Gwadar as a potentially significant port.

Research papers by officers of National Defence University, Pakistan and US Naval Post- Graduate School, Monterey provide useful information on the maritime sector of Pakistan particularly the Gwadar port. A lot is also being published in newspapers, magazines and electronic media but it is generally based on biased or superficial research. A detailed study conducted by Arthur D Little (Gwadar Master Plan) provides the best account as far as the economic feasibility of Gwadar is concerned. Examination of studies by various government ministries/ departments and official documents is necessary to bridge the gaps in the published literature.

Detailed examination of the literature reveal certain misunderstandings or gaps in perception which this study attempts to fill:

Firstly, the history of Gwadar is not well documented. Generally, the published information about Gwadar gives an impression that Gwadar was gifted to the Sultan of Muscat by Khan of Kalat, Mir Naseer in the eighteenth century. Claims to the contrary, even if mentioned, are downplayed. The known history is silent on the later attempts by Kalat at regaining the area, or, after independence, the negotiations between Pakistan and United Kingdom regarding Gwadar. There is no mention of the details of the process that led to the purchase of Gwadar by Pakistan and the conditions of the transfer.

Secondly, the studies and plans have not been made public due to which there are misunderstandings which are played up by vested interests within and outside the country. Even the details of the concession agreement between the port operator and government are not publically known. This makes people vulnerable to speculation and propaganda.

Thirdly, a group of scholars, primarily US-based, propagate that the security situation in Gwadar is very poor and the local people do not think favourably of the port. Thus, giving the 17 impression that the environment is not suitable for investment in port or related infrastructure in Gwadar. This assertion is also mirrored by some Pakistani scholars, all of whom have never visited the area. Those researchers and writers familiar with the area and the people claim that unlike the unrest in some parts of the Balochistan province, Gwadaris are very moderate and peaceful people and they shun violence. They, however, agree that the situation in Balochistan has the potential to spill over if not controlled.

Fourthly, there is also a group which questions the feasibility or need for the port at Gwadar. However, most local and foreign scholars do not agree with this thought. Logical discussion backed up with facts and figures is needed to address this question comprehensively.

Fifthly, the maritime sector of Pakistan is not well documented and there is a serious lack of published research in this field. Even basic awareness of general public about the maritime sector is very limited.

ORGANISATION

The thesis is organized in a manner as to first apprise the reader of the theoretical aspects of the subject. After a recap of the basic definitions and concepts such as security, national and maritime power and elements of maritime power, a review of Pakistan’s maritime sector with respect to all the four major elements of maritime power is presented. Following an account of various segments of maritime sector highlighting their importance for the security and development, the study focuses on Gwadar- the subject of the case study. The last three chapters before conclusion are dedicated to a detailed understanding and analysis of Gwadar.

The first chapter sets the stage by defining the concept of power, explaining various elements of national power and the relationship between them. Power is a central concept in International Relations or Peace and Conflict studies. The chapter also explains the relationship between power and influence. An important lesson emerging from the chapter is that power is not absolute; it is relative and subject to growth and decline, both in real and relative terms. This explains the constant struggle between nations for power and influence. Power can be manifested in three different ways: violence, wealth and knowledge. The National Power of a state is based on a mix of strategic, military, economic, political and psychological strengths and weaknesses. 18

While military strength remains as an important factor in determining a country’s relative power, its overall power depends on a mix of various other factors called the “elements of national power”. The chapter goes on to discuss some of these vital tangible and intangible elements such as geography, population, natural resources, economy, military, nature of government and its relationship with the people, the willingness of the population to support the policies of the government or its military, national character, morale, nationalism etc.

Chapter two highlights the importance of the oceans and the role of maritime strategy in harnessing the bounties of these waters. It discusses in length the four main elements that together constitute maritime power of a country. Man by nature lives on land, but is heavily dependent on the oceans for sustenance. The seas have a profound influence on our economic, social, cultural and military lives. Technology has made it possible for the humans to explore the treasures of the oceans and exploit these to their advantage. An attempt is made to explain the benefits and uses of the seas under three important spheres of human activity i.e. economic, military and political. Understanding the importance of the oceans and their uses leads us to the role and significance of maritime strategy. Maritime strategy determines the development of elements of sea power. The chapter identifies four elements of maritime power: ports and harbours, merchant marine, ocean economic resources, combatant navy which are discussed in detail. The difference between maritime strategy and naval strategy is also highlighted in the discussion. In general, Chapter Three helps in understanding the concept of maritime strategy and power, and the elements that contribute to a nation’s maritime power.

Chapter Three is dedicated to a review of Pakistan’s maritime sector. An effort is made to understand the contribution of maritime sector in national security and development. Each element of Pakistan’s maritime power is discussed in some detail to appreciate its strengths and weaknesses. Pakistan has a long coastline extending to 960 km and a vast EEZ covering 240,000 sq km. It claims a continental shelf of up to 350 nm extending the maritime zone by another 50,000 sq km. However, the current scientific knowledge about the country’s maritime zone is inadequate due to negligence of successive governments and lack of maritime awareness. With the exception of fisheries and forestry resources other resource potential such as energy, mineral, water, petroleum, tourism etc have been scarcely utilized. Gwadar is a major contributor in fish catch, after Karachi. The Indus Delta is covered with 260,000 hectares of mangroves, which is 19 the fifth largest in the world. However, due to inadequate care and management this maritime asset is fast depleting. There is also a great potential for hydrocarbons and minerals which is yet to be explored. A detailed overview of Pakistan’s mercantile marine is also included in the chapter along with a brief on the combatant element i.e. the Pakistan navy and the Maritime Security Agency. And finally, the most important element of maritime power i.e. the ports is discussed giving a brief each of existing ports such as Karachi, Bin Qasim,. Gwadar, Pasni, Jiwani and Ormara. In short, the chapter explains the potential of Pakistan’s maritime sector and also tries to find out why Pakistan has failed to utilize its maritime power effectively.

Chapter four gives a detailed account of the history of not only Gwadar but the Makran coastal region as well. It explains that the area has always occupied an important place as a trade centre as well as an intersection connecting various regions and almost all notable travelers have mentioned this area in their memoirs. While Gwadar changed hands a number of times due to its geo-strategic importance, no invaders could stay here long due to harsh terrain and difficult living conditions. The chapter also discusses how the Sultan of Muscat usurped Gwadar from the Khans of Kalat with the help of the British, who considered Gwadar as a special outpost in their imperial strategy. The importance of Gwadar lay not only in its geostrategic location but also because of the prospects of oil. Pakistan government realized the importance of Gwadar since independence, and after hectic efforts, and conceding some concessions to the Sultan, managed to purchase it from Muscat. A brief background and status of the present port project is also included in the chapter.

Chapter five highlights the geostrategic importance of Gwadar port. It sits atop the North Arabian Sea and at the crossroads of four important geopolitical regions. The chapter explains Pakistan’s imperatives for an alternative port and why Gwadar is the best option. Gwadar provides Pakistan with a most suitable alternative to the Karachi port complex, both from the point of view of security as well as trade. A detailed analysis of the port is included with respect to its potential as a transit port for China and Central Asia or as transshipment hub for other ports in the region. The assertions are supported by valid data and studies. The chapter also discusses the interests of various regional and extra-regional players including the United States, European Union, Central Asia, Persian Gulf states, India and China. It provides a fair analysis of the 20 potential of Gwadar as a regional hub and why the port could be useful not only for Pakistan but also for other regional states as well.

Chapter Six is the measure of Gwadar’s potential as a contributor to Pakistan’s maritime power and national security. Pakistan’s dependence on Karachi has been a nightmare since independence. Pakistan has always felt the need for an alternative port especially after the port came under attack during the 1971 war. However, due to economic and political constraints the dream could not be converted into reality for so long. The chapter analyses and justifies the need for another port, away from Karachi on its western seaboard, for military as well as economic security. It discusses in detail, the concept and existing state of the port, its potential, major impediments and solutions. Reference is made to different studies and reports, all of which justify the feasibility of Gwadar as a transit, transshipment and logistics hub. The chapter discusses some of the areas in which Gwadar can contribute towards national security and prosperity. A detailed account of Gwadar’s contribution in the fishing sector is also included in this chapter.

Finally, some conclusions and recommendations are offered in the end. 21

CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPT OF NATIONAL POWER

All politics, domestic and international, reveal three basic patterns, that is, all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types. A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power13.

Power has always been a fundamental concept in the study of International Relations. For the students of International Relations it is a must to understand the nature and dynamics of power; how different philosophers and strategists have defined and explained this important factor and how it affects the behaviours of individuals, groups and nations. Power has been defined in many ways. The simplest of the definitions is given by Wikipedia: “Power is a measurement of an entity's ability to control its environment, including the behaviour of other entities. An even more comprehensive definition applicable to International scene is given by Rosen and Jones who 14 define power as “the ability of an international actor to use its tangible and intangible resources and assets in such a way as to influence the outcomes of events in the international system in the direction of improving its own satisfaction with the system.” The definition points to a relationship between power and influence. Whereas, some writers fail to differentiate between power and influence, the latter is actually the carrier of power or the means to use power15 in pursuit of one’s own objectives. It must be remembered that power is relative and not absolute. An individual or country possessing power or influence against one may not enjoy the same influence against another; in fact, it may itself be a subject of power and influence of another individual or country. Power is also subject to growth and decline, both in real and relative terms. A comparison of the relative power of United States vis-à-vis China would reveal that a decade back US was far more powerful compared to China than today. This is despite the fact that the US power has not declined materially during these days, in fact, its power and influence with respect to the rest of the world has increased but it has decreased with respect to China because China’s power has grown in relative terms. Similarly, while India has

13 Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 5th rev ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973), 42. 14 Steven J Rosen & Walter S Jones, The Logic of International Relations (Massachussets: Winthrop, 1977), 182. 15 Charles Handy, Understanding Organisations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 123. 22 grown in military and economic power it still can’t match that of China because of China’s relative growth in both these areas16.

According to Alvin Toffler17, power can be manifested in three different ways that are violence, wealth and knowledge. Each successive kind of power represents a more flexible kind of power. Violence, which he describes as ‘low-quality power’ involves coercion or punishment and is extremely inflexible. Hence even when it ‘works’, it produces resistance. Wealth, by contrast, is a far better instrument of power. It is much more flexible because it can be used in a positive way (through rewards, payments and pay-offs) or in a negative way (by holding or threatening to hold money). Wealth is thus considered a medium-quality power. The highest quality power is obtained from the application of knowledge. Knowledge can be used to reward, punish, persuade and even convert an enemy into an ally. It increases efficiency and also serves to enhance both, wealth and force.

Power in society is often determined by the possession of these three elements. Of course, maximum power is available to those in a position to use all three of these tools in a clever mix of threat and reward, along with persuasion and intelligence. A skillful power player knows how (and when) to use and relate available power tools and resources. Toffler argues that the very nature of power is currently changing. Throughout history, power has often moved from one group to another; however, at this time, the dominant form of power is changing. During the Industrial Revolution, power changed from the hands of a ‘nobility’ acting primarily through violence to industrialists and financiers acting through wealth. The nobility, of course, used wealth just as the industrial elite used violence, but the dominant form of power shifted from violence to wealth. Today, a third wave of power shift is taking place in which knowledge is overtaking wealth. Kautilya described power as the possession of strength derived from three elements; knowledge, military might and valour18. And then there is another way of looking at power, that of Thomas Hobbes who defines power as a “man’s present means, to obtain some future apparent good”. Hobbes writes:

16 Azhar Ahmad, “Concept of National Power”, Strategic Studies, Vol. XXXII, No. 2&3(Summer & Autumn 2012), 83. 17 Toffler, op.cit., 15-16. 18 Quoted in Theodore A Couloumbis and James H Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982), 63. 23

I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death19.”

As we have noted already, power is the capacity to influence the behaviour of others to get the desired results. There are two types of power: Hard Power, which is basically reflective of the material prowess of the state and achieves its objective by coercion and manipulation; whereas Soft Power is based on values, culture, policies, institutions, diplomacy etc and their ability to influence through cooperation rather than coercion20.

Power does not have to be exercised to be effective. It is usually enough that the opposing parties acknowledge the presence of power, either implicitly or explicitly, since the potential exercise of acknowledged or presumed power can be as intimidating as its actual use; which is what we call the concept and practice of deterrence. Historically, some international actors have sought power for power’s sake; however, most nation states normally seek and use power to achieve or defend their survival, vital and important interest, goals, objectives, and expectations21.

Since in international relations we are concerned more with the behaviours of states rather than individuals it is also important to comprehend the concept of National Power; what it means and what it takes. National Power or State Power may be described as “a mix of strategic, military, economic, political and psychological strengths and weaknesses of a country or a state22.” According to the Wikipedia, “National power is the sum of all resources available to a nation in the pursuit of national objectives 23 .” It is, however, important to understand that historically, military strength was considered as the main criteria of national power of a state or country. However, to attain and sustain the military strength other factors are also essential. History has also taught us that militaries alone cannot win, they are but only one element of the national strategy and many other factors must act in cohesion for the strategy to succeed. While

19 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), 86. 20 Different authors have described Hard and Soft power in their own way. There is still no standard, universally accepted definition. 21 Craig W Mastapeter, “The Instruments of National Power: Achieving the Strategic Advantage in a Changing World” Thesis US Naval Post Graduate School (2008), 190. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD= ADA493955 &Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, accessed on October 15, 2011. 22 Sam C Sarkesian & Robert E Conner, US Military Profession in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2006), 103. 23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National power, accessed on August 20, 2011. 24 the military strength of a country is an important ingredient of the national power, there are other vital factors, as well, which determine the National Power of a state. A mix of these factors, commonly referred to as the ‘elements or instruments of national power’, determine the power of a state.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

National power may therefore, be regarded as a mix of elements such as population, size, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability etc. Nevertheless, presence of one or few elements alone cannot guarantee national power. Similarly, the absence of an element does not necessarily mean a decline in national power. For Example, the huge size of India, Brazil or Saudi Arabia; the large populations of India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh, the industrial make-up of Belgium; and the first class army of Switzerland do not make them big powers. Morgenthau calls the mistaken attempt to define national power in terms of one element of that power the “Fallacy of the Single Factor.24” Another important factor is to differentiate between possessing the elements of power (potential power) and translating these elements into actual power. The elements of national power have been divided into different categories by different scholars. For example, Organski25 describe these elements in terms of Natural (geography, resources, and population) and Social (economic, political, military, psychological, informational etc). Morgenthau divides the elements into two groups, those which are relatively stable (geography and natural resources) and those which are subject to constant change (industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, quality of diplomacy, quality of government) 26 . Similarly, Couloumbis and Wolfe describe national power into tangible (population, territory, natural resources and industrial capacity, agricultural capacity, military strength and mobility) and intangibles (leadership and personality, bureaucratic-organizational efficiency, type of government, societal cohesiveness, reputation, foreign support and diplomacy, accidents)27. Without subscribing to any particular grouping, some important elements of power (generally recognized) are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

24 David Joblonsky, “National Power”, Parameters (Spring 1997), 35. 25 A. F. K. Organsky, World Politics, (New York: Knopf, 1958), 124-155. 26 Morgenthau, op.cit., 117 27 Couloumbis and Wolfe, op.cit., 65-78. 25

Geography: Oxford dictionary defines Geography as “the study of the physical features of the earth and of human activity as it relates to these28”. In the study of Geography as an instrument of national power, factors such as location, size, topography and even climate are considered. All these factors affect the nature of a people and their relationship with other states. Among these factors location arguably plays the most vital role in determining interstate relations. Therefore, all the historians and writers, previous and contemporary, have elaborated the importance of this element. The value of Geography in international relations can be gauged from the fact that it has resulted in an extensive new field of study called ‘Geo-politics’. It is therefore, no surprise that Geography influences the policies of a state towards others and vice versa.

Nazi Germany has made profound geographic influences on world politics. In doing so the Germans developed what they regarded as the science of geopolitics. Geopolitics, to take a convenient definition, is the science of the relationship between space and politics which attempts to put geographical knowledge at the service of political leaders. It is more than political geography, which is descriptive. It springs from national aspirations, searches out facts and principles which can serve national ends 29 . Napoleon understood the importance of geography and contributed a great deal in institutionalizing the knowledge of geography. He paid special attention to promoting the knowledge of geopolitics and believed that power politics and geography are intrinsically linked. His famous quote30, “the policies of all powers are inherent in their geography” is a manifestation of the importance he attributed to geography.

It is primarily the result of its location at the confluence of South Asia, Far East (China), Central Asia, and Middle East that has dragged a land locked country like Afghanistan in the existing geo-political quagmire. The Afghan state and nation has always been subjected to invasions, the recent examples being the invasion by the USSR for access to so-called warm waters or more recently by the USA to occupy a vantage position in a region that is growing in strategic importance and is vital to US interests. Similarly, Pakistan and Iran are on the US wish list for their location (besides natural resources) astride the oil rich Persian Gulf, access to

28 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th rev. ed. (2008), 595. 29 William H. Hessler, “A Geopolitics for Americans,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, LXX (March 1944), 246. Also see Nolmer D. Palmer & Howard C. Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition, 3rd rev. ed. (New Delhi: AITBS, 2010), 41. 30 John A. Agnew and David N. Livingstone, eds., The SAGE Handbood of Geographical Knowledge, (London: SAGE, 2011), 219. 26

Central Asia with its vast natural resources and Proximity to China. The only reason why the foes of the Cold War India and US have turned strategic allies is the location of India vis-à-vis China. Because, the US considers India to be an important counter-weight to, and an ally in the policy of ‘strategic hedging’ of China. It is purely the irony of geography that has allowed absurd terms like ‘Afpak’ and ‘Chindia’.

The UK and USA, both exploited their strategic location to become great powerful empires. Having a relative immunity from land attack, and vast coastlines forced them to invest in their navies which became the instruments of force projection around the world. On the other hand a tiny state like Singapore has become an important regional actor and a prosperous nation merely because of its location astride the strategic Malacca Straits. Not only states but certain areas and choke points have also become very important in the power game because of their geography. There are many such areas as the Straits of Malacca, the Persian Gulf, Bab-al- Mandab, the Suez Canal, the Panama, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles etc which are vital for many regional and extra-regional players albeit for differing reasons.

Besides location, the size (and topography) is also an important factor in determining the national power of a state. Size makes possible the support of a large population and the possession of large resources. A large size can be a blessing, not only because it provides strategic depth and strategy options, but also because larger size is expected to contain more natural resources and space for various activities such as agriculture, farming or scientific experiments etc. The large size of Russia while on one hand has exposed it to incursions from different directions, has also provided the depth and resultant attrition against invaders. On the other hand the immense size of USSR perhaps contributed significantly in its final breakup from within. Similarly, the countries protected by physical features are less prone to attack than those having exposed borders. The entire scope of the Middle East peace process is based on Geo- politics.

As pointed out by Morgenthau, the possibility of nuclear war has further enhanced the importance of size as a source of national power. A country needs a large space to disperse its vital assets as well as its population to avoid complete destruction in case of a nuclear attack. Even the capability of ‘second strike’ is only relevant when a country has the capacity to absorb 27 the first. It is in this context a handicap for countries like UK and Israel and an advantage for countries like USA, China, Russia or India.

Geography is also related to Climate which affects the national power both directly, as well as, indirectly. It is no coincidence that most powerful empires in history belonged to the temperate zones. While today, most of the poorest and weakest states are located outside the temperate zones. The climate not only affects the nature of people (as you move closer to the equator, people are generally more lethargic and less laborious) but also provides options for sustenance. Countries are considered blessed if they can enjoy all the four seasons. Since it provides the opportunity to the populace to involve in all kinds of activities and also helps in achieving self sufficiency in producing its own foods, flora and fauna.

Population: Population in this context does not refer only to the number of people in a country. It rather includes the demographics as well as the nature and quality of the inhabitants of a particular state or country. It can be explained through the use of parameters such as size, age distribution, geographic distribution, ethnic/religious make-up, quality of individuals etc. The dynamics of population growth, settlement patterns and movement across the borders will have major impact on the power potential of a state. Therefore, demographic factors are, and should be recognized, as a potentially important contributor to the power of states. A large population is a key prerequisite, but not an absolute guarantee for national strength. Quality, quantity, morale, will of people, demographic shifts and population pressures are all important determinants of national power subject to varying contexts of geo-politics 31 . So while it is important for a potential great power to have a reasonably large population, the availability and readiness of these numbers to undertake the various tasks that make a nation great, is even more important. These tasks may range from providing food and security (military) to economic and industrial development, from research and academics to other social activities. It is, therefore, important to understand why the United States is the sole super power despite countries like China and India having larger populations. Even countries like Japan and Singapore with much smaller populations may rate a lot higher on the National Power Index than countries with much larger populations. According to Morgenthau32, the historical increase in American power owes

31 Sunil D. Tennakoon, “Demography as an Element of National Power,” NDC Journal (Winter 2003), 57. 32 Morgenthau, op.cit., 131 and Joblonsky, op.cit., 39. 28 partly to the arrival of more than 100 million immigrants between 1824 and 1924. Whereas, during the same century, Canada and Australia, comparable in territory and development level but with populations less than a tenth of America’s, remained secondary powers.” If the immigration law of 1924, limiting the number of immigrants to US to 150,000 per year, had been enforced half a century earlier, the United States may have been deprived of this important factor in its rise to glory. Nations that are competing against each other for power must, therefore, be cognizant of the size of, and trends in, population among their rivals. However, like most other factors, population may have negative connotation as well. Hence there is need to maintain a balance between population and resources. Without requisite resources to feed and sustain, large population may even become a liability. The current shifting of power from west to east owes, besides other factors, to the population trends in the eastern countries, as well, which have substantial work force available at their disposal. Thus it concludes that only having a large population is not enough but potentially useful population i.e. skilled population in the right age group (between 20 to 45 years of age). According to some experts one of the problems in the current financial crisis in United States may also be the “baby boomer” generation reaching a stage where it is leaving the work force and claiming overwhelming social entitlements33.

Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister, highlighted the importance of population in his radio address on March 22, 194334:

One of the most somber anxieties which beset those who look thirty, or forty, or fifty years ahead, and in this field one can see ahead only too clearly, is the dwindling birth-rate. In thirty years, unless present trends alter, a smaller working and fighting population will have to support and protect nearly twice as many old people; in fifty years the position will be worse still. If this country is to keep its high place in the leadership of the world, and to survive as a great power that can hold its own against external pressures, our people must be encouraged by every means to have larger families.

It can be safely said that future global trends also will have their influence on the structure and balance of national populations, particularly those of the poorest countries. In 1830,

33 Peter G. Peterson, “Will America Grow Up Before it Grows Old”, The Atlantic Monthly, May 1996, 55. 34 Morgenthau, op.cit., 134. 29 the global population reached one billion for the first time; it required 100 years to double. It took only 45 more years (1975) for the population to double again to four billion. In the next 21 years the population increased almost two billion, reflecting a growth rate of about 90 million a year. For the next several decades, 90 percent of this growth will occur in the lesser-developed countries, many already burdened by extreme overpopulation for which there is no remedy in the form of economic infrastructure, skills, and capital.35

The above explains why China exercises stringent birth-control rules. However, India which has not been able to control its birth expansion will soon take over from China as the most populous country. This may be the biggest obstacle in India’s quest for great power status since almost half of India’s population is living below poverty. Noting that overpopulation leads to insecurity and unrest, Aldous Huxley made an interesting prophecy36 in 1958:

Overpopulation leads to economic insecurity and social unrest. Unrest and insecurity lead to more control by central government and an increase of their power. Given this fact, the probability of overpopulation leading through unrest to dictatorship becomes a virtual certainty. It is a pretty safe bet that twenty years from now, all the world’s overpopulated and underdeveloped countries will be under some form of totalitarian rule”

Natural Resources: Some writers distinguish between Natural Resources and Raw Materials. For example, Palmer & Perkins write that natural resources and raw materials are not the same thing. According to them natural resources are gifts of nature of established utility e.g. most minerals flora and fauna, waterfall and fertility of soil. Some of these, like minerals and forests, are commonly both natural resources and raw materials. On the other hand, some raw materials must themselves be produced, as rubber, hides, and cotton37. However, Morgenthau and few others have discussed food and raw materials as sub categories of natural resources in their attempt to explain their affect on national power. And, therefore, for the purpose of this study, we should also consider raw materials as part of natural resources.

35 Joblonsky, op.cit., 40 36 Quoted in Palmer & Perkins, op.cit., 63 37 Ibid., 45 30

Availability of natural resources, in the form of food, minerals, energy etc plays an extremely important role in the relative power structure of nations. Large amounts of natural resources are essential for a modern nation to wage war, to operate an industrial base, and to reward other international actors through trade and aid. Moreover, as in the case of the geopolitical ownership of strategic places, the physical possession of natural resources is not necessarily a source of power unless a nation can also develop those resources and maintain political control over their disposition38. The dependence of nations on crucial resources can severely restrict their national power and influence. Conversely, the dependence of others on a resource held by a particular country or countries can add to latter’s influence and power. The dependence of the world on oil supplies from the Gulf has exalted the geostrategic importance of this region and hence provided these states with an instrument of power, which they amply demonstrated in the oil crisis of the 70s, to the detriment of the West39. The almost complete dependence of Japan on raw materials is a critical issue in the survival calculations of the Japanese. The importance of natural resources varies with time and technology. A resource, nevertheless, is a potential element of power and if the mother country is not in a position to utilize or defend this resource, it may invite envy or even aggression. So it is important also to have the technology and the wherewithal to exploit the gifts of nature. The source of strength US enjoys from its abundant natural resources and immense technological and industrial capability is the corner-stone of US position as the sole super power of the world.

All humans depend on food, the most basic of these resources, for their existence. Therefore, the importance of having access to sufficient food for the population cannot be overemphasized. A country that is self-sufficient (or nearly self-sufficient) in food supply has a clear advantage over one which has to import its foods from others. Deficiency of this important factor may have contributed in Britain becoming a major colonial power, since it was forced to reach out for food and maintain a strong navy to protect its food (among other valuables) supplies from interruption. It is said that Great Britain only grew 30 percent of the food consumed in the British Isles, before the Second World War. Furthermore, the defeat of Germany in the First World War is also attributed to the Allied blockade, imposing privations upon the German people which

38 Joblonsky, op.cit., 40 39 Azhar, op.cit., 91. 31 sapped their will to resist.40. Countries deficient in food supplies have to ensure continuous uninterrupted availability of alternative sources or else they starve. The plight of many starving Africans dependent partially or sometimes entirely on others to feed them, is a case in point.

Countries enjoying self-sufficiency, such as the United States, Russia or China, need not divert their national energies and foreign policies from their primary objectives in order to make sure that their populations will not starve in war. Self sufficiency in food is therefore, always a source of great strength. On the other hand, permanent scarcity of food is source of permanent weakness in international politics. For an agricultural country like Pakistan it is therefore, of utmost importance that it is able to meet the basic food requirements of its growing population. Because, growth in population and neglect of the agriculture can adversely affect availability of food. Basic food stuffs such as wheat, rice and corn are essential for national as well as for individual survival and for economic and physical development. According to Raymond W. Hiller:

Hunger is the most important factor in the world today. The real challenge of the 20th century is the race between men and starvation.41

Malnourished people cannot perform as well as the well-fed ones and hence it affects the quality of population which is another important factor of national power. Just as food is essential for sustenance of life, other raw materials and minerals required for industrial production and waging of war are equally important for the survival of nations. The dependence of human beings on raw materials has transformed with time. As man learned the techniques to discover, extract and utilize available natural resources their importance also increased exponentially. UK and USA became great powers because they had iron and coal, two most important raw materials of the time and the technology to exploit these. While both iron and coal remain important elements, their importance paled to the discovery of oil and its usage in transportation, weapons and industry. The UK and rest of the Europe started losing their strengths to USA and USSR which were rich in oil resource, besides other elements of power. Japan has become vulnerable due to its dependence on imported oil. Since the First World War,

40 Morgenthau, op.cit., 120 41 Quoted in Pooja Charak & Neetika Verma, “India As An Emerging Power: Economic Front”, International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow 1, no. 5 (July 2012), 1. 32 oil as a source of energy has become more and more important for industry and war. Most mechanized weapons and vehicles are driven by oil, and, consequently, countries that possess considerable deposits of oil have acquired influence in International Relations which would not have been possible without this precious possession. French Prime Minister Clemenceau is quoted to having said during the First World War that, “One drop of oil, is worth one drop of blood of our soldiers 42 .” OPEC’s control of oil provided its members influence all out of proportion to their economic and military power43. In October 1973, in retaliation to the US support to Israel during Yom Kippur war, the Arab countries announced an oil embargo. The oil embargo created rifts between the US and its NATO allies and they were forced to persuade Israel to withdraw from occupied territories. As a result, Israel vacated some areas of Sinai and Golan heights and the embargo was lifted in March 1974.

The American presence in the entire Gulf, the two Gulf wars and the occupation of Iraq (and recently Libya) is the result of the same experience. US and Europe cannot afford to undergo such a traumatic experience and have, therefore, strengthened their stranglehold on areas containing this important resource. The expansion and variations in technology has a direct impact on importance of raw materials. In today’s world some minerals such as Uranium and Plutonium have become important because of their use in nuclear industry. Whereas, others such as quartz, cobalt, chromium, manganese and platinum etc are considered classic strategic minerals for host of military, medical, scientific and commercial uses. New processes and inventions are continuously changing the demand for certain minerals and hence the competitions are shifting to areas containing those minerals. Afghanistan and the African continent are the two primary sources of most strategic minerals and much of instability and wars in those regions are actually battles for control and access to the minerals44. Until today, coal and oil are considered as the chief sources of energy. However, the nuclear energy, though technologically not accessible by all, is a competitor. Now because of the dwindling sources of oil and coal and concerns of pollution, the world is shifting its focus to other forms of energy such as the hydro, the wind and the solar energy. Already, the experts have started predicting that

42 Soraya Sepahpour, “When Oil And Water Mix”, http://www.payvand.com/news/07/may/1295.html, accessed on February 25, 2013. 43 Joblonsky, op.cit., 41. 44 Elizabeth Young, “What are Strategic Minerals?”, Helium, http://www.helium.com/items/1949042-what-are- strategic-minerals, accessed on October 04, 2011. 33 the next wars will take place because of water instead of oil45. As the humans continue to explore and utilize the resources, the availability of natural resources on land is on the decline. This has enhanced the importance of the seas which contain vast amounts of hitherto unexplored natural resources in the form of food and minerals; not to mention the immense energy generating potential of the oceans.

Economy: the economic factor is becoming more and more relevant in the modern world. And, may be considered as one of the most important elements. Especially since it is related closely with, and has influence over, most other elements of power- natural or social, stable or unstable, tangible or intangible. Economy is a more comprehensive term that encompasses other factors such as industrial capacity and technology etc which were referred as independent elements of power by writers in the past. A strong economy is a must to sustain and exploit other elements of national power. It is gradually taking over from the military element as the chief means to influence another nation or state. No country can maintain a viable military without putting in a lot of money which comes from a strong economy. Even if a country enjoys an ideal geography and abundance of natural resources, it has to have a strong viable economy to exploit its resources, feed its people and run its military establishment, and in turn, maintain the sanctity of its territorial integrity. Without a viable sustainable economy a country is at the mercy of others like Pakistan and many other poorer countries are.

The former Soviet Union was one of the mightiest powers on earth militarily; geographically it occupied the “Heartland46” which according to some historians was the key to world domination; it was almost self-sufficient in natural resources, like no other country, but it disintegrated because it could not maintain a healthy economy. China still regards itself as a developing country, however, it is arguably the most powerful and influential country in the world after United States. It has achieved this status only on the basis of a strong growing economy and has recently become the second biggest economy after United States. China has chosen to pursue wealth and knowledge, instead of violence. The strength of China’s economy is inherent in the fact that the so-called sole super power United States had to seek China’s help to

45 On January 24, 2008, Ban Ki-moon (former UN Secretary General) at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland alarmed the world of the impending water wars. Also see, “Will the Next War be fought on Water”, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/storyphp?storyId., accessed on May 12, 2013. 46 For Heartland theory see Halford John Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace”, Foreign Affairs 21 (1943), 595-605. 34 bail it out of economic recession. Why a nuclear power like Pakistan is openly humiliated and coerced by the United States and its allies? Because Pakistan is dependent on economic aid from these countries and the International institutions run under the influence of these countries. Pakistan has failed to pursue the higher form of power i.e. knowledge. The importance of the Gulf nations in the regional and international politics is only because of their oil economy. Because of globalization and the dependence of nations upon each other economically this factor has become ever more important. The economic stability, or otherwise, in one country does not only affect that particular country but it has effects regionally and sometimes globally’ depending upon the size of its economy and its interaction with other economies. We have recently witnessed the effect of recession in United States on the global economy. The strong economic bloc of the European Union is trembling like a house of cards by the prospects of bankruptcy of Greece.

In the past, the role of economy was limited to provision of livelihood to the people and maintenance of a country’s war machine. Its relations with other countries were dependent more on the military might of the country itself and the combined might of its friends and allies. However, economy has become an important tool that creates non-military national power. Economically strong countries can exercise their power through trade, aid, loans and grants and hence can influence the poorer countries using both carrot and stick, without employing military means. Not only the countries, but some multinational corporations and money lending institutions have become even more powerful than the countries. In today’s globalized world variations in a country’s economy can have rippling effects in countries which are neither physically close nor directly trading with that country. Hence, the strength of a nation’s economy has a direct effect on the variety, resiliency, and credibility of its international economic options. Increasing dependence on each other has caused major changes in the economic element of national power. Economies of individual countries have become more dependent on international trade and on financial markets that have become truly global in scope. A nation’s economic policy is now affected by a number of factors including the policies of international institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)47, influence of multinational corporations (it is said that multinationals play a major role

47 See Joblonsky, op.cit., 42. 35 in shaping the policies of the US since they fund election campaigns of the candidates), and, of course, the policies and state of economy of other countries.

