House of Commons Defence Committee
Securing the Future of Afghanistan
Tenth Report of Session 2012–13
Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 26 March 2013
HC 413 Published on 10 April 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £23.00
The Defence Committee
The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies.
Current membership Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) (Chair) Mr Julian Brazier MP (Conservative, Canterbury) Thomas Docherty MP (Labour, Dunfermline and West Fife) Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) Mr Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) Adam Holloway MP (Conservative, Gravesham) Mrs Madeleine Moon MP (Labour, Bridgend) Penny Mordaunt MP (Conservative, Portsmouth North) Sandra Osborne MP (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Sir Bob Russell MP (Liberal Democrat, Colchester) Bob Stewart MP (Conservative, Beckenham) Ms Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham, Edgbaston)
Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.
Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/defcom.
The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.
Committee staff
The current staff of the Committee are Alda Barry (Clerk), Dougie Wands (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Ian Thomson (Inquiry Manager), Christine Randall (Senior Committee Assistant), Rowena Macdonald and Carolyn Bowes (Committee Assistants), and Sumati Sowamber (Committee Support Assistant).
Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson on 020 7219 1589.
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 1
Contents
Report Page
Conclusions and recommendations 5
1 Introduction 13 Our inquiry 13 Previous inquiries 13 Background to the situation in Afghanistan 14 Armed Forces and civilian personnel 15
2 Transfer of responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan Forces 16 Counterinsurgency strategy for Helmand 16 Security situation in Afghanistan 18 Levels of violence 18 Civilian casualties 18 Continuing insurgency activity 19 Attack on Camp Bastion 20 Sustainability of the ANSF 21 Training and recruitment 21 Afghan National Army 22 Afghan National Police 22 Afghan Local Police 22 Confidence of the Afghan population in the ANSF 23 The ability of the ANSF to support itself after 2014 24 Security where the ANSF has taken over responsibility 28 Future of the ANSF 30 Future funding for and size of the ANSF 30 Future loyalty of the ANSF 32 Future role of UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan 33
3 Political and economic prospects 37 Afghanistan’s political prospects 37 The likelihood of a peace settlement 37 Political leadership 38 The role of women in Afghan society 40 Reconciliation and reintegration 40 Durability of any peace settlement 42 The importance of other regional states 44 Economic development and the judicial system 47 Economic development 47 Corruption 48 Kabul Bank 49 Narcotics 50 Judicial and penal systems 51 Role of the FCO post 2014 53
2 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
4 Withdrawal of ISAF combat troops 56 Plans for the withdrawal of combat troops 56 Withdrawal of equipment 58 Preparation and planning 58 Practical problems and the costs of withdrawal 59 The protection of UK personnel 61 Rest and recuperation 63 Strategic communications 64
5 Conclusion 66
Annex 68
Formal Minutes 72
Witnesses 73
List of printed written evidence 73
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 74
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 3
AFGHANISTAN ISAF (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE) REGIONAL COMMANDS D E 3 3 3 3 3 3 F 0 2 8 4 6 8 E o o o o o N I N R C E
A A S S W E C N 6 6 6 6 I N a 0 0 0 0 o a o o N
e
s u u F p o o T r E E s t t t t i E e t h t
h h
a L G e r e
e L n W l r r
r n I R
n
n G R H e e
R
E e R R s g e
N g t e
e i e A g o i g g C o r i n i o i
n E n
o o n N
n n R
e
g I i S o
n
T A
F a N 6 6 6 r H a Z
2 2 2 h
a e
o r o N a - r
n H a i j e
m t
r I
a S t r F o
a z A T r a
U h F
R R Q K a
l ‘ e a M B h
- y g
a D
e
E i
A s
H
d
p
r
N r
i
e u
a g a N t L t o e
o e
d a d w h l s
m 6 6
h i I n s k 4 4 S a a
o o
r n a
T G M
d
a a l A h
i
m a C F N n a G a
h r o h y
o a m r b
K m a C n T d h
K
a a a a r h g a i n a h
J n n r c K S h o d o a
S t w a D d a r U a h 6 6 r h n i a b z -
r S
6 6 a s i y e j u a r o o a g r r k
z - h N P e n u g a
i P l n u i n a u l l d n i U Z B Q Z B a B a a l m a a E b t M l y S u K k a a a z l h a n I m r G - S e h a
B S T a A n a h m a i A z g b r y n a i a f a k 6 6 N i n n 8 8 M W o o a i d G a a h n r P a
K S d z K P u a h n a u n P a i u k l d h - B k C e a n u r t K
h i z a ’ r P d A A a k S w u g l r u B a h a i l k - L m h a e z U a a r
o l r K G a L n a n g h a K u r n a d m P a e P T r r z M a b i a a K a k u k h n a B T K t l m a h a j i h K p l s z u y o o L a a i d h q s h a r a s r - a t a o e a n a k 7 7 g
R s y 0 0 h a N t r q o o m i a M a n B P N e n g h a A u t a J a d a r r T r
l i a L a F K h s l a a A a k K a m i t b z I a h u r a a S J d b n s n a P I h d a a T K r a r u A A n n I s 0 a S d N I R P a n T b r e t a o e A d f v r e i n N n r 7 7 a e c 0 2 2 t e n i o o o
c B n e o a u l
B n d o K a u i l r n o M y m d i
l e . e a . s t . r r . e . y . s .
. . A . . . . m ...... e . . . . y . .
. . © M . . 7 7 . . . 4 4 .
2 U a U 0 o o K p 0
M p N i
O
n C C D g
C L I C r H o
N 1 A w 2
7 0 n I S 0 6
D C
N
7 o S 2 p I
/ y A I
0 r A 3 3 F i 1 g 0 0
h 3 3 3 3 3 / I
o t E 0 8 2 4 6 2 , N
8 2
o o o o 0 D / 1 U 1
4 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
ISAF SOUTH WESTERN REGION (AFGHANISTAN)
3 3 3 3 N 3 1 0 2 ° ° ° °
D E K K F Z Z h h E J J o o N a a a r r r a a a n n n B C I s s h u u R E
a a U D S M P R I b b
a S n A n n
e e i i r e e i I n l t a R - - s o E i W S S N e c g u e e e m d s
i t
v o n F r o o r T i c F t o i n e i e n
a E a n u u c h r
n a
s t d E L t o G c t t n a A n R
e a t t L h h a e b a i l e
l R o I o o s l r
e
v
d o G
e b
W b r y n t H b b a r
u d n E E o
a
o .
a H n H a a r . n
N
e u N .
u
o l
n
r
D
R D
t t
.
a
a N
H H d o A R . s n
C n b
a
. m a T T a A A e
a
. a a a t d
E d d o e
. r
D
D e
h
r
g
C m m .
d
H
H n n n u y y a
a u . g y
N
. D
D r a a a a .
i
a
a r n
n . r
a a a a a n .
o
u u L L L ( i
n
.
r
r . y
n n
(
y E
A
a
a o c
- - .
m
m .
S
d
y
y r r r
n n a a n
.
e
e .
f h r a a r
. I
n W
R
.
(
g
(
a D D a
-
y
y .
S
.
s s s A
u u D D D
a
h S . e
S S Q Q Q .
c H
H r
e
a a W .
. f
n n h h r h
h a
. y
. g
h
a
D D a a a
e
A
c c . H a
g a n .
a a a
-
- - h
.
- - -
g
.
r
e
b
h
h
T e y m m . .
r r r
a a .
e a i o i i e e l l i
.
.
.
D D D
h
h o
r
r o e
e a a a e
S
e e g
n . . r r . S
‘ ‘ n
(
P
m
m .
.
.
n
a
u
Z u Z
y
u y u - r
r i
h S S l n A . .
. a
h h h
o
J J o
y
y
y )
i
u
u .
.
.
D
S S n n
a
n
H H .
h h h a a n
-
- n S .
n . ) .
i
a
e
e .
u u
. . .
y y .
z s
e s e
S u c
c ) - - l d
.
.
. a
. h h . b b
n
n - - -
y
.
a a .
e s e
t t . . e
e . . h
n h a N
w w
.
n .
T
T ) y y
. . . .
a
d
d . o
a a k k .
.
. m .
e . .
e
B e B
.
d
. S
S .
. . . . n
n e e
.
s .
. - - .
.
l l . . y y y h h a a .
.
. u
. . a a .
.
a )
) .
.
.
.
. . .
E
E b b - - .
r .
y y K K
.
. . .
.
b n b n
. y . - ......
.
.
.
. .
n n n .
e
d e d e e .
a a
. . K K . . . . A A
.
.
.
. .
.
r
G
G a a
h h I
i i n S S o o
r r a S
- - h h a
a H
C C O O r r e e e a L L L
i i h
r D D
n n
a a u
W A W
a t a a W W s s d d h h R r r h h o a a a - - a
a d
- - e h h F e e
k
s s
D
K H a a J
e e
u u
t t t a
-
- r r K
i i
w w
t S Z m Z m
E E a a a O a a
a a
h
u u y y n n
r r o w w
n n n
P
n g g n Z Z a Z Z
a
k k - n n -
u
e E E a a r j j
6 m m
l l
P R R r 2 t F
a u
a u
P P
° h
D
C C D
K
A
A D S
k
z z a
u u S n
E
R R
h h h
a a a u a h
a s s a
r
o
n H
a H n a a A k
k a a n h h f j a W e d a C h h h s d t t k k D D s - - y t
a a a
h
h h
-
e F a a S S S
d e e r r r o r r a
a C
h w
B B e f
h h h H H i r h h h a a
n G u u
R R R
j j a a a a a s i i d u u - - - r r r
r
e e
r
h T j j T k k
S S b b a a
e
a a a
t G Q Q B B B a a a
B H h n n
h e k k
t t e
a a -
D - o o a a a - - d d S S a u n i i l l e e e
u
a a a
r r r
w w n n
e
a a E E n r r w
y y n K K
D n D n D d d d j j j
S S
N N N
s s e
d d h a h a d d d r n a
u
i
a
s a a
u u
u u c
h h
- - K K n n n n a k k
s s
e
h e n n K e K e - -
h h r r i i i d
h h
A
y y y
s
o o
d d m m
t
k R k
Z Z e e e
r r
F
H H m m A A
e ‘ ‘ H ‘
b K b b
a A A A
r r a a B B r
S e
h a
l
e l
a
A o o A e a e l l h h
l K K
a a r i i
i s
h h q q m h g k k a h h z z z l R l
h h
L
a L
H S
o S
n a a a i o o a a
d L L
d h
n n o n y y
o o o
s s B
H R H
k k k B R R
h h
T
o o o n h h a a a
d a i i l l R B D z z S u u A A
- k a a a a a u a o o z k n k y y n w a w w e d d b
E s a a a h 6 3 h B ° a a r r
M A P P z D a a b b i i D s A S A A u h a n n u T T e d
a a R s R R R H H g D K K K e e e a h i i l l j j g g
a a G a a i G
z - - - r r r S S S u a a e e e I I a r r K K m m m S S S
O z r r K K h a a w w a a S n a h h h m a g g a a a a k k G r r r h h - - e n n n
K a a
u Q N Q Q K
T T N N N r r h h l o a a i a o o e e l l w s r ‘ ‘ ‘ n n a a k s s s A A A t t
h h h K K h h h a P P P i - a i i i N n u u y n n n l l e r r r a a a N N
y y ‘ C C C d d A
h h l W W ‘ i A H H H a a m m m m m a a a l a i e e 6 s s r L a a 4 S S S d h h h M o l l n n ° a B e e a a m m y a a n n r r a r r r
r B N
h h B N N N j K B a a W
a a a r r a a Y Y a a a h a h g a a G G a d n n a a n n n w w w a K m r r r h Q
s s s a a a a a a a a n A A u D D s i i d d d a a a d N N c r k k n - c c l l h h h e m m a a h e a i z z z h h o o m
r - - r r a a a B n n ‘ w w
y y T T w w w h A S S S ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ c a e e i a a i i a h e e
N N y e e g
y y K K K e B y y s Z Z n n o o s r
a L L a a w w h D D a a h L L a a a a t w w a a l l l N N N a a m a D D k a a l l d d G s s S a a a a a n n o
S S y y a a a r r u a Z Z h h h a r e w w s s h c n h h h h h n k k a a a a r e e o r r r h d i i h h e d d a D h s s s - - S S r i s e e u r r h h a a k k a s
h h n
n n G G a a k S S t G a a e k d d a n n y a s a a S r r r a n n h h r r 0 h h a
n n Q a a a M M n G G G j j j o a g g u l a a i ‘ r s n a a a h h h
h
R 0 P
a H M
s
D
a
E E B S S S
a a
u m K a a a a a a n b b n K
a n
u u i g e d a a
w
G
G j
A a a
s
g
D K B n n h a S M n n
i
m j j
u a a - k U K a r
a a
n
a a
P
i
i d
n
n j
n j
i a
I
e
M
a
n a n L L e
L k k k
a d d K d
y
I n n N
R R k
s k
E o
o d
i
- S -
n n
i
M e
S e e e G r
a
j
C a g g
w ©
S a h h n
i i
p
U o o s L s a D K p S r r d t t
u ’ ’
M i a a A a a a a
T n i U n n O a g
Z k k k D D D e n n
d R R D s S
h C 5 r C a h a S D D A r
0 a 1
u o w w S y h H K e w 7 a A r r K k k 6 n a
z a a h h
a s u I 7 C
r R D a
h h u y N j F s g 7 o d d d a r e p D a i N / n n a a D D S
S
w a
h 5 y d 0 A K I a D u r K K
k D a a a a
S s s 0 r d e e 1 i u E S S n a a g - g n u r n m u a r / n h d h s s l l a d d e e i n n 0 a a d d d a n
n e t
n a h , a s a D n y e 8
d e 2 h d d g z n s / 0 a a s h U 1 r b 1
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 5
Conclusions and recommendations
1. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. It has suffered many years of conflict. Prime Minister Tony Blair promised ‘The conflict will not be the end, we will not walk away as the outside world has done so many times before.’ Throughout this inquiry into securing the future of Afghanistan, we have received starkly opposing evidence and narratives of future scenarios following the withdrawal of combat forces from those which are overly optimistic to those which see only gloom and doom. The fact is that the UK will have limited influence and, indeed, it is for the Afghan people themselves to determine for their future. The best the UK can do is to withdraw in good order and engage with external partners to improve the chances of Afghanistan going forward. In so doing the UK and its international partners must show the Afghan people that they will abide by their obligations to continue to support them in their efforts including in the area of women’s rights which, at the start of the conflict, the then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, described as ‘non- negotiable’. (Paragraph 151)
2. Securing the future of Afghanistan requires the concerted efforts of all the Afghan people; regional neighbours, in particular Pakistan; the USA; NATO and other coalition partners. Much detailed work needs to be done before the end of combat operations at the end of 2014. We recognise that achieving a peaceful Afghanistan is a process not an event but Afghanistan has to be given the best chance when it takes over full responsibility for its own security. (Paragraph 152)
3. In the process of establishing a peaceful and functioning Afghanistan, we will be looking for evidence of:
If not a concluded peace settlement, at least the start of the process, with the insurgency including Taliban—it should be Afghan led but supported by neighbours such as Pakistan, and the international community must do its utmost to ensure that all the people of Afghanistan, including women, are brought into the process;
Open and free elections;
An appropriately trained and equipped ANSF able to maintain security against a continuing and possibly increased threat of insurgency with financial support after 2014;
Continuing support for economic development including the provision of aid, the maintenance of this aid will be crucial both in strengthening the Afghan Government’s hand in negotiations and ensuring that the West continues to have a voice in Afghanistan;
A strong judicial system; and
A reduction in the level of corruption and some measure of control of drug production and the drug trade. (Paragraph 153)
6 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
4. The UK Government has a responsibility to use such influence as remains to it to make a post-2014 Afghanistan work. In response to our Report, the Government should set out what it intends to do in support of the above goals in the run up to the end of 2014. It should also set out how it intends to communicate these objectives and the end of the military mission to the Afghan and UK populations, in particular, what more needs to be done to ensure that the ANSF are able to deliver the security of Afghanistan after 2014. We recognise that the UK is only one player in ensuring a successful Afghanistan but we urge the Government to use its influence with the international community to achieve much more in Afghanistan before the end of 2014. (Paragraph 154)
5. If the UK is to continue to provide financial and training support to Afghanistan post 2014 there needs to be a clear articulation of the areas the UK will fund and support and the outcomes it expects to achieve. It must be clear to those engaged in the peace negotiations that, in providing support in the future, the UK will be paying close attention to the progress on the rights of women, children and minority groups, the tackling of corruption and the furtherance of the rule of law. (Paragraph 155)
6. We have received very little information from the MoD and the FCO as to how they plan to be involved in Afghanistan beyond 2014. Given there are less than two years before the end of 2014, the Government should inform us how it sees its future role in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 156)
7. The withdrawal of UK Armed Forces will involve a demanding and complex set of tasks. The UK Armed Forces and other allies face many challenges in the withdrawal of the military equipment in Afghanistan. As the plans for withdrawal mature, the MoD should provide us with the detailed plans, if necessary on a classified basis. The MoD should put the protection of the Armed Forces at the forefront of its preparation and planning. (Paragraph 157)
8. Finally, we recommend that, in 2015, the Government undertake a comprehensive and detailed lessons learned process which looks forward to how these lessons will influence the future decision making processes of the MoD, DFID and the FCO and other Government Departments, as well as a major review of what the UK has achieved and not achieved in Afghanistan in the period 2001 to 2014. (Paragraph 158)
9. Finally, we recommend that, in 2015, the Government undertake a comprehensive and detailed lessons learned process which looks forward to how these lessons will influence the future decision making processes of the MoD, DFID and the FCO and other Government Departments, as well as a major review of what the UK has achieved and not achieved in Afghanistan in the period 2001 to 2014. (Paragraph 158)
10. We wish to pay tribute to the dedication of the Armed Forces and the sacrifices they and their families have made and continue to make. (Paragraph 8)
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 7
Transfer of responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan Forces
11. The Afghan Government must ensure that it takes steps to address the security issues caused by the increasing number of displaced people across Afghanistan, who may find themselves targeted for recruitment by the Taliban. (Paragraph 17)
12. We note that civilian casualties have fallen for the first time in six years although they still remain high. We also recognise that enemy initiated attacks are now occurring in less populated areas. However, we remain concerned that, as withdrawal and the final handover to the ANSF draws near, violence levels have not fallen. The lack of progress in reducing violence does not auger well for improving security and economic development on a long-term sustainable basis. (Paragraph 20)
13. If the ANSF is to provide security in Afghanistan and ensure that the insurgency does not gain control of areas in Afghanistan from 2015, it will need to be able to support itself fully. Whilst we recognise that the ANSF will operate differently from ISAF, it will still need to be properly trained and equipped to carry out the full range of military tasks required of them. We identified significant gaps in necessary ANSF capabilities such as the provision of logistics, helicopters and close air support, and medical care from 2015. Clearly the needs of the ANSF post 2014 will depend on the local political situation: for example, if there is consent on the part of local people, there is unlikely to be much need for extensive counter measures for IEDs, because insurgents will not be able to plant them. We are concerned that the international community is not seriously engaged with the assessment of the need for force enablers. For at least some period after the withdrawal of ISAF from the combat role, there will need to be a smooth transition from the international way of achieving effect to the new Afghan way. The MoD should press NATO for an early review of the ANSF to ascertain what more needs to be done before the end of 2014. We recommend that the MoD liaise with allies to identify the likely shortfalls in ANSF capabilities and investigate ways of meeting them. We were told that issues of corruption within the ANP continue to require attention. A trusted and reliable police force seen to be on the side of and not exploiting the local population is a basic requirement for building trust in a national government which may be seen as remote from communities. (Paragraph 40)
14. The MoD and the FCO painted a very positive picture of the transition to the ANSF, particularly, progress on their ability to carry out operations but we would caution whether progress is sustainable once ISAF withdraws. However, the UK Armed Forces should be more robust in allowing the ANSF to test themselves in challenging circumstances. (Paragraph 45)
15. We are concerned that the ANSF will reduce its strength by over a third on current plans based on the expectation that the insurgency will have been diminished. The Government should urge the international community to develop a contingency plan in case the level of the insurgency does not diminish. (Paragraph 50)
16. It is, therefore, essential that the UK continues to maintain the momentum in ensuring that the ANSF has the capabilities and appropriate equipment to preserve and, indeed, improve security in the face of an insurgency at current levels. (Paragraph 51)
8 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
17. If the ANSF is to remain a cohesive and loyal force, frontline troops and police will need to have confidence that they have access to the necessary support when engaged in battle with insurgents. This must include close air support and emergency medical care. (Paragraph 52)
18. We welcome the Government’s commitment to the ANA Officer Academy, believing that it will give a powerful boost to the capability of the ANA and provide a very valuable long-term legacy. However many challenges remain, such as attracting the target number of women recruits and the provision of a suitable cadre of Afghan non-commissioned officers as trainers. The MoD should explain how it intends to tackle these and other challenges. It should also provide us with a description of how it will differ from other training institutes and training run by the USA, France and others. (Paragraph 61)
19. In its response to this Report, the Government should confirm that the funding of personnel who remain behind after 2014 will be from the Treasury Reserve. (Paragraph 62)
20. Protection of UK personnel working in the Academy now and post 2014 is vital. In response to this Report, the MoD should tell us how UK personnel at the Academy will be protected and how they will review protection in future. Such a review will require a risk assessment and the development of contingency plans to extract UK forces should the security situation deteriorate. (Paragraph 63)
21. In its response to this Report, the Government should set out what roles other than training it envisages for the UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 64)
Political and economic prospects
22. There are many Afghans who have benefited from the changes in Afghanistan over the last ten years, including Afghan women. Mistakes have been made, principally by promoting a western style analysis on efforts to improve the position of women in Afghanistan. Efforts should be made going forward to ensure women’s programmes realistically reflect the differing needs of women from rural and urban areas. However, these groups, including women, will need to be brought into the peace settlement, which must not disadvantage them. If Afghanistan is to become stable and functioning, it is important that those currently excluded are brought into the process and are given a stake; this particularly applies to women. If as a consequence of negotiating with the Taliban they are excluded, the progress made could easily unravel. UN Resolution 1325 requires that in all peace negotiations in regions affected by conflict, women’s voices must be heard to ensure the long-term stability of any negotiated settlement. Afghanistan is no different. The United States has passed the Afghan Women and Girls Security Promotion Act 2012 which requires the development of a three part strategy to ensure and strengthen women’s security and lays a foundation for Afghan women’s participation in Afghan society in the long term. In its response to this Report, the Government should inform us how it is contributing to ensuring women are able to participate in discussions on security and transition in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 90)
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 9
23. It is in the nature of a negotiation that both sides have to give ground. If a reasonably free and fair election takes place, it would seem unpalatable for those who have expended great resources including the lives of Armed Forces personnel, Afghan as well as Western, to compromise on issues like democracy, the rule of law and women’s rights. The extent of the need to compromise will be a function of relative strength. The Government should make every effort to support its international partners to support a peace settlement, but should make it clear that some principles of rule of law and human rights cannot be compromised in the process. (Paragraph 91)
24. While we recognise that the UK has a limited role in facilitating a peace settlement, the Government should continue to use its influence with the Afghan Government to promote a satisfactory agreement for all Afghans. Many countries in the region are important in realising a secure Afghanistan, including Pakistan, China, India and Iran. The Government should build on the trilateral meetings it has hosted and urge international partners vigorously to support a peace settlement. (Paragraph 92)
25. For Afghanistan to grow economically and to reduce its dependence on international aid, it will need the continuing support of the international community for some time. During our recent visit to Afghanistan, we saw welcome signs of economic activity not seen on earlier visits. However, corruption and the narcotics trade remain a problem and are likely to continue to be so after 2014. To ensure that Afghanistan does not lose the gains it has made, the UK Government should continue its support after 2014 for economic development, and for reducing corruption and the size of the narcotics trade. But it should also make it clear that if corruption increases and human rights and the rule of law are not protected, that the UK government may consider withdrawing that support. (Paragraph 110)
26. We were encouraged by evidence of indigenous Afghan initiative and recommend that the UK investigate ways of further encouraging UK companies and institutions to develop links with Afghanistan, since only through the development of its industrial and commercial base can the country have a sound future. (Paragraph 111)
27. The rule of law is an important component of a stable Government, the FCO should continue its efforts to promote a strong judicial and penal system in Afghanistan. The building of new prisons in Afghanistan is a welcome development but the crucial improvement needed is in the provision of prisoners’ human rights. In response to this Report, the Government should inform us of the latest position on the transfer of detainees from Camp Bastion to the Afghan penal system. (Paragraph 112)
28. The Government must, as a matter of the highest priority, develop, in conjunction with international partners, a policy which will assist the Afghan Government to establish judicial and penal systems which satisfy international standards. In regard to future deployments, the UK Government must urgently develop a policy which protects the position of UK personnel in dealing with detainees in jurisdictions that may not meet the requirements of UK courts. (Paragraph 113)
10 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
29. Six new women’s prisons have been built in Afghanistan and we were concerned to hear that many of the prisoners are women who have fled domestic violence. We were informed that the women could leave prison if they returned home to their families. It is unacceptable for women to be imprisoned for leaving a violent home life and to be forced to return to violence as a condition of release. (Paragraph 114)
30. In response to this Report, the Government should set out its current thinking on its future role in Afghanistan. It should spell out the practical measures it envisages to promote economic development, establish a strong judicial and penal system and reduce corruption and tackle narcotics, and what criteria it will use to quantify progress. (Paragraph 115)
31. We hope that Afghanistan can become a secure, prosperous and flourishing country but we are concerned that Afghanistan could descend into civil war within a few years. Engaging with the Taliban in the peace process will clearly be necessary. In response to this Report, the Government should spell out what steps it intends to take to at least hold on to the progress made so far. (Paragraph 120)
Withdrawal of ISAF combat troops
32. We agree with the Government’s decision that the UK needs to see through the process of transition to the end of 2014. It is essential that UK Armed Forces are able to protect themselves until they leave Afghanistan. We are convinced that the withdrawal of troops will not be as straightforward or risk-free as the MoD tells us. The MoD should share with the Committee its detailed withdrawal plans. The plan should encompass the following:
An orderly handover of responsibility for security to the ANSF;
An orderly withdrawal of men with appropriate levels of protection;
An orderly withdrawal of equipment or its safe disposal;
Collaboration and consistency with NATO, other allies and Afghanistan;
An associated strategic contingency plan to cater for an unexpected breakdown in security within Afghanistan and armed resistance to the UK’s withdrawal including a significant reserve force to secure a timely and effective recovery of personnel and key materiel; and
A list of reference points by which the MoD will assess the timeliness and success of the withdrawal. (Paragraph 127)
33. We agree that decisions as to what equipment to bring back to the UK must be based on what the Armed Forces need and must represent good value for money. Regenerating equipment returned from Afghanistan will be expensive and we believe that the MoD is being unduly optimistic about these costs. Both equipment purchased as Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) and equipment purchased normally have been used extensively. The MoD should not make hurried and flawed decisions on what equipment to return from Afghanistan because of pressures of short-term affordability. The Treasury should pay for the regeneration of core
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 11
equipment under the normal convention that additional costs of operations are funded from the General Reserve. (Paragraph 135)
34. The MoD should only give equipment to the ANSF that it can use and maintain. We note plans to co-ordinate with NATO on gifting equipment to the ANSF. In response to this Report, the MoD should provide detailed criteria for determining what should be gifted to the Afghan forces and update us on the progress made by NATO in co-ordinating the gifting of equipment to the ANSF. (Paragraph 136)
35. Planning for the withdrawal of equipment is underway but many key decisions have yet to be made. As the UK will be withdrawing its equipment at the same time as other allies, the MoD should ensure that it secures the necessary transport in a timely fashion and should provide us with metrics that we can assess. (Paragraph 137)
36. We note that the MoD has already started to withdraw some equipment and matériel it no longer needs in Afghanistan. The MoD should not withdraw equipment early that would put the lives of UK Armed Forces at risk or that would leave them living in very uncomfortable circumstances. (Paragraph 138)
37. As it is less than two years away from the end of 2014, at which time all combat troops should have been withdrawn, we would expect plans for withdrawal to be firmed up soon. In response to our Report, the MoD should provide us with its detailed plans as they mature, including the quantities, routes including possible pinch points to progress, security and co-ordination with NATO. The MoD should also provide us with estimates of the likely range of costs of the withdrawal of equipment. We were glad to hear that there will be continuity of responsibility for the withdrawal in that General Capewell will be staying in post throughout. (Paragraph 139)
38. Any loss of life is to be deeply regretted but it is particularly poignant when the death is caused by one of the people that UK Armed Forces are mentoring and supporting. In addition to the Armed Forces, there are many UK civilian personnel and contractors working in Afghanistan. The protection and medical care of Armed Forces and civilian personnel will continue to be a challenge up to and beyond the withdrawal of combat troops. In response to this Report, the MoD should tell us of the arrangements it has made with the US and the Afghan Forces on force protection and the provision of medical care, and associated aeromed evacuation. (Paragraph 144)
39. Strategic communications are important in ensuring the support of both the UK and Afghan populations for what the UK is doing and has done and will be doing in Afghanistan. It is vital that the process is seen as transition and not as a ‘withdrawal through fatigue’. We have seen little evidence that the Government’s communications strategy is fulfilling its objectives. We recommend that the MoD and the FCO reinvigorate their communications strategy for the populations in the UK and Afghanistan and provide us with the detail on how the strategy will be enacted. The strategy should contain as a bare minimum the following:
what we set out to do;
what we achieved;
12 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
what remains to be done including managing the continuing risk, albeit reduced, of UK casualties ; and
the manner of the leaving of UK Armed Forces.
It is essential that the MoD should publish a report setting out what it has learnt from being in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 150)
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 13
1 Introduction
Our inquiry
1. The Defence Committee announced an inquiry into Securing the Future of Afghanistan on 18 June 2012. Our inquiry has been conducted against the planned withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat troops at the end of 2014 and the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). We decided that the inquiry would examine progress towards a secure and stable Afghanistan within the wider region, including Pakistan, and the plans by the UK, NATO and other allies for a smooth transition of responsibility for security to the Afghan Government and the ANSF.
2. We have taken oral and written evidence from a wide range of witnesses and have had several informal briefings from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and others about Afghanistan and the surrounding region. The MoD provided written evidence to the Committee at the start of the inquiry and further information in response to our detailed questions which arose in the course of the inquiry.
3. We visited Afghanistan in November 2012 and spent time in Kabul and Helmand including a patrol base, Sparta. We spoke with members of the Afghan Government including President Karzai, Defence Minister Bismullah Khan, Minister Patang at the Ministry for the Interior and the Women’s Minister Ghazanfar. We received extensive briefings from Sir Richard Stagg, the UK Ambassador to Afghanistan, Lt General Nick Carter, the Deputy Commander of ISAF, and Ambassador Maurits Jochems, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan. In addition, we spoke to Afghans involved in the peace process, the ANSF and other aspects of the Afghan Government and with members of ISAF and UK Forces and others. We also saw new court and prison facilities near Kabul. We are grateful to our special advisers and staff for their assistance in this inquiry.
Previous inquiries
4. During this inquiry, we have also been mindful of the recent report on the UK’s foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan by the Foreign Affairs Committee1 and also that of the International Development Committee on Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014.2
5. We last reported on Operations in Afghanistan in July 2011.3 In that report we focused on:
Operations in Helmand in 2006;
1 Foreign Affairs Committee, The UK’s foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Fourth Report of 2010-11 HC 514 2 International Development Committee, Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014, Sixth Report of 2012-13, HC 403 3 Defence Committee, Operations in Afghanistan , Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 554
14 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
Military operations since 2009;
Training of the Afghan National Security Forces;
The impact on the civilian population; and
Transition and withdrawal.
The previous Defence Committee reported on operations in Afghanistan in July 2007: UK operations in Afghanistan.4 Many of the issues raised in that Report remain of concern today. One of the Committee’s primary concerns was the necessity that the international community should focus on establishing security and denying the Taliban and al- Qaeda the environment in which to operate.5
Background to the situation in Afghanistan
6. In its written evidence on this inquiry, the Government described the current situation in Afghanistan. We consider this assessment to be of sufficient importance to repeat it in Box 1 as the backdrop to our inquiry into Securing the Future of Afghanistan.
Box 1: Government assessment of the situation in Afghanistan6
Over 30 years of conflict have left Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world. Afghanistan ranks 172 out of 187 countries and territories on the UN’s Human Development Index—the lowest outside of Africa.7 A third of Afghans live below the poverty line; one in six children die before their fifth birthday; and average life expectancy is just 48. Only one in four Afghans are able to read and write. Afghanistan remains off-track on all the Millennium Development Goals and has agreed a five year extension until 2020. Corruption is a problem felt personally by many Afghans, fuelled by patronage politics and a war economy. Women and girls still face enormous challenges and huge disadvantages in the areas of political participation and decision-making.
A weak and politically unstable state fosters insecurity and holds back social and economic development. Afghanistan’s diverse cultural and ethnic mix, and resistance to change from external influences, are contributing factors. Poor governance and corruption undermine trust in the government, while weak public sector capacity hinders service delivery. The transition process is now well underway but it will likely be another decade before the Afghan Government is able to pay for its own security costs without external support.
4 Defence Committee, UK Operations in Afghanistan , Thirteenth Report of Session 2006–07, HC 408 5 Ibid 6 Ev 82 7 http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 15
From this low base, progress has been made over the last ten years. 5.8 million children now attend school, over a third of whom are girls, up from virtually none under the Taliban. 85% of Afghans are now covered by basic health services, compared to 9% in 2002. The economy has grown by an average of 11% per annum since 2002, and tax revenue has risen from $200m in 2004 to a preliminary estimate of $2bn in 2011-2012; progress is being made on strengthening public financial management, and local government is improving in some areas.
The Afghan government is increasingly taking the lead, in working for better security, governance, social and economic opportunities for Afghan people. Long term stability in Afghanistan will also be dependent on increased regional cooperation and integration, particularly on issues such as security, trade and economic infrastructure. While improvements have been made, considerable challenges still lie ahead.
Source: MoD
Armed Forces and civilian personnel
7. We wish to pay tribute to all the British personnel, both military and civilian, who are currently serving or have served in Afghanistan but, in particular, to those who have lost their lives, and the many more who have sustained life-changing injuries as a result of the conflict there. We also express our deep gratitude for the vital contribution made by the families of Armed Forces personnel. We are mindful that some of the conclusions in this Report could be interpreted as a criticism of the men and women who have worked in extremely hazardous, hostile and difficult conditions. We wish to place on record that no such criticism is intended: the Armed Forces and civilian personnel in Afghanistan have our full support in tackling the challenges before them.
8. The major cost of operations has been the loss of lives of Armed Forces personnel and the number of personnel receiving very severe injuries. From the start of operations in Afghanistan in 2001to 31 January 2013, 440 personnel were killed with a further 596 very seriously or seriously wounded. We wish to pay tribute to the dedication of the Armed Forces and the sacrifices they and their families have made and continue to make.
16 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
2 Transfer of responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan Forces
9. In November 2009, as part of his inauguration speech, President Karzai stated that Afghan forces would be capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan within the next five years:
Within the next three years, Afghanistan, with continued international support and in line with the growth of its defense capacity, wants to lead and conduct military operations in the many insecure areas of the country. As they already have in Kabul, our own security forces should be able to take control of security of other provinces as well, and thus the role of the international troops will be gradually reduced and limited to support and training of Afghan forces. We are determined that by the next five years, the Afghan forces are capable of taking the lead in ensuring security and stability across the country.8
10. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and those nations contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) decided on the transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to enable Afghanistan to take full responsibility for its security. They agreed that there would be a gradual process of transferring security responsibility for districts and provinces from ISAF Forces to those of the ANSF. This transition would begin in 2011 and would be conditions-based: ISAF troops would remain in a supportive role in those areas where responsibility had been transferred. The transition to full responsibility for security across Afghanistan should be completed by the end of 2014.9 This intention was subsequently confirmed at the Chicago Summit in May 201210 and in the Tokyo declaration in July 2012.11
Counterinsurgency strategy for Helmand
11. Following the US surge in troop numbers in 2010, the UK developed a counterinsurgency model for central Helmand which increasingly placed the ANSF in the lead; the aim was to set the conditions under which Afghan governance and development activity could begin to have an effect. UK Armed Forces would support and mentor the ANSF, building up their capabilities and their confidence to undertake operations. Box 2 details the progress of this policy and the gradual transfer of responsibility for operations from UK Forces to the ANSF.
8 www.afganistan-un.org 9 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?selectedLocale=en 10 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm 11 http://president.gov.af/Content/files/Tokyo%20Declaration%20-%20Final%20English.pdf
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 17
Box 2: The transfer of responsibility to the ANSF in Helmand12
With the improved force densities that resulted from the US surge in 2010, the UK has developed and evolved a clear counterinsurgency model for central Helmand which has increasingly placed the ANSF in the lead. The first phase was to establish force concentrations within the most populated areas, in order to set the conditions within which Afghan governance and development activity could begin to have an effect. Throughout Herrick 12 and Herrick 13 (April 2010 to April 2011), 4 Mechanised and 16 Air Assault Brigade sought to establish security zones around the key population centres, particularly Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and the green zone around the river Helmand. These were then gradually but aggressively expanded, increasing the proportion of the central Helmand population under the ISAF and Afghan security footprint and, consequently, Afghan governance. This activity also had the effect of disrupting insurgent attempts to concentrate its activity, providing space within which the ANA and AUP could develop in both capability and confidence.
This model was sufficiently advanced by July 2011 that the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah and its surrounding environs was included in tranche 1 of transition. During Herrick 15, there were no requests for ISAF to support the ANSF in delivering security within the transitioned areas. During 3 Commando Brigade’s tour on Herrick 14, there was also a clear focus on consolidating the gains that had been made, as well as on developing ANSF operational and planning capability. The Operation ‘Omid’ (Hope) series in Herrick 13 and 14 saw, for the first time, large scale operations planned and led by the ANSF, with ISAF providing support with an increasingly lighter touch.
In September/October 2011, the Nad-e Ali South and North Battlegroup Headquarters merged to simplify engagement with the district authorities, reflecting the shifting focus to governance and transition, as well as the significant improvements in security that had been achieved. In December 2011 Nad-e Ali formally entered transition. By that point, a model which saw the AUP providing security in the centre, with ANA disrupting activity in the periphery areas and ISAF providing support throughout, as well as the ability to conduct and enable disruption operations in the peripheral areas, was well established.
By March 2012 security responsibility for the entire Lashkar Gah district had been transferred to the Afghans. ANSF capability was such that they were now capable of planning and executing operations independently of ISAF support, and frequently did so during the Herrick 15. In early 2012 an ANSF operational design for central Helmand emerged. This plan, written and owned by the Afghans, mapped for the first time security activity against the Provincial Governor’s security priorities. This outlined a succession of complementary operations, planned and led by the Afghans with UK forces providing a supporting and advisory role, to further expand the
12 Ev 98
18 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
ANSF security footprint, dominate contested areas and target insurgent supply routes. In the early operations the insurgent resistance was often light, suggesting that they were aware in advance of these operations; but the operations nevertheless demonstrated publicly that the ANSF were capable of delivering security in a coordinated way.
In May 2012 Nahr-e Saraj was announced as entering tranche 3 of transition, which is due to begin before the end of October. This is the final district for which the UK has responsibility. There are still areas within the three districts where the insurgent has relative freedom of movement, and he will remain capable of launching attacks into the protected communities. However, he is unable to concentrate his forces in a meaningful way. The ANSF operational design has exposed operational-level Afghan thinking which emphasises the importance of the main population centres and transport routes between them. As a result, it has identified those areas which are of less significance to the ANSF and has allowed UK forces to realign themselves to better reflect Afghan priorities. Increasingly, operations will be Afghan run with UK adviser or mentoring support and enablers, which will themselves gradually decrease over time. The focus of the UK counterinsurgency campaign in central Helmand is now on delivering a capable, confident ANSF which is able to protect the gains that have been made over the past six years.
Source: MoD
Security situation in Afghanistan
Levels of violence
12. ISAF reported an increase of six per cent in the number of enemy initiated attacks in the three months from May to July 2012 compared to the same quarter in 201113 but, in September to November 2012, there had been a fall of 13 per cent.14 Security in Afghanistan varies across the regions, with the majority of the violence occurring in the south, south west and east of the country. In the south west which includes the UK’s area of operations, ISAF recorded a three per cent decrease in enemy initiated attacks.15
Civilian casualties
13. Armed conflict in Afghanistan has continued to take a heavy toll on Afghan civilians in 2012. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 7,559 civilian casualties (2,754 deaths and 4,805 injuries) from armed conflict in 2012. This decrease of 12 per cent in the number of civilian deaths was the first in six years. In its annual report for 2012, UNAMA reported:
13 Ev 82 14 Ev 117 15 Ev 83
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 19
While these numbers reflect a 12 per cent reduction in civilian deaths and a minimal increase in civilian injuries compared to 2011 they underscore the continuing high human cost of armed conflict in Afghanistan – which demands even greater commitment and redoubled efforts by all parties to reduce civilian casualties and improve protection of civilians in 2013. Over the past six years, 14,728 Afghan civilians have lost their lives in the armed conflict.16
14. Eighty-one per cent of the civilian casualties were attributed to anti-government elements. While there was an overall fall in civilian casualties, the number injured by those opposing the Government has risen by nine per cent. The United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan said:
Indiscriminate and unlawful use of improvised explosive devices by Anti- Government Elements remains the single biggest killer of civilians. Steep increases in the deliberate targeting of civilians perceived to be supporting the Government demonstrates another grave violation of international humanitarian law.17
Continuing insurgency activity
15. As violence has continued in Afghanistan, in particular, in the south and east, we wanted to ascertain whether the insurgency was still operating at the same level as in previous years. The MoD told us that insurgent activity was concentrated in the more sparsely populated rural areas:
There remain parts of Afghanistan where the insurgency is able to operate with relative freedom of movement and exert a dominant influence on the local population. However, both nationally and in Helmand this affects only a relatively small minority of the Afghan population. These areas are not clearly defined and the nature of insurgent influence is complex; who has influence in an area cannot be described in simple black or white terms. The areas where the insurgents maintain a degree of influence, or one that is at least not regularly challenged, are within the large rural areas of the country and not the major population centres.18
Brigadier Chalmers, the returning Commander of Task Force Helmand, confirmed that the violence had moved out of the more populated areas.19 He also said:
In the three central districts, the city of Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and a number of market towns, [...] the level of violence has only dipped very slightly. What has changed is where that violence is taking place. There has been a significant change over time. The violence has been displaced out of the market town areas and the deeply farmed areas, more into the dasht or the desert areas outwith those areas.
16 Afghanistan Annual Report 2012 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 17 Afghanistan Annual Report 2012 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan press release 19 February 2013 18 Ev 117 19 Q 142
20 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
That has allowed Afghan local and economic confidence to grow over the summer, and that is now being secured by Afghan security forces.20
16. The displacement of fighting into outlying desert areas has had some unfortunate consequences. We were told that cultivation of opium had been pushed out of the Helmand valley into the desert which was now controlled by the Taliban. During our visit to Afghanistan in November 2012, we were told that cultivation had required the digging of illegal wells which had disrupted local water supplies and had resulted in anger in the law-abiding community. On our visit to the Helmand PRT, they told us that starving, dispossessed people had drifted to the fringes to farm poppies as the only option to feed their families. As Government forces sought to suppress these people, they were providing natural support for the Taliban.
17. The Afghan Government must ensure that it takes steps to address the security issues caused by the increasing number of displaced people across Afghanistan, who may find themselves targeted for recruitment by the Taliban.
18. There were two recent high profile attacks in Kabul in January 2013. Two vehicle carrying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were targeted at the National Directorate of Security and Traffic Police headquarters resulting in the deaths of five personnel. The ANSF responded to both incidents with little support from ISAF.21 As the ANSF has taken the lead in more security operations- now over 80 per cent – they have suffered more casualties. In the final six months of 2012, 463 members of Afghan National Army (ANA) were killed.22
Attack on Camp Bastion
19. Camp Bastion is one of ISAF’s main sites in southern Afghanistan and acts as the main UK operating base in Helmand. The base is the size of Reading and has a perimeter fence of some 40 kilometres long and is difficult to defend. In September 2012, there was a significant and well-co-ordinated attack on Camp Bastion. Fifteen insurgents, dressed in US Army uniforms and armed with automatic rifles and grenade launchers penetrated the perimeter of the base near the main runway. They attacked coalition fixed and rotary wing aircraft, destroying six US Harrier jets. Coalition forces including the RAF regiment responded to the incident and engaged the insurgents, killing 14 of them and wounding one. Two US marines were killed and 13 coalition personnel were wounded. We were concerned about the implications of this attack for the security of UK Forces. General Capewell, Commander Joint Forces, said that security had been improved since the attack:
I would describe it as a tactical setback. [...] It is now absolutely secure in terms of the redoubled efforts that have been put into trying to get to grips with where the gaps are. I am sure in my own mind that although the enemy got lucky on this occasion, it is no more than that. This is not a strategic threat in any sense.23
20 Q 141 21 Afghanistan monthly progress report from DFID, FCO and the MoD, January 2013 22 Ibid 23Q 145
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 21
20. We note that civilian casualties have fallen for the first time in six years although they still remain high. We also recognise that enemy initiated attacks are now occurring in less populated areas. However, we remain concerned that, as withdrawal and the final handover to the ANSF draws near, violence levels have not fallen. The lack of progress in reducing violence does not auger well for improving security and economic development on a long-term sustainable basis.