Military: Military strength, since ages, has been the most obvious and visible symbol of a country’s national power. The proverb “might is right” is definitely right in international relations. And the unchecked and unjustifiable show of force by the US (supported by its Western allies) in countries across the globe, in pursuit of its hegemonic interests, is a clear manifestation of the importance of this element of national power. It was assumed after the two World Wars that the world has seen enough destruction and the institution of United Nations would usher in an era of peace and progress. However, the natural lust of humans for power and their mistrust and suspicion of each other has continued to mar the world with more and more conflict and the United Nations has become only a tool in the hands of the powerful. The basic composition of United Nations, giving preferential status to the powerful five, defied its stated objective from the very beginning.

Military strength does not only mean possession of weapons and sensors to fight a war. It is dependent on a whole lot of factors which include material factors such as economy, industrial development, technology, resources, number of men available to fight etc as well as non-material factors such as leadership, quality of men and their training, the morale of both, the armed forces as well as the entire nation, and also the willingness of the nation to support the armed forces etc. Because of the overwhelming influence of military on national policies, countries tend to lose balance and spend disproportionately on their military establishment, causing harm to other sectors. The collapse of USSR owed predominantly to this reason and the current economic crisis in USA also has a share of its overstretched military adventures. However, every sovereign nation requires a balanced military force strong enough to defend its territorial integrity and preferably, deter potential aggressors.

The importance of technology in raising and maintaining a potent military cannot be overemphasized. Countries that fail to keep pace with modern technology can only do so at their own peril, and they become totally dependent on other countries for provision of latest military hardware and software. Technological innovations have often been the difference between the victor and the loser. Beyond doubt, the current US mastery of the world has only been possible because of its overwhelming superiority in (military) technology. Maintaining a military also 36 requires, as mentioned earlier, strong economy as well as access to natural resources. However, in addition to material means the military strength depends a great deal on the quality of men and the leaders. Of course, the concept of military leadership has somewhat changed in the modern war. The individual charisma and bravado of the military commanders is becoming less and less relevant but their training, ability to comprehend the situation, timely decision-making and judicious use of available resources remains paramount.

Another vital element of military strength is the quality and quantity of its men. In the words of Morgenthau48:

A nation may have a good grasp of technological innovations in warfare. Its military leaders may excel in the strategy and tactics appropriate to the new techniques of war. Yet such a nation may be militarily and, in consequence, also politically weak if it does not possess a military establishment that in its over-all strength and in the strength of its component parts is neither too large nor too small in view of the tasks it may be called upon to perform. Must a nation, in order to be strong, possess a large army or is its power not impaired by having, at least in peacetime, only small land forces, composed of highly trained, heavily armed specialized units? Have battle-ready forces-in-being become more important than trained reserves? Have large surface navies become obsolete, or do aircraft carriers still fulfill a useful purpose? How large a military establishment can a nation afford in view of its resources and commitments? Does concern for national power require large-scale peacetime production of aircrafts and other mechanized weapons, or should a nation, in view of rapid changes in technology, spend its resources on research and on the production of limited quantities of improved types of weapons?

Morgenthau’s counsel is more and more relevant with advancements in technology, lethality and reach of weapons, and in the age where economy is taking over from military as the dominant element of national power and prestige. Countries have to address the above questions and many more. With growing emphasis on economic development, the people are less and less

48 Morgenthau, op.cit., 129. 37 willing to spend their hard earned money on killing people. The future shall belong to smaller, better equipped and better trained forces. The balance of armed forces is a question being discussed all the time in all the countries. Whether Pakistan needs an aircraft carrier to match the designs of the Indians or invest in submarines to counter the threat more effectively? The kind of leverage a few submarines can provide to Iran in the Persian Gulf, can it be possible with surface ships and aircrafts? Why should countries like Pakistan and India invest heavily in conventional weapons when they have nukes? The countries have to find the right answers to these questions. This important element of power can become a liability if the right balance is not achieved.

Intangibles: There are certain unquantifiable factors in the make-up of national power which play an equal, or sometimes more important, role in the application or manifestation of a country’s power, than the more visible and measurable elements. The nature of government and its relationship with the people, the willingness of the population to support the policies of the government or its military, national character, morale, nationalism etc are factors which can be crucial in determining a nation’s power at given time.

The quality and character of the government is extremely important. It is the government which bears the responsibility of all actions within a state. If the government is honest, capable and efficient, and it has the support of its people, it can take bold decisions and does not have to fear outside forces. The government should have the ability and will to bring all the elements of national power to bear upon an issue. A government has to cater for the interests of its people, ensure welfare and development, guarantee social justice, law and order and harmony. Such a government will always have the backing of its population. When these basic necessities are provided for, it will automatically raise the morale and national integration. The Americans have always trusted and supported their governments in international affairs. This has been a national character despite repeated betrayals and lies by successive governments. This is one of the strengths which has allowed the US to project its military power around the world with impunity. However, when the American public withdrew that support, like in Vietnam, the US forces had to withdraw in defeat. The decline in domestic support to military actions around the world is now causing the Americans to find face-saving exit solutions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran has been able to face economic hardships and wrath of the US and its Western allies because the people stood behind their government. On the other hand, successive Pakistani governments 38 have not been able to implement important projects like the Kalabagh dam because they lacked public trust and support. Due to this lack of support in the masses, the governments had to look for strength towards foreign forces, particularly the US. The US and its allies would not have been able to invade Afghanistan and Libya if a substantial population had not sided against their regimes. Similarly, India had not succeeded in breaking East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) if the local people were united and satisfied with the Pakistani government.

One of the important tasks of the governments includes diplomacy. Diplomacy is the skill of managing International Relations. Morgenthau describes diplomacy in the following words49:

The conduct of a nation’s foreign affairs by its diplomats is for national power in peace what military strategy and tactics by its military leaders are for national power in war. It is the art of bringing the different elements of national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation which concern the national interest most directly. Diplomacy, one might say, is the brains of national power, as national morale is its soul. If its vision is blurred, its judgment defective, and its determination feeble, all the advantages of geographical location, of self-sufficiency in food, raw materials, and industrial production, of military preparedness, of size and quality of population will in the long run avail a nation little.

National Character also plays an important role in diplomacy and policy making. For example Indians are very shrewd and calculative and have the ability to sweet-talk their opponents; the Americans are very arrogant but when confronted with strong will can easily change their position. The Pakistanis are generally straight forward and ‘non-diplomatic’, where as the Chinese are very pragmatic, cool and calculative in their dealings with the foreigners. The Germans are considered a very disciplined and hardworking nation which has always helped the Germans to rally behind their leaders and rise after every defeat. It is said that the people living close to the equator are generally lethargic in character and that is the reason these nations have never risen to glory and power. Unlike all great empires in history the Chinese have not shown hegemonic or expansionist tendencies. The Americans are less interested in politics and

49 Ibid, 146. 39 international affairs and more in their own well being and comfort. That is why they seldom question the foreign policies of their governments but raise their voice for economic development and social justice within the society. Hence it is very important to take a nation’s character in mind when dealing with a country to be able to comprehend and predict its response to different issues.

National will and morale may be defined as the degree of determination that any actor manifests in the pursuit of its internal or external objectives. What causes 313 ill equipped companions of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) to fight and defeat a much larger army at the ‘battle of Badr’? Why Pakistan was able to beat materially and numerically much superior Indian military in 1965? How a rag-tag army of few thousand ill- equipped, ill-trained talibans fought the history’s mightiest military power and brought the coalition of US and its 40 allies to a state where they are forced to negotiate an honourable exit for themselves? How the Vietnamese managed to defeat a super power? These questions cannot be answered by counting the material elements of national power.

It is said that in 1969, during the last days of Vietnam war, Pentagon fed all material data like population, gross national product, manufacturing capability, number of tanks, ships, and aircraft, size of the armed forces etc, in respect of both the US and North Vietnam in the computer and asked the computer, “when will we win?”. The computer immediately responded, “You won in 1964”50. This example clearly manifests the importance of national will and morale in the outcome of a conflict. The side which considers that it is fighting the just cause, will always enter a conflict with a high morale compared to the side that lacks justification or morality. Similarly, if a people are fighting for survival, they will show amazing and unexpected results.

Another very important factor, which relates to and has enormous influence on all the intangible factors mentioned above is nationalism. This factor, unfortunately, is not given due consideration in the discussion of elements of national power. Unlike religion or ethnicity, nationalism has no sects or factions and, is therefore, the most effective binding force. Nationalism is the only force which can effectively bring people of different colours and creeds

50 Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute ,1983), 11. 40 together. Once a nation is truly united it finds its own ways to development and progress. Such a country need not fear an adversary or adversity, because the bond of nationhood motivates people to stand by each other and also give strength to the representative governments. Sometimes adversities help to bring an otherwise divided people together, as has happened during wars and calamities to the Pakistani people. The United States and its allies could easily invade Iraq and Afghanistan because their people are divided into ethnic and sectarian groups, but they will never venture against countries like Iran and North Korea which stand as one nation. The world’s most populous country China, with a huge land mass, has proved how unity and direction can turn a demoralized, opium-infested country into a super power within a short span of half a century. So nationalism provides a degree of integration and a sense of belonging, which contributes to national will and morale.

CHAPTER TWO

MARITIME STRATEGY

It is He who has subjected the sea unto you, that ye may eat flesh thereof that is fresh and tender, and extract therefrom ornaments to wear, and thou seest the ships therein that plough the waves that ye may seek to enrich yourself of the bounty of Allah and that ye may be grateful51.

More than two-thirds of the earth’s surface is covered by water. All major oceans of the world are practically connected to form one whole. These oceans provide man with a seamless medium to traverse the entire length and breadth of this globe. Although human beings naturally live on land, their sustenance is crucially linked and dependent on these waters. All oceans, seas and inland waterways are a huge reservoir of food and an endless resource of organic and non- organic materials. The two most traditional usages of the seas include the use of these waters as a source of food (fishing) and as a medium of transportation. Even today, seafood comprise major portion of the overall human food consumption and the trend is increasing with the improvement in technology and better access to fishing techniques. Similarly, sea transport remains the most convenient and the cheapest mode of transport the world over. It is, therefore, no surprise that the humans preferred to live close to the waters and today 80% of the world’s population lives on or near the coasts and 90% of the entire world’s commerce is routed through the seas52. Moreover, the seas contain tremendous amount of resources so important for sustenance and development of human society which include oil and gas, important minerals, food and energy. It is also the single most influential element that affects and regulates our climate and environment. Thus the seas have a profound influence on our economic, social, cultural and military lives. Despite such remarkable and ubiquitous influence on our lives we have yet to fully understand and exploit the bounties of the oceans. Even in this age of knowledge not many people understand how crucial the sea and the maritime sector are to modern life. Mahan has expressed this fact in the following words53:

51 Holy Qur’an, Surah Al-Nahl, Ayah 14. 52 O. S. Verma, “UNEP Theme: Wanted! Seas & Oceans Dead or Alive”, Journal of Extension Systems 20, no.2 (December 2004) available at http://www.jesonline.org/2004dec.htm. 53 Mahan, op.cit., v. 42

Significance of the Seas

Despite what has been stated above, there have been others like Mahan, who have tried to draw the attention of their peers to the importance of oceans in their lives. One of them was the architect of modern Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, who writes54:

Our seas, oceans and inland waterways are of huge importance in terms of resources, the environment and conservation, trade and industry, marine sciences and leisure activity.

The seas have been used, since time immemorial, primarily as an important resource of food, mainly fish, and as an economical and indestructible path for transportation of goods and people. However, advancements in technology promise a much wider access to the depths and widths of the seas. The increasing knowledge about the variety of sources available in these waters and their bottoms and the capability to technically exploit these precious sources has further enhanced the economic importance of seas. Technology has already transformed (and continues to do so) the traditional knowledge and uses of the seas which are now being used for variety of civil and military purposes. In order to fully comprehend the scope and benefits of the seas, an effort is being made to categorize the uses of the oceans and the seas under three broad but very important aspects of human activity.

Economic: The foremost activity at the sea remains fishing. Sea food is one of the most preferred (though expensive) and healthy of the foods. Millions of individuals and their families are associated with and dependent on fishing around the world which has taken a form of a proper industry. It is estimated that over 500 million people earn their livelihood directly or indirectly through this industry 55 . Besides catching and selling fish the industry includes manufacturing of fishing boats and trawlers, fishing lines and nets and a variety of modern

54 Gorshkov, op.cit. 55 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_fishery, accessed on February 8, 2012. 43 equipment which is used directly or indirectly in the process. Furthermore, fish processing has also become a thriving industry which gives employment to thousands and is a source of huge revenues for many countries. New techniques and equipment are being introduced regularly giving a continuous boost to the industry and adding its contribution to the overall economic activity. Rise in population and awareness about its nutritious value is adding to the demand of fish, generating more opportunities for the coastal states and individuals related with this industry.

Another vital economic activity at sea is the marine transportation. It is said that 90% of world trade is carried out through seas. Bigger, much faster ships and loading/unloading and storing techniques provide vast economic opportunities. The transportation through sea is not only safer, but is much cheaper as well. No other medium, land or air, has the capacity to lift equivalent amounts of cargo in comparable size and cost. Not only the littoral states but even the land-locked countries are also dependent on the sea for a major portion of their imports and exports. Merchant shipping is a multibillion-dollar, multinational endeavour; an estimated two million people make their livelihood from seafaring56. There are other major activities associated with sea trade like ship-building and repairs, construction of ports and harbours and associated infrastructure, and also the infrastructure and communications required for linking these ports and harbours with the hinterland. Thus the scale of economic activity generated through sea trade is enormous and has the capacity to alone turn the fortunes of the coastal states. Singapore and UAE are just two examples of states thriving on sea trade. Globalization has caused an increase in the world trade and this represents a primary force that has affected the international maritime environment.

Sea is also a significant resource for countless minerals. Many perhaps are still unknown to the mankind, however, the technology is opening up new vistas and human reach is becoming possible in the remoteness of ocean beds. So far, the most important and precious non-living produce of the sea is petroleum. According to Professor Till57, nearly one third of the oil and gas being consumed by the world comes from the seabed; Methane hydrates are the future energy resource and sea will be used more and more for energy generation as we learn to exploit

56 Daniel Sekulich, Oceans Titans: Journeys in Search of the Soul of a Ship, (Guilford: Lyons, 2007), 32. 57 Geoffrey Till, Sea Power: A Guide for Twenty First Century, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 2. 44 fluctuating tides, the movements of waves, and water temperature differentials. The economic activity being generated by transportation and use of petroleum alone is so enormous that it would be difficult to put a figure on it. Technology is opening wider and deeper oceanic areas for exploration of minerals. It is due to modern technology that Japan is endeavouring to retrieve iron from near its coast.

The Oceans hold a promising future to meet the rapidly expanding needs of the people. Governments throughout the world are showing close interest in the deep sea, the sea-bed and its subsoil. The United States, Germany, Japan and Soviet Union are leading the world-wide enterprise of oceanic explorations. In addition to the vast mining of oil and gas being carried out at sea, numerous other minerals and metals are also being mined from the sea-bed, which include: sulphur, coal, diamond, tin, gold, manganese, iron, nickel, magnesium, chromium etc. As technology advances, the volume and variety of the yield from the sea would also increase. Sea water, sea-bed and subsoil of the sea carry huge potential resources of all kinds of foods, minerals, biological and chemical resources for the coastal states.

In its hunger for more and cheaper energy, mankind is turning toward the sea with renewed hopes. The potential sources of energy from the sea are numerous including the harnessing of wave-energy and the tidal movement, recovery of hydrogen from the sea water, and development of big-mass energy from biological sources of the sea. In this last category, the energy would be obtained from Kelp, the ‘king of the sea weeds’ which can grow by two feet per day. A kelp or sea weed forest grown in the coastal waters can also support a very large number of fish to be converted into food.58 Even the wind generated across the coasts is indirectly a product of the sea which is being used for energy generation.

Another great economic asset provided by the seas is the exploitation of ports and harbours. Ports and harbours are not merely used for fishing and shipping or maritime related activity. Development of ports and harbours is a catalyst in the overall economic and industrial uplift of a country. It provides impetus to economic and social activity throughout the country. Even water sports and leisure activities provided by the seas contribute enormously in the social and economic well being of the people. It is no coincidence that most of the prosperous cities and

58 Maritime Warfare Docket (Islamabad: National Defence University, 2009), 140. 45 notable commercial as well as cultural centres are located astride the seas. Real estate, recreation, ocean-related occupations, and other services associated with the ocean generate 54 billion dollars in goods and services per year. Revenue generated to the ocean is generated through: kelp (emulsifying agent in food and pharmaceutical products), food, recreation (hook and line fishing, spear-fishing, scuba snorkeling, whale watching etc), mining (salt, oyster shells, jade, etc), shipping and biomedical products59.

Military: The importance of the seas as a medium of warfare and influence has grown over a period of time. The earlier military use of the seas was restricted to transportation of men and material to and from the enemy coast. The actual action was to be carried out at land. However, with passage of time and proficiency in the use of boats and weapons, it was sometimes found prudent to face the enemy at the sea instead of allowing him to reach your coasts. In military conflict the sea may serve as the first line of defence for some countries and for some as the last reserve of space to fall back upon. The sea also provides logistic supply routes to the combat forces fighting on land or operating near coastal areas. Despite advancements in warfare at sea, amphibious landing remains one of the most intricate and spectacular of military actions launched from the sea. Landings at Normandy and Inchon played decisive role in the outcome of the respective battles. It is still considered as an attractive form of power projection against weaker adversaries. Sea bed also provides ideal ground for installation of long range listening devices and under-water weapons.

Mobility, flexibility and reach are some of the important characteristics of all naval forces. Sea power plays a major part in projecting power both by direct support of operations on land and by independent action at sea. Due to increased dependence of states on sea borne trade, the protection (or interdiction) of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) has become an important military assignment for naval forces. States are becoming more and more dependent on sea trade and any interference thereof can have serious repercussions.

Development of new weapons like the stand-off cruise missile which can be fired from any platform has made it possible for maritime forces to carryout lethal missile attacks on shore targets including the interior of the coastal cities. However, in the nuclear age, the most sought

59 Project Oceanography, University of Florida, 1998 available at http://www.marine.usf.edu/pjocean/packets /f98 /f98u1le1.pdf. 46 after military instrument at sea today is the submarine which provides the best assured ‘second- strike’ capability to a nuclear state.

Political: Political importance of any element or resource is essentially a product of the economic and military factors. With the indisputable economic and military importance of the oceans, their political importance is inevitable. Ability to use the sea enhances the overall freedom of a nation, particularly in the case of those nations which are surrounded by hostile neighbours.

A state needs a very wide variety of contacts and communications with the international community to advance its influence and aims for its political stability as well as national progress. The sea facilitates in promoting commercial, cultural, scientific and industrial contacts between the littoral states. When Mozambique became free from Portuguese domination, its reestablishment of trade ties with the world community was quick because of its access to the sea. Pakistani merchant ships also immediately started calling at the Mozambique ports to bring own exports to that country. The state of Rhodesia which has now become Zimbabwe, on the other hand has been taking much longer to develop similar contacts with other countries because it is a landlocked country60. Pakistan enjoys a special importance for landlocked CARs and Afghanistan for providing access to the world through sea.

The states having access to the sea invariably tend to have a greater voice and influence in the sphere of international trade and commerce, fixing of transportation prices, allocation of tariffs and quotas, and on policies regarding shipping and turnover of trade etc. This enhances the overall economic expertise and activities of these states. Countries like Singapore, Iran, Egypt, Panama, Turkey etc have a role to play in the international politics due to their proximity to important maritime choke points.

The coastal states possess an attractive advantage of letting out naval facilities etc. to the big powers depending on the strategic requirements of each party. Such matters can be quite sensitive and at times lead to tension and political problems, but on the other hand if handled tactfully they can be turned into very useful bargaining factors and can provide opportunity for naval development and defence.

60 Maritime Warfare Docket, op.cit., 46. 47

The sea provides a very good medium through which show of force to serve as deterrence or as a pressure tactics can be mounted. This kind of diplomacy by force or what is sometimes also called as ‘Gun-boat diplomacy’ is being quite widely used both by big powers as well as the regional powers. Present trends in power-politics in the international sphere, as well as availability of new kinds of weapons and naval units would seem to indicate still wider currency and applicability of the use of naval deterrent forces in support of diplomacy.

Understanding Maritime Strategy and Sea Power

Many historians have generally used the terms maritime strategy or sea power in the military context. It is, therefore, no surprise that people tend to mix maritime/ sea power with naval power. Hence, there is a need to put the two in their correct perspective. The word ‘maritime’ is a composite term which has various elements such as ports and harbours, merchant marine, ocean economic resources and naval forces. All these elements essentially contribute towards the ‘National Power’ of a littoral state. Maritime strategy is all about the sea and management of maritime assets in the best possible fashion61; which brings riches and honour to the state that learns and applies this skill. The political, economic and technological environments have got a direct bearing on the maritime strategy of a nation. Maritime strategy uses the sea to exploit geography to the advantage of a littoral state and seeks to deny its advantages to the enemy. Thus the main play ground of maritime strategy is the sea, and the possessor of this capability can be conveniently called a ‘Sea Power’62. Sea power is broadly defined to include all relevant aspects of national power, both civil and military. National maritime capabilities and potential are seen in comprehensive terms as including ports & harbours, merchant marine & maritime industry, fishing and oceanographic fleets, ocean economic resources like fish, oil & gas, minerals etc, maritime outlook and tradition, and other aspects of national power related to sea power, rather than in narrow terms of weaponry alone. A strategy to enhance national sea power accordingly promotes and coordinates all aspects of maritime activity, both civil and military in order to optimize the use of available resources63. It

61 Anwar, op.cit., 9. 62 Ibid. 63 M. A. Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies, (London: Macmillan, 1987), 94. 48 may be said that maritime strategy is the conviction of a nation to put to use her political, social, economic and maritime assets with the aim to promote her maritime interests64.

For Naval Strategy, let us first define naval power which is "Military power brought to bear on the sea; on the surface of the sea; underneath it; or in the air above". Naval power, therefore, is the total sum of surface combatants, subsurface elements and air units. The art of development and employment of this naval power in attainment of military objectives is called `naval strategy’ and the object of naval strategy will invariably be: "to directly or indirectly secure the sea control or to prevent enemy from securing it".

As stated above, the maritime strategy determines the development of elements of sea power. It is greatly influenced by the economic, trade, energy, defence and foreign policies amongst others. Maritime strategy therefore, regulates all the elements of sea power which are; ports and harbours, mercantile marine, ocean economic resources and combatant naval forces whereas, naval strategy deals primarily with the last element i.e. combatant naval forces.

Naturally, there is considerable inter-linking between the two because naval strategy is designed to protect the maritime interests of the state in peace and war. Moreover, it has the potential to support broad national objectives, particularly in the foreign policy. In the context of maritime affairs, naval forces safeguard the elements which are lucrative and open to dispute because conflicts over the treasures of the sea are bound to arise.

Despite excessive use of the term sea power, by majority of naval writers, in purely military context, this study considers sea power as an all-encompassing term which includes the ability to exploit all elements of maritime power as discussed above. Although Mahan’s works revolved mainly around naval campaigns, he did realize the importance of other elements of maritime power as well. According to him65, sea power was essential to the growth of national strength and prosperity. He identified various factors which affected the sea power of a nation which included: geographical position, size of territory and population, political institutions and national character. It may be noted that these factors have already been discussed in the context of national power of a state in the previous chapter. However, Mahan contextualized these

64 Anwar, op.cit., 2. 65 Mahan, op.cit., xxix. 49 elements and explained their relationship with respect to the sea. All proponents of sea power unanimously agree that the ascendency of UK and USA owes primarily to their sea power. According to Corbett, it was only because of sea power that a tiny island nation such as Britain could rule the entire world. Mahan was so obsessed with sea power that the entire theme of his most famous book aims at “estimating the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations”. The father of modern Soviet fleet Admiral Gorshkov expresses his views on sea power in the following words66:

A nation’s sea power is determined not only by the weapons and armed forces with which it can affect events at sea but also by its merchant marine, its fishing and oceanographic fleets, and its maritime outlook and tradition. It is true that these civil maritime activities can become vital ingredients in a nation’s ability to exercise military power at sea, for example when merchant ships carry troops and supplies in wartime, or trawlers and scientific vessels collect intelligence in peacetime, but they are not inherently instruments of armed force.

How much influence sea power has had on the course of history and destiny of the nations is a matter of debate. Notwithstanding the fact that this influence has not been constant and has varied due to various factors, it would be hard, even for the proponents of continental primacy, to reject its importance outright. As noted by Professor Till67 sea power may not be required today for colonization, but many other benefits of sea power, not visible to the early writers have arisen. For example the adoption of the UNCLOS has provided a whole new meaning to the term sea power by giving rights and responsibilities to coastal states. One extremely relevant manifestation of sea power is the nuclear submarine with its capability of second strike. So while the means, and even the ends, may have changed; the importance of sea power and hence of maritime strategy has not diminished. The United States’ ability to invade far off lands and maintain its hegemony and control over resource rich areas of the globe is only possible because of its preponderance at sea. Having established the importance of sea power for contemporary littoral states, the need for a maritime strategy to exploit this power becomes only

66 Quoted in Hedley Bull, “Sea Power and Political Influence”, ed. Jonathan Alford, Sea Power and Influence: Old Issues and New Challenges, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, (England: Gower & Allanheld, Osmun, 1980), 3. 67 Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, 5. 50 too obvious. Let us now discuss a few elements which are critical to the existence and exploitation of maritime power.

Elements of Maritime Power:

Under modern conditions, however, home trade is but a part of the business of a country bordering on the sea. Foreign necessaries or luxuries must be brought to its ports, either in its own or in foreign ships, which will return, bearing in exchange the products of the country, whether they be the fruits of the earth or the works of men’s hands; and it is the wish of every nation that this shipping business should be done by its own vessels. The ships that thus sail to and fro must have secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as possible, be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage68.

Maritime elements are various and listed differently by different writers. However, we shall discuss the following four basic elements which are essential for a state to be considered a sea power of any stature:

Ports & Harbours

Merchant Marine

Ocean Economic Resources

Combatant Force

Ports and Harbours

As a nation, with its unarmed and armed shipping, launches forth from its own shores, the need is soon felt of points upon which the ships can rely for peaceful trading, for refuge and supplies. In the present day friendly, though foreign, ports are to be found all over the world; and their shelter is enough while peace prevails69.

68 Mahan, op.cit., 26. 69 Ibid., 27. 51

The most fundamental constituent of maritime power is the ports (and harbours). Without ports and harbours worthwhile maritime activity cannot simply take place. Seventy percent of earth’s surface is covered by the sea and approximately seventy percent of world’s population lives within one hundred miles of coastline and nearly eighty percent of world’s capitals lie within this belt. Inherently, the economy of sea contiguous states revolves around port cities such as Karachi, Bombay, New York, Singapore, Dubai etc.

The possession of ports and harbours is a significant attribute of sea power. A port offers facility for receiving ships and transferring cargo. A port is in effect a gateway between water and land transport with services for receiving and transferring cargo as well as passengers. As such a lot of related industrial activities take place in and around the ports, giving rise to port- industrial complexes. It may also be defined as an intermediate location in the global flow of passengers and freight. These freight flows can be construe as steps in commodity, value or supply chains and as elements of the logistic systems put in place to manage them. A commodity chain is a functionally integrated set of production, consumption, distribution and exchange activities extending from the acquisition of raw materials through to the sale of finished goods and services. As shipments by sea account for about 90 percent of international trade by volume, sea ports are vital nodes in global supply/logistic chains, as well as in supra-national and regional trade. Naturally, therefore, all ports also form focal points for economic activities and for associated industrial development70. The economic activity associated with ports can be divided into several groups. The first group includes cargo/passenger handling, storage and distribution activities directly related to the port function, ship repair and a host of transport-related services located in port itself and in their city centres. The second group comprises of a set of processing industries that transform imported material before their onward shipment/re-export taking advantage of the inter-modal, trans-shipment and break of bulk functions of ports. A third group of industries located in port- industrial complexes are those whose inputs comprise bulk commodities imported through the port. Oil refineries and related chemical industries, iron and steel mills and sugar refineries71 may be included in this last category.

70 Michael Dunford and Godfrey Yeung, “Regional Development: Port-industrial Complexes” in Kitchin, Rob and Thrift, Nigel (eds.) International Encyclopedia of Human Geography 8, 2009, 285-294. 71 Ibid., 287. 52

Mahan further explains the importance of ports in the following words:72:

The seaboard of a country is one of its frontiers; and the easier the access offered by the frontier to the region beyond, in this case the sea, the greater will be the tendency of a people toward intercourse with the rest of the world by it. If a country be imagined having a long seaboard, but entirely without a harbour, such a country can have no sea trade of its own, no shipping, no navy. This was practically the case with Belgium when it was a Spanish and an Austrian province. The Dutch, in 1648, as a condition of peace after a successful war, exacted that the Scheldt should be closed to sea commerce. This closed the harbour of Antwerp and transferred the sea trade of Belgium to Holland. The Spanish Netherlands ceased to be a sea power.

The possession of bases, ports and harbours is a significant attribute of a sea power. While smaller powers will content with their home ports and harbours, the major powers would be keen to maintain bases world-wide to sustain their out of area operations and control. Hence the requirement and significance of bases will vary according to the national policy and maritime strategy of a country. Naval bases range in degree of utility and importance from fleet anchorages at one end of the scale to main bases with supporting industrial establishments at the other. In varying degrees they support, and even make possible many forms of naval activity.

The bases, ports and harbours provide berthing, repairs and numerous logistic facilities including recuperation of personnel, without which the sustained operations are not possible. The distant bases help increasing endurance and reach of combatants. Mahan said that the US navy needed bases in the outer oceans where shipping operated if it wanted to defend trade; otherwise the navy will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their own shores. Commercial ports and harbours are focal points for economic development of any state. Modern ports’ capability of handling large quantities of cargo and shipping are important assets. Finally it is no exaggeration to say that the existence and exploitation of all other elements of maritime power depends on the availability of suitable ports. The importance of this vital element of national power can be understood by the study of various maritime (military or economic) powers. Singapore had a

72 Mahan, op.cit., 35 53

GDP per capita of $511/- before establishment of Port of Singapore Authority in 1965. Today the GDP figure for Singapore has risen to $43867/-73. Dubai’s progress and prosperity, similarly, has been significantly depended on its port. The ports are also contributing overwhelmingly in the growing trade of China and today six of the world’s top ten container ports are in China.

Merchant Marine

The maritime nations have many interests, global economic interdependence, and a heritage tied inseparably to their geography. Regular intercontinental commercial flights and direct worldwide communications have created fresh commercial opportunities and brought nations closer, though they still rely on the oceans to serve as a defensive barrier as well as a highway to commerce abroad. The stability of the world economy depends upon unhindered trade across the seas and the oceans. Today, almost ninety percent of the world's trade is transported on the sea. Even the most powerful world economies, like US, with vast industrial, technological, agricultural, and resource components, are not self-sufficient. Nations depend on the continued flow of raw materials and finished products to and from different countries.

International trade plays an overwhelmingly important role in stimulating economic growth. With the onset of globalization and improvement in transportation and related services, the world economies have become ever more dependent on each other. The three mediums of transportation i.e. land, air and sea have certain advantages and shortcomings. For example, man is most comfortable on land, the latter being his natural habitat and source of sustenance. Land also allows free and sustained movement even without the use of any vehicle. However, the land is not continuous and sometimes the terrain is not very hospitable. Even with the use of vehicles there is restriction on speed and capacity. On the other hand, the air is ubiquitous, uninterrupted, and free of terrain difficulties. It allows high speed movement in all directions without the need of preparing roads and rails. Nonetheless, despite huge technological improvements, the staying power and size of air vehicles remains limited, and the energy required to move them at high speed becomes exorbitantly expensive. In contrast, the sea is almost continuous and free of terrain difficulties, requires no road, rail or runway preparations and allows large and heavy cargos to be lifted at far less energy expenditure. The only restriction is on the speed of

73 World bank, “World Development Indicators” updated 13 Dec 11. 54 movement. Sea is, therefore, not just an additional, but the most advantageous form of transportation. Research shows significant difference in the relative costs of other modes of transportation74:

Sea 1

Rail 10

Road 45

Air 163

The capacity of a state to use the sea as a medium of transport is manifestly important and requires adequate merchant shipping to carry export overseas and bring in imports i.e. raw materials, food, oil and military hardware etc. A national merchant marine provides stamina and strength and is considered important particularly in times of national crisis for obvious reasons.

A merchant marine, under the national flag and nationally owned and manned, was generally considered by the classical writers to be an important element of maritime power. It enabled the state to ensure the maintenance of its trade; earned profits, created wealth and provided employment; besides maintaining a pool of trained seamen. All these traits were regarded as particularly important in times of national crisis, when in addition it might be desirable for a state to requisition merchant ships for naval or auxiliary purposes75. A clear example of this is seen in the Falklands campaign where a large number of merchant ships were commissioned by the Royal Navy to augment its strength. It is also a well known fact that some countries use their merchant (and fishing) vessels for intelligence gathering and eavesdropping as well.

Having own merchant fleet of sufficient size and capability is particularly important during war and tension. Because during such periods the Flag of Convenience ships usually refuse to ply in dangerous waters. Even when they do agree to operate, they charge exorbitant fees on account of war insurance, which despite being a burden on the national exchequer does

74 Maritime Warfare Docket, op.cit., 20. 75 Anwar, op.cit., 16. 55 not assure continued supplies. On such occasions the best and only reliable solution is to have own ships able to carry vital cargo.

Hence it follows that the possession of merchant fleet is not only important for economic reasons but for the purposes of national security as well. Negligence to build and maintain your own fleet could impact a state in three different ways. First and foremost would be to lack the capacity of assured supplies during peace and war. Secondly, the state will lose an opportunity to earn vital revenues from carrying cargos of other countries. And thirdly, it will have to pay exorbitant freight charges and, may be, even war insurance bills to flags of convenience.