Sustainability of the ANSF
21. A critical component for a successful handover of security to the Afghan Government will be well trained and prepared Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANSF is made up of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). There are five main pillars of the ANP:
The Afghan Uniform Police provides community policing, traffic policing and the fire service;
The Afghan National Civil Order Police provides civil order patrols, an anti- riot capability and a crisis or counter-terror response capability within urban areas;
The Afghan Border Police facilitates freedom of movement, encourages the development of commerce, prevents illegal border crossings and polices airport points of entry;
The Afghan Anti-Crime Police provides specialist police expertise, counter- terrorism, counternarcotics, Major Crime Task Force (governance and anti- corruption) and forensics; and
The Ministry of the Interior provides enablers such as logistics, medical, training and education.24
Training and recruitment
22. Considerable progress has been made in training the ANSF since the introduction of the NATO Training Mission in November 2009. The ANSF is now at full strength with a force of 352,000 personnel although not all of these personnel are yet trained. Dame Mariot Leslie, UK Permanent Representative to NATO, told us:
[...] we are at full strength for that 352,000. There is still a training deficit, so they have been stood up, but they are not all fully trained. There will be some attrition over time and there will need to be further recruitment. There is still a task to bring that force to full surge capacity, although the numbers are there now.25
24 Defence Committee, , Operations in Afghanistan, Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 554 25 Q 165
22 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
Afghan National Army
23. The numbers of recruits leaving the ANA (referred to as “attrition rates”) remain high, peaking at 3.5 per cent per month in October and November 2012 against a target of 1.4 per cent. The MoD told us that attrition rates were now falling.26
24. It is widely accepted that the composition of the ANSF should, as far as possible, reflect the composition of Afghan society. Southern Pashtuns are still underrepresented in both the ANA and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The MoD told us that the Afghan MoD was trying to recruit Southern Pashtuns into the Afghan National Army (ANA), encouraging recruiting centres and provincial councils to identify suitable recruits. The ANA recruited 756 Southern Pashtuns in the first quarter of 2012, 3.7 per cent of the total recruits against a target of four per cent.27 This remains a low target given that Pashtuns from the three Southern provinces are estimated to be a third of the population.
Afghan National Police
25. General Barrons, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations), said that the police force had made less progress in developing its capabilities and was a more difficult challenge than the Army. UK trainers were working with the leadership of the police service to develop the ANP into something nearer a normal police constabulary rather than a protection force. He further said:
[...] we have spent some time training on the ground, to a very basic level, Afghan policemen to do what are effectively security tasks through a combination of patrolling with Royal Military Police and other service police assistance. [...] That responsibility falls to the regional and national training facilities that are turning out policemen. Now, there is quite a concerted, but long-term plan to improve the recruiting, vetting, training, leadership and support of the police—both Afghan national police and their national counterpart, the Afghan national civil order police, which are higher calibre organisations.28
Mr Patang, Minister of the Interior, reported to us that the ANP had made significant progress in the last year and that they were very grateful for international assistance in achieving this and he hoped that this would continue after 2014.
Afghan Local Police
26. In addition, in July 2010, the Afghan Government announced a new initiative agreed with General Petraeus, the then US Commander of ISAF, to train and recruit some 10,000 personnel as local community police separate from the ANP. Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, the Secretary of State for Defence, said that the Afghan Local Police has provided a valuable contribution. He added:
26 Ev 129-130 27Ev 96 28 Q 356
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 23
On Monday, I had a very interesting discussion with the Minister of the Interior about the long-term future of the ALP, and he does envisage it being incorporated over time into mainstream Afghan police, and coming under its direct command. This is seen as a force alongside the police, which will gradually integrate into the formal police structure.29
Confidence of the Afghan population in the ANSF
27. Vincent Devine, MoD Director Operational Policy, said that the Afghan population had increasing confidence in the ANSF:
[...] I thought that the figures that came out of the Asia Foundation survey, which is a pretty widely respected document, were really rather encouraging in this area.
More than four out of five respondents agreed that the ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people: The figure was around 85%. 81% believed that the ANP helped improve security; 75% said that the ANP is efficient in arresting those who have committed crimes and bringing them to justice; 93% agree that the ANA—the national army—is honest and fair with the Afghan people and 87% think that the ANA is helping to improve security. [...]30
28. Despite reports of increased confidence in the ANSF, there is evidence of a continuing problem with corruption in the ANP.31 When asked about corruption in the ANSF, Brigadier Stevenson, NATO Afghan National Training, said:
[...] corruption means different things to different people. What I saw in Afghanistan was an absolute determination, albeit from the middle and more senior ranking Afghans that I met, both in the army and the police, first, to understand what was considered unacceptable behaviour and to eradicate it from their ranks, if it existed.32
Brigadier Chalmers added that the situation had improved since his first tour in Afghanistan in 2008:
[...] I reflect on the police I saw then and the police I saw this summer. It is quite a stark difference. As you say, there is a level of pragmatism in Afghan society. The word “corruption” [...] for them it is multi-layered. It is the tolerable or intolerable nature of it. Back in 2008 there was a lot of intolerable corruption that was really affecting the will of the people.
[...] They are increasingly dealing with it [corruption] themselves. That means they are policing their own policemen [...]. That is not to say that it is corruption-free; it is not by our standards. However, in terms of what is tolerable to the local population it is much more in balance than it was several years ago.33
29 Q 357 30 Q 259 31 BBC documentary on corruption in the ANP in Helmand - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21547542 32 Q 183 33 Q 185
24 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
The ability of the ANSF to support itself after 2014
29. During our visit to Afghanistan, General Carter, Deputy Commander ISAF Forces, told us that the challenge for the transfer of responsibility for security in Helmand was that the ANSF did not have the necessary enablers. The capabilities and assets that facilitate and support operations are known as enablers. General Sherin Shah, Commander of the ANA’s 3/215 Brigade, also told us that the ANA lacked the necessary enablers such as intelligence gathering and analysis, medical care, air support and counter IED equipment, having lost 16 men in a week to IEDs, and mine detectors, and would continue to need help beyond 2014. He specified training, particularly in specialist fields. He also referred to vehicles, saying that he had 4,500 troops in his brigade but could not move them. We had concerns as to whether the ANSF would be able to support itself with training, logistics, and in providing medical care, air support and intelligence. We asked Dame Mariot Leslie whether the ANSF would have the required enablers when they took over full responsibility for security at the end of 2014. She replied:
[...] They do not have all of those now, and some of those higher end of the scale capabilities are being provided for them by ISAF. We have until the end of 2014 to gradually shift the training programme so that, increasingly, they are able to do more and more of their own enabling. The training programme is shifting more and more from general infantry skills to skills in logistics, medical evacuation, planning and some of the higher command skills, moving more and more upstream towards the NCO cadre and upwards into the higher command cadres.34
General Barrons said:
[...] there are other bits of the ANSF—for example, their aviators, medics, communicators and logisticians—where they are behind in the development process, so they will need more help for longer, but much of that help is not in the eye of the fight, as it were.35
Training, logistics, medical care, air support and intelligence are dealt with separately below.
Training
30. We asked the MoD if the ANSF would be able to direct and carry out their own training after 2014. General Capewell and Brigadier Stevenson assured us that they would. In particular, Brigadier Stevenson said
[...] within NTM-A [NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan] we were involved in training institution transition. [...] by the end of 2014 at the latest—and there was an intent to bring this forward, possibly by as much as a year—the aim was that the Afghans would be running their own training institutions. That would be training ranging from the initial nine-week package to train a basic warrior through to what we call branch schools, which are more specific training—for example, signals
34 Q 161 35 Q 269
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 25
training, engineer training and so on, less some of the more sophisticated areas within that—through to what we would call command and staff training in the Afghan national defence university.
By the end of 2014, the aim is that the Afghans are in charge and are running all of those. That is not to say that there will not be embedded staff from other nations. [...]36
31. On training the ANP, Brigadier Chalmers said:
[...] For example, at the police training centre outside Lashkar Gah, we are seeing that the course instruction is now predominantly given by instructors allocated and designated by the Ministry of Interior who are posted there, which is a huge change from the last couple of years. [...]
[...] a lot of the on-the-job training and other elements are done with a lot of mentorship and advising by the teams to build up that experience base. Of course, we have been at this for quite some time, [...] [which] means you now have young officers who have been engaged for seven-plus years. They have actually been gaining a strength and experience bank over that time.37
Logistics
32. The MoD told us that the ANA relied heavily on ISAF and contractors for some aspects of logistic support. The sourcing and distribution of stores and equipment from national level depots to the regional logistic support commands remains the most significant challenge. Improving logistics capability had been a priority for 2012:
Deputy Commander (Army) within NTM-A provides the technical training for the ANA logisticians. This training will enable them to organise and run their own logistics within the fielded force. The training is undertaken at the ANA CSS [Combat Service Support] School in Kabul, which is mentored by German and French advisors. The CSS School is currently rated as still requiring embedded mentors. However, progress is good and it is projected to transition to Afghan control on 1 June 2014.38
The Secretary of State said:
[...] Logistics is an area where they are improving. It is very clear on the ground that some harsh lessons have been learned about logistics. That is an area where ISAF is adopting the approach of letting them experience the consequences of poor logistics in order to enhance their thirst for better logistic planning. My understanding is that that is an area where there has been significant improvement.39
36 Q 183 37 Q 174 38 Ev 97 39 Q348
26 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
Medical care
33. Following 30 years of war, much of Afghanistan’s medical infrastructure has been destroyed and medical education largely non-existent. Much medical care has been provided by ISAF.40 On our visit to Afghanistan, we were told that the best general hospital in Helmand was near Lashkar Gah and was the joint responsibility of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Health. General Sharin Shah said that the ANA lacked qualified doctors and a proper hospital. The Joint Force Support group, ISAF, told us that there was no plan for an advanced surgical hospital in Helmand but that wounded personnel would be medevaced via land vehicle to Herat or Kabul after damage control help.
34. A plan to improve the medical care within the ANSF was introduced in November 2011. We were told that the capacity of the ANSF to provide medical care was improving though it would not reach the standards of medical care provided by the US or UK.41 The Secretary of State said:
Medical is the other one [...] where there is a developed plan to build an ANSF medical service that is appropriate to Afghan conditions. That will provide a proper level of medical support, which is not dependent on western-style medical enablement.42
35. We saw in Kabul an excellent example of providing medical care appropriate to Afghan circumstances in the Red Cross rehabilitation centre in Kabul where prosthetics are built to suit the individual by staff who were themselves disabled. We were disappointed to hear that no Afghan Minister had visited the centre, despite its being so accessible.
Air support including helicopters
36. We asked whether the ANSF would have sufficient air support after 2014 including helicopters, Dame Mariot Leslie said:
They now have some attack helicopters. I think we need to distinguish between what NATO is doing, which is the training programme, and a number of bilateral programmes, particularly the American one, working with the Afghans on equipment. Obviously, the end of 2014 is still some time away, and we will need to take stock again, but the intention is that they will have a much greater capability, in terms of both skills and equipment, to do their own enabling by then.43
Brigadier Stevenson added:
You are quite right to highlight the Afghan air force as the element of the ANSF that presents the greatest challenge; I think that is self-evident. It is in the public domain that the Afghan air force will not be anything like developed until 2017. So we are talking about 2014 principally for ground forces, army and police, but for the air
40 Ev 97 41 Q 175 42 Q 348 43 Q 163
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 27
force the date that we have acknowledged is 2017. That is not to say that it will be fully developed by then, but it is to acknowledge the challenge that any nation is faced with when developing an air force.44
Intelligence gathering
37. On intelligence gathering, the Secretary of State said:
[...] ISAF is heavily dependent on electronic intelligence gathering; the ANSF will have much greater dependence on, but also much greater capability to deliver, human intelligence gathering; in consequence, it will operate in a different way. That does not mean it will be less effective; it just means it will operate in a different way.45
Overall sustainability of the ANSF
38. Dame Mariot Leslie said that the ANSF training programme was shifting increasingly from general infantry skills towards more of the enabling requirements for the force,46 though General Barrons said that, in case of some enablers, “they will need more help for longer”.47 Nevertheless, Dame Mariot made it clear that planning for the future NATO mission did not envisage providing any of the enablers such as logistics, medical care and air support after the end of 2014 though some countries might consider doing so bilaterally.48 General Barrons said that the international community was not yet prepared to have a debate about what to do if the ANSF was not self-standing by the end of 2014.49
39. General Barrons said that the ANSF would operate differently from ISAF and be less reliant on technology:
The other key thing is that the Afghans will never operate as a mirror image of us. They function differently on the ground; they are much less reliant on technology; they are much more human intelligence-focused; and the standards that they require in terms of equipment and method of operating are slightly different. They will produce local solutions in the way that they operate that require less enablement than the ones that we have enjoyed as a foreign army.50
The Secretary of State said:
[...] delivering to the Afghans the full panoply of enablers that ISAF routinely uses would not be efficacious as they would not able to maintain them, and it would encourage them to try to conduct their operations in a way that mimicked western
44 Q 163 45 Q 329
46 Q 162 47 Q 269 48 Q 175 49 Q 279 50 Q 279
28 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
concepts of operations, rather than adapt and adopt an approach that is more appropriate to their capabilities and their sustainable levels of equipment.51
40. If the ANSF is to provide security in Afghanistan and ensure that the insurgency does not gain control of areas in Afghanistan from 2015, it will need to be able to support itself fully. Whilst we recognise that the ANSF will operate differently from ISAF, it will still need to be properly trained and equipped to carry out the full range of military tasks required of them. We identified significant gaps in necessary ANSF capabilities such as the provision of logistics, helicopters and close air support, and medical care from 2015. Clearly the needs of the ANSF post 2014 will depend on the local political situation: for example, if there is consent on the part of local people, there is unlikely to be much need for extensive counter measures for IEDs, because insurgents will not be able to plant them. We are concerned that the international community is not seriously engaged with the assessment of the need for force enablers. For at least some period after the withdrawal of ISAF from the combat role, there will need to be a smooth transition from the international way of achieving effect to the new Afghan way. The MoD should press NATO for an early review of the ANSF to ascertain what more needs to be done before the end of 2014. We recommend that the MoD liaise with allies to identify the likely shortfalls in ANSF capabilities and investigate ways of meeting them. We were told that issues of corruption within the ANP continue to require attention. A trusted and reliable police force seen to be on the side of and not exploiting the local population is a basic requirement for building trust in a national government which may be seen as remote from communities.
Security where the ANSF has taken over responsibility
41. On 22 March 2011, President Karzai announced the first set of Afghan provinces and districts to start transition. The decision was based upon operational, political and economic considerations, drawing on the assessment and recommendation of the Afghan Government and NATO. President Karzai announced the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities for transition on 27 November 2011 and the third tranche on 13 May 2012. On 31 December 2012, the fourth tranche was announced with 87 per cent of the population living in areas where the ANSF is responsibility for security once the tranche is fully implemented.52 The provinces, districts and cities covered by the four tranches are shown in the map below.
51 Q 329 52 ISAF - http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_87183.htm
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 29
Afghanistan Transition Map for tranches 1 to 4
Source: ISAF53
42. Dame Mariot Leslie said that, when the final tranche is implemented in the middle of 2013, the ANSF would have lead responsibility for security in the whole of the country but they would still be supported by ISAF in some districts.54 On progress towards transition, Mark Sedwill, Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan and Director General South Asia, FCO, said:
When I left Afghanistan in May 2011, less than 20% of operations were led by the Afghan national security forces. It is now over 80% and of the remaining 20%, half are co-led by them. That is a dramatic change in 18 months and demonstrates that the transition process—when we say it is making progress, that is real.55
43. During our visit to Afghanistan, we were told that ISAF was sometimes reluctant to do, what is often the most difficult thing of standing back and allowing the ANSF to make mistakes from which they would learn. We heard of growing confidence in the effectiveness of Afghan forces when they were encouraged to operate on their own. In Helmand, Brigadier Bruce, Commander Task Force Helmand, told us of an operation planned, rehearsed and carried out by the ANA with only minimal support from UK forces. We discovered that the only negative, apart from the loss of one soldier, had been
53 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_87183.htm 54 Q 158 55 Q 233
30 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
the late involvement of the ANP, resulting from distrust between the forces. General Sherin Shah later confirmed that the ANA was ready to fight, indeed was already fighting, although they would need continuing help with maintenance and medical care beyond 2014.
44. We asked the MoD why UK Forces were still patrolling rather than letting the ANA try their strength. General Barrons said:
[...] the answer is that we are patrolling a whole lot less, because as we hand over the leadership to the Afghan national security forces, they are taking the fight on themselves. As a rule of thumb, over the last 12 weeks, the number of attacks against the Afghan national security forces across Afghanistan has risen north of 150%. That reflects the fact that they are very firmly in the front as we begin to step back. There are some areas—the more difficult areas—where we will continue to take the lead for a little while yet, and there are other areas where, for our own force protection, we will always wish to have our hand on the ground. The area around Camp Bastion is an example of where, for our own reasons, we will need to be outside the wire.56
We further asked if it was possible to hand over responsibility to the ANSF more quickly. General Barrons said that any decision to accelerate should only be taken with the Afghans and when the ANSF were confident enough to stay with the fight and be resilient.57
45. The MoD and the FCO painted a very positive picture of the transition to the ANSF, particularly, progress on their ability to carry out operations but we would caution whether progress is sustainable once ISAF withdraws. However, the UK Armed Forces should be more robust in allowing the ANSF to test themselves in challenging circumstances.
Future of the ANSF
Future funding for and size of the ANSF
46. The international community has made a number of commitments to the future funding of the ANSF which are detailed in Box 3. The funding is calculated on the basis of funding 352,000 ANSF personnel until the end of 2015 with a reduced force of 228,500 thereafter.
56 Q 268 57 Q 272
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 31
Box 3: Future funding and force size of the ANSF58
ANSF Funding
Following the NATO Chicago Summit there is now a credible funding plan in place to sustain the ANSF post-2014. The international community (excluding the US) has so far made pledges totalling around $1 billion a year towards a US request of $1.3 billion for the funding of the security forces. The UK has pledged £70 million59. The level of our funding will be contingent on ongoing agreement between the international community and the Afghans on their security requirements. UK funding will come from the cross-government Conflict Pool and will be reviewed each year.
The UK’s contribution will form part of a wider pool of some $4.1bn that the international community and the Afghans are putting together. As the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly funding share of the ANSF will increase progressively from at least $500m in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. In light of this, during the ‘transformation decade’ [2015-2025] we expect international donors will gradually reduce their financial contributions commensurate with the assumption by the Afghan Government of increasing financial responsibility.
We expect other countries to finalise their contributions over the coming months. We will continue to work with our Afghan, NATO and US partners to ensure the ANSF are sustainable.
ANSF Future Force
The ANSF are expected to remain at their 'surge' target of 352,000 until the end of 2015 before a conditions based reduction to an envisaged size of 228,500 (123,500 ANA, 97,000 ANP and 8,000 AAF). The reduction in size is based on a continuing degradation of the insurgents’ capability and the financial realities of supporting the ANSF into the future. It will be increasingly an Afghan lead to structure the force within the available funding envelope and the quoted force figures are a guide only. The ISAF/NATO effort will increasingly shift from generating the force to refining ministerial capacity and developing its enablers such as logistic capability, air support and medical care.
There will need to be a managed drawdown to reach the enduring level agreed between the Afghan Government and the international community at some point after 2014. The pace of that drawdown will be based on conditions on the ground. The costs of the enduring size of the ANSF are envisaged at $4.1 billion per annum.
Source: Ministry of Defence
58 Ev 94 59 The UK’s contribution to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy will be in addition to this £70m.
32 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
47. We learnt that the ANSF is currently funded for 352,000 personnel and that this funding will fall after 2015 to funding for only 228,500 but that no plans had been made as to how that reduction was to be achieved. Dame Mariot Leslie said:
It was announced at the Chicago summit and then ratified and confirmed at the Tokyo donors meeting this summer that the international community will produce something like $4.1 billion up to 2017 for the Afghan national security forces—that is the army, the air force and the various manifestations of the police.
That was worked out on an indicative figure of 228,500. We know that there will be a gap between that and the higher figure—the surge figure—of 352,000, which we are at now, and which is due to come down towards 2017. How that is going to be funded has not been addressed, to be frank, but I think it will be addressed bilaterally between the Afghan Government and the donors.
The international community has committed to $4.1 billion as an indicative figure. Of course, by then the Afghans will be in control of their own figures, so the funding has been committed subject to things like the delivery, the accountability, the good governance and all the other things that were discussed at Tokyo under a so-called Mutual Accountability framework. However, the actual numbers will be within the control of the Afghan Government at the time, in the light of what it perceives to be its needs and in dialogue with the international community. 60
Future loyalty of the ANSF
48. In briefings, we have been told that it was not clear that personnel in the ANSF would be able to remain a national and loyal force after 2014. In his evidence to the International Development Committee, Dr Gordon of LSE said:
If you remove the funding, what you have got is a well trained militia. There are already signs, in parts of Helmand and elsewhere, in particular, of some of the security forces, particularly the ANA and some of the militia, realigning with some of the local power brokers; the old strongmen. I think it is that fragmentation along with tribal and patronage network lines that is the real concern.61
49. Robert Fox, defence journalist, was worried about where the loyalties of individuals in the ANSF would lie after 2014. He also said:
We are not asking ourselves the blood questions enough. Where are their loyalties going to lie? I think they can forget our training overnight. I am very struck by how much we large up how important it is that we are giving them literacy and a bit of civics. It is really too thin. [...] if we think we are going to produce an army in three and a half years, which is what we are trying to pretend, given what goes on in that part of the world and given the friable and fragile loyalties, it is going to be a big ask. I am not saying that it is impossible, or that it is defeat already, but there are some very
60 Q 189 61 International Development Committee, Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014, Sixth Report of Session 2012–13, HC 403, Ev 8, Q 17
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 33
big questions, which are not in public debate now because the great spotlight has moved on.62
We asked Mark Sedwill what were the prospects of the ANSF remaining national and loyal to a future central Government:
[...] The army is a national force, and it has been very careful to ensure that units are of mixed ethnicities and that there is a balance.
In the officer corps of the army, that balance is not yet quite what we would like to see in, for example, bringing Pashtun young officers through. There is a genuine commitment in the Afghan national security forces to the nation. I have been struck by Afghanistan—if you think of other countries under this kind of pressure, with ethnic divisions and all the other sectarian divides, they have fallen apart. [...] we saw it happen there. But largely since the civil war, Afghanistan has held together. That is because they have been through it before. They know what happens to their country if they allow themselves to go that way. There is a genuine commitment to Afghanistan in the army. [...].63
50. We are concerned that the ANSF will reduce its strength by over a third on current plans based on the expectation that the insurgency will have been diminished. The Government should urge the international community to develop a contingency plan in case the level of the insurgency does not diminish.
51. It is, therefore, essential that the UK continues to maintain the momentum in ensuring that the ANSF has the capabilities and appropriate equipment to preserve and, indeed, improve security in the face of an insurgency at current levels.
52. If the ANSF is to remain a cohesive and loyal force, frontline troops and police will need to have confidence that they have access to the necessary support when engaged in battle with insurgents. This must include close air support and emergency medical care.
Future role of UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan
53. Since the deadline of the end of 2014 for the end of combat operations was announced, there has been much speculation over the role that UK Armed Forces might play in Afghanistan thereafter. UK Armed Forces are capable of providing force enablers such as air support, training, supervision, intelligence or Special Forces operations. To date, however, the only confirmed role for the UK Armed Forces will be the support for future training, through the future Afghan National Army Officer Academy. The MoD described it as follows:
The UK will provide approximately 90 mentoring staff in total to the academy. Around 30 other mentoring staff will be provided by coalition partners. UK military personnel will also be deployed to sustain and protect the UK mentoring staff. The coalition manpower commitment will diminish over time as the Afghans
62 Q 19 63 Q 308
34 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
increasingly take over the lead for the academy. The academy is being built by the NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan and is due to open its doors to its first intake of students in 2013. Once fully operational it will accept three intakes of students per year; with an expected total of 1,350 male students and 150 female students trained annually. Specifically UK forces will be mentoring, assisting and advising Afghan instructors to run one year courses - based around the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst model - designed to teach Afghan National Army officers leadership and tactical skills.64
54. When asked about the future role of UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan, General Barrons said:
The only things that I am sure about are that we are committed to being the leading light of the Afghan national army officer academy, which will start to train Afghan student officers next year and will deliver, when it is at full strength, about 1,300 male cadets and about 150 female cadets a year; we will provide very modest mentoring in Kabul. Anything more than that will be subject to a debate in NATO, not yet had, on what we as an alliance think we should do, and to a national debate about our appetite, and that political debate will occur over the next three or four months.65
55. While in Afghanistan we visited the part-built Academy (ANAOA). It is part of a complex of institutions, on the large site at Qargha, which, when complete, will comprise various training establishments each sponsored by a different partner. The Academy was being built for the ANA, who would also provide the trainers, the partner nations providing mentors. The first five mentors were already in place, and the first recruits were expected to begin training in September 2013.
56. The approvals process for recruits was slow, and recruitment staff were still developing the necessary skills. The sister academy, the US-run ‘West Point’ academy offering a four- year course (for a commitment of 15 years service), had received ten times more applicants than places were available, which our interlocutors took as a favourable omen for the ANAOA. The long-standing Turkish-run Military High School provided an object-lesson about the dangers of being influenced by irrelevant pressure to recruit unsuitable candidates (a problem General Karimi was determined to end) and a ‘blind’ recruitment process was in place to guard against the expected increasing political pressure to accept particular candidates.
57. On our visit to Afghanistan, General Karimi, Chief of the General Staff of the ANA, told us that they had set a target of 10 per cent of recruits to the officer academy to be women. There are currently some 400 women in the ANA; last year 45 women passed the test to join the officer academy. We identified a number of barriers to entry for women, not least the need to have permission from every male member of their family. We asked the Secretary of State if the target to recruit and train 150 women was too ambitious. He said:
64 Ev 114 65 Q 297
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 35
The 150 female students a year represent about 12% of the total throughput, which is a relatively small percentage. This will have been discussed and agreed with the Afghans—it is not something that we have done on our own [...]66
General Barrons added:
The first point is that the total has been agreed with the Afghans, so it is a level of ambition that we are all comfortable with. Secondly, we might not get there at the first pass, but if we lowered our sights and said our ambition is not 150 but 100, we might have 60, whereas if we say it is 150, we might get 80. We want to try to pull this thing by the nose a little bit. Given that we are going to be doing this for a number of years, even if the first year does not hit 150, perhaps we will in year two or three.67
58. The premise behind the defence academy is that it is based on the British model of Sandhurst, for example, that there should be a strong cadre of non-commissioned officers doing the training. As there is no tradition of non-commissioned officers in Afghanistan, we asked the Secretary of State how successful using this model would be. He replied:
I am not sure whether we are going to refer to them as non-commissioned officers or as trainers with some other description, but the principle of a dedicated group of Afghan individuals who are trained to be trainers of future cohorts of officer cadets will certainly be reflected in our approach. I understand it is also the approach that the Americans will take in the officer training academy that they are constructing, again based on the West Point model. I see no reason why that should not be successful. It may be that we need to be culturally sensitive: calling the trainers NCOs and expecting officers to defer to them may be difficult in the Afghan culture, in which case, let’s call them something else.68
General Barrons added:
[...] the Afghans do not have a tradition as established as our own, so they will not have many people who are as outstanding as our senior NCO instructors at Sandhurst, but they now have 12 years’ experience of growing NCOs at the regional military training centres and an awful lot of operational experience. Given that the head of the army, General Karimi, who was trained at Sandhurst, understands the value of the model, and that the Afghans have seen our senior NCOs training their candacs for some time now, there is buy-in to the idea, and now we have to grow the people. The first Afghan national army academy sergeant-major has been appointed, so we have got the senior leadership in, and we have until September this year to grow a sufficient cadre of ANA senior NCO and warrant officer instructors to get us started.69
59. When asked how future trainers at the academy were going to be protected, the Secretary of State said that the protection arrangements had not been decided:
66 Q 364 67 Q 364 68 Q 365 69 Q 365
36 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
First of all, the ability to protect whatever force we have on the ground will be absolutely paramount; we will not leave forces behind if we cannot adequately protect them. At the present time, the arrangements around the ANAOA [ANA Officer Academy] and the protection arrangements are not entirely resolved, because it is not yet clear the extent to which we will be working within an American compound, how much protection the Americans will provide, how much life support the Americans will provide, and what the Afghans will provide. We have a range of estimates for our total force number associated with the ANAOA, at the lowest end being the basic numbers required to provide the training and basic UK aspects of life support, but assuming that the majority of the force protection is provided by others; and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, a number based on an assumption that we have to provide our own force protection to the ANAOA. [...]70
60. We asked the Secretary of State how personnel who remained behind after 2014 would be funded. He replied:
Our expectation would be that anything related to the operation in Afghanistan would be funded from the Treasury reserve.71
61. We welcome the Government’s commitment to the ANA Officer Academy, believing that it will give a powerful boost to the capability of the ANA and provide a very valuable long-term legacy. However many challenges remain, such as attracting the target number of women recruits and the provision of a suitable cadre of Afghan non-commissioned officers as trainers. The MoD should explain how it intends to tackle these and other challenges. It should also provide us with a description of how it will differ from other training institutes and training run by the USA, France and others.
62. In its response to this Report, the Government should confirm that the funding of personnel who remain behind after 2014 will be from the Treasury Reserve.
63. Protection of UK personnel working in the Academy now and post 2014 is vital. In response to this Report, the MoD should tell us how UK personnel at the Academy will be protected and how they will review protection in future. Such a review will require a risk assessment and the development of contingency plans to extract UK forces should the security situation deteriorate.
64. In its response to this Report, the Government should set out what roles other than training it envisages for the UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan.
70 Q 366 71 Q 389
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 37
3 Political and economic prospects
65. Whilst the maintenance of security is a prerequisite for a stable Afghanistan, there are many other aspects of governance which must be consolidated or improved. The most important player in delivering a settled Afghanistan is obviously Afghanistan itself but there are many other important players including the USA, NATO and regional states, particularly Pakistan. Crucially, there must be some level of peace settlement. The UK has an important but limited role in the political and economic prospects of Afghanistan.
66. The MoD made the following assessment of the situation in Afghanistan:
A weak and politically unstable state fosters insecurity and holds back social and economic development. Afghanistan’s diverse cultural and ethnic mix, and resistance to change from external influences, are contributing factors. Poor governance and corruption undermine trust in the government, while weak public sector capacity hinders service delivery. The transition process is now well underway but it will likely be another decade before the Afghan Government is able to pay for its own security costs without external support.
The Afghan government is increasingly taking the lead, in working for better security, governance, social and economic opportunities for Afghan people. Long term stability in Afghanistan will also be dependent on increased regional cooperation and integration, particularly on issues such as security, trade and economic infrastructure. While improvements have been made, considerable challenges still lie ahead.72
Afghanistan’s political prospects
The likelihood of a peace settlement
67. We asked Mark Sedwill what the prospects were for a peace settlement in Afghanistan. He stressed the importance of the international community remaining engaged after 2014 but that the peace process should be led by the Afghans. He also said that channels of communication had opened between the Afghan Government and the insurgency:
[...] What is absolutely crucial is that we do not allow history to repeat itself. If you talk to them, most Afghans are really fearful that the experience of the early 1990s will be repeated. That is why, in the first half of this year, we put so much effort into securing the commitments from the international community—we got $4 billion over several years from the national security forces at Chicago and from the economic and development side at Tokyo—partly for the practical effect, which is very important, but partly for the political effect in order to convince the Afghans and their neighbours that we were not about to make the same mistake and abandon them, and that they should therefore no longer make decisions based on their fears. [...]
72 Ev 82
38 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
In terms of the Afghan reconciliation itself, we are all very clear that it must be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. We are starting to see the channels of communication opened between the Government and the insurgency and between some of the legitimate opposition—the northerners and others—and the insurgency. It is very exploratory and it is really early days, but the Afghans have done this before.73
Vincent Devine said that achieving a political settlement was a process which had started and would continue after 2014.74
68. In November 2011, Ahmed Rashid said that the region—Afghanistan and its neighbours—“seems to be moving inexorably toward greater conflict and contradiction rather peaceful resolution and reconciliation”. 75 He did hold out some hope for a positive outcome but contrasted that with what might happen:
A positive outcome for the region will depend on a deliberate, carefully considered Western withdrawal from Afghanistan, the existence of a political settlement with the Taliban, and Pakistan’s willingness to rein in Islamic extremism and prevent a potential state meltdown. The grimmest outcome would result from a botched, overly hasty Western withdrawal, the absence of a political settlement with the Taliban, a continuing civil war in Afghanistan, the Pakistani leaders’ continuing resistance to internal reform, the army’s refusal to seek compromise on Afghanistan with the United States and the Afghans, and a consequent meltdown of the Pakistani state.76
69. We put to Mark Sedwill that many commentators thought that Afghanistan might collapse sometime after 2014. He said there was a good prospect Afghanistan would be able to govern itself and contain whatever criminal and political violence remained:
[...] It is tempting in those circumstances always to point to the negatives, risks, gaps, challenges, failures—the mistakes that we have made. I cannot give you a guarantee about the outcome in Afghanistan, but I can tell you that the decisions lie in our hands and the hands of the Afghans and their neighbours. If we make the right decisions, there is a good prospect that Afghanistan will continue to achieve the campaign objectives and Afghanistan will be, not peaceful in the sense we understand it, but peaceful in the sense that it will no longer be a threat to the region. Afghan Government writ will run throughout its territory and they will be able to contain what criminal violence and what other political violence remains.77
Political leadership
70. To have an effective Afghan security apparatus, it is important that there is effective political leadership at a national and provincial level. Sir William Patey, former UK
73 Q 253 74 Q 253 75 Pakistan on the Brink: the future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West by Ahmed Rashid, page 188 76 Ibid , page 189 77 Q 263
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 39
Ambassador to Afghanistan, thought that the political leadership would be good enough and stressed the importance of the Presidential election in 2014 and the Parliamentary elections in 2015:
[...] How that presidential election is conducted and who becomes the president is quite a big question mark over the process. I know that there are parties working behind the scenes to draw up a broad coalition of people who are pro-reform and pro-democratic candidates. Nobody has put their head above the parapet yet, mainly on the grounds that anyone who does is likely to get it shot off—probably literally and metaphorically. Our hope would be that, as we get closer to it and as we go into 2013, you would begin to see what the alternatives are. I cannot predict the outcome, but it will be absolutely critical that that is a decent election, that we get a decent presidency going forward and that there is a good election in 2015 as well.78
Sir William added that it was not yet clear if Afghanistan was on the path to a stable democracy and that it was the quality of the third and fourth elections which was the true measure.79 He did, however, say that that the necessary institutions were getting stronger:
[...] I used to say in Afghanistan [...] that parliamentary elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for democracy. Without the other bits, the elections are a waste of time. Without independent institutions, the rule of law, a free press and separation of powers, you will never really have a democracy. All those things are in place in one form or another and need time to bed down and to find their way. In declaring the election, the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan proved itself to be a very strong body in the face of physical and political threats to its independence. Whether it will be allowed to continue in that vein is, again, an open question, but these are important institutions that we have spent a lot of time supporting, both publicly, financially and morally.80
71. Mark Sedwill said that there were significant challenges particularly in south and east of the country. A successful Government was dependent on some kind of political accommodation and reconciliation with the Taliban.81 Government would be weaker in rural areas where the Taliban was still strong:
I would expect it [the Government] would be effective by the standards of a country at Afghanistan’s stage of development. Let’s remember this is one of the poorest countries in the world and will be for some time to come. We would expect it to be effective in the main urban centres, the main population centres, even in those contested areas. But clearly rural areas, if the Taliban are still strong in those areas, it would inevitably remain much weaker.82
78 Q 60 79 Q 60 80 Q 61 81 Q 231 82 Q 231
40 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
The role of women in Afghan society
72. Afghanistan is a culturally conservative country and Helmand even more so. There have been some minor improvements in the role and status of women in some parts of Afghan society since the fall of the Taliban, due in part to the involvement and resources of the international community. Nevertheless, significant problems remain, particularly in the fields of health, education, employment, security and access to justice. The International Development Committee concluded that in some respects the situation for women had deteriorated:
While the situation for women in Afghanistan improved after the fall of the Taliban, it remains difficult and even appeared to us to have deteriorated in some respects since our last visit. Although DFID [Department for International Development] and the UK Government have spoken at length about women’s rights and women in Afghanistan, we are concerned that this has not been followed by adequate and specific action and funding.83
73. We asked Sir William Patey about the protection of the human rights of women:
That is why it is important to focus on the constitution and the rule of law, because the legal framework is such that women are protected under the constitution in terms of their rights. Any move away from the rule of law, where tribal justice or ad hoc justice is applied, is bad for women. We have seen that in the remoter parts of Afghanistan. [...] We are pretty powerless to do much about that, but what we can try to do is make sure that women’s rights are enshrined in the constitution, and that there is no derogation from that, and to use our influence.
We can use our influence beyond because if we continue to fund the Afghans, obviously we will make it conditional on things like corruption, human rights and how women are treated. So we will at least give the Minister of Finance, the President and all the others an incentive to do the right thing. So I think we should use our influence to the extent that we have it.84
74. We were told by several Afghan Ministers that women were consistently achieving the best results in their studies and were proving to be amongst the best new entrants to departments. We recognise the important role educated women will play in building an effective and functioning Afghan state.
Reconciliation and reintegration
75. During our visit to Afghanistan, General Smyth-Osbourne, ISAF Reintegration Cell, gave us a full and detailed briefing on reconciliation and reintegration. He described the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme and the other structures underpinning the peace process including the High Peace Council and Provincial Peace Committees.
83 Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014, International Development Committee, Sixth Report 2012-13, HC 403 84 Q 94
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 41
76. Although the process of reconciliation is at an early stage, Mark Sedwill thought that there were some positive signs:
[...] It is not yet at the stage where we can say there is a single, load-bearing channel that we could expect to conduct a formal negotiation. It has not reached that point yet, but there are genuine channels of communication open and we are seeing from the Taliban—including from the Taliban leadership, including in some of their public statements—a genuine interest in engaging in a political process. They recognise that they are not going to win their objectives on the battlefield. They need to engage in a political process, at least after we have left, and they can set conditions for that now. The prospects for some kind of political accommodation are positive, but it is at an early stage, and it will be very complex and difficult to follow for most of the next few years.85
77. Sir William Patey was not convinced that the Taliban was yet taking the process seriously:
The Taliban adopted a position of, “We are not dealing with the monkey, we want to deal with the organ grinder” and they refused to deal with Karzai on the basis that the Americans called the shots. [...]
[...] President Karzai and the international community have done what they can to create the circumstances, working with Pakistan, trying to bring them in, but until the Taliban think they need to make the compromises for a political process, I do not see it going very far.86
He further said:
[...] The ideal solution is one in which there’s a political process backed by everyone—Pakistan, the international community—and in which the Taliban agree to lay down their arms and they form a political party. There may be some deal done that gives them some positions in government in the run-up to an election. They’re allowed to form a political party. You would need to talk about amnesties. There would need to be ceasefires. All of that is the sort of thing that you would expect to discuss in a genuine political process. That hasn’t started.87
78. Reintegration of former insurgents is fundamental to a peace settlement. We were told that the amnesty available was targeted only at the insurgency and not at other crimes relating to narcotics. We were told that offences relating to narcotics carried heavier penalties than other crimes such as murder including crimes against the military. We asked the Secretary of State about the current programme of the reintegration of former insurgents in the light of this fact. He replied:
there is a substantial reintegration under way; about 6,000 Afghans joined the formal re-integration programme. We suspect that there are many more Taliban adherents
85 Q 245 86 Q 84 87 Q 86
42 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
who simply melt back into civil society—who simply go back to their village and melt back into what they were doing before. I do not claim to be an expert on Afghan society, but I wonder how meaningful is the concept of handing in your weapon in an amnesty, in a society where everybody has a weapon. We must be realistic about the realities of Afghan society on the ground. We have got to promote the reintegration process and the idea that at the margin some compromises may be needed in order to make it realistic. On the other hand, I do not think we would want to say to the Afghans that they have to pass up the right to take action against any criminal in Afghan society, no matter what area of crime he has been involved in.88
79. Mark Sedwill acknowledged that ISAF’s understanding of the Taliban was limited and when asked if the international community was hearing a consistent message from the Taliban, he said:
[...] We have some insight into internal debate within the Taliban and where different groups and leaders position themselves, but that insight, inevitably, is far from complete. I think the leadership of the Taliban is beginning to accommodate itself to the need for a political settlement, but their objectives are still not the same as ours: they don’t want the Afghanistan that we would see as acceptable and most of the Afghan population would see as acceptable. Again, you would expect that at this stage. There are many people within the Taliban who are essentially fighting to protect their local interests. [...] most of the Taliban, and most of the insurgency as a whole, essentially fight in their own areas. Therefore, quite a lot of this is driven by local tribal frictions, access to resources and so on. Quite a lot of the fight is for that reason. That is not really about policy or ideology.89
Durability of any peace settlement
80. Not all commentators agree that negotiation with the Taliban is the way forward for Afghanistan. Frank Ledwidge, in his book Losing Small Wars, said:
We have bought into a policy which will fail. If we are honest, everyone is simply crossing fingers and hoping for the best. In so doing we have continued a path of allowing ourselves to be pushed about by events, rather than being active and creative in seeking a solution that would be acceptable to all Afghans save the few who have a stake in the continuation of a corrupt and discredited government. The consequences of continuing down this path will be severe, damaging and immediately apparent. As matters stand we are simply, through ennui, fatigue or laziness, consciously allowing Afghanistan to drift.90
81. Recognising that all sectors of Afghan society, not just the Taliban, have to accept any peace settlement, we asked Mark Sedwill how durable any peace settlement would be. He replied :
88 Q 314 89 Q 255 90 Losing Small Wars – British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan by Frank Ledwidge
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 43
It depends on how many people are involved, and on the terms. We have all made clear what we believe the terms should be: there needs to be a renunciation of violence and association with terrorist groups, and there needs to be respect for the Afghan constitution, including, of course, the human rights provisions— inevitably, many of us have focused on women’s rights, but also children’s rights and the rights of other disadvantaged groups. That is not just right, it is actually necessary, if it is to be durable, because there is a constituency in Afghanistan who have really benefited from the last 10 years. Of course the implementation of what we would regard as acceptable standards of human rights, including women’s rights, throughout the country is still very uneven. It is particularly uneven in rural areas in terms of levels of education and so on, and social exclusion is still high, but you would expect that in a country at Afghanistan’s stage of development. But there is a constituency that will not give those things up without a fight.
Although I would not like to put too much emphasis on this, we are, interestingly, starting to see some recognition [...] that they need to move on that issue and accommodate the positions that the rest of Afghanistan hold and the commitment that the rest of Afghanistan has to girls’ education, to women’s rights and to the other advances of the last 10 years.91
82. During our visit to Afghanistan, we were told by a number of NGOs and Afghan women that they were concerned about the discussions with the Taliban and that the gains achieved in respect of women’s rights might be lost. In response, the Secretary of State said:
One has to be careful how one states this case. Many women in Afghanistan are concerned about the discussions with the Taliban. Discussions with the Taliban must be the way forward; that is not an optional extra. In my judgment, there will not be a lasting settlement in Afghanistan without discussions with the Taliban. I understand that there will be concerns about the expressed agenda of some parts of the Taliban. I think there should be some reason for optimism, though. We have seen—it is a matter of public record—that there is debate within the Taliban about the popularity of some of the policies that they have previously espoused, particularly with regard to women’s education. Again, I don’t claim to be an expert on this, but my understanding is that the rhetoric around women’s education has subsided somewhat over the past few years and there is evidence that the Taliban recognise that this is not an issue that they should focus major attention on if they want to establish broad support across the population.92
83. We asked the Secretary of State what would happen if a peace settlement had not been achieved by the time of withdrawal of ISAF. He replied:
I suspect that the Afghan National Security Forces would effectively hold the important parts of the country—the population centres, the key towns and cities, the principal communications arteries and the major economically important areas. I would expect attempts at dialogue, at groping towards a peace process, to continue. I
91 Q 254 92 Q 322
44 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
would expect the situation to be messier than it is today with ISAF present on the ground, but I sense that there is a growing recognition on both sides of this fight that neither side can win outright. [...] So both sides will want to make progress ultimately to some kind of political accommodation.
Our own experience in similar situations suggests that this might not be a smooth process. It might go in fits and starts. There may be periods when it looks as though the political process is making way and there may be other periods when it looks as though the political process is stalled and the focus is on the ability of the security forces to maintain the ground. But I would expect slow and messy progress.93
The importance of other regional states
84. Witnesses have been clear that the Afghans must make for themselves their own political settlement and cannot be forced by the ISAF/NATO powers into something not of their own political design. On the other hand, the ISAF/NATO countries can play a more direct role in influencing the attitudes of the key regional players in the situation. Without a favourable international climate, any domestic Afghan political settlement would face significant challenges.