The availability of shipping services to meet country’s foreign trade needs in war or other emergencies has been the major reason for development of merchant shipping by many countries. Though national defence requirements fall outside the normal economic considerations, they have been a very important factor in development or expansion of national mercantile marine. As mentioned earlier, a war in the region or a heightened state of tension can deter neutral foreign shipping from plying in a war prone zone. This may result in denial of essential services for transportation of country’s trade or increased insurance premium for all cargo destined to or from a war zone. The ability of shipping own trade is particularly important for developing countries to reduce dependency and cost. Experts have quoted five basic reasons why developing countries invest in shipping industry. These are: saving foreign exchange, reducing freight costs and thus promoting the country’s foreign trade, earning revenues from the profitable shipping operation, providing added employment, and assuring adequate and reliable shipping services in peace and crisis76.

Ocean Economic Resources

Oceanic economic resources may be defined as those assets or materials related to the oceans or seas, which help generate economic activity or contribute to the economic well being of individuals or states. While merchant marine and port/ harbour facilities may be included in this category, they are generally dealt with as separate elements of maritime power. Generally

76 Raja Rab Nawaz, Maritime Strategy in Pakistan, Master’s Thesis (Monterey: Naval Post-Graduate School, 2004), 11-29. 56 this term is used to include all living and non-living organisms and materials e.g. marine animals and plants, minerals, oil and gas etc that are found in the oceans.

The coastal areas are by far the most biologically productive zones, endowed with rich, unique natural ecosystems that can contribute significantly towards national economy and growth. It is estimated77 that one hectares of mangrove if properly managed could produce an annual yield of 100kg fish, 25kg shrimp, 15kg crab meat, 200kg mollusc, and 40kg sea cucumber, in addition to supplying indirect support for 400kg of fish and 75kg of shrimp that mature in off-shore areas. According to Shahid Amjad, the economic wealth of coastal areas is derived from five major sources78:

a. Products of direct economic value e.g. shrimp and finfish, which earn millions of US dollars in foreign exchange; minerals; sand mining; beach recreation and tourism that generate revenue, apart from providing support to livelihood of many rural communities along the productive natural systems.

b. Products of natural systems that are intangible and are not accounted for by the market economy. These are the output of economic functions performed and services provided by those systems e.g., supply of rich nutrients to support productivity of biologically diverse fauna and flora, of direct and indirect economic value to humans such as food, firewood, honey; fodder for animals, cattle and wild life. c. Coast dependent activities such as coastal aquaculture, marine transport and shipping, beach related activities, tourism, ports and harbour etc. d. Coastal linked activities include fish processing, agricultural activities along the coastal belt, marine coastal installations, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, ship building, power station etc.

e. Coastal services activities include housing, real estate, business industries and other professional services.

77 Data from National Institute of Oceanography, quoted in Babar Bilal, Pakistan’s Maritime Assets, Individual Research Paper (Islamabad: National Defence University, 2008), 14. 78 Shahid Amjad, “Marine Resource Development” (Karachi: National Institute of Oceanography, 2005). 57

Thus the total economic wealth generated by the natural systems, coast depended activities and services, contributes billions of US dollars to national GNP. Many nations depend on the common resources of the oceans for enhancing their economic power. Since the access to the ocean is free it allows the states to enjoy the unlimited bounties offered by the ocean. Admiral Gorshkov considered seas, oceans and inland waterways to be of huge importance in terms of resources, the environment and conservation, trade and industry, marine sciences and leisure activity. He writes79:

The exploitation of the natural resources of the World Ocean, combined with the advance of science and technology making such exploitation possible, opens new vistas of economic and political integration for the socialist states of the world, widens the sphere of their international cooperation and heightens the prestige of the Soviet State in the international arena.

With advancements in science and technology, man’s access to the ocean and his ability to explore and exploit the treasures of the sea, it is only obvious that the seas will contribute more and more in the prosperity, strength and prestige of states blessed with such an access. The growing interest in ocean resources is the direct consequence of our realization that the resources on land may not be able to cope with the insatiably growing needs of us humans and also the knowledge of the infinite potential of the oceans.

Combatant Naval Force

After establishing the importance of the oceans and the various elements of maritime power, it becomes common sense that a state would need a capable force to safeguard and protect not only its sovereignty but all its assets and resources. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that a coastal state must possess a potent naval force to protect its maritime interests. The sea, as we have examined, plays a crucial role in the economic, military and political affairs of a state. If adequate maritime force is not maintained, the sea can become a liability rather than an asset.

79 Gorshkov, op.cit., 79. 58

The sea covers seventy percent of the globe. Man lives on land but the predominant support to his life comes from water. Besides the fact that the sea is inextricably linked with every aspect of man's life, the potential resources possessed by the sea are infinitely greater than those of the land. Those who can harness the resources of the sea would always have more resources at their disposal for development. It is inevitable that the nations which have the capability of controlling the sea would become the dominant nations in the world. Khairuddin Barbarossa rightly understood the importance of naval power, when after his conquest in the battle of Preveza, in 1538, he uttered his famous words:

He who rules over the sea will undoubtedly rule over the land.

In the recent history natural resources of the seas have attracted great interest around the world. The land is becoming scarce of some of the traditional raw materials due over- exploitation, while the demand is still on the rise. While with advancement in technology, it is becoming increasingly possible for man to work at sea and exploit the unlimited resources it offers. Parallel with this increase in the access and demand of marine resources goes, of course, an increase in their strategic significance80. The conflicts over the use of ocean space that mark the new era of ocean politics arise principally from two developments: first, an explosion of technological advances in exploiting fish, petroleum, and minerals in ocean space; and second, the rising influence of developing countries in asserting their claim to the benefits of such exploitation81. The UNCLOS has given a large area of the seas under the jurisdiction of coastal states to exploit and reap its benefits. However, mere claims and resolutions do not guarantee protection of a nation’s interests. A coastal state requires a potent military force to be able to protect its interests and deter intrusion.

Notwithstanding the above, the realm of a naval force extends much beyond mere protection of maritime interests. Their unique composition and special characteristics set them apart from both, the land and air forces. Hence modern naval forces are used as military as well as political instruments in support of national policies. Naval presence is used to provide a regional stabilizing influence, foster strong alliances, and encourage multinational friendships. Development of new weapons, the capability to strike beyond just the coastal areas, and the

80 Erik Moberg, “The Protection of Resources”, in Jonathan Alfred, op.cit., 19. 81 Robert E. Osgood, “Military Implications of the New Ocean Politics”, Ibid., 12. 59 second strike capability, has increased the importance of navies manifold. A naval force can be engaged or disengaged easily without fear of unintended escalation. By being on the high seas or in foreign ports a navy can convey threats, provide reassurances, or earn prestige in a way that troops or aircraft in their home bases cannot do. Naval forces operate in an international medium and can reach and operate around the globe, besides having the capacity to sustain themselves for longer periods.

The Navy remains at the core of a country’s military preparedness and war-fighting proficiency. As a team, operating at sea and in the world's littorals, naval forces are able to shift their focus, in no time, from passive, low-profile, forward deployed operations to high-tempo crisis response. In this environment, the naval forces are expeditionary in character, a force whose readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility is capable of deterring and, if necessary, winning regional battles, resolving crises, or serving as a vital component of joint task forces, to protect national interests. It is, therefore, considered a vital element of not only the maritime power but that of the national power.

CHAPTER THREE

APPLICATION OF ELEMENTS OF MARITIME POWER TO PAKISTAN

Pakistan has a land area of 796,096 sq km and a population of more than 180 million82. It is situated in the north-west part of the Indian Ocean. The country has an extensive coastline stretching to about 960 km, from Sir Creek to the Iranian border near Jiwani, and has a large EEZ of about 240,000 sq km. With the extension of the continental shelf, the maritime zone of Pakistan extends up to 350 nm from the coastline giving it an additional 50,000 sq km83. It is a vast area with high economic potential. Pakistanis are a very fortunate nation to be located on the Arabian Sea. This is an area which has always intrigued scientists and academics. Besides its much known and publicized geo-political importance, the waters are highly productive, having much room for future exploitation of its marine resources. It is remarkably rich, almost twice as high in bio-diversity, abundance and productivity as the world’s other oceans. Its deep waters are high in nitrates and its sediments rich in organic carbon. Its unique upwelling is quite different from those in other areas of the world. The coastal area of Pakistan, with its unique mosaic of rivers, estuaries and mangroves, has also attracted marine researchers and biologists. It has the Indus River, the world’s sixth largest, which flows 2900 km to join the Arabian Sea. Its magnificent delta, once 2600 sq km, has now dwindled to a mere 260 sq km (due to reservoirs, irrigation channels and other man-made structures). The delta includes the fifth largest single mangrove area in the world84. Pakistan, as a maritime nation, is heavily dependent on sea and its resources. In the current global scenario, when the market forces have come to determine the standing of any state based on its economic strength, Pakistan with its dwindling land resources is compelled to focus on exploitation of its sea resources, both living and non-living. Following paragraphs present a brief overview of Pakistan’s maritime sector, discussing each element of

82 According to the last census held in 1998, Pakistan’s population was 132.5 million. Results of current census, in progress, are likely to be published in 2013. However, as per UNDP and independent estimates, the population of the country has exceeded 180 million. 83The Nation (Islamabad), May 07, 2009. Issue of extension of Continental Shelf was submitted in UN in May 2009. The UN has principally approved the case, subject to resolution of boundary issues with India and Oman. 84 Preface to the Proceedings of the Conference on the Arabian Sea: Living Marine Resources & the Environment, (Karachi: National Institute of Oceanography, June 1993). 61 maritime power; in order to understand its importance, highlight its present status and contribution towards national security.

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ)

Since the industrial revolution, the use of the earth’s resources has increased manifold and the usage of both metallic and non-metallic minerals for the benefit of mankind are increasing in all spheres of our life. The ground resources are depleting at a very fast rate against a rising demand, making it very difficult for the land based supply to meet the future requirement. During the last three decades, the geological studies of the oceans using state of the art technology have proved great economic value of the offshore areas. The seabed resources are enormous and can fulfill the future needs of expanding industries. Contributions of international scientific expeditions revealed the geological significance of Arabian Sea and brought to light important discoveries of resource potentials. Findings of national and international research, in respect of resource exploration in Pakistan’s EEZ (despite obvious inadequacy of research facilities) are very promising85.

The continental margin and sea floor of the North Arabian Sea represents all important geological features common in other oceanic regions and may have good prospects of non-living resources. The origin and nature of the geological features and processes suggest that the marine geological environment is favourable for the formation and accumulation of mineral resources. The continental margin and sea-floor of the Arabian Sea are covered by thick sediments and contain wide variety of minerals. The presence of rich organic sediments also indicates a potential source for hydrocarbons86.

As mentioned earlier, the EEZ of Pakistan encompasses an area approximately 240,000 sq km, consisting of three distinct and diversified geological regions namely: the Makran offshore; The Indus offshore; and the Murray Ridge, a prominent tectonic feature at the possible plate boundary between Indian and Arabian plates. Makran coastal zone extends from the Hub

85 Ali Tabrez, Director General National Institute of Oceanography, in discussion with the author, Karachi, March 05, 2012. 86 Ather Ali Khan et al, “Non-Living Marine Resource Prospects of Pakistan Exclusive Economic Zone”, in Proceedings of the Regional Seminar on Utilization of Marine Resources, (Karachi: National Institute of Oceanography, 2004), 201-202. 62

River to Iranian border and is about 772 km long. The entire shelf area of this region comes to about 1,95,300 sq km. The bottom is generally rocky and shelf is uneven. The region is characterized by a number of bays such as Sonmiani, Ormara, Kalmat, Pasni, Gwadar and Jiwani. Indus offshore is 348 km long and extends from Pakistan-Indian border to Hub River. The bottom is generally sandy or sandy cum muddy. The shelf area is about 35,740 sq km. This area especially in the Indus delta region extends up to 80 miles (128.75km) from the coastline. The region unlike Makran is characterized by a network of creeks having mangroves that serve as nursery ground for finfish and shellfish resources.87

Figure-4.1 Exclusive Economic Zone of Pakistan

Pakistan’s coastal areas including its EEZ have distinctive oceanic phenomena and features that should theoretically be capable of producing rich fisheries, minerals, and oil and gas resources. However, it requires extensive survey, data collection and research to understand the processes and features which affect the location of living and non-living marine resources and their sustainable development and conservation. The current scientific knowledge about the EEZ

87 Ibid. 63 is inadequate and limited from the resource point of view, as no serious attention has been paid so far in this respect. Efforts to survey living and non-living marine resources started as early as 1948 by commissioning specialized research vessels or using foreign vessels as part of some international collaboration programme. However, these efforts were discontinued in 1990 when the two research vessels Machhera and Tehkik were decommissioned88. After that there was a gap of over 20 years before another survey project was undertaken in November 2010, with technical assistance from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and financial and technical assistance from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Institute of Marine Research, Bergen, Norway89. This discontinuity negatively affected knowledge of and the potential to exploit marine resources.

MARINE RESOURCES OF PAKISTAN

The coastal zone and EEZ of Pakistan has a large potential of both living and non-living resources which have not yet been fully explored and exploited. With the exception of fisheries and forestry resources other resource potential such as energy, mineral, water, petroleum, tourism etc have been scarcely utilized90. Marine resources can generally be divided into living and non-living resources. The living resources, which particularly include the fish, are further divided into Nektons and Benthos.

The nekton consists of animals that can swim freely in the sea and include fish, squids, and marine mammals. Fish rank among the most important animals of the nekton. The benthos are marine organisms living on or near the sea floor. Animals of the benthos may burrow in the ocean floor, attach themselves to the bottom, or crawl or swim about within the bottom waters. The benthos includes plants and plantlike organisms, such as kelp and sea grass, that become anchored to the bottom. Among the common benthos animals are crabs, lobsters, clams, starfish, and several types of worms91. Pakistan is bestowed with rich living and non-living coastal marine

88 Qamar Raza and Muhammad Wasim, “Marine Fisheries Resources and their Sustainable Development”, in Proceedings of the Regional Seminar on Utilization of Marine Resources, op.cit., 94. 89 Paul Fanning, et al, “Surveys of the Offshore Fisheries Resources of Pakistan-2010”, (Karachi: United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization, 2011), FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1065. 90 Niaz Rizvi et al, “Marine Resource Potential of the Coastal Zone and their Exploitation Levels in Pakistan”, in Proceedings of the Regional Seminar on Utilization of Marine Resources, op.cit., 91. 91 Khalid Amin Cdre et al, Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone: Prospects and Challenges, Group Research Paper, (Islamabad: National Defence University, 2006), 14. 64 resources that include minerals, gas hydrates and untapped marine living resources. While there are evidences of huge resources, both living and non-living within the EEZ of Pakistan, the real challenge is to fully explore, exploit, and safeguard both tapped and untapped maritime resources and interests.

Nektons and Benthos 144

zooplankton Phytoplankton Copepod Nektons

Seal Anchovies

Shallow Benthos Sperm whale Benthos

Squid

Octopus Gulper eel

Deep Benthos Sea Lilies

Figure 4.2 Marine Living Resources

MARINE FISHERIES

The marine fisheries industry of Pakistan started virtually from scratch at the time of Pakistan’s independence in 1947. It was then based entirely on a small scale fishery. The country inherited only one rundown fish trawler as its share of resources of the fisheries industry of the subcontinent. Therefore, for quite some time all fishing was done with small boats and cotton nets. There was no fish harbour and no fish processing plants. However, Sind had a Department of Fisheries, which controlled the affairs of both, fresh water and marine fisheries until 1951, when it was renamed as the Central Marine Fisheries Department. First fish harbour was constructed at Karachi in 1958. Subsequently, the fishing fleet grew considerably and was mechanized to a fair extent over time. The total fish production of Pakistan in 1947 was close to 65

33000 tons92 which has reached 539,690 tons (marine 64%, inland 36%). The marine fishery industry of Pakistan is basically an export oriented industry and marine shrimps are the most valuable export commodity. For canning of shrimps 11 plants were installed, but due to negligence of the government all the plants closed one by one. Pakistan exported substantial quantity of canned products in the 70s, however, the quantity declined substantially in the 80s and since the year 2000 we have not been able to export canned products93. Fish processing plants have the capacity to process only 20% of the total catch, the rest is dried locally. The status of fisheries according to the latest figures available with the Marine Fisheries Department is as under94:

Status Of Fisheries

Total Fish Production 539,690 m tons

Marine 346,442 m tons Inland 193,248 m tons Aquaculture share in inland production 45%

Export quantity 115,450 m tons

The contribution of fisheries to the economy of Pakistan is as follows:

GDP 1%

Contribution to Agricultural GDP 4%

Contribution to Labour force 1%

Total Value of fish production Rs 50 billion

Export Earnings US $ 230 million (Rs 20 billion)

Source of livelihood for

Fishing 400,000 persons

Ancillary Industries 600,000 persons

92 Qureshi, M. R., 1961 quoted in Muzammil Ahmed, Marine Fisheries of Pakistan (Karachi: Centre of Excellence in Marine Biology, University of Karachi, 1985), 1. 93 Handbook of Fisheries Statistics, (Karachi: Marine Fisheries Department, 2009), 75. The canning plants were designed for small size shrimps, but gradually closed down for not being cost effective. 94 Data received from DG Marine Fisheries Department (MFD), April 01, 2012. 66

Per capita consumption 1.8 kg (World per capita consumption is 16 kg).

Marine Fishing Zones

Figure 4.3 Marine Fishing Zones

For the purpose of exploitation of marine resources, the government of Pakistan has earmarked three zones called the Marine Fishing Zones:95:

Zone I Provincial Jurisdiction: (0 -12 n miles) Reserved for traditional small scale fishermen of Sind and Balochistan.

Zone II Federal Jurisdiction: (12- 20 n miles) Exploited by medium sized trawlers from 100- 250 Registered Tonnage. No restriction on fishing by traditional small scale fishermen

Zone III Federal Jurisdiction: (20- 200 n miles) Exploited through bigger vessels, stern trawlers, and tuna long liners from 300-500 Registered Tonnage. No restriction on fishing by traditional small scale fishermen. (to be revised on acceptance of continental shelf).

The size of the fishery resources within the country's EEZ is relatively unknown.96 The results of fishing surveys indicate the presence of untapped demersal and pelagic fish stocks

95 Shaukat Hussain, DG Marine Fisheries Department, in discussion with the author,Karachi, March 5, 2012). 67 beyond the range of traditional grounds. Major fishing activity in our waters is carried out in the coastal waters stretching from Hub River to Sir Creek and Makran coast west of Karachi to the Iranian border along the coast. Fishing grounds for large pelagic species, tuna, mackerel, mullet, silver wittings and other small sized demersal fishes are located in these waters. However, little effort is undertaken in the EEZ to catch nekton and benthos. The estimated resource potential of fisheries in Pakistan’s EEZ is as given in the table below97.

Biomass Max Sustainable Landings Incremental Yield (2003) Potential

Small Pelagic 700,000 235,000 216,000 19,000

Large Pelagic 88,000 60,000 46,000 14,000

Demersals 500,000 235,000 216,000 19,000

Shellfish 171000 47,500 37,300 10,200

Meso-pelagics 10,000,000 5,000,000 - 5,000,000

Total 11,407,300 5,717,600 566,200 5,151,400

Table 4.1 Resource Potential of Fisheries

Since independence Pakistan has lacked considerably in fish harbours and fish landing jetties. Consequently, its fishing boats have remained small in size since it is easy to pull smaller boats on the fish-landing beaches for berthing98. However, due to their smaller size and lacking modern techniques these boats are limited to shallow waters and fair weather operations. Hence, the EEZ of Pakistan mostly remains unexplored by the local fishermen. Foreign deep-sea trawlers have taken advantage of this handicap and enjoyed fishing in Pakistani waters (legally as well as illegally) unchallenged by the local fleet. The first Deep Sea Fishing Policy was promulgated in 1989 to encourage fishing in the EEZ by Pakistani flag vessels under “Pay As

96 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Coastal Environmental Management Plan for Pakistan, (New York: United Nations, 1996), 105-124. 97 Khalid Amin et al, op.cit., 17. However, the figures seem overoptimistic. 98 Muzammil Ahmed, op.cit., 10-11. 68

You Earn” (PAYE) Scheme, for the period of 5 years. However, the local private sector could not establish their own deep sea fishing fleet, and the government allowed foreign vessels under licensing arrangements in collaboration with Pakistani companies99.

The graph below shows the contribution of fishing done in Pakistan’s EEZ as compared to total marine fish caught in the country. Unfortunately, the share of EEZ fisheries is only 1%.

Percentage composition in Marine sector

EEZ 1% Baloch. 32%

Sindh 67%

Figure 4.4 Comparison of Contribution of EEZ

Major fish landing centres of Pakistan include the following100:

Karachi fish harbour

Pasni fish harbour

Gwadar fish harbour and mini port

Ibrahim Hayderi landing jetty

Gaddani fish harbour

Damb (Sonmiani) fish harbour

In Pakistan the knowledge of the art of fishing is transmitted from father to son. Despite a lack of formal fisheries education, Pakistani fishermen are skilful and know their trade well. Some affairs of the marine fisheries industry are managed by the Fishermen’s Cooperative

99 Data received from DG MFD, op.cit. 100 Hamid Badr, MFD, in discussion with the author, Karachi, March 5, 2012). 69

Society, Karachi (FCSK) which has been established since 1945. The FCSK remains the most active fishermen’s organization in Pakistan. The fishermen belonging to the FCSK are considered financially better-off and enjoy better privileges. The government had exempted the members of the society from the payment of custom duty and sales tax on articles used in fishing. Even income from fishing has been exempted from tax. These incentives have helped the society to import duty free fishing gear, boat engines and other items used in the industry. For these reasons many fishermen from other areas have migrated to Karachi in search of better living101.

Management of Fisheries

Federal government is responsible for policy making at the national level as well as international coordination. The functions of the federal government are looked after by the Fisheries Development Commissioner who sits in the Ministry of Ports and Shipping and the Marine Fisheries Department at Karachi. The federal government is responsible for management of fisheries and other living resources beyond territorial waters, import/export of fish and fisheries products, management of federal harbours and research and training. Inland fisheries including fishing in territorial waters and aquaculture, domestic marketing, management of provincial fish harbours etc is the responsibility of provincial governments102.

MANGROVES

Another very important living resource is the mangroves. Mangroves are collection of woody plants and associated fauna and flora that utilize coastal, saline, depositional environment. About 260 kilometers of Indus Delta, between Sir Creek in the east and Karachi in the west, is covered with about 260,000 hectares of mangrove forest, rated as the largest arid climate mangrove forest in the world. It is the fifth largest single mangrove area in the world; and second in the sub-continent. There are eight mangrove species in the Indus River delta region and five in the Makran coast. Mangrove forests on the Makran coast (7340 hectares) are restricted to three main sites namely Miani Hor, Kalmat Khor and Gwatar Bay. There are no Mangroves in the Hub delta103.

101 For Details See, Muzammil Ahmed, op.cit., 5-9. 102 Shaukat Hussain, op.cit. 103 UN Commission, op.cit., 86-96. 70

There are several kinds of direct utilization of mangroves in the world. In some countries, the local economy is based on the annual yields of products taken from the mangrove ecosystem. In Pakistan, mangrove use is largely restricted to fuel and fodder. According to an estimate, the coastal inhabitants of Pakistan use 18,000 tons of wood annually, costing Rs. 20 million as an energy source. Mangroves are also used for animal grazing and stall-feeding along our coastal areas. The coastal dwellers number about 125,000 individuals in the Indus Delta region and most of them rear camels and cattle including buffalos and goats which either graze or are stall-fed on mangrove foliage. The camels number 16,000 in the area while as many as 11,000 buffalos, sheep and goats utilize approximately Rs. 3 million worth of fodder104. Mangroves are the lifeline for the fishermen and their cattle along our coastline.

158

Figure 4.5 Mangrove Forest found on Pakistan’s Coast

Mangrove cover in Pakistan has decreased over the years due arbitrary and indiscriminate exploitation of the mangrove trees for energy and fodder and because of the deterioration of the environment owing to decreased alluvial flow, hyper salinity, pollution, soil erosion, and dredging. Mangroves thrive on continuous supply of fresh river water but construction of dams has decreased the discharge of fresh water. In addition, silt and clay deposits elevate land and the mangrove plants have limited access to tidal water, the plants thus become retarded and the

104 S. M. Saifullah, “Utilization of Mangrove Resources in Pakistan”, in Utilization of Marine Resources, op.cit., 148-149. 71 forests deteriorate. The mangrove forests of the Indus delta are under stress due to changing levels of water and sediment discharge from the Indus and the increasing influence of marine hydrological processes105.

SEAWEEDS

The name seaweed incorrectly implies that these organisms have little value. Due to their chemical properties and nutritional value, seaweeds have been successfully utilized by countries world over as food, fodder, and fertilizer. Many types of seaweed are rich in vitamins and minerals and are eaten in many parts of the world. Seaweeds also have many industrial uses, particularly in Pharmaceutical and Cosmetics.

The survey of seaweed resources in Pakistan’s coastal area has not been done comprehensively106. Seaweeds found in Pakistan are green, brown and red, grown mostly in the inter-tidal and sub-tidal areas. Green seaweed constitutes 52% of total biomass, brown seaweed 40% and red seaweed 8%107.

Figure 4.6 Types of Seaweeds found in Pakistan

105 Snedaker, S. C., “Mangroves: A Summary of Knowledge with emphasis on Pakistan,” Marine Geology and Oceanography of Arabian Sea and Coastal Pakistan, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1984) quoted in Khalid Amin et al., op.cit., 21. 106 Hina Saeed et al., “Sea weed Resources of Pakistan”, in Utilization of Marine Resources, op.cit., 159-165. 107 Khalid Amin et al., op.cit., 24. 72

Sea weeds have great export potential for Pakistan. World’s total yearly harvest is 8.4 million tons of green seaweed, 2.8 million tons of brown seaweed and 1.2 million ton of red seaweeds. Because of their nutritional value - high calcium content, 50% more Vitamin C than orange, and low calorie count - they are very popular in West as natural medicine. As a source of “superior” food, seaweeds are in high demand in Far Eastern countries. Extensive use of seaweeds in cosmetics (France uses 5,000 tons annually) and their increasing use in pharmaceutical industry provide great opportunities of export108.

MARINE MINERAL RESOURCES

As for as marine mineral resources are concerned, little data is available on the potential of non-living resources in Pakistan’s maritime zone. However, geological features of continental margin and the sea floor of the North Arabian Sea provide a geologically favourable environment for the formation of mineral resources. Some possible minerals include chromium, titanium, zircon, zinc, copper rich sulphide, manganese and cobalt. Currently, the potential deposits of economically important minerals have not yet been quantified109.

The story of petroleum search is not a lot different from minerals. Pakistan has been slow in realizing the true potential of offshore areas. Exploration began in the Indus delta in 1961. The Sun Oil Company of USA was the first to survey and drill three near-shore wells in Indus region110. Since then merely 16 wells have been drilled of which only four were in the Makran Offshore region. The drillings have been mostly unsuccessful due to non-availability of data and other technical reasons111. However, experts believe that the geology of both the Makran and Indus offshore and discoveries close to these regions is a clear indicator of presence of substantive amounts of oil and gas. Based on per cubic mile yield of analogous producing basins, an offshore potential of 16,650 million barrels of oil or equivalent gas has been estimated112. Concerted efforts are needed to quantify resource potential on a scientific basis.

108 Hina Saeed, op.cit., 164. 109 Ather Ali, op.cit., 201. 110 “Pakistan and Offshore Energy Exploration”, http://viewstonews.com/index.php/pakistan-and-offshore-energy- exploration/pakistan, accessed on April 10, 2012. 111 Sher Muhammad Khan, DG Petroleum Concessions, in discussion with the author, Islamabad, April 09, 2012. 112 “Pakistan and Offshore Energy Exploration”, op.cit. 73

Figure 4.7 Offshore Exploration Map of Pakistan

In the Petroleum Policy 2001 the government introduced a special package for offshore exploration with lucrative incentives, which was further refined in existing petroleum policy 2009 (draft petroleum policy 2012 is being processed at the ministry). The countries offshore undiscovered areas, owing to high geological risks and state of exploration, have been designated as ‘Zone 0’. The zone is further divided on the basis of water depth, for the purpose of varying incentives. Areas under 200 m in depth are Shallow whereas, 200 to 1000 m are considered Deep and beyond 1000 m are designated as Ultra Deep. The offshore zone has further been divided into blocks and designated by grid system for award of petroleum rights113. The diagram on preceding page shows areas earmarked for exploration.

MERCANTILE MARINE

Mercantile marine due to its bulk carrying capacity and low cost of transportation compared to other means, plays an important role in the economic development of a country. Since most of the world trade, both by volume and weight, amounting to more than 7 billion

113 Gul Munir Ghumro, Director Exploration, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Resources, in discussion with the author, Islamabad, April 12, 2012. Also see Petroleum Exploration and Production Policy 2009, 1,2,40. 74 tonnes 114 , is conducted through sea, the need for an efficient mercantile fleet is vital. Advancements in technology have made shipping an increasingly efficient and swift method of transportation. Progressively due to the ever increasing dependence on the sea trade, the littoral states are becoming more conscious of enhancing their mercantile fleet and safety of their Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).

The growth and development of shipping in Pakistan has been erratic, particularly since the nationalization of the industry in 1974. Some of the other factors that contributed to its decline include, ship registration regime, taxation policy, uncertainty, lack of finances, port facilities, lack of entrepreneurial capabilities in the private sector, and lately, security. Moreover, the continental mindset of the rulers has neglected the entire maritime sector and not only the mercantile marine. The state of Pakistan’s mercantile marine in Pakistan can be discussed in different phases, one starting from independence to 1971 war, and the second phase commencing 1971 onwards:

Before 1971

When Pakistan came into existence in 1947, there were only three old ships (an oil tanker and two small cargo ships) which were owned and operated by the private sector. The trade was predominantly inter-zonal, between East and West Pakistan. The two dry cargo ships were inadequate for the heavy demand for movement of food grain, salt, cement and military cargoes 115 . For its entire international trade and most inter-wing trade, Pakistan was solely dependent on foreign shipping. Foreign shipping services were mostly operated by a consortium of European shipping companies, which exercised monopoly on various international trade routes to and from Pakistan. This caused heavy damage to the scarce foreign exchange resources creating public interest in shipping industry. The Government took following measures for promotion of shipping in the country116:

a. Ports of Karachi and Chittagong were declared as ports of registry.

114 According to www.marisec.com the shipping industry transported an estimated 7.7 billion tonnes of cargo in 2008. 115 Sheikh Mohammad Iqbal, The Significance of Shipping, Dawn Oct 17,2004. 116 Iqbal Bajwa, Pakistan Mercantile Marine Neglected Sector- Policy Options for Pakistan, Individual Research Paper, (Islamabad: National Defence University, 2004), 9. 75

b. Control of Shipping Act was invoked to restrict the freedom of movement of foreign ships on the coast.

c. Long term credit on suitable terms was offered to the private entrepreneurs for the acquisition of ships.

d. Fuel oils and lubricants used by the ships were exempted from the levy of the import duties.

f. Training facilities for Seamen and port improvement programs were launched.

The Habib group (Muhammadi Shipping) and the Cowasjee families took the lead by purchasing a few old ships117. These ships were used on the Karachi-Chittagong route carrying domestic cargo. The positive measures of the Government bore fruit and by the end of 1948, the fleet strength rose to 6 ships. The domestic route between East and West Pakistan was controlled by the government under the Shipping Ordinance of 1943. Government control helped the fledgling industry to develop without having to compete with better organized foreign shipping services. To meet additional requirements the government resorted to chartering ships. Several new companies were established and fleet strength rose to 22 ships by 1952. During these years the government gave full support to the private sector to develop the merchant fleet. As the private sector gained ship owning and operating experience on the domestic route, they began operating on international routes from 1952 onwards. A consortium of Pakistani ship owners was formed and became known as Pakistan Shipping Lines. By the end of 1960, Pakistani ship owners were running 30 ships on domestic as well as international routes. Despite this considerable progress, the national fleet could only handle less than 10% of Pakistan’s international sea-borne trade. In 1960 Pakistan spent in the region of 50 crores of rupees in foreign exchange on freight118.

Pakistan’s economic development beginning in the 1960s forced the government to review its policies towards modernizing and strengthening the maritime sector. One of the important first steps was to establish Directorate General of Ports and Shipping, under Ministry of Communication, tasked to formulate policies for the maritime sector and exercise executive

117 Iftikhar Malik, Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, e-mail message to author, May 2012. 118 Haroon Ibin Ali, Uncharted Waters: A Journey Through Living History, (London: Avon Books,1998), 155. 76 function. As a result, Pakistan’s first Shipping Policy was promulgated in 1962, which underscored following objectives for the development of the merchant marine:

a. Entire coastal trade to be carried by own fleet.

b. 40 % of external trade to be carried in own ships.

c. Operation and owning of ships by Pakistani citizens to be encouraged (ships procured to be suitable to serve as naval auxiliaries in emergencies).

To achieve the objectives set forth in the Shipping Policy, National Shipping Corporation (NSC) was established in the public sector in 1962, with a capital of Rs 5 crores, and following incentives were offered to the shipping sector119:

a. Cash down credit facilities.

b. Increased bonus voucher entitlements on foreign exchange earned.

c. POL to be free of all duties.

d. Replacement of ships to be allowed.

The corporation was charged with building a modern, technologically sound fleet and with providing competition to the private sector, thereby improving the quality of services provided by their fleets. NSC started its operations by acquiring one ship and rapidly expanded its fleet to 32 ships by 1971, through acquiring new as well as second hand modern ships. The growth in NSC's fleet also provided a stimulus to private ship owners and they replaced their old ships with relatively new ships. The total strength of Pakistan's merchant fleet, including that of the private sector rose to 71 ships in 1971. This fleet comprised 63 dry cargo ships and 8 passenger-cum cargo ships120.

Meanwhile, RCD Shipping Services commenced operations in July 1966 and Pakistani ships formed the backbone of these operations. Pakistan’s emerging relationship with mainland China opened up new vistas of opportunity for both, the air transport and the sea transport. Pakistan International Airlines became the first international airlines to commence operations between Pakistan and China. Similarly, some of the ships in the private sector were also

119 Ibid., 158. 120 S. M. Obaidullah, e-mail message to author, May 2012 and Iqbal Bajwa, op.cit., 10. 77 chartered by the Chinese government for carriage of their cargoes, especially to Cuba. If this arrangement had continued, it would have earned substantial foreign exchange for Pakistan and given further boost to the shipping industry. However, under the US pressure the government had to ask the ship owners to pull out from this route. A maritime agreement was also signed with Indonesia to promote economic relations between the two countries. The agreement envisaged pulling cargoes on certain routes, use of each other’s maintenance, repair and other port facilities121.