85. Our witnesses were divided on the prospects of the emergence of a favourable international climate. Sir Rodric Braithwaite, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and author of Afgantsy, said:
all the neighbours, of course, have their own interests, and much more durable interests than ours, in Afghanistan. The trouble is that the interests very often conflict with one another, India and Pakistan being the obvious one. If the Indians and Pakistan behaved differently and were prepared to agree with one another on how they should treat Afghanistan, a lot would change; but that does not seem very likely.
Of course, Iran is another one which has a strong, legitimate and on the whole quite often constructive interest in Afghanistan; but they tend to be excluded by American desires or obsessions. I think the Russians have an interest, and they are still very well connected in Afghanistan. They know lots of people. I think they are mainly Northern Alliance people, but they can make an input; and of course the immediate neighbours also have an interest.94
He emphasised that China was optimistic in its long-term view of Afghanistan and was buying up mines.95
86. We asked Mark Sedwill who were the critical players in ensuring a lasting peace settlement. He replied:
93 Q 311 94 Q 130 95 Q 130
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 45
All the region has a role to play. It is important that Afghanistan is embedded economically, and, in terms of security, in the region as a whole. There are various processes to encourage that. The Turks have been leading one called the Heart of Asia process, but there are others as well. The key external player—other than ourselves, of course—is Pakistan. It is where the insurgency is based. The border between the two countries bifurcates the Pashtun belt. There are 18 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan and about 30 million in Pakistan.
In Pakistan they face a severe problem with their own Taliban, the TTP. Of course, that is why they point out that they cannot afford instability in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, because it will spill back into Pakistan and make their own problems even worse. That is why we are hoping that Pakistan will take more effective action to promote a political settlement. Of all the external players, I think Pakistan is the most crucial.96
87. On 3 to 4 February 2013, the Prime Minister hosted a summit at Chequers , attended by President Karzai of Afghanistan and President Zardari of Pakistan. They were joined by Foreign Ministers, Chiefs of Defence Staff, Chiefs of Intelligence, the Afghan National Security Adviser and the Chair of the Afghan Peace Council. This was the third in a series of trilateral meetings to discuss the Afghan-led peace and reconciliation process and how to strengthen joint efforts to address extremism and advance regional peace and stability. In the joint statement following the summit, the three leaders agreed on the urgency of the work on peace and reconciliation and committed themselves to take all necessary measures to achieve the goal of a peace settlement over the next six months. They affirmed their support for the opening of an office in Doha for the purpose of negotiations between the Taliban and the High Peace Council of Afghanistan.97 Such meetings are due to take place.
88. Mark Sedwill thought that the Afghan-Pakistan bilateral relationship would be key to a lasting peace settlement:
While there is distrust in that relationship, while there are frictions along the border and while they essentially fear each other’s motives, it is inevitable that insecurity will continue along the border. It is very difficult in those circumstances to get Pakistan and the Pakistani security apparatus to commit to an Afghan political settlement and use their influence to try to push or encourage the Afghan Taliban, many of whom are operating from their territory—although, in many cases, ungoverned parts of Pakistan’s territory—to commit to a political settlement. It is really important that we stabilise that relationship.98
89. The Secretary of State stressed the need for political compromise between the different ethnic and political groups in Afghanistan. He also said:
There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic. The dialogue that is going on, brokered by the UK—the trilateral discussions between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the UK— suggests a level of Pakistani engagement with the issue, and a commitment to trying
96 Q 257 97 Chequers Summit Joint Statement February 2013 www.number10.gov.uk/news/chequers-summit-joint-statement/ 98 Q 253
46 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
to find a solution to the problem that we have not always seen in the past. That is a very healthy indicator. There are signs that there is a dawning realisation in Pakistan that as ISAF troops withdraw from Afghanistan, it is very much in Pakistan’s interest to have a stable settlement in Afghanistan. Otherwise, Pakistan runs the risk of becoming the mirror image of Afghanistan today—a country potentially destabilised by people who find refuge in an unstable neighbour. There are good, self-interested reasons why Pakistan is engaging, and thus those reasons are likely to be enduring.
[...] The announcements made during the recent meeting between the US President and President Karzai around the Doha office and that process are also quite positive. It is going to be a slow and careful process. I don’t expect dramatic progress, but I think we are heading gently in the right direction, rather than in the wrong direction.99
90. There are many Afghans who have benefited from the changes in Afghanistan over the last ten years, including Afghan women. Mistakes have been made, principally by promoting a western style analysis on efforts to improve the position of women in Afghanistan. Efforts should be made going forward to ensure women’s programmes realistically reflect the differing needs of women from rural and urban areas. However, these groups, including women, will need to be brought into the peace settlement, which must not disadvantage them. If Afghanistan is to become stable and functioning, it is important that those currently excluded are brought into the process and are given a stake; this particularly applies to women. If as a consequence of negotiating with the Taliban they are excluded, the progress made could easily unravel. UN Resolution 1325 requires that in all peace negotiations in regions affected by conflict, women’s voices must be heard to ensure the long-term stability of any negotiated settlement. Afghanistan is no different. The United States has passed the Afghan Women and Girls Security Promotion Act 2012 which requires the development of a three part strategy to ensure and strengthen women’s security and lays a foundation for Afghan women’s participation in Afghan society in the long term. In its response to this Report, the Government should inform us how it is contributing to ensuring women are able to participate in discussions on security and transition in Afghanistan.
91. It is in the nature of a negotiation that both sides have to give ground. If a reasonably free and fair election takes place, it would seem unpalatable for those who have expended great resources including the lives of Armed Forces personnel, Afghan as well as Western, to compromise on issues like democracy, the rule of law and women’s rights. The extent of the need to compromise will be a function of relative strength. The Government should make every effort to support its international partners to support a peace settlement, but should make it clear that some principles of rule of law and human rights cannot be compromised in the process.
92. While we recognise that the UK has a limited role in facilitating a peace settlement, the Government should continue to use its influence with the Afghan Government to promote a satisfactory agreement for all Afghans. Many countries in the region are important in realising a secure Afghanistan, including Pakistan, China, India and Iran.
99 Q 310
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 47
The Government should build on the trilateral meetings it has hosted and urge international partners vigorously to support a peace settlement.
Economic development and the judicial system
Economic development
93. Economic development is essential to the promotion of a successful Afghanistan after 2014. During our visit to Afghanistan we saw signs that the economy was improving. There were more, and more varied shops, in Kabul than we had seen on previous visits. The Secretary of State said that economic development must be the answer to the insurgency but acknowledged the difficulties caused by the profitability of the cultivation of narcotics.100
94. Mark Sedwill said that the Afghan economy was likely to remain aid dependent until the mid 2020s:
[...] The World Bank’s estimate is that there is a fiscal gap of around 40% now and up until about 2014, and that will be 20% by the end of the decade and by the mid-2020s should close, if Afghanistan remains on its current track. Growth per year has been about 9% per year, which you would expect from a very low base, as we have seen in Afghanistan. Their own revenue collection has grown quite significantly. In about 2005, it was 3% of GDP. It is now 11%. Clearly, that needs to continue, which is one reason we focus so heavily on customs collection, and so on.
The main staple for the economy is still agriculture. In the previous eras, they exported high-quality soft fruits into the Indian market. Therefore the AfPak-India trade agreements—the AfPak transit trade agreement—is important to the agricultural sector for Afghanistan. Pomegranates and other exports of this kind. Towards the end of the decade we hope that mineral resources will come on-stream. You have probably seen the reports of the vast mineral resources Afghanistan has. Properly managed, they have a genuinely prosperous future, not just a future above subsistence level.101
95. In its recent inquiry into Afghanistan, the International Development Committee found that the withdrawal of military spending by ISAF in Afghanistan would have an adverse impact on the economy which would threaten growth and economic stability.102 The Committee recommended:
[...] DFID will also need to continue to lead donors in pledging and disbursing aid so that there will not be any sudden drops in funding that could exacerbate an extremely fragile situation. Based on the assessment of the likely economic impact of military withdrawal, the UK Government should be prepared to do whatever it can
100 Q 316 101 Q 234 102 Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014, International Development Committee, Sixth Report 2012-13, HC 403, paragraph 62
48 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
to address this potential shortfall in spending including urging other governments to increase their aid commitments in Afghanistan to fill the economic gap.103
96. When we asked Mark Sedwill about the economic impact of the withdrawal of ISAF, he said that the World Bank had estimated that growth in Afghanistan would fall from the current seven to nine per cent to low single figures.104 He added:
Quite a lot will depend on how we, essentially, repatriate some of the people whom we have employed. We employ a vast number of interpreters and highly skilled people within the ISAF mission. As we have seen elsewhere, if given lump sums and the right kind of training, they can come out and start setting up businesses of their own. The World Bank has taken that into account, and that is a big part of the underlying work on the transition.105
97. As we said above, we saw signs of the economy improving. We met a businessman and his non-Afghan associate who had set up a variety of retail, mining and insurance companies. He said that in the last ten years many Afghans had made a lot of money and the challenge was to keep it in the country. His own staff were 90 per cent Afghan, and he had attracted a lot of young ‘returners’; he was optimistic about the younger generation. His Afghan staff included women both in management roles and in laboratory work.
98. He told us of the barriers to enterprise. The legal climate was not propitious, particularly in respect of mining. Which he felt was Afghanistan’s best hope and the only sector likely to attract direct foreign investment. To give an example, the right to explore for deposits did not entail the right to exploit them; a draft law designed to remedy this situation and others had been amended and its future was now uncertain. Another handicap was the variable quality of administration, though the UK was working to help this and the Ministry of Mines had been considerably improved as a result. Poor transport links, both internal and through neighbouring countries, were also problematic.
Corruption
99. Economic growth and increased security will not be enough to ensure a peaceful Afghanistan if the problem of corruption is not tackled. Mark Sedwill told us that corruption and abuse of power was intrinsic in Afghan Society and would take a generation to resolve. He outlined the ways in which corruption was being addressed:
Essentially, there are two things that I would say that we have done in the last year to tackle this: one by us, one by the Afghans themselves. At the Tokyo conference, we agreed with them a very challenging mutual accountability framework, which requires them to take corruption seriously and to get a grip on it throughout the system—not just high-profile cases, but throughout the system. The aid that we have committed over the period after 2014 is dependent upon them honouring those commitments.
103 Ibid paragraph 66 104 Q 237 105 Q 237
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 49
Just a few days later—I think it was 26 July—President Karzai issued a decree with 164 time-bound measures on corruption, and some of those are starting to take effect. Of course, declaratory policy is all very well, but it does mean that we have some specific commitments against which we can hold them to account.106
Kabul Bank
100. The Kabul Bank was a trusted institution on which millions of Afghans relied. Its collapse caused a financial crisis in Afghanistan. The bank’s controlling shareholders, key supervisors and managers led a sophisticated operation of fraudulent lending and embezzlement predominantly through a loan-book scheme. This resulted in Kabul Bank being deprived of approximately $935 million, funded mostly from customer’s deposits. There were many opportunities for national and international bodies to detect these activities between 2007 and their eventual exposure in 2010. However from September 2010 to April 2011, there was disagreement on the action to be taken. In April 2011, when it became clear that this was affecting donor funds, the Afghan Government agreed to put the bank into receivership. In June 2012 following investigations, indictments were issued against several bank staff and government employees.107
101. We asked Mark Sedwill for the latest situation with regard to the Kabul Bank:
To be candid, it took about a year after the Kabul Bank incident itself for the Afghan Government to grip it. There were some very powerful political interests involved and, as we all know, that was very challenging for President Karzai and his Ministers to work through. They faced losing some of the support of the principal power brokers within Afghanistan, so he had to manage that very carefully and it took longer than we had expected or wanted for them really to take a grip on it and start to recover some of the funds and, indeed, follow up with criminal prosecutions and sort out the bank.
After a year, the right measures were in place, and it was really as a result of that that commitments were possible at the Bonn conference, and, indeed, international commitments from the IMF essentially recertified that aid programmes that had been suspended could restart. So the experts essentially concluded that the Kabul Bank was on track, but it remains the most visible sign of the underlying corruption problem.108
102. Mark Sedwill said that the international community had acted as quickly as possible when the scandal hit but that the Afghans had taken longer:
[...] I think the Afghans took longer, and they took longer partly because it wasn’t just members close to the President’s family, but actually the most significant shareholders were among other very senior power-brokers in Afghanistan, and he had to manage that. I think that took longer than we expected and there were very some difficult exchanges, including exchanges in the Afghan National Security
106 Q 238 107 Report of the Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis, November 2012 108 Q 238
50 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
Council, which I and others had with him and his Ministers over exactly that, where we had to confront them with the prospects for international support for Afghanistan were they not to take the right action. It was a very, very difficult period.109
On 5 March 2013, 21 individuals were convicted of wrongdoing. These included two senior executives from the bank who were sentenced to five year prison terms and ordered to repay some $800 million.110
Narcotics
103. Afghanistan’s economy depends heavily on the drugs trade. The country supplies over 90 per cent of the world’s opium. International bodies say that the drugs trade helps fuel the Taliban insurgency which is estimated to receive some $100 million a year from it.111 Robert Fox thought that international intervention had made little difference to the growth of the poppy and that narcotics were an important part of the Afghan economy:
Without exaggerating, the enduring part of the Afghan economy, when the aid and war economies are taken away—if they do go away after 2014—is the narco economy. Looking at the statistics, there is a hard yield of between 5,200 and 6,000 cubic tonnes of, I think, wet opium, a year and it supplies over 90% of the world’s heroin ingestion. Despite the good intentions, not least by the Government of the UK at the time in Bonn, we have made very little difference.112
Sir William Patey was equally pessimistic:
By the time I left, I became pretty pessimistic about what we could achieve and had achieved. It was clear we had achieved significant reductions in poppy cultivation in Helmand—a 40% reduction over two years—by a combination of law enforcement, alternative livelihoods and wheat seed distribution. No one thing seemed to work. If you got the combination right—a good governor and a Minister of counter-narcotics who was working with you—you could achieve some progress.
But by the time I left, the overall production of poppy in Afghanistan had gone up. It had gone down in Helmand and up elsewhere. [...] Other places that had been poppy-free suddenly became attractive again for poppy.113
The problem is compounded because, as Non-Governmental Organisations told us, efforts to suppress poppy cultivation, unless accompanied by effective measures to provide alternative means of earning a livelihood, may provide a fertile recruiting ground for the Taliban.
109 Q 242 110 www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/kabul-bank-chiefs-jailed-fraud?INTCMP=SRCH 111 /www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Summary_Findings_FINAL.pdf 112 Q 14 113 Q 72
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 51
Judicial and penal systems
104. On our visit to Afghanistan, Chief Justice Azimi told us that they had been developing an effective judicial system. Their first challenge had been human resources— knowledgeable, honest judges cannot be purchased but must be trained. They had screened existing judges and dismissed those that were unqualified. They had also developed a new system for the appointment of judges. A team of UK officials is working with the Directorate of National Security to improve the judicial system from arrest to verdict and to ensure that it is compliant with human rights.
105. Mark Sedwill told us that the rule of law was crucial in the development of Afghanistan:
[...] you are absolutely right to focus on the judiciary, the prison system and the rule of law generally. [...] I think this remains one of the most significant risks to Afghanistan’s own stability—the connection of their people to their own Government and system, but of course our own attitude to the resilience of the state. It is going to be a long process and it remains one of the most significant risks.114
106. We asked if there were prisons which could keep their prisoners secure, Mark Sedwill said:
There are some, but it is far from country wide, and one of the problems with the prisons is that people are, of course, able to bribe their way out—not in a high-profile case, because it’s self-evident if it happens there, but at lower levels it is possible for people to do so and the prison system remains a significant gap. So, I think there are prisons that meet that test, but it’s far from all of the prisons, let alone all of the detention facilities that exist in Afghanistan so far.115
107. As part of our meetings with the National Directorate of Security, we visited the construction of court holding cells and new prisons cells on two sites in Afghanistan. The construction of these prisons will ensure better conditions in prisons but the key measure needed is an improvement in the human rights of prisoners.
108. We were particularly concerned that UK Armed Forces would not be able to transfer the prisoners held at Camp Bastion to the Afghan penal system because of human rights failures. The Secretary of State said:
[...] At one time last year there was an injunction in place preventing the transfer of UK detainees into the Afghan system. In response to that injunction and in preparing a case to challenge it in the courts, a great deal of work was done in the MoD. In the course of that work, material came to light that caused me to make a policy decision, independent of the injunction under which we were placed, to suspend transfers into the Afghan system until further notice.
The injunction is no longer in place. The policy decision remains in place. [...] We have to establish or re-establish a route to transfer detainees into the Afghan judicial
114 Q 238 115 Q 239
52 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
system. [...] that will be acceptable to the High Court here to allow that process to resume. We are looking at different approaches as a matter of urgency in theatre and we very much hope that it will be possible to resume transfers some time during the course of the spring.116
109. On 23 March 2013, the US Government agreed to hand over final control of its last detention centre to the Afghan Government. General Dunford, ISAF Commander, handed over the Parwan detention centre to Bismillah Khan, Afghan Defence Minister. The majority of the prisoners were already under Afghan control but a few hundred prisoners had not been handed over because of US concerns that the Afghan authorities might release them. With the transfer of the final prison run by the USA in March, we are the only nation still running a prison in Afghanistan. This raises a wider point. Getting countries the UK is working with to meet standards in their judicial and prison systems acceptable to UK courts may not always be possible. If the UK Armed Forces are to continue to be involved with a range of partner countries, what is the policy on dealing with prisoners? The UK cannot continue to run a prison after leaving Afghanistan, or indeed in any other country UK forces have deployed to. Nor would it be acceptable to bring such prisoners back to the UK.117
110. For Afghanistan to grow economically and to reduce its dependence on international aid, it will need the continuing support of the international community for some time. During our recent visit to Afghanistan, we saw welcome signs of economic activity not seen on earlier visits. However, corruption and the narcotics trade remain a problem and are likely to continue to be so after 2014. To ensure that Afghanistan does not lose the gains it has made, the UK Government should continue its support after 2014 for economic development, and for reducing corruption and the size of the narcotics trade. But it should also make it clear that if corruption increases and human rights and the rule of law are not protected, that the UK government may consider withdrawing that support.
111. We were encouraged by evidence of indigenous Afghan initiative and recommend that the UK investigate ways of further encouraging UK companies and institutions to develop links with Afghanistan, since only through the development of its industrial and commercial base can the country have a sound future.
112. The rule of law is an important component of a stable Government, the FCO should continue its efforts to promote a strong judicial and penal system in Afghanistan. The building of new prisons in Afghanistan is a welcome development but the crucial improvement needed is in the provision of prisoners’ human rights. In response to this Report, the Government should inform us of the latest position on the transfer of detainees from Camp Bastion to the Afghan penal system.
113. The Government must, as a matter of the highest priority, develop, in conjunction with international partners, a policy which will assist the Afghan Government to establish judicial and penal systems which satisfy international standards. In regard to
116 Q 355 117 www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/24/us-handover-afghan-prisoners-pressure-uk
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 53
future deployments, the UK Government must urgently develop a policy which protects the position of UK personnel in dealing with detainees in jurisdictions that may not meet the requirements of UK courts.
114. Six new women’s prisons have been built in Afghanistan and we were concerned to hear that many of the prisoners are women who have fled domestic violence. We were informed that the women could leave prison if they returned home to their families. It is unacceptable for women to be imprisoned for leaving a violent home life and to be forced to return to violence as a condition of release.
115. In response to this Report, the Government should set out its current thinking on its future role in Afghanistan. It should spell out the practical measures it envisages to promote economic development, establish a strong judicial and penal system and reduce corruption and tackle narcotics, and what criteria it will use to quantify progress.
Role of the FCO post 2014
116. We asked Mark Sedwill about the role of the FCO after 2014. He said that they would continue to work like a normal embassy in a country like Afghanistan:
[...] the political accommodation, the political process, will almost certainly continue beyond 2014, not least because [...] the new president and the new Government will have to be part of that, not just the outgoing Administration of President Karzai. He is partly setting the conditions for that. After 2014, I expect us still to have a very big embassy in Kabul, and that will still contain around a dozen Government Departments—the Foreign Office, DFID and all the others. There will still probably be people there from SOCA or the National Crime Agency, as it will become, working on counter-narcotics. There will still be military people there and so on. But as in other places, our role will become increasingly one of diplomatic influence on a political process, which will be an Afghan political process, rather than direct intervention.118
117. As part of the transition to Afghanistan control, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are being progressively phased out. The PRT in Helmand will withdraw at the end of 2014. Mark Sedwill said:
[...] We don’t expect to have a mission on the ground in Helmand after 2014. The PRT, as they will throughout the country, will close and we will maintain our legacy programmes in Helmand, essentially working through our teams and from Kabul and one or two regional centres.119
He outlined the work the PRT had done in helping the provincial government build its capacity in governance, health and education.120
118 Q 262 119 Q 262 120 Q 260
54 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
118. We asked witnesses if Afghanistan was likely to descend into civil war in the years following 2015. Sir William Patey said that there was a 50 per cent chance of it happening.121 He added:
[...] We will have some pretty difficult times ahead. There will be all sorts. There will be more green on blues. There are going to be corruption scandals. There is going to be all of that, but I do not think that anything I have seen in the last year is sufficiently bad to derail the strategy.
I do think that we have the right policy in terms of the timetable. We could come out earlier—you could come out earlier and you could increase the risks. The corollary of that might be if we stayed longer we would be more likely—I do not think that is true. I think there comes a point where you have outlived your usefulness, and I think actually coming out in an orderly fashion by the end of 2014 will tip the balance. I think the Taliban will find it very difficult to sustain an insurgency against their own people when we remove their excuse that they are fighting a foreign invader—that will tip the balance. [...]122
Mark Sedwill said that there was a risk of a descent into civil war123 but that the UK should:
Maintain both the practical but, more importantly, the political commitment that we make. So loose talk about rushing for the exit, and so on, in newspaper articles and books actually has a political effect, because it undermines Afghan, Pakistani and regional confidence in our determination to see it through, and if they act on their fears then the worse scenarios that you set up become that much more likely. So this has to be about transition and commitment, not withdrawal and exit. We have to be clear that 2014 is the moment at which we complete our combat mission and that our commitment to Afghanistan continues. That way we give the Afghans the best prospect of securing and governing their own country to their own standards and recognising all the challenges that will remain, but doing so in a way that essentially protects the reason we are there in the first place, which is to protect our national security and to prevent another threat emerging which directly threatens our national security.124
119. The Secretary of State said that the message he wished to give the Afghan people was:
We cannot build the future of your country; we can build the conditions that give you a reasonable, sporting chance of doing it for yourselves, but the future lies with you, in political compromise and agreement, in allowing the institutions of civil government to flourish, and in tackling the corruption that is still a major problem at every level of Afghan society. 125
121 Q 97 122 Q 98 123 Q 305 124 Q 306 125 Q 382
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 55
120. We hope that Afghanistan can become a secure, prosperous and flourishing country but we are concerned that Afghanistan could descend into civil war within a few years. Engaging with the Taliban in the peace process will clearly be necessary. In response to this Report, the Government should spell out what steps it intends to take to at least hold on to the progress made so far.
56 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
4 Withdrawal of ISAF combat troops Plans for the withdrawal of combat troops 121. Under current plans, all ISAF forces in combat roles will have been withdrawn by the end of 2014 with responsibility for security having transferred to the ANSF. On 19 December 2012, the Government announced that UK force levels would be reduced to approximately 5,200 by the end of 2013. The Secretary of State for Defence told the House of Commons that “We will keep this number in review as the ISAF plan firms up and other allies make draw-down decisions in the new year”.126
122. As part of his State of the Union 2013 address, President Obama announced that, having already reduced its troop level by 33,000, the USA would further reduce its forces in 2013:
This spring, our forces will move into a support role, while Afghan security forces take the lead. Tonight I can announce that over the next year, another 34,000 American troops will come home from Afghanistan. This drawdown will continue and by the end of next year, our war in Afghanistan will be over.127
123. General Barrons defined a successful withdrawal as:
Militarily, the first priority is an Afghan national security force organisation, military and police, that is sufficiently capable, confident and large to take on the residual insurgency—in other words, to have completed transition to them to the point where they can take this fight on without our direct help. Secondly, that we have recovered our men and matériel successfully from Afghanistan and taken them back to the UK in good order. Thirdly, that we have come to some sort of accommodation or agreement about what we will continue to do in a very small way with the Afghan national security forces after the end of ISAF.128
124. We asked the Secretary of State if the announced reduction in the number of UK troops would be phased. He replied that the plan had to be flexible enough to respond to what other ISAF nations, in particular the USA, decided.129 He further said:
[...] We will not be deploying 9,000 troops in the RIP [relief in place - deployment] in April, so there will be a step down in April. There is a clear expectation that there will be a further step down in September/October. What I cannot tell you is whether those two steps will take us down to 5,200, or whether it will be a question of bringing some people out of theatre. I suspect that once we embark on this process, if things go smoothly, the curve will look broadly smooth, so that there will be a
126 Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence HC Deb, 19 December 2012, cols 853-856 127 President Obama – State of the Union address February 2013 /www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/us/politics/obamas-2013- state-of-the-union-address.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 128 Q 289 129 Q 369
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 57
combination of a reduction at each RIP but the withdrawal of some elements from theatre during the course of each six-month deployment.130
When asked if he had a strategic reserve in the event of withdrawal plans going awry, he said:
You will be aware that we hold a theatre reserve battalion in Cyprus, and we will continue to hold that theatre reserve battalion in Cyprus if short-notice reinforcement is required at any point.131
125. General Barrons assured us that UK troops would be able to protect themselves until the day they left:
But as we reduce our capability over that same time, we will never be at a position where we are so exposed that we cannot look after ourselves up to the day we go. Eventually, we will fall back on Camp Bastion, which has a perimeter the size of Reading and an enormous American population. This is not like a fighting withdrawal through the jungles of the second world war. It is completely different.132
We pressed General Barrons on the possibility of having to withdraw in contact with the insurgency. He said:
I am afraid that this question keeps coming up—the idea that we are somehow going to be forced to withdraw in contact. We just do not see the capacity in the insurgency to force that. There was a time, between 2006 and 2008, when the insurgency was tempted to take us on in a more orthodox confrontation, [...] Every time that occurred they took a lot of casualties and were defeated, because they are simply incapable of replicating the combat power that we can focus on those sorts of encounters. The next instalment of this campaign has been falling back on IEDs and very small-scale small arms encounters. That is the limit of their capability.
Since then, not only has their capability reduced a little, but Afghan National Security Forces have got better, so not only do we have robust capability, but we have Afghan colleagues who can match us. At no point in this business of getting out of Afghanistan are we going to allow ourselves to be in the position where these tiny packets of insurgents and their little bits of asymmetric capability would overface us. That is not going to happen.133
126. We asked if there was a possibility that UK Forces could leave earlier and prevent further deaths of Armed Forces personnel. General Barrons replied:
I would not subscribe to that, provided you are committed to the current plan. There is a price to be paid for seeing through the process of ANSF development and the process of transition. For as long as you choose—it is not a military decision, ultimately—to continue to see that plan through, there will be a price to be paid, but
130 Q 368 131 Q 370 132 Q 282 133 Q 290
58 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
it is declining over time, and, as I said earlier, there is no sense of military adventurism about this. We are not trying to hang on to operations for longer because we think it is a good idea. That is not what we are about [...] If you were to decide that the most important thing is the force protection of our people, then, like any operation, tell us to come home, but that would be at the price of the operation that we are currently embarked on not succeeding.134
127. We agree with the Government’s decision that the UK needs to see through the process of transition to the end of 2014. It is essential that UK Armed Forces are able to protect themselves until they leave Afghanistan. We are convinced that the withdrawal of troops will not be as straightforward or risk-free as the MoD tells us. The MoD should share with the Committee its detailed withdrawal plans. The plan should encompass the following:
An orderly handover of responsibility for security to the ANSF;
An orderly withdrawal of men with appropriate levels of protection;
An orderly withdrawal of equipment or its safe disposal;
Collaboration and consistency with NATO, other allies and Afghanistan;
An associated strategic contingency plan to cater for an unexpected breakdown in security within Afghanistan and armed resistance to the UK’s withdrawal including a significant reserve force to secure a timely and effective recovery of personnel and key materiel; and
A list of reference points by which the MoD will assess the timeliness and success of the withdrawal.
Withdrawal of equipment
Preparation and planning
128. General Capewell described the preparation and planning for withdrawal:
I should start by describing the MoD approach to this redeployment challenge. Of course it is not just about what is delivered in theatre, in terms of redeployment, it is how it is managed once it gets back to the UK base, so there is a whole MoD approach to this. A number of governing apparatuses manage and oversee this but, in so far as my contribution to redeployment is concerned, calibrating how much equipment—how much matériel—we need to extract from theatre over the next two years or so is clear to me. [...] I also know how I am going to get it back in terms of permutations of routes, whether through Pakistan or the northern Stans. I also know what that matériel looks like in terms of its movement, whether by road or air. The co-ordination of this is through my headquarters in the PGHQ, forwarding to the Joint Forces Support Headquarters, which is the headquarters that sits in Bastion.
134 Q292
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 59
What is going on at the moment? there is quite a lot of aggressive battlefield clearance, of equipments and matériel that we do not need. That is being properly moved back. Of course, the NAO has an interest in this, through proof of good order and in making sure that we do this properly in terms of biometric checks, to get this equipment back. The whole apparatus of this is well understood in UK terms, but of and in itself it is not just about the UK deployment because, if you envisage the theatre requirement, NATO also has a role to play in co-ordinating and synchronising the route access—how we get this out, the air space management required to get this out, the border control management needed—so this is not simply me having a good plan, it is me having a good plan that can nest inside a broader NATO plan. In that plan, it must also connect through the coupling bridge which is one of the routes that we use by air or sea back to the UK base to deliver a considerable amount of equipment necessary for future regeneration and contingency back in the UK base.135
129. General Capewell said that matériel and equipment not required in Afghanistan was already being moved out.136 During our visit to Afghanistan, General Carter told us that there would be a period of austerity at the end of the UK deployment when much of the supporting equipment would have been sent home.
130. The MoD provided us with considerable detail on its current plans for withdrawal. We then probed the current thinking on the approach to the withdrawal of equipment. The results of our investigations into the policy; the quantity to be returned; gifting to the ANSF; disposal; routes; costs; timetable; security; and co-ordination with NATO are summarised in an annex to this Report.
Practical problems and the costs of withdrawal
131. Francis Tusa, defence analyst, examined the publicly available material on the withdrawal from Afghanistan. His view was that the MoD did not appreciate the size of the task involved nor the practical problems associated with the withdrawal of large volumes of equipment and that consequently, it had underestimated the costs of the withdrawal. Compared with the withdrawal from Iraq, there is considerably more equipment in Afghanistan; 4,000 containers in Iraq compared with 12,000 in Afghanistan. Securing routes out of Afghanistan is more difficult, and relationships with Afghan neighbours are less stable than was the case in Iraq. He estimated that some 85 per cent of equipment had been flown in to Afghanistan which would be a very expensive way of returning equipment to the UK.137
132. Francis Tusa estimated that the MoD may need a “logistics surge of up to 1,000 people to clear up the stuff, unless we just want to abandon £6 billion of stock”. We asked General Capewell how many extra people he would need to deal with the logistics:
[...] we have got permission to surge up to 500 people into theatre to allow this to take place. I will give you a little bit more detail on that. It will not necessarily be 500
135 Q 212 136 Q 212 137 Q 25
60 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
people; it could be as low as 20 people. It depends what the specific requirement is. For instance, if you have a certain fleet of vehicles that need preparing for redeployment, that requires a certain set of specialists. So this is bespokely designed, it is focused on the immediate problem and it is episodic, in the sense that we surge people in and out to deal with these technical challenges as they come along.138
133. Much of the equipment used in Afghanistan has been purchased as urgent operational requirements (UORs). These requirements were not part of the MoD’s core equipment programme and were paid for from the Treasury’s Reserve. If such equipment is returned to the UK and becomes part of the Armed Forces’ equipment, the MoD is responsible for the cost of regenerating it. The Secretary of State explained:
We will only bring back equipment that we need as part of our equipment plan. Equipment that is in Afghanistan as an urgent operational requirement is not assumed to form part of the future equipment plan. If it is to be brought back into the equipment plan, it will have to have a budget line exactly like any other equipment. In this case, there will not be a capital cost of procurement, but there will be a cost of any adaptation or refurbishment that is required for use in core, and of course for the ongoing sustainment of that equipment. There will be a value for money case on each individual line of equipment; for example, within the defence equipment plan, we have already taken the decision to reduce the allocation that was originally planned for new armoured fighting vehicles. Significant numbers of UORs have been acquired for Afghanistan in particular—350-odd brand new Foxhound vehicles. Some have just been delivered, and many more will be delivered over the next two years. They will be brought back into core, and they will form the backbone of the Army’s light armoured vehicle fleet for the future.
In many cases, recuperating UORs, refurbishing them and sustaining them in core will be the best value for money option for delivering equipment to UK armed forces. Where equipment does not represent value for money, after taking into account the cost of getting it back from theatre and then refurbishing it into core, it will not be brought back; it will either be sold, gifted or destroyed, as appropriate.139
134. Francis Tusa said that the equipment in Afghanistan had been used extensively and much of it was not in a good state. He estimated that the cost of regenerating 75 per cent of the UK vehicles in Afghanistan could be between £1.5 billion and £2 billion. He did not think that the costs of the regeneration of equipment could be found within the current £8 billion headroom in the equipment programme.140
135. We agree that decisions as to what equipment to bring back to the UK must be based on what the Armed Forces need and must represent good value for money. Regenerating equipment returned from Afghanistan will be expensive and we believe that the MoD is being unduly optimistic about these costs. Both equipment purchased as Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) and equipment purchased normally have
138 Q 220 139 Q 387 140 Q 25
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 61
been used extensively. The MoD should not make hurried and flawed decisions on what equipment to return from Afghanistan because of pressures of short-term affordability. The Treasury should pay for the regeneration of core equipment under the normal convention that additional costs of operations are funded from the General Reserve.
136. The MoD should only give equipment to the ANSF that it can use and maintain. We note plans to co-ordinate with NATO on gifting equipment to the ANSF. In response to this Report, the MoD should provide detailed criteria for determining what should be gifted to the Afghan forces and update us on the progress made by NATO in co-ordinating the gifting of equipment to the ANSF.
137. Planning for the withdrawal of equipment is underway but many key decisions have yet to be made. As the UK will be withdrawing its equipment at the same time as other allies, the MoD should ensure that it secures the necessary transport in a timely fashion and should provide us with metrics that we can assess.
138. We note that the MoD has already started to withdraw some equipment and matériel it no longer needs in Afghanistan. The MoD should not withdraw equipment early that would put the lives of UK Armed Forces at risk or that would leave them living in very uncomfortable circumstances.
139. As it is less than two years away from the end of 2014, at which time all combat troops should have been withdrawn, we would expect plans for withdrawal to be firmed up soon. In response to our Report, the MoD should provide us with its detailed plans as they mature, including the quantities, routes including possible pinch points to progress, security and co-ordination with NATO. The MoD should also provide us with estimates of the likely range of costs of the withdrawal of equipment. We were glad to hear that there will be continuity of responsibility for the withdrawal in that General Capewell will be staying in post throughout.
The protection of UK personnel
140. Keeping UK Armed Forces and civilian personnel safe is of paramount importance. We asked what the MoD was doing to keep personnel secure. Mark Sedwill described the approach with regard to the Provincial Reconstruction Team:
We currently have five district stabilisation teams. Over the next year we will draw back to three hubs—north, central and southern—and then we will essentially have a reserve or support base in Camp Bastion. So we are gradually, in parallel, drawing the civilian effort back from being in the field on the ground to enabling the provincial Afghan Government, and then gradually stepping back so that the transition is to them, rather than to the UN or anyone else.141
Vincent Devine added:
141 Q 260
62 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
[...] As he [General Capewell] plans this complex transition, force protection will be a priority both for UK forces and personnel working alongside us. [...] Ministers have been absolutely clear in the direction they have given. [...]142
General Barrons added:
The contractors come in a number of guises. Those contractors that are from the west fulfil a number of roles, but they will tend to be either behind the wire in places such as Camp Bastion or absolutely integral to our own movement. There are third- party contractors who are much more comfortable operating in a very light way among the local population.143
141. We have been concerned about the insider attacks on UK Forces by members of the ANSF and we wanted to know how the Armed Forces were going to reduce the risks to UK personnel. General Barrons said that a very large number of ISAF soldiers of all nations are working shoulder to shoulder with their Afghan army, police and Afghan local police colleagues in many settings:
[...] there have been a number of occasions when members of those institutions have turned their weapons on members of ISAF. This is an extremely significant and very unfortunate turn of events. The thing we need to be clear about first of all is why it is occurring. The fact is that roughly half the perpetrators of those attacks either do not survive the experience or, in a few cases, escape, so we cannot ask them. Of the balance, there are very clear indications that a relatively modest proportion are directly connected to the insurgency, and rather more have turned their weapons on us as a result of some grievance or slight, or the co-option of their family or some other response to a very localised event. But the outcome is the same: in some cases, our soldiers have been killed and in other cases, wounded. It is completely clearly understood by the leadership of the ANSF and their political masters that this is a highly unfortunate turn of events, and our Afghan counterparts are as keen as we are to do everything we can to contain it.
[...] What we have to do is contain the risk of insider threat, which will diminish as we step back over time and thin our forces down. It is bounded by time and the nature of the task, but it cannot be eliminated entirely.144
We were given more detailed information about the measures being adopted to protect UK Armed Forces in classified briefings by the MoD in London and Afghanistan.
142. We asked the Secretary of State how those trainers and troops remaining in Afghanistan after 2014 would be protected. He replied:
First of all, the ability to protect whatever force we have on the ground will be absolutely paramount; we will not leave forces behind if we cannot adequately protect them. At the present time, the arrangements around the ANAOA [Officer
142 Q 261 143 Q 261 144 Q 266
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 63
Academy] and the protection arrangements are not entirely resolved, because it is not yet clear the extent to which we will be working within an American compound, how much protection the Americans will provide, how much life support the Americans will provide, and what the Afghans will provide. We have a range of estimates for our total force number associated with the ANAOA, at the lowest end being the basic numbers required to provide the training and basic UK aspects of life support, but assuming that the majority of the force protection is provided by others; and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, a number based on an assumption that we have to provide our own force protection to the ANAOA. Outside the ANAOA, if we decide to do anything else anywhere in Afghanistan, we will either include UK forces for force protection purposes, or it will be on the basis that we are working within an ISAF construct, where force protection will be provided by ISAF allies—I should say NATO allies, post-2014.145
143. When we asked the Secretary of State about the provision of medical care to those remaining after 2014, he said
As with force protection, we will only put people into a situation if we are confident that we are able to provide appropriate medical support to them, because as you say, even if they won’t be in a combat role, there will be risk in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. But it is likely that that in-theatre medical support will be provided—I could say by allies, but let’s not beat about the bush: it would almost certainly be provided by the United States, under an agreement, as it is highly unlikely that we would have enough people in theatre post-2014 to make the provision of dedicated UK medical facilities practical, I would think.146
144. Any loss of life is to be deeply regretted but it is particularly poignant when the death is caused by one of the people that UK Armed Forces are mentoring and supporting. In addition to the Armed Forces, there are many UK civilian personnel and contractors working in Afghanistan. The protection and medical care of Armed Forces and civilian personnel will continue to be a challenge up to and beyond the withdrawal of combat troops. In response to this Report, the MoD should tell us of the arrangements it has made with the US and the Afghan Forces on force protection and the provision of medical care, and associated aeromed evacuation.
Rest and recuperation
145. It was represented to us that we should consider changing the system for rest and recuperation for soldiers on operations. No other country flies its personnel home during tours and such visits can be disruptive rather than conducive to family life; the MoD takes a great deal of trouble over decompression at the end of a tour, part of whose aim is to ensure transit back into normal life. Yet there can be no time for such decompression before a short visit. We received testimony that this also puts extra strain in another way as it means two partings in each tour. Furthermore the long transit times put a stress on the air bridge – and soak up manpower waiting to go home and return. The best solution may
145 Q 267 146 Q 380
64 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
well be a more traditional approach of arranging local leave at the nearest safe and pleasant location available.
Strategic communications
146. The view that the public takes, in both Afghanistan and in Britain about the role and outcomes of the ISAF mission and UK participation in it, is a critical element in its ultimate success or failure. If the outcome of any counter-insurgency operation rests in the “hearts and minds” of those concerned, then the strategic communication about its mission, its activities and its impact are as important as the combat it undertakes.
147. In its Report on Operations in Afghanistan in July 2007, the previous Defence Committee expressed concern on the need for effective strategic communications in Afghanistan and with the UK:
The Government is not communicating key messages to the British or Afghan public about the purpose of its operations in Afghanistan effectively enough.147
Our last Report on Operations in Afghanistan in July 2011 also stressed the importance of the communication of the nature of the mission in Afghanistan to the local population and to that of the UK. We, therefore, wished to understand the Government’s current approach.148 The MoD told us that the cross-Government communications strategy had the following objectives:
To increase UK public confidence in HMG’s strategy in Afghanistan to build a secure, stable and viable Afghan state to protect our national security and reassure them that the mission is worthwhile.
To build understanding and support amongst Afghans for the international mission, and increase the confidence of the Afghan people in Afghan-led security, governance and development.
To ensure the support of international allies, including Pakistan, to achieve shared policy objectives and make a long-term commitment to Afghanistan.149
148. General Sherin Shah said that getting the media message right was sometimes more important than military operations. Helmand was a remote area and the Afghan media were new to it: nonetheless Afghan national television could and did report developments. It was particularly important that central government, with the assistance of scholars, should counter the misleading material put out by some clerics. There was still a lack of communications professionalism in central government.
149. We asked if more could be done to explain to the British and Afghan people about the nature of the mission in Afghanistan and the transition to the ANSF. On the message to the UK population, the Secretary of State said:
147 Defence Committee, UK Operations in Afghanistan, Thirteenth Report of Session 2006–07, HC 408 148 Defence Committee, Operations in Afghanistan , Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 554 149 Ev 111
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 65
Our strategic message will be that we went into Afghanistan for a purpose, that the mission has evolved in function, going through the phases [...]—the defeat of al- Qaeda, pushback of the insurgency, creation of credible civil government, and then growing the ANSF to the capability that it will have when we leave at the end of 2014—and that the job that we set out to do has been done. We have delivered those four phases of the intervention and we have left an Afghanistan with an ANSF that has demonstrated itself to be capable of holding the ground that ISAF has held over the past few years.150
On communication with the Afghan people, he said:
The broad thrust of it will be, “We, the foreigners, have carried out this four-stage process. We cannot build the future of your country; we can build the conditions that give you a reasonable, sporting chance of doing it for yourselves, but the future lies with you, in political compromise and agreement, in allowing the institutions of civil government to flourish, and in tackling the corruption that is still a major problem at every level of Afghan society. We have given you an Afghan security force that is credible to hold the ring. You now have to do your bit in delivering the type of society that you want to live in in the future.”151
As Afghanistan changes—and it has changed dramatically over the last decade— many Afghans will want to seize that opportunity now and they will not be attracted to the prospect of going backwards into the dark ages that the extreme end of the Taliban offers as an alternative future for that society.
150. Strategic communications are important in ensuring the support of both the UK and Afghan populations for what the UK is doing and has done and will be doing in Afghanistan. It is vital that the process is seen as transition and not as a ‘withdrawal through fatigue’. We have seen little evidence that the Government’s communications strategy is fulfilling its objectives. We recommend that the MoD and the FCO reinvigorate their communications strategy for the populations in the UK and Afghanistan and provide us with the detail on how the strategy will be enacted. The strategy should contain as a bare minimum the following:
what we set out to do;
what we achieved;
what remains to be done including managing the continuing risk, albeit reduced, of UK casualties ; and
the manner of the leaving of UK Armed Forces.
It is essential that the MoD should publish a report setting out what it has learnt from being in Afghanistan.
150 Q 381 151 Q 382
66 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
Conclusion
151. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. It has suffered many years of conflict. Prime Minister Tony Blair promised ‘The conflict will not be the end, we will not walk away as the outside world has done so many times before.’ Throughout this inquiry into securing the future of Afghanistan, we have received starkly opposing evidence and narratives of future scenarios following the withdrawal of combat forces from those which are overly optimistic to those which see only gloom and doom. The fact is that the UK will have limited influence and, indeed, it is for the Afghan people themselves to determine for their future. The best the UK can do is to withdraw in good order and engage with external partners to improve the chances of Afghanistan going forward. In so doing the UK and its international partners must show the Afghan people that they will abide by their obligations to continue to support them in their efforts including in the area of women’s rights which, at the start of the conflict, the then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, described as ‘non-negotiable’.
152. Securing the future of Afghanistan requires the concerted efforts of all the Afghan people; regional neighbours, in particular Pakistan; the USA; NATO and other coalition partners. Much detailed work needs to be done before the end of combat operations at the end of 2014. We recognise that achieving a peaceful Afghanistan is a process not an event but Afghanistan has to be given the best chance when it takes over full responsibility for its own security.
153. In the process of establishing a peaceful and functioning Afghanistan, we will be looking for evidence of:
If not a concluded peace settlement, at least the start of the process, with the insurgency including Taliban—it should be Afghan led but supported by neighbours such as Pakistan, and the international community must do its utmost to ensure that all the people of Afghanistan, including women, are brought into the process;
Open and free elections;
An appropriately trained and equipped ANSF able to maintain security against a continuing and possibly increased threat of insurgency with financial support after 2014;
Continuing support for economic development including the provision of aid, the maintenance of this aid will be crucial both in strengthening the Afghan Government’s hand in negotiations and ensuring that the West continues to have a voice in Afghanistan;
A strong judicial system; and
A reduction in the level of corruption and some measure of control of drug production and the drug trade.
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 67
154. The UK Government has a responsibility to use such influence as remains to it to make a post-2014 Afghanistan work. In response to our Report, the Government should set out what it intends to do in support of the above goals in the run up to the end of 2014. It should also set out how it intends to communicate these objectives and the end of the military mission to the Afghan and UK populations, in particular, what more needs to be done to ensure that the ANSF are able to deliver the security of Afghanistan after 2014. We recognise that the UK is only one player in ensuring a successful Afghanistan but we urge the Government to use its influence with the international community to achieve much more in Afghanistan before the end of 2014.
155. If the UK is to continue to provide financial and training support to Afghanistan post 2014 there needs to be a clear articulation of the areas the UK will fund and support and the outcomes it expects to achieve. It must be clear to those engaged in the peace negotiations that, in providing support in the future, the UK will be paying close attention to the progress on the rights of women, children and minority groups, the tackling of corruption and the furtherance of the rule of law.
156. We have received very little information from the MoD and the FCO as to how they plan to be involved in Afghanistan beyond 2014. Given there are less than two years before the end of 2014, the Government should inform us how it sees its future role in Afghanistan.
157. The withdrawal of UK Armed Forces will involve a demanding and complex set of tasks. The UK Armed Forces and other allies face many challenges in the withdrawal of the military equipment in Afghanistan. As the plans for withdrawal mature, the MoD should provide us with the detailed plans, if necessary on a classified basis. The MoD should put the protection of the Armed Forces at the forefront of its preparation and planning.
158. Finally, we recommend that, in 2015, the Government undertake a comprehensive and detailed lessons learned process which looks forward to how these lessons will influence the future decision making processes of the MoD, DFID and the FCO and other Government Departments, as well as a major review of what the UK has achieved and not achieved in Afghanistan in the period 2001 to 2014.
Q 225 225 Q
152
is giving guidance to nations. to guidance giving is
152
ecision, but NATO NATO but ecision, at would not. It will still be a national d national a be still will It not. would at things that would be good to leave behind leave to good be would that things for the Afghans and the kinds of things th things of kinds the and Afghans the for
ification for the kinds of of kinds the for ification nistan setting out a kind of spec of kind a out setting nistan n Afgha n That is the logic behind the NATO training mission i mission training NATO the behind logic the is That Dame Mariot Leslie: Mariot Dame
equipment. equipment.
e amount of of amount e mind that that is not going to be a hug a be to going not is that that mind efforts to improve that side of the Afghan se Afghan the of side that improve to efforts curity apparatus, but I am clear in my own own my in clear am I but apparatus, curity
e are making making are e As you have heard, w heard, have you As intain this equipment. equipment. this intain not to put stress on their technical capacity to ma to capacity technical their on stress put to not they have already. We would want would We already. have they equipment to ANSF ANSF to equipment
a problem than the one that that one the than problem a will not cause the Afghans more of more Afghans the cause not will General Capewell General : [...] If we leave anything behind, it will be equipment that that equipment be will it behind, anything leave we If [...] : Gifting of of Gifting
on completion of the Force Element Table Element Force the of completion on ongoing. Greater fidelity will be achieved achieved be will fidelity Greater ongoing.
(FET) during Herrick 17. Herrick during (FET)
3
ut planning is is planning ut under consideration b consideration under the range of options options of range the . Further analysis is being conducted on on conducted being is analysis Further . scrapping and gifting of materiel in theatre in materiel of gifting and scrapping
approximately 6,500 approximately planning after the consumption, selling, selling, consumption, the after planning is currently being used for movements movements for used being currently is twenty foot equivalent units of materiel of units equivalent foot twenty
2
to move is also underway. A figure of of figure A underway. also is move to y how much materiel and equipment needs needs equipment and materiel much how y Considerable analysis to determine exactl determine to analysis Considerable
fined as planning progresses. progresses. planning as fined approximately 3,000 vehicles). This figure is being constantly re constantly being is figure This vehicles). 3,000 approximately
ncludes ncludes ipment was 11 was ipment ,000 twenty foot equivalent units; (this i (this units; equivalent foot twenty ,000 returned returned Theatre. The initial estimate of the total quantity of UK in-theatre equ in-theatre UK of quantity total the of estimate initial The Theatre.
ipment out of of out ipment nt and the flow of materiel and equ and materiel of flow the and nt nding of both the scale of redeployme of scale the both of nding going to enable full understa full enable to going Operational analysis is on is analysis Operational Quantity to be be to Quantity
on gifting will gifting on , therefore, be coor be therefore, , dinated with that of NATO and ISAF. ISAF. and NATO of that with dinated support and enduring training. Our approach Our training. enduring and support ANSF ANSF
cost of ownership, ownership, of cost d equipment is sustainable in terms of of terms in sustainable is equipment d sustainability at risk. The underlying requirem underlying The risk. at sustainability ent of any gifting must be that all gifte all that be must gifting any of ent of or gifted to the the to gifted or of
uld put ANSF ANSF put uld cious that uncoordinated gifting co gifting uncoordinated that cious dit Office rules. We are cons are We rules. Office dit liamentary, Treasury and National Au National and Treasury liamentary, appropriate and follows Par follows and appropriate returned, disposed disposed returned,
ensure that any gifted any that ensure policies on gifting to to gifting on policies money to the UK taxpayer. We are reviewing our our reviewing are We taxpayer. UK the to money equipment is is equipment operational priority and value for for value and priority operational equipment will be be will equipment
les of of les basis using the princip the using basis made on a case-by-case case-by-case a on made decisions on what to do with equipment will be will equipment with do to what on decisions Within the overall policy umbrella policy overall the Within Policy on what what on Policy
plans Current 1
sposal of equipment from Afghanistan Afghanistan from equipment of sposal Current plans for the return or di or return the for plans Current Annex Annex Securing the Future of Afghanistan
68
69 131 Ev 156
Qq 215-216 215-216 Qq
155
Q 294 294 Q
154
Q 388 388 Q
153
el by air. by el and armoured vehicles by rail and equipment and personn and equipment and rail by vehicles armoured and
156
ts with Uzbekistan on the transit of non-w of transit the on Uzbekistan with ts arlike stores stores arlike e Government has signed bilateral agreemen bilateral signed has Government e Since we held our last evidence session, th session, evidence last our held we Since
ive the mass of that redeployment”. that of mass the ive is appropriately configured to rece to configured appropriately is confident that the “UK strategic base base strategic “UK the that confident
155
he was was he uding airports such as Brize Norton and ports and and ports and Norton Brize as such airports uding
Securing the Future of Afghanistan incl UK the to entry of ports on working were they that said Capewell General
future equipment programme, will c will programme, equipment future uch. back to us by air, pretty m pretty air, by us to back ome Army needs for its its for needs Army to us, not least the key vehicles that the the that vehicles key the least not us, to
154
at really matter matter really at will be moving in the order of 1,000 me 1,000 of order the in moving be will tric tonnes a month by air. The things th things The air. by month a tonnes tric Force and commercial transport. Quite soon, we soon, Quite transport. commercial and Force
in a mixture of Air Air of mixture a in el from Bastion directly back to the UK UK the to back directly Bastion from el way, which is a little bit more expensive, expensive, more bit little a is which way, but only a little bit, is flying your matéri your flying is bit, little a only but
e Middle East, where we can then try to to try then can we where East, Middle e ship it. The final final The it. ship fly things from Bastion to somewhere in th in somewhere to Bastion from things fly There is a third route that will allow us to us allow will that route third a is There
eements that we will work through. through. work will we that eements that is a next step in the agr the in step next a is that but not exit it, through the north, so north, the through it, exit not but
matériel in, in, matériel tion. Right now, we can fly matériel from from matériel fly can we now, Right tion. the south, and at the minute we can bring can we minute the at and south, the arrangements over the air lines of communica of lines air the over arrangements
ar ar they take a bit longer to get our stuff home a home stuff our get to longer bit a take they nd they need to be accompanied by simil by accompanied be to need they nd place. They are generally more expensive, expensive, more generally are They place.
or are coming into into coming are or NATO basis. Those agreements are in place, in are agreements Those basis. NATO lly, but it is better that we do it on a a on it do we that better is it but lly, can construct agreements to do that bilatera that do to agreements construct can
of routes that that routes of Russia. We We Russia. “stans” and through through and “stans” Afghanistan through the the through Afghanistan would go from the north of north the from go would The next alternative is to have a number number a have to is alternative next The
rs. But we need alternatives. alternatives. need we But rs. by us, but by civilian contracto civilian by but us, by out. As you know, it is moved not not moved is it know, you As out.
cient and most attractive way of way attractive most and cient moving our stuff stuff our moving i. That is the cheapest, most effi most cheapest, the is That i. rse flow through Pakistan to Karach to Pakistan through flow rse January, we will have reve have will we January,
quite yet in the bag—that by December, m December, by bag—that the in yet quite aybe aybe close to resetting that agreement and we ar we and agreement that resetting to close e reasonably confident—although this is not not is this confident—although reasonably e
n. As you know, those routes have been have routes those know, you As n. closed for a while, but we are quite quite are we but while, a for closed General Barrons: Barrons: General [...] By road, you could go south through Pakista through south go could you road, By [...]
materiel and outsized loads. loads. outsized and materiel
icant part of the UK rede UK the of part icant sensitive sensitive out of Afghanistan Afghanistan of out ployment plan pa plan ployment d Mobility vehicles, Mobility d rticularly for Protecte for rticularly However, redeployment by air forms a signif a forms air by redeployment However,
ans in shipping co shipping in ans ntainers. ntainers. e materiel, equipment and supplies will be recovered by surface me surface by recovered be will supplies and equipment materiel, e Routes to be taken be to Routes Where there are no time pressures, low grad low pressures, time no are there Where
will make a case-by-case judgment. case-by-case a make will we can sensibly attempt to sell? We sell? to attempt sensibly can we
153
Is it something that that something it Is ? Is there a sale route for it? for route sale a there Is ? afford to gift it to the Afghans the to it gift to afford stainable by the Afghans? Can we we Can Afghans? the by stainable useful to the Afghans? Is it su it Is Afghans? the to useful
equired in core. Is it it Is core. in equired ions for equipment that is not r not is that equipment for ions irements. We will look at all the opt the all at look will We irements. xpayer when it is surplus to requ to surplus is it when xpayer possible value for the ta the for value possible equipment equipment
military equipment to achieve the best best the achieve to equipment military We have our very own eBay, the Defenc the eBay, own very our have We e Disposals Agency, which disposes of of disposes which Agency, Disposals e Philip Hammond: Hammond: Philip Disposal of of Disposal
Q 220 220 Q
159
Q 295 295 Q
158
Q 213 213 Q
157
d quarterly with the next submission schedul submission next the with quarterly d ed for mid- for ed oversight of country redeployment plans a plans redeployment country of oversight nd flow rates. DDPs are typically submitte typically are DDPs rates. flow nd
cell with with cell ) to provide the ISAF fusion ISAF the provide to ) Detailed Deployment Plans (DDP Plans Deployment Detailed onal reporting of each country’s country’s each of reporting onal Control Cell collates all multi-nati all collates Cell Control
NATO NATO through Joint Forces Command Brunssum Command Forces Joint through working groups which are attended by MOD MOD by attended are which groups working SHAPE and SHAPE Air Movements Movements Air SHAPE representatives. The The representatives.
5 4
TO continues continues TO this end, strategic liaison with NA with liaison strategic end, this ring successful redeployment. To To redeployment. successful ring be an important factor in ensu in factor important an be Co-ordination with with Co-ordination Cross-ISAF coordination will coordination Cross-ISAF
surge people in and out to deal with thes with deal to out and in people surge e technical challenges as they come along. come they as challenges technical e
159 159
, in the sense that we we that sense the in , is focused on the immediate immediate the on focused is problem and it is episodic is it and problem is bespokely designed, it it designed, bespokely is requires a certain set of specialists. So this So specialists. of set certain a requires
t of vehic of t yment, that that yment, les that need that les preparing for redeplo for preparing ment is. For instance, if you have a certain flee certain a have you if instance, For is. ment depends what the specific require specific the what depends
be as low as 20 people. It It people. 20 as low as be not necessarily be 500 people; it could could it people; 500 be necessarily not you a little bit more detail on that. It will will It that. on detail more bit little a you to allow this to take place. I will give give will I place. take to this allow to
500 people into theatre theatre into people 500 got permission to surge up to up surge to permission got that suggests that we have we that suggests that General Capewell General : You have already got written evidence evidence written got already have You :
ecific option used. used. option ecific depending on the sp the on depending fly/rail/sail options. The detailed costs will vary will costs detailed The options. fly/rail/sail
y one of the the of one y 000 per container equivalent, either retu either equivalent, container per 000 Communication costs range between £10,000 and £30, and £10,000 between range costs Communication rning directly to the UK by air or b or air by UK the to directly rning
Line of of Line of surface containers range from £5,000 to to £5,000 from range containers surface of £12,000 per container equivalent. The Air Air The equivalent. container per £12,000 The approximate costs of the redeployment redeployment the of costs approximate The Costs of withdrawal of Costs
regulation. regulation.
158
rcise some some rcise container equivalents, which needs to get down down get to needs which equivalents, container the same routes in much the same time fr time same the much in routes same the ame. That is where NATO will have to exe to have will NATO where is That ame.
100,000 20- 100,000 foot foot eer volume of ISAF materiel, of the order of of order the of materiel, ISAF of volume eer e extraction of stuff. The greatest peril is the sh the is peril greatest The stuff. of extraction e not much peril attached with th with attached peril much not
that matters, not least all our w our all least not matters, that ut. That is it. There is is There it. is That ut. arm bodies, we will fly o fly will we bodies, arm e end of the world. The stuff stuff The world. the of end e and you will be cross, but it is not th not is it but cross, be will you and
ffice will be cross cross be will ffice expensive and the National Audit O Audit National the and expensive re less about a about less re nd it does not make it, it will be will it it, make not does it nd you only send by road the stuff that you ca you that stuff the road by send only you
the contractor provides. There is no risk to UK UK to risk no is There provides. contractor the d by road. If If road. by d personnel on the movement of stuff that we sen we that stuff of movement the on personnel accompanied by the security that that security the by accompanied
on by road is on a contractor’s truck, truck, contractor’s a on is road by on because the materiel that leaves Basti leaves that materiel the because General Barrons: General For us, this is only about Camp Bastion, Camp about only is this us, For Security Security
redeployment.
157
is, and we are making a big effort to apply science to this this to science apply to effort big a making are we and is, So there is quite a lot of physics in th in physics of lot a quite is there So we need to use to get this equipment out. equipment this get to use to need we
e apertures, that that apertures, e lated to the progress we make on the grou the on make we progress the to lated nd in transition terms, and the bandwidth, th bandwidth, the and terms, transition in nd build speed, and its speed is directly re directly is speed its and speed, build
tinue. It will will It tinue. te. That process will now con now will process That te. aspects of transition are comple are transition of aspects ployment dividend until certain certain until dividend ployment transition you do not get any rede any get not do you transition
. The major redeployment effort started effort redeployment major The . on 1 October, because of course in in course of because October, 1 on We have been planning for a long time long a for planning been have We General Capewell: Capewell: General
2012. 2012.
ich, based on planning, will begin in earnest fr earnest in begin will planning, on based ich, om 1 October October 1 om ed in Theatre to prepare for redeployment wh redeployment for prepare to Theatre in ed Routine clearance has already start already has clearance Routine Timetable Timetable Securing the Future of Afghanistan 70
71 217 Q 160
Securing the Future of Afghanistan
SHAPE is located in Belgium Belgium in located is SHAPE
gic military commands. commands. military gic – one of NATO’s two strate two NATO’s of one – Europe is the Headquarte the is Europe rs of Allied Command Operations Command Allied of rs 5. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Powers Allied Headquarters Supreme The 5.
4. One of NATO’s three operational Hea operational three NATO’s of One 4. dquarters, Brunssum in the Netherlands, serv Netherlands, the in Brunssum dquarters, es as the higher Headquarters for ISAF. ISAF. for Headquarters higher the as es
ilities and equipment that are to be moved. moved. be to are that equipment and ilities 3. The definitive document listing all capab all listing document definitive The 3.
liable to change as planning continues. continues. planning as change to liable 2. This figure is an estimate only and is and only estimate an is figure This 2.
ss specified differently differently specified ss Notes: Notes: m the MoD memorandum unle memorandum MoD the m 1. Information is taken fro taken is Information 1.
is to be emptied by 2014 in good order, order, good in 2014 by emptied be to is so we are very keen that NATO proceeds. NATO that keen very are we so the NATO ones if the whole of the theatre theatre the of whole the if ones NATO the
160
latively mature—ne latively ed to be f be to ed this. National plans—our own are re are own plans—our National this. itted in with with in itted s tackling tackling s across the whole of ISAF can get a grip on how NATO i NATO how on grip a get can ISAF of whole the across
sters collectively collectively sters ] there should be a report to the next Mini next the to report a be should there ] sters’ meeting in February, so that Mini that so February, in meeting sters’ NATO to get on with it and co-ordinate. [... co-ordinate. and it with on get to NATO
in encouraging encouraging in om has been very active active very been has om structures, and the United Kingd United the and structures, particularly in the military military the in particularly A lot more work needs to be done in NATO, NATO, in done be to needs work more lot A
and what they do not need, and so on. on. so and need, not do they what and
the Afghan forces might need, need, might forces Afghan the ngs behind, behind, ngs gift to them and leave thi leave and them to gift if countries were minded to to minded were countries if document that sets out principles for what what for principles out sets that document
[...]Some of the building blocks are in are blocks building the of [...]Some training mission in Afghanistan, for instance, has a a has instance, for Afghanistan, in mission training place already. The NATO NATO The already. place Dame Mariot Leslie: Leslie: Mariot Dame
ISAF redeployment. redeployment. ISAF
use of assets for for assets of use de-confliction and where possible shared shared possible where and de-confliction November. Coordination of the ISAF nations’ ISAF the of Coordination November. DDPs will ensure better use of resources, of use better ensure will DDPs 72 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
Formal Minutes
Tuesday 26 March 2013
Members present:
Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair
Mr Julian Brazier Mrs Madeleine Moon Thomas Docherty Sandra Osborne Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Sir Bob Russell Mr Dai Havard Ms Gisela Stuart
Draft Report (Securing the Future of Afghanistan), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 158 read and agreed to.
Annex agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Tenth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report in addition to that ordered to be reported for publishing on 4 September and 4 December 2012 and 8 January 2013.
[Adjourned till Tuesday 16 April at 2.00 pm
Securing the Future of Afghanistan 73
Witnesses
Tuesday 26 June 2012 Page
Robert Fox, Defence Correspondent, Evening Standard and Francis Tusa, Defence Journalist, Defence Analysis Ev 1
Tuesday 4 September 2012
Sir William Patey KCMG, former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan Ev 16
Sir Rodric Braithwaite GCMG, former UK Ambassador to the Soviet Union and author of Afgantsy Ev 25
Tuesday 30 October 2012
Lieutenant General David Capewell, Commander Joint Forces, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, returning Commander Task Force Helmand, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG, UK Permanent Representative to NATO and Brigadier James Stevenson, NATO Afghan National Training Ev 32
Tuesday 20 November 2012
Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations), Vincent Devine, Director Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence, and Mark Sedwill, Political Director and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 48
Wednesday 23 January 2013
Lieutenant General Richard Barrons CBE, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) and the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence Ev 65
List of printed written evidence
1 Ministry of Defence Ev 82: Ev 117: Ev 127: Ev 128: Ev 148 2 Professor Michael Clarke, Director, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Ev 125 3 Ken Guest, “RAM” Seeger and Lucy Morgan Edwards Ev 132 4 Brigadier (Retired) David Martin of the Centre for Defence Acquisition, Cranfield University Ev 143 5 David James Ev 145 6 Gregory J Wilson and Marcus Williamson Ev 150
74 Securing the Future of Afghanistan
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament
The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.
Session 2012–13 First Special Report Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts HC 85 2010–11: Government Response to the Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2010–12 First Report Ministry of Defence Supplementary Estimate 2011–12 HC 99 (HC 577) Second Report The Armed Forces Covenant in Action? Part 2: HC 331 (HC 578) Accommodation Third Report MoD Main Estimate 2012–13 HC 133 (HC 607) Fourth Report and Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export HC 419 First Joint Report Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues Fifth Report Future Maritime Surveillance HC 110 (HC 827) Sixth Report Defence and Cyber-Security HC 106(HC 719) Seventh Report Defence Acquisition HC 9 Eighth Report The work of the Service Complaints Commissioner for HC 720 the Armed Forces Ninth Report Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts HC 828 2011–12
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 1
Oral evidence
Taken before the Defence Committee on Tuesday 26 June 2012
Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)
John Glen Penny Mordaunt Mr Dai Havard Bob Stewart Mrs Madeleine Moon Ms Gisela Stuart ______
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Robert Fox, Defence Correspondent, Evening Standard and Francis Tusa, Defence Journalist, Defence Analysis, gave evidence.
Q1 Chair: Welcome, both of you, to this meeting on Robert Fox: I think the answer to both might well Afghanistan. Although you have both appeared before prove to be yes, because I think this is where it went the Committee—at the very least for informal wrong in 2006. As you may remember, on the briefings, and I suspect for formal evidence sessions invitation of the governor of the day, when Brigadier too—I would be grateful if you introduced yourselves Ed Butler was COMBRITFOR—rather, he was for the sake of the record. commander of 16 Air Assault Brigade, so he was not Robert Fox: I am Robert Fox, Defence Correspondent technically COMBRITFOR, which was Charlie of the London Evening Standard, but I am also an Naggs—they went up to Musa Qala, Now Zad and Associate Fellow of the Centre for Defence Studies at places way to the north, because that is where a King’s. I have just been invited to join the new security interest was divined by the Government. That Strategic Studies department at Exeter as an was a brutal introduction for the British to the mosaic Honorary Fellow. of tribal politics, which appears at all levels. Francis Tusa: I am Francis Tusa, editor of the Going back to the achievement, yes, there is newsletter Defence Analysis, an independent defence commerce and tremendous activity. There have been journal. I am present before the Committee gains in education, as we hear about and I have specifically because I have written pretty much the witnessed, particularly in places like Gereshk and, only open-source material on withdrawal costs from above all, Lashkar Gah. But I fear that, unless you Afghanistan and some of the key issues that not will could guarantee such a heavy security presence, those gains may prove fragile; they are reversible. face but are facing logistics plans today, which are Francis Tusa: I would only add that, certainly when becoming more and more crucial by the day. the US marines came into the theatre and British forces were able to concentrate on a far more compact Q2 Chair: Thank you both very much. This is a portion of ground, the effectiveness went up. Yes, question to both of you. How effective would you say there are areas where maybe it is difficult to say that current operations by UK forces are in Helmand? life goes on as normal, but certainly from experience Robert Fox: Within their limitations, they are there were routes in and out of the green zone effective because they benefit from the very high force regarded as far less dangerous—a few of them, even ratios that they had with the arrival of the US marine benign. corps two or three years ago. But I would stress that Tactics change, but I know of no one who believes the aims must be very limited indeed. Largely, if you that in many, if any, places, there has been an are looking for effect, it is within the lozenge, the food irreversible change in the security situation. As zone. Roughly, that lozenge embraces Gereshk to the another observation, any time a force says, “Yes, we north, and not much further north of Gereshk, Lashkar will be here, but only until the following time and Gah, the rich river valley opposite—Nawa, and places after that we are gone”, you have pretty much played like that, particularly Marja, are a bit more difficult— some of your trumps into the hands of your and Garmsir in the south. opponents. A lot of marginal land is being cultivated that is beyond the security envelope, I would say, of US-UK Q4 Chair: Is the implication of what you are saying forces and even the ANSF. I think there is now a very that there ought to be more ISAF personnel there; or clear distinction that there is poppy cultivation going are you saying that there could never be enough ISAF on without control, largely predicated on fuelling the personnel to achieve a wider effect? insurgency. Francis Tusa: If you unfortunately had to go back to stage 1, there should have been more straight off. Q3 Chair: We will come to the poppy issues in a Enough people have written about the fact that in moment or two. Are you saying that this operation 2001, NATO, ISAF, US-led forces went in and very ought to be limited to that lozenge, or that it is limited quickly, after a victory, forgot about Afghanistan to to that lozenge? move on to Iraq. That would have been the time to cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Ev 2 Defence Committee: Evidence
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa start flooding the place with forces—to have the surge astonishing example of that is Bamiyan province. It is before the surge was talked about. a particular case, I grant you, but what is notable is Unfortunately, I suspect that once you have pretty how light the footprint was and how they had got on much everyone heading for the door in 2014, it is too and done it themselves. late. For something like this, unfortunately, unless you say that you are there for as long at it will take, then Q7 Mrs Moon: What do you think the ISAF forces’ you have pretty much lost your main cards to your priorities are at the moment? Are they looking opponents. towards the exit, to consolidate or to make a sudden burst of progress? Where is the focus? What is the Q5 Chair: You have also abandoned the pressure on orientation that the forces are taking at the moment? the Afghan Government to become a more effective Robert Fox: ISAF is far more variegated—a much governmental force. What do you think about that bigger mosaic than is generally appreciated. We are argument? very Helmand-centric, and the British media have Francis Tusa: If you stay for ever? been, to a fault. The Americans have, on the whole, been better, but on the whole the really good reporters, Q6 Chair: If you say we will stay for as long as it correspondents and colleagues—Dexter Filkins, takes, you are abandoning— Carlotta Gall; you know them all—have tended to get Francis Tusa: Perhaps we are facing the wonderful the best information when there has been an American dichotomy that democracies are rarely able to look footprint. It is fascinating to go to areas where they beyond a four or five-year democratic turn, but some are not there. of these wars will take far longer to conceive and What people do not realise is that it has been very fight. Perhaps if we went back to some of the thin indeed, particularly in areas in the north and east. campaigns from the 19th century and the so-called In the east, a very dramatic war has been going on, little wars, then they were taking decades. Perversely, involving the Americans and local forces. But if you of course, so did Northern Ireland. go to astonishingly dramatic provinces in terms of Perhaps we have a change in view that democracies their physical aspect, such as Nangarhar—in either are not willing to send their troops overseas for Nangarhar or Nuristan, the security presence of limitless periods of time. In which case, there is Afghan police in the whole province is only 120. This something that needs to be learned and considered for is the thing that is so difficult. future operations. To draw back to your question about the main aim Robert Fox: I have a slightly different take on that, and object, you get aims and objects when you go to but you probably do not want to— ISAF headquarters—they are to get out and get out as Chair: No, I do. well as possible. It is the draw-down time. To Robert Fox: I think you have to go back to Phases 1 corroborate that, it is well worth looking at the and 2. We have gone through four phases of this war literature. Each of these American regimes has its own so far, if you prefer a journalist’s to historiographic court and court chronicler—Bob Woodward for shorthand. We are into Phase 5, which is the George W. Bush. withdrawal. Phase 2 came on very quickly, I think at Have a look at the David E. Sanger book, “Confront the moment when President Karzai was informed by and Conceal”, which is not nearly as well written as British and American envoys that there was going to Woodward’s. It was finished about four or five weeks be draw-down in February 2002 and they were ago and it is quite clear that Afghanistan is not priority heading off to Iraq. Interlocutors, people who know No. 1 for the region. That colours the whole of ISAF. him well—not British and American necessarily— Priority No.1 is, as you would have heard from my said that he had never forgiven us for that. That is colleague and friend Ahmed Rashid, the potential why I said at a meeting of RUSI that there was almost implosion of Pakistan. That is the focus now. an element that, in terms of control from Washington This is the thing that in various discussions in think- and London, he had gone rogue. He was going to do tanks in this capital we do not appreciate enough— his own thing and it was about Karzai’s survival. we are following an American lead. The American Where I disagree with my colleague here is that I do priorities are shifting all the time. They are following not think it could ever have been done by kinetic the Holbrooke script now; although long gone, his means. We were looking at the wrong spectrum and presence looms over this. It is AfPak, but in fact this has been a continuing weakness and proclivity. PakAf is the main emphasis. That is where you are Probably unwisely, there was great praise—and I going to see the action. It is very interesting that lavished praise—on the COIN concept as developed where things are really tough for the Americans— by Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus, but it was places in the east such as Kunar province and around far too kinetic and still is. It cannot deliver the kind it, where the cross-border incidents have taken of governance that we dreamed of and laid down at place—they are looking for a score draw at best, and the Bonn conference at the end of 2001. to get out. It is a war that they know they cannot win. This is a generational game. It is quite clear that in They are facing a very difficult enemy because it is the areas that I have visited, the greatest qualitative so complex. success is happening—and last year, I visited Afghanistan more extensively than I have visited the Q8 Mrs Moon: Those are ISAF’s priorities, but what territory before in 23 years—where the direct input of are the ANSF’s priorities? the ISAF military and of the western, that is Robert Fox: The ANSF priority is to get as much European/US/NGO, presence is lightest. The most training as they possibly can. There are two things cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 3
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa about the ANSF. They are now just over 340,000, but worth it”. You would have to come up with an nobody believes for a minute that that number could amazing justification for another big push with lots of be sustained on the funding that is likely to be helicopters and so forth. The closer you get to 2014, available after 2014. The big question with the even though it may not be written down as an order, ANSF—I am sorry to be circular—where we go back the answer will be, “Keep it quiet.” to Phase 1 of this war, is whether that force can stay We have already seen handing over of districts to together or whether it is going to break up into its Afghan forces quicker than perhaps might have been constituent parts. the case. That is part of trying to get the footprint I know that we hear a lot of, “This is a national army. smaller and more manageable for the draw-down Oh yes, there is a slight excess of Tajik, particularly, phase. It is difficult to see anyone of any nationality Uzbek and, to a certain extent, Hazara officers and as a commander getting even a pseudo-surge inside NCOs.” That is quite marked because the real Afghanistan moving huge forces into one area, question you have to ask again and again is whether because someone will say, “Great. So you have a two- you are recruiting and retaining southern Pashtuns. week concentration of force here. Then they go back The disproportionate element among the Pashtuns are to where they came from. What happens next?” the northern Pashtuns. Funnily enough, I suspect there will be a politically I shall throw this parting shot in. Part of the problem induced reduction in major kinetic combat operations, is that Phase 1 was seen as a Tajik victory. This is the though you will still see troops and forces continuing bit that never got through in the general media to patrol. After 2014, the word is that troops will not narrative, particularly in this country. When John be doing anything other than mentoring. There may Simpson liberated Kabul and walked in there, he be the odd British unit there for overwatch. Actually, could not have got it more wrong or more right. He a point that can come up with withdrawal is that there was liberating it for Tajiks. The Tajik presence will be British forces well beyond 2014 in other roles. thereafter, from November through, in the capital has That is one of the concerns about that period. The been resented, and is resented to this day. The allies draw-down withdrawal is at one level the most were saluting the great hero, the Lion of the Panjshir, difficult operation that will be faced, and one that, at Ahmad Shah Massoud. No. Interpreting for the first a political level, is not being considered particularly British battalion in 2 Para, a former colonel of the old important. Nadjibullah air force knew me and said, “I really Chair: Again, we will come to that in due course. resent this, and a lot of my family resent this. The Pashtuns in this capital resent this element.” Q10 Mr Havard: I do not disagree with a lot of what I am just putting this down as a marker: I think we you said. There is also a background timetable, isn’t are not home and dry with the ANSF. I think there are there? The idea that ISAF and others were trying to potential troubles and we are beginning to see them shape Afghanistan—I mean, we have got to this with the rising number of green on blue, the position where it is the Afghan plan and the Afghans detachment and defections, and some excellent ought to be shaping Afghanistan. Their declarations reportage that I have here of collusion between are that they want the whole of the transition, in terms mountain ANSF and local Taliban. It is a big issue of the military lead, to have taken place by the middle and the thing that security will sink or swim on. It is of next year. So, come this time next year, it won’t be still a very open question. the case that the ISAF forces will be making the decisions about whether to have an extra push. These Q9 Mrs Moon: Is there anyone who can hold it tactical and strategic questions about how to deploy together? Is there anyone in particular you can see? forces have already passed dramatically into the hands Robert Fox: I think you will get plenty of candidates, of the Afghans. The decision-making process about which has always happened. In my experience that what ISAF would like to do takes on a different happened in Nadjibullah’s time. One of them is still complexion, in terms of what they are able to do and the same person, one General Dostam, the Uzbek in the legitimacy of what they are able to do. the north. He has got his fingers in the oil pool in the Francis Tusa: But then, perhaps the area in which north, as you probably know. I think it is bound to ISAF will have an influence, even if the de facto become a regional army; by that I mean a federated political and military decision making has gone, is army. That is the best you could possibly do. that, while a lot of Afghan units are capable of I can see somebody such as General Wardak or his undertaking their own combat operations at battalion like making a bid for power, because the situation level or just above, one area where they are generally after Karzai is still open. The ANSF is going to be a regarded as not having particularly good capabilities very difficult tiger to ride, particularly when you come yet, if ever, is logistics and support, especially to the local levies, which are strong: not only the ANP medical. It is the biggest concern of a lot of British but the ALP—the Afghan local police—because they commanders whom I have spoken to. are not flaky drug dealers; they have been doing a hell When we have a joint British-Afghan operation and of a lot of the communal ethnic fighting in the north. one of our people gets injured, of course we send out Francis Tusa: I have just a few thoughts on the the MERT helicopter to pick them up. At the moment, emphases and stresses of ISAF. The closer you get to they pick up the Afghans as well, bring them back to 2014 and the end of the combat operations, I suspect Bastion and give them the same treatment. The it will be very difficult for any ground commander of problem is that we are now in a stand-off position, in any nationality to go up the chain of command and the last couple of years of presence there. In theory, say, “Look, sir, one last push.” The view will be, “Not we are meant to be taking the stabilisers off the bike cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Ev 4 Defence Committee: Evidence
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa and letting the Afghans stand on their own two feet, is filling the gap left last year when the Americans but if we are still taking our guys out of combat in the pulled out and the Danes pulled south to Gereshk and best-equipped helicopters with medical treatment and the Upper Gereshk valley leading up to Sangin, where leaving the Afghans to go in a pickup truck and wait they could patrol the highway but nothing of the three or four days for medical treatment, there is a hinterland. serious moral concern. The ISAF influence is on support operations. I have Q12 Ms Stuart: I want to follow up on what Francis heard no one suggest, apart from very small pockets, Tusa said about medical back-up. I declare an interest: that the Afghan security forces have enough of a the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine is in my helicopter force, for example, to be able to support constituency. What should we do to avoid the very major operations. Here and there, there are some small thing you describe as being a problem? units. They will be dependent on that sort of Francis Tusa: The feeling is, funnily enough, support—fixed wing combat air support and so on— boosting the amount of training of Afghan medics. from ISAF until the very last day. If that was held One of the problems they were told last year was you back from an Afghan security force push which ISAF could train a lot of them up to very high standards, did not want to take part in—I will leave Robert to and there was a tendency for them to go to Kabul, or discuss what it would do politically, but I suspect that to go to the Gulf, because they could then earn much it would have a great influence on the military more money as a fully qualified medic there. Training outcome of such an operation. them, mentoring—whether there has been enough done on that: I think people would say probably not. Q11 Mr Havard: Yes, but they are not going to make There are issues, then, of supply of equipment. Some the decision to actually have the push. If the Afghans of the greatest advances from Afghanistan specifically decide that they want to take on an area, or they want have been in medical treatment—new bandages, to take on my old mate General Dostum, that will be clotting agents, tourniquets and so forth. It needs to for them to decide. Then you are in a support role, are be ensured that the Afghans have full supplies, and you not? access to these, way beyond the time of any Robert Fox: I agree. I think the real difficulty is that significant ISAF presence—funded. Are they getting ISAF cannot take a political lead now. That is part of supplies of these at the moment? In a lot of cases, the problem. Because we are in an election year yes; in other cases, no. It is going to be very patchy, already in the United States, the criticism is that depending on exactly which part of the country it is. McChrystal, Petraeus and to a certain extent Mattis Is there a co-ordinated plan? Almost certainly not. grabbed the steering wheel, because there was no strategy and no strategic policy when Obama came in, Q13 Penny Mordaunt: I have a couple of questions and they ran it. for Mr Fox. In an article that you wrote in February I endorse what Francis said. The thing that it is this year, you said that home-made bombs are the difficult to go into, for obvious reasons, although we scourge of the 21st century. My first question is: how should, is covert operations, the special forces. well do you think the MoD is dealing with such Famously, when they took out Osama bin Laden with devices? Secondly, you also mention the development a SEAL team, it was one of 14 raids that night, and of sticky bombs. My second question is, really: how they like to say, beating their chests, that some do you think that IEDs will develop in the future? operations were more complex than that. This has a Chair: You may not want to answer all of that tremendous legacy. It was part of the McChrystal/ question, but answer as much of it as possible. Petraeus COIN policy of concept of operations. Robert Fox: I’ll give the subbed down version. I think Really, it has absolutely sod all to do with COIN. that was from a meeting with General Barbero. It was What they aimed to do was write down the middle hardly attended by the media here. It was very level of command. I say to the Committee that I think interesting. He spoke at the RUSI land warfare that legacy still endures. They are still talking about conference. He was a most interesting man, and this body counts and numbers of middle-level is a command with a $2 billion budget, which looks commanders. The average age of a young commander at these things. This was him talking to me. in Kandahar or Oruzgan has gone down from mid-30s I was really becoming aware of the sticky bombs. The to late-20s to mid-20s. sticky bombs are magnetic bombs—clunk, under a This is very worrying. It is not a policy. It is not a car. They have been used to take out two of the Iranian way of securing a community. Despite Afghans being nuclear scientists. They are absolutely the curse of the involved in this, being consulted and saying, “We 21st century. You can get three, possibly four pretty would like to do this particular raid,” ISAF is still in good IEDs, big ones, that will blow up big vehicles, the driving seat, and we have to work out what that with the gear you need, for about $100. For $100 you legacy will mean. On certain information that I have can blow up four half-a-million dollar vehicles. That from highly trusted sources, it went very badly wrong is the maths of it. on a number of occasions. When they got the body I think the MoD is doing its best. I am particularly count on people taken out, on at least three occasions struck—and it’s counter-intuitive—with the they were actually taking out parties of young Afghan motivation of our young men and women in doing Taliban who were coming in to negotiate. this. The other day I was at the dining in and dining It is a very worrying aspect of the campaign concept, out dinner for the Corps of the Royal Engineers. I but I agree with Francis. I think the watchword is would like to talk about the Royal Engineers, because caution and force protection. I think the great example they are the good deed in a naughty world. They have cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 5
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa done absolutely brilliantly in Afghanistan as a corps, opium. Could you comment on how effective you in different ways—completely unsung, probably think that counter-narcotics strategy is? Spraying the because of the MoD’s crass media and public crops of opium has been suggested; how effective do relations policy. you think that would be? They were the young troop commanders: a very high Robert Fox: I don’t know where we are with percentage of women—30% to 40% were women. spraying. It is a favoured technique of the Russians. They were graduates; they had done their troop We have a Russian in charge of the UNODC, and it commanders course. Over half were going to do bomb is worrying. disposal, which means IEDs, and they were absolutely Stop press—of course, it has been a lousy harvest, up for it. So the personnel are very willing, and the because rather like two or three years ago when we science is there. had a blight, there has been insect infestation and We know we haven’t got the money to throw at it that yields have plummeted in some areas. That is not the States do. We do work very closely with them. We entirely good news, particularly for the farming are absolutely aware of what this is all about. I must communities. It accelerates aggressively the debt say, in terms of operational security, speaking against cycle—the people who cannot pay their debts, and my own trade, it was significant that there was no most of the farmers are in debt before they have other hack—journalist—at the Barbero briefing. harvested. They and their families are in bond. You Nobody seeks him out. He gave me his card. It is all have the usual sensational stuff, and I blush to say that there. Actually, mostly when they go out there and I have contributed to it, that girls and wives are traded, somebody is blown up—boom—they write tosh and so on. about it. Without exaggerating, the enduring part of the Afghan Francis Tusa: I would just put in place as well, one economy, when the aid and war economies are taken problem about IEDs is people sometimes believe— away—if they do go away after 2014—is the narco and you see this in the press—that there are technical economy. Looking at the statistics, there is a hard solutions. The first IED of the modern era, as it yield of between 5,200 and 6,000 cubic tonnes of, I were—and actually they go back to the IRA using think, wet opium, a year and it supplies—I mean, them in culvert bombs in the 1960s and 1970s—the what are numbers?—over 90% of the world’s heroin one that brought it back into focus was an Israeli ingestion. Despite the good intentions, not least by the Merkava tank taken out in the west bank by the better Government of the UK at the time in Bonn, we have part of 1,000 lb or 1,200 lb of explosive dug into a made very little difference. The kaleidoscope has bank. The tank was blown the better part of 100 shaken around a bit. People like Governor Mangal in metres, in bits. That is why, unfortunately, it is, yes, Helmand seem very serious about it. Karzai says very the scourge of the 21st century. serious things. The Iranians get very serious, as do the If you use enough explosive, and then use it cleverly, Russians and the Pakistanis, because—I have noticed there is nothing that will provide a perfect defence, this myself since 1989—the signs of indigenous and the best we can do—and this is the sort of level addiction are getting very worrying indeed. The we are at, at the moment—is vehicles where the trouble with addiction is that most statistics are probability of surviving an explosion is high. The meaningless, because you get them through vehicle will be destroyed, but enough systems cause clinician’s reports. the crews to walk out, and I have seen that on two I went to one of the few working rehabilitation clinics occasions. So the vehicle becomes entirely disposable, in Lashkar Gah last summer and talked to the doctor, which perhaps goes against the grain with some armed who had worked in the Gulf in this. He thought it was forces, especially when you have mechanics whose a fair estimate that about 100,000 out of 800,000—I entire job is keeping vehicles on the road. They do know the population of Helmand is bigger, but that is not like it when they see things back in ruins. I would the productive population in the lozenge—are crippled also put some words forward for the Royal Logistic by drug addiction. Some 25% of them are women, Corps, which provides the majority of the counter- who are inhaling it, and often their infants are inhaling IED. it from them. That has not changed. The point to make between all of them is that we are Really serious people like the amazing MP from potentially seeing, under Future Force 2020, Takhar, Habiba Danish, who has visited this country significant reductions in so-called “non-teeth” arm on several occasions, are really worried about it. She units. For anyone who goes out to Afghanistan, you and her colleagues think it is getting out of control. It will be hard-pressed to say who is in a teeth role and is very bad in prisons. It is not static—that’s what I am who is not. You have REME mechanics out on the saying. It is moving. You have the rock-hard statistics: front line dragging bomb-damaged vehicles out under 350,000 families—not individuals, but families—are fire. I wish the words “forward area”, “rear area”, dependent on the industry, and I do not see that “teeth arm”, and “sport arm” were basically binned. changing much in the next few years. By the way, the You look at somewhere like Afghanistan, and very Foreign Office hates me saying this. It always few people are living the life of Riley—let’s put it that criticises my articles. way. A lot of people are in a lot of danger, in a lot of areas, wearing a lot of different cap badges. Q15 John Glen: Why do think that is? Robert Fox: It told me once that they were too Q14 John Glen: Mr Fox, may I turn back to the issue accurate. It is worrying. The Russians, from a security of the counter-narcotics strategy? You wrote a piece point of view, are very concerned about the in April this year, speculating about a bumper crop of deleterious effect it is having on the northern borders. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Ev 6 Defence Committee: Evidence
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa
I know it doesn’t adjoin as such, but they see a in certain parts of Helmand where there was strong collapse of Kyrgyzstan and, potentially, Tajikistan, leadership—you might dare call them warlords or and it is having a heck of an effect on indigenous whatever—the police were regarded as being consumption in their cities, with Moscow in the lead. incredibly capable. People believed that it was on an upward trend, but I didn’t hear anyone say that that Q16 Chair: Do they advise spraying? was an upward trend from a particularly happy place. Robert Fox: They have advised spraying. This is the Again, very patchy. new thing—the softly-softly approach, gentle eradication. There has been eradication—Mangal is Q18 Bob Stewart: Looking, Robert, at how they are serious about this and supplying the wheat—but this equipped as some kind of check, they always look to is a whole subset and an area that should almost be me as though they have second-rate equipment, by explored in a separate meeting. The problem with comparison with us. Because they have second-rate alternative production is, first, wheat is not a substitute equipment, one might assume that they have second- crop and, secondly, a lot of the revenue and the hidden rate training and that they are second-rate. funding has gone into the insurgency. That is why I Francis Tusa: Just to come back on that one, this has disagree with the IISS report on drugs. It focused on an impact on the withdrawal issue, because I know drugs in Afghanistan and missed the absolute key that planners would love basically to hand off most of point. You cannot look at the narco economy unless the kit in Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces. you look at land tenure and how the mafia-type If you went to the Afghan brigade camp just to the clans—they are very prominent and very well known; north-west of Camp Bastion—it is pretty much some are even Karzai’s relations—deal with land and adjoining—there is an equipment park that has the manipulate it and the drug production that goes with better part of $300 million to $400 million dollars of it. absolutely brand spanking new US mine-protected The three linking networks are the syndicates, the vehicles and trucks. It is a complete army’s worth. producers and the middlemen. The producers earn That has been replicated across Afghanistan. No one absolutely nothing. It is the middlemen, the land was quite sure whether the US were putting in $8 barons and, of course, the security and transportation billion or $14 billion to equip the Afghan national people who earn a tremendous amount of value added, forces, but the answer was a lot of money. not only from transportation, but from good old The strange thing was that in a lot of cases, when you extortion as well. spoke to the Afghans and the troops themselves, faced with the choice between some incredibly high-tech Q17 Bob Stewart: This question is for both of you, mine protected vehicles or just going out in a pick-up but I would like to start with you, Francis. Could we truck, they far preferred going out in the pick-up truck look at security forces and their training? Let’s take because they understood it. If one of those very three branches. Let’s start with the Afghan national expensive mine-protected vehicles broke down— army, then the special forces, which are trained British forces had trouble in the early introduction of separately, and then the police. As a Committee, we the Husky vehicles, because they are very computer- have heard, as brigades have come back, how controlled, and there were a lot of problems in the fantastically well these guys are doing, but I question early days—the Afghans were just taking one look at that they are doing so brilliantly and that their it and saying, “Nope, thank you very much.” At least leadership is fantastic. I am putting that presumption when your Ford pick-up truck—that is pretty much to you. What is your view of how well they are doing? the standard—breaks down, they know exactly how to Francis Tusa: To go back to and expand on the mend it. Strangely, even though it had absolutely no comments made earlier, it will be a curate’s egg, good mine protection and the ballistic protection of tissue in places. Some units in and around Kandahar and paper, they had all these vehicles they could draw on Helmand have been doing independent operations and and in most cases they preferred to use those very basic information, saying to the NATO-ISAF commercial vehicles. forces, “I’m off to do this.” They will be doing their own operations, although I wouldn’t say happily, and Q19 Bob Stewart: Can I finish by going back to the are regarded as being incredibly capable. macro question and asking you, Robert, how good the Yes, we still have issues on logistics and support. training is? What is your assessment of the training? Medical is still very much dependent on ISAF. On Robert Fox: I think it is much too brief. I have been other areas, I think you’ll find people shaking their shown endless demonstrations, and I have even been heads. Certainly, on a visit over there last year, the out to field exercises just north of Kabul. The Afghans view was, probably, if we had our time again, we are very willing and they are very well programmed would have invested more in the training of Afghan to say, “I want to fight for my country,” but even the national security forces earlier. It wasn’t necessarily 60 hours or so of literacy does not get you terribly far. that they paid lip service to it but just didn’t put the On the question of vehicle maintenance, look at the resources in. We have seen a substantial increase in number of dead tractors you see around even in an the number of people trained at all levels of training. agriculturally productive area. The land is fertile You could say that as soon as you have a hard around the Helmand river, although all the rest is withdrawal phase of, “We are out by 2014,” this desert. Mechanical skills are very low in Afghanistan, suddenly becomes a vital issue. Some areas were and basic mechanical schools are needed enormously. regarded as perhaps even more patchy at the time of I want to go back to your first question that you asked the visit and, subsequently, with the police, although me about special forces. It is not so accessible, but I cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 7
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa think we have had tremendous benefit from the just going to run for it”. Which is sad, because there layering of our special forces. It is the mentoring of have been incredible efforts to bring in business the second level of what was 1st Battalion the education and literacy. Parachute Regiment and is now the Special Forces You get a certain aspirant teenager or early 20- Support Group. They have achieved a great deal, something—women as well as men—who say: “I because you get highly motivated young men—I am want to make sure that I can read and write really talking about British men—who learn enough of the well. I want accounts, I want English and IT”. This is language to be able to communicate with their squads. very important and, again, I think we have been really It is what we should have seen in the football match very weak in reporting it. In most villages, with most against Italy the other day; they are squad players, and headmen—and the older generation will be literate, in they are young men having the time of their lives. We that they can read a document—very few people, if have to ask ourselves the serious point about force any at all, know how to keep a simple account. Even 333 and 444—the so-called Tigers—is how they are in places where we have been putting a lot of effort going to fit in with hierarchical, structural, village in, like Nad Ali, they do not know the basic elements shura society, because that is going to be very of book-keeping. Hence the whole thing of corruption. difficult. The police are going to be a continuing You go and ask for the subsidy for what you can get difficulty, because despite the claim to have an Afghan and so on. We are coming from an extraordinarily low national police force, large parts of the police force base. To answer your question, I think the time scale attain to local power structures and local power is too short and there is a great awareness of this. We politics, some of which are extremely difficult to know why it is and they are going to get on with it. discern. That is why I agree with you. I think the Francis Tusa: My understanding from last year and equipment is basic. Actually, it is a third-world army, early this year is that, from a British point of view, and we are trying to pretend it is a second-world there will be a progressive and accelerating handover army—the sort of thing at the top end that actually of districts to ANSF: basically, everything pulling the Soviets did very well with the Najibullah air force back to Camp Bastion and/or the north of the and some of the armoured units. They hung on, as Helmand river for over-watch of the Afghan National we know, for three years against the mujaheddin in Security Forces. From there, a draw-down, those days. withdrawal, redisposition will be conducted along Qualitatively, we are faced with the same problems. many of the routes. Looking at the advance statement We are not asking ourselves the blood questions made about six weeks ago on forces for Operation enough. Where are their loyalties going to lie? I think Herrick, kicking off in October this year, I found it they can forget our training overnight. I am very interesting that the size of forces did not seem to have struck by how much we large up how important it is come down. They can change at any stage, they can that we are giving them literacy and a bit of civics. It stand down units as and when, but the planning is really too thin. Taking Francis’s point, if you look figures still seem to be right up—9,500—and there is at the time scale, if we think we are going to produce an army in three and a half years, which is what we no sign of the first of the battle groups being cut off. are trying to pretend, given what goes on in that part So, on that basis, unless something happens as of the world and given the friable and fragile loyalties, deroulement takes place, you would be anticipating it is going to be a big ask. I am not saying that it is that the next Herrick will still have the same number impossible, or that it is defeat already, but there are of troops. In which case, you would be looking at some very big questions, which are not in public April next year when you start seeing the first of the debate now because the great spotlight has moved on. reduced Herrick deployments.