After 1971

During the 1971 crises a number of ships were lost. Furthermore, the elimination of trade between the two wings and weakening of the Conference protection saw a decline in Pakistan’s shipping. In January 1974, the Government, in line with its over-all economic policy, nationalized all shipping in Pakistan. The National Shipping Corporation had 25 ships at the time of nationalization122. The shipping in the private sector were taken over by the government and merged into the Pakistan Shipping Corporation (PSC) in 1976. With the creation of PSC the whole shipping industry in Pakistan came in the public sector. NSC and PSC worked in parallel till 1979, when the Government of Pakistan merged NSC and PSC and formed the "Pakistan National Shipping Corporation" (PNSC).

NUMBER OF SHIPS WITH DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE AT THE TIME OF MERGER OF NSC & PSC IN 1979123

DEAD S. NO. OF NAME OF COMPANY WEIGHT SHIPS NO. TONNAGE

PAKISTAN SHIPPING CORPORATION (PSC)

1. M/S PAKISTAN SHIPPING LINES LTD. 2 25,280

* 2. M/S PAN ISLAMIC STEAMSHIP CO. LTD. 6 64,390

3. M/S MUHAMMADI STEAMSHIP CO. LTD. 5 68,100

121 Haroon Ibin Ali, op.cit., 165. 122 Mohammad Iqbal, op.cit. 123 Anwar Shah and Iftikhar Malik, e-mail messages to author, May 2012. 78

4. M/S UNITED ORIENTAL STEAMSHIP CO. LTD. 3 41,252

5. M/S TRANS OCEANIC STEAMSHIP CO. LTD. 3 42,050

6. M/S EAST WEST STEAMSHIP CO. LTD. 2 24,689

7. M/S GULF STEAMSHIP CO. LTD. 1 14,940

8. M/S CRESCENT SHIPPING CO. LTD. 1 5,772

9. M/S CHITTAGONG STEAMSHIP CORPORATION. 1 14,975

TOTAL: 24 301,448

NATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION (NSC) 24 281,836

GRAND TOTAL (NSC+PSC): 48 583,284

Table 4.2 (* M/s Pan Islamic Steamship Co. Ltd., was later denationalized in 1980).

PNSC mainly handled shipments of general cargo. To generate capability for shipments of liquid cargo imported by Pakistan, PNSC in collaboration with the State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation Limited (PERAC) established the National Tanker Company (NTC) in 1981 as a joint venture for transportation of crude oil and petroleum products. PNSC was, however, not able to keep pace with the competitive environment or the technology. The management remained weak and the corporation continued to decline steadily124.

Current Situation

Pakistan has been an agricultural country and is in the process of developing its industrial base. Every year it imports, through sea, significant quantities of industrial raw material, machinery and equipment and various other essential commodities. The export commodities include cotton and cotton products, rice, leather goods, carpets, fish and fish preparations etc. Pakistan relies on sea transportation for over 90% of its imports and exports. It includes imports of over 35% of raw material for capital and commercial products and about 60% of oil125. Pakistan’s total seaborne trade is about 80 m tones, of which less than 10% is carried by Pakistani flag vessels. Pakistan is, therefore, incurring huge expenditure on freight charges

124 Bajwa, op.cit., 10. 125 Masood Alam, “Decline of Investment in Ports and Shipping by Pakistan Entrepreneurs”, Mariner, (June 2000), 38. 79 annually (approx US $ 4b126). However, most of its crude oil is carried by own flag vessels which is strategically very important.

The situation for Pakistan has become very grim, because shipping sector has remained neglected for too long There has been no particular development in the shipping sector since long, except that private sector was allowed to participate in shipping through deregulation in 1992127. A total of 36 licenses were issued out of which only four private companies i.e M/S Millwala, M/S Ray Enterprises, Dewan and Tri-Star shipping companies engaged in Marine trade by bringing in 09 ships. However, in a span of 10 years all these ships were phased out and never replaced128. Let’s see what happened to the fleet after the inception of Pakistan National Shipping Corporation.

Pakistan National Shipping Corporation

At its inception in 1979, PNSC had received 48 ships (tonnage 565,360) from its predecessors. Majority of these were old and uneconomical and had to be phased out. However, 14 new ships were purchased in 1979-80, in one go129. The PNSC did not acquire any further tonnage until 1995-96. During the intervening period, almost all the old ships were scraped. Presently PNSC is operating with only nine vessels including three tankers. Some of the vessels owned by PNSC have aged and are incurring heavy maintenance expenditures every year.

The rapid changes taking place in the maritime world such as stringent and demanding control on ships operations and trade have been enforced by International Maritime Organisation (IMO); containerization and bulk shipping is also becoming the trend. The Corporation unfortunately failed to maintain a dynamic profile. This state initially resulted in stagnation and then finally degradation. However, after the promulgation of Mercantile Policy and Shipping Ordinance 2001, the situation improved and some new ships including three tankers

126 Anwar Shah, former DG Ports & Shipping, e-mail message to author, May 2012, and Shakil Naz, GM (Submarine Construction) Karachi Shipyard & Engg Works Ltd, presentation to Maritime Industry Task Force, (Dec 2009). 127 Rahat Qaseem, “Decline of Shipping in Port and Shipping Sector by Pakistan Entrepreneur”, PIMA Magazine, (June 2000). 128 Iftikhar Malik, op.cit. 129 S. T. H. Naqvi, Chairman PNSC, “Role & Development of PNSC”, Paper presented at PN War College (Karachi: October 10, 2003). 80 were inducted in 2003 and onwards. PNSC also has plans to induct three bulk carriers, two tankers and an LNG carrier by 2014130.

S No. NAME TYPE TONNAGE ACQUISITION YEAR BUILT

MV 1. Combination 18,204 15-03-1983 ISLAMABAD 1983

2. BC KAGHAN Bulk 65,716 10-01-2006 1986

3. MT QUETTA Tanker 107,215 10-07-2008 2003

4. MT LAHORE Tanker 107,215 23-02-2010 2003

5. MT KARACHI Tanker 107,215 21-04-2010 2003

6. BC CHITRAL Bulk 46,710 25-10-2010 2003

7. BC MALAKAND Bulk 76,830 27-12-2010 2004

BC 8. Bulk 52,951 21-04-2011 2004 HYDERABAD

9. BC SIBI Bulk 28,442 05-2011 2009

Table 4.3 Present Fleet of PNSC (as on May 04, 2012)

SHIP BUILDING AND REPAIRS

Although Karachi was one of the four major ports of the sub-continent, no shipbuilding or major repair facilities were available here at the time of independence. Therefore in 1952 the Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works Ltd (KS&EW) was undertaken as a project by the then Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and started its commercial operations in 1957. KS&EW constructed the first ocean going vessel MV Al-Abbas in 1968 for Muhammadi Steam Ship, a private shipping company. In 1970 the control of KS&EW was given to the Ports & Shipping Wing under the Ministry of Defence. Later on the wing was transferred to the Ministry of Communications. Its control was transferred back to the Ministry of Defence in

130 Obaidullah, op.cit. 81

1993 131 . KS&EW has three berths, each equipped with cranes and allied facilities where construction of vessels up to 26000 DWT may be undertaken. It has built more than 430 small and large vessels for Pakistan as well as other countries like Belgium, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China Bangladesh and UAE. It has also constructed small crafts for the Pakistan Navy. The KS&EW has two dry docks of 18000 DWT and 26000 DWT capacities each for underwater repairs. For above water repairs it has two long quay walls of 500m and 165m respectively. However, above water repairs for vessels of any size and DWT can be undertaken not only at KSEW premises but also in Karachi harbour and even at the outer anchorage. The shipyard has so far repaired about 5000 ships of which about half were Foreign Flag Vessels132.

Being an organization under Ministry of Defence, KS&EW enjoys support of Pakistan Naval Dockyard in the designing, development and construction of submarines and warships. Pakistan Navy has also been giving regular orders to shipyard to support it. KS&EW is equipped with an ISO-9002 certified laboratory which was the pioneer public sector organization to obtain ISO-9002 certification. It also has a Metallurgy and Testing laboratory and modern foundries and pattern shops. Karachi Shipyard is one of the major industries of the country which has the capacity of undertaking additional engineering works for other than the shipping sector as well 133 . Due to poor management and overall deterioration in the maritime sector, Karachi Shipyard has been in slums for some time. However, Pakistan navy has once again provided succor to the shipyard by giving orders of a Frigate (F 22P), a Fleet Oil Tanker and Fast Attack Crafts (FACs). Nevertheless, this may be a temporary relief; it is important to maintain the facility at par with other shipbuilding/repair yards in the region to attract more customers.

Ship Breaking

Ship breaking industry contributes significantly towards national economy by providing steel & iron for local consumption as well as for export. In 1980s, the ship-breaking industry provided employment to over 30,000 workers, through trade and industries, which used ship scraps as raw material. In 1985-86, the ship-breaking industry helped the country in making an annual saving of Rs 1,500 million, which would otherwise have been spent on import of iron and

131 Azhar Hussain, MD KS&EW, Presentation to Prime Minister, (November 13, 2003). 132 Information retrieved from official website of KS&EW on May 09, 2012. 133 Ibid. 82 steel. It also earned another Rs 500 million in the foreign exchange through the export of surplus ship scrap and second hand machinery. The contribution of ship breaking industry to the national economy has to be acknowledged as even for a comparatively lean year in 1996-97, this industry paid Rs. 4.0 billion in revenues134.

Pakistan's ship-breaking industry had been in a state of coma for the last couple of decades, following discriminatory policies adopted by the past governments. The most contributing factor in the decline of this business has been the rapidly changing tariff structure135. However, as a result of the policy measures adopted by the previous government, including reduction in duty on scrap for ship breaking from 15% to 10%, ship-breaking activities are picking up at a fast pace, which may provide the much-needed breather to this industry, having contributed significantly in the past. The decision by IMO to scrap all the 40,000 single hull tankers by 2015, will certainly give a tremendous boost to this industry. Our present share of ship breaking in international market is just 17%, whereas China's share is 40%, India's 25% and Bangladesh's 18%.

Seamen Employment

Before 1971 large numbers of seamen were employed on our flag carriers as well as on foreign ships of international shipping companies. While working on foreign ships our seamen earned huge amount of foreign exchange and contributed towards economy by sending large amounts to their families136 in Pakistan. With the general decline in Pakistan's shipping industry from 1972 onwards our share in the seafarers supply market has dwindled. We have already lost our share of market to Philippine and India. China after Philippine and India is emerging as the biggest human resource for worldwide ship owning sector. Indian seafarers employed on foreign ships remit over US$ 1 billion to their exchequer. Pakistani seafarers, who brought annually over US$ 70 million, are virtually jobless and today earn only around $25 million annually.

134 Haleem A Siddiqui, Chairman Task Force, Prime Minister Task Force Report on Ports and Shipping, 45. 135 http://www.flickr.com/photos/tree_elf/5422696495/ accessed on April 17, 2012. 136 Intizar Mehdi, “Taxability of Pakistani Seamen Serving Onboard Foreign Flag Ships”, Mariner (June 2000), 18. 83

PORTS AND HARBOURS

Seventy percent of the earth’s surface is covered by the sea and approximately seventy percent of the world’s population lives within 100 miles of coastline and nearly 80% of world’s capitals lie within this belt. It is, therefore, natural that the economy of sea contiguous states revolves around port cities. A seaport is a place where each-way exchanges between land and sea transport regularly take place 137 . Over the period of time, ports have undergone significant transformation. The first generation ports only acted as an interface between land and sea transport and were considered to operate in isolation from trade activities and had limited interaction with surrounding municipalities. The second-generation ports performed a broad range of functions and acted as transport, industrial, and commercial centers. The third generation ports are considered to be a product of global containerization. Ports have become dynamic nodes in the complex international production and distribution network138.

Ports and harbours are considered as important pillars of national power. These contribute towards the economic growth of a country as well as strategic defence needs. Pakistan has about 960 km long coastline on the Arabian Sea spreading from the Indian border to the Persian Gulf. At the time of independence, Pakistan inherited only one deep-water functional port at Karachi in the western half of the country. This port not only catered for the entire sea borne cargo of the country but also provided transit trade facility to land-locked Afghanistan. With the increase in seaborne trade, the need was felt for another port to take some load off the single port at Karachi. The establishment of Pakistan Steel Mills Project in 1970s added additional impetus to this need and finally the construction of a second seaport, Muhammad Bin Qasim, started in mid 1970s. This port was completed and opened to shipping in 1990 and is in operation ever since. At present both of these ports serve 796,096 square kilometers of hinterland as well as offering services for landlocked Afghanistan.

137 James Bird, Seaports and Seaport Terminals (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1971), 13. 138 A. K. C. Beresford et al., “The UNCTAD and WORKPORT Models of Port Development: Evolution or Revolution?” Maritime Policy & Management 31, no.2 (April-June 2004), 94. 84

Karachi Port

The Karachi Port is the principal seaport of Pakistan which handles approximately 75 percent of the entire national trade. It is a deep-sea natural port with 11 km long approach channel to provide safe navigation up to 75,000 DWT tankers, modern container vessels, bulk carriers and general cargo ships. The Port has 30 dry cargo berths including two container terminals and three liquid cargo-handling berths, out of which presently eight are non- operational. The channel is dredged to a depth of 11.6m. Eighty percent of the country’s container traffic is handled at Karachi Port. There are two dedicated container terminals. Karachi International Container Terminal, being operated by Hutchison Port Holdings, handles 300,000 TEU containers per annum. Pakistan International Container Terminal was completed in 2004 with a capacity to handle 350,000 TEU containers per annum. This terminal was constructed on build, operate, transfer basis (BOT) under 21 year implementation agreement between the Karachi Port Trust and Premier Mercantile Services Private Ltd. There are a number of smaller stevedoring companies that handle the remaining container traffic139.

In addition to providing livelihood to millions of people, Karachi Port is a major source of revenue generation. During the fiscal year 2003-04, Karachi Port Trust (KPT) earned Rs 9.27 billion showing an increase of 10 percent over the preceding year’s income of Rs 8.423 billion. The net surplus after meeting the expenditures was Rs 4.258 billion. Total cargo handled in the same period stood at 27.8 million tons and the number of containers handled at the port increased to 824,753140. Keeping in view the port facilities, changes in maritime transport, and future requirements of trade & commerce, the port is being modernized at a total cost of Rs. 5 billion. The projects include construction of oil piers to enhance annual liquid cargo handling capacity to 8 million tons, construction of a circular road, reconstruction/ rehabilitation of berths to handle increasing volume of cargo and additional container terminal141.

139 Raja Rabnawaz, “Maritime Strategy in Pakistan”, Master’s thesis (Monterey: Naval Post Graduate School, 2004), 43 and Abdul Rehman, KPT, e-mail message to author, May 18, 2012. 140 Dawn (Karachi), 29 July 2004. 141 http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/mega/ports.html accessed on February 09, 2012. 85

Port Muhammad Bin Qasim

Port Qasim is Pakistan’s first industrial and multi-purpose deep-sea port situated 52 kilometers south east of Karachi in Indus delta region. The port is well connected to the hinterland through rail and road links. Port Qasim handles the remaining 25 percent of the total cargo and 20 percent of the container traffic. The port has a dedicated container terminal, Qasim International Container Terminal, which is being operated by P&O group of Australia. In addition the port has a dedicated Iron Ore & Coal Berth for exclusive use of Pakistan Steel Mills for handling raw material imports, a specialized oil terminal offering state-of-art facilities to tankers up to 80,000 DWT, and four Multi-purpose berths142. Other than the government-owned steel mills, there are number of major privately owned industrial units being set-up in the port area. The port is situated very close to the Pakistan Steel Mills in an old channel of the Indus River. The approach to the port is through a 45 km long channel dredged for vessels over 11 m draft. Recently, a bulk carrier with a draft of 12.3 m was berthed at one of its terminals, which is the largest-ever cargo ship to enter the port143. The authorities plan to enhance the draft of the navigation channel to accommodate 14m ships. The port is connected with the national railway network and located only 15 km from the National Highway, and only 22 km from Jinnah International Airport144.

Due to their close proximity, both the ports of Karachi and Qasim are commonly referred as a single port complex instead of separate ports, more from the aspect of security rather than commerce. Being very close to the Indian border and almost co-located means the ports (and the entire sea borne trade of Pakistan, thereof) remain very vulnerable to attack in case of a war. The consequences of such an assault on this port complex could be extremely detrimental for Pakistan, both from defence as well as from economic point of view. Although, Port Qasim did take some load off the Karachi port it was realized that this single port complex with all its limitations would not be able to handle the projected increase in trade volume in the coming years; as Pakistan hoped to provide an access to Central Asian trade. Hence, alternative ports were required to provide flexibility in terms of economic as well as military security. While the

142 Rabnawaz, op.cit., 43. 143 The News International (Islamabad), April 15, 2012. 144 http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/mega/ports.html, op.cit. 86 navy opted to establish a base at Ormara, it was decided to build a deep-sea commercial port at Gwadar.

Gwadar Deep Sea Port

Development of the Gwadar Port is a strategic as well as an immediate commercial need to handle national trade. The port offers multi-dimensional advantages and will influence the geo-strategic and politico-military environment in the region. Gwadar is a coastal town on the Makran coast strategically located close to the Persian Gulf overseeing major shipping routes emanating from the Gulf. The advantage of a port at Gwadar was felt long before, however, due to various reasons the project could not be undertaken until March 2002. Some people think Gwadar has the potential to repeat the growth witnessed by Karachi, which turned a small twon of 50,000 people at the time of independence into a metropolis city of 14 million and serves as the economic capital of the country145. Another major benefit to Gwadar city, in particular, and the region in general is the development of socio-economic infrastructure. The government has plans to construct modern healthcare facilities, schools, desalination plants, and improve the transportation sector146. Once developed, Gwadar port would reduce the congestion on existing ports of Karachi and Bin Qasim.

The Gwadar Port Project was planned in two phases with the help of Chinese government. Phase-I comprised three multipurpose berths of 200 meters length each with 350 meters of backup area and related ancillary facilities, a 4.5 km approach channel dredged to accommodate vessels up to 50,000 DWT drawing 11.5 meters drafts, cargo handling equipment and operational crafts. The phase cost Rs.14.9 billion (US $248 million)147 for the construction of berths and ancillary equipment required for port operations. The Chinese government contributed an amount of US $ 198 million for this phase and the rest was provided by the Government of Pakistan. Another $ 39.8m were added later for designing and additional dredging (15.5m outer harbour, 12.5 m inner harbour) of the navigation channel148. China has also invested another US $ 200 million for building Makran Coastal Highway connecting Gwadar port with Karachi.

145 Sheikh Javaid, “Gwadar: The Dream City of South Asia,” Pakistan and Gulf Economist, July 9-15, 2001. 146 Pak Tribune, October 3, 2004, http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=79349. 147 Abdul Raziq Durrani, DG Operations, Gwadar Port Authority, e-mail message to author, February 4, 2013. 148 Ibid. 87

Phase-II envisages the construction of seven additional berths of 300 meters and two oil piers. It will provide facilities to accommodate oil tankers up to 200,000 tons DWT, Bulk Carriers up to 100,000 tons, General Cargo Vessels up to 100,000 tons and fourth generation Container Ships of 15.6 to 20 meters draft. The cost of Phase-II was initially estimated at US $524 million which is later revised to cost $ 932 million, and is proposed to be built on a BOT/BOO basis.

In 2007 the Gwadar Port Phase I was commissioned and its operations handed over to PSA Gwadar Pvt Ltd, under a 40 years Concession Agreement. However, the company failed to fulfill various obligations under the Agreement149. It could not provide envisaged business to the port and failed to invest as per the Agreement. The situation has halted predicted benefits to the country as well as to the local people. In February 2013, the company agreed to sell its stakes to a Chinese company namely China Overseas Port Holding Company.

Ormara Naval Base

Ormara is a small port located on the Makran coastline along the Arabian Sea in Balochistan province of Pakistan. It is located 240 kilometers west of Karachi, and east of coastal village Pasni. Jinnah naval base of Pakistan Navy is also being constructed at Ormara. Ormara also has a small airport for landing of short run aircraft like the Fokker. Ormara is an old coastal town. Its historical routes are linked with Alexander the Great, who stayed here with his army for a few days on his way back from Indus region after conquering the lands of Sindh, Panjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions of modern day Pakistan which he joined to his expanding Hellenic empire, in 325-27 BC. One of his generals "Ormoz" died here and the present day Ormara was named after him. For a few centuries, Ormara remained a battle field between the Baloch Sardars (local feudal) and foreign aggressors. Before independence, it was part of the state of Las Bela and afterward it became part of Makran Division. Being an isolated town, it remained undeveloped, however with the naval presence around, life has taken a positive change for the locals with many local industries and the resultant increase in jobs available for the locals. It has a population of about forty thousand people and still offers a traditional look at how the ancients lived. Most residents make their livelihood from fishing; a few of them also

149 Recommendations of the Maritime Industry Task Force, June 2009, op.cit. 88 work in Middle Eastern countries. Ormara has witnessed considerable growth in recent years especially with the foundation of the Makran Coastal Highway, which integrated the area with the mainstream Pakistani economy and major urban centres allowing for easier transport of goods, commerce and people.

Pasni Fishing Harbour

Pasni is a medium-sized town and a fishing port along the Makran coastline in Balochistan. It is located about 300 km from Karachi. The town houses a modern fish harbour and Port of Pasni, with fishing being the main occupation of the town dwellers. Frozen catch is also sent to Turbat and Karachi for sale in the larger markets. A joint-user airfield is shared by Pakistan Air Force (PAF), Pakistan Navy and civil aviation. PAF as well as PN-Aviation operational facilities are housed nearby. Daily commercial flights link the town with Karachi. In 2008, the government approved the construction of Shadi Kaur storage dam near Pasni, which is expected to alleviate some of the power deficiency of the region. Administratively, Pasni is the headquarters of the Pasni sub-division of Gwadar district that includes Pasni and Ormara Tehsils as well as Astola Island which lies 40km ESE of Pasni, in the Arabian Sea150.

Jiwani Fishing Harbour

Jiwani is a small fishing harbour strategically located astride the shipping lanes to and from the Persian Gulf. This is the main reason that the town hosts a small naval base and an airport with a 5,500-foot runway. Jiwani is located at the eastern end of Gwatar Bay, which is shared between Iran and Pakistan. The area around the bay includes an important mangrove forest extending across the international border, and is an important habitat for a wide variety of wildlife, especially the endangered Olive Ridley and Green Turtles. Being free from pollution, Jiwani is reminiscent of a South Sea island, with vast stretches of sandy beaches. For the same reason, Jiwani is rich in biodiversity. WWF-Pakistan has established Jiwani Conservation and Information Centre (JCIC). The aim is to contribute towards the conservation of biodiversity in the area, through information dissemination.

150 Babar Bilal, Pakistan’s Maritime Assets, Individual Research Paper (Islamabad: National Defence University, 2006), 10. 89

Jiwani has been used in World War II as an Allied Air base and remains of the base are available near the village. Visiting the barracks area of the base used during World War II reveals many handwritten small stories and name of Allied pilots. It is also claimed that Queen Victoria planned to visit the area to watch sunset and a hut which is now known as "Victoria Hut" was built for this purpose. Victoria hut is still being maintained by Pakistan Coast Guards151.

COMBATANT NAVAL FORCE

Pakistan Navy

One of the many daunting tasks involved in the separation of India and Pakistan included division of assets of the Armed Forces. An Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee (AFRC) was formed under Field Marshall Claude Auchinleck, then Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Indian Army152. Three different sub-committees were set up under the AFRC for each service. The naval sub-committee was headed by Commodore J.W. Jefford (the first C-in-C of the Royal Pakistan Navy) and comprised prospective officers from both the navies. After deliberations by the sub-committee the final distribution of naval assets was more than 2:1 in favour of India153. Out of the 49 sea going units of various sizes 33 (four sloops, two frigates, twelve minesweepers, one corvette, one survey vessel, four trawlers, four motor minesweepers, one motor launch, and four Harbour Defence Motor Launches) were allotted to India and the remainder to Pakistan (two sloops, two frigates, two trawlers, four minesweepers, two motor minesweepers, and four Harbour Defence Motor Launches). In addition, all available landing crafts were allotted to Indian Navy (exact number of these landing craft is not known, however, these craft were later used to land troops and occupy the princely state of Junagadh which had acceded to Pakistan154). The ship repair and maintenance facilities were mostly concentrated in the Indian ports of Bombay and Calcutta. The infra-structure at Karachi was almost non-existent and there was

151 http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/mega/ports.html, accessed on February 9, 2012. 152 Ibin Ali, op.cit., 56. Also see PN History Cell, Story of Pakistan Navy (1947-1972), (Karachi: Elite Publishers,1991), 48. 153 Anonymous, Sentinels of the Sea: The Pakistan Navy PR Directorate, Naval Headquarters, (1947-1997), (Islamabad: Barqsons, 1997), 11. 154 Ibin Ali op.cit., 56,58. 90 severe shortage of men (180 officers and 3400 ratings155) and material. With the creation of Pakistan came the birth of the Royal Pakistan Navy.

The structuring of Pakistan Navy was a challenging task. It has been the most neglected of the three services since its inception. The service was initially commanded by a British officer, Rear Admiral J W Jefford till February 1953156, when the first Pakistani C-in-C Rear Admiral HMS Choudry took over reigns of the service. A number of other British officers also continued to serve in various capacities and contributed in the initial set up. The navy retained the prefix ‘Royal’ till 1956 when the country was proclaimed a Republic.

For a country like Pakistan with a vast coastline and two coastal components separated by three thousand miles157 of sea, a strong and efficient navy was an obvious choice. However, unfortunately, the rulers failed to see the importance of the navy. The navy did make some progress in the mid 1950s by contracting some major surface ships from Britain. However, the military take-over by General Ayub Khan spelled disaster for the service. The General failed to understand the importance of the navy and started creating problems for the service. Due to the General’s “unwise and uncalled for interventions”, the first Pakistani C-in-C, Admiral Choudhry had to resign his post in 1959158. The notion, “the defence of East Pakistan lies in the defence of West Pakistan”, and subsequent neglect in strengthening the navy, cost the country dearly during 1971 debacle159. However, even after losing half the country the lesson was not learnt and we continued to neglect this important service. The reasons for continental mind-set can be attributed to the physical shape of the country, history of invasions through land, the animosity with India and, of course, the preponderance of Army in decision making 160. This mindset continued to be strengthened because of successive wars with India and developments in Afghanistan.

The navy, however, continued to evolve as a professional and proficient service due to the unrelenting efforts of its pioneering officers and men. It started with makeshift arrangements, but

155 Sentinels, op.cit., 77. 156 Story of Pakistan Navy, op.cit., 59&164. 157 Ibid., 161. 158 Sentinels, op.cit., 18 159 Cheema, op.cit., 2. 160 Ibid., 181. 91 soon became a force to be reckoned with. With the Induction of an ex-US Tench Class submarine (named PNS Ghazi) in June 1964, it became the only service, after that of Indonesia, to operate a submarine in the Indian Ocean region161. The induction of a submarine added a new dimension to the concept of warfare in the Pak-India context and arrived just in time to play a crucial role in the forthcoming conflict.

Pakistan Navy saw combat for the first time in 1965. Notwithstanding the lack of government support mentioned above, the navy proved ready and worthy of the tasks assigned. The enterprising deployment of its only submarine outside Bombay harbour effectively blockaded the Indian fleet and allowed the Pakistan Navy to undertake another daring mission- bombardment of Dwarka and destroying radar and radio beacon facilities which were assisting the Indian aircrafts in attacking land targets in Pakistan. Despite its brilliant performance in the war, the navy could not draw the ruler’s attention and continued to receive lower priority. This negligence resulted in degeneration and shrinking of its fleet. While India, learning from the experience of 1965, spent heftily on the navy. Resultantly, when war broke out again in 1971, the navy was not in a position to protect its maritime interests spread over a vast area between the two wings.

Ironically, the loss of the eastern wing simplified much of the strategic planning at sea. Having lost East Pakistan meant even a lesser role for the navy. In the following decade, the navy continued to strive for upgrading its condition and, disappointed by the showing of the US, started to explore diverse sources for equipment procurement. Pakistan acquired eight missile boats along with hydrofoils and Gunboats from China during the 70s. The naval air arm was established in 1974 with Seaking ASW Squadron, and later strengthened by the induction of French Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft, Seaking and Alloutte helicopters. Commissioning of six US Gearing class destroyers from the late 70s to early 80s made up for acute shortages in the surface fleet. Acquisition of two Agosta class submarines from France and another Daphne from Portugal gave boost to the submarine force. In 1982, Pakistan Navy bought a County class guided missile destroyer from Britain, which provided the much-needed platform for maintaining the training capability162.

161 Sentinels, op.cit., 79. 162 Rabnawaz, op.cit., 75. 92

Late eighties and early nineties was an unprecedented period in the history of the navy. The navy contracted eight Brooke and Garcia class ships from the US on five years lease. During the period, the navy acquired long range sophisticated anti-ship missiles and enhanced its maritime reconnaissance capabilities. This expansion was provoked by the extensive development in the Indian navy and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan163. In 1989 PNS Moawin, a Fleet Logistics Support Ship was commissioned in Pakistan navy. However, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the US withdrew its support under the Pressler Amendment. This seriously impaired the Pakistan navy which was composed almost entirely of former US origin ships and blocked the delivery of a wide variety of defence related equipment and spare parts. The navy had to forego the Brooke and Garcia class frigates on expiry of their lease in 1993, which was a severe blow to the navy’s operational capability. A good effect of the Pressler Amendment, however, was that Pakistan began to concentrate on self-reliance in defence production. In 1994, Pakistan signed a contract with France for three Agosta 90B submarines with transfer of technology. The first boat Khalid was constructed in France and commissioned in the navy in December 1999, the other two boats were built in Karachi with French assistance and entered service in 2003 and 2006 respectively. These submarines are fitted with AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) System, which gives them a substantive edge over other conventional submarines. Induction of three Eridan class mine hunters in 1990s, last of which was built in Pakistan with French assistance, has significantly improved Pakistan’s mine countermeasures capability. To make up for the deficiency in surface combatants Pakistan purchased six Type-21 Destroyers from Britain from 1993 to 1995164. Later Pakistan concluded an agreement with China for four frigates of the F-22P class, again involving transfer of technology. The first three ships of this class were built in China and commissioned in Pakistan Navy during 2009-11, while the fourth ship constructed in KS&EW was handed over to the navy in March 2013. The present and projected strength of the navy is as under:

The Naval Headquarters are situated at Islamabad but the fleet and logistic commands are in Karachi, together with most training facilities. In late 1980s, with the expansion of the fleet, the Pakistan government ordered the construction of a new major naval base at Ormara, 240km west of Karachi. The base is named Jinnah Naval Base (after the founder of the nation) and the

163 Sentinels, op.cit., 79. 164 Pakistan Navy official website, http://www.paknavy.gov.pk/destroyer.htm, accessed on March 15, 2012. 93 ground breaking was in 1993. In the long term Pakistan plans to move the navy out of Karachi to Ormara 165.

S. No Item Existing Strength Projected Strength (2020) 1 Destroyers/Frigates 11 12

2 Missile Boats 4 8

3 Corvettes Nil 1

4 Fleet Tankers 2 2

5 Small Tankers 4 4

6 Mine Hunters 3 6

7 Submarines 5 6

8 Strike/Surveillance Aircraft 7 12

9 helicopters 19 20

Table 4.4 Present and Projected Strength of Pakistan Navy

The primary missions of the navy include the defence of Pakistan’s maritime assets, enforcing order in the EEZ, naval diplomacy and maritime cooperation with regional and extra- regional navies. Secondary missions comprise coastal surveillance, SAR duties, hydrographic surveys, maintaining navigational aids and law enforcement. In recent years the navy’s role expanded to narcotics interdiction, anti-terrorist operations, anti-smuggling, elimination of piracy, combating environmental pollution and assistance to the civil administration in the supervision of national and provincial elections. Pakistan is also committed to peacekeeping operations under the UN Flag. Since 2001, the Pakistan Navy has expanded its operational scope and has been given greater national and international responsibility in countering the threat of sea-based global terrorism, drug smuggling and trafficking issues. In 2004, Pakistan Navy became a member of the primarily North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Task Force 150 (CTF-150), under the ambit of Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP). Additionally, upon

165 Sentinels, op.cit., 81-83. 94 adoption of a resolution by (United Nations Security Council) UNSC to combat piracy in area off Horn of Africa and Somali coast, Pakistan navy also became a member of the multi-national Task Force 151. Pakistan’s Chief of the Naval Staff in his interview asserts that166:

PN stands ready and committed to promote peace, stability in the region and maintain a legitimate maritime order in cooperation with partners, for lawful maritime activities to take place unimpeded. In a globalised world of geo- economic primacy, I foresee exponential rise in importance of Seas and indeed of the Naval Forces. Therefore, at operational level we must continue todevelop a whole range of capabilities to mitigate the risks vis-à-vis the expanding and ever changing threat spectrum and in tandem should be able to perform diverse missions expected of the navy in future.

Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA)

To consolidate the advantages offered by UNCLOS, requirement of enforcing national and international laws at sea in our maritime zones became a necessity. A National Maritime Affairs Committee was constituted by the Government in 1983 to look into the new avenues offered by UNCLOS. The committee was tasked to analyze the entire spectrum of Maritime activities and recommend measures pertaining to the setting up of an organization to meet the requirements of the convention.

Deliberations of the Maritime Affairs Committee first led to the establishment of a Maritime Affairs Wing in the Ministry of Defence in May 1986. Subsequent to detailed deliberations, the committee finally recommended to establish a dedicated agency to look after the Maritime interests of the country in its Maritime Zone. The agency was named as “Maritime Security Agency” (MSA). The Agency was established in January 1987. Thereafter, the MSA Act was passed in 1994167.