Q20 Chair: Can we talk about transition to ANSF Q21 Mr Havard: I think that is right. The transition control? What about Helmand and Lashkar Gah? How is happening and there is a common language about has it gone and what do you think the obstacles to what “transition” means. That is happening on the transition are elsewhere? What do you think the time ground there. Can I come back to what has been said scales are? earlier? In Afghanistan from the start there was the Robert Fox: We have had the time scale. I am led to ISAF mission and the parallel CT mission Operation believe that, despite the public pronouncements, we Enduring Freedom. At some point or another, these are going to step down from major combat offensive changed after McChrystal and Co. Ostensibly, a large operations from the middle of next year, with a draw- part of the CT operation was merged in, but a counter- down by a little over a year later, by the late summer terrorism operation still ran and is running—this is the of 2014. I think that is extremely difficult. In terms of Afghanistan-Pakistan border question. So the Lashkar Gah, which you have asked me about, I think transition is going to take place as described but, at a lot of people will run for the Gulf. There is a young the same time, this counter-terrorism operation that businessman’s association, which is extremely you, Robert, referred to—the Holbrooke mission and effective, run by a chap who runs the first independent all of that stuff—is going to continue. What is your commercial cotton gin. It employs about a seventh of assessment of what should happen in relation to those what the Government cotton gin employs. I would put two things together? Because there are special forces it at probably three or four times as much. He said: “I being deployed to involve themselves in the counter- keep my fortune on me”, and he showed me his belt. terrorism, to defend itself against terrorism in the “I don’t believe in banks. As soon I see the security future—how do you see these things, the one crumbling, I know that myself and my colleagues are influencing the other? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Ev 8 Defence Committee: Evidence
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa
Robert Fox: I agree with you. I think that CT is going Robert Fox: No, I think the king is dead, long live to take the lead now. I think that there is a lot being the king—the CT mission will continue. undeclared, and for very obvious reasons, if we can be quite blunt about it. These things are said in Q25 Mrs Moon: Can we look at the withdrawal of Sanger’s book and the Peter Bergen book on killing ISAF forces? I would like you both to look at this, bin Laden. That is part of the real-action narrative for but may I start with you, Mr Tusa, having read your Barack Obama. You know, that we have had a excellent article? It was somewhat depressing, success—in both books, though Sanger is more however, I have to say. What do you think that the cautious than Bergen, with more of a sense that we practical problems are going to be? How are they have destroyed al-Qaeda in the region, which we going to be exacerbated by the current difficulties with absolutely have not at all. I have talked to people who Pakistan? Are those difficulties surmountable? Are were very willing to talk to me—special organised there other routes that we can find? Are there crime officers who are particularly good on this negotiations that we can have with the Pakistanis? Tell area—and you have to look at it organically. If you us your thoughts on those. take what has happened in the area that we have Francis Tusa: I will start by saying that there are described, particularly in the east, or what happened people sitting at desks at Camp Bastion with the to poor Linda Norgrove, when she was killed, new permanent joint logistics headquarters today who will elements have been entering in. What has been continue to update and write the plans for the draw- different is that the al-Qaeda focus, particularly down, withdrawal or whatever you want to call it. The because of the relationship between Mullah Omar and real worry is whenever any question about what Osama bin Laden, has largely been Arab-based, but it happens to equipment from Afghanistan gets asked in is absolutely clear that the recrudescent or resurgent the House, the answer always come back that those is not so Arab-based, and it is particularly so in that decisions have not yet been made. One of the slew of the east, going right up into the Stans. There problems was accurate as of January this year: if you do seem to be exchanges, with Chechens, and a lot of were just to rely on the airlift that the UK could Uzbeks and minority people, but these are very hard reasonably call upon and you assumed everything else characters, and they will live off that kind of chaos. was benign, and we could move stuff from out bases Rashid suspects it is happening and fears it is going to Camp Bastion with no obstruction, it would still to happen. It is particularly important for this country take the best part of three complete years to draw all because there are discrete connections and, although the equipment. Forget the people; the people would it seems to be moving very actively in a particular be extra. Three complete years to withdraw the region, it is global and of course it is attached to the equipment we have in Afghanistan. Kashmir cause as well. But to draw in, Mr Havard, to That is also assuming we would burn a lot of say that al-Qaeda has been defeated, which has been ammunition in place, try to sell off a lot of equipment a populist American narrative—I am talking about in and throw a lot of it away. Three years to complete. the populist media there—just does not bear scrutiny There is an idea that it is a simple operation and one at all. about which we can say, “Don’t worry, it will all happen.” I was struck and very worried when you had Q22 Mr Havard: The transition is pretty well set the Secretary of State saying, very off-hand, “It will out. As Francis said, everyone is expecting that this is be about £100 million to withdraw.” Much like the the linear process that is now going to happen— costs for Operation Ellamy, that seems to fly in the face of reality. nothing in Afghanistan is binary—job No. 1. Our Bear in mind that Operation Brockdale, the draw- politicians and others say that transition is all down from Kuwait, which was conducted in an supposed to be conditions-based, but what happens entirely benign environment—anyone who had been when transition falls back, possibly, because of these hostile to us was quite happy to watch us go, most of interactions? the equipment had already been withdrawn, we had a Robert Fox: Whoever goes to the White House after secure base in Kuwait, basically a free port, all within November—whoever is sworn in in January—will be 100–120 kilometres of where we were drawing facing a very large CT campaign in the region, to down—cost a minimum of £170 million. answer your question yes. It is not something that they For Operation Brockdale there were slightly fewer can take the foot off the accelerator, because it is than 4,000 containers of equipment left. At the discretely connected with equivalent hot spots—not moment there are at least 12,000, possibly 16,000 in only the Caucasuses—such as al-Shabaab which we Afghanistan and it is going up daily. Almost every are now seeing in central, northern sub-Saharan day more equipment is going to theatre; there is Africa, so yes they do have links, and we are talking certainly more equipment going in than coming out. about an acknowledged training ground. There are at least 3,500 vehicles. For Brockdale there were about 500, a lot of which were things like Q23 Mr Havard: If transition goes and ISAF civilian Land Rovers, which they were able to sell. transition happens— This is an immense issue to solve and is not Robert Fox: The Americans will keep 20,000 troops, something that can be wished away. Two years ago, and most of them will be— you would have found people, especially with the Army, saying, “Don’t worry. We’ll be able to get rid Q24 Mr Havard: What do you see that being? Do of all our new vehicles we bought for Afghanistan, you see that being a new mission? leave them in Afghanistan, and then we can come cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 9
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa back to Britain and buy new ones.” That is certainly The problem that I cannot get an answer to is this. To not the case now. date, Russia has always said it will not allow warlike None of that answers a particular problem, which is equipment to be moved through its country or its that the equipment we have been using in Afghanistan airspace. I am led to believe that that still stands. In has been trashed. It has been used to the limits of that case, you might be able to move all your stuff capabilities. I refer you back to a parliamentary into Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan or whatever, but if all the written answer from last week on Viking and the vehicles and other warlike equipment then cannot go regeneration of the Viking amphibious all-terrain on the nice train to Riga, you will still have to fly it vehicle, where the answer from the Minister for all back, and it is going to be incredibly expensive. Defence Equipment, Support and Technology was that Coming back to the first point about how long it they are still working out how much it is going to cost would take to move by air, unless we start moving to reset that capability. The stresses and strains those stuff back today and seriously start thinning out— vehicles were put under, just with the amount of Herrick 14, the permanent joint logistics headquarters, equipment, armour and extra things, have caused was the first one to start actively managing getting structural fatigue. It is not just the Viking fleet that stuff back. They were very pleased in one six-month has happened to; it is every fleet of vehicles. period to have been able to move about 120 containers The particular answer for Viking was, “We’ll work out of stuff back to the UK, but let us come back to the how much this will cost.” The money will be found in fact that there are 12,000 to 14,000 or 15,000 the so-called £8 billion headroom—as if. That is going containers. With 120 over four months, you are barely to be the same answer given for every single other scratching at the problem. vehicle fleet: “We’ll find the money somewhere.” An example given by a one-star at Permanent Joint When I first looked at the potential costs of Headquarters was that in the last rotation of Herrick, regeneration capabilities, on an assumption that about they moved about 7,000 extra containers of kit out to 75% of the vehicles we had in Afghanistan in 2010 Afghanistan. They did not move 7,000 containers would be brought home and regenerated, I came to back from Afghanistan at the same time. The air figures that I then passed in front of the relevant two bridge is working great at getting stuff out there. The stars, and it was about £1.5 billion to £2 billion. One problem is that the imperative is always to get stuff of them said that he wasn’t sure whether to be more out there. You can understand it: “Hi, we’ve got new worried that the figures I had come up with were very armour for the vehicles.” “Get it out to Afghanistan.” similar to a paper that had been on his desk only two That is the priority. days previously, or that I had been able to reverse People would love to start using the air bridge back engineer them from what was in public. Those were as efficiently as possible, but at the moment, it is not certainly the regeneration figures: at least £1.5 billion. happening. Equipment is piling up at Camp Bastion. It is piling up in some of the forward operating bases. It is not in the budget; it is not in PR12, the balanced Efforts are being made to manage it, but perversely, budget. That money is coming from somewhere else. as the so-called combat troops reduce in number in One of the real worries is that again we have not really 2013 and into 2014, there may have to be a logistics looked after our equipment as well, ever since the start surge of up to 1,000 people to help clear up all the of operations in Afghanistan and then Iraq, and now stuff—unless, by the way, we just want to abandon the heavier phase of Afghanistan. If you look at the the better part of £6 billion of stock. That is the last sums of money the United States army and marine audited figure I have from the logisticians. If we want corps spend on annual maintenance of their kit, they to just abandon £6 billion of equipment in range from six to 12 times more per vehicle for year. Afghanistan, fine, but I suspect this Committee might They probably gold-plate their support, but it does have something to say about that in two to three mean that their equipment is in a much better years’ time. situation. This is why some of the original calculations and To go back to the other point you made about getting assumptions made about the withdrawal from out of Afghanistan, at the moment one of the Afghanistan—one was that we would be able to sell problems is that at least 85% of all the equipment, off or gift all our vehicles to the Afghans. If you saw stores and stock are flown in. It is the most expensive the equipment that the Afghan kandak had in the camp way by a factor of four or five. Do we want to reverse next to Camp Bastion, why on earth they would want that and fly 85% back? No. It will cost at least £400 our tatty, second-hand, knackered equipment, without million to £500 million, if not £600 million, if we do any of the sexy counter-ID stuff? I fail to see why it that way. That is a long way away from “about they would want our equipment. £100 million”. As for selling things off, we will have an opportunity The problem is a question that I cannot get any serious to sell things off. Without a doubt, there will be white answer to. We have had praise that we have opened vehicles, air conditioning units and televisions. I have great agreements with the Stans that they will let us no doubt we will be able to sell those. Are these things use bases for the northern line of communication, the the bulk of the problem? No, they are not. This is NLOC. You fly, almost certainly, to a base somewhere tinkering around the edges. The real problem is in a Stan. You then trans-ship on to a spur of the vehicles, the equipment that goes with them, the Trans-Siberian railway. You get all the way to Riga, tentage that makes up the expeditionary campaign where one of the MoD’s ro-ro ships picks it up and infrastructure and so forth. The logisticians at Camp drops it off at Marchwood—if they haven’t already Bastion today will have a pretty good figure, not even sold Marchwood, which is of course another issue. plus or minus 5%, about what there is in country. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Ev 10 Defence Committee: Evidence
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa
The problem is that I get the very firm impression that me, and I am sure it dawned on all of you, that we every time they try to tell people a long way up the are going to leave behind a hell of a lot more than we chain of command, “You’ve got to start now or else,” are saying at the moment. I can see us leaving half they are told one of two things. Either it is, “Oh, that fleet behind. Afghanistan is yesterday’s war. We’re now concerned with contingent operations,” or it is, “Stop bothering Q27 Mrs Moon: Can I ask you about Camp Bastion? me with these boring facts.” That is literally the What will happen to it? attitude. One comparison heard from a logistician Francis Tusa: At the moment if things run according about three months ago was that they had had to use to plan, the hope is that, since the US Marines will scare tactics. They showed a picture of what was have a far greater problem shifting everything out, we actually the beach at Dunkirk the day after Operation will try and be the ones out of the door first. We will Dynamo ended, and said “If you want Camp Bastion try to sell the relevant facilities to the US Marines and to look like that, you are on the right path, because other US military, and wave goodbye on the last we will just have to destroy everything in place.” aircraft we have out of there. Of course, that assumes It is depressing and frightening. Operation Brockdale that we manage to get all our ducks in a row and start started from scratch and was run on a shoestring. No our withdrawal in time, so that we finish first. one, not least those involved, would claim it was Over the past year, there has been a little jockeying in perfect, but it achieved what was demanded. One of Camp Bastion, where—I exaggerate only slightly— those things was that it was POGO—proof of good US Marine flags have turned up on open bits of land order. “What was left in Iraq and Kuwait? Did you inside Camp Bastion, which in theory is a largely bring it home? If you did not bring it home, what did British camp, simply because they wanted real estate you do with it?” They are actually still finishing the closer to the airport, as Camp Leatherneck is on the accounts for Iraq, to work out who got what and pass other side. It sounds strange, for a camp that is the it on to whoever else, but they were able to provide a size of Croydon, Reading or Crawley now, that space degree of assurance, so that the NAO, from what it is actually at a premium. has seen, has said, “That’s not bad.” If you are going to be pulling back 3,000 to 4,000 The question is: will someone authorise a physical vehicles in our case, and 8,000 or 9,000 in the case of reverse supply chain move, getting stuff out of the US Marines, you physically need car-parking Afghanistan now, so that when we get to the really space for that number of vehicles, so that you can difficult bit, when there are potentially just two battle process them. On that basis, Camp Bastion and Camp groups left and the circle is being drawn in, you do Leatherneck may look great from the air, but if you not want to be left with warehouses just full of kit. As are looking for facilities close to runways to load I say, the risk is that it literally gets destroyed in place. things, it is problematic. It is certainly hoped that the UK would be able to sell at a reasonable price Q26 Mrs Moon: Mr Fox, do you want to add facilities in Bastion on to US forces, in much the same anything? way that the contingency operating base at Basra was Robert Fox: I think the prospects of opening up the sold to the US, and they made about £25 million out routes through Pakistan in the way that they were of it. Whether you would be able to get that amount before are slim, but you have to remember that of money for Bastion, your guess is as good as mine. between 40% and 60% of all the revenue to the There will be people who will negotiate. I suspect that Afghan state comes through the Torkham gate, known they will make some money, but it will not be the to us as the Khyber pass. It is a big revenue earner, but windfall-like privatisation of British Gas or anything. the Pakistan army will be extremely sticky, because it has taken such a battering in public opinion, so it will Q28 Mrs Moon: On the residual capacity that we not happen any time soon. I agree with Francis that it need to leave there, Bastion is the size of Reading. will be very difficult going through the north and the Robert Fox: And it is in the middle of the desert. “Stans”. We have been so warned by Colonel General Boris Gromov, who led the 40th shock army. I was Q29 Mrs Moon: It is in the middle of the desert. there on the day to wave him goodbye as he crossed What will we be able to do with it if we retain it for the bridge of peace and friendship. our ongoing commitment there? How realistic is that? I would like to add one thing to what Francis said, How much will we need to have there, both ourselves and I think this is core business for the Committee— and NATO? not that I am here to tell you your business. It is quite Francis Tusa: Thoughts are, partly look at the clear from what Philip Hammond said the other day investment that primarily the US has put into the that they had expected, and this had been assumed, runway, which is a huge investment, and the facilities that they would leave the bulk of the vehicles behind. on the east side of the airfield. It has been suggested, The FRES story comes into this—the Committee will if you look at the number of fighters and fighter be so familiar with the UV story, and as Francis has bombers they are basing out there and the proximity written very eloquently about it, the money was never to certain countries on the west side of Afghanistan, there for the utility vehicle. Hammond admitted to us Camp Bastion in the future may have a different role at a press conference that they were trying to plug the from the one it has today. It may have far more gap with a slack couple of thousand vehicles coming relevance to US interests against Iran, than does out of Afghanistan, although how a Mastiff, a Afghanistan. If the UK is still providing enduring Ridgeback or a Jackal fills the UV criteria beats me. support to Afghan security forces in Helmand, it is It is a sudden swerve. Following that, it dawned on highly likely that that would be the base. There are cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 11
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa talks of anything from one battlegroup’s-worth of bidding war with everyone trying to outbid everyone troops and a battlegroup of other forces to two else for the same assets. battlegroups left there, which would pretty much be Are people trying to deconflict? Yes. I will bet you the size of the original Camp Bastion, with helicopters here and now that for certain assets—specifically the to support as well. But that would be a far smaller An-124 aircraft, the outsize aircraft—there will be a footprint than that today, which is massive. There bidding war and people will end up paying two, three would of course be the issue with any of this of who or four times more for a charter than they would in would then guard the perimeter. At the moment we normal times. have been able to get other forces to do that. Would a Robert Fox: The problem is colossal for the United residual rump British force and US Marine corps have States, not least for the reasons already stated—the to look to their own resources to do so? In which case, geopolitical landscape there—but also the political that would be a drain on manpower. landscape. I will say one word: sequestration. They Robert Fox: I think we have just heard quite a rosy are going over the cliff in funding very soon. scenario. I do not want to throw gloom on my already American commanders I talk to are very worried gloomy parade, but a lot depends on something that indeed. There is not going to be the money. The big we have not discussed but is very important in all of change in the geopolitical landscape in the United this to do with who follows Karzai. What will happen States is that the gravy stops next year. Things like in Kabul? Will we just have a sort of rump Kabul subvention—look at the amount of money that has Government, which will probably fight itself, the way been spent through CERPS and other things, which it is situated at the moment? The idea that you would we might raise on another occasion because it is done have an air base with the capability of strike on Iran as a model. Huge sums of money were spent in a very sitting in Bastion, would be anathema to almost any conflicted district like Marja. This kind of thing is not Kabul Government of whatever stripe; whatever could going to be available in the future. That is why the be envisaged. I agree with you. It is looking a bit like music is stopping; so much of the aid money, an elephant’s child at the moment. It is an enormous especially the military aid money, goes down by half. facility, as you say. But I have witnessed similar It was very interesting at the DFID presentation the things happening in Kandahar. They invested an awful other day that the big problem was the gap in lot of money, in permanent buildings around the subvention. How are we going to pay for the ANSF airfield there, then they decided it was too hot to hold. over the next decade? The sums have not been added If you are going to be doing special forces operations up yet by any manner of means. We are short by $2 in the area that I described, the border land to the east, billion a year at least. probably you need to be far nearer the scene of the Chair: Luckily, I am not very good at counting crime. You would probably have to be in and around sentences. Jalalabad at least, which is the main air head. But one Robert Fox: The thing is, we are over the cliff. thing that nobody is talking about in this, the other big player in the game—and we do not know how Q31 Ms Gisela Stuart: This follows quite neatly to define their intentions, because their intentions as because I was not quite scaling it up, but I was trying declared at the moment are so far commercial, but to work out. Do we know what the French and also they are security, and security in terms of narco Germans are going to do? Given that the French are politics, as well—are the Chinese. You just look at the leaving before us, they may join the bidding war. How acquisitions they are making. It is not just Mes Aynak are they dealing with the physical withdrawal of and the copper mine. Almost any other decent their gear? mineral—they are not getting all of them, but they are Francis Tusa: They are going to face exactly the getting a lion’s share. They are getting into things in same problems. Most people have established bases Helmand now, like rare earth elements. I think that in the United Arab Emirates, where they can take they will have a big role in what comes in in Kabul ships. Ro-ro ships take vehicles out there and then a after the Karzai clan. I think it will be very difficult way is found of flying them into country. Or they are for the Karzai clan to dominate things in the way that flown direct. If France departs according to the they have hitherto. I am not sure what can happen Hollande time scale, they will be fortunate because with Bastion. I would be very surprised, seeing the they will not have the same competition for resources. shape of Army 2020—such that we have seen it They will be out of sync. If you look at what the now—if we would keep two battalions there. I just do Dutch paid with their draw-down, they were lucky not see it. that they were able to get a lot of stuff going through Pakistan, which is the cheapest route. Even if you Q30 Chair: Could I ask you to answer this extremely were to assume that the Pakistanis charged $1,000 a complicated and difficult question in one sentence vehicle as a sort of export licence, it would still be the each, please? Presumably, the difficulties that you cheapest route. have referred to about the withdrawal for the UK are Germany at the moment is still on the same NATO shared on a much larger scale by the United States. time scale. However, you have an active northern line Have you analysed that at all? of communication. Since they are sitting in certain Francis Tusa: Absolutely, and the biggest single cases right next to the rail heads built by the Russians problem to consider is that, if everyone is heading for for the invasion, it will be a far simpler operation. One the door at the same time, there will be a scrabble for of the various options that the UK has for the northern commercial transport assets, be they trucks from local line of communication is that everything comes back transporters or aircraft. In that case, you end up in a to Camp Bastion and is then flown to Uzbekistan or cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Ev 12 Defence Committee: Evidence
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa somewhere like that. Another option, which is still provinces. There is some sort of realisation by some being discussed but is less obvious, is to hire local of the ex-Taliban—but in fact they are interlocutors— people to ship equipment by truck along highway 1 such as Zaeff, who was their ambassador in a sense all the way round through Herat and so forth to the with immunity in Kabul. Journalists beat a path to border areas. Again, it is cheaper than flying, but it is his door. less certain, and we would not really want to trust One thing they have learned is how they did not really local contractors to take MRAPs and other war-like govern. Apart from beating up people and stoning vehicles on the back of their low-loaders, for which them, they did not run a Government between 1996 we would pay quite a lot. and 2001. They know that they are not equipped for The Germans at the moment are on the same time it. That is something that has got through. I am talking scale; so, in theory are the Italians. The French are particularly about the Quetta shura, which is the getting out early, so they should be able to do it biggest concentration. They know that they would cheaper, but they will face exactly the same problems have to come to power in a coalition. That is the good of chartering outsize aircraft. I will be very interested news, but they mistrust those that are there already. It to see whether they physically achieve the withdrawal is therefore very difficult. Ahmed Rashid is very close of all their equipment in the time scale they are talking to a lot of this. It is difficult to see what kind of about because they have a far less capable air settlement there will be. transport fleet within the French air force. I knew Staffan de Mistura very well, the previous UN High Rep. He was too diplomatic; he wanted to talk Q32 Ms Stuart: The key thing is that they are not at heads of sheds level. Hence you got the opening up doing anything that we could be learning from. They of the office in Qatar. I think it is what comes from are in denial, just as the rest of us are. below. This is going to be the big shock for the Francis Tusa: I suspect that everyone has done the Taliban. Some literate young Pashtuns I know who same thing. Operational necessity—throw stuff into have got an education are very happy to be able to go the theatre. Suddenly when you come to the draw- to school and be able to set up their radio station or down, it becomes far more complicated. I was get a business going in the bazaar, import tractors thinking about the French. They had some stuff on from Iran and China, or whatever. They do not want their MoD website about the draw-down from Libya to go back to what they remember or were told about and they were still doing things three months ago. was going on in Kabul and Kandahar from 1996 on. I know our Government do not like it—Mr Hague, Mr Q33 Chair: This is another of those really cheerful Hammond and the Prime Minister. When we talk of a evidence sessions. civil war, as in so many places, it is not two sides. It Francis Tusa: It could get worse, if you want. is not cavaliers and roundheads. In this, I think we are very much underestimating the possibility of serious Q34 Chair: No, thank you. Not at the moment, communal war. Even in the so-called heartlands such unless you feel right at the end you really want to as Kandahar, there are young people now who will depress us. I will move on to another set of questions, not accept the old order. There is a huge battle of unless Mr Fox wants to say something. generations literally going on at the moment, but it is Robert Fox: No, I’m fine. unrecorded. Forget about the yellow press. You are not hearing about it from Governments. You are not Q35 Bob Stewart: Let’s be more cheerful about hearing about it from the aid authorities—the aid prospects for some sort of settlement—peace you philosophy is a whole game that we will not get might call it. How would you assess the situation as into—which seems to have been wholly we withdraw, when we withdraw and immediately unimaginative. after we withdraw? What is going to happen? It seems to me that there are some things that the Robert Fox: I suspect that there is going to be no Anglo-Saxons should look at, for instance what was grand settlement. There has been an announcement done in terms of very focused education by the Dutch today from one of the Taliban spokesman that they PRTs in Uruzgan, where they really got into this and are opening negotiations with the Americans again. got hold of it. The prospect that we find is very That is the key thing. It is not what they say to worrying. The word that I come back to all the time Karzai’s Government. Karzai is yesterday for a lot of is incoherence, because we have started going down the Taliban leaders. We have already seen it and they one avenue, and then we go down another. Helmand- were up for it much earlier on. You are going to have shire from 2006 was going to be a green and pleasant local deals all the way round. It is very difficult land and was going to be twinned with Virginia Water. because we concentrate on the film stars such as the Some of the aspirations were absolutely crazy, but Haqqani syndicate—when in doubt mention the some very good things have been done, and there are Haqqani—but there are many other elements in it. I signs of progress. We are getting out at just the time see a capacity for local deals. when those seeds really germinate and begin to There is a curious thing with some parts of the blossom. Taliban, particularly in some of the pronouncements I would like to add one thing as a footnote. In terms of Mullah Omar over the past 18 months from Quetta: of our aid, the small, seemingly gestural efforts by they are being got on education. They realise that they groups of individuals, not big organisations, have had cannot just say no, no, no to education, although there an effect out of proportion to their cost and manpower, are appalling reports from the south-east that they are but they have not generally been recognised. The already trying to close down schools in the eastern stabilisation advisers—practically closing down the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 13
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa department and building a block of flats on the site, a similar operation in Afghanistan—there would have as usual. That is what happens with the conflict to be heavier formations left as the perimeter is drawn resolution department. The work that individuals have down. That means you are then left with more heavy done in places like Garmsir and Kanashin—the back equipment at the end needing to be shifted out, which of beyond—have had an enormous effect and a lasting presents its own special logistics problem. impact, but none of that ends up in the audit of the big ministries, and it should, because it is supposed to Q38 Bob Stewart: My final point, rather than a be the great thing of joined-up government. question, is that it just shows that withdrawal is the The other thing I would like to highlight—I have most difficult act of war. Withdrawal in contact will written a bit about it—is basic infrastructure, such as mean that we really need some skilful generals. road building, ditch clearing and electricity. I do not Robert Fox: And the passage of lines, which we are know whether the Special Team Royal Engineers have going to have to do, too. been mentioned to you. At any time there are about 30 or 40. They are one or two individuals, boy-girl or Q39 Chair: The role of the media— two men going out, and they have had an enormous Robert Fox: Ugh! impact in rural Helmand. They have probably had greater lasting impact than the very expansive Q40 Mrs Moon: Oh, a groan! You mentioned alternative production schemes, such as the wheat Ahmed Rashid a few times today. I have to say that scheme that I mentioned, which at times has badly his “Descent into Chaos” is one of the most thumbed sprung a leak because it has gone to the bad guys books in my library, and “Pakistan on the Brink” is very quickly. absolutely excellent. Would you both say a few words about the role of the media in conflict? How do you Q36 Chair: The food is going to the bad guys? operate effectively; do you feel you get appropriate Robert Fox: Yes. I have colleagues and friends who support from the Ministry of Defence; are they helpful are operating it, and one was in quite some distress. or hindering? How can that situation be improved? He and a buddy came to see me and said, “We know Francis Tusa: I will throw in just one comment and that the stuff has gone straight—almost ‘Do not pass leave it to Robert, because we had a quick chat about go’—to help the insurgency.” this. I frequently find it strange, if not bizarre, that Francis Tusa: Could I deal with your question on a you have a lot of conversation and talk in the MoD more tactical level? By settlement and talking about about information operations and how they will transition, will there be a peaceful collapsing of the manage the media, then I come across so few people perimeter of British forces to Bastion? I do not know inside the MoD who understand how the media anyone who is planning that. We were perhaps lucky actually operate. I think the concept is flawed from in Iraq that we were able to negotiate enough security the start. This then results in some incredibly strange with whichever local groups—they were decisions on how things are managed. You could say multifarious—to have a more or less benign that from a strategic level, if they fundamentally do withdrawal. I do not know anyone who is making not understand how the different parts of the media plans for a benign withdrawal. work, what drives them and what they need, it is always going to be rather difficult to come up with a Q37 Bob Stewart: Robert’s scenario is that they will coherent policy. start positioning themselves to take over. Might they actually be worrying about their position post our Q41 Mrs Moon: Could you also contrast their policy withdrawal? Might groups be positioning themselves and operation, informing people in the UK but also to take over and, therefore, not be so worried about their strategy for Afghanistan and talking to the us because they know we are going, so we might get Afghans? away with it? Francis Tusa: The Afghan side I know less about, but Robert Fox: Very quickly on that, when Boris I would come back to this one of trying to say, “Right, Gromov left, Ahmad Shah Massoud—John Simpson we are going to have information operations, here are and Sandy Gall’s friend—had to show off. He staged the messages we want to get out”. Great. Those may a huge battle involving hundreds or possibly be the messages they want to get out, but are they of thousands of people on both sides to kick the backside any relevance to a newspaper or a TV or radio station; of the remnant of the 40th shock army as it came out or have they supplied the correct media to that radio of the Salang tunnel going up the Salang highway. station? You come across people who do not There was no tactical reason to do that whatever. They understand that the radio station will need to do voice were going—they were gone. There is the warrior interviews and get noises. If you are talking about culture, which is what worries me. It is not just that television, they will need pictures. Frequently, it is, they will have to show off; they have to say, “I am a “We have done all the camera work. Do not worry, real warrior, and I will do that.” I take Francis’s point; you can just use that”. People then look at the film it is not going to be an easy ride. footage and say, “It is not broadcast quality”. You still Bob Stewart: I am going to cut it there, because I come across errors like that. After a decade of know we are pressed for time. constant operations, these mistakes should not be Francis Tusa: One extra point on that: it means that made. unlike Iraq, where all the heavy formations had left Combat camera teams sometimes take some amazing Iraq and Kuwait before the draw-down happened— footage, but on a lot of other occasions I have come again, I do not know anyone who has been planning across, people in newspapers have had pictures come cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Ev 14 Defence Committee: Evidence
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa in from the MoD and say, “They are absolutely of no brigade, to metaphorically wave two fingers at them. relevance or value to a newspaper at all”. That is the The level of engagement is so unintelligent. problem—people who do not understand the That is why I really fear what these people have done, differences between Fleet Street newspapers, local including what they have achieved. I have mentioned newspapers, specialist magazines, television and the StabAds and rebuilding places to get schools radio. You cannot have a single information policy. really going in the back of beyond, in places like Khan They all require different policies, and I have seen no Neshin. Two or three brave individuals have done as evidence that the MoD is capable of understanding much as anybody to help. Risk goes by the board— that. not invented here. I went three times through the PRT in Lashkar Gah, Q42 Chair: Robert Fox. and I was shocked by what I found last time—I went Robert Fox: How long have we got? for almost a month each time. There were five people Chair: We are down to our basic quorum now, which meeting for three weeks before I arrived about what I is a hint to the others not to leave. should say and what I should be allowed to say. I Robert Fox: My story is that in a month or two I am discovered that because I went to look for a kidnapped going to be 45 years in journalism. It would be too boy with the commanding officer of 2 Para in tempting to say that the clock has gone backwards February in a place called Khan Neshin, and I said, “I from the Falklands, but something did happen from want to go back there.” When they heard I wanted to the Falklands. They thought they could control the go back, they sent three people down there for three message. Very much as Francis said, it is one size fits days to see what I could see. This is bizarre, and very all. Then there became a culture—I do not think it is expensive, too. particularly of one party of one particular stripe, Although I am not exactly a candidate for All Souls, neither Conservative nor Labour, I think both sides I do not regard myself as totally stupid. I find the got involved in it—where you were following the condescension of the system absolutely galling, and Minister. So much of the information policy from the still do to this day. You feel like saying, “Do you MoD was following what the Minister wanted, of his really expect me to believe that?” And the people who are really good, because they are spokesmen or views and often of his political career. This has spokeswomen in their own cause, are the men and coloured things. women in the military, and they are still naturally It would be crass and vulgar—and one is tempted to bloody good at it. be so—to say that the MoD’s media policy on By contrast, I did a tour of five provinces with an Afghanistan has been a disaster. It has not been smart American cultural team to look at cultural monuments enough, that is how I would prefer to put it. It has from Herat through to Ghazni and Mes Aynak, where been unhelpful in explaining what we are trying to do, I went to the great copper mine. The Americans were where and how. Yes, with the embedded policy, you so open, so engaging and so trading on equal terms. I have seen brave soldiers doing brave deeds, but in was looking at stuff like the property rackets in Herat, what context? They had great difficulty, both on the which are the biggest single security threat there. record and off the record, in saying why they were There was no hindrance. It was, “Here is somebody there from about 2006. I have tried, including with you might want to talk to about it.” The contrast with brigadiers and chiefs of staff, to get 40 words, which our own dear country and our own dear Ministry of is the statutory NATO requirement for a mission Defence was absolutely breathtaking. statement of objectives, on “Why are we here?” I think a lot stems from that. I spent a lot of time there Q43 Chair: Robert Fox, you have just been speaking last year, and I was trying to nose around on complete music to our ears. We feel in exactly the development: what is going to happen? What is going same position. I am thinking of having what you just on with the Afghans’ farming? Narco-politics. Child said framed in gold and sent to the Secretary of State brides. You name it. Can the improving mission set for Defence. I only hope that someone hears, reads down at Bonn happen, or is it happening? It is and takes in what you have just said, because it is probably a more mixed story than even I have been absolutely perfect. portraying this afternoon. Francis Tusa: As we have discussed, this attitude What was so worrying was the management of the goes way beyond just the operations. It goes to media operation, which, unless you are old and budgets, and so on. Unfortunately, in areas like that, practically in a zimmer frame, as I am now, was the MoD is frequently a stranger to anything close to almost insulting. They said, “This is not the story we the truth or accuracy, which then hinders the core would like you to write. This is not positive enough. MoD mission. They are spending far too much time This is not the right message.” For God’s sake, once cooking the books and they do not end up running the I was going to see the outstanding governor of Ministry effectively, which applies to civil servants Bamiyan, Habiba Sarabi, who has a fantastic literacy and the military in equal number. record with the Hazara people. She is everybody’s Chair: Absolutely right. They seem to forget that they favourite cousin, aunt, or whatever, and Lyse Doucet have friends out there who would be only too willing has done some marvellous profiles of her. The FCO to help, if they were not quite so ridiculously spokesperson was like a terrier, even in the governor’s controlled by Ministry of Defence people who are not presence, saying, “But that’s not the line we want to entirely aware of what they are doing. put out.” That is an insult to intelligence, and no Ms Stuart: Far be it from me to try and defend the wonder there is an instinct, particularly in the old MoD on that point, but the Foreign Office is just as cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o001_th_CORRECTED HC 413-i.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 15
26 June 2012 Robert Fox and Francis Tusa bad in many ways. They do a double act, and the them to do their job. Why? As I say, unfortunately, I only difference is that the generals wait slightly longer believe that Afghanistan now, a little like Iraq was, is before they tell the politicians how stupid they were yesterday’s operation. It is the forgotten operation and to have ever believed a word they said. Our diplomats people do not want to be associated with it. do it the minute they leave the post, saying, “We can’t Robert Fox: Can I just make this point? It is the last believe the politicians who came and visited us. Did footnote, but I think it is absolutely core business for you know that they believed everything we told you. We have to talk about the 2020 effect, the Force them?” 2020 effect and the Army 2020 effect. The fact that we are going, getting out, drawing down, and we are Q44 Chair: Is there anything else that you would like going to be less professional is bound to have an to tell us? effect. What happens in Afghanistan from now to the Robert Fox: I would just like to underline the piece end of 2015 will call the bluff on two central that I have made. It is not that I am sentimental, propositions, which I know people are worried about. because you get people who are indifferent or worse They are: that you can have one in three on operations than indifferent, but when you are actually doing from the reserves, and that we can man, train and something in the field, the blokes, the young—and not sustain a 30,000 reserve; and, as Mr Hammond has so young—men and women out there, including the leaked from his private office to various papers, the best of the aid organisations, are much better in their fact that we can cut things like the strength of the own cause than having people who have sat around Corps of Royal Engineers and the Royal Logistic the clipboards, in a huddle for three weeks, discussing Corps almost by half, or at least 40%, and your visit. By the way, two of those people did not go contractorise. Not so—experience already has warned out of the wire. The head of public information, the us of that. Look at the problems they had with British one in the PRT, used to, under heavy armoured contractorisation in Basra. Damage to morale and real escort—there is no criticism of that—go to the media effect will come from that. office of the governor once a week. That is all he saw of Lashkar Gah and Helmand. It was an absolutely Q46 Mrs Moon: Can we have that enshrined in gold Carrollian—as in Lewis Carroll—situation. as well? Chair: I am running out of gold leaf. Q45 Chair: Okay. Is there anything else you would Robert Fox: I would say that the contractor piece is like to say? Francis Tusa, would you like to depress slightly more nuanced than that, because out in us a bit more? Afghanistan, you will not find many people who Francis Tusa: Just to reinforce the fact that there are would say that contractors have failed. In a lot of excellent logisticians in Afghanistan today in the cases, they have succeeded. The biggest limitations entire support chain, at Permanent Joint Headquarters, on contractors have actually been legal limits on such and at Land Command. Royal Marines, and Navy and things as whether they can go outside the wire. I have Air Force people are involved as well. Any problems come across field service representatives for armed with the withdrawal will not be as a result of any equipment manufacturers who were quite happy to go failure on their part. They are putting in a vast amount out to the four operating bases to do work, but could of work to quantify exactly what needs to be done. If not do it. Computer says no. there is going to be—I use the word—failure and we Robert Fox: That’s what happened in Basra, very will not have proof of good order in withdrawal, it badly. will come because the highest levels of leadership, Francis Tusa: Yes, but those lessons were learnt. inside the Ministry of Defence and Downing street, There is room for more contractorisation, but blanket will not actually allow them to do their job, nor will cuts in the Royal Logistic Corps and so forth would— they give them the resources. again, there is this idea of teeth, arms and then the I repeat one thing. The unpalatable point is that to useless tail. Surely, if we have learnt anything from achieve proof of good order, there will have to be a Iraq and now Afghanistan—Robert mentioned the logistics surge; extra troops will have to be sent out Royal Engineers. I remember people saying even after to deal with this mountain of kit. However, just to 2003, that the days of combat bridging were gone. No repeat, the alternative to not sending out an extra 600 one needed to put bridges across rivers. Well, if you or 800 people will be the equivalent of going to the go around Helmand, there are an awful lot of green four big hangars that have been built on Camp painted bridges. I think people would probably have Bastion, which have been populated with vast said that we did not need mine clearance, because that amounts of kit that have been sitting in containers, was a very cold war role. If there is any plea for and dousing the place with petrol. If you do not send Future Force 2020, it has to be balanced. Blanket talk out those 600 to 800 guys and girls, you might as well of “Teeth, arms stay, and everyone else goes”— set it alight, because that is the alternative. That is therein lies the path of madness. why it is perhaps a depressing situation. Chair: Okay. If I may say so, thank you very much The solutions are out there. People know exactly what indeed. Some people on the Committee will have needs to be done. They could tell you—offline, I can missed that, and I think that they will think themselves tell you some people you should speak to—tomorrow accursed that they were not here. how they would do an effective draw-down in Robert Fox: Extremely civil of you to say so. Afghanistan from today, leading to the end of 2014. Chair: We have been extremely lucky to have such a The problem at the moment is that no one is allowing fascinating, useful account. Thank you. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SE] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Ev 16 Defence Committee: Evidence
Tuesday 4 September 2012
Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)
Mr Julian Brazier Penny Mordaunt Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Sandra Osborne John Glen Sir Bob Russell Mr Dai Havard Bob Stewart Mrs Madeleine Moon Ms Gisela Stuart ______
Examination of Witness
Witness: Sir William Patey KCMG, former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan, gave evidence.