Presently the sea going surface units comprise of one Gearing class Destroyer, four corvettes and three Fast Patrol boats. The air wing comprises a squadron of three Defender Aircraft. In order to ensure coverage of the area, MSA has established coastal bases at Gwadar

166 Muhammad Asif Sandila, Chief of the Naval Staff, in discussion with author, Islamabad: March 12, 2013. 167 PMSA Official Website www.msa.org.pk accessed on May 17, 2013. 95 and Pasni while the plans also include establishment of bases at Ormara and Keti Bandar. These bases have been equipped with patrol boats and wooden launches for patrolling within territorial waters. The Operations Room, located at the Headquarters in Karachi, is the nerve center of all operational activities. It is also acting as the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) and Disaster Response Centre.

Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA) is responsible for the regulation and protection of the maritime interests of Pakistan and to assert and enforce national jurisdiction and sovereignty in the Maritime Zones. The tasks assigned to PMSA as per PMSA Act 1994 are:

• Enforce National and International laws, agreements and conventions in the Maritime Zones.

• Prevent unauthorized exploitation of economic resources within the Maritime Zones.

• Protect Pakistan fishing vessels and crew against any threat within the Maritime Zones.

• Assist and co-ordinate Search & Rescue for the vessels, property and lives in distress at sea.

• Assist and coordinate with national and international agencies to prevent and control the effects of marine disasters including pollution.

• Assist and co-ordinate with national and International agencies in hydro-graphic and oceanographic research and other scientific activities.

• Assist other departments and agencies in safeguarding and protecting offshore installations/structures in the EEZ.

• Provide assistance for petroleum and other mineral exploration in our Maritime zones.

• Co-operate with and provide help to other departments and agencies at sea in the discharge of their duties and functions.

• Perform such other functions as may be assigned by Govt to protect maritime interests of Pakistan.

Pakistan Maritime Security Agency has contributed significantly in maintaining order at the sea. During the period from 2005 to 2010 the agency seized Hashish and Heroin worth Rs. 96

1595 million in addition to contraband (mainly liquor and diesel) of the value of Rs 269 million168.

All maritime nations maintaining paramilitary forces such as Maritime Security Agency or Coast Guard, integrate them with the Navy during Emergency, War or Conflict so as to augment their country’s defences. In order to remain prepared for such an eventuality PMSA surface and air units regularly participate in Pakistan Navy exercises. Major functions being performed by PMSA on behalf of various ministries are as shown169:

Anti Narcotics Min of Narcotics Control Anti Smuggling Min of Finance / CBR Human Trafficking Min of Interior Hazardous Material Control Regime (HMCR) Min of Ports & Shipping Search and Rescue Min of Ports & Shipping Protection of living resources Min of Food & Agriculture Environment Protection Min of Environment Protection of non-living resources Min of Sc & Tech/Min of Petroleum & Natural Resources Repatriation of foreign fishermen Min of Foreign Affairs/Min of Interior. Secondary Maritime Force Min of Defence

168 Data is collated from the DG PMSA address at Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), (Lahore, December 26, 2012) and official website of PMSA. 169 Address of DG PMSA, Ibid. 97

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF GWADAR

Gwadar is a picturesque port city on Pakistan’s western seaboard Makran coast. It is an important city of Baluchistan province and is located about 635 km (via the Makran Coastal Highway) or 257 nm (nautical miles via sea) west of Karachi, the main port of Pakistan. Despite its strategic location and historical importance, Gwadar has remained generally obscured from the limelight until recently. It came to international spotlight in 1993 when finally Pakistan decided to pursue its longtime desire of constructing an international port at Gwadar. And the fact that China decided to help Pakistan build the port in 2002 galvanized the politics of the region. The significance of Gwadar as a future trade hub and an important geo-strategic location has attracted a lot of discussion domestically as well as internationally. All regional and extra- regional players have since shown great interest in the port (and in fact, the entire province) for a mix of reasons- most paramount among those being economic and security. Pundits have elucidated on the port’s potential as a gateway of trade and prosperity, not only for Pakistan but for the connecting regions as well. It is prophesized to open up vistas of opportunity for the Central Asian Republics, China and even Russia, connecting these regions to the rest of the world and allowing easy flow of energy resources of the region. There are, also a few who feel threatened from the envisaged competition that the port may generate, and there are still others who are worried for security reasons, particularly the access of China. Although, both China and Pakistan, clarified that the port is being built for entirely economic reasons, the port continues to be a subject of speculation and intrigue.

History of the Makran Coast

Gwadar is an ancient town which has always held an important place in the history of Makran. A brief look at the history of Makran is therefore, essential to understand the background of the region in general and that of Gwadar in particular. Historians have traced the history of Makran to the time of Prophet Dawood (David), when people entombed themselves in the small cairns to avoid famine. Traces of these cairns (known locally as dambi) could still be 98 found in Makran170. Persia’s famous poet Firdousi has mentioned this place, in Shahnama, as the battleground between the Iranian and Turanian Kings. Makran, according to recorded history, formed part of the possessions of Iran during the reign of King Kaus, who is said to have travelled across Makran from where he took a boat to other parts of his dominion. The area remained under the province of a Turanian King Afrasiab for some time before it was regained by Kai Khusrau. Kai Khusrau is said to have stayed in Makran for about a year. He is credited with considerable improvement in agriculture of the area by importing expert cultivators from all over the world, to layout fruit gardens and attend to pasture grounds for his horses and hunting grounds.

According to Shahnama Makran paid allegiance to Kai Kaus, Kai Khusrau, Lehrasp, Gushtasp, Bahman, Huma and Darab 171 . The long history of Persian rule was apparently interrupted in 325 BC with the invasion of Alexander172. The journey of Alexander’s army and his fleet along the coast, as narrated by Arrian, is perhaps the oldest well documented account of this area. At that time the whole area was known as Gadrosia173. Arrian described the coastline as the country of Ichthyophagoi i.e. fish eaters. The present name Makran seems to be derived from a Persian word “:Mahi Khoran” having the same meaning i.e. ‘fish eaters’. According to the annals of his expedition, while Alexander with his army travelled through Makran, keeping as close to the coast as possible, his fleet under Admiral Nearchus was sailing parallel along the coast and mentions the names of Kalmat, Gwadar, Pishukan and Chahbahar in his accounts174.

Sir Thomas Holdich has traced Alexander’s route as following the coast to the north of the Hingol river, when he turned northward and passed through the mountains at the back of the Taloi ridge of the Makran Coast Range, emerging on the shore between Kalmat and Pasni, along which he continued to Gwattar (Gwadar)175.

Most of the Alexander’s historians admit that all the hardships which his army suffered in Asia are less in comparison with their sufferings on this route. However, according to Nearchus,

170 Planning & Development Department, Government of Baluchistan, Gwadar: A District Profile, (Quetta: Quetta Printing Press, July 1997). 171 Ibid. 172 Tahir Mehdi et.al., South Asia Partnership-Pakistan, Profile of District Gwadar with Focus on Livelihood, (Lahore: Visionaries Division, December 2009). 173 Lord Curzon, 1892 quoted in The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran), (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1906), Preface. 174 Tahir Mehdi, op.cit. 175 Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran), op.cit., 40. 99

Alexander intentionally chose this route after learning that no one had traversed it with an army except Semiaramis, when she fled from India with only twenty men, and Cyrus who escaped with only seven men. Another reason for staying close to the coast, besides outdoing Semiaramis and Cyrus, was an operational necessity to keep his fleet supplied with provisions. Nevertheless, the blazing heat and want of water destroyed a great part of his army. The accounts of Alexander’s expedition are indicative of the extreme in-hospitability of the terrain, which remains a factor retarding the development of this region even in today’s technologically advanced age. And it is for this reason that none of the invaders or conquerors wished to stay in this country for long. Therefore, while the region did come under the rule of great kingdoms on different occasions, no permanent rule could be established and hence remained less developed. For most of its history the Makran coastal belt seems to have remained under the reign of local sardars and chieftains holding influence over small pockets of areas. After the death of Alexander, one of his generals Seleukos Nikator claimed control of the dominion and is presumed to have marched through Makran across the Indus where he was defeated by Chandragupta in 305 BC, and forced to cede Makran along with other provinces.

For the next eight centuries, or so, history seems to be silent on Makran. In the fifth century AD, Shermah, Malik of Hind married his daughter and gave the territory of Makran in dowry. For the next two centuries the territory thus remained in the hands of the Sassanians until the rise of the Brahman dynasty in Sind. According to Chachnama, Rai Chach marched through Makran towards Kirman in 635-6 AD, subduing the local chieftains, and marking the boundary between Kirman and Makran.

Immediately after the death of Prophet Muhammad (Peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), the Arabs showed interest in Makran and India. However, they did not feel powerful enough to venture against Sind until after the conquest of Persia. In the last years of Caliph Umar (634-643 AD) the Arab Muslims invaded India and after stiff resistance from the ruler of Makran (Malik Saad), Makran fell into the hands of the Arabs. The message sent by his general Abdullah Bin Abdullah to the Caliph is as follows:

Commander of the faithful, it is a country of which the mountains are mountains indeed, and the plains of which are real mountains; it is a country with so little water that its dates are the worst of dates, and the inhabitants are the most 100

warlike of men. If thou hadst a less numerous army there, it would be annihilated and could do nothing; and if thy army is considerable, it will perish of hunger, because there are no victuals. The country beyond is still worse176.

On receipt of this message, the Caliph reportedly dropped the idea of conquering Sind. However, Makran was made a base for the officer-in-charge of the Indian frontier, and remained under the Arab rule, not withstanding a few setbacks in between, through to Umayid ruler Abdul Malik (684-705). During this time, Makran came under the jurisdiction of Hajjaj Bin Yousuf, who was appointed the governor of Iraq. It is said that Muhammad Bin Qasim was assigned to check piracy along the Makran and Sind coasts. After the conquest of Sind by Muhammad Bin Qasim, Makran was administratively amalgamated with Sind. Arab settlements probably studded the coast of Makran for many years after the seventh century and Arab blood has undoubtedly left its mark on the present population of the area177.Not much is written about the area for the subsequent periods. However, from the accounts of Ibn-ul-Haikal it appears that the Arab rule lasted till at least the 10th century. Frequent references to Makran are also made by other Arab geographers of the period namely Ibn-e-Khurdadba, Al-Istakhri and Al-Idrisi, all of whom agree in describing the country as “for the most part desert”.

For the next seven centuries Makran came under attack by various foreigners and changed hands frequently. The foreign dynasties that exercised temporary suzerainty over the region included the Deilamis, the Seljuks, the Ghaznivids, the Ghorids and the Mongols. However, since no invader stayed in this country for long, the local rulers continued to enjoy internal authority, most of whom had by now converted to Islam178. The local rulers ascended to power in the following order: Hots, Rinds, Maliks, Buledais and Gichkis.

Makran is also mentioned in the memoirs of Marco Polo in the following words179:

Kesmacoran is a kingdom having a king of its own and a peculiar language. [Some of] the people are Idolaters, [but the most part are Saracens]. They live by merchandize and industry, for they are professed traders, and carry

176 Ibid., 43. 177 Ibid., 61. 178 Tahir Mehdi, op.cit. 179 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo.2, available at http://www.hotfreebooks. com/book/The-Travels-of- Marco-Polo-Volume-2-Marco-Polo-and-Rustichello-of-Pisa--20.html, accessed on October 3, 2012. 101

on much traffic by sea and land in all directions. Their food is rice [and corn], flesh and milk, of which they have great store. There is no more to be said about them.

It may be noted that this part of the region was often quoted by historians as Kech (Kij) Makran to distinguish it from Persian Makran. The term Kech Makran has also been mentioned in the accounts of other great travelers: Ibne- Batuta and Turkish Admiral Sidi Ali, and in the local folklore ‘Sassi Punnu’.

Turkish Admiral Sidi Ali Reis remembers his visit to Gwadar in the following words180:

…escorted by the said captain we entered the harbor of Guador (Gwadar). The people there were Beluchistanis and their chief was Malik Djelaleddin, the son of Malik Dinar. The Governor of Guador came on board our ship and assured us of his unalterable devotion to our glorious Padishah.

In the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese arrived and captured several places along the Makran coast. A well known Portuguese writer Manual De Sauza has written the details of the Portuguese attack on India in his book “The history of Portuguese days in East”181. The Kalmatis fought bravely, but the Portuguese ultimately prevailed and burnt the cities of Gwadar and Pasni in 1581182.

The great Baluch migration eastwards took place in the fifteenth century attributed to the tyrannical rule of one Malik Muzaffar Shah. In the middle of the 18th century (circa 1758) this area fell under the control of Mir Naseer Khan who added it to the Khanate of Kalat and reinstated the local Gichki chief, Umer as a governor. Later, both the Gichki chiefs and Mir Naseer realized that neither could keep the area without the other’s support and therefore, entered into an agreement which allowed the Gichkis to maintain administrative control of the area, in return for furnishing half the collected revenues to Kalat183.

180 Sidi Ali Reis, Miratul Mumalik, (1557 CE), (The Mirror of Countries), Medieval Sourcebook, available at [email protected], accessed on October 28, 2012. 181 Gwadar Historical Background, http://www.skyscrapercity.com/archive/index.php/t-360436.html, accessed on June 27, 2013; and Tahir Mehdi, op.cit. 182 Tahir Mehdi, op.cit; Gwadar profile 1997, op.cit.; The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran), op.cit., 46. Most of the documents agree on this date, however, A Gazetteer of Baluchistan, (Haryana: Vipin Jain for Vintage Books, 1989) originally published by the Superintendent of Government Printing Calcutta(1908) gives the year to be 1651. 183 Tahir Mehdi, op.cit; Also see The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran), op.cit., 50. 102

History of Gwadar

In 1783 Saiad Said bin Ahmad succeeded to the throne of Muscat. His brother Prince Saiad Sultan bin Ahmad, fell foul with the brother, fled to Makran and met Mir Naseer Khan. Naseer Khan declined to offer military assistance but handed over Gwadar, as part of his share of revenues, to Saiad Sultan, for the later’s maintenance. Saiad Sultan became the ruler of Muscat in 1797184 and failed to return Gwadar. The ensuing struggle for the possession of Gwadar between the heirs of the Sultan and those of Mir Naseer, allowed the British to intervene, who signed an agreement declaring Gwadar as part of Muscat. (At that time the term Gwadar was applied not only to the town and port of Gwadar but the entire area under the suzerainty of Muscat. According to the Gazetteer this area covered about 307 sq miles at that time)185.

British attention was first drawn to Makran at the time of the outbreak of the first Afghan war, when Major Leech deputed Haji Abdun Nabi to visit the country from Kalat in 1838-9. Gwadar achieved strategic importance when the British decided to lay the first Indo-Europe telegraph. Major Goldsmith was appointed by the British government in 1861-2, to ascertain the extent of coastal areas under control of local chiefs and an Assistant Political Agent was appointed in Gwadar in 1863. The first ever telegraphic link to these areas was made in 1863 when Gwadar was linked to Karachi. Telegraph offices were opened both at Gwadar and Pasni and both these cities became ports of call for the steamers of British India Steam Navigation Company. Post office was opened in Gwadar in 1894186. Both Gwadar and Pasni became the link to the inland cities. Lord Curzon landed at Pasni at the end of 1903, the first Viceregal visit ever paid to Makran187.

According to the Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran) the population density of the area was less than three persons per square mile (1903), a result which indicates the sparsely populated character of the country. It further states that the inhabitants have a general tendency to avoid living together in large communities and the only place which possesses any pretensions

184 Muscat claimed that the city was transferred permanently by the Khans of Kalat, a claim supported by Lord Curzon- who asserts that the place was made over by the khans of kalat as a free gift to the Sultans- but denounced by the natives of Gwadar and the Khans themselves. See The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran) and Gwadar District Profile 1997, op.cit. The declassified documents of British India also indicate that the area was not permanently gifted to the Sultan. 185 The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran), op.cit., 280. 186 Gwadar District Profile op.cit., 1997. 187 The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran), op.cit., 56. 103 to be called a town is ‘Gwadar’ There has been from time immemorial a great deal of traffic between Gwadar and the other coastal ports of Makran and Muscat, and the names of some of the species of dates are probably Arabic in a more or less corrupted form188.

The fact that numerous traces of irrigation works still exist throughout the area, even in tracts which are now dry crop areas, and the circumstance mentioned by Al-Idrisi that sugar was grown in the country and silk was produced in exportable quantities, indicates that Makran enjoyed in the past a high degree of agricultural and commercial civilization189. It appears from different historic accounts that Gwadar was the chief port on the entire Makran coast which handled all the trade of this area. The trade was mostly in the hands of Hindus and Khojas (locally known as Lotias). In 1903 Gwadar’s trade was estimated at Rs. 550,000 of exports and Rs. 200,000 of imports. The contract for customs (levied at 5% ad valorem), octroi and tithes on fish, was leased for Rs 40,000190. However, after 1903, when the British India steamers also starting calling on Pasni, a significant share of the trade was diverted to Pasni,191 also helped by the bridle route constructed in 1904 from Pasni to Turbat (connecting with Isai in Panjgur)192. The British also used Gwadar as a Flying Boat base until 1938, when the operations were shifted to Jiwani193.

Some uncertainty has been created about the nature of transfer of the area to Muscat. Lord Curzon incorrectly asserts that the place was given to the Sultans as a free gift. However, the local accounts strongly contradict this assertion. An extract made from the diary in possession of one Mir Mazar Mirwari of Malar in Kolwa is relevant in this regard. It is addressed to the writer’s son and runs as follows194:

If somebody asks you whether Gwadar belongs to Kech and how it fell into the hands of the Bu-Saiads of Maskat, tell him in reply that Saiad Sultan was their ancestor and fled from the country of Maskat at the hands of his own relations and came to Zik. Dad Karim Mirwari accompanied him and went to

188 Ibid., 167. 189 Ibid., 137. 190 A Gazetteer of Baluchistan, op.cit., 187. 191 The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran), op.cit., 226. 192 Ibid., 228 193 His Majesty’s Government India Office Declassified Records, National Data Centre, Cabinet Division, Islamabad, accessed on October 12, 2012. 194 The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran), op.cit., 186-7. 104

Kharan and induced Mir Jahangir Nausherwani, to join them and they took refuge with Shah Naseer Khan (of Kalat). In the end, the Brahui army did not go to Maskat to help Saiad Sultan, but at length Mir Naseer Khan lent him Gwadar on trust. Mir Naseer Khan said, ‘as soon as Maskat is recovered make over Gwadar to me (Mir Naseer Khan).’ He has not given it back up to this time.

This local assertion is also supported by the Gichki’s claim that they continued to receive their share of the revenue long after this incidence, which would have been stopped if the country was handed over permanently to the Sultan. Even Haji Abdun Nabi’s report confirms this when he writes in 1839 that195,

The two ports (i.e., of Gwadar and Chahbahar) formerly belonged half to the Gichkees and half to the Brahoees. The Brahoees’ half was given in grant by Mir Naseer Khan to the present Imaum’s father, Saiad Sultan, who took refuge at Kalat during some convulsion in his own state.

A tug of war ensued between the heirs 196 of Mir Naseer and Sultan Saiad for the possession of Gwadar which allowed the British to intervene and hand over the possession to Oman through an agreement. It may be remembered that Muscat had also come under British influence at that time 197. From 1863 to 1879 Gwadar was the headquarters of an Assistant Political Agent198. In 1880 Major Henry Green, who was the Political Agent at Kalat, published a book titled “Gwadur”. Green not only supported the claim of the Khan of Kalat to Gwadar but also suggested that “the British government should purchase the town of Gwadar and present it to the Khan of Kalat.199”

The Khans of Kalat continued to reiterate their claim on the ‘Gwadar enclave’, however, since the area was under British suzerainty it did not materialize. The documents of the period declassified by the British government indicate that before independence, the ‘Wazir-e-Azam’ of Kalat again raised the issue of Gwadar. The political agents of the time Colonel Poulton and his

195 Ibid., 284 196 According to some accounts Sultan Saiad died in 1804, however, there is difference of opinion on the death of Mir Naseer on either 1793 or 1817. 197 Gwadar Historical Background, op.cit. 198 The Gazetteer of Baluchistan (Makran), op.cit., 285. 199 Henry Green, Gwadur, (Calcutta: Superintendent Printing Press, 1880), 1-5. 105 successor Sir Geoffrey Prior supported the Khans claim and proposed that Gwadar be transferred to Kalat. In the words of Poulton, the political agent at Gwadar in 1947200:

The Sultan (of Muscat) is an interloper there and his retention of an enclave in non-Arab territory will tend to become more and more of an anachronism.

The documents further reveal that the Jain community in India also offered to purchase Gwadar. The Jain community, according to one official account “numbered 1,500,000, possessed great wealth and could offer good price”. In the end the British government decided that it is in their strategic interest if Gwadar stayed with Muscat. A number of reasons may be found by sifting through the declassified files of that era. Firstly, the fact rarely mentioned, the British had hoped to find oil in Baluchistan also including parts of Gwadar. For the purpose of oil exploration ‘Concession Rights’ were awarded to a British-American company called Indian Oil Concessions Limited, in 1939. However, before the company could start its work, World War II broke out and a moratorium was imposed on oil exploration until after the war201. Secondly, both Admiralty and Air Ministry opposed transfer of Gwadar to Kalat because they thought it is important for both, imperial strategy and Air communications, to retain a “pied a terre” on mainland in case India becomes unfriendly202. Thirdly, Nehru had already asserted that Kalat should form part of the Indian territory. The British had doubts that independent India will not remain part of the Common Wealth and it was considered unwise to handover strategically important Gwadar to an “unfriendly India”203. Furthermore, Gwadar was an important outpost in Britain’s ‘Forward Policy’ to contain Russia from warm waters.

At the time of partition of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan, Gwadar, comprising Peshukan, Sur Bander, Phuleri and Nigore, was under the political control of Sultan of Oman204.

200 Declassified Records, op.cit. 201 The war lasted from 1939 to 1945 during which the British lost its primacy as the world’s super power. After the war the British realized that the cost of maintaining colonial rule is too high and agreed to grant independence to the sub-continent. Thus the oil exploration could not materialize. 202 M. W. Low of British Air Ministry at London to P.A.K. Harrison, India Office, London, March 4, 1947, in Declassified Records op.cit. 203 It may be noted that the partition of the sub-continent into Pakistan and India was announced on June 03, 1947 hence these documents still refer to united India and not Pakistan. 204 Tahir Wasim, et.al., Gwadar- 20 Years From Now, Group Research Paper, (Islamabad: National Defence University, 2007), 1. 106

Pakistani authorities realizing that geographically and historically, Gwadar is a part of Pakistan requested the British government, immediately after partition, to allow/induce the Sultan for return of Gwadar. However, due to their continuing strategic interests the British declined to help. In this regard, the instructions from the British Foreign Office to their Political Resident in the Persian Gulf are relevant, extract of which is reproduced below205:

We understand, however, that the hinterland possessed oil bearing properties, and that there is, therefore a long term possibility that Gwadar may become an important port. This long term possibility should be borne in mind in any negotiations concerning the future of Gwadar.

The reason why Pakistan had to request the British instead of talking directly with Muscat was that the British had concluded an agreement with the Sultan on March 20, 1891 in which the later pledged “never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give in occupation any of his dominions or dependencies save to the British government” 206 . However, the Pakistan government continued to raise the issue with the British. In 1958, after learning that the Indians are also trying to purchase Gwadar207, the government of Pakistan intensified its efforts and succeeded in concluding an agreement with the British government on August 01, 1958. According to the Agreement the Pakistani government had to pay an amount of £ 3 million ($10m)208 along with some concessions to the Muscat government. Hence on September 08, 1958 Gwadar was transferred to Pakistan, through the British representatives209. It was made a tehsil of district Makran in the Balochistan province.

Gwadar was given the status of a district on 01 July 1977 with its headquarters in Gwadar town. The word Gwadar is derived from two Balochi words “gwa” meaning wind and “dar” meaning gate, thus literally meaning, the “gate of wind”210.District Gwadar is bounded on the

205 B. A. B. Burrows of British Foreign Office to Lt Col A. C. Galloway, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain, August 26, 1948 in Declassified Records op.cit. 206 Harrison to Low, February 19, 1947, in Declassified Records op.cit. 207 Akram Zaki, former Secretary General Foreign Affairs, in discussion with author, Islamabad, April 25, 2013. 208 Declassified Records op.cit., and Gwadar Historical Background, op.cit. 209 On behalf of the Sultan of Muscat, the Wali handed over Gwadar to the representative of the British Consul General in Muscat who, in turn, handed over possession to Pakistan government’s representative Mr Agha Abdul Hamid, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister and Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. 210 Fazal-e-Maqbool Afridi, “Gwadar As Future Economic Hub” in Azhar Ahmad et.al., eds. Balochistan: Rationalisation of Centre-Province Relations, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2010), 42. 107 north by Kech and Awaaran districts, on the east by Lasbela, on the west by Iran and on the south by the Arabian Sea. It is further divided into Gwadar and Pasni sub-divisions for administrative purposes. The total area of the district is 15,216 sq km square kilometers 211. Gwadar is the ninth largest district of the province with respect to area while it is ranked 17th among the 26 districts of the province in terms of population which was estimated at 249,055 in 2008212.. The total no of tehsils in the district are four (Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, Jiwani) and thirteen union councils. The literacy rate among the males is 25% and among females 14%. The infrastructure, education and health facilities being extremely limited, especially in rural areas around Gwadar, the human development index in the district has been one of the lowest in the country. However, it is envisaged that since the launch of the port project, migration has taken place from other parts of the province/country and the population must have considerably increased.

The coastline of Gwadar district extends for in an east-west direction and is almost entirely deserted. The coastline is deeply indented with bays, but its most characteristic feature is the repeated occurrence of promontories and peninsulas of white clay cliffs capped with course limestone or shelly breccia which approach the table-topped form. The intermediate coast is low. The most conspicuous headlands are Jabal-e-Sur, the north-east point of Gwadar east bay; Gwadar head-a hammer-headed rocky promontory about eleven kilometers (7 miles) in length east and west and about one-and-a-half kilometer (1 mile) wide; and Ras Pishukan a narrow rocky spit. Jabal-e-Mehdi, so called because it originally was the settlement of Mahdizais, an offshoot of the Sangur tribe, on its skirts, is a mass of white clay hills of somewhat remarkable outline and with perpendicular cliffs on its south side. A gap of low land more than three kilometers divides it from the Sur headland. Koh-e-Batel forms part of the Gwadar headland and is an irregular mass of cliffs of dark brown colour and about 480 ft high, overlooking Gwadar town.

There is nothing distinctive about the flora, which is scanty in the extreme. Gwadar Nigwar possesses a few date groves. The hills contain mountain sheep and Send ibex, which are

211 Small & Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA), Gwadar: District Profile, available at the official website of SMEDA, http://www.smeda,org.pk, accessed on July 13, 2012. 212 Tahir Mehdi, op.cit. According to last census in 1998, the population was 185,498. 108 celebrated for their size. Still a sizable population lives on fishing, which is carried out in Gwadar bay, Pishukan, Sur and off the mouth of the Barambab.

Gwadar Port Project

In 1882, Sir Charles M. Macalfe visited Gwadar and travelled along the coast. He reported that Gwadar was a suitable place for a modern port but this proposal was not approved because of lack of resources213. After the Pak-India war of 1971, a proposal was put up to the government for an additional port along the Makran coast (Gwadar being a preferred option)214. According to T.M. Khattak215, Pakistan’s President Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, in 1974 offered the US to build a port at Gwadar and use it as a naval base. However, the US declined because they had Chahbahar under friendly Shah of Iran’s regime. For decades, the coastal town of Gwadar had been a victim of sheer neglect at the hands of the government, and hardly any development work was seen there. In 1988 a Belgium firm was awarded a contract to build a small “fish harbour cum mini port” at Gwadar which completed in December 1992. In 1991 the concept of deep water port at Gwadar was formally conceived by the Government of Pakistan and the first PC 1 was prepared amounting to Rs. 10 billion. The project was in principle approved by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) in June 1994216. In December 1995 the government of Pakistan instructed Karachi Port Trust to finance the development of Gwadar to the extent of Rs. 1 billion. In February 1996 the government released Rs. 2 billion for the construction of a deep sea port in Gwadar. In Dec 1996, 43 major companies submitted Expression Of Interest (EOI) for construction of Phase I of the Gwadar project217. In March 2002 Sino-Pak Agreement was signed under which China Harbour Engineering Company built Phase- I of the Port at a cost of US $ 248 million. Out of the $248 million, Pakistan’s contribution was only $ 50 million, whereas, the rest was to be paid by the Chinese government. Gwadar Development Authority (GDA) was established in October 2003218. In 2004 the scope of work

213 Jason R. Murtha, The Strategic Importance of Balochistan, Master’s Thesis (Monterey: Naval Post-Graduate School, 2011), 8. 214 U.S. Department of State memorandum s/s-7323703 6722 dated December 20, 1973 qouted in Ammad Hussain, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port- Prospects of Economic Revival, Master’s thesis (Monterey: Naval Post Graduate School, 2004), 3. 215 The News (Islamabad), April 03,2013. Khattak is a retired Vice Admiral and former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. 216 Durrani, e-mail message, op.cit. 217 Reema Kazmi, “Port Gwadar: Turning Dreams into Reality”, IBEX, (January, 2009), 12-17. 218 Yasmeen Gul, “Converting the Dream into Reality”, The Gwadar News, (July-August, 2007), 27. 109 was enhanced which included designing and additional dredging of the navigation channel and cost an extra US $ 39.8 million (Pakistan $ 17.54 million, China $ 22.26 million)219.

In December, 2005 Phase-I of the project was completed with a total cost of US $ 287.8 million (Rs 17.268 billion), which consists of:

- 3 berths of total length 602m - 4.5 km long approach channel - Outer harbour dredged to 15.5m, inner harbour 12.5m. - Turning basin 450m diameter - 1x 100m service berth - Related port infrastructure and port handling equipment, Pilot tugs, tugs, survey vessels etc

China has also invested another US $ 200 million for building the Makran Coastal Highway connecting Gwadar port with Karachi. After the completion of Phase I the port can handle Bulk Carriers of up to 50,000 DWT (Dead Weight Tonnage) and Container ships of up to 25000 DWT.

Phase-II envisaged the construction of seven additional berths of 300 meters and two oil piers. It will provide facilities to accommodate oil tankers up to 200,000 tons DWT, Bulk Carriers up to 100,000 tons, General Cargo Vessels up to 100,000 tons and fourth generation Container Ships of 15.6 to 20 meters draft. Phase-II is estimated at US $ 932 million and proposed to be built on a BOT/BOO basis220.

In 2006 the government of Pakistan invited offers from experienced port operators for the management of the Port of Gwadar. Six companies submitted bids including the Dubai World Ports, Hutchinson of Hong Kong, PSA International, two Saudi companies and one Pakistani company. An interested Chinese company opted out of the formal bidding. The contract was finally awarded to PSA International. The agreement was signed on 5 Feb 2007 between Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) and a “Special Purpose Vehicle” company PSA Gwadar Pvt Ltd (a

219 Durrani, e-mail message, op.cit. Also Chairman GPA presentation to Maritime Industry Task Force, February 20, 2009. 220 Data received from GPA December 2012 op.cit., also see Raffat Zaheer, “The Dream of a $1bn Boom Town”, The Gwadar News, (July-August, 2007), 32. 110 subsidiary of Port of Singapore Authority International)221. However, the company failed to develop the port as envisaged and it was decided to handover the operations to a Chinese company. On 18 February 2013, an MOU was signed for transferring the concessional rights to a Chinese state-run company, China Overseas Port Holding Company222.

The government of Pakistan believes that the port has the potential to become a regional hub, which would be able to meet not only the growing domestic requirements but also handle cargo for the entire region. Hub port may be defined as a single concentrated point for the collection of numerous trades. Empirical studies show a positive relationship between trade and growth. Gwadar port is strategically located at the cross roads of natural resources of the Middle East and Central Asia, a huge consumer market of Asia with over one third of world population, and at the shortest route to the southern provinces of China. It is being equipped with modern cargo handling facilities to meet the challenges of growing world trade, which over 70% is conducted through containers. Economically booming China and India, increasingly stable Pakistan, and gradually opening consumer markets of Central Asia, coupled with exponential population growth in the region, will generate a substantial portion of world trade in near future, if prudently developed Gwadar port will be able to attract its due share of trade and act as a hub port for the entire region.223.

221 Raffat Zaheer, “Development and Operations of the Gwadar Port”, The Gwadar News, (July-August, 2007), 18. 222 News International, February 19, 2013. 223 Ammad Hussain, op.cit., 11. 111

CHAPTER FIVE

GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES

This combination of useful harbours and the conditions of the communications between them constitute, as has been said, the main strategic outlines of the situation224

At the time of partition, Pakistan inherited only one commercial port, Karachi, which was located at the eastern end of the seaboard, only 200 km from the Indian border. Karachi had been a busy port having adequate capacity to handle trade requirements of the nascent country. However, even at that time its proximity to India was viewed with concern from security point of view. This vulnerability, eventually, was amply demonstrated during the 1971 Pak-India conflict, when the Indian navy carried out successful attacks on port installations and navy units inside the port. Gwadar was identified as one of the few options for a second port. The primary consideration at that time was to have a port outside the range of Indian attacks and close to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea SLOCs. This would make the defence of incoming merchant ships carrying vital cargo, especially oil, simpler. Pakistan navy will not be required to protect these High Value Units (HVUs) 1000 km to Karachi where they remain vulnerable all the way. Instead the ships would need to travel a short distance after leaving the international shipping and could be in safe heavens even without the need for escorting. So it can be said that the initial considerations for an alternative port were security rather than commercial.

However, with the passage of time the trade volume at Karachi also grew and especially with the setting up of the Steel Mills a new port was established at Bin Qasim to share the load of Karachi. Although Karachi and Bin Qasim, together may be able to handle the current trade requirements of Pakistan, they continue to pose security risk. Karachi and Port Qasim are virtually one port complex and remain within easy striking distance of the Indian Navy and Air Force. So the question of another port at a safe distance from India remained on the agenda of successive governments. Eventually in 1991 it was decided to establish Gwadar as a full-fledged deep water commercial port, while the navy decided to establish its base in Ormara, 235 km (127nm) west of Karachi. This was the time when the Central Asian Republics (CARs) had just

224 Mahan, op.cit., 521. 112 gained independence and the prospects of their trade being carried through the warm water ports of the North Arabian Sea were gaining currency.

It was obvious to the experts that Karachi and Bin Qasim, with existing cargo handling capacity of 42 million metric tons225, will not be able to handle the projected growth in trade. In the meantime, China’s economy was also growing in leaps and bounds. And, with China paying more attention to its thus far neglected western provinces, the feasibility of using Pakistani ports for China was also becoming clearer. Thus Gwadar was built with multiple objectives: to cater for security, being away from India and close to our vital shipping lanes, and also to provide access to China, Afghanistan and Central Asia. In addition, it was believed that it had the potential to serve as a hub port for the region.

The development of Gwadar as a deep sea port has tremendous potential. However, there are certain serious challenges as well, which have hitherto hampered the successful development and operation of this port. In the subsequent paragraphs effort is made to analyze the potential of Gwadar as a strategic maritime hub; the interest of various stake holders- regional and extra- regional- and the internal environment within Pakistan which affects the progress and future of this magnificent project. It is critical for the government and the stake holders to comprehend the challenges and find mutually accepted and long lasting solution. Provision of security would remain critical to the success of the port.

Geographical Location

History is witness to the strategically important location of Gwadar. It occupies a vantage point in the Indian Ocean with the potential to connect five very important regions with each other and with the rest of the world. These regions include Persia (Iran), Arabia, Central Asia, South Asia and China.

To the east, Pakistan’s major port city Karachi is located about 257 nm (476 km), while the Indian border is 650 km. Mumbai, a major Indian port and naval base is located about 1280km (690 nm), whereas the nearest Indian Air force bases of Nalya and Bhuj are more than 750 km. On the west, the all vital Strait of Hormuz is only 356 nm (about 660 km). A merchant

225 The capacity of both the ports has since been increased to 67 m tons. 113 ship/ tanker travelling at an average of 20 knots takes only 18 hours to reach Gwadar after leaving Hormuz, as compared to almost twice the travel from Hormuz to Karachi, thus saving vital time and cost and, more importantly, reducing the time exposed to seaward intervention, after crossing the Gulf of Oman. Gwadar is also located ideally for the Central Asian Republics’ access to the warm waters of the North Arabian Sea. It is only 1500 kms from Turkmenistan. And although the Turkmen capital Ashgabat (Ashkhabad) is closer to Chahbahar, the fourth largest city Mary of Turkmenistan which is located towards the east is not only closer to Gwadar but already connected to Pakistan through a very good road network via Herat and Qandahar in Afghanistan. Similarly, Tashkent, the ‘Stone City’ and capital of Uzbekistan is 2912 km, while Tajikistan’s capital and largest city Dushanbe lies only 2246 km, and ‘the city of apples’ Almaty, major commercial and cultural centre of Kazakhstan is at a distance of 3254 km from Gwadar. All these countries are indicated on the following map (Figure 6.1) which provides a fair idea of the location of Gwadar vis-a vis Central Asia.

Gwadar

Figure 6.1 Map Showing Gwadar and Central Asia

It may be acknowledged that Gwadar is not the only port which offers such an access to the Central Asian Republics. Iranian port of Chahbahar (and Bandar Abbas) also provides more 114 or less equally lucrative option and, therefore, need to be remembered whenever, potential and prospects of Gwadar are being analyzed. Comparison of these ports only with respect to their distances from major cities of Central Asia is given below for better understanding226.

a. Turkmenistan. Using the shortest road link from Gwadar to Ashgabat, Gwadar faces a distance disadvantage of about 261km and 164Km from Chahbahar and Bandar Abbas respectively (Figure 6.2). However, as already mentioned Turkmenistan does have an option to use the shortest route through Mary via Afghanistan. While Mary already has a developed road link with Quetta via Herat and Qandahar, no such road link exists between Ashgabad and Iran.

b. Uzbekistan. Using the shortest road link from Gwadar to Tashkent, Gwadar has a distance advantage of 266km and 198Km with Bandar Abbas and Chahbahar respectively (Figure 6.3). c. Tajikistan. Using the shortest road link from Gwadar to Dushanbe, Gwadar has a distance advantage of 281km and 213Km with Bandar Abbas and Chahbahar respectively (Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.2: Distances of Regional Ports from Turkmenistan

226 Tahir Wasim, op.cit., 12-14. 115

Figure 6.3: Distances of Regional Ports from Uzbekistan

Figure 6.4: Distances of Regional Ports from Tajikistan 116

As highlighted, Gwadar is advantageously placed with respect to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as compared to its competitor ports of Chahbahar and Bandar Abbas in the region. Karachi Port despite having distance advantage would not be a cause of concern due to the facts that it is operating close to its full capacity limit, it is away from main concentration point of international shipping lanes, is own port of Pakistan and that port expansion plans would require considerable time as well as Government’s resolve. Therefore, Gwadar is the most viable option available with the Central Asian Republics as far as the distance is concerned. However, the distance alone may not provide the correct picture. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are connected with rail to Bandar Abbas, whereas no rail connection exists between these countries and Pakistan (Gwadar). Needless to say that rail is a much cheaper and securer mode of transport compared to trucks. Secondly, the quality of roads in Afghanistan and Pakistan is poorer compared to those in Central Asia and Iran. Due to this reason and delays in border crossings goods take more time in reaching Karachi (two weeks- Gwadar is still to be connected) than Iran (7-9 days). Hence currently Afghanistan-Pakistan route is attracting much less traffic compared to the Iranian route227. This situation may however, change if Iran’s tensions continue with the West and infrastructure and services improve on the Afghanistan-Pakistan route.

China: Today China accounts for 12% of total world energy consumption, second only to the US at 24%. China meets about 40% of its demand from imports and is the world’s second largest oil importer. About 60% of its energy supplies come from the Middle East, through the Straits of Hormuz and 30% from Africa. By 2025, China is likely to import 75% of its oil which will traverse the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca, if no other alternative route is available. In order to meet its future energy demands, China has signed a number of agreements with its bordering Central Asian States for laying oil and gas pipelines, however, that will not reduce its dependence on Middle East. China’s oil has to traverse 10,000km from the Gulf to its eastern seaboard (Shanghai port). It has also laid an inland pipe network of 4500 km from its eastern province Xinjiang to Shanghai228. On the other hand the distance from Gwadar to Kashgar, the capital city of Xinjiang is only 2500 km, offering a huge distance advantage for supply of oil not only to the Western China

227 Martin Reiser and Dennis De Tray, “Uzbekistan”, in Silk Road Studies, 206-220, available at www.silkroadstudies.org, accessed on May 13, 2012. 228 Tahir Wasim op.cit., 14-15. 117 but to the entire country (Figure 6.5). The advantage is not only in distance; it also provides China relief from traversing a long distance along the Indian coast and through the Malacca Straits. The Malacca Straits remain vulnerable due to piracy while the entire sea route will be a security risk in case India or the US decided to intervene. Therefore, Gwadar offers the shortest and the safest route through the soil of a time-tested friend, away from the reach of hostile navies and air forces. In other words it relieves China of the ‘Malacca Dilemma’, in addition to tensions in the South and East China Sea.

Figure 6.5 Sea and land routes between China and Persian.Gulf

Pakistan already has road link with China via the Karakoram Highway (KKH), feasibility of laying a rail along this route is under progress. A 10,000 ft high Sust Dry Port was inaugurated on July 4, 2006 near the Pakistan- China border with a hope to bolster bilateral trade and to facilitate in realizing Pakistan’s potential as hub of intra-regional trade. The development of better infra-structure and improvement in KKH, which is in progress, would provide China shortest access to the Middle East and other world markets through Gwadar port. While inaugurating the dry port the President of Pakistan remarked that229:

229 Tahir Wasim, op.cit., 16. 118

The construction of the KKH was hailed as the eighth wonder of the world and we are capable of creating 9th and 10th wonders in the form of railway and pipeline linkages between Pakistan and China.

It may therefore, be logically visualized that Gwadar port will be an integral part of the China’s foreign trade route in future. The existing KKH already connects Western China to Pakistan. With further expansion and upgrading of this traffic artery and proposed linkages to Gwadar via the under construction Ratodero-Khuzdar road, shall make it the shortest and viable route connecting Gwadar to Western China.

Interests Of Regional & Extra-Regional Actors

United States: United States’ interest in the Indian Ocean goes back to the prophecy of Mahan who had forewarned of the importance of this ocean in the nineteenth century230:

Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.

And much before the dawn of the 21st century, his prophesy was beginning to show. Indian Ocean started to emerge as an important geo-strategic space on the world’s map. Today, in the beginning of the 21st century this ocean has become the focus of the entire world, both politically, as well as economically. And, shall continue to attract world’s attention in the foreseeable future. Indian Ocean, by virtue of its size and location and its vast mineral resources, is the world's most vital trade route today, with most of the major economic powers of the world strategically dependent on it for their energy and other requirements. With the end of the Cold War, the geo-political importance of the region has increased considerably, thus making political stability of the regional states a matter of prime concern. It is, therefore, obvious that all regional and extra-regional powers are trying to dominate the region both, economically as well as, militarily. While the entire Indian Ocean has gained considerable strategic importance, the region encompassing the North Arabian Sea surpasses all, in strategic as well as economic significance.

230 Hash V. Pant, The Rise of the Indian Navy, (London: Ashgate, 2012), 3. 119

Therefore, North Arabian Sea can be called the “Strategic Heart” 231 of the Indian Ocean and stands out as a fulcrum of global geo-politics. This region has remained very important throughout the history and has always attracted extra-regional players.

The US military arrived in Iran during World War II, primarily to provide support to the Russians232. However, the region forming the ‘Rimland’, with newly discovered vast reserves of oil, was too lucrative to be left alone. US Navy operations began in the Persian Gulf in 1948233 and since then the US has maintained continuous presence in these waters and established many bases in the ocean. All through the Cold War, US maintained substantial military presence in and around the Gulf region. It was expected that conclusion of the Cold War will also wane the pretext of heavy military presence in this area. But the continuing importance of oil, to maintain the burgeoning military and industrial complex of the United States (and its allies), additional oil and gas reserves of the newly created Central Asian States, and, the emerging power of China, provided enough incentive to the US, not only to maintain but to further its influence in this region. The importance of this region in US eyes is manifest from the following policy statement234:

Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors.

Vital interests of US in this region include hedging China and access to oil and other vast natural resources. Friends and adversaries/competitors on the other hand are not permanent. While China and Iran today fall clearly in the latter category, Pakistan’s status is ambiguous, swinging from former to latter, depending upon the geo-political expedience.

231 Azhar Ahmad, “Extra-Regional Influences in the Indian Ocean, Emerging Indo-US Nexus and its Bearing on Pak-China Relationship”, in 60 Years of Pak-China Relations: Landmarks, Trends and Approaches, (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2012), 51. 232 Wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Army_Forces_in_the_Middle_East, accessed on August 14, 2012. 233 Wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Naval_Forces_Central_Command, accessed on August 14, 2012. 234 A doctrinal statement titled, A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Sea Power, issued jointly by the US Navy, Marine Corps and the Coast Guards, October 2007, 9. 120

In the existing geo-political and economic quagmire, Gwadar has the potential to play a key role. While the US seems fully entrenched in the Middle East, despite 9/11 and the recent Arab spring, they also realize that their acceptability as a power broker and stabilizing agent is destined to decline and it cannot depend on the Middle East oil exclusively. It requires alternative sources of supply which are available in the Central Asia. However, the entire Central Asia is land-locked and the only viable access is through ports in the Arabian Sea via Afghanistan or Iran. And the only ports that can provide that access are with Pakistan and Iran. Considering the present relationship between US and Iran, it cannot use the Iranian land or ports and, therefore, the only choice left for the US is to use the Pakistani ports via the Afghanistan route. Karachi/ Port Qasim are already getting congested, and the route passes through densely populated areas of Pakistan, which does not suit US for security reasons. Hence Gwadar port seems to be the most suitable option to access resources of Central Asia. Only a few days before the September 11 incident, the US Energy Information Administration documented Afghanistan’s strategic geographical position as a “potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea235”. For exploiting this route, the US needed a compliant regime in Afghanistan and 9/11 provided a seemingly perfect excuse. Immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan by coalition forces, New York Times reported that, “The State Department is exploring the potential for post-Taliban energy projects in the region236.” Other than accessing Central Asia, Gwadar can also aid US in its ‘so-called War on Terror’ by providing an alternative, shorter and much securer route to Afghanistan. It has already suffered a lot of resistance on the existing route. It may be said that the future of US influence in this region will depend a lot on the outcome of the Afghanistan situation.

Furthermore, as US gradually loses its grip on the region and its capacity to “shape the environment” decreases, the countries in the Middle East will be reluctant to host its ground forces, which means more dependence on offshore mobile forces. As US dependence on its naval forces increases and their acceptability in the Middle East declines, US will require alternative bases for its forces and Gwadar will become the most attractive choice. If US asks for basing rights in Gwadar, or even stationing of its forces, it will definitely alarm China and put Pakistan

235 Ammad Hussain, op.cit., 121. 236 Ibid., 122. 121 in a serious dilemma. Allowing US military usage of the port under such circumstances will likely strain its relationship with China as well as Iran and other Middle Eastern countries.

It is common knowledge that the US sees China as its major competitor in the region (and beyond) in the future. And it is also wary of Pak-China friendship. Washington knows that growing influence of China in this region is detrimental to its interests and would do anything to check this trend. Washington views Gwadar as the “Chinese Gibraltar”237.The recent entente cordiale with India is part of the strategy to hedge Chinese influence in the region and shows US distrust of Pakistan in pursuit of its strategic objectives. However, it continues to court Pakistan for the same reason, due to the latter’s vital position on the regional chess board. US feels that by having access to Gwadar China can rid itself of the liability of long and vulnerable SLOCs, which would tremendously help its economic as well as maritime potential. Furthermore, by stationing at such a pivotal location China will be in position to monitor all US naval activities. In addition to above, Gwadar (in the hands of the US) can serve as an effective platform to further US goals of maintaining its hegemony, control of the hydrocarbons and minerals of the Persian Gulf, Central and South Asia and, containment of both, China as well as Russia.

European Union: European Union is not particularly blessed as far as hydrocarbons are concerned. EU members possess only about 0.6% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 2.0% of the world’s natural gas. Economic prosperity and industrial development has continued to enhance their dependability on hydrocarbons and other energy resources. According to some estimates, by 2020, EU will be required to import two-thirds of its total energy requirements. EU’s dependence on the Persian Gulf is evident from the fact that in 2002, Western Europe averaged 2.3 million bbl/day of oil imports from the Persian Gulf238. And hence it is natural for these countries to look for alternative sources, one of which is the vast reserves of Central Asia. European Union countries have remained dependent on the US, so far, to protect their interests in the region foremost of which is continuous flow of oil. And in return for that service they have supported US policies and interventions, albeit sometimes at the cost of their prestige and national pride. On individual level Europeans have tried to maintain good relations with the countries of the region, using only ‘soft power’ where necessary. However, in light of the waning

237 Abdus Sattar Ghazali, “India Alarmed As Chinese Built Gwadar Port Of Pakistan Becomes Operational”, February 8, 2008, http://www.countercurrents.org/ghazali080208.htm. 238 Ammad Hussain, op.cit., 59. 122 power and acceptability of US, the Europeans have realized that they cannot depend on US patronization for long and need to work on independent options as well. Commissioning of a military base by France in 2009 in the Persian Gulf is a case in point239. In their attempt to tap alternative oil sources, Europeans have supported an oil pipeline from Central Asia through Georgia and Turkey. However, besides covering a long distance the project is fraught with many geographic as well as geo-political hurdles. Some of which include separatist crisis in Georgia, instability/uncertainty in Kurdish areas of Turkey and unrest over Cyprus near the Mediterranean Turkish port of Ceyhan. In the given scenario EU is also faced with the same options of a pipeline via Pakistan and Iran. And till the current feud of US and its allies continues with Iran their best bet remains the Gwadar route. EU has developed a stable relationship with China and they will be less concerned with a potential shift in power balance in the Indian Ocean/ North Arabian Sea, as long as their interests are protected.

India: India has always regarded the Indian Ocean as an “Indian Lake”. It considers itself as the true heir of the British Empire in the region and, therefore, aspires for a greater influence. India’s geography dictates heavy dependence on the sea, since it does not enjoy any significant access to land routes. Its antagonistic relations with Pakistan and China, and a very hostile geography separating it from China and Burma ensure complete dependence on the sea routes. Not only that 97% of India’s total trade is sea borne, it also imports 60% of its petroleum requirements via the sea 240 . India currently ranks sixth in energy consumption and its requirements continue to rise. Consequently, like other major industrial countries, it is forced to look towards Central Asia for its energy requirement. One of its major interests in Afghanistan, also, lies in its access to Central Asia. 241

Pakistan and India are locked in perpetual enmity since their independence from the British in 1947. The two have fought three wars and are in fierce competition for balance of power in the region. India harbours much greater aspirations; it wants to replace the external

239 French President Sarkozy commissioned a military base in Abu Dhabi on May 26, 2009, the first permanent military establishment created by the French Republic in a foreign country since over half a century. The Abu Dhabi base, Sarkozy said, “illustrates the responsibilities that France, as a world power, intends to assume alongside its special partners in a region that is a nerve center for the entire world". 240 Ammad Hussain, op.cit., 142. 241 India imported 4.1 million barrels/day of oil in January 2013, sixty one percent of it coming from the Middle East. 123 powers as the regional hegemon. In this context it has to claim special interest in all the developments in the areas of her interest, particularly Pakistan. In the absence of good relations with Pakistan, the only alternative route available to India, to access Central Asia, is through Iran. India has thus far enjoyed good relations with Iran. It is helping Iran in the construction of Chahbahar port and a 200 km road that will connect Chahbahar with Afghanistan242. India is doing all this to ensure continuous supply of its ever-expanding energy demands. However, it knows that the SLOCs from Chahbahar (or Strait of Hormuz) have to traverse close to the Pakistani territory and, therefore, remain vulnerable. Furthermore, the recent warmth in Indo-US relations is being viewed with concern in Tehran and could affect the relationship between these two countries.

India has territorial disputes with China, which led to a war between the two countries in 1961, resulting in defeat for India. While both China and India have tried to improve their relations in the near past, the territorial issues remain unsettled and keep resulting in minor unpleasant incidents. According to Mr Jaswant Singh:

Beijing is the principal variable in the calculus of Indian foreign and defense policy243.

China and India being close neighbours and rising powers are natural competitors, in both, the military as well as, economic spheres. It is an historical inevitability that they will have to compete and even clash for the same strategic space. India attributed its nuclear explosions in 1998 towards its security concerns against China, rather than Pakistan. And, is perpetually engaged in an economic and military race with China.

China factor has also helped India and US to come closer. After the demise of the erstwhile USSR, India was quick to readjust its foreign policy alignments and used West’s “China phobia” to its advantage. The result is that today India has become a strategic partner and both, the Bush and Obama Administrations vowed to “help India become a major world power in

242 Ghazali, op.cit. 243 Donald L. Berlin, “India in the Indian Ocean,” http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/ 2000s/ Donald.pdf, accessed on December 31, 2010. 124 the 21st century”244. The Western intelligentsia and media have also created undue excitement about India’s rise as a regional power. According to Dr. Ashok Sharma245,

Today, Indo-US courtship has moved beyond party and individual leader’s penchant and it’s more institutionalized in defence, military, energy, technology and economic issues. Moreover, Indo-US ties is not confined to the South Asia, it has long-lasting and bigger role to play in global governance, security and developmental issues.

Both, India and US agree that China represents a significant threat as a military and economic competitor. And, therefore, are unduly wary of China’s access to North Arabian Sea or the Persian Gulf through Gwadar, and will do anything to keep China or even Pakistan benefitting from this port. It seems part of the US strategy to keep Pakistan and Afghanistan destabilized and strengthen India, so it is free to stand up to China. India and US would like to cut off China’s resources and trade corridor through Pakistan because then its long SLOCs would be extremely vulnerable. On the occasion of Gwadar port’s commissioning Indian Naval Chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, expressed his country’s concerns in the following words246:

Being only 180 nautical miles from the exit of the Straits of Hormuz, Gwadar, being built in Baluchistan coast, would enable Pakistan take control over the world energy jugular and interdiction of Indian tankers.

Indian scholars, as well as government officials continue to overplay the “String of Pearls” theory for expressing their concerns against Gwadar and, China’s intentions. They claim that India is being encircled by China from three sides- Myanmar, Tibet and Pakistan. To counter Pak-China collaboration, India is trying to form economic and strategic alliance with Iran and Afghanistan247. Indian writer Sanjeev Miglani expressed his country’s concern in the following words:

244 Robert Blake (US Assistant Secretary of State) has recently reiterated this stance in Beijing on March 18, 2011, he says, “we think India’s going to be one of our defining partnerships in the 21st Century”. 245 Azhar, “Extra-Regional Influences in the Indian Ocean”, 55. 246 Ghazali, op.cit. 247 Ibid. 125

The spectre of Chinese ships including perhaps the aircraft carrier that is under development and submarines operating from Gwadar is sure to feed insecurities in the region, drive countries to ramp up military spending and deepen alliances248.

India, already worried about an increasingly assertive China, will be sufficiently alarmed to pour more funds into its navy besides deepening ties with the United States and, of late, Japan to balance its interests in the region. Already the Indian Defence Minister A. K. Antony has expressed concern about the growing defence ties between China and Pakistan.

So far, India’s relations with its neighbours have largely been driven by security concerns based on suspicion and mistrust. According to Joseph Nye jr249.

India’s military capabilities are impressive in South Asia but not in the larger Asian Context. However, its strategic interests extend way beyond that and tend to enter the domain of regional hegemon, which dictates her relations with other countries.

Pakistan remains the major obstacle in India’s quest for regional dominance and it would never like China playing greater role in the region’s affairs, which will strength Pakistan’s position as well. Nevertheless, it seems that India is shifting its orientation from security to economy and is improving its relationship with its larger neighbourhood. This is a good omen for the regional countries, particularly Pakistan. Recent developments between the two countries and the on-going dialogue, augurs well for the future of this region. Gwadar rather than being a bone of contention, can, in fact, play a vital role in bringing the two countries closer. India can solve its energy dilemma by using Gwadar port for its access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. This is the shortest and most feasible route for India provided the two countries realize its importance. And once these two countries are economically interdependent, the solution to other issues would also become possible.

248 http://blogs.reuters.com/afghanistan/2011/05/26/in-pakistans-gwadar-port-chinese-whispers-grow/, accessed on August 12, 2012. 249 Ammad Hussain, op.cit., 149 126

Persian Gulf States: All the Gulf States must have special economic and military interests in the Gwadar port. The Persian Gulf is an important trade route in the strategic northern reaches of the Indian Ocean. All Gulf States are oil-producing countries and their only direct access to the rest of the world is through the Strait of Hormuz and the North Arabian Sea. Iran, being a country sitting astride the narrow Strait is in a position to dominate these trade routes and influence the passage of oil and other commodities to and from the Gulf. Gwadar can offer reasons for both, cooperation as well as, competition for these countries.

Iran has genuine economic and security interests in the North Arabian Sea. In its recent row over the nuclear issue with the West, it desperately needs friends and alternative economic options. Supply of natural gas to Pakistan and India, commonly referred to as IPI (or peace pipeline) is a project of mega importance for Iran. While India is reluctant to go ahead on the project due security reasons, Pakistan has also been slow due to US pressure. Still, Iran is vigorously pursuing the pipeline knowing its importance for the future. Similarly, Iran needs to use its geographical location alongside Central Asia and the Arabian Sea to connect the Central Asian States with the rest of the world. For this reason Iran is developing Chahbahar port, with the help of India. Chahbahar, like Gwadar has the potential to become a hub of regional maritime activity. However, Iran’s current political situation is not conducive in this regard.

Turkmenistan may consider Iran as a viable route for exporting its oil and gas and other maritime trade, but the US and Europe are opposing the Iran route. Therefore, the US is strongly in favour of Trans-Afghanistan (TAP) or a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline. Washington advocates the construction of pipelines in several directions from Central Asia, explicitly excluding Iran.

Despite occasional lows in the relations between Pakistan and Iran, generally, the two countries enjoy good friendly relations. Pakistan sees increasing influence of India in Iran as a cause of concern. Both Iran and Pakistan require each other’s goodwill and, instead of competing for the resources, a way should be found to complement each other. Iran has recently shown interest in setting up of an oil refinery at Gwadar. Iran is perhaps more isolated internationally and needs Pakistan’s goodwill more than ever before. If the countries cooperate on oil pipelines and generate a fair competition among the ports there will be enough trade for both the countries 127 to prosper. Recently, China and Iran have decided to promote bilateral trade and cultural relations. Obviously, the only sensible option to link Iran with China is through Pakistan and this could be a point of convergence for the two countries on Gwadar. Gwadar can provide a link between Iran and Western China.

At present UAE ports of Rashid and Jabal Ali are the centre of regional maritime activity. Dubai ports have contributed significantly to the progress and prosperity of UAE and it will rightly be alarmed at the development of ports like Gwadar, Chahbahar and Salalah which are in a way better located than Dubai. However, a look at the maritime trade statistics indicate a continuous growth in global and regional maritime activity. Although major ports are taking measures to meet this growing demand, there is always a limitation to which a port can be expanded. Therefore, there is already a need for new ports. The immense increase in trade generated by the growth in Chinese economy, reviving economies of South Asia, and dynamics of the Central Asian and Middle East markets require ports to handle additional trade requirements. Even Dubai ports can benefit by using Gwadar as the transshipment hub instead of engaging in meaningless competition.

Saudi Arabia is already working on joint energy projects with China in the later’s Western region. Gwadar will be the shortest route for it to reach out to that area. Furthermore, since Tehran and Beijing have already declared their interest in setting up oil refineries at Gwadar, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries, are also likely to follow suit. Qatar is also interested in laying a pipeline across Gwadar (to India). Therefore, Gwadar, which is all set to become a future energy hub and a petrochemical centre is a gateway linking the Gulf States to China via the bridge called Pakistan. Consequently, healthy competition notwithstanding, Gwadar port is likely to be used by all the Gulf States in future.

China: China as an emerging global power has legitimate interests in the areas of its immediate concern. Pakistan is strategically located astride the Persian Gulf and the North Arabian Sea and, at the cross roads of four important regions of the world. Such an important geographical (as well as ideological) entity cannot be ignored by any regional or extra-regional power; let alone by China which happens to be its neighbour. According to United States Energy 128

Information Administration (EIA) China is currently the world’s largest energy consumer250. It is also the world’s second largest economy slated to surpass the United States by 2020251. China’s desire to play an important role in the North Arabian Sea (Indian Ocean) is a logical outcome of its historic association with the littorals of the area and the presence of her vital trade routes (both sea and land). Its long term interests in the region are both, economic as well as, politico- strategic252. Being also the most populous country and a growing economy, the demand for energy continues to increase putting extra pressure on the People’s government not only to find alternative sources but also to secure their supplies from intervention by other competing powers. In addition it also requires markets to export her consumer goods and to import the needs of her burgeoning populace with ever rising standards of living. Hence economic and energy security seems to dominate her strategic thinking.

In this backdrop, a cursory look at the geographical map of the region is enough to highlight the significance of the Gwadar port for China. Gwadar can provide a strategic foothold for China in the region connecting the energy rich Middle East and Central Asia, and providing trade access to its less developed western provinces. China’s Western region comprises ten provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. It covers 56% of the country’s land mass (5.38 m sq km) and has a population of 287 million people that is just 22.99% of the national total. The area is rich in natural resources but is the least developed253. In Xinjiang province poor economic conditions and lack of development in the area, has created a sense of deprivation and alienation in the native Uyghur population which is sometimes reflected in anti-state activities. With growing status and prestige China would like to present itself as a peaceful and harmonious nation. China realizes that this dream would only come true with across-the-board development and opportunities254. It has therefore, decided to improve the overall condition of these provinces so that economic progress and prosperity overrides nationalistic/secessionist feelings. The effects of economic reforms and the potential have been visible in the last decade. In 2012, Xinjiang’s

250 Official EIA website, www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH, accessed on September 13, 2012. 251 Joseph Nye Jr, The Paradox of American Power, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 19. 252 Ammad Hussain, op.cit., 50. 253 http://www.china-window.com/china_market/china_industry_reports/western-region-developmen.shtml., accessed on May 30, 2013. 254 China’s Peaceful Development, 1st ed., a doctrinal document issued by China’s Information Office of the State Council, (2011), 14. 129 foreign trade was of the order of $ 22.8 billion, 30% higher than the previous year255. It boasts a GDP of 746.6 billion Yuan ($ 118.26b) a year-on-year increase of 12 %256. China has the funds to undertake welfare and development works in the region. It has allocated large industrial zones for establishing manufacturing units. However, due to the area’s remoteness from the more prosperous east and particularly the ports (all of which lie in the east), provisioning of large amounts of energy (petroleum) and raw materials and export of manufactured goods remains a challenge for the government, which remains a major impediment in progress.

The geographical location of Gwadar is ideal to resolve this dilemma. It can provide the shortest possible access to the energy sources as well as to the world markets. People of this region have traditionally used this route for centuries, commonly known as the ‘Silk Route’. Since long the Uyghur Muslim population has also used this route for travelling to Saudi Arabia for Hajj via Islamabad257. On their way these people carryout trade to offset the pilgrimage expenses. In addition, all the merchandize destined for and from Xinjiang or the western provinces of China, from/to Europe, Middle East and Africa through sea can use Gwadar for transit. In this way it will save billions in terms of time and money which can be used for the welfare of the area and improvement of infrastructure from Gwadar to Kashgar. This infrastructure is in any case bound to develop since the trade between the two countries continues to rise after implementation of Free Trade Agreement in 2007258. Furthermore, the existing Chinese ports are under pressure due to a burgeoning economy; the continued growth of GDP by 8-10% is likely to require more ports in the future. Having access to Gwadar for trade destined for their Western regions will reduce workload on the existing ports.

China’s economic security 259depends on “Three Es”, namely: economic growth, energy security, and environmental protection. China is the second largest importer/consumer of oil- a major element in its overall energy calculus. The country was a net oil exporter until the early 1990s and became the world's second largest net importer of oil in 2009. China's oil consumption growth accounted for half of the world's oil consumption growth in 2011. Natural gas usage in

255 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-02/09/content_14568305.htm, accessed on March 3, 2013. 256 www.dbresearch.com/, accessed on March 3, 2013. 257 Pervez Mahmood, “Riding China’s Economic Wave, National Trade Corridor: The Road to Prosperity”, IBEX, January 2009, 18-21. 258 “Official Speaks About Discrepancy in Pak-China Trade Statistics”, Business Recorder, (September 5, 2012). 259 Xuecheng Lieu, “China’s Energy Security”, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, September 2006, available at http://reports-stanleyfoundation.org. 130

China has also increased rapidly in recent years, and China has looked to raise natural gas imports via pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)260.

China's oil demand growth, particularly for petroleum products, hinges on several factors such as domestic economic growth and trade, power generation, transportation sector shifts, and refining capabilities. United States EIA forecasts that China's oil consumption will continue to grow during 2012 and 2013 at a moderate pace. Even so, the anticipated oil growth of over 0.8 million bbl/d between 2011 and 2013 would represent 64 percent of projected world oil demand growth during the two year forecast period261. In anticipation, and taking advantage of the global recession, Chinese companies have started investing in the energy sector worldwide. A recent report of the EIA explains this trend as follows:

Since 2009, Chinese NOCs (National Oil Company) have purchased assets in the Middle East, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The NOCs invested $18 billion in overseas oil and gas assets in 2011. The NOCs increased their natural gas purchases abroad and invested $12 billion in 2011, out of a total $18 billion of oil and gas purchases, to gain more access to LNG and unconventional gas.

At present, China imports about 60% of its energy supplies from the Middle East through the Strait of Hormuz. Analyst believe that by 2025 China will be importing 75% of its oil most of which is to traverse the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca unless an alternative route is found262. Due to growing competition (and resulting tensions), China is extremely wary of its long SLOCs across the Indian and Malacca Straits263. This route remains vulnerable to hostile intervention and even piracy. Besides, the SLOCs are too lengthy and are impossible to defend given the present capability of the PLA Navy. China has been exploring various options to offset this challenge, which has been exploited by the Western and Indian writers in the name of “String of Pearls” strategy 264 . The best option available to China is the ports of Pakistan,

260 EIA, op.cit. 261 Ibid. 262 Tahir Wasim, op.cit., 14. 263 Generally quoted as the “Malacca Dilemma”. 264 The strategy was outlined in a paper “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral,” by Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher J. Pehrson, of the Pentagon’s Air Staff, in Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, July 2006. 131 noticeably Gwadar- the brightest of all the so-called pearls. Besides proposals of trans- Himalayan oil pipeline, China has also shown interest in setting up a large refinery complex at Gwadar. This will allow the Chinese to carry refined products instead of crude oil, making the process cost-effective and more efficient265.

Saudi Arabia is the main exporter of oil to China, accounting for 17% of its requirements and its cooperation with Saudi Arabia in this field continues to grow. SINOPEC (China’s premium petroleum company) has jointly built a refinery and petrochemical company (FRPC) with the help of Saudi Aramco and ExxonMobil in China’s Fujian province. The refinery has the capacity to process 240,000 bpd of crude. SINOPEC and Saudi Aramco are also building a refinery in Yanbu (YASREF) which will be able to process up to 40,000 bpd of Arabian Heavy crude oil and produce refined products for domestic and international markets. This cooperation will be helped if a shorter more secure route is available for transit of the crude oil and products. The distance from the Strait of Hormuz to Kashgar via the Gwadar route, is little over 3000 km whereas, the sea distance from Hormuz to China’s eastern seaboard is 10,000 km, five times more, and vulnerable as well, in addition to over 4500 km further inland.