Q47 Chair: Sir William, welcome to the Defence the focus of the Government and the public was on Committee and thank you very much for coming to Iraq. Having arrived in Afghanistan in 2010, it struck help us on our inquiry into Afghanistan. The first time me that there was a period where some of the things I met you I think you were ambassador to Iraq. Then, that we were doing in 2009 and 2010 were things that after a brief session elsewhere, you moved to might have been done earlier. We did not begin Afghanistan, which was an interesting succession of building up the security forces of Afghanistan early jobs. What was your main role as the ambassador to enough in my view. Perhaps we had not achieved as Afghanistan? much as we should have done. The focus was on Iraq Sir William Patey: It was leading a very large team during the period of 2003Ð07. to deliver UK policy and UK objectives in Afghanistan. They were shared objectives, obviously. Q49 Ms Stuart: So at what stage did you realise that We were part of an international coalition. In the time we were not doing things that we should have been I was there I would have defined those objectives as doing? helping build institutions in Afghanistan and helping Sir William Patey: It was with hindsight. develop a security framework that would enable ISAF troops to withdraw, leaving an Afghan Government Q50 Ms Stuart: So it was not while you were in and an Afghan security force capable of maintaining post? security in Afghanistan. Our subsidiary objectives Sir William Patey: No, by the time I got there the would have been to strengthen democratic institutions, focus had switched back to Afghanistan. Some of the help the Afghans develop institutions to protect decisions had already been made, such as the US human rights, and help with the development of surge in troops, for instance, and the additional troops Afghanistan. So, it was quite a broad range. Many that were sent to Helmand. There was a recognition Whitehall Departments were represented in the that we had too few troops in Helmand to do what embassy so it was quite a complex environment. It they were being asked to do. There were too few was one of our biggest embassies. I think it is still our troops in general to perform all the tasks that were biggest embassy in the world, as we go through the asked of them. Earlier in the period, our ambitions process towards 2014. were not matched by our resources. Looking back, it Chair: During the next hour or so, we will go through was only in 2008 and 2009 that the resources began the question of the extent to which you and the to match the ambitions, and the ambitions had been country succeeded in those objectives. We will start lowered by then. with an interview you gave earlier this year. Q51 Ms Stuart: So, as far as you are concerned, by Q48 Ms Stuart: You gave the interview to The Daily the time you arrived in Afghanistan our ambitions and Telegraph and in it you suggested that we had taken resources were matching each other. our eye off the ball in terms of Afghanistan. Could Sir William Patey: Yes, they were getting in sync. you elaborate a little on that? Sir William Patey: Yes. They were asking why we Q52 Ms Stuart: I want to expand on this point— had not made more progress and why, after almost 10 many of us first met you out in Iraq, and quite a years, the country still seemed difficult, complex and, number of us have been on other Committees such as in The Daily Telegraph’s eyes, was not making the the Foreign Affairs Committee—because there progress that might have been expected after nine or appears to be a tendency among our ambassadors, 10 years of engagement. So it was in that context that when parliamentarians visit them on site, to tell us I suggested, and I have said this many times before, that they are dealing with the drugs and the terrorists not just to The Daily Telegraph, that after the invasion and that it is all fine. When ambassadors come to the and the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, my point of retirement, they then express surprise at how sense, with hindsight I have to say, was that the focus gullible the politicians are and how they do not realise had switched very quickly to Iraq. Indeed, I was the how bad things really were. When I last raised that ambassador in Iraq in 2005 and 2006, during what I point, it was suggested to me that my security would regard as the period when we had taken our clearance was not high enough to know what was eye of the ball in Afghanistan. It was clear to me that really going on. I wondered whether you have cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 17
4 September 2012 Sir William Patey KCMG observed the tendency among diplomats of seeing the ambassador and Members of Parliament. I think there light when they are about to retire. is a nuance there. Sir William Patey: When you are a diplomat you are Chair: I think I accept that. pursuing Government policy, so you cannot deviate too far from what the Government are saying. In Q55 Ms Stuart: With hindsight, do you think that fairness to diplomats and myself, I was saying that you gave us a sufficient and true picture of the Kabul we had taken our eye off the ball long before I left Bank when we were there last time? Afghanistan. I think that any of you who have known Sir William Patey: I think I did. I cannot recall that me a while will know that I was pretty frank when I told you about the Kabul Bank, but I would have you came to Afghanistan. I have not tended to see told you— things through rose-tinted spectacles. Part of the difference is that when an ambassador is Q56 Ms Stuart: I had a feeling that we were on the briefing the public or the press, whether it is MPs or way to sorting it, but it isn’t sorted. It’s in an even anyone else, they are required to explain how the worse mess. policy might work. They are required to put the best Sir William Patey: Well, it is not in a worse mess. possible spin on it. It is no good if the ambassador Can you remind me when you were last there? It was starts putting his hands on his head and saying, “My about a year ago, wasn’t it? God, it’s all hopeless. We’re all doomed.” I suspect Chair: January last year. that that would not be the way to lead a big team of Sir William Patey: So January 2011. We were on the people who you are trying to get to achieve path to getting the Afghans to take the right decisions extraordinary things in extraordinary circumstances, on the Kabul Bank, on holding the crooks who had knowing that you will never be able to achieve helped themselves to a large pot of money to account everything that you have set out to achieve. I think and delivering what the IMF wanted them to do in that you just have to accept that ambassadors will put terms of transparency and recapitalisation. We were a good spin on it. That does not mean to say that on the way to getting that. In January 2012, that is they should be giving you unrealistically rosy pictures what I would have been saying. The IMF programme when there are real difficulties. You can judge for was resumed. I think the Kabul Bank is on the way yourself. I hope that I have tried to give a realistic up. I am not up to date with what they have done picture of what could happen—discussing what the since and whether they have reneged on their better-case scenarios are while being conscious at the commitments, but by the time I left this April, they same time of the worst-case scenarios. I did not just were on a path to sorting it out, isolating the bank say that in the interview I gave to The Daily Telegraph from any further thievery and trying to preserve the after I left; I think if you went back, you would find bank as a bank for ordinary Afghan customers. It was that I have been saying the same thing consistently. an evolving picture. I would never have told you that the Kabul Bank was all right. I think it was on a path Q53 Ms Stuart: Should we have the opportunity to to solution. talk to your successor, do you have any advice on how Chair: I think I came away myself with a feeling that we could get the best information out of him or her? it was a very strange affair that needed to be Sir William Patey: He is very smooth, my successor. I seriously investigated. think you should ask him honest questions and expect honest answers. Q57 Penny Mordaunt: You also said that the coalition had missed the opportunity to train and equip Q54 Chair: Sir William, you say that when you are the national Afghan security forces to fill the power a diplomat, you are pursuing Government policy, gap left. What do you think has been the outcome of which of course is true. But don’t you agree that that that missed opportunity? policy depends, for its formation, on Members of Sir William Patey: I think it means that there is a Parliament coming out to a country and being given greater level of doubt about the capacity of the Afghan the real facts, as they are on the ground, warts and security forces to fulfil their obligations to provide all? Not, “We’re all doomed”, but, “There is a real security throughout the country in 2014 than there problem here and that is at risk of failing. This is would otherwise have been. Indeed, had we started going well, but that person is corrupt.” Don’t you earlier, we might have been in a position to withdraw think that we need to be given the absolute truth, as troops earlier. I genuinely think it was the decision to you see it as an ambassador? put a deadline on combat troop withdrawal that really Sir William Patey: I do not think an ambassador focused people’s resources on what was needed if that should be telling you that things are better than they was to happen. General Caldwell, who was the really are, but there is a big gamut within there in general responsible for the training at the time, had terms of how you explain the policy. The Committee, made it absolutely clear to his superiors that unless he when it comes out, usually asks very pertinent and got certain support in terms of increased trainers and critical questions, and many of you have your own money, he would not be able to deliver; he was very views on the policy. It is the ambassador’s job to clear about that. defend the policy within the context of giving you the I think the missed opportunity is one of timing. If we best possible advice. But there has to be a level of had started earlier, we would be further down the path. frankness between the ambassador and the Ministers There would be fewer doubts about the capacity of responsible for the policy that is not of the same order, the Afghan security forces to fulfil the role that will I would suggest, as the level of advice between the be expected of them in 2015 and beyond. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Ev 18 Defence Committee: Evidence
4 September 2012 Sir William Patey KCMG
Q58 Penny Mordaunt: Without the deadline it was provincial level. Is it your sense that that leadership just drifting. will be there? Sir William Patey: Steps had already been put in Sir William Patey: My sense is that it will probably place. As I said, in 2008Ð09 there was a clear surge be good enough. It will not be a finished product and in the number of troops, and there was a clear ISAF it will depend on what happens in the 2014 commitment to provide extra people. There was more presidential election, so there are big caveats on money; the Americans were putting in $12 billion a whether it will be sufficient. The next parliamentary year, at the point when I arrived, to build this force election is not due until 2015, but the presidential up. That had already happened, so I think the decision election is due in 2014 and constitutionally President to have the 2014 cut-off for combat troops just Karzai cannot stand again. So there is a big question concentrated people’s minds and gave an added mark. President Karzai is very clear and was clear to impetus to getting it right. me personally and to visiting Ministers and in public that—even if he could—he would not stand again. Q59 Mr Donaldson: Sir William, when we last How that presidential election is conducted and who visited Kabul we met with some of the political becomes the president is quite a big question mark leaders including President Karzai, and I must say I over the process. I know that there are parties working came away with a bit of a sinking feeling that the behind the scenes to draw up a broad coalition of aspirations to create a more stable security climate people who are pro-reform and pro-democratic were not met by the extent to which long-term candidates. Nobody has put their head above the political stability could be achieved. Has the western parapet yet, mainly on the grounds that anyone who coalition placed sufficient importance on creating does is likely to get it shot off—probably literally and democratic institutions in Afghanistan and a good, metaphorically. Our hope would be that, as we get stable Government? closer to it and as we go into 2013, you would begin Sir William Patey: Our commitment is very strong. to see what the alternatives are. I cannot predict the The question is, is the Afghan commitment as strong? outcome, but it will be absolutely critical that that is a I was clear most of the time when I was there that decent election, that we get a decent presidency going some of our pressure was resented, particularly over forward and that there is a good election in 2015 as well. the electoral process. We tried to support the independent electoral commission against attempts by I have always said that, in my experience of Iraq, all sorts of people—this was not President Karzai; Afghanistan and other countries, it is not the first and second elections that really matter; it is the third and there were all sorts of people trying to manipulate the fourth ones. If they are of a higher quality and they result after the fact, from MPs to power groups to take place and there is democratic change, you can power brokers, and I do not think that the president begin to say with some confidence that you are on a was the biggest culprit by a long way in this respect. democratic path. We are not yet there with Often there was resentment at foreign ambassadors Afghanistan. I think the jury is still out on whether and foreign Governments trying to support we are on a path to really stable democracy. independent electoral commissions and trying to support the rule of law. Q61 Chair: We are not yet there, but are we getting It was not an absence of commitment on our part. better? Sometimes you have to go with the political reality Sir William Patey: I think the institutions are getting and know when to draw back and when to push. I stronger. One of the things that I used to say in think we were up against a body politic in Afghanistan Afghanistan all the time—although the House of that was not all that familiar with, and had not really Commons is perhaps not the place to say it—is that adjusted to, the idea that in democracy you might lose, parliamentary elections are a necessary but no matter how much money you have put into the insufficient condition for democracy. Without the election. So I do not doubt our commitment. I am sure other bits, the elections are a waste of time. Without you could come up with things we should have done independent institutions, the rule of law, a free press better, but part of the problem was that the system is and separation of powers, you will never really have not well understood in Afghanistan. a democracy. All those things are in place in one form Part of our problem is that we get very impatient about or another and need time to bed down and to find the absence of progress in a country like Afghanistan, their way. In declaring the election, the Independent where it will take decades to get a stable democracy. Election Commission of Afghanistan proved itself to I always used to say to the Afghans, “We started our be a very strong body in the face of physical and democratic process in 1215 and we completed it in political threats to its independence. Whether it will 1921 when women got the vote. We are hoping you be allowed to continue in that vein is, again, an open can do it a bit quicker, but it is a long process.” Our question, but these are important institutions that we commitment is there, and I did not see any lack of have spent a lot of time supporting, both publicly, commitment in terms of how we allocated our financially and morally. resources. Q62 Bob Stewart: Sir William, I think most people Q60 Mr Donaldson: But the immediacy of 2014 recognise that in Helmand between 2006 and 2009 looms large, and if you are to have an effective things were a bit poor or bad. I know that it wasn’t Afghan security apparatus you need effective political your time, because you did not arrive until much later leadership to drive it, both at national and at than even 2009, as I understand it, but what was your cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 19
4 September 2012 Sir William Patey KCMG understanding of the strategic plan for when we first and whether we missed an opportunity to intervene in moved military forces into Helmand in 2006—if you that area earlier on. What should we have been doing can remember from your briefings? to reduce corruption in Afghanistan? Sir William Patey: I think the plan was to deny the Sir William Patey: A little bit of humility is what is ground to the Taliban and to expand the zone of required in terms of what we can do about corruption security for the population, so that the Afghan security in Afghanistan. Remember, we were a player in a forces could take over. I think that was the plan right bigger coalition. from the start, but, having been on the ground in Helmand and having seen the lie of the land, it was a Q70 John Glen: Given all that— big ask for the number of troops that we had there at Sir William Patey: Given all that, we were very clear the time. in focusing our resources on areas where we could make the biggest difference. One of the areas where Q63 Bob Stewart: It does not seem to have been we could make the biggest difference was in tax particularly well thought through—at least collection and customs revenue. If you could get the retrospectively—when we actually moved one state’s revenues delivered to the state with as few battalion into such an area without understanding that middlemen and with as little corruption as possible, as soon as you move out of your base you are likely you were making a huge difference. I actually think to be clobbered, which the Americans might not have we succeeded quite well in that by focusing on the done prior to 2006. Did you get any feel for that? Ministry of Finance and on the Ministry of Mines. If Sir William Patey: My experience with our military you look at what happened in finance, we have is that they will do what they are told to do with managed to help the Afghans develop a taxation and whatever resources they have. I think those were the revenue collection system that means that the customs resources that were available at the time. revenue that they collect at the border actually gets When I was sent to Iraq was the first time that I have into the Ministry of Finance without being siphoned ever had my objectives delivered directly to me by the off by various power brokers. Prime Minister. One of the objectives he set me was The Ministry of Mines has introduced a transparent to get some troop withdrawals by the following system of tendering—indeed, cancelled a number of year—by June 2006. It was clear to me that we were contracts that did not meet the new standards—with a looking for extra troops, which we did not have, to commitment to publish on the internet within six send to Afghanistan. We were clearly in Afghanistan weeks of the tender being given. The details were with as many troops as we could afford at the time published so that people could not claim there was and doing what we could. That is why the surge was bribery. The Ministry of Mines closed its own bank so important later on. Not only did we surge troops; account and had all the revenues go direct to the the Americans were able to surge troops; and we Ministry of Finance. That alone—overnight— eventually got to the 30,000 troops in Helmand that I produced an extra $100 million into the coffers just think probably turned out to be sufficient for the job. by changing the bank account. The revenue that the Afghans get now is approaching Q64 Bob Stewart: You just commented that in your $2 billion. It has risen from $100 million. That has experience the military would do what they were told reduced corruption at a strategic level. We have also to do with the troops that they have at hand. Were helped them work through by reducing procedures. It they told to go into Helmand and do that by some took 52 processes to get a driving licence in political authority, or was it really a 50:50 deal? Afghanistan, which was reduced to four. That is 48 Sir William Patey: I do not know what— fewer opportunities for corruption. Also, it is important in developing a proper well-paid, well- Q65 Chair: This was before your time. trained public service. By getting policemen paid— Sir William Patey: Before my time. introducing direct payment to policemen on their mobile phones—they suddenly realised how much Q66 Bob Stewart: I accept that. I am just they were paid. Cutting out the middleman reduces wondering whether— the opportunity—or the incentive—for ordinary policemen to be corrupt. That has not solved the Q67 Chair: And to a certain extent we covered that problem. It will take decades. in our last inquiry. Bob Stewart: I am sorry—I am like a dog with a Q71 John Glen: When we discuss the issue of bone. corruption, it is obviously one of these situations Sir William Patey: I do not know the answer to that. where the starting point is so far away that any I assume they were told to go and do what they could. examples you give will sound very impressive. I am The fact that they turned up probably created a bigger not trying to be difficult; I am just trying to get an problem in a place like Helmand. assessment of whether we did enough early on in a broad range of areas to maximise the influence that Q68 Bob Stewart: That is what I am getting at. we could have had in dealing with corruption. Sir William Patey: They poked the hornets’ nest and Sir William Patey: It is hard to see what more we the hornets got out. could have done. There is a balance to be struck all the time. You have corruption across the board. You Q69 John Glen: I want to ask about corruption in are trying to deal with it institutionally. You have got Afghanistan and your perspective on what the UK did politicians and Government Ministers who are cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Ev 20 Defence Committee: Evidence
4 September 2012 Sir William Patey KCMG corrupt. I will be frank: you have a system that itself Sir William Patey: It struck me as the law of supply must balance corruption against other things. and demand. We were trying to deal with the supply Personally, I think President Karzai is not corrupt, but side, but the demand was as high as ever. It is not my he provides protection for people who I think are. area—I know there are lots of controversies—but I Why does he do that? He has to balance a coalition came to the conclusion that we should just legalise it, of power in the country. He is not an absolute ruler. make it a health issue and take it out of the hands of He is holding together a coalition of power brokers. criminals. But that is another debate, and I am not an That is why the Kabul bank was so difficult to deal expert on that. with. There were particular power brokers very close I did get very pessimistic about it. The actual farmers to the top who had family vested interests in this, and were getting very little for this; it was all the narcotics were resolutely opposed to a solution. syndicates linked with terrorism, and all that. We did What could we have done? You could have made have an impact in the south, in cutting off the corruption your only issue and dealt with it head-on Taliban’s supplies and affecting them financially, so it all the time. You would have lost traction quite had a good effect on the counter-insurgency; but in quickly with most of the interlocutors you were terms of the overall aim of reducing significantly dealing with in trying to deal with all the problems. narcotics production exports from Afghanistan, I fear On a daily basis, I had to decide, when I would go to we did not do very well. see the President or the vice-president, what three issues we needed purchase on that I would get him to Q74 Chair: We were hugely playing second fiddle, focus on that day. Corruption was always up there, but in everything that we were doing, to the United States, there was a point if you pushed when you would come weren’t we? up against an obstacle, decide you would not get any Sir William Patey: Well, they had much larger further today and go on to your next subject. resources, yes. That is why we concentrated on niche It is a balance to be struck, and I don’t think we ever areas. The only people doing counter-narcotics were lost sight of it. I certainly used the public platform I us and the US, and the US were spending huge sums had in Afghanistan to say, “If you don’t sort this, your of money on it—I have to say to much less effect— future is bleak.” It was one of my big messages when and my experience of Afghanistan on absolutely I left Afghanistan: “Yes, we are committing to support everything is more money is not necessarily a you financially, but you’ve got to be worthy of that solution. Indeed, sometimes more money contributes support. You’ll be worthy of that support if you start more to the problem than the solution. I can doing something about corruption. We are not going understand why money gets thrown at it, because to give our taxpayers’ money directly into corrupt political pressure to solve problems in an instant is as pockets.” That was a warning I delivered very great in the United States as it is here. forcefully before I left. Q75 Mrs Moon: Can I ask a few questions about the Q72 John Glen: Can I move on to look at your perspective on the effectiveness of the UK’s anti- Afghan national security forces, and whether you feel narcotics strategy? I remember when we visited in they will be ready to take responsibility in 2014 for January last year, we saw some of the work there. the security of Afghanistan? Will they be ready? When you reflect on it, how do you assess the Sir William Patey: I think they will be. Certainly they effectiveness? Again, perhaps you will give your will have the sufficient numbers that they need. I think perspective over time of where it really hit and started they will reach their maximum figure by October this to work, if it did. year and then that figure will actually decline, because Sir William Patey: By the time I left, I became pretty I think then what you want to do is to concentrate pessimistic about what we could achieve and had more on quality than on numbers—so there has been achieved. It was clear we had achieved significant a focus on that. I know the vetting process that has reductions in poppy cultivation in Helmand—a 40% already been stepped up with the Afghanistan local reduction over two years—by a combination of law police will probably be renewed in terms of the enforcement, alternative livelihoods and wheat seed security forces, so you will want a smaller, better- distribution. No one thing seemed to work. If you got equipped force. the combination right—a good governor and a The reason I think they probably can is that where Minister of counter-narcotics who was working with they have been in the lead—and certainly in areas in you—you could achieve some progress. Helmand—they have shown themselves to be pretty But by the time I left, the overall production of poppy effective. Our own troops, who are a better judge of in Afghanistan had gone up. It had gone down in the effectiveness of Afghan security forces than I Helmand and up elsewhere. It was a bit like splat the could ever be, were certainly saying better things rat, for those of us who are old enough to remember about them in the last year I was there than they were that great fairground game: you splat a rat, and saying in the first year. Our troops, who are not known another one comes up somewhere else. Other places for holding back their opinions on things like that, that had been poppy-free suddenly became attractive were pretty scathing, and by the time I was leaving again for poppy. they were saying, “Oh, not bad; they do things differently, but they’re okay. They’ll do it their own Q73 John Glen: Was that an inconsistency of resolve way.” The reality is they do not have to be as good as across the country, or just tactical moving around by us; they just have to be better than the Taliban, and I those who were growing? think they are already better than the Taliban. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 21
4 September 2012 Sir William Patey KCMG
The question is, as Mr Donaldson alludes to: you can I arrived, that they were just being recruited and then have the best security force in the world; if you do not let loose. Now, no policeman gets deployed without have the right political direction and the right political at least six weeks’ training, which includes their role leadership they will not do very much. That would be as a protector, so that level of corruption is my worry about the security forces: not their diminishing, but not eliminated. competence; not their professionalism—as long as we What you then need to get in place is the chain of continue to pay. There is a big bill for us for quite a command—the supply chain—to make sure that when number of years. That was the significance of the money is allocated for uniforms, for buildings and for NATO summit in Chicago: our willingness to meet all of that, it does not get siphoned off. That is part that bill. It is way beyond the capacity of the Afghans and parcel of it, and not just unique to the police; it for many years to come to meet that bill. If we are the same for the army. Those are the big challenges. I willing to pay them, the big question mark will be the think that at getting the security services into the front political direction they get. I do not think it will be line, they are pretty good. It is getting the logistic their competence. It will be whether there is a political chain, the command structure, the training and the settlement in Afghanistan that endures. institutional that will keep regenerating that force and keeping it in check. That is the bit that we really need Q76 Mrs Moon: Is 2014 a realistic time scale in to focus on in the next two years. which to get them to where they need to be, and what On corruption, it is the same issue. We need an are the obstacles along the way that we need to attorney-general in Afghanistan who is going to apply overcome to make sure that 2014 is going to be the rule of law and we need a legal system that is effective? going to uphold that law. There is work to be done. Sir William Patey: We have to work on the competency. Clearly Taliban infiltration seems to be Q78 Mrs Moon: And a National Audit Office. an issue. I noticed that General Allen said he thought Sir William Patey: Well, yes. it was about 25% Taliban infiltration. The other 75% would be all sorts of different reasons—cultural, and Q79 Sir Bob Russell: Sir William, I wonder if I what have you. I think the cultural problems will could ask a supplementary to the previous questions. reduce as we are less in the forefront and the Afghans You mentioned that Britain will be ending its combat are in the forefront, doing it their way. With our troops role in 2014, but we are not leaving entirely; we will in the background advising, the culture clash will still be there in a training role. Is that a significant reduce. difference to what happened when the Soviet forces I think we have to continue with the training. Britain withdrew? is making a contribution; I think the first cadets in the Sir William Patey: Rodric Braithwaite will be able to officer academy will start in 2013, so you need a good tell you. He is a great scholar on what the Russians group of officers—well trained. The focus in the sort did and did not do. of two years that I was there was getting the numbers The biggest difference between what will happen in up. In the last year, there was more focus on quality, 2014 and what happened with the Russians is that the and I am sure that that will be continuing now, so for money stopped, so the security forces did not get paid. the next two or three years it is quality. Remember It would not have mattered how many trainers you that, at the end of 2014, it will not be a finished had staying on in training the Afghan forces, the product; it will still be a security force in Russians cut off the money supply, and that led to the development. We are not abandoning them; it is just forces dissipating and being seduced by warlords. that our role will change dramatically. Our role will That is the big lesson we will need to learn. be much more on training, than it will be on combat. It is not a sort of cliff face that we are facing at the Q80 Sir Bob Russell: So provided the money supply end of 2014; we just do not expect to be in combat at continues, there is hope? the end of 2014, but we will still be there helping. Sir William Patey: Yes, I think so. For me, that is certainly the most identifiable point of failure in the Q77 Mrs Moon: You mentioned very briefly two whole campaign, if we do not keep the money going. things: one is the rogue elements within the Afghan police—indeed, some nations have said that they will Q81 Ms Stuart: Can you just confirm to me that I no longer provide the training missions, because of have understood this right? Are you saying that as green on blue attacks—and also corruption. Can you recently as 2010 we were taking Afghan national say a little bit about the problems of the presence of police officers on without any training whatsoever? those rogue elements and of corruption in the Afghan Sir William Patey: When I arrived in May 2010, national police? Afghan police forces were being deployed without Sir William Patey: There are different levels of training. corruption. You had the low-level corruption in which policemen did not get paid, and therefore they thought Q82 Ms Stuart: That is certainly, in all the visits I it was okay to extort money from the citizens and have been on, something I have never picked up. I were immediately at loggerheads with the citizens. think we were always given to understand that there That is being addressed, and you see a difference in was minimalist training. that with the police—they are getting paid directly and Sir William Patey: They may have had a day. they are better trained. They were not trained: such Mrs Moon: As for the local police, we were always was the pressure to get police on to the streets, when told that they were not having the training. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Ev 22 Defence Committee: Evidence
4 September 2012 Sir William Patey KCMG
Sir William Patey: Even the ALP now get training. constitution is a barrier to a peace settlement and when will it come to a crisis that will show its reform? Q83 Chair: Do you know how much training? Sir William Patey: The Taliban always say that they Sir William Patey: The national police get six weeks will not work with this constitution and that they want initial training. The ALP has much less. I think it is constitutional change. I think that that is a tactic rather two weeks. than a reality. There is nothing in the constitution that would really stop the Taliban from coming forward. Q84 Mr Havard: May I turn to the peace process— That is an excuse. I have spoken to ex-Taliban, as they or the peace settlement? How durable can this be? You are now known, but they are still in touch with the have just made a remark about what would happen if Taliban people, and they did not really raise the the rest of the world community does not come up constitution as an issue. It is about how much power with finances and resources to support the they think they can get. If they think they can get development of a durable, stable situation. What is power through the barrel of a gun, they’ll stick with your assessment of a peace settlement? that. Sir William Patey: I was a great tango fan in So I don’t think the constitution is a problem. It’s Afghanistan—I took tango lessons—and it was pretty there. It can be amended if you get sufficient support. difficult to do it on your own. There was a shortage The Taliban don’t need to argue for Afghanistan to be of women, so you had to do it on your own an Islamic country: it is. I mean, they are not alone; occasionally. The problem is that the Taliban, from there’s a vast majority of people who accept a my point of view, are not taking this seriously. All the conservative Islamic country. So that’s not something discussions they had with the Americans when I was the Taliban need to insist on. there were about tactical advantage—discussions over an office in Doha or releasing prisoners from Q86 Mr Havard: I ask the question because you Guantanamo, which the Americans were perfectly talked about 2015 and the parliamentary elections, happy to do in the hope that it would lead to a process. post the presidential elections, and it’s a question of The Taliban adopted a position of, “We are not dealing whether, at that point, there is a continuing with the monkey, we want to deal with the organ democratic-style process or whether that process is grinder” and they refused to deal with Karzai on the going to be the election of a Parliament to a different basis that the Americans called the shots. That is their constitutional structure—a federalism, a form of position. I noticed Michael Semple, who knows the accommodating the warlords. Is that one way of Taliban quite well, quoting a senior Taliban source breaking down an excuse or a barrier? saying that he at least had come to the conclusion that Sir William Patey: Well, they would still have to do they could not achieve their objectives by force. If it within the constitution. Unless you’re going to that becomes the accepted view of the Taliban abandon the rule of law in Afghanistan, that is the leadership, that will be progress. At the end of the constitution and that makes provision for how you day, an inclusive political settlement in Afghanistan amend it. So they would need to gather quite a lot will require the Taliban to be brought into a political of support to amend it. You would need to have a process that is acceptable to the rest of the Afghans. constitutional Loya Jirga. You would need to call it The Talibans think that it is a power-sharing and say what it was to discuss, and that would need agreement; we get this and we get that. They have to work within a constitution and be prepared to fight to be discussed. The ideal solution is one in which elections and act politically as a political party. I do there’s a political process backed by everyone— not think that they have made that calculation yet. Pakistan, the international community—and in which Quite a lot of the Taliban still think that they can wait the Taliban agree to lay down their arms and they till the end of 2014 and take on the Afghan forces, so form a political party. There may be some deal done why make the compromises that a political settlement that gives them some positions in government in the would require? run-up to an election. They’re allowed to form a President Karzai and the international community political party. You would need to talk about have done what they can to create the circumstances, amnesties. There would need to be ceasefires. All of working with Pakistan, trying to bring them in, but that is the sort of thing that you would expect to until the Taliban think they need to make the discuss in a genuine political process. That hasn’t compromises for a political process, I do not see it started. going very far. Q87 Mr Havard: The extent to which we Q85 Mr Havard: Can I just pursue that a bit? One collectively—the whole of the international of the things that has been said to us is that some of community—have been participating has provided a the older Taliban—older in Afghanistan is a relative substitute economy, effectively, in Afghanistan that term—in Pakistan and Quetta may want to give up has sort of allowed it to develop so far and not and come back. We have the reintegration and develop its own economy. Is that the incentive? Is rehabilitation process. Marc Grossman from the US is there some economic incentive for both them and their still engaged in some process like that, but then there neighbours that brings them into this process? Will is the Qatar process and President Karzai’s business. that solve the problem if it is not constitutional President Karzai, when he wants to, steps outside the matters, human rights and other things? constitution. He sets up his Loya Jirgas and plays Sir William Patey: I don’t know how we can give power games. To what extent do you think the them an economic incentive, because we need to start cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 23
4 September 2012 Sir William Patey KCMG reducing the amount of money we spend on Q91 Mr Donaldson: I used to hold the view that the Afghanistan, not— key to progress in Northern Ireland was to defeat the IRA and then negotiate. It did not work that way and, Q88 Mr Havard: So how does it become sustainable if it did not work that way in a western democracy, within itself by 2023? there is very little chance of it working that way in Sir William Patey: A political process. Well— Afghanistan. Therefore, the extent to which there is an engagement with the Taliban—whether track two or otherwise—is very important because we could Q89 Mr Havard: No, an economic process. wait a long, long time for the kind of progress at a Sir William Patey: The economic process is one security level that may never happen. where we have to keep helping the Afghans fund their Sir William Patey: You are absolutely right. I keep development for 10 years beyond, while they get on using the Northern Ireland example. There is no with developing their mineral resources, at the same military plan that has as its objective the defeat of time trying to execute a political process that would the insurgency. Our strategy is not based on defeating reduce the pressure on the security forces—they the insurgency. would not have to be so proficient if there was a political process. You have to work on all these things Q92 Mr Donaldson: No, but I fear from what you at once. But I’ve always said we must not make our said that there may be some among the Afghan strategy dependent on a political deal with the Taliban, leadership who hold to that view. because that gives them a veto. You have to have a Sir William Patey: They genuinely want a settlement. policy that says, “Here is a strategy that is not They have huge differences about what terms they dependent on the Taliban.” Obviously, the Taliban would be prepared to accept. If you talk to Afghan stopping fighting and getting engaged in the political women, Fawzia Koofi and others, they are very process makes the rest of it much easier. I’ve always worried that the terms of the settlement would be to thought we would make one of the Taliban the their detriment. If you talk to the Tajiks, they do not Minister for anti-corruption, or something, and see want to give up the amount of power they have had. how he gets on. That would be an interesting They have had more power than they would normally development. You have to pursue the political process have in Afghanistan, so they will have to compromise. at the same time as the rest of it, but must not make At the end of the day, what does a political settlement your strategy dependent on it, because if the Taliban look like? How are people’s interests engaged? choose not to— I think that the military objective is to reduce the A senior Afghan said to me that he did not think there insurgency to a level that can be handled by the would be a serious political process until the Taliban Afghans. It will create an incentive. If more Taliban had been defeated on Afghan soil by an Afghan army come to the conclusion that they cannot gain power in Kandahar. So you might say we are creating the through force, they are more likely to be in the market circumstances for that to happen—that the Taliban for the sorts of compromises that might be on offer. will be defeated at some stage in Kandahar by an Afghan army. Q93 Mr Donaldson: Coming from a side of the community in Northern Ireland that thought that Q90 Mr Havard: So their last stand was their holding all power was the way to sustain its position, penultimate stand. I understand the mindset. But sharing power can actually strengthen your position, not weaken it. A You also said in the article in March that, not only process of national reconciliation is therefore were the finances important, but the west being something. Rather than talking about the political diverted elsewhere was important. What happens to negotiations and the hard brokering of “who gets what the peace settlement if things are happening elsewhere position in government”, perhaps a reconciliation at the time, because nothing here is in a solid state or process needs to take place. binary in terms of the calculations for 2014? Sir William Patey: I agree with you. I encourage you Sir William Patey: That is the biggest risk. Our to use your experience in Northern Ireland when you attention span is limited and history tells us that when are out there to make that point to the politicians. The the troops are out, our interest levels will decline only difference in Afghanistan, if you are applying it significantly. Look at what happened when our troops to Northern Ireland, is that the Catholics have the were out of Iraq—it was somebody else’s problem. power and it is the Protestants who are trying to wrest There is a big danger that that could happen in some of it back. Afghanistan. It is understandable. The fact that 10,000 troops are on the ground and young men and women Q94 Sandra Osborne: You have answered my are dying has a degree of focus and interest that is question. You have repeated several times that it impossible to sustain. However, we should recognise would take a long time to have some sort of proper it as a danger point. We will be diverted; something political settlement. I am worried about the position else in the world will take our attention and our of those in Afghanistan who do not share a energies, but we all will remember that we should fundamentalist position. What can be done to protect continue to invest in Afghanistan. We at the British their human rights in the meantime after we go and Foreign Office and in the United States should have they are probably left in a more vulnerable position? the capacity to keep our eye on more than one ball Sir William Patey: That is why it is important to focus at once. on the constitution and the rule of law, because the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Ev 24 Defence Committee: Evidence
4 September 2012 Sir William Patey KCMG legal framework is such that women are protected As far as our troops are concerned, we are in Helmand under the constitution in terms of their rights. Any and would not be overly affected by that. We would move away from the rule of law, where tribal justice be affected by a more rapid US withdrawal or a more or ad hoc justice is applied, is bad for women. We rapid US redeployment out of Helmand to elsewhere have seen that in the remoter parts of Afghanistan. to cover for those countries. So there is a risk that the The reality is that it will pretty difficult for women in sort of transition plan that is in place for Helmand remote parts of Afghanistan. As you see in Pakistan, gets derailed by the Americans having to redeploy it has a rule of law and institutions, but you cannot more troops to backfill other countries. I hope that the always enforce that rule of law in the remote parts. ISAF coalition as a whole—the big troop That will be the reality for a lot of women in remote contributors—will stay pretty solid. The Germans and parts of Afghanistan. We are pretty powerless to do the Italians look set to stay to the course. So of the much about that, but what we can try to do is make big countries that are there in numbers, it is only the sure that women’s rights are enshrined in the French who have brought their timetable forward a bit constitution, and that there is no derogation from that, and that has been taken into account, I understand. and to use our influence. We can use our influence beyond because if we Q97 Mrs Moon: On a scale from one to 10, with continue to fund the Afghans, obviously we will make one being highly unlikely and 10 being very likely to it conditional on things like corruption, human rights happen, with the caveat that the money keeps going and how women are treated. So we will at least give in, what are the chances of Afghanistan descending the Minister of Finance, the President and all the into civil war post 2014? others an incentive to do the right thing. So I think we Sir William Patey: Five. should use our influence to the extent that we have it. Mrs Moon: That is not very positive.
Q95 Sandra Osborne: Have you done that up until Q98 Chair: Is there anything else that you think it now? Have you threatened to— would be helpful for us as a Defence Committee to Sir William Patey: Our influence is going to diminish, know? remember. We will not be there on the ground in the Sir William Patey: All I would say is that, coming out numbers we are now. So our influence will diminish. from it and sitting here back in London and not having Chair: We have a couple of questions about the future access to all the official papers and everything, you of Afghanistan but you may have answered them are driven by a perception of what is going on by the already. media. We will have some pretty difficult times ahead. There will be all sorts. There will be more green on Q96 Mrs Moon: Very quickly, I should like to hear blues. There are going to be corruption scandals. your comments on the instability of the next two There is going to be all of that, but I do not think that years. We are leading up to an announced withdrawal anything I have seen in the last year is sufficiently bad by the end of 2014 but already some other partner to derail the strategy. nations are talking about going before then and who I do think that we have the right policy in terms of may well decide to go early. What are the risks in the the timetable. We could come out earlier—you could next two years, both to the UK troops who are come out earlier and you could increase the risks. The remaining there, and to any possible stability for corollary of that might be if we stayed longer we Afghanistan post 2014? would be more likely—I do not think that is true. I Sir William Patey: It is an issue. I do not think we think there comes a point where you have outlived should be too worried about individual countries your usefulness, and I think actually coming out in an ending their combat involvement earlier. The French orderly fashion by the end of 2014 will tip the will probably be out of combat by the end of this year. balance. I think the Taliban will find it very difficult That will not have a strategic impact. There may be to sustain an insurgency against their own people others who naturally will come to the end of a combat when we remove their excuse that they are fighting a role. The transition is happening in different places at foreign invader—that will tip the balance. However different times. So there will be particular countries difficult it is, it is important to stay the course, but I who have been in a particular area where the transition would not be advocating, anyone who advocates has happened. They will not want to be redeployed staying on beyond, I do not think that is going to make anywhere else and so they will withdraw. So if it is much of a difference. part of the overall transition process—I think if there Chair: Thank you very much indeed. That was very was to be a mass exodus at an earlier stage it would interesting stuff. Most helpful, as we expected it to be, put additional pressure on us and on the Americans. I having seen you in Kabul. do not see that happening. Some of the exits were Sir William Patey: It’s a pleasure. Have a good trip. I happening anyway: I detect that some of the hope my successor has kept that nice malt whisky politicians in those countries are maximising the collection. political benefit from something that was happening Chair: He may have drunk it by now. anyway to say, “Look, we brought the troops home earlier.” There is a plan. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 25
Examination of Witness
Witness: Sir Rodric Braithwaite GCMG, former UK Ambassador to the Soviet Union and author of “Afgantsy”, gave evidence.