In 1996 Chinese President Jiang Zemin took a policy decision to re-engage with Africa. Today, African countries which only hold 9-10 percent of global oil reserves, account for one- third of China’s oil imports. Angola is the second largest supplier of oil after Saudi Arabia. Other African countries that export oil to China include the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Gabon, Algeria, Libya, Liberia, Chad, and Kenya 266 . Sudan, as well, supplied a substantial amount of oil to China; however, after the West-sponsored breakup and subsequent impasse between the two parts this supply was halted. In 2009, China surpassed the United States as Africa’s largest trade partner267. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Sino- African trade reached $126.9 billion for 2010, while the trade volume between China and Africa rose 30 percent year-on-year during the first three quarters of 2011, signaling a new record high268. China's top five African trading partners 269 are Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria,

265 Pervez Mahmood, op.cit., 20. 266 http://www.cfr.org/china/expanding-china-africa-oil-ties/p9557, accessed on September 13, 2012. 267 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903392904576510271838147248.html?mg=reno- secaucus-wsj, accessed on September 13, 2012. 268 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-11/16/content_14107209.htm, accessed on September 13, 2012. 132 and Egypt. Chinese imports from the continent of Africa have to travel the same long and insecure route through the Indian Ocean/ Malacca Straits. By diverting these imports to Gwadar China can save a lot of time and foreign exchange. China is also improving its ties with Iran270 and trade through Pakistan/Gwadar is the most viable option. This allows security conscious Beijing to bypass the narrow and vulnerable (both, from piracy and military intervention) Malacca Straits, which, at present, carries up to 80% of the country’s oil imports. Conversely, it also allows the African states a more convenient and secure route to connect to their largest trading partner.

China has acknowledged that Gwadar’s strategic value is no less than that of KKH which helped cement the China-Pakistan relationship. Beijing is also interested in turning it into an energy transport hub by building an oil city and connecting Gwadar via an oil pipeline to China’s Xinjiang region. The planned pipeline will carry crude oil sourced from Arab and African states. Such transport by pipeline will cut freight costs and also help insulate the China imports from interdiction by hostile naval forces in case of any major war271.

In 2011, the Chinese State Council issued a policy document called “China’s Peaceful Development”. In this document the Chinese government has highlighted its future policy in the following words:

China should develop itself through upholding world peace and contribute to world peace through its own development…….War and confrontation will only lead to a vicious cycle of violence begetting violence, while dialogue and negotiation are the only effective and reliable way to settle disputes……China is committed to pursuing a defense policy which is defensive in nature. The fundamental purpose of modernizing the Chinese armed forces is to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and interests of national development272.

269 Lu Yong, “China’s trade Rush with Africa” available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zfgx/t820242.htm, accessed on September 13, 2012. 270 Guangming Daily, (Beijing) http://en.gmw.cn/2012-09/11/content_5043350.htm. 271 http://hisamullahbeg.blogspot.com/2011/01/link-between-gawadar-port-and-kkh.html, accessed on September 01, 2012. 272 China’s Peaceful Development, op.cit., 3,22,18. 133

In fact, China has already been pursuing this policy since Premier Deng Xiao Ping’s economic reforms. It may be noted that China is the only nuclear state which has committed to ‘no-first-use’ of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. However, given the norms of international politics and hegemonic tendencies of regional and extra-regional players it must remain prepared to defend its legitimate interests. China knows that the United States has been attempting to hedge China through various proxies and may interfere with Chinese trade and other interests if its sees its own interests being compromised. Similarly, China is wary of Indian designs in the region and its current honey-moon with the United States which is obviously aimed against China. It is, therefore, imperative for China to develop sufficient maritime capability to be able to defend its interests in the Indian Ocean. In this context, as well, Gwadar can provide an important platform. However, in light of the Chinese policy of peace and reconciliation this possibility seems remote.

Central Asia and Afghanistan: There is no fix universally accepted definition of Central Asia. Different people have suggested varying compositions depending on their own perspective and geo-political expedience. Sometimes, Afghanistan, parts of Iran, Pakistan, China and Russia are also included in the area. However, all compositions of Central Asia do include the five ex-soviet republics namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (generally referred to as the CARs or ‘stans’). For the purpose of this research we refer to these five countries as Central Asia. Central Asia has always been a core region of the Asian Continent connecting West Asia, East Asia, South Asia and Europe through the famous ‘Silk Route’; an ancient trade route which is again finding its relevance in the present ‘resurgence’ of Asia. Besides being part of the same region, these countries also share another unique feature i.e. being virtually land-locked. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are littorals of the Caspian Sea, they still need land route (s) through another country to connect to the wider world. This geographical handicap has put a serious constraint on the countries’ policy making and progress.

These countries are predominantly Muslim. Under the Soviet rule, while their resources were being exploited, the states themselves remained neglected and therefore, poor 273 . The outside world also paid little attention to these states during that era; however, after

273 Michael Kort, Nations in Transition: Central Asian Republics, (New York, Facts on File, 2004), vi. 134 independence they received unprecedented attention, particularly because of their vast hydrocarbon and mineral wealth. It also happened at a time when the existing sources of oil and gas were depleting and the prices rising274.

The following table illustrates the volume of proven energy reserves of Central Asian States:

Country Crude oil Natural Gas Population (Billion Barrels) (Billion Cubic Meters) (2011) 2011 2011 Kazakhstan 30.00 2407 16,674,023 Kyrgyzstan 0.04 5.663 5,532,710 Tajikistan 0.01 5.663 7,849,579 Turkmenistan 0.06 7504 5,526,406 Uzbekistan 0.59 1841 28,850,508 Total 30.70 11763.326 64,433,226

Table 6.1 Proven Reserves of Central Asia (2011) 275

Besides being a historic trade link between Europe and various regions of Asia, the importance of Central Asia lies in its vast reserves of hydrocarbons and minerals. Central Asia has large deposits of coal, iron, copper, lead, phosphates, zinc, gold, uranium, and a variety of other minerals. However, by far the most important natural resources are oil and natural gas, the two essential energy sources that power much of the modern industrialized world. These extremely valuable resources are not equally distributed among the countries of the region, as most of them are beneath or near the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan has huge deposits of both, oil and natural gas, while Turkmenistan has some of the world’s largest natural gas deposits and some oil deposits. Uzbekistan has smaller but still significant natural gas deposits. Kyrgyzstan has very limited amount of oil and gas, while Tajikistan must rely on hydroelectric power as its main domestic source of energy. Due to its enormous energy potential the region is destined to play an

274 According to some estimates the Alaska and North Sea deposits will exhaust by 2015, (Constantine Arvanitopoulos, “The Geopolitics of Oil in Central Asia”, March 2002). 275 Data collected from official websites of CIA and EIA on September 22-23, 2012. 135 important role in global energy demand growth over the next twenty years276. The countries still depend on Russia for transporting/ exporting their energy to other countries, a handicap being exploited by Russia, both politically as well as economically. Once these republics have found open access to the warm waters of the North Arabian Sea, they will be able to manage their resources and their policies in a better and independent manner.

The total population of the Central Asian Republics is less than 65 million. All these states are regarded as poor and underdeveloped, hence their own energy requirements are not large. It is, therefore, obvious that they have plenty of stocks to offer to the world. But being land-locked states their major dilemma is how to export their resources to the outside world. Being part of the erstwhile USSR these states had no connections with the rest of the world. At the time of independence, the countries found themselves totally dependent on Russia for imports and exports. This was not only the longest route but also made them vulnerable to Russian dictates. Therefore, the governments started looking for alternative routes. The options available to the CARs to export/ import commodities are various and briefly discussed as under277:

a. The Northern Route: This option entails expansion of the existing network, from Kazakhstan via Russia to Black Sea through the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Obviously favoured by Russia, it involves fear of establishing excessive Russian control over the network. Already, Kazakhstan is exporting most of its oil to Russia. When Kazakhstan signed an agreement with Chevron, Moscow initially refused to allow use of its pipeline network. Later, after stiff negotiations and imposition of high tariffs, Russia only allowed a defined quantity of oil to pass through its pipelines. These pressure tactics allowed Russia to become member of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which is to build a $2 billion pipeline from Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk. Therefore, both, the Europeans as well as the Central Asians (particularly Kazakhs) would like to have alternatives available. b. The Western Route: This is the route preferred by most Europeans and Turkey. This route envisages a pipeline across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea port of Supsa (Georgia). Whence it can be shipped to Europe. However, Turkey has claimed that Bosphorus will not be able to handle the increased tanker traffic

276 “Integrating Central Asia into the World Economy: The Role of Energy and Transport Infrastructure,” A report prepared by the Carnegie Endowment and Wolfensohn Center For Development (Brookings), October, 2007. 277 Arvanitopoulos, op.cit. 136

and proposes a pipeline from Baku (Azerbaijan) to Ceyhan, a Turkish port in Mediterranean. Analysts believe that due to exorbitant costs (around $2.9 billion) and security issues (the proposed route passes through unstable Kurdish territory), this is not a feasible option. If Turkey insists, the alternative could be to bypass Bosphorus through a pipeline linking Bulgarian port of Burgas (Black Sea) with Alexandroupolis (a Greek port). c. The Eastern Route: this is the route linking the Central Asian countries to China (via pipeline as well as road/rail). China has already constructed a 2228 km long gas pipeline linking Kazakhstan’s Caspian shore (Atyrau) to Xinjiang (Alashankou); during the project Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also joined and since December 2009 China is connected to all the three countries via pipeline. China is currently the second biggest consumer of oil and the number one consumer of energy. Its energy demands continue to rise and will remain an important market for Central Asian oil and gas for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Chinese route is not feasible for further export (or imports in case of other commodities) to the rest of the world (particularly Europe, which is an important trade partner for the Central Asian states) due to excessive distances involved. d. The Southern Route 1: Geographically, one of the most viable options may be to link Central Asian states with Iran and use its ports (Bandar Abbas or Chahbahar) to connect with the rest of the world. Iran has invested a great deal in infrastructure (also being helped by India, because India also prefers this route to access Central Asia). It is already linked with Turkmenistan and offers the shortest access to the warm waters of the North Arabian Sea from the East Caspian coast. However, for the time being this option is practically shelved due to the opposition of United States and the West. This route does not seem politically viable in the near future due to estranged relations of Iran with the West. No international or regional institution will fund the project due to sanctions on Iran and even if the links are established there will not be many customers. e. The Southern Route 2: this route makes sense both geographically as well as economically. United States is already pushing construction of a pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan (American Oil Company Unocal has shown interest in the project). After construction of deep water port at Gwadar which is very close to the Persian Gulf and ideally located at the North Arabian Sea, this route has 137

gained immense significance. This route provides the shortest distance for some Central Asian states (as already illustrated under ‘Geographical Location’) and the most feasible under the circumstances. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are members of CAREC (Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation) which further adds to the significance of this route. This route also bypasses the more turbulent Kabul and Eastern Afghan regions. Still, the outcome of this route is dependent on peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Due to the dependence of the Central Asian states on other countries for trade, these countries are incurring heavy costs on movement of goods. The countries remain relatively poor on the LPI (Logistics Performance Index) and are still in search of better options to trade their goods. The cost of trading e.g. a 20ft container for the Central Asian states is more than five times than for Pakistan278. While the world is more interested in their oil and gas reserves, they have other valuable minerals (like Uranium) and are trying to diversify their trade which includes crude oil, metals and cotton fiber. They need to import machinery, transport equipment and consumer goods besides other things. All countries/ trading groups are wooing Central Asia to construct pipelines and follow routes of their choices. The importance of these routes is clearly described in the words of a Russian Newspaper ‘Izvestiya’:

The struggle for future routings of oil from CIS countries to the world market is entering a decisive stage. The victor in this struggle will receive not only billions of dollars annually in the form of transit fees: the real gain will be control over pipelines, which will be the most important factor of geopolitical influence in the Transcaucasia and in Central Asia in the next century.

Afghanistan is another land-locked country bordering Pakistan, which is sometimes included in Central Asia and sometimes in South Asia. Afghanistan has been dependent for its seaborne trade on Pakistan. Total trade flow between Pakistan and Afghanistan comprises 85% of all trade between Pakistan and the land-locked countries. However, despite growth in trade volumes Afghan transit trade only generates 0.6% of total port traffic279. Currently, Karachi port is looking after the trade interests of Afghanistan. After operationalizing of Gwadar port and

278 Jesus Felip and Utsav Kumar, “The Role of Trade Facilitation in Central Asia: A Gravity Model”, New York Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No.68, October 2010, 7. 279 Tahir Wasim, op.cit., 16. 138 related infrastructure this responsibility will be taken over by Gwadar. Afghanistan is a country full of natural resources, which include the world’s largest deposits of copper and large deposits of high grade iron ore. The country also possesses oil, gas, coal and precious stones. However, at present the country is under foreign occupation and in a state of war. It is, therefore, difficult to predict the future outcome. For some time Afghanistan has started diverting some of its trade through Iran. Nevertheless, so far its major trade is through Pakistani ports and as the country comes out of this situation and improves economically, this dependency is likely to increase. Once Afghanistan is stabilized and its natural wealth is fully exploited, it has the potential to generate huge amount of trade activity, which would need operationally feasible and economically viable sea route(s). Gwadar route provides a much shorter distance compared to any other port in the region. It will also be a preferred option even over Karachi due to shorter distance and being away from urban congestion. Hence Gwadar is the most suited option for Afghanistan. One of the projects that Afghanistan is very keen to implement is TAPI, through which Afghanistan can earn substantial revenues and employment opportunities for thousands of Afghan citizens280. Transit trade from Central Asia to Gwadar can provide much needed succor to Afghan economy.

Afghanistan is also a member of CAREC, it’s a partner of the Organization for security and Cooperation (OSCE), a member of the South and Central Asia Trade Forum, and has also applied for accession to the WTO. This shows Afghanistan’s desire to develop economic links with Central Asia and the rest of the world. Afghanistan is committed to a strategy of regional integration because of its unique geopolitical location astride Central and South Asia and the Middle East. Afghanistan’s ability to pull itself out of the current war and create the foundations for an open, growing economy will have far reaching implications for the development of Central Asian transport corridors and energy sector development. The Developments in Afghanistan will, therefore, have impact on the future trade at Gwadar.

Pipeline Politics

Gwadar’s role is also very important in the new game of ‘pipeline politics’. The modern world economy is dominated by the need for energy, especially fossil fuels, which power

280 According to estimates Afghanistan can earn US $100-300 million per year in transit fees from TAPI project. 139 everything from transportation to agriculture. Gwadar could provide access to Central Asia to export its energy resources to the world. According to some estimates these reserves match the combined oil reserves of Iraq and Kuwait, and natural gas stocks of Saudi Arabia281. Being land- locked, all Central Asian States are completely dependent on Russia for export of oil and gas. The Russian companies enjoy complete monopoly and exploit these states to gain political as well as economic mileage. For example, reportedly, Russian companies purchase Central Asian gas at one-third or even one-quarter of the market price in Europe and then resell this gas at market price282. These circumstances forced international buyers to think of bypassing Russia by constructing pipelines. These pipelines would allow the CARs to sell their commodity directly to the purchasers at market price. Different routes have been proposed for these pipelines, the most favoured one being the Trans-Afghan route (TAP) culminating at Gwadar. Needless to say that the pipelines will benefit the CARs and their customers, but the countries hosting the pipeline would also get substantial revenues in the form of transit fees. In addition, these countries will have easy access to the hydrocarbons to meet their own energy needs. This situation has led to intense competition not only among regional countries that possess easy access to world markets through their deep-water ports, but also among energy-hungry players who need to fund these projects. Every stake holder is vying for the project most suited to its own future needs. Due to the proximity and location of Gwadar, Pakistan is poised to benefit immensely from these projects.

281 Jason R Murtha, The Strategic Importance of Balochistan, Post Graduate Thesis, (Monterey: Naval Post Graduate School, 2011), 34. 282 Ariel Cohen, "U.S. Interests and Central Asia Energy Security,” The Heritage Foundation, November 15, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/11/us-interests-and-central-asia-energy-security. 140

CHAPTER SIX

CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY & PROSPERITY

Pakistan is a land of opportunities and challenges. The current population of Pakistan is estimated to be over 180 million. Pakistan is bestowed with a large land area with diverse features and abundant natural resources. Yet, twenty two percent of its population is living below poverty. The country’s per capita income is merely $2800.00 and its total trade amounts to $65.23 billion (2011 estimates)283. Pakistan’s maritime trade, during the financial year 2009-10 was approximately 67m tons284. As already mentioned, ports have historically been a hallmark or stimulus for flourishing economies. Most of the thriving civilizations owe their existence and prosperity to availability of ports. Pakistan is extremely fortunate to be in possession of a number of ports but has not been able to fully exploit these God given gifts so far. Karachi contributes significantly in the overall economy of Pakistan. Similarly, Gwadar bears immense potential to transform Pakistan’s geostrategic, economic and political landscape. The geography of Pakistan connecting important regions of the world and the location of Gwadar astride the warm waters of the North Arabian Sea, in close proximity of the Persian Gulf, has all the ingredients to become a dream maritime hub. However, it will require strong political will, commitment, meticulous planning and patient implementation to achieve the desired results. The importance of Gwadar for Pakistan may be summarized in the ensuing paragraphs.

Maritime Importance

Pakistan has so far relied solely on the Karachi/ Bin Qasim port complex. Due to the close proximity of these two ports to each other and to India, these ports remain vulnerable to attack or blockade. The ports are within 200 km of Indian border and vulnerable to attack from air as well as surface units. This constitutes a strategic vulnerability. This vulnerability was successfully exploited by India during the 1971 war285. Gwadar is located 476 km westward of Karachi. The Indian Air Force bases of Nalya and Bhuj are both more than 750 km from Gwadar

283 CIA World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html, accessed on July 13, 2012. 284 www.ship-technology.com/projects/port-qasim/ accessed on January 13, 2013. 285 India successfully attacked port installations, naval units and merchant ships during the 1971 war. 141 while the Mumbai naval port is about 1280 km. It is, therefore, extremely difficult for India to carryout similar attacks on Gwadar.

In addition, having more ports along its coast, spread at safe distances, provides much desired depth and flexibility to Pakistan Navy. Instead of being bottled up in one vulnerable port, the navy can now disperse its forces, gaining strategic reach and poise advantage. On the other hand, it provides Pakistan with superior orientation being located at the mouth of the Gulf of Oman. Gwadar is ideally located for monitoring and security of SLOCs emanating from the Persian Gulf and checking of illicit activities along the Pakistan coast. All the traffic coming from the Persian Gulf passes within striking distances of Gwadar. it is easy to observe flow patterns, frequency and routes of all shipping. Moreover, the ERF generally operate in areas close to south of Gwadar and it is easy to monitor their activities from Gwadar. Because of these reasons, any country which has stakes in the Persian Gulf must have genuine interest in developments at this port. This places Pakistan in an extremely advantageous position vis-à-vis its adversaries and is the main reason for concern of India and the US.

MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF GWADAR PORT

Ormara GULF Gwadar SLOCs Karachi

80 NM 120 NM 120 NM 150 NM

240 NM Kandla 240 NM

Mumbai 600 NM Vizag

Karwar

RED SEA SLOCS Chennai

24 Cochin

Figure 7.1 SLOCs Emerging from the Gulf 142

Majority of Pakistan’s trade and all the oil comes from the western approaches whether coming from the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf. Before Gwadar Pakistan had to employ considerable naval units for the protection of its HVUs, particularly after they left traffic lanes in the Gulf of Oman and headed for Karachi. During the passage not only the ships remained vulnerable to attack for almost a day, they also tied down a number of naval units which could otherwise be employed for other operational tasks. Gwadar is so close to the Gulf that the ships after leaving traffic lanes will require very little time in reaching the safe havens of the port. This makes it very difficult to interdict Pakistan-bound shipping. Due to this decreased vulnerability Pakistan will be able to receive vital supplies, during war and tension, with lesser risks and consequently smaller war premiums. Similarly, Pakistan can shift its strategic oil storages from Karachi, where they remain vulnerable286, to Gwadar.

It may be noted that India is equally dependent on oil supplies and trade from the Gulf. Pakistan navy with its superior ‘strategic orientation’ sitting conveniently along India’s supply routes will be in a better position to interdict Indian shipping. Therefore, Gwadar is extremely important from point of view of, both military as well as economic, security.

Figure 7.2 Comparison of Trade Forecasts for Pakistani Ports

286 During 1971 Operations Trident and Python, the oil storage tanks caught fire because of the Indian Navy missile attacks, due to which more than 50% of oil was blown away. 143

Pakistan’s current maritime trade is 67 m tons. The present cargo handling capacity of Karachi and Bin Qasim ports is sufficient to handle the existing trade volumes. However, the trade forecasts indicate exponential rise in volumes far exceeding the capacity of the two ports (See Figure 7.2).

Pakistan’s economy and industrial base may be under-developed, but there are excellent prospects for growth and acceleration. Pakistan did show a high GDP and GDP-per-capita growth in the previous decades which is an indication of Pakistan’s potential. The current low in the economy, due to the ‘War-On-Terror’ and ‘global recession’ is only temporary and the economy has the potential to bounce back under right policies and environment. The study conducted by Arthur D Little287 forecasts that Gwadar’s port traffic is likely to be between 42-65 million tons in the short term (15 years) (Figure 7.3) while in the long term (50 years) Gwadar should become a major port, handling one third of Pakistan’s trade with a throughput volumes of 300-350 million tons (Figure 7.4). The study bases its forecasts on the assumption that in the short term, major contributor to port traffic shall be local industry development and national import/export. While the benefits of transshipment and transit trades are likely to take longer (Figure 7.5). However, in the researcher’s analysis, given timely connectivity, if a sizable portion of China’s trade is diverted to Gwadar, it may become a major contributory factor in the short term. The report also suggests that liquid bulk and containers will be the main contributors until 2020, reflecting the importance and potential of petrochemical activities (Figure 7.6). With the planned influx of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the area, Pakistan could become a major world conduit for petro-chemical trade and greatly stimulate its economic growth. Estimates suggest potential FDI to the tune of $8 billion, for infrastructure and social development projects288.

The statistics, even without taking into consideration the envisaged transit and transshipment trade in the short-term, justify investment in operationalizing of an additional port to augment existing port infrastructure of Pakistan both from commercial and security point of view.

287 Arthur D Little is a US Management Consultancy Firm that was hired by the government of Pakistan for feasibility study of Gwadar port. 288 Sarfraz Ahmed, “The Latest Hotspot: Gwadar”, Daily Times, May 5, 2004, Quoted in Murtha, op.cit., 43. 144

Figure 7.3 Gwadar Port Traffic Forecast

Traffic forecast – National port traffic

In 2055, Gwadar will have become a major port, handling about one third of the nation’s trade with a throughput volume of 300-350 mln tons

National port traffic throughput forecast

Port traffic (mln tons) 1100 Best case: 1125 1000 Existing Ports Worst case: 950 900 Gwadar Port 800 New Port 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Sources: Pakistan Board of Statistics, Karachi Port, Port Qasim, many others, Arthur D. Little analysis

Figure 7.4 Pakistan Port Traffic Throughput Forecast 145

Figure 7.5 Short Term Contribution Sector-wise

Figure 7.6 Short Term Contribution Cargo-wise 146

Traffic forecasts – Long term

Looking ahead long term, the relative weight of the different sources of cargo through Gwadar will shift

Share of traffic in Gwadar over the years

4 1Local industrial 2 3 National Ex-Im Transhipment Transit Trade development

Short Term Small, minor, (<15 yrs) Most important, key Second most although Transit with Small, but growing driver important China may become substantial

1Local industrial 2 3 4 Transhipment Transit Trade National Ex-Im development

Long Term (40-50 yrs) Still most important Share grows Share grows Share declines

Figure 7.7 Short and Long Term Traffic Forecast of Gwadar Port

Natural Resources

Balochistan is a province full of natural resources most of which have not yet been tapped. Large reservoirs of gas, possibility of oil, and discovery of precious minerals has attracted international interest in the province. Investors and developers are showing keen interest to take part in the development process and be part of the potential bonanza. The subsoil holds a substantial portion of Pakistan’s energy and mineral resources, accounting for 36 percent of its total gas production. It also holds large quantities of coal, gold, copper, silver, platinum, aluminum, and, above all, uranium. There is an estimated stock of 200m tons of iron289 and 217m tons of coal290. Saindak Gold & Copper mines are estimated to contain reserves of up to 412m tons291. Similarly, Reko Dik reportedly contains 5.9 billion tons of Copper & Gold 292. The province lacks proper infrastructure to transport these resources. The construction of Gwadar

289 http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/top-menu-explore-balochistan/top-menu-natural-resources.html#6 accessed on January 13, 2013. 290 Faisal Mushtaq et al, “Coal Fired Power Generation Potential of Balochistan”, www.vurup.sk/petroleum-coal accessed on January 13, 2013. 291 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saindak_Copper_Gold_Project, accessed on January 12, 2013. 292 Ibid. 147 port and requisite infrastructure linking it with the rest of the country and beyond will provide an easy access for export of these minerals. A road from Saindak has already been constructed to link it with Gwadar293. In addition, Balochistan also offers a vast and potentially rich EEZ spread over an area of approximately 180,000 sq km. A modern port and supporting infrastructure is required to exploit the full potential of this important resource as well.

Economic Potential

In the long term Gwadar port is likely to earn enormous revenues for the country by providing transit and transshipment facility to a number of countries. It is the shortest and most feasible route to the sea for most Central Asian countries. It provides the best option to China’s western provinces, and even to Russia, to link to the rest of the world. Central Asian economies are still very weak and are likely to take a while before these can be major factor in transit trade through Gwadar. Moreover, trade with Central Asia is dependent on the situation in Afghanistan as well which is not likely to recover in the short term. Therefore, the transit trade is given less weight in the short term. However, notwithstanding the traffic forecasts of the study, if China diverts even a small percentage of its trade through Gwadar, the figures could soar dramatically. In 2012 China’s total volume of foreign trade amounted to $3.867 trillion. China is an important trading partner for Pakistan, and increased trade between the two countries is a major anticipated benefit of the Gwadar deep sea port. Annual trade between the two countries has risen steadily to over $2.4 billion. Xinjiang, the western province of China bordering Pakistan, had an annual foreign trade of $22.8 billion in 2012, thirty percent higher than the previous year and a GDP of $118.26 billion in 2011294, a year on year increase of 12 percent. These figures are sure to rise exponentially as China pays more attention to this neglected region, and if access to the region is provided through Gwadar. A sure sign of progress in this region is borne by the fact that in 2012 Xinjiang earned tourism revenues of up to $9.17 billion (57.6 billion Yuan) a year on year increase of 30%. 295 Afghanistan provides the shortest route to the Central Asian States and therefore, its stability is important, nevertheless, the CARs could still link to Gwadar (or

293 Reema Kazmi op.cit., 14. 294 Murtha, op.cit., 40. 295 http://www.travel-impact-newswire.com/2013/01/chinas-ethnic-muslim-province-of-xinjiang-enjoys-tourism- boom-in-2012/#story1, accessed on January 30, 2013 148

Karachi) via Iran and China. Both the countries already have road/ rail infrastructure connecting with Central Asia.

In the same context, it is essential to evaluate the world’s growing energy needs. It is estimated that the demand of natural gas will continue to grow by 2.75% annually for next 20 years. Crude oil seaborne shipments increased by 3.5% to 1.66 billion tonnes and the oil demands would remain unabated for many years. 296 Ever increasing requirements of global energy markets would need additional natural resources as well as alternative routes for their transportation. Natural resources of CARs gain importance in this regard and the Gwadar port is one of the priority routes for their access to world energy markets. Therefore, large volumes of natural resources are logically expected to flow through the Gwadar port, generating enormous revenues for Pakistan’s economy.

In addition to road and rail networks that could earn large transit fees for Pakistan, a number of other initiatives are also being planned. For example, there are a number of oil and gas pipelines on the cards which will generate a lot of economic activity for the region. Further, there are also plans to establish an ‘oil city’ at Gwadar. China and Iran have already shown their interest in setting up oil refineries at Gwadar and other countries such as Saudi Arabia may also follow suit in future.

Once requisite infrastructure, facilities and services are made available at the Gwadar port it will also be a port of choice for transshipment of cargo to and from a number of countries. Its ideal location, natural deep water port and quick turn-around will attract larger vessels to offload their cargo for further transshipment to the countries in the Persian Gulf and the littorals of the North Arabian Sea.

Industrial Potential

As discussed earlier, Gwadar has a tremendous potential to link various regions and act as an important economic and commercial hub. This strategic advantage in geography, offers Gwadar with the prospects to become an important industrial powerhouse within the Pakistan economy.

296 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Review of Maritime Trasnport-2004”, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2004_en.pdf, accessed on December 25, 2010. 149

A detailed study conducted by by Arthur D Little has to offer following deductions on the industrial potential of Gwadar297:

1. General: Gwadar has the potential to become a large city with a large and diversified economic and industrial base. On the longer term, all possible industrial sectors and sub-sectors will appear in Gwadar.

2. Heavy Industries: There is good potential for investments in specific heavy industries in Gwadar, namely steel making, cement, building materials, car assembly, shipyard and marine services (e.g. ship breaking). These industries leverage on specific advantages of Gwadar i.e. Greenfield, availability of land, availability of factor inputs etc. Most of these industries have substantial port and economic impacts and spin offs. There is also a potential for mineral processing.

3. Manufacturing: The development of a textiles & clothing industry in Gwadar is certain. It will be a significant contributor especially in terms of employment. The food processing sector and building materials have moderate potentials. Many other export- oriented industries can also be attracted due to Gwadar’s advantages (new port, tax-free status).

4. Petrochemicals: Particularly in the oil and gas sector, Gwadar has strong potential. To tap this potential, efforts need to be directed towards attracting oil refining, petrochemicals and gas. These facilities are essential to trigger and facilitate the development of numerous downstream petrochemical complexes, gas-based industries, chemical industries and energy-intensive industries.

Competitive Advantages

Gwadar enjoys a number of specific advantages, which provide it definite competitive edge. These advantages can be exploited by specific industries to ensure their success. Some of

297 Extracted from the study of Arthur D Little, op.cit. 150 these advantages which validate Gwadar’s potential as a future industrial hub are enumerated below298:

Competitive Advantages Industrial Development Opportunities

Greenfield, low land cost, low Land intensive industrial complexes e.g. steel mill. development costs Low cost of port and industrial development

Low labour cost Labour intensive sectors e.g. textiles

Proximity to oil & gas resources Oil & gas related processing and downstream industries e.g. petrochemicals

Proximity to fast growing Gulf States Export industries that meet Gulf States’ import needs e.g. automotive, consumer goods

Proximity to major shipping lanes Ship related industries e.g. ship repair

Agricultural resources, including the Food processing, fish-processing coastline

Mineral resources Minerals processing e.g. building materials, cement

Short access channel, deep draft, short Industries that require large export/import quantities turnaround times and corresponding ship sizes e.g. oil refining

Tax-free status for new investments + Export-oriented manufacturing incentives + port proximity

Table 7.1 Competitive Advantages of Gwadar

298 Muneer Ahmed, GPA, in discussion with the author, Gwadar, December 19, 2012. 151

An assessment of the industry sectors considered most important for Gwadar’s industrial development shows highly promising results299:

Industry Sectors Conclusions Economic Main Complications On Potential Benefits

Steel Making Need government sector strategy. Need global player as investor.

Cement Location selection.

Building Materials ST None

Marine Services None

Shipyard Need major (Korean or Chinese) Player. Major incentives needed.

Automotive Need good strategic plan and policy support.

Food Processing ST Limited agro resources. Government needs to be proactive. LT

Textile & Clothing None

Oil Refining Government support.

Petrochemicals Security on oil refinery and gas supply.

Fertilizer Secure gas supply.

LNG Terminal Coordination between different players.

Excellent Good Medium Low

Table 7.2 Assessment of Industry sectors suitable for Gwadar

299 Based on Muneer Ahmad, op.cit. and Arthur D Little, op.cit. 152

Shipping and Ship-building

Development of Gwadar port will also give a much needed boost to the shipping industry of the country. As mentioned earlier, there is no private carrier in Pakistan and the national shipping is unable to lift substantial percentage of Pakistani cargo 300. Gwadar may act as a catalyst in giving the much needed impetus to the shipping industry, thereby attracting private ship-owners in the country. It is natural that when trade volumes increase and the stakes are risen, there will be pressure on the government to increase its shipping fleet. In addition, the business will also attract private ship owners. More Pakistan flag vessels will be required to lift national cargo as well as provide services to other customers especially for transshipment to and from Gwadar. This in return will increase the requirement of shipbuilding and repairs. Therefore, Gwadar has the potential to become an important shipbuilding and repairs centre bringing substantial foreign exchange to the country. Shipping industry is an important element of maritime power and plays extremely useful role in the strengthening of national economy, in addition to complementing the naval forces in times of need.

Fishing and Related Activities

Another important maritime aspect of a port is fishing. Fishing has been given the status of an industry and involves a number of people and ancillary activities. It is natural that majority of the people in Gwadar town and its associated tehsils i.e. Jiwani, Pasni and Ormara, are associated with the trade of fishing. Gwadar town, being the largest of the four, contributes the most as well. Fishing is carried out all along the coast, however, the vessels tend to be concentrated where there are suitable harbours and sheltered landing places. As observed earlier, most of the Makran coast is not suitable for human habitation; hence the people and the fishermen tend to congregate in areas where they find some basic facilities and infrastructure. In terms of fish landing sites, the Balochistan coast is divided into three clusters as shown in Table 7.3 and Figure 7.8301. For this reason, the fishing is concentrated at 10 major and 30 minor landing sites, the list of which is reproduced below302:

300 The national flag carrier currently accounts for only 9% of the national trade. 301 Competitiveness Support Fund (CSF), Balochistan Fisheries Development Study: Options for Balochistan Coastal Fisheries and Aquaculture, (September, 2008), vi. 302 Ibid., 21. 153

Fish Landing sites and harbours of Balochistan. (From Balochistan Department of Fisheries data) Eastern Cluster Central Cluster Western Cluster BUNDI WARI KUND MALIR CHANDDI GADDANI MEHD BANDAR KALMAT SONMIANI BALRA ISPEHAK DAMB HUDD ZARAIN BERA ORMARA EAST I PASNI PORE ORMARA WEST II CHUR SPATT TAAK SHAMAL BANDAR HINGOL KOHI DARAG BALL KAPPAR SIKUNI SUR BUNDER BASOL SUNT DHOR MAKOLA GWADAR EAST I GWADAR WEST II SHABI PISHUKAN GANZ ROBAR JEWANI NBANDARI PANWA

Table 7.3 Fish Landing Sites in Balochistan (Large landing sites shown in Bold)

These clusters are based round sheltered landing areas and centres of population. The ‘Western Cluster’ near the Iranian border is centered on Gwadar, the ‘Central Cluster’ on Omara and the ‘Eastern Cluster’ around Damb.