Q99 Chair: Sir Rodric, welcome to the Defence gave was a guarantee that they would hang together Committee. Thank you very much for agreeing to and direct their weapons in the right direction, and I come and give evidence to us. do not quite see why the army we leave behind should Your experience and your writing about the Russian be any better than that. experience of Afghanistan and your experience as British ambassador to Russia has been fascinating to Q100 Chair: Would there be any acts or omissions read about. You wrote, in December 2009 in the of the western coalition that you would point to now, Financial Times, that the situation in Afghanistan with the benefit of hindsight, as having been a mistake displayed “tactics without strategy”. What sort of or a series of mistakes? lessons should we learn from the experience of the Sir Rodric Braithwaite: This is the Irish question, Russians in Afghanistan? isn’t it? If you want to get to Dublin, you wouldn’t Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Of course, you can never start from here. replicate historical experience exactly. But if look at Mr Donaldson: Certainly not! [Laughter.] what the Russians decided they needed to achieve Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I think the mistake we made after they decided there was no point in staying, what is the mistake the Russians made and the mistake that, they decided they needed to achieve was to withdraw on the whole, the British did not make in the 19th in an orderly fashion, leaving behind a viable century: it is that you can go in there and win a Government of their own choice, with armed forces military victory, but you make a great mistake if you that could defend it. Actually, they did achieve that; do not leave immediately. The Russians could have they did withdraw in good order. I recommend an done that, but they stayed on because they wanted to article by an American colonel on the withdrawal— re-engineer Afghan society and turn it into a stable, he said the Soviet withdrawal was a model. They left, well governed—by Soviet standards—country, and of to all intents and purposes, unopposed. They had the course we wanted to do the same. If we had left after great advantage that we do not have—that they only we defeated the Taliban and al-Qaeda at the end of had to cross the river and they were back home. Both 2001, we would be no worse off than we are now in the withdrawal and the logistical problem of getting my view, and in many ways a lot better off. The same their stuff out was much simpler. They partly solved is true of the Russians: if they had left after they the problem of getting their stuff out, which you heard overthrew the Government that they chose to a lot about at your last session, by leaving it behind overthrow, they would not have got involved in nine and handing it over the Afghans. A lot of it then just years of war. disappeared, but at least they did not have to take it home. Q101 Chair: Do you believe that our action in What then happened? Well, first of all, the army they Afghanistan was important to our national security? left behind them: you can never believe any figures, Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I believe that it was or almost any figures, about Afghanistan, but inevitable after the Twin Towers—it was inevitable particularly you cannot believe figures, either then or that the Americans should go in and it was inevitable now, about what the size of the Afghan armed forces that we should support them. I have no trouble with are. But they left behind a nominal 12 divisions armed that. I do not believe—I’ve never believed—the with heavy equipment, mostly officered by Soviet- argument that by fighting in Helmand you will prevent trained officers with 10 years of experience fighting people plotting in the mountains of Pakistan to blow either independently or alongside the Russians. They, us up on the streets of London. It seems to me that on their own after the Russians had left, had several that is a series of non-sequiturs. The success that has major successes against the Mujaheddin, but what been gained against terrorism in this country, as far as then happened was that it all fell apart. It fell apart for I know—and I don’t know very much—is through two reasons: partly because the army and the regime good intelligence work, good police work and the fell apart through internal intrigue; but also because occasional use of special forces; but fighting in the Russians went bankrupt. Najibullah, their chosen Helmand seems to me to have very little to do with man, and the military were wholly dependent on that. Russian supplies for food, fuel, equipment and munitions, and at the beginning of 1992 they were cut Q102 Chair: So your suggestion would be that the off. Within a few months, the regime had collapsed, mistake was to extend the control of the western the army had split and the civil war started. coalition down into the south? One obvious lesson from that is that the Afghan Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Control is a very big word. Government will need to be supported for a long time—supported effectively, which is of course the Q103 Chair: Okay: extend the presence. problem. The other conclusion that I draw from that Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Extend the presence and the is that the army you leave behind can be as well attempted control. What has been going on—I want trained as you like—you can believe the statistics that to emphasise I am not an expert on what’s been going are put out by military spokesmen if you want to— on—but what seems to me to have been going on is but that is not the point. The point is whether the army what did go on in the Russian time. We can take the holds together and at whom does it direct its weapons? ground—we had the operation a couple of years ago I do not think that the sort of training that the Russians in Helmand, which was successful in a sense—but we cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Ev 26 Defence Committee: Evidence
4 September 2012 Sir Rodric Braithwaite GCMG can’t hold the ground, and when we leave, the bad Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I simply don’t know enough guys come back again and start chopping off heads, about present day Afghan politics. William Patey, I as they did recently. The Russians had the same am sure, would have been able to answer that experience. The Russians calculate now—at least one question. calculation—that they would have needed something It is usually true that in these sorts of situations, like 36 divisions to hold the place down and occupy nobody knows who the successor is going to be until it effectively. Of course, that was never in question. he does emerge—we are all speculating about who is going to follow Putin, for example. So first, I don’t Q104 Chair: What do you think our mission at the know the answer and, secondly, I should be surprised end of 2001—after 9/11—should have been? if anybody had a secure answer. I think it is something Sir Rodric Braithwaite: As stated: to destroy the that will come out of an Afghan political process, training camps, destroy the grip of the Taliban on the which might be quite unattractive. country, and destroy as much of al-Qaeda as we could—but of course the Taliban and al-Qaeda are Q107 Mrs Moon: Lucy Morgan Edwards has written totally different. The Taliban live there, they are going a book in which she suggests that we got it very to stay there, and they are not much interested in wrong—that, instead of allowing the loya jirga to go international terrorism, whereas al-Qaeda can operate ahead and Afghans to find their own solution, we from all sorts of places. I think that if we had stuck to backed the Northern Alliance and blocked Abdul Haq our minimal objective, we could have achieved it, but from taking over in 2002. Would you agree with that? then we would have had not much control over the Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Well, as I say, I am not an future of Afghanistan: the Afghans would have had to expert on current Afghan history and politics. I think sort it out for themselves—but that is what they are what went on in Bonn and the whole process is that going to anyway, it seems to me. we tried to manage, or the Americans tried to manage, more than we actually could manage, and what Q105 Mr Brazier: Directly following on from that, emerged was probably not what would have emerged Sir Rodric, if I remember my 19th century Afghan if the Afghans had been left to themselves. As I heard history, which is pretty sketchy, correctly, in both the William Patey saying just as I came in, you now have successful campaigns we conducted there, we sorted a situation where the Northern Alliance and the Tajiks them out and got out quickly, although faster in one carry, in the eyes of many Pushtuns, far too much case than the other, but in both cases we left behind weight, far more than they have had historically, and somebody we could live with in charge. The that’s an imbalance that they will be determined to complication in the answer you have just given— change, I think. So I think I agree with what I think although I entirely agree with your analysis—is that is your premise, which is that we did try and impose simply to have retreated without doing anything at all a kind of politics on the situation after 2001 which, in about who is in charge would surely simply have the long run, was not going to work. invited the same thing to start all over again. Sir Rodric Braithwaite: What happened in the 19th Q108 Bob Stewart: Sir Rodric, what you have said century was that the guy who took charge once we up till now implies that from 2003, we had a pretty left was the guy that we went in to overthrow—the disastrous experience militarily. Have we, by our same guy. The guy who took over after the second war, Abdur Rahman, who was an ideal Afghan leader military interventions since 2003, achieved anything in many ways, had been living under Russian worthy of note, or is it a total disaster? protection until we pulled out. We were smart to Sir Rodric Braithwaite: That is a hard question to recognise that this was a guy we could work with, and answer satisfactorily. If you are asking “Was it worth we did work with him for the next 20 years. But we it?” I have to say I am not sure that it was worth it, did not impose him, and we did not impose in terms of lives lost on both sides and money spent— Mohammed Dost after the first war: both of them, as but we are talking about counter-factual history: what it were, emerged from the Afghan process. The guy would have happened if we hadn’t done it? We don’t that we did impose in 1839, Shah Shujah, ended up know. I think that, as the Russians discovered, we are hanged on his own doorstep. As you know, a lot of discovering that the approach whereby you go into a Afghans call Karzai Shah Shujah. place like Afghanistan in the belief that you can re- The Russians did manage. Najibullah was the man engineer the way the politics and society work is they left behind. He was their chosen man and he mistaken. I do not think one can. To that extent, came to a bad end, as you know, but Afghans today putting all those people in there could not achieve are circulating DVDs of his speeches and saying that what is now abandoned but was then our stated if he had stayed alive none of this would have objective. What they now call the strategy is, of happened. I think that’s a myth, but it is a striking course, an absolutely minimalist thing. sentiment. Q109 Bob Stewart: Again, what you suggest is that Q106 Mr Brazier: Moving from where it went we went in the first time—well, we supported in wrong immediately after the invasion to where we are 2001—we achieved a change of regime and we should now, can you see anybody emerging who would have not have touched it again. By implication, if we had the support base, not to run a modern liberal our time again and you were Methuselah and in democracy, but to provide a little bit of prosperity and charge, you would have said, “Let’s not go back in in security of the sort that could be workable? 2003; it was a mistake.” cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 27
4 September 2012 Sir Rodric Braithwaite GCMG
Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Methuselah is right, but “in short term—is so sophisticated and difficult that any charge” is wrong. I think there is an alternative intervention you make will hit only part of it, and it version that if we had not been distracted by Iraq and takes a while to understand that sort of ecosystem? concentrated on Afghanistan, we would have had the Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I wonder whether it is ever resources to achieve something. That is an arguable possible to understand it sufficiently to intervene point of view, but I suspect that it is not the case, effectively. Politics—everybody’s, including ours— because the basics were wrong anyway. are very, very complicated for outsiders to understand. We don’t speak the language of most of them, we Q110 Chair: You suspect that it is not the case? don’t know the history or the people. How are we Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I suspect that it is not the going to intervene effectively to manipulate politics of case, because I think the fundamental problem would that degree of complexity? I think that is something have been the same even if we had thrown all those that is not only true in Afghanistan; it’s true of lots of resources at it in 2003. You mentioned a book but places. So, again, I am afraid it’s the Dublin question. there is another, perhaps the best book on the subject, We shouldn’t have started from there. by a Norwegian woman called Astri Suhrke, who has been in and out of Afghanistan for 20 years. The book Q113 Ms Stuart: If I remember rightly, I think you is called “When More Is Less”, and it is really about say in your book that there wasn’t any corruption that: could we, with more resources, more aid and under the Russians because there was no money to be more military effort, have achieved more than we corrupt with. have? If it had not been for Iraq, could we have Sir Rodric Braithwaite: If I said that, I was achieved more? Her answer is no. I think that it is a exaggerating. very well argued and sober book. As I said, it is probably the most sensible dissection of the problem Q114 Ms Stuart: But in a sense, the point that you I have yet read. make is that, because you have chucked so much money at it, it’s no good harking back to a time when Q111 John Glen: Can I ask you about corruption and there wasn’t corruption. what interventions have been made? I am not sure Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I would not say that there whether you were here when Sir William took us was no corruption, because there was certainly through some of the work done with respect to corruption, but it wasn’t megabucks because there securing the system for collecting money, so that weren’t megabucks. However, there was corruption all revenues would get to the right place, but do you right. The Russians are fairly corrupt themselves. think, in terms of the work done on dealing with Their soldiers sold stuff and all sorts of things went corruption, that we intervened early enough and hit on at all levels of the Russian army, but the Russians the right things? Given all the constraints and made some attempt to limit corruption in various ways reasonable expectations of where the starting point is, and they mostly failed. how do you see that? Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Again, because I am not an expert, I have to answer it rather a priori, if you don’t Q115 John Glen: Respecting your lack of immediate mind. As a general proposition, if you throw billions knowledge on the narcotics side, we had quite a of dollars into a small, poor and badly traumatised depressing picture of where we have ultimately got to country, a lot of it is going to end up in the wrong with the counter-narcotics strategy. Do you have any place. It is not only Afghans who are corrupt; it is a insights into how we tackle narcotics and whether we lot of other people, and a lot of that money has not have made any meaningful progress? ended up in Afghan pockets. I think that we are a bit Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I don’t think that I have any too ready to blame Karzai and his people for things insights that are worthwhile. The Russians were which are at least partly our fault, even if we did not concerned about narcotics and they took some action intend them. That is the first thing. against the problem, but it was not particularly The second thing is perhaps more debatable and less effective. They had a very strong interest, because politically correct. If you go back to Abdur Rahman, even then—in the ‘70s—drugs were passing from he ran Afghanistan very effectively by a combination Afghanistan and central Asia into Russia and of nepotism, putting his relatives in the places that exacerbating the problem there. I don’t really have a matter; cronyism, putting his chums in the places that position on the present situation, except to say that matter; ruthlessly dealing with anybody who didn’t one of the solutions being suggested—buying up the measure up; and bribing a lot of other people. If you poppy crop and turning it into medicinal drugs— like to call that corruption, it was part of the system, seems to depend on the proposition that we can and we encouraged it with what we called subsidies. always outbid the villains in the price we pay to the Karzai has never been given the chance, actually. I farmers, and I would have thought that is not so. The mean, every time he gets up and protests about villains are always going to be able to outbid us. something or other—you know, every time a wedding party is killed—we slap him down and tell him he is Q116 Mrs Moon: You talked about how the Russians ungrateful. How is he to run the country in that way? built up an equivalent of the Afghan national security forces, and we have done the same. Why will the Q112 John Glen: Is it just that the starting point— present creation of the Afghan national security forces the level of complexity and sophistication to the be more successful and more enduring than the arrangements of governance that are needed in the Russian forces, other than the fact that hopefully we cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Ev 28 Defence Committee: Evidence
4 September 2012 Sir Rodric Braithwaite GCMG will not go into financial meltdown in the same way some element of a kind of ability to communicate that the Russians did? across the culture that we do not have. Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I was not trying to imply that Another thing was that the Soviet army had a lot of they would be more successful. soldiers in it who spoke the local languages, because they came from the same ethnic backgrounds—say, Q117 Mrs Moon: You weren’t? Uzbeks, Tajiks and so on. So you would get a Soviet Sir Rodric Braithwaite: No. The other point is that armoured vehicle going into a village, with one of the the most corrosive thing going on at the moment is guys in it being able to speak to the locals. I do not green on blue incidents. There were almost none in want to exaggerate that, because they had a problem the Russian period. There were some, and of course with interpreters, too. On the other hand, before the again you can never be quite sure that the figures are war started, they had massively trained people in the right, but they would be measured in dozens—if Afghan languages. A lot of guys in their last year of that—over nine or 10 years. university were simply mobilised and sent down to Another advantage that the Russians had, of course, Afghanistan because they could speak the languages. was that they were building up: the Afghans had an So they had various ways of getting across. army when the Russians went in. Abdur Rahman Of course, dreadful atrocities were committed as well, started building them an army, so they had a proper by both sides, and I do not want in any way to army, which was well equipped and on the whole—at underplay the brutality of that. It was a very brutal war, but it had this other element in it as well. least the officer corps—well trained. They were not trying to build an army in the middle of an insurgency—in the middle of a civil war. They were Q120 Sir Bob Russell: Sir Rodric, as I understand it, building it before and by the time that they got there despite leaving Afghanistan with a strong Government the civil war had started, but there was still a and army, the Soviets still had to conduct a seriously recognisable, reasonably coherent and competent— difficult fighting withdrawal. Are we likely to have to do the same? when the wind was in the right direction—Afghan Sir Rodric Braithwaite: The answer is they did not armed force. The Russians had people attached to it have to conduct a serious fighting withdrawal. There at all levels, down to battalion level, and they got was sniping—they went on losing people at a rate that killed but they got killed by enemy action, not by the we would find unacceptable—but the withdrawal was people they were fighting alongside. not opposed. Q118 Mrs Moon: So why are we having more green Q121 Sir Bob Russell: So it was not a fighting on blue attacks? What have we done wrong and what withdrawal? could we have done differently? Sir Rodric Braithwaite: No. Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Again, you are asking me rather more than I know, so I am speculating. I think Q122 Sir Bob Russell: Would you anticipate that it is a measure of the extent to which we have made there would be a fighting withdrawal this time? ourselves unpopular. When the military spokesmen Sir Rodric Braithwaite: To start with, perhaps it is say, “Well, it’s not as bad as you think it is, because worth trying to understand why the last one was not a these attacks are mostly not Taliban-driven,” that fighting withdrawal. It was very well planned from a seems to me the opposite of reassuring. It means that military and logistical point of view by the Soviet ordinary Afghans in the armed forces are getting sick army. As I say, they did not try to take all their kit of us. Maybe they have been corrupted by the Taliban, with them, so they did not have that logistical but who knows. The main thing is that quite ordinary problem, which Bob Fox told you about. Throughout Afghans are doing these things, and the effect it has the war, they were negotiating at all levels with the on our soldiers who are having to mentor them is, of other side. Local commanders, lieutenants would course, very damaging. You now have this system that ensure that they had some way of communicating with the Americans have introduced—what they call the local— “guardian angels”—which is that each group being mentored is overlooked by an American with his Q123 Chair: Can I ask you to do your best to speak finger on the trigger. into the microphone, please, because we are having a bit of difficulty hearing you? Q119 Mrs Moon: What did the Russians do Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Sorry; my voice is not differently? What was positive about what they did working very well. that we have not done? Any ideas? They did negotiate and come to agreements with one Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I have asked Russians and another at very local levels right up to the top. There Afghans—I emphasise that it is a small statistical were negotiations between the Mujaheddin leadership sample; it is not a Gallup poll—how they got on with and the Soviet generals at various points. During the one another, and the answer was that they could withdrawal, they had done their best, as it were, to recognise themselves in the other. One Russian soldier talk their way through the barriers. That broke down, I spoke to, who was a peasant from a poor part of and these kinds of agreements, ceasefires and so forth Russia, could recognise the Afghan peasant living the were always breaking down for various reasons, but same sort of live as he did: eating badly, badly dressed then, for one reason or another, they would get and so on, so there was some element of that. A lot resumed. That was the reason why there was not a of very, very bad things happened, but there was also fighting withdrawal. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 29
4 September 2012 Sir Rodric Braithwaite GCMG
The only major fighting that took place was in Q127 Mr Havard: They could probably teach them January, less than a month—three weeks—before the a few lessons about corrupt government as well, while final withdrawal, and that was initiated by the Soviet they were at it, couldn’t they? Now, now; I’d better side. It came about because Najibullah wanted the get on with this. I want to ask about the peace Russians to deal with Massoud, the Tajik commander settlement, if there is to be a peace settlement, and its who was based in the Panjshir valley, which is a durability, if it can be made durable. What do you see strategic threat to the Salang route, the main route as the obstacles currently facing everyone in trying to between Russia, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan— achieve this peace settlement by 2014? Kabul. He asked his friends in Moscow to instruct the Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I find the idea of achieving a Soviet generals in Afghanistan to deal with Massoud. peace settlement that one would recognise as such in The generals objected strongly to that. They said it the history of diplomacy rather incredible. A peace was pointless and they were right. They had not settlement— managed to deal with him in nine years; why should they be able to deal with him in a matter of weeks? Q128 Mr Havard: There was a very nice description They were overruled and they conducted a two-day at Chicago of what it is supposed to contain. bombardment of Massoud’s positions, which resulted Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Chicago? in quite a lot of Massoud’s people being killed, Mr Havard: The Chicago conference of NATO. although, as usual, nobody knows how many, and not There was a very nice description of what it is very many Russians. After that, there was no serious supposed to contain. fighting on the withdrawal route and, indeed, there Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Yes, I know. It is very—I am was no serious fighting on the ground. There was a trying to think of the right adjective; I was going to continual drip, drip of casualties from sniper fire and say “colourful”. things like that. Q129 Mr Havard: It is certainly ambitious. Q124 Sir Bob Russell: With that historical Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Yes, ambitious. We have, for perspective, are NATO forces in a better position to obvious reasons, not much negotiating power, I withdraw than the Soviet forces were? wouldn’t have thought. We have, therefore, very little Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I don’t see why they should leverage to impose our view of the right outcome. I be. There is no absolute reason why they shouldn’t think it goes back to what the Afghans decide they be. What happened in the Soviet time was that the want. That depends on how Karzai is going to talk to Mujaheddin were holding their fire because the the Taliban, and how the Pushtuns are going to talk to Russians were leaving and they wanted to position the Tajiks, and a whole lot of things over which our themselves for the fighting that would take place after influence is rapidly decreasing, it seems to me. So a the Russians had gone—namely, the civil war. There settlement that you could recognise as such by 2014 wasn’t much point in their fighting the Russians once seems to me beyond my imagination, anyway. I the Russians were going. I would have thought that assume that we will leave. I assume that we will say something similar would apply today. On the other that our strategy has been successful, therefore. I hand, of course, all the routes that we withdraw assume that after that we will, I hope, go on through are complicated in various ways. I am supporting the Kabul Government in an effective way; thinking of the Khyber pass and so on. As I said but our record—I mean not only in Afghanistan, and earlier, the Russians got in their vehicles, drove north, not only this country—of sustaining support after the across the river, and they were back home. crisis seems to be over and we have come home is not very good: the first thing. Q125 Sir Bob Russell: My final question, Sir Rodric, The second thing is that making sure that the kind of is this. If you were asked to write a report to the assistance that we give actually achieves a real Secretary of State for Defence, what lessons would objective on the ground is going to be complicated. I you tell him that the UK armed forces and NATO think we have to do what we have to do, which should learn from the Soviet withdrawal when includes continuing to support the armed forces, planning our withdrawal? continuing to support the economy—and the Afghan Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Bits and pieces of the MoD economy has never balanced its books since near the keep on asking me that question. [Laughter.] Beyond beginning of the last century; and after 1945 it was what I have said, I am not sure that there are all that largely aid-dependant the whole time. I suppose that many lessons. The situation is different. One of the will not change. So there are some things that we can advantages that the Russians have always had in do, but they are not very dramatic ones. managing their logistical affairs, which they are very good at managing, is that they do not have to worry Q130 Mr Havard: You talked earlier about them too much about the welfare of their soldiers. The having an army: Afghan national forces—a soldiers get cold and hungry, and some of them die, nationalised force, as it were; but where it might train but they get moved around very efficiently. We can’t its guns was an interesting question in this period. do that. What are the incentives for the neighbours? What are the incentives for the Taliban who are in Pakistan? Q126 Sir Bob Russell: So that is one lesson that we What is the incentive for Pakistan and the other will not follow. neighbours geographically—Iran, China—to Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Absolutely. contribute in terms of some sort of consistent cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Ev 30 Defence Committee: Evidence
4 September 2012 Sir Rodric Braithwaite GCMG accommodation, if not the ambitious peace settlement not know of any particular evidence that shows that described at Chicago? what they are going to do will be wholly constructive. Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Well, all the neighbours, of course, have their own interests, and much more Q133 Mr Brazier: Picking up on that, the punchline durable interests than ours, in Afghanistan. The of your original article in The Telegraph, which many trouble is that the interests very often conflict with of us read with interest, was that none of this is one another, India and Pakistan being the obvious one. contributing very much to tackling the problem of If the Indians and Pakistan behaved differently and fanatics from the Afghan-Pakistani border blowing were prepared to agree with one another on how they people up on British streets. Obviously, the position should treat Afghanistan, a lot would change; but that of Pakistan, next door, is pretty insecure, and it is a does not seem very likely. nuclear power. More specifically, the problem along Of course, Iran is another one which has a strong, that border, as you pointed out, still exists. Most of legitimate and on the whole quite often constructive the players in that area have a strong interest in interest in Afghanistan; but they tend to be excluded security. We share an interest with the Russians and by American desires or obsessions. I think the the Chinese, although we do not always see a way Russians have an interest, and they are still very well there. I am not suggesting producing liberal connected in Afghanistan. They know lots of people. democracies, but in trying to resolve the fact that I think they are mainly Northern Alliance people, but along that border, mostly on the Pakistani side, there they can make an input; and of course the immediate is a very dangerous mixture of people who may pull neighbours also have an interest. down the Pakistani Government, what wider things A fascinating thing, which I don’t know enough about, should we be trying to contribute in terms of is that China seems to be the only country that is influencing policy there to try to bring stability to the taking a long-term optimistic view of Afghanistan, the region? way it is piling in and buying up the mines, and so Sir Rodric Braithwaite: First, you talked about on. What they know that I don’t know—of course, I terrorism. I made the point that the Afghan Taliban don’t know; but I think one of the questions is how are not international terrorists. The people who are they are going to keep their people in those mines international terrorists are Pakistani Pushtuns with the secure, and how they are going to get the stuff out. odd Afghan Pushtun thrown in. That is why the war in Afghanistan is irrelevant to that issue, except in so Q131 Mr Havard: That was very Rumsfeldian, far as it makes it worse because it radicalises Muslim almost; but you mentioned Russia’s role. Do you think opinion all over the place. That goes back to what I Russia has a particular contribution it could make, was saying that from our point of view, the most here, in this transition period? effective thing that we can do, and I think that we are Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I do not think it is a doing—I have to say that I only read the particularly strong one, but I think it is better to have newspapers—is to collaborate with the Pakistan them on the same side as us, because they do know intelligence authorities so that we have the best about the place, and they can influence some of the players, and it would be silly not to take advantage of possible stream of intelligence coming out of the that, I think. Pakistani places where British terrorism is partially Mr Havard: What do you think is going to happen if generated and then following it up at home. we do not have this peace settlement, as described, by The border, which everyone blames Mr Durand for, is 2014, and combat troops come out in an orderly the line we drew through the Pushtun tribal territories fashion? What is your prognosis? at the end of the 19th century, and it is part of the Sir Rodric Braithwaite: Well, I think the question was problem. In so far as the Afghans have an interest in asked earlier. Civil war is an obvious possible that area, their belief is that it should all belong to outcome. The last civil war was horrific. A lot of them, including the Pakistani side. They believe that people, including some Afghan women and the sister it is all Pushtun and should all be theirs, which the of an Afghan that I met when I was in Kabul, Pakistanis will never accept. Afghanistan was the only welcomed the arrival of the Taliban, knowing what country that did not recognise Pakistan independence the Taliban were like; because it could not be worse in 1947 because that dispute had been going on for 70 than what was going on at the moment. So it is not at years already. In terms of dealing with the problem, all an attractive prospect. I still think that whether or you suggested that somehow we might successfully not it turns out to be as bad as that, it is something engage the other locals in a way that would do that. I that the Afghans will have to sort out for themselves. have to be very sceptical about that. I do not see why The very few Afghans I have talked to recently have the locals should take much notice of us, and that said that that is their strong view. There are two or includes the Pakistanis, the Indians, the Afghan three officers who have been training here, rather Pushtuns, the Pakistani Pushtuns and everybody in the impressive people, and their view is that when we area. They will not take much notice of what we think. leave, they will then be able to start sorting things out. Q134 Sir Bob Russell: Sir Rodric, I hope I Q132 Mr Havard: Do you see the neighbours, the misunderstood something you said earlier; are you Russians and so on as being agnostic in that? saying that it is your anticipation that after the Sir Rodric Braithwaite: They will all be tempted, withdrawal of combat troops, Afghanistan will won’t they, to fiddle around in the chaos, but I think descend into civil war, if not immediately, then within that the Pakistanis and the Indians are the key. I do a few years? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o002_th_120904 Corrected HC 413-ii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 31
4 September 2012 Sir Rodric Braithwaite GCMG
Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I suppose the short answer is argument is, “If you weren’t here, the Taliban would yes, but nothing is certain in the future. Civil wars not be killing us.” Who knows? It is an argument that end when both sides get weary of them, and it may at least it is in the family with the Taliban. be that after 30 years of war, people are weary enough to think, “Surely we must try and find another way.” Q137 Ms Stuart: Just a thought, because we keep It may be, as some people like to argue, that the thinking about India and Pakistan, which is quite Taliban have learnt their lesson in the past 10 years or right, let’s look at the other side of the border. Given so. It may be that the split between the Tajiks and the that there is a clear Ottomanisation of Turkey’s Pushtuns can be managed—it used to be managed and foreign policy and you see Turkish investment in maybe it can be managed again. I think it would be northern Afghanistan, is there more that we could do silly to make an absolute prediction of any kind. I via Turkey as a player? think that there is such a risk however. Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I do not know much—really anything—about the Turkish involvement, but it does Q135 Sir Bob Russell: So it is a risk? make me think. I mentioned the Chinese. If the Turks Sir Rodric Braithwaite: It is a risk. Not a very low are doing it and the Chinese are doing it, somebody risk, but as I say, nothing is certain on the one hand, is doing something positive that is perhaps going with and on the other hand, I do not quite see what we can the grain, whereas I think that what we have been do about it. doing has been going against the grain. They are doing it in the north. I do not know that the Chinese Q136 Sir Bob Russell: My next question was, in are trying to develop very much in Helmand yet— order to assist the weariness towards them not having a civil war, what can we do to assist in that not Q138 Ms Stuart: Essentially, they are after rare happening? earth, aren’t they? Sir Rodric Braithwaite: I do think that getting out is Sir Rodric Braithwaite: That seems to me positive. If quite a—there will be less of a reason to kill people. the Turks are willing to do it and the Chinese are One of our arguments is that when there is an incident wiling to do it, perhaps we should simply let them get of civilians being killed by NATO troops, we say, on with it and let them be driven by ambition and “Well, the numbers are going down and in any case greed of a rather positive kind. the Taliban kill more civilians than we do,” but Chair: Sir Rodric, thank you very much indeed. That Afghans do not like their families being killed has been another very helpful evidence session of whether it is done by NATO or the Taliban. If it is by great interest. NATO, they blame NATO. On the other hand, another cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SE] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Ev 32 Defence Committee: Evidence
Tuesday 30 October 2012
Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)
Mr Julian Brazier Sir Bob Russell Mr Dai Havard Bob Stewart Sandra Osborne Ms Gisela Stuart ______
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Lieutenant General David Capewell, Commander Joint Forces, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, returning Commander Task Force Helmand, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG, UK Permanent Representative to NATO and Brigadier James Stevenson, NATO Afghan National Training.
Chair: I welcome all of you to our evidence session remain broadly similar to 2011.” Of course, we saw on Afghanistan, which we are using today to look at in September the destruction of Harrier jets. Why do the current state of operations there, how well the you say that violence levels are beginning to go Afghan national security forces are doing, and how we down? will plan for withdrawal from Afghanistan. I would Lt-Gen Capewell: You are right to say that the levels welcome evidence as full as you are able to give at of attack are broadly the same. We are beginning to the current state of planning, but we recognise that see a 1% or 2% decline in the activity levels from the some of that planning may not yet be mature. Would insurgents. This is a judgment about Helmand rather you like to introduce yourselves, and would you like than a judgment about the rest of Afghanistan where to begin, Dame Mariot? there is more improvement. Dame Mariot Leslie: I am Mariot Leslie, and I am the UK Permanent Representative to NATO. Q141 Chair: Yes, I did ask about Helmand. You are Lt-Gen Capewell: I am David Capewell, the Chief of right. Brigadier Chalmers. Joint Operations. I work out of the Northwood Brigadier Chalmers: In the three central districts, the headquarters. city of Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and a number of market Brigadier Chalmers: I am Doug Chalmers, towns, you are right that the level of violence has only Commander, 12th Mechanized Brigade. I commanded dipped very slightly. What has changed is where that Task Force Helmand between April and October this violence is taking place. There has been a significant year. change over time. The violence has been displaced out Brigadier Stevenson: I am James Stevenson. I am of the market town areas and the deeply farmed areas, currently a member at the Royal College of Defence more into the dasht or the desert areas outwith those Studies. I came out of Afghanistan about two and a areas. That has allowed Afghan local and economic half months ago, having been Deputy Commander confidence to grow over the summer, and that is now Army within the NATO training mission in being secured by Afghan security forces. Afghanistan. Q142 Chair: So the violence hasn’t gone down, it Q139 Chair: Thank you very much indeed. has just moved position. Why is it better that it should Let us begin with a general question. How are things be out in the more desert areas? going in Helmand in terms of the level of violence? Brigadier Chalmers: It is away from the larger bulk Give us a rundown of how things are going and of the population. We have mapped the heat—the whether you think that it will get better, stay the same level of incidents over the last couple of years—and or get worse. Who would like to begin? the area that houses about 70% of the population is Lt-Gen Capewell: I will start and then I should give three central districts covering those cities and market the recent Task Force Commander the floor. My towns. The violence is away from those areas, so the judgment is that progress is being delivered. We are bulk of the population in those centres is now able to increasingly seeing an Afghan security apparatus that get on with the business of life and enjoy some form is becoming more confident and vibrant. The levels of of economic move forward. violence are beginning to go down. We are also seeing much more ownership by the Afghan National Q143 Chair: How much of Helmand is still under Security forces across the whole of Helmand. That is Taliban control? true also across the rest of Afghanistan. We are seeing Brigadier Chalmers: If you looked at a map, and much more independent thought by the Afghans, both looked at a geographical space, you could colour in in political terms in the provinces and by the security parts of the outlying areas. If you look at the apparatus. To get a better sense of what it feels like population centres, you will find that the bulk of the on the ground, Doug should speak. population now is under Government control.
Q140 Chair: Before I come to Brigadier Chalmers, Q144 Mr Havard: The memorandum that we have you say that the levels of violence are beginning to go reflects what you have just said, but it expresses it by down, Lt General Capewell. But the Ministry of saying that they are not able to concentrate attacks; it Defence memorandum says, “violence levels in 2012 is more dispersed. It is as you describe, but it is so cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 33
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson partly because the ANSF operational design is to do fallen if you have moved the trouble out of the civilian this, and they are effectively driving the process that areas. Has the number of casualties being caused by creates what you describe. It is their priority to deploy ISAF fallen? their forces in order to achieve the effect you just Lt-Gen Capewell: I think it is generally correct. Now described. Is that right, or is it because of and again, there are mishaps with civilian casualties circumstance? Is it because it is the only thing they across the whole of Afghanistan, and it is something can do? And what happens when the lights go out? that we deeply regret. I know that both ISAF and What happens at night? Afghan forces deeply regret that. I just want to Brigadier Chalmers: On the displacement, I think that reassure the Committee that the actions that we take is exactly right. Throughout my tour—this is different to ensure that this is minimised are: that our activity from my previous tours there—I very much worked is consistent with the law of armed conflict; that we in support of Afghan intent and Afghan priorities. have very clearly displayed rules of engagement and They have prioritised the larger populated areas and targeting directives that really limit how this is done; those market towns, and that is where they are and that this is taken very seriously at the highest concentrating their efforts to make sure that those levels in both ISAF and nationally. There is also the gains can be sustained. Afghan interest in this, because of course they are part At night, in the more densely populated areas, the pickets—if we can call them such—of particularly the of the mix. It is not just ISAF; the security effort now Afghan police around the market towns remain very is a very clear combined—and increasingly much in place. One of the things that has changed Afghan—operation. over the years I have been there is that when you do fly at night, the level of electricity and the sense of Q147 Mr Brazier: May I ask you an historical growth that you get is quite stark. question about this? I should say that I was one of the Lt-Gen Capewell: I look in the eyes of most of the MPs who frequently questioned on the Floor of the Afghan leadership in Helmand, and I have done so for House whether the rules of engagement in Northern a number of years now. We are really now beginning Ireland were too tight. It seemed to me that they were to see a sense of ownership by that leadership—army unreasonably tight. Do you think that our poor leadership in particular—in the sense that they relationship in the early years with the civilian understand how they want the security apparatus to population may have been because they were too settle, and they know and can visualise what they see loose—using attack helicopters and so on in civilian as an enduring footprint. That is their own design, areas? Do you not think the fact that we killed very which is, in my view, a very clear indication that they large numbers of civilians in our early involvement, understand what they want to get out of their own when we had the platoon houses strategy and so on, security institutions. They understand how they want may have been part of the reason why so much of the to police it and secure it, and they have a very clear population was against us in the beginning? It was understanding about where the edges of this footprint a very different approach from the traditional British are. approach in other theatres. Doug’s point about pushing the violence out to the Lt-Gen Capewell: I can only answer that with the edges is absolutely clear in their minds. They keep it answer I have just given. The rules of engagement in away from the population and deal with the those days were no different, in broad terms, from insurgency at the edges. I do not think that we can, at what they are now. I do not know which incident you the moment, ask any more of them than that in terms are referring to, so I cannot make a specific judgment of their design for operations—to use a military about it. If you wanted a specific judgment about a phrase—over the years. specific incident, we would obviously give you written advice on that. Do I think it is the sole reason Q145 Chair: What about Camp Bastion? The attack why there was a difficulty to start with? No. There is on Camp Bastion in September—was that a worrying a complex tapestry of a number of reasons that phenomenon, or was it difficult to deal with or resulted in the conditions at the time. unexpected? How would you describe it? Dame Mariot Leslie: May I add to that? There are Lt-Gen Capewell: I would describe it as a tactical setback. I do not know how recently you have been some recent statistics on that. UNAMA—the UN to Bastion, but it is a camp with a 40 km radius. It is mission there—tracks this very closely, and the North now absolutely secure in terms of the redoubled Atlantic Council always takes an interest when we see efforts that have been put into trying to get to grips the commander of ISAF forces, General Allen, in a with where the gaps are. I am sure in my own mind video meeting once a month. I think the latest reports that although the enemy got lucky on this occasion, it suggest that 80% of the civilian casualties are now is no more than that. This is not a strategic threat in being caused by the insurgents, that only something any sense. like 10% can be attributed to the ISAF plus ANSF forces—our effort—and that a further 10% are hard to Q146 Mr Brazier: If I may, I would like to shift the account for. discussion to civilian casualties. Clearly, as you are Mr Brazier: Do not misunderstand me. There is no describing, if you are moving the trouble away from question but that we are doing extraordinarily well on the populated areas, that is progress. Presumably, the it at the moment. My question related to 2006 and level of civilian casualties caused by ISAF must have 2007. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Ev 34 Defence Committee: Evidence
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson
Q148 Chair: Maybe that was for our previous on. As I understand it, if there is an IED incident there inquiry on Afghanistan. may well be investigations of another sort, to see if Dame Mariot, the fact that ISAF has not caused those there are forensics and if you can do something about civilian casualties does not stop ISAF being blamed apprehending people, prosecuting them and so on. for civilian casualties caused by the Taliban, does it? Presumably the investigations that you describe form They still get blamed by the local population. part of a broader investigation and discussion with the Dame Mariot Leslie: They get blamed for a level of community about the context in which the incident violence sometimes, yes. happened. Is that right? If it isn’t, please explain what Brigadier Chalmers: There are two things I have seen is right. Who is involved in that process—the a change in, having served there in previous times. As Afghans, the Afghan police, civil society? Give us an soon as there is any indication of civilian casualties, insight into how one of those investigations would we very quickly launch a joint investigation with our look. Afghan peers and partners. Locally, it is particularly Lt-Gen Capewell: Let me start and then Doug can the IED that causes a lot of the civilian casualties, and give an on-the-ground sense of this. Whenever there the local population are actually pretty clear who has is an incident that involves civilian casualties there is caused that. Although we might be indicated in an investigation. It is jointly led with Afghans and is creating the overall environment, the actual act that has caused the civilian casualties is pretty quickly taken extremely seriously, to get to the truth. Of attributed directly to the insurgents themselves. course, on some occasions it is difficult to do that Lt-Gen Capewell: A final remark from me on this because of the nature of the incident, but this is jointly issue is that protecting the civilian population is an delivered and it is recorded as such. absolute principle of this operation. Without that Brigadier Chalmers: The joint investigation team protection, this operation, in my view, would not be would be led by an officer who comes from RC viable. I think that is the view of all my counterparts Southwest, with his partner, an Afghan element from and Afghans as well. At the heart of this is— the provincial government side of it; calling in members of the Afghan security forces as required, Q149 Bob Stewart: General and Dame Mariot, I will and members of the district government as well. It start with you. The NAC decides the rules of goes on over a period of time. There would be an engagement. initial visit by that team to get to know the elements, Chair: The NAC? they would also visit other areas in order to collect Bob Stewart: The North Atlantic Council. other pieces of evidence, to make their understanding Does the North Atlantic Council direct that in those whole. If necessary, they would then go back to the rules of engagement, if there is the possibility of a community if the investigation took them in that civilian casualty, the engagement should not take direction. place, or is that a judgment call given down to the Lt-Gen Capewell: And of course these things aren’t commander at the level at which it is required to be straightforward. There are always allegations and made? In other words, if there is a possibility of a counter-allegations. On many occasions we have civilian being hurt by, say, a drone strike, it does not found civilian casualties as a result of insurgent go ahead, or is it a judgment call made at a lower activity. As Mariot pointed out, that is an increasing level? factor. So it is difficult to judge to start with, but we Chair: You will not wish to give details of the rules are sure that the way to deliver the most clear of engagement. exposition of what has happened is to do it together, Dame Mariot Leslie: Indeed, I will not. What I can with Afghans, under agreed protocols and principles. say is that, no, the NAC has not given that sort of political guidance. The political guidance the NAC Q152 Chair: Does the length of time it takes rather has always given is that the law of armed conflict disconcert the local population who might be needs to apply here as it would anywhere else, so any expecting more rapid justice? operation needs to be proportionate, and it needs to be necessary. Brigadier Chalmers: The key is to get the investigation team there quickly. That we have enabled every time. So long as the outcome is seen to Q150 Bob Stewart: The Geneva conventions in that case direct that you should not actually engage a be fair and they are seen to be heard, that is what population where there is a possibility of civilian matters most importantly to them. casualties. That is what the Geneva conventions say. The law of armed conflict says that, so I make the Q153 Mr Havard: What compensatory or restitution assumption that it is within our rules of engagement. arrangements are there? We hear stories about how What do you say, Brigadier? other forces behave in other parts of Afghanistan. Brigadier Chalmers: There are layers on it, but any What do the Brits do? chance of civilian or collateral damage—to use that Brigadier Chalmers: We are very much in line. There word—is ruled out very quickly. That does alter the is a series of measures out there once the evidence is judgment call. lined up and we go through that with our regional command as well. I do not think there is any Q151 Mr Havard: You talked about investigations separation between us and our American colleagues taking place when there are civilian casualties and so in that regard. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 35
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson
Q154 Mr Havard: So you pay compensation to over time and that process comes to conclusion at the certain people if certain damage has been done? end of 2013, but I caveat that this is conditions-based. Brigadier Chalmers: If that is where the You have to make these judgments on the ground as investigation goes. a task force commander. Chair: We have been talking until now about general Dame Mariot Leslie: On the way the strategy is matters. We are now getting on to training and working, this transition process leading to the end of everything about the Afghan National Security Forces. 2014 was first announced at the NATO Lisbon summit, and we took stock of it again at the Chicago Q155 Ms Stuart: I particularly want to look at the summit this May. It envisaged what were originally transition period for a moment. Can you tell us going to be, I think, six tranches of transition; we have generally about what has happened to areas where the now agreed it should be five. We are in the middle of ANSF has already taken over, and with a view as to tranche 3. I am sorry—it was going to be five, it is how you see the transition to full takeover? Within now going to be four. What will happen when the final that, I was struck by your phrases about the confident, tranche comes in, in the middle of 2013, is that that vibrant look in the eye. It could just be that they know will be the point at which the ANSF have the lead for when we are going. security in every geographical bit of the country, but Lt-Gen Capewell: Of course, they do know that we it does not mean that transition will be complete; it are going. That has been clearly defined by a timeline means that, geographically, they will have that lead at the end of 2014. That in itself in many ways is a responsibility, but they will still be moving district by forcing agent behind the Afghans as much as it is district geographically, and also in institutional terms, behind us in terms of delivering an Afghan security through taking more and more responsibility for the apparatus through the work of NTMA and other type of operations that they are leading. They will still agencies. My general sense is that the areas that have be moving through that process until they reach the transitioned have an Afghan security solution in place, end of 2014. There will be an important way station— which is what we started this endeavour to do, and an important milestone—in the middle of 2013, exact that Afghan security solution is absolutely sensitive date yet to be defined because it will be conditions- to local requirements, both in political terms and in based, but from that moment on they will be in the governance and development terms, because it is a lead. complex mixture. Transition is not simply about I can give you an example of how it is working in handing over; it is about making sure that the tranche 3, which we are in the middle of now. That comprehensive approach is manifest on the ground in tranche has started; it is well under way in Helmand, all its senses. where the British forces are. There are some areas Transition is going according to plan. By the end of where the Afghans are now in the lead, but there are next year Afghans will be fully in charge of their one or two areas where they have not yet taken over security arrangements and that is a really good sign to the lead and by the time tranche 3 is completed they me, because it means that our plan to deliver a will have taken over the lead. We are seeing a substituting security force has occurred, that the geographic transition, but also, as I said, an Afghans are now absolutely competent to do what institutional one, so that gradually, as they take over they want to do and we can take our hands off and control, ISAF forces are stepping back from going on disengage. joint patrol with them to merely mentoring them and then doing enabling, as they step back one stage Q156 Ms Stuart: You say, “By the end of next year”, further. The final stage will be when they do what so you think they will be completely ready to take is called sustaining them—helping to give them the over by the end of 2013? resources and the wherewithal, but they will Lt-Gen Capewell: That is the way that the transition increasingly be doing it themselves. process goes. It is not the end of the operation. You We are seeing this also in the planning process; for give them their security lead—Doug will fill in how instance, this year, for the first time, the overall joint that works—and then there is a moment of distance operations plan, for March 2012Ð13, was drawn up mentoring where we watch them, and this is jointly jointly by the ANSF and ISAF with the ANSF in the agreed, and then our redeployment becomes more lead. Down at tactical level there are a lot of places consistent. where it is the ANSF and not ISAF who are planning their tactics for that night’s or that week’s operation. Q157 Ms Stuart: Just to be clear, you say that by 2013 you will start the process of stepping back? Q159 Ms Stuart: But that is the planning. Is it Lt-Gen Capewell: We have started it. actually happening on the ground? Dame Mariot Leslie: Yes. Q158 Ms Stuart: And by 2014 we expect that they Brigadier Chalmers: May I paint a tactical picture? If can take entire, full responsibility for their own you take the district of Nad Ali, which is a good security? example, it went into transition in tranche 2. It was an Lt-Gen Capewell: The principle behind transition is area I had been in as a battalion commander a couple that it is inch by inch at the tactical level, so that at the of years before. I have seen it progress over time, so very lowest level, we step back. That induces, later, a I know it quite well. There were 10 precincts within higher level of stepping back—it is like having your that district during that period of time, and last hands on a bicycle with stabilisers; you gently let go summer, as the transition started, I re-entered it. There cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Ev 36 Defence Committee: Evidence