154

Figure 7.8 Map of Balochistan Coast showing “Clusters” of Fish landing sites (catches in tons x 1000 (2005))

The Balochistan Vision 2020 303 gives an estimate of 40,000 active fishermen in Balochistan. The Balochistan Fisheries Presentation (2008)304 suggests 48,900 active fishermen and locates them in the 8 main fishing towns as follows:

Jiwani 4612 Pishukan 3684 Sur (Bunder) 3990 Gwadar 8746 Pasni 9853 Ormara 5844 Damb 7333 Gaddani 4838 Total: 48,900

Numbers of fishermen are derived from the numbers of boats and an estimate of the number of skippers and crew on the boats. The boats data is derived from licensing and is quite accurate. The fishing boat data released by the Balochistan Coastal Development Authority (BCDA) in 2007 is shown in Table 7.4.305:

303 “Balochistan Vision 2020”, Government of Balochistan, Coastal Development and Fisheries Department. 304 “Balochistan Fisheries” Power Point presentation quoted in “Balochistan Fisheries Development Study”, (Islamabad: Competitiveness Support Fund, 2008). 305 The Fisheries Handbook 2009 indicates that the total number of fishing boats registered in Balochistan in 2007 was 6316 (1672 Mechanized, 4641 Mechanized-cum-sail boats and 03 sail boats) whereas, for the year 2008 the same figure is 6378. 155

Type of boat Jiwa Pishuk Gwad Sur Pasni Omar Damb Gadda Total Mechanized 171 172 277 141 265 153 113 158 1,450 ni an ar a ni Motorized 392 258 808 391 957 686 672 392 4,556 OthersBoats - - - - - 11 56 78 145 TotalBoats 563 430 1,085 532 1,222 850 841 628 6,151 Percentage 9% 7% 18% 9% 20% 14% 14% 10% 100%

Table 7.4 Fishing Boats Statistics of Balochistan

It may, however, be noted that in both cases, data from only eight major landing sites is available, 32 minor fishing sites have been ignored which means that the actual figures could be much higher. It may be deduced from above that Gwadar and Pasni are the two major fishing towns. With infrastructural improvements and rising standards of living in Gwadar, due to the deep sea port, Gwadar is likely to attract more fishermen and capital investment in fishing industry, resulting in increase in fishing activity. The Fisheries department data for 2008 indicates 1779306 fishing vessels operating in Gwadar. The data also claims that there are 16,803 full time fishermen in Gwadar (which is twice the numbers indicated above for 2006 by the BCDA). Fishing activity is 100% male orientated. It is not the norm in the coastal societies for women to fish. Fishing still remains the only major activity in coastal towns of Balochistan. Though, with development of deep water port and other industries, alternative employment opportunities are increasingly becoming available at Gwadar.

Fish catch reported from major fishing towns in 2007 was307:

Location Catch (Tons) Value (PKR Millions) Jiwani 14,994 825 Pishukan 9,435 444 Gwadar 35,029 182 Sur Bander 9,357 451 Pasni 27,240 1,522 Ormara 16,815 806 Damb 16,157 787 Gadanni 6,371 329 Total 135,398 5,346

306 Of these 435 were Mechanized/ Gillnetters while 1344 were motorized/ small day trippers. 307 CSF, op.cit., 11. 156

Statistics related to fishing in Pakistan may not be very accurate and therefore, should be viewed with caution. Actual figures may be higher since all fish catch is not accounted for because of a number of reasons. The fact that needs to be brought home is that Gwadar is the second largest contributor after Karachi to the fishing sector. However, the share of fishing in the overall economy is very small 308. With better management and investment, Gwadar has the capacity to do better and increase this share.

There are a number of fish processing plants in Gwadar (a total of about 20 processing plants along the coast, of which 9 are in Gwadar, including one each in Surbandar and Pishukan)309. Most of the processed stock is exported and earns foreign exchange. One of the limitations on Gwadar’s contribution depends on the fact that the entire catch has to go to Karachi. The produce is taken fresh or frozen to Karachi by road. About 52,678 tonnes of fish is sent to Karachi frozen (41.8% of the total catch), and another 26,560 tonnes of fish (19.6% of the catch) is sent there fresh; a total of more than 8 billion PKR in value; 475 tonnes of fresh and frozen shrimp, valued at 3.89 billion PKR, make up the second most valuable section of the catch and 207 tonnes of lobster (value 2.29 billion PKR) is the third most important of the total 310 . The Makran coastal highway has considerably improved transportation time and conditions to Karachi. However, there is still lapse of valuable time. Some of the larger vessels from Gwadar venture as far to Africa, India and Sri lanka311. These vessels frequently offload their catch at Iranian ports, because of lack of canneries at Gwadar. Some of the smaller fishing vessels also trade their catch at Iranian ports in lieu of fuel or other items. There are no statistics available for fish consumed locally especially that which lands at smaller sites. The fishing industry also requires ice plants, which are available all along the coast. There are, reportedly 8 ice plants in Gwadar312.

A number of departments are responsible for management and infrastructure development in the fishery sector; which include the Gwadar Development Authority,

308 State Bank figures of 2005 indicate the share of fishery in the economy is only 0.3%, and 0.9% in total export earnings. 309 Abdul Basit Qadir Bukhsh, President Gwadar Chamber of Commerce, in discussion with the author, Gwadar, December 22, 2012. 310 CSF, op.cit., 25. 311 Ibid. 19. 312 Ibid. 27. 157

Balochistan Coastal Devlopment Authority, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Ports and Shipping, Ministry of Food and Agriculture etc. Lack of coordination between these departments is a cause of concern for the future of fishery industry in the area.

Gwadar deep water port does not now provide any shipping facilities for getting fish product out in containers, since there are no ships calling there. The airport does not accept international flights from large planes. As a result nearly all the fish for export travels to Karachi from the fish processors and handling stations. An unknown amount goes to Iran, either by road or is unloaded directly by boats stopping in Iranian landing sites. In Iran the vessels also buy fuel and other items to return to Pakistan. The border is porous. A very small amount of fish goes inland from coastal towns. Operationalizing of Gwadar port and development of ancillary facilities will help in enhancing the fish landings and will also improve fish processing and export procedures. Hence Gwadar can also contribute substantially in the fishing sector as well.

Investment Opportunities

With the development of Gwadar as an international port and attractive business centre; human resources, both labour and capital, will galvanize towards Gwadar and Balochistan, bringing increased international exposure to this province. Development results in investment opportunities, both for locals as well as foreigners. Pakistan is an investment friendly country and a large portion of its total investment has always come from FDI, be it from Asia or Europe. Pakistan needs to capitalize on its strengths. Some of the potential investment opportunities in Gwadar include313:

- Private owned warehouse and cold storage units. - Private cargo handling equipment and trucking yards. - Development of industrial zone and industries. - Ship building and Repairs Industry. - Hospitals, colleges and schools. - Tourism related industry. - Water sports. - Bunkering of vessels, large fuel storage and mobile barges.

313 Reema op.cit.,16. 158

- Oil refinery and large oil storage. - Ferry services between Gwadar and surrounding ports314.

Progress and Prosperity

Gwadar port has the potential, directly and indirectly, to bring enormous wealth, progress and prosperity to the area which has traditionally been left behind in development. If Gwadar is built on the lines of a modern port cum city, as per the master plan, with all modern day services and facilities, it can become a hub of business and tourism, generating substantial revenues for the country315. The Gwadar Development Authority estimates that 1.7 million people will move to Gwadar in the next thirty years. Future activities at Gwadar are expected to generate about two million new jobs in just 8-10 years316, subject to operationalizing of the port as per the master plan. A number of new industries, services and facilities are likely to come up in the area. Despite the fact that the port has not been functioning as planned, signs of progress and prosperity are already visible in Gwadar city317. New and modern residential areas, hotels, buildings, schools, hospitals and roads are indicative of the positive effects of port development. All this activity will eventually contribute toward the development of the area and welfare of its people.

Challenges and Obstacles

Lack of Expertise: KPT was established more than 125 years and has been running the Karachi port since. Port Muhammad Bin Qasim was developed and the Port Qasim Authority was established, to manage the port, in 1973. Despite this long experience of managing these ports the country lacks expertise to develop and run a modern port. Due to this handicap Pakistan has not been able to fully operationalize the Gwadar port. Initially the country needed foreign support to build the port, which was fulfilled by the China Harbour and Engineering Company which completed the first Phase in 2005 and handed over to Pakistan. Next, it needed assistance in operationalizing the port. Due to this weakness the government ended up signing an

314 British-India Navigation Company was already running ferry services between Bombay-Karachi-Gwadar- Muscat-Dubai-Qatar-Bahrain-Basra at the end of 19th century. 315 Pakistan’s Prime Minister during his visit to China in July 2013 expressed his desire to develop Gwadar on the lines of Hong Kong. 316 Reema Kazmi, op.cit., 14. 317 The author visited Gwadar and adjoining areas in December 2012. 159 agreement that unduly favoured the ‘Concession Holder’. Consequently, despite passage of more than five years, the port has not been able to attract a single commercial ship.

It is imperative that the country should develop its own expertise in developing and managing ports. That will only be possible if Gwadar Port Authority shares the operations of the port. Under the current ‘landlord’ concept Gwadar Port Authority has no stakes in running the port and will remain behind in learning this skill.

Lack of Funds: Another important factor in the development and operations of the port is the availability of funds. Construction and running of port is a mega project requiring billions of dollars 318 . The government needs donations/loans for this project but because of the global financial crisis and the local environment, such assistance is not forthcoming. The government needs funds not only for construction of the port but for development of auxiliary facilities and infrastructure. Development funds have to be created if the port has to succeed. At the moment the only country that is in a position to offer funding of such magnitude is China. PSA Gwadar Pvt Ltd had undertaken spending $550319 million on upgrading the port in five years. However, after five years only a fraction of the amount has been spent. On the other hand the government of Pakistan has also been lagging behind in providing requisite facilities and infrastructure. One option is to include the development of infrastructure in the agreement for port operations. Another option that may be useful is to offer berths/terminals to different operators instead of constricting the options and depending on only operator. This option will provide more flexibility/ competition and also ease pressure on funding. Nobody should have exclusive rights; concept of open market- open competition should have been introduced.

Connectivity & Hinterland: The viability of a port, besides its infrastructure, also depends on its hinterland and connectivity with other, particularly developed areas. Gwadar and the surrounding areas are least developed and, until recently, had poor connectivity with the rest of Pakistan. The areas along the Makran coast are barren and comprise of desert and hilly terrain. There is no industry and little agriculture; the area is dependent on the rest of the country for its sustenance. There are no markets near Gwadar to provide trade for the port. Since the markets

318 Development and operationalizing of Gwadar port is estimated to cost US $1.16 billion. 319 The figure generally quoted in publications is $550 million. However, Mr Pervaiz Abbas, former Chairman GPA states that the agreed figure was $770 million (in discussion with the author, Gwadar, December 21, 2012), no official document is found to verify this amount; the Concession Agreement is silent on this matter. 160 are located far from the port, the importance of good connectivity and development of requisite infrastructure at Gwadar becomes very important without which the port operations cannot be cost-effective. For consolation, it may be noted that initially Dubai too did not have a well developed hinterland. Right policies and their implementation with spirit and determination resulted in the present day Dubai. Of course, Dubai was luckier as for as the funds are concerned. It is, therefore, an urgent necessity to complete the Gwadar-Ratodero motorway and connect the port to China through KKH and also with Afghanistan. However, more cost-effective solutions are the rail and pipelines. In order for the transport of goods to be cost-effective laying of a railway line is imperative. Construction of railway track and pipelines, as discussed earlier, will have to be undertaken soon to optimally utilize the benefits of the port. The new government of Pakistan realizes the importance of connectivity and the incumbent Prime Minister has already emphasized the need of rail and road links with China in his inaugural speech320.

Cost-effective Services: Gwadar port will have to attract big shipping lines and customers to bring their ships and cargo to this port. For this, it will have to create ‘comparative cost advantage’ in the form of low port charges and cargo handling costs. Quality of services and swift turn-around time will also be important factors. In addition, the port will have to provide storage and other supporting facilities/ infrastructure at competitive costs and quality. Gwadar has to compete with Karachi/ Port Qasim in addition to other regional ports and therefore quality of services, turn-around times and competitive costs will have to be ensured. This shall be augmented with aggressive marketing. It may be worth mentioning that Karachi port is not considered an attractive destination by the shippers due to its high costs and turnaround times.

Competition with other ports: As noted earlier, Gwadar has to compete with other ports in the region for business. Some of these ports are already well established while others are still being developed. It is often pointed out that Gwadar’s most fierce competitor is the Iranian port of Chahbahar. Chahbahar is closer to the Caspian and Iran already has a better road and rail network connecting it to Turkmenistan; whereas, a road is being built, with Indian assistance, to link Chahbahar with Afghanistan’s western provinces. It must, however, be remembered that Gwadar has its own advantage vis-à-vis Chahbahar. Firstly, for the time being, Iran does not enjoy good relations with the West. Due to this reason and the sanctions imposed by the US and

320 The News International, June 06, 2013. 161 its allies, a number of major shipping lines and other companies will avoid doing business at Chahbahar. Secondly, at least for now, the Central Asian economies are very small and there is little trade. Gwadar is not solely dependent on Central Asia; its major trade is expected to come from China, and Gwadar remains the best option for linking Chinese western regions to the sea. Gwadar also has to compete with Karachi/ Port Qasim. The latest decision of the government to expand Karachi deep sea port has direct bearing on Gwadar port, since Karachi is well connected to the targeted markets. Some believe that due to congestion at Karachi, and considering the fact that it already has serious surplus capacity, the expansion is not warranted at this time321. In fact, this amount could have been used for improving facilities at Gwadar port. Gwadar deep sea port could also serve as transshipment port even for Karachi.

Attracting Investors: In the past, Pakistan’s economy has depended largely on FDI. Due to economic crisis globally and rise in fundamentalism and terrorism in the region, many genuine investors were discouraged to invest in Pakistan. The government will have to come up with real incentives, with aggressive marketing, to attract investors. This will require services, connectivity, and a security. It is, therefore, important to bring the local populace onboard and curb miscreants. A number of incentives have already been offered which include tax relaxations and declaring Gwadar as Special Economic Zone; much more still needs to be done. Generally, Gwadar gets undue negative publicity by the western scholars who do not realize the difference between some tribal Balochs, who are creating trouble in the province, and the local people who are very peace loving and moderate.

Law and order: Maintenance of law and order is a primary responsibility of any government. Development and investment are directly dependent on security. No investors would risk their money where there is no security. Similarly, all development works are affected by the prevailing law and order situation. Unfortunately, due to the ‘War-On-Terror’ the law and order situation in the country has not been good. Additionally, nationalist movements have further exacerbated the law and order situation in Balochistan province. Due to this situation the image of Pakistan in the eyes of international community has suffered and the investors are reluctant to invest in a country with poor law and order record. The law and order situation in Gwadar is not bad but it is being projected negatively which is affecting progress in Gwadar.

321 Anwar shah January 23, 2013. 162

Gwadari322 people are very moderate and peace loving and they are ignorantly compared to the tribal Balochs. Nevertheless, the government has to take positive, visible measures to allay the apprehensions of the investors-foreign as well as local. It is important for the entire country and also with respect to Gwadar. Preventive measures should be taken to ensure that the local environment is not affected by wave of terror prevailing in some parts of the province.

Participation of locals: No mega project worth its name could be successful without the support of the locals. In order for the port to be successful Baloch and Gwadaris must be onboard. It must also be borne in mind that the locals have every right to be benefitted from the port. Although it is a national project and vacancies have to be filled on merit, local populace may be given preference wherever possible. A number of writers have mentioned that the local population is not supportive of the port. However, during the visit to Gwadar, this researcher realized that this is not true. Some foreign powers, which do not want to see the port being successful, have their own geopolitical interests in the region and it is in their interest to project such an image of the place. On the one hand they fuel local sentiments against settlers from other provinces, and also try to scare the investors through negative propaganda. Gwadar is a remote town; most of the analysts/ writers have never visited Gwadar. So, even Pakistani writers, influenced with the larger propaganda, tend to give an inaccurate picture about the local environemnt. It is important to reassert that Gwadaris are very peace loving people who are content with their life. They understand the importance of the port and generally support the idea. However, they do have genuine concerns, in that they like to see the fruits of development reaching the locals. Another concern, particularly of the fishermen community, is that they should not be dislocated from their existing locations323. Government must address the concerns of the local people and win their whole-hearted support before they are won over by the miscreants. It is observed that there are a number of Baloch/Gwadari people employed in Gwadar Port Authority and Gwadar Development Authority. Special care should be taken to train more and more locals to undertake jobs of higher responsibility. Besides, the local leadership should also be taken in confidence on existing and future plans. If the locals

322 Local people prefer to call themselves as Gwadaris. 323 Gist of discussions with locals including intellectuals, government officials, fishermen and politicians, (December, 2012). 163 understand and own the project it will become much easier to maintain security and the benefits of the port will be equally distributed.

164

CONCLUSION

Oceans and seas have always been crucial for human sustenance. Traditionally valued for their contribution in food and transport, the seas are an integral part of life on planet earth. The technology to access hidden reaches of the seas and the knowledge and ability to exploit the ocean economic resources, has further increased the value of the seas in our times. The importance of the seas is manifest in all aspects of human life, for example, economic, military, political, as well as environmental.

Indian Ocean has achieved significant economic and political importance since the prophecy of Mahan in the late nineteenth century. It is the third largest water reservoir on earth, after the Pacific and the Atlantic, covering an area of 73.44 million sq km. Indian Ocean, by virtue of its size and location and its vast mineral resources, is the world's most vital trade route today. Most of the major economic/ industrial powers of the world are strategically dependent on North Arabian Sea for their energy and other requirements. With the end of the cold war, the geo-political importance of this region has increased considerably, thus making political stability of the regional states a matter of prime concern. It is, therefore, obvious that all regional and extra-regional powers are trying to dominate the region both, economically as well as, militarily.

Pakistan lies strategically along the North Arabian Sea connecting four important regions, i.e. the densely populated consumer markets of the South Asia, resource- rich Central Asia vying for access to the warm waters, strategically important Middle East (the Persian Gulf region) and the energy-hungry future super power and economic giant China. This vital geo-strategic location has put Pakistan in the spotlight. Pakistan in general and Pakistan’s newly constructed Gwadar port has become a focus of political and economic intrigue.

Pakistan has a vast coastline and enormous ocean resources waiting to be tapped. However, due to continental mindset of the rulers, and lack of vision of successive governments, the country has not been able to benefit from this tremendous resource. Pakistan is in need of sound maritime strategy to be able to exploit its maritime resources and be counted as a true maritime nation. Pakistan’s Gwadar port has the potential, if driven with wisdom and foresight, to put Pakistan on the right path. The study has proved that there is great potential in the 165 maritime sector to contribute towards national security, driven by a sound maritime strategy, and Gwadar port can take a lead in achieving the desired goals.

Unfortunately, almost all prominent writers on the subject have failed to delink maritime strategy from the sea power; maritime strategy has been considered to be an equivalent of military strategy on the seas; this is exactly what it is not. For this reason, it is difficult to find a standard comprehensive definition of the term. Maritime strategy is distinctly different from naval strategy (which is incorrectly termed by writers as maritime strategy). Maritime strategy is much more comprehensive, encompassing all aspects of the maritime domain. National maritime capabilities and potential are seen in comprehensive terms as including ports & harbours, merchant marine & maritime industry, fishing and oceanographic fleets, ocean economic resources, maritime outlook and tradition, and other aspects of national power related to sea power, rather than in narrow terms of weaponry alone. Maritime strategy thus, is the conviction of a nation to put to use her political, social, economic and maritime assets with the aim to promote her maritime interests. In short, maritime strategy determines the development of elements of maritime power. All writers and thinkers agree that maritime power plays a crucial role in the security and prosperity of a state.

Pakistan has an enormous maritime zone equivalent to about 36 percent of the country’s land mass. Its long coastline has natural ports, bays and one of the finest beaches. The waters are highly productive, rich in bio-diversity, abundance and productivity. It has magnificent delta harbouring the world’s fifth largest mangrove forests. Pakistan’s coastal areas including its EEZ have distinctive oceanic phenomena and features that should theoretically be capable of producing rich fisheries, minerals, and oil and gas resources. Extensive survey, data collection and research are however, required to understand the processes and features which have a direct bearing on locating the living and non-living marine resources and their sustainable development and conservation. The current scientific knowledge about the country’s EEZ is inadequate and limited from the resource point of view, as no serious attention has been paid so far in this respect.

Traditionally, the Sind and Makran coast has had thriving fishing. The coastal inhabitants of the Makran coast have almost exclusively depended on fishing for their sustenance. The situation is not changed much, and the major populations in cities like Gwadar, Jiwani, Pasni etc, 166 along the coast, are still engaged in the fishing business. Despite this fact, fishing contributes only one percent of the national GDP, and the per capita of fish consumption in Pakistan remains one of the lowest in the world. The fishing crafts and techniques are pre-modern; and fish resource is in danger of depletion because of poor techniques and non-existent implementation of rules. Similarly, one of the finest mangroves of the world are reducing fast, due to lack of attention from the government. Although some measures have lately been initiated to compensate for the loss of mangroves, it will take a few years before the results are visible.

Pakistan’s record in the exploitation of other non-living resources is even worse. The geological features of continental margin and the sea floor of the North Arabian Sea provide a geologically conducive environment for the formation of mineral resources. But, due to lack of expertise and data, even the nature and extent of the potential has not yet been quantified. The country’s record in offshore oil and gas exploration has been equally disappointing. Due to lack of expertise and inconsistent policies of the past governments little has been done in this area, with no success so far. From the studies of geology and the success of the neighbours, the experts believe that there is a potential of gas and oil along both, the Makran coast as well as the Indus delta.

An important element of a country’s maritime prowess and national strength is its own shipping industry. This includes the availability of a sizable fleet of merchant ships to be able to lift the country’s vital cargos, and the technical/ industrial capacity to maintain and run the fleet. Merchant marine has always been regarded as the safest and cheapest mode of transportation. Now the developments in technology have made it more efficient, versatile and swift. Almost ninety percent of the global trade is carried through the sea, which has forced the countries to enhance their merchant fleets. The progress of the merchant fleet in Pakistan has been very erratic. It was the private sector which initially brought merchant ships to help the nascent state with its trade requirements. There was a time when Pakistan had a strong fleet boasting strength of 71 commercial ships. However, after the nationalization of shipping industry, the fleet started to decline and today there are only nine Pakistan registered ships, all in the public sector. Efforts to attract private shipping have not met success due to inconsistent policies and lack of trust of the investors. On the positive note, most of Pakistan’s crude oil is being shipped by own ships, however, Pakistan is paying huge sums in freight charges for the rest of its trade. Consequently, 167 the shipbuilding and repair industry has also failed to register any progress. The Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works, has been a fine shipbuilding and repair project, which bustled with activity in its early days. The shipyard built small and large ships for local as well as foreign customers. It has also built small warships for the navy. However, like other public sector entities, the shipyard has gradually declined and has failed to attract major commercial orders in the recent years. The fate of ship-breaking industry has not been different. Pakistan had one of the largest ship-breaking industries at Gaddani, which contributed handsomely to the national exchequer. However, due to marring policies the industry is in a slum and needs a lifeline to resurrect itself.

Having a resource is not enough; the possessor should have the ability to exploit, as well as the capability to protect its resources. The security of its resources is the duty of a country’s armed forces; while to protect its coast and maritime resources is the responsibility of the navy. The naval forces, including the coast guard or the maritime security agency, are the custodian of a nation’s maritime interests i.e. its maritime boundaries, maritime zones, sea lines of communication, and installations ashore. It is imperative for a maritime power to have a navy commensurate with its resources and ambitions. Pakistan navy has been a subject of neglect since its inception and has always strived to achieve parity with its arch rival Indian navy. However, the horizon of responsibility of Pakistan navy has expanded considerably under the existing geo-strategic compulsions. And, therefore, there is a need to revise the mission, force goals and resource allocation to this important element of national power.

The most essential element of maritime power is availability of ports and harbours, around which the entire maritime activity revolves. No maritime activity can take place without suitable ports and harbours; without which a country does not even deserve to be called a maritime state. Pakistan has been fortunate in the sense that it inherited a coast, provided by suitable bays and natural ports, some of which have been in existence since ages. However, due to lack of maritime awareness, Pakistan has not been able to improve its ports infrastructure along the coast, and, therefore, the vast coast has remained underdeveloped. The country has remained depended on Karachi port for its entire existence. Construction of Port Qasim has been able to share some load off the Karachi port, however, due to its co-location its contribution to national security and development has remained tagged with Karachi. Realizing the necessity of 168 alternative ports for military as well as economic purposes, Pakistan has lately paid attention to the development of Ormara and Gwadar, as naval and commercial deep water ports respectively. While Ormara has remained out of international limelight, Gwadar has attracted much global attraction for various reasons.

Gwadar’s geo-strategic location and the fact that it offers a natural deep water port, has important connotations for Pakistan and other regional and extra-regional powers. Gwadar has been an important ancient port, in use since centuries, and has been mentioned in the accounts of almost all renowned historians who have travelled in this part of the world. Due to harsh climate and terrain it could not attract rulers or conquerors to take permanent residence, but remained important as a link joining Sind, Persia, Arabia and the rest of the world. Due to this reason it changed hands a number of times when it finally came under the suzerainty of the ruler of Kalat in the modern times. The British realized the importance of Gwadar and the adjoining areas; it remained a port of call for British steamers and flying boats and an important node in the British telegraph system. This prompted the British to side with Oman on the dispute of ownership of the area, leaving Gwadar with Oman at the time of independence of the sub-continent. Pakistan had to purchase this important strategic town, which should have been part of Pakistan, from Oman in 1958. International attention was restored when Pakistan announced developing a deep sea-water port of international standards at Gwadar, and China offered to help in the venture, both financially as well as technically.

The Gwadar deep water port formally began its operations in 2007. The port is envisaged to act as a strategic hub; providing transit access to the resource-rich Central Asian Republics and China to the warm waters of the North Arabian Sea; transshipment facilities to a number of ports in the region and act as an industrial base and logistics port. Its close proximity to the Persian Gulf which provides 60 percent of world’s oil, and overlooking the strategic Sea Lines of Communication, adds further value to the port. For Pakistan, the port helps solve its security dilemma, because it is situated farther away from Karachi and much less vulnerable. Not only that Pakistan’s maritime assets could be safer in Gwadar, it reduces Pakistan’s vital Sea lines by one third the distance from the west and, therefore, provides economic security as well. Additionally, it places Pakistan in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the Indian energy supply routes emanating from the Gulf. Studies have proved the economic and strategic viability of the 169

Gwadar port. However, to meet the envisioned targets, the port needs to further develop its infrastructure and connectivity with the hinterland. The security situation in Afghanistan will also have an important effect on port due to its connectivity with the Central Asia. The port will also have to compete with Chahbahar and other regional ports for quality and cost of services. While location is a significant characteristic of a hub port, it also takes technology, innovation, productivity and a dynamic management for a port to succeed. An important factor in the success of the port is the security of Baluchistan province. Gwadar is relatively calm and the local population is not averse to the port project, yet there is unrest in Baluchistan which has the potential to spill over, and must be controlled. Transfer of ports operations to a Chinese company is a good omen for the port and is likely to bring in the much needed trade and development. Gwadar port project, if handled with wisdom and dedication, could contribute significantly in the development and security of Baluchistan and Pakistan.

170

RECOMMENDATIONS

The state of the maritime sector indicates lack of a suitable maritime vision and a strategy to implement that vision. A viable maritime strategy can play a vital role in the national security and Gwadar port project is a test case for Pakistan’s maritime planners. Some broad suggestions are offered for the policy makers to improve the maritime sector and devise an effective maritime strategy:

1. There is a need to review the national maritime policy and consequently, respective policies of individual sectors. 2. There is a need to devise a maritime strategy in light of the national maritime policy, for the protection and projection of Pakistan’s maritime interests. Comprehensive strategy is required for development of coastal zones, ports and harbours, protection and conservation of marine environment and ecosystem. 3. Maritime sector involves various government ministries and departments, which complicates the issue of coordination. There is a need to form an overarching body to implement the maritime strategy by monitoring/ coordinating the activities of different departments. 4. The Chief of the Naval Staff is the Principal Technical Advisor to the government on Maritime Affairs in peace and war. He must be consulted on all maritime issues in the maritime domain. 5. The current scientific knowledge about Pakistan’s coast and maritime zone is inadequate. There is a need to invest in survey, data collection and research in the maritime sector. 6. Policy implementation needs to be improved in all sectors. 7. Pakistan has adequate experience of running ports (Karachi and Bin Qasim). It is not advisable to hand over the port operations (Gwadar) entirely to a foreign entity. The government of Pakistan/ GPA should remain a partner in running/ managing the port. 8. Efforts should be made to impart modern training in all sectors, including the fisheries, so they improve their livelihoods and contribute effectively in national economy. 9. Experts believe in the possibility of oil and gas in the maritime zone. Determined efforts are required in the offshore exploration. 171

10. Merchant marine is the back bone of a country’s trade; the government needs immediate measures to revitalize this important industry and attract private investors. Both inland and ocean transportation systems need attention. 11. Rail/ road connectivity of Gwadar with the hinterland must be expedited on war footing. A port loses its efficacy in the absence of good connectivity. 12. The shifting of the fishing harbour/ village in Gwadar, as planned, should be delayed. Once the port is fully operationalized and its benefits start becoming clearer to the local population, it would be easy to convince the fishermen to move to the new location, with all the facilities provided. In the meantime the proposed site be developed and incentives offered for voluntary migration. 13. There is a need for a Deep Sea Act to bring together the efforts of concerned departments, to ensure success. 14. Security and stability in Balochistan is a pre-requisite for success of the port and must be ensured. The Baloch national and local leadership should be taken into confidence for smooth functioning of the port and ensuring that the benefits reach the locals. 15. The apprehensions of regional and extra-regional players should be allayed and an environment of trust and cooperation be promoted instead of encouraging rivalry and suspicion. 16. Enhanced coordination is required with other countries within the ambit of UCLOS-82 as well as other international conventions, treaties and agreements. 17. Connectivity with Central Asian States will depend on security in Afghanistan as well as our relations with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Pragmatic diplomacy is desired to safeguard Pakistan’s interests. In the meantime, efforts be made to utilize routes through China and Iran to trade with Central Asia. 18. Knowledge is power- a comprehensive programme is required to create maritime awareness and culture in the populace, particularly the ruling elite. 19. Gwadar Master Plan was developed on the basis of studies conducted by Arthur D Little in 2006. There is a need to carryout fresh studies based on existing conditions. 20. Karachi and Port Qasim are currently under-utilized with surplus capacities. If Gwadar manages to attract some of the trade bound for other provinces and Afghanistan, it will further relieve pressure from Karachi/Bin Qasim. There is a need, therefore, to seriously review the expansion plans of Karachi port. 172

21. Chinese like to work quietly without making a lot of noise. Pakistan should take a lead from the Chinese and avoid making unwise statements about the project. 22. Pakistan must develop the capability to conduct maritime trade under all security conditions. This entails own ships lifting vital cargos and a naval force strong enough to protect all maritime interests.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS/ POLICIES

China State Council. China’s Peaceful Development. Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2011. Department of Defence, Muscat. Proclamation of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman addressed to Khudas of Gwadar area. September 1958. Photocopy. Government of Balochistan, Balochistan Vision 2020. Quetta: Coastal Development and Fisheries Department. Government of Pakistan. Brief on Gwadar Port Authority. Islamabad: Ministry of Ports and Shipping, May 2011. ———. A Brief on Marine Fisheries Department. Karachi: Director General MFD, April 2012. ———. Data on Transportation Networks. Islamabad: Director Road Transport, Ministry of Communications, October 2012. ———. Investment Opportunities in the Oil and Gas Sector. Islamabad: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, 2004. 186

———. National Maritime Policy 2001. Rawalpindi: Defence Division. Ministry of Defence. ———. National Policy and Strategy For Fishing and Aquaculture Development in Pakistan. December, 2006. Islamabad: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock. ———. Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10. Islamabad: Finance Division. ———. Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09. Islamabad: Finance Division. ———. Pakistan Merchant Marine Policy- 2001. Islamabad: Ministry of Communication. ———. Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2010. Islamabad: Statistics Division. Federal Bureau of Statistics. ———. Position Paper for Joint Working Group on Communications and Railways, Islamabad: Ministry of Communications, May 2012. ———. Presentation on Fisheries Sector of Pakistan. Karachi: Director General MFD, April 2012. ———. Seventh Five Year Plan (1988-93) & Perspective Plan 1988-2003. Islamabad: Planning Commission of Pakistan. ———. Shipping Policy 2006. Islamabad: Ministry of Ports and Shipping. His Majesty’s Government India Office “Declassified Records”. Islamabad: National Data Centre, Cabinet Division. Naval Headquarters. Data on Pakistan’s Ports, 2012. Islamabad: Directorate of Maritime Affairs & Environment Control. ——— Opord No. DN/1100 dated September 5, 1958. United Nations. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 1983. Geneva: UN Publications, 1983. US DOD and Homeland Security. A Coop Strategy for the 21st Century Sea Power, Washington DC: Department of Defence, October 2007. ———. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington DC: Department of Defence, September 2005.