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson was then a process of transferring the security greater capability, in terms of both skills and responsibility by area, according to the conditions that equipment, to do their own enabling by then. have just been mentioned. Brigadier Stevenson: You are quite right to highlight Over time, we have been able to transfer responsibility the Afghan air force as the element of the ANSF that across to them, and as we have done so we have presents the greatest challenge; I think that is self- reduced our footprint in those areas and taken a step evident. It is in the public domain that the Afghan air back. To draw that greater colour, last summer there force will not be anything like developed until 2017. were five rifle companies inside the centre of the So we are talking about 2014 principally for ground district enabling that security framework to be held forces, army and police, but for the air force the date together; at the end of this summer—we have now that we have acknowledged is 2017. That is not to say handed over full responsibility for nine of the that it will be fully developed by then, but it is to precincts of Nad Ali—we were able to shut down acknowledge the challenge that any nation is faced more than 60% of our bases and move them out of with when developing an air force. that area and on to the fringes. What you see is very real, Afghan-led security inside the area. It can be Q164 Ms Stuart: How do we envisage that period quite frustrating, to be honest. We are no longer in the between 2014 and 2017 being covered? Either they lead in those areas. are not going to need it— Brigadier Stevenson: That is still the subject of Q160 Ms Stuart: What were the major challenges ongoing planning within NATO headquarters. that you faced in this process? Lt-Gen Capewell: But you are right to point it out. Brigadier Chalmers: Understanding Afghan intent Part of this is making sure that the effort we make and what matters to them, working to their timeline— now in security terms reduces the level of threat that the Afghans can move very quickly sometimes, and would require that sort of sophisticated response. sometimes they move more slowly than us—and There is a calculus here that has a variety of pieces in aligning ourselves to them. It was more of a challenge it, including the development of the air force, the for us to get properly into the mindset of enabling different local tactics that the Afghans will use—as their activity than a real challenge, if that makes sense. opposed to how ISAF do their business as we disengage, as described by the transition process—and Q161 Ms Stuart: As a matter of interest, because the localised security solutions. All that is playing out in troop surge strength was 352,000, where are we at the period between now and 2014. As Mariot has the moment? pointed out, that is now being looked at institutionally. Dame Mariot Leslie: We are there. Q165 Ms Stuart: Just one final question. If you say Q162 Ms Stuart: So we have the full strength, and we have full strength, we are on target and the bits we are in that process. Even if you hand over they have started to take over are fine and we are completely to the ANSF, they will be saying that there are some capabilities they simply will not have. They getting there, what keeps you awake when you think will not have the close air support, the helicopters or about transition at the moment, other than the pacing the ISTAR capability. How do we assume that they of the Afghan transition not being quite what it can take full responsibility without that backing? should be? Dame Mariot Leslie: You are absolutely right. They Dame Mariot Leslie: Just to correct something, we do not have all of those now, and some of those higher are at full strength for that 352,000. There is still a end of the scale capabilities are being provided for training deficit, so they have been stood up, but they them by ISAF. We have until the end of 2014 to are not all fully trained. There will be some attrition gradually shift the training programme so that, over time and there will need to be further increasingly, they are able to do more and more of recruitment. There is still a task to bring that force to their own enabling. The training programme is full surge capacity, although the numbers are there shifting more and more from general infantry skills to now. skills in logistics, medical evacuation, planning and Brigadier Stevenson: From my perspective as a some of the higher command skills, moving more and generator and trainer from the national end of the more upstream towards the NCO cadre and upwards spectrum—Doug will be a better witness as to the into the higher command cadres. effect on the ground—I merely highlight that in the early days we focused on quantity, filling the gaps and Q163 Ms Stuart: Yes, but if they haven’t got the putting the quantity out into the field, and that was helicopters, you are not going to train them to fly, very Afghan-driven. We have started in earnest now are you? to consolidate that, by which I mean introducing more Dame Mariot Leslie: They now have some attack technical training and, specifically, introducing helicopters. I think we need to distinguish between collective command-level training. We bring back, for what NATO is doing, which is the training example, formation headquarters from the field, we programme, and a number of bilateral programmes, put them through a package at the command and staff particularly the American one, working with the course—that plays to your initial question—which Afghans on equipment. Obviously, the end of 2014 is helps to consolidate and improve the ANSF’s ability still some time away, and we will need to take stock to lead themselves in the field. It would not again, but the intention is that they will have a much necessarily keep me awake at night, but it is an cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 37
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson obvious challenge and the next step in developing more, not so much of the Pashtun, but of the southern the ANSF. Pashtun specifically. There is an issue there for two Ms Stuart: It all sounds so perfect. Everything is reasons. First, geographically it is a little bit more going just as it should. difficult to prise them away from their homelands to attend training and courses thereafter in Kabul, and Q166 Chair: General Capewell, does anything keep that is a very real issue. Secondly, they are perhaps you awake at night? more entrenched in their places of origin. Ethnically Lt-Gen Capewell: Lots keep me awake at night. I can they are different from the others. I will let Doug run over a range of operational issues, but in the continue. domain of ANSF delivery what is important to me is Chair: We are just about to come back to this issue, that the momentum that we have now delivered to in any event. We will leave that for now. an Afghan system that is looking more confident and vibrant—I absolutely stand by that remark—is Q170 Mr Havard: I want to ask about dependencies continued beyond 2014 in a virtuous way. We already in terms of doing some of this stuff, but can I just be know that the international community are determined clear about what you were saying? The plan is to have to do that, and it is about ensuring pull-through the security transition by the end of 2013, which can beyond 2014 on that momentum, so that the security then consolidate itself. There are presidential elections gains that we have made together can be consolidated, in 2014, so your point about conditions-based and the security gains that we have assisted the withdrawal following that, or reaction to, and longer Afghan security forces in are absolutely understood so term agreement on status of forces, development that the population are protected on the ground, and forces, whatever, depends partly on circumstances that the space and governance to develop are given come from that. That, as I understand it, is the sufficient oxygen. That is what keeps me awake at transition plan. Is that right? night: delivering the promise that we have all made Dame Mariot Leslie: There are two aspects. There is here to our Afghan friends and partners. one fixed date. The international community has Chair: That is very positive. We will come back to said—ISAF has said, NATO has said—that the current that right at the end, because of the things that you NATO mission will come to an end at the end of 2014. have not mentioned, which we will come on to during The pace at which transition proceeds within that end the rest of the session. stop is conditions based. I’m afraid I muddled up my tranches. We are in the middle of 3 now. We expect 4 Q167 Mr Brazier: Just as a point of history, I have to be announced before the end of this year and then just had an ex-QDG officer in my office as an intern. 5 will be the one that comes in in the middle of 2013. Chair: QDG? The exact timing, pace and speed of the implementation of those tranches will depend on Q168 Mr Brazier: Queen’s Dragoon Guards officer. conditions both at tactical and at strategic level. But He had spent the previous couple of months flying that 2014 end date is fixed. with the Afghan air force. He said they were quite What we have also said—the NATO Chicago summit impressive except that they had to follow the roads so said and the North Atlantic Council has repeated that they could see the street signs when it came to since—is that NATO will run a new training, advisory navigating the helicopter. and assistance operation after that. So one operation My question is for Brigadier Stevenson. I was will come to an end and another one will start. That privileged last year to host Brigadier General Shah in will be at a time when the Afghan Government is in the House, because I happened to be the only MP who full control of its own sovereignty, and the current UN was around when he was over. I was very impressed Security Council resolution basis for the current ISAF by both his determination and his obvious operation will have come to an end. We will need a intelligence. Pressing him, it became fairly clear that new sound legal basis for the new operation. We will a high proportion of the people around him, like him, need status of forces agreements for the NATO forces, come from the northern end of the country. Are you and the North Atlantic Council is just engaging with satisfied, both in terms of language and connection the Afghan Government on what the shape of that new with the population, that the Afghan army and police mission will be. are seen by the people there as their forces, rather than There is a mixture of conditions-based in the occupying forces? implementation of the current plan to the end of 2014 Brigadier Stevenson: Again, from my Kabul end of and then there are the beginnings of the negotiations the telescope—Doug will have a view as well—I was about what the next mission will be. But, as I said, it privileged to meet Shirin Shah a few times. will not be a combat mission. It will be a training, advisory and assistance mission, which is part of the Q169 Mr Brazier: Sorry, I did not hear that. very long-term commitment of the international Brigadier Stevenson: I was privileged to meet Shirin community to Afghanistan over what is called the Shah. He is a particularly dynamic, bullish, transformation decade, as agreed at the Tokyo summit impressive, tactical leader. You are right to point to a this summer. There is going to be a mixture of what slight imbalance at the moment of Tajiks from the NATO is doing on, in effect, military capability north in the officer corps at the middle rank. They are building; what the international community in a much good quality people and what we have always tried to broader sense is doing for the very substantial do in the recruiting and selection of officers is include problems of poverty, development and governance in cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Ev 38 Defence Committee: Evidence
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson
Afghanistan; and then what individual countries like do in terms of officer training and so on. Can you say our own are doing in their bilateral programmes, something about where and how that leadership deficit which will be part of that whole approach to is being addressed? Afghanistan, led of course by the Afghan Lt-Gen Capewell: There is a range of leadership Government. development projects. Specifically, in UK terms, you will have heard the phrase “Sandhurst in the sand”. Q171 Mr Havard: We will doubtless want to ask That project—the Afghan national army officer questions about post-14 at some point and about how academy—is well in train, signed up to by the Prime enduring and sustainable a lot of that process is. Minister. That is emblematic of the effort that we are Currently, there is a dependency. We have a making in terms of junior leadership to bring this dependency. ISAF has a dependency and so do the forward. Afghans, particularly on contractors in order to get I spoke earlier about how keeping this momentum supply and matériel. On the question about how going is vital. Mariot has linked that now to the sustainable they are going to be logistically beyond transformation decade, so there is a sense of 2014, some people will now say that, effectively, this continuity and equilibrium developing. I am confident is just giving money to the Taliban, because they have that the investment we are making is the right thing. captured the contracting process and so on. Brigadier Stevenson: The international community is That is one end of the spectrum of argument; another spending $234 million on a site in Qargha about 20 is that the money is just going to contractors outside km to the west of the city centre of Kabul. It is to be the country and not developing the country. So we known as the Afghan national defence university, a already have a debate about where contractors play in complex that will house a number of schools—one this whole discussion. What is your view of the being the officer academy sponsored by this country. country’s dependencies in terms of being able to There is the National Military Academy of maintain its logistical supply against your plan? Afghanistan, which is very much the officer training Lt-Gen Capewell: Are you talking in terms of support school based on the US West Point model. The to the Afghan National Security Council? command and staff college will be based there. The Mr Havard: Yes, absolutely. sergeant-major’s academy will be based there. On the Lt-Gen Capewell: Because I can only make a basis that that is developing relatively junior to judgment about that. The effort that NTM-A are middle-ranking leadership, that is a huge investment, making— and it is one that certainly I was enormously encouraged by as I watched it develop. However, that Q172 Chair: NTM-A? will not fully be in operation until towards the end of Brigadier Stevenson: It is the NATO training mission 2013 when, as I am sure you are aware, the officer in Afghanistan. academy will take its first course. Lt-Gen Capewell: Thank you, James. They are making an effort to absolutely isolate those constituent Q174 Mr Havard: Can you say something about parts of the Afghan security apparatus that are to do how the generational change process that you are with combat service support—combat support—so the describing, where younger officers come through and rear area functions as much as the fighting echelon sustain their future forces, fits with the reconstruction functions. A great deal of effort is now being placed and reconciliation process? There is a worry that some on that in terms of the schools required to support that express about people coming back, but they are and the project development required to deliver it. coming back with expectations and they are being put That is being seriously addressed now as we move back into a process. Is there any conflict between from transition at the front end of the Afghan fighting these processes? How is that working with the present force through its more rear area constituency. That is military structures developing up to 2014 and how a development that is now in train. does it affect the plans beyond? As for support to Government and wider contracts, Dame Mariot Leslie: I would just say two things. that is well outside my remit. First, I think that they are different issues, actually. Brigadier Stevenson: Certainly with effect two and a There is a NATO reintegration programme. half months ago, NTM-A had really ratcheted up its Mr Havard: That is the word I was looking for. effort to get ahead of two specific challenges for the Dame Mariot Leslie: That tends to involve relatively Afghans. One was infrastructure management and the junior fighters coming back: I think that the numbers other was, as you say, contract management—two are now something like 5,000, mostly in the north of relatively technical and sophisticated areas that we the country. They tend to be people who have gone had hitherto been doing very much on their behalf, but into the insurgency relatively unskilled, and they are NTM-A is very aware of the need to get the Afghans being reabsorbed into different destinies in Afghan “smart”, as the Americans would say, on that. I cannot life—some into the security forces, but some just back speak for what has happened in the last two and a half into civilian life in their villages and communities. months, but I have no doubt at all that a lot of effort That is one programme, although I am not sure that it is going into that. actually has a lot of bearing on the development of an NCO cadre and then a junior officer cadre. Q173 Mr Havard: One of the things is about The point I was going to make is that it is not leadership and their ability to have leadership. There something that will start only in 2013 or beyond; we have been some comments about what the Brits will are already seeing a very much more effective and cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 39
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson confident lot of young Afghan officers. The North and I think that the question of quite where that will Atlantic Council was in Afghanistan about 10 days be by 2015, when the current ISAF force is finished, ago and we visited, for instance, the Special Forces is some way down the track and will be addressed training centre. Something like more than 80% of the again before then. But the planning for the future instruction there is being done by Afghans; we have NATO mission does not envisage enablers like that; it trained the trainers and they are now training other envisages training, advising and assisting. Afghans. While it is still there until the end of 2014, Brigadier Stevenson: But in the meantime, we are ISAF is steadily trying to put in place the ability of training many Afghan medics to operate at the tactical Afghan forces to sustain and regenerate themselves by level—at the point of wounding, if you will. That giving them the skills that they will be able effort will continue to accelerate. I think you have communicate to other people. In the training centre touched on the valid point that, in terms of the more that we saw, that process was certainly very much expensive, more ambitious enablers, clearly, planning under way. is under way to ensure that the transition takes into Brigadier Stevenson: And this is helped enormously account the fact that the capability will not be that of, by the fact that internationally—in the UK we are say, the United States or the United Kingdom—that is reflecting it with the officer academy—we are very self-evident. deliberately feeding western-trained Afghan officers, Mr Havard: From our own reserve forces, and others those who have been, for example, to West Point or who do medical work for Brits, we know how that Sandhurst as cadets, back into their own system. That process runs. I know that some regions are capable— should create this self-generation and re-generation of to some degree, the Afghans are probably capable of Afghan expertise. In that positive sense, there will be dealing with category A casualties themselves—but it an effect, but on your first point, reintegration, I am is a variable picture, so we are asking a general not as sure, because I don’t know enough about it. question. Brigadier Chalmers: To follow that up, I made exactly the same observation. For example, at the Q176 Bob Stewart: Dame Mariot, as we are lucky police training centre outside Lashkar Gah, we are enough to have you as a representative at the North seeing that the course instruction is now Atlantic Council, you said in your evidence that there predominantly given by instructors allocated and will be no combat mission after the end of 2014. designated by the MOI—Ministry of Interior—who Could you define “combat mission”? are posted there, which is a huge change from the last Dame Mariot Leslie: I can define what it is not. couple of years. Our instructors are now staying behind. Q177 Bob Stewart: No. What I mean is, what do I also think that, on the level of advisors, as you see, you, in the North Atlantic Council, suggest will not the academies are on their way, but in the meantime be possible after 2014? For example, on the ground a lot of the on-the-job training and other elements are mentoring of Afghan national forces, whether police done with a lot of mentorship and advising by the or army, with one of our officers who is actually with teams to build up that experience base. Of course, we a company commander or battalion commander. Or, have been at this for quite some time, so if you look more sensitive—you will probably tell me to wind my at, for example, the elements we have been at, that neck in, which I accept—Special Forces operations. I advice over time means you now have young officers am worried by the definition of a “combat mission”, who have been engaged for seven-plus years. They as it can mean many things to many people and many have actually been gaining a strength and experience nations, as you know in the North Atlantic Council. bank over that time. Dame Mariot Leslie: The North Atlantic Council, at heads of State and Government level, said at Chicago Q175 Mr Havard: May I ask you about one other that this would not be a combat mission—we would area, which is health and medical care for Afghans be doing training, advising and assisting. There may themselves, and the sustainability of that? Currently, be nations who are willing to do combat alongside they are hugely dependent on health care in the Afghans, but that will not be part of the NATO country. However, in terms of future medevac mission. capability, for example, what is going to happen with At the moment, NATO is building up the North the sustainability of their ability to treat themselves, Atlantic Council initiating directive—it has just been should they be engaged in future operations? The very passed and accepted—which starts the planning sophisticated medical processes that we have in place process. There is nothing in that that is really different are not going to be there. from what was said at Chicago, which is what I just Dame Mariot Leslie: Two things on that. First, as I said. It means that I expect NATO will be ready to was saying previously, that has been identified as a train, advise and assist Afghan forces engaged in key enabler for the current level of fighting—we very counter-terrorism operations, counter-narcotic much hope that there may not be the same level of operations and counter-insurgency operations, but fighting after 2014, but let us see. That is one of the they will not be doing that by engaging in combat areas in which we are busy training Afghans to take themselves. They will not be going out and over more and more capabilities themselves. aggressively engaging in combat; they will be Then there will be the issue of equipment, helicopters, training, giving advice and giving them some enabling medevac and so on. NATO is not addressing that assistance but not giving combat support in the sense directly, but some countries are doing so bilaterally, of actively participating themselves. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Ev 40 Defence Committee: Evidence
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson
What that means, when you get down into much more Chair: We will come back to that very briefly at the detail, is something that needs to be defined, and that end. planning process is starting just now. We will be looking for a concept of operations and an operating Q181 Ms Stuart: I have a quick question for plan and rules of engagement. But I understand that Brigadier Stevenson on health care. That comes to an that means that we will not have NATO forces— end post 2014, but it would still be open for a bilateral including British forces in a NATO operation—going arrangement for injured Afghans to come to the out on combat aggressively, under the law of armed Centre for Defence Medicine. We have some combat, anywhere where we or anybody else has provisions in Birmingham which are so specialist that forces. Self-defence may operate if people find Afghans have wanted to contract them. Have I themselves in a dangerous situation, but that is not understood correctly that that will have to be a combat. bilateral arrangement, rather than being part of ISAF? Dame Mariot Leslie: I think so. Q178 Chair: We heard Brigadier Chalmers say that Brigadier Stevenson: I would probably defer to there is a shortage of helicopters and attack aircraft General Capewell for that. in the Afghan air force. Would you count a combat Chair: We are still with the training of the ANA, and helicopter as “being involved in combat”? it may be that some of the things that Sandra Osborne Dame Mariot Leslie: I think that if you have British would like to ask you have already been answered. I pilots in a combat helicopter, they would be involved rather suspect that that is true. in combat if they were using it for combat. Q182 Sandra Osborne: We have covered some of Q179 Chair: So there will not be British pilots in it. You have said that you have reached a target for combat helicopters after 2014? recruitment of 352,000. I believe that that is as part of Dame Mariot Leslie: Our Ministers have yet to take the surge, but in the future will be brought down again exact decisions, but it is very clear that—they have to a much smaller number. What sort of time scale said this—they will not be engaged in combat will that be done on, and how will it be achieved? operations in a NATO mission in Afghanistan after Lt-Gen Capewell: Let us first of all address the 2014. question of 352,000. As Dame Mariot has pointed out, that isn’t totally fielded yet, so that is in the training Bob Stewart: The reason why we ask that, Dame system. It has yet to be fielded. What do I mean by Mariot, is that the Defence Committee understands the that? It has yet to be delivered on the ground in some difference in style between the United States approach cases—it has yet to be placed on the ground. It is in and the British approach to mentoring. The British the system, but not necessarily fielded. approach, as the senior officers on your board will My view about the 352,000 over time is that it is know, implies that mentoring is on the ground with funded through international contribution; it may well companies and battalions, whereas the American decline, as Afghans decide on where this settles in approach is further back. We are slightly worried that terms of what they can support, as they begin to fund there will be a difference in interpretation about what it over time. But I am sure in my own mind that we a combat mission is. That is why I asked the question, can clearly see those figures being maintained, and I think I will wind it up there because the certainly to 2017. Chairman might bring this up, if he wants to, at the end. Q183 Sandra Osborne: In terms of the situation after 2014, will the Afghan security forces be able to Q180 Sir Bob Russell: This is a less problematic direct and carry out their own training? question. What happens to the hospital at Camp Lt-Gen Capewell: James will want to add to this. That Bastion after 2014? is the whole basis of our approach: in everything that Lt-Gen Capewell: That depends on a number of we do, whether it is in terms of security operations in issues. One is the ownership of Bastion over time, the field or training systems in the rear areas, we which is part of this longer-term development of transfer this responsibility to Afghans. You have Afghan infrastructure and basing, which is not yet already heard about the reintroduction of western- clear or decided. It also depends on how the Afghans trained officers to that system, and that encourages see their own medical solution. You have already that momentum to continue. The mentoring in the rear heard evidence of how that feels on the ground. areas on combat service support and combat support, Of course one of the constituent parts of that debate through specialist schools, is part of that. is how much the Afghans are prepared to contract Brigadier Stevenson: The word “transition” meant medical support, because it does not necessarily have something slightly different to me in NTM-A, as it to be grown organically; although we are trying to do did to Brigadier Chalmers, because within NTM-A we that in combat terms, there is a wider question about were involved in training institution transition. That how you sustain a medical facility that is more broad plays exactly to your question in that, by the end of than just support to the Afghan security forces. There 2014 at the latest—and there was an intent to bring are a number of things in the debate here, but we have this forward, possibly by as much as a year—the aim good facilities at Bastion at the moment and it is was that the Afghans would be running their own clearly of interest to the Afghans. Over time, we will training institutions. That would be training ranging come to negotiate a position. from the initial nine-week package to train a basic cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 41
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson warrior through to what we call branch schools, which Brigadier Chalmers: I might step in on this one. What are more specific training—for example, signals was referred to earlier was the Afghan National Army, training, engineer training and so on, less some of the which is spread out. There are quite a few Pashtuns more sophisticated areas within that—through to what in the Afghan National Army and that percentage has we would call command and staff training in the risen over the past couple of years. A lot of them are Afghan national defence university. northern rather than southern Pashtuns. By the end of 2014, the aim is that the Afghans are in The police in Helmand is predominantly southern charge and are running all of those. That is not to say Pashtun, as is the local police. You have a combined that there will not be embedded staff from other security force that is a blend of the two, and in many nations. That will be under an entirely different ways that sometimes acts as a check and a balance. arrangement. They would be there on an exchange The locals believe that sometimes the outsiders, who basis or gift basis or whatever it might be, but the are not engaged in some of the local dynamics, are Afghans will be in charge by that time. fairer, and act almost as a check and balance on it. So that ethnic balance is not a completely bad thing; it Q184 Sandra Osborne: Does that include the sort of equals itself out, particularly in the eyes of police? some of the local population. Brigadier Stevenson: That will include the police, though, as I am sure you are well aware, the police Q187 Sandra Osborne: The attrition rate is quite are somewhat behind the army. That tends to be the high at 2.3%, against a target of 1.4%. Why is that? tradition. It was certainly the case in Iraq, for Brigadier Stevenson: I can start here. That is an example. It took longer to develop the police for average attrition rate across the country. It goes various reasons, but that is the intent. without saying that we discovered—I am sure Doug will back this up with further detail—that for those Q185 Sandra Osborne: Could you comment on the Afghan corps that were in the fight in the south and levels of corruption within the police in particular? east, the attrition rates were higher than those based Brigadier Stevenson: All I would say is that in the north, the west and in the capital. An attrition corruption means different things to different people. working group has been set up under the chairmanship What I saw in Afghanistan was an absolute of the Vice Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant- determination, albeit from the middle and more senior General Akram, just to demonstrate how seriously the ranking Afghans that I met, both in the army and the Afghans are taking this, and progress is being made. police, first, to understand what was considered When an army is in a fight and when they are still unacceptable behaviour and to eradicate it from their getting their heads around rotations in and out of the ranks, if it existed. When you get lower down into fight to leave and so on, the impact on morale is the more localised arrangements that are made, it is inevitably going to be higher than when they have probably not for me to comment as a non-indigenous eventually got themselves sorted with some form of Afghan on how local business is conducted. rotational process, which they have not quite done yet. Brigadier Chalmers: I can add a little to that on the That is the principal reason why we see people going tactical front. We can also compare and contrast. My absent from their duty. The other is that a lot of them first tour in Helmand was in 2008, and I reflect on the are asked to move out of area—we are, after all, police I saw then and the police I saw this summer. It creating an Afghan National Army—and a lot of them is quite a stark difference. As you say, there is a level feel homesick. of pragmatism in Afghan society. The word “corruption” for us, for them it is multi-layered. It is Q188 Mr Havard: May I press you a little bit on the tolerable or intolerable nature of it. Back in 2008 what you have said about the figure being 352,000, there was a lot of intolerable corruption that was really possibly? From what I understand, it is 228,000. affecting the will of the people. That is definitely Brigadier Stevenson: Point five. policed out now. We had a number of occasions where our advisers Q189 Mr Havard: Whatever. On this question about would identify something, and we would watch before funding, I want to be very clear. Are you saying that I would go in at the higher level of the police, to see at the NAC donors conference somebody has agreed whether they would deal with it themselves. They are the funding will be provided up to 2017 to sustain the increasingly dealing with it themselves. That means 352,000, or whatever it is? Is that right? they are policing their own policemen out of the Dame Mariot Leslie: It was announced at the Chicago game, moving them away from certain areas. That is summit and then ratified and confirmed at the Tokyo not to say that it is corruption-free; it is not by our donors meeting this summer that the international standards. However, in terms of what is tolerable to community will produce something like $4.1 billion the local population it is much more in balance than up to 2017 for the Afghan national security forces— it was several years ago. that is the army, the air force and the various manifestations of the police. Q186 Sandra Osborne: You referred to the That was worked out on an indicative figure of difficulties of recruiting Pashtuns from the south. 228,500. We know that there will be a gap between What are the implications for that at the moment? that and the higher figure—the surge figure—of What would be the implications after 2014, if they are 352,000, which we are at now, and which is due to not reasonably represented in the security forces? come down towards 2017. How that is going to be cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Ev 42 Defence Committee: Evidence
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson funded has not been addressed, to be frank, but I think opportunities that present. But we are all thinking it will be addressed bilaterally between the Afghan about it. Government and the donors. Brigadier Chalmers: For 12 Brigade we lost seven of The international community has committed to $4.1 our soldiers to these type of attacks. They are billion as an indicative figure. Of course, by then the definitely the hardest to bear. But I think what really Afghans will be in control of their own figures, so the reassured us was that, both tactically—those Afghans funding has been committed subject to things like the that we worked closely with were equally as shocked delivery, the accountability, the good governance and and, definitely, at my level the level of real shock was all the other things that were discussed at Tokyo under quite palpable. a so-called Mutual Accountability framework. There is an eight-step Afghan process, as you know, However, the actual numbers will be within the to bring their individuals in, but what I saw in our control of the Afghan Government at the time, in the time is a real push by them to grip it and take better light of what it perceives to be its needs and in control of it. But a lot of that is about re-vetting as dialogue with the international community. much of the force that is in place now—and it is a big force; we have spoken about some of these figures Q190 Mr Havard: And that would be for their new already—and for them to go through that process to President to determine? get up to speed with it. But in our tour we saw a Chair: But it is not clear that there will be 352,000 number of occasions where the Afghan army moved until 2017. people that they suddenly grew suspicious of and therefore they were proactive in trying to mitigate the Dame Mariot Leslie: That is the plan. The funding results. The details of today, which you have does not support that number. mentioned, will come out in due course, as time Chair: It is the unfunded plan. I see. moves on.
Q191 Bob Stewart: I am sure you are aware that two Q192 Bob Stewart: So the answer to the question is, soldiers have just died. It has just been announced you are not sure what percentage of these attacks are publicly, so I presume you have been briefed privately actually Taliban. The general used the word that two soldiers from the Gurkhas were killed by a “insurgent”. Do you actually mean Taliban? man purportedly in Afghan national police uniform in Lt-Gen Capewell: You could describe it how you Helmand. In your opinion, General Capewell, of the want. It is a tactic on the ground that is employed by 56 ISAF deaths this year attributed to people who are the enemy. meant to be wearing uniforms—I do not like the phrase “green on blue”; I call it murder—are they all Q193 Bob Stewart: And you never know who the caused by the Taliban or are tribes getting in on it, or enemy are? is there any other reason? Is it Taliban only or not? Brigadier Stevenson: It is difficult to attribute. Lt-Gen Capewell: The reasons for these attacks are complex, but there is no question in my mind that this Q194 Bob Stewart: I will not go further on this is an insurgent tactic. I think deeply about this every thing, because we know where we are going on this day, as do my international counterparts in theatre, as matter. do my Afghan counterparts in theatre. In the collective Brigadier, how has your mentoring changed as a result sense of owning this problem, we are all aligned. It is of these attacks over the last few months? I know the difficult to deal with. precautions you are putting in place, but I also know You know as well as I do, Mr Stewart, how hard it the British strategy, tactics and mentoring approach, is to determine what might happen on the ground in which is anathema to trying to stand back, but really circumstances that are often dynamic. However, we encourages involvement with people on the ground in are all determined—the international community is order to mentor. How are you dealing with this determined to get to grips with this. You will know dichotomy? the measures we are taking from right at the top of Brigadier Chalmers: We have adjusted our tactics, the ISAF structure and the Afghan Government to techniques and procedures as you would expect us to come to terms with this. There is a four-step approach do after each incident, but we went in having learned that looks at how we prevent this, how we educate from those that had gone before, and that training was everybody to deal with it, what the training pretty much in place. We have worked harder on it, requirement is, both nationally and internationally but the real thing that has moved on is that before people go to theatre—and, indeed, in theatre— engagement. and what the force protection requirements are to You say “we”; I viewed the “we” as the collective— come to terms with it. Afghans and ourselves, together—in dealing with this I think you have been briefed on the Guardian Angel problem as one. They did not want this to be seen approach. I think you also know about the institutional as anything that would divide us. I think it has been approach to vetting Afghans in security forces, which mentioned that it is an insurgent tactic. Exactly what includes all sorts of guarantees—screening, medical a trigger is on a variety of occasions, as you have screening, biometric data collection. We look at this heard the Secretary of State say before, is sometimes on a daily basis, nationally, to look at the training and difficult to divine, but we are clear that we do not how this is delivered on the ground, but you can never want to open up any space that would allow the have a perfect system, because people take the insurgents to separate us. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 43
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson
The real change on our tenure, which we saw, which passing through—so those who were possibly we worked hard on, at my level and down all the level presenting a greater threat in this regard than those of command, was to stay as tight as possible. So in who had already been trained and educated and so terms of that mentoring—for example, me to the on—the overriding view across NTMA, across provincial chief of police—that did not change. If nations, was that the way to instruct and mentor was anything, it pushed us closer together. to get alongside these Afghans. I was in Kabul when the two US officers were shot in the National Military Q195 Bob Stewart: At top level, I totally understand Police Co-Ordination Centre in the MOI. There was that you all stand at one, and they loathe it; they loathe an absolute desire, from those who were even present it at your level as much as possible. Put yourself down on the day, to get back in, because if they stepped to a private soldier’s situation. I ask you, how have back and remoted themselves from the Afghans they these sort of attacks impacted on the morale, not of would make the problem worse. Doug touched on high-level commanders like yourselves, but of the this. Proximity to the Afghans, intimacy with the low-level soldiers who actually have to work with Afghans, is very often the best form of defending these people without the back-up that you have? What against this form of attack. is morale like with regard to this matter at low level? Brigadier Chalmers: You would not be surprised to Q198 Sir Bob Russell: General, will you be able to know, sir, that I spent quite a lot of time visiting my achieve a successful withdrawal of UK combat troops adviser teams to get exactly that feel. I went to every by the end of 2014? adviser team that had suffered one of these attacks, to Lt-Gen Capewell: I hope so. I will be sacked if I get a sense of them. They were convinced of the don’t. But let me give you a straight answer. purpose that they were achieving—the reason they Sir Bob Russell: I thought you did give a straight were there every day—and they firmly believe that answer. this was the way of getting the Afghans, as we have Lt-Gen Capewell: This is the biggest redeployment spoken about, on the front foot to be able to look after operation in a generation. Noting the investment in their own population in due course. They believed that theatre that has taken place over 10 years, so there is they were adding real, tangible value in the delivery a lot of equipment and a lot of matériel, I and my of that. headquarters absolutely understand how much we It was really noticeable to them that the Afghans they have to move over the time available. worked with and knew were never the ones who conducted the deed; it was always someone further Q199 Chair: We will come on to the physical out on the fringe or the margin and very loosely withdrawal in a few moments. I think Sir Bob’s point connected, if at all. The attacks we had over this time was about the overall general plan of withdrawal. Will added to the level of pressure and risk, but did not you be able to be successful? dent morale. Their belief in what they were doing Lt-Gen Capewell: Yes I will, noting, of course, that remained solid. Indeed, every one of the teams I have the national operation is synchronised inside a wider just mentioned—we had three teams that were hit— NATO operation. A great deal of work is being done continued on with that task. I always came away from in NATO to deliver that co-ordination at the moment. visiting those teams—you will remember this very well—actually more reassured. I had probably had Q200 Sir Bob Russell: Can I ask the four of you taken more counsel of my own fears until I came back along the table, are we seriously led to believe that on from visiting them on the ground. 1 January 2015, the Afghan National Security Forces will be sustainable? Q196 Bob Stewart: So the answer to the question is Lt-Gen Capewell: Yes, I think that is the assumption that morale is largely undiminished by these attacks, that we have to make. Mariot has described the because the people on the ground feel that their job is funding piece here. The training apparatus has been so important that they can take hits like this, and they described by James in terms of the way we want to are prepared to take that risk for the greater good. make them viable in their terms. I am confident that Brigadier Chalmers: Yes, but it does add to the stress the transition process to deliver that self-aware that is on those soldiers. security apparatus will have occurred by then.
Q197 Bob Stewart: Particularly, I am thinking, and Q201 Sir Bob Russell: Dame Mariot, what is the we are thinking, of their families when they are latest thinking about UK troops being withdrawn informed that they are going to be working with the earlier than 2014? Afghan National Security Forces. That must send Dame Mariot Leslie: I am not aware of any latest panic through quarter patches throughout the country. thinking on that. It is something you really need to Brigadier Stevenson: I detect that there is a tendency ask somebody other than me. I am focused on the to believe that the British armed forces are NATO plans. significantly closer at the tactical level in terms of mentoring than, say, any other out in the coalition. In Q202 Sir Bob Russell: So any suggestions prior to my experience, which included commanding, for want that have not come across your table. of a better description, within a NATO construct, the Dame Mariot Leslie: I have seen, as I am sure the Kabul military training centre, within which there Committee has, what the Defence Secretary and were hundreds and thousands of raw Afghan recruits others have said in public. Transition is going to plan. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Ev 44 Defence Committee: Evidence
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson
There will be opportunities next year to make further will be involved in the planning from now on, and withdrawals. The Government have already other nations may choose to be so. The North Atlantic announced that some 500 will have been withdrawn Council will decide case by case which stage of the by the end of this year. Next year, there will almost planning process we bring them in on. certainly be scope to take further decisions that the The next stage is for the military authorities at SHAPE Government have not yet taken. You probably need to and elsewhere to draw up a concept of operations. I ask the Defence Secretary when he envisages that expect that to be decided some time in the course of might be possible. next year and, from that, an operating plan. We will then get down to the detailed process of the North Q203 Sir Bob Russell: We are talking about a time Atlantic Council deciding the so-called execution line of slightly more than two years, so things can directive, at which point the commanders can start change. I recognise that. deploying their resources. It will be a long-term Dame Mariot Leslie: I think the Prime Minister has process, with a lot of conceptual work on the concept said that what we are looking for is a glide path of operations taking place next year. But the final towards the end of 2014, not a cliff edge. The dispositions, the numbers and who will do what, Government will take those decisions when they are where and to what end will probably be decided a bit ready. They have not announced any so far. later in the process, because it will be decided in the light of where we have got to by 2014. Q204 Sir Bob Russell: Events will clearly dictate what happens, hopefully, rather than political Q207 Ms Stuart: But by the end of 2013, you feel decisions. I wouldn’t ask you to comment on political that we will have some kind of broad outline. decisions. I hope that events will dictate what Dame Mariot Leslie: I would expect to have a happens. concept of operations by then. Lt-Gen Capewell: But I can reassure you and give you confidence that the figures announced by the Prime Q208 Ms Stuart: What about post-2014, the UK’s Minister—500 out by this December—will be role after that? The General may want to comment. delivered. We will be down at 9,000 by then. Will that also be clear by the end of 2013? Dame Mariot Leslie: Ministers have yet to take Q205 Sir Bob Russell: My last question is whether decisions. They have taken decisions and announced anybody has heard anything about the possibility of that we will be making a contribution of £70 million NATO or the United States, in particular, thinking towards the future ANSF and its sustainability, and about withdrawing significant troops earlier than the they have announced that we will be acting as the lead end of 2014. for the Afghan National Army officers’ academy that Dame Mariot Leslie: The United States also will want Brigadier James Stevenson has been talking about, but to take some decisions next year in the light of how they have not yet decided in detail—and I think see the transition goes, particularly at the mid-2013 way no need to decide quite yet—the nature of Britain’s point that I was talking about, when the last transition contribution in 2015. They will decide that later in the has started. I don’t speak for the US Government, but light of events and circumstances at the time. I am sure that they will be taking further decisions in the course of next year. Q209 Ms Stuart: So in terms of specific UK capabilities or specific UK armed forces personnel Q206 Ms Stuart: Post-2014, how do you envisage, remaining there, no decision has been made as yet. Dame Mariot, NATO’s role at that stage? What is its Dame Mariot Leslie: No. remaining function? Dame Mariot Leslie: It goes back to Sir Bob Russell’s Q210 Ms Stuart: Would you expect that decision to question. The ANSF will be sustainable, but it won’t be made by the end of 2013 or not? be on its own. NATO has already said that it will have Dame Mariot Leslie: Forgive me, but that might be a training, advisory and assistance mission. It would something you would like to ask of the MoD officials be a new one. It would be doing just that, and not in whom you are seeing a little later, but I think those combat. But that won’t be the only thing that will decisions are not imminent. be there. There will be the international community’s overall support for governance, economic Q211 Ms Stuart: Finally, of any UK personnel who development, human development and so on in might be there post-2014, are you confident that their Afghanistan. That will be a very important security is safe in Afghan hands? complement to what NATO will be doing. There will Lt-Gen Capewell: Yes. Remember of course that this be other bilateral programmes as well. is a way away yet and security conditions are not yet The NATO process, which I was beginning to clear, but I am sure that we would not commit any describe, is that the North Atlantic Council has just support forces to the training apparatus unless we launched the planning process with an initiating were sure. directive. We have associated with that six of our current ISAF partners that are particularly keen, and Q212 Chair: Now a few questions about the physical have already said that they would like to take part withdrawal of British troops. It might well be that you in the future NATO mission. That is Australia, New will have to say that plans have not yet been made Zealand, Finland, Sweden, Georgia and Ukraine. They and, to the extent that you must, please feel free to cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 45
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson do so, but who will be responsible for the practical Q214 Chair: When will you have completed the withdrawal of UK troops and equipment? Since you, agreement with the Stans—the central Asian General Capewell, said that you would be sacked if it republics? did not go well, can we assume that it is you? Lt-Gen Capewell: There are some treaty sensitivities Lt-Gen Capewell: It is me for certain aspects of it, there, clearly, but I am confident that that will be but perhaps I should start by describing the MoD delivered by the end of this year or early next year. approach to this redeployment challenge. Of course it is not just about what is delivered in theatre, in terms Q215 Chair: Do you think that Brize Norton will be of redeployment, it is how it is managed once it gets able to cope with the withdrawal? back to the UK base, so there is a whole MoD Lt-Gen Capewell: Yes, I do. There is work going on approach to this. A number of governing apparatuses in Brize Norton, but it is not only about Brize Norton; it is about ports of entry as well as airports of entry. manage and oversee this but, in so far as my This is a national effort in terms of the MoD’s contribution to redeployment is concerned, calibrating oversight of the operation. What I do is to make sure how much equipment—how much matériel—we need that the redeployment of equipment will not in any to extract from theatre over the next two years or so way hinder the military operation that it is supposed to is clear to me. I know what the physics of that look support. There is an equilibrium here about supporting like. I also know how I am going to get it back in transition right through to 2013 and the end, which terms of permutations of routes, whether through you have heard us describe, and how much equipment Pakistan or the northern Stans. I also know what that we can take out. That is a fine balance, which we matériel looks like in terms of its movement, whether address and scrutinise on a regular basis. by road or air. The co-ordination of this is through my headquarters in the PGHQ, forwarding to the Joint Q216 Chair: So if RAF Brize Norton is not going to Forces Support Headquarters, which is the be a pinch point, are there any other blockages that headquarters that sits in Bastion. you have identified at this stage of the planning? What is going on at the moment? Well, there is quite Lt-Gen Capewell: There are number of things that a lot of aggressive battlefield clearance, of equipments could change the calculus. We know how frustrating and matériel that we do not need. That is being some of this route management question has been properly moved back. Of course, the NAO has an over time, with Pakistan. But when I look at the interest in this, through proof of good order and in number of permutations available to me in terms of making sure that we do this properly in terms of redeployment, I am confident that I can meet that requirement and that the UK strategic base is biometric checks, to get this equipment back. The appropriately configured to receive the mass of that whole apparatus of this is well understood in UK redeployment. terms, but of and in itself it is not just about the UK deployment because, if you envisage the theatre Q217 Chair: Dame Mariot, will NATO be co- requirement, NATO also has a role to play in co- ordinating all this? ordinating and synchronising the route access—how Dame Mariot Leslie: NATO is increasingly focusing we get this out, the air space management required to on this. SHAPE, the NATO command at Brunssum get this out, the border control management needed— and the people in theatre at the ISAF joint command so this is not simply me having a good plan, it is me have already been giving this some thought. Some of having a good plan that can nest inside a broader the building blocks are in place already. The NATO NATO plan. In that plan, it must also connect through training mission in Afghanistan, for instance, has a the coupling bridge which is one of the routes that we document that sets out principles for what the Afghan use by air or sea back to the UK base to deliver a forces might need, if countries were minded to gift to considerable amount of equipment necessary for them and leave things behind, and what they do not future regeneration and contingency back in the UK need, and so on. base. A lot more work needs to be done in NATO, particularly in the military structures, and the United Q213 Chair: What is the time scale for all this? You Kingdom has been very active in encouraging NATO to get on with it and co-ordinate. At the NATO are due to start the detailed planning this month, is it, Defence Ministers’ meeting earlier this month we or next month? asked, and I think the Secretary-General has agreed, Lt-Gen Capewell: We have been planning for a long that there should be a report to the next Ministers’ time. The major redeployment effort started on 1 meeting in February, so that Ministers collectively October, because of course in transition you do not across the whole of ISAF can get a grip on how NATO get any redeployment dividend until certain aspects of is tackling this. National plans—our own are transition are complete. That process will now relatively mature—need to be fitted in with the NATO continue. It will build speed, and its speed is directly ones if the whole of the theatre is to be emptied by related to the progress we make on the ground in 2014 in good order, so we are very keen that NATO transition terms, and the bandwidth, the apertures, that proceeds. we need to use to get this equipment out. So there is quite a lot of physics in this, and we are making a big Q218 Chair: So that February meeting will be a effort to apply science to this redeployment. key meeting. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Ev 46 Defence Committee: Evidence
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson
Dame Mariot Leslie: It may not be the decisive one, In leaving equipment behind in Afghanistan and but it will be an important forcing point for the perhaps giving it to the Afghan national security NATO planning. forces, can we avoid leaving them with an enormous logistical problem of having to deal with a hotch- Q219 Chair: General Capewell, how is all this going potch of different fleets of stuff from all over the to be funded? world? Lt-Gen Capewell: In so far as the NATO funding is Lt-Gen Capewell: Absolutely. If we leave anything concerned? behind, it will be equipment that will not cause the Chair: No, in so far as the United Kingdom funding Afghans more of a problem than the one that they is concerned. have already. We would want not to put stress on their Lt-Gen Capewell: I am confident that the money is in technical capacity to maintain this equipment. As you place to do this. have heard, we are making efforts to improve that side of the Afghan security apparatus, but I am clear in my Q220 Chair: Will you need more people to help own mind that that is not going to be a huge amount produce this fantastic logistical feat? of equipment. Lt-Gen Capewell: You have already got written Dame Mariot Leslie: That is the logic behind the evidence that suggests that we have got permission to NATO training mission in Afghanistan setting out a surge up to 500 people into theatre to allow this to kind of specification for the kinds of things that would take place. I will give you a little bit more detail on be good to leave behind for the Afghans and the kinds that. It will not necessarily be 500 people; it could of things that would not. It will still be a national be as low as 20 people. It depends what the specific decision, but NATO is giving guidance to nations. requirement is. For instance, if you have a certain fleet of vehicles that need preparing for redeployment, that Q226 Chair: And the Afghans will have a say in requires a certain set of specialists. So this is what they accept and what they are taking. bespokely designed, it is focused on the immediate Lt-Gen Capewell: Yes. problem and it is episodic, in the sense that we surge people in and out to deal with these technical Q227 Chair: The question of whether Afghanistan, challenges as they come along. after we leave, is going to descend into civil war is obviously one that is on the tip of everybody’s tongue. Q221 Chair: Has planning advanced sufficiently far What do you think we need to do to ensure that it for you to be able to say what proportion of the does not descend into civil war after we leave? equipment you intend to bring back to the UK? Dame Mariot Leslie: Shall I take that? I see my Lt-Gen Capewell: Yes, the majority of equipment. military colleagues looking in my direction. I am not There are things that we would want either to sell or trying to be evasive, but this is a question that you gift to the Afghans and that calculus is not yet fully had best pursue perhaps with the people dealing with defined on the ground, but it is certainly a work in the overall Afghan strategy. progress, because it requires a deal of negotiation on Chair: We will do that too. the ground as transition takes place and the Afghan Dame Mariot Leslie: I am sure you will. requirements become clear. I absolutely understand, The very important thing to say is that Afghanistan’s however, how much equipment we have to get back, long-term future does not depend entirely on the and it is the majority of equipment, because this military instrument. It depends on the very much equipment is required for future-proofing the Army wider support that the international community is and the other services for their Future Force 2020 going to give to that country, which will remain a poor design. It is equipment that we have spent a lot of country with real developmental, human resources, money on in terms of UORs over this campaign, so I human capital and economic needs, as well as needs am sure that we are not leaving behind vital combat for support in its region, for a very long time. That has been the point of some of the things that are not equipment that is necessary for future operations. to do with NATO and therefore not to do with me that have been going on over this year. There has been Q222 Chair: So these UORs—urgent operational an Istanbul process, in which regional countries got requirement bits of equipment—will become part of together, and that was followed up with a Kabul the core equipment of the MoD. conference this summer. A series of regional Lt-Gen Capewell: Yes. confidence-building measures are now going on with support from the international community. For Q223 Chair: Who will pay for that? instance, the Foreign Secretary was in Kabul in the Lt-Gen Capewell: The MoD. summer for the second of those conferences and promised support to that process where we can. Q224 Chair: Although they have in the past, because There is also the international aid picture. Alongside they are UORs, been paid for by the Treasury. the £4.1 billion pledged to the ANSF up to 2017, there Lt-Gen Capewell: It moves into core over time, and I is also a further £16 billion—roughly the same can give you further advice on that if you want. amount per year—of civil development aid up until then. So there are many other actors and I am not Q225 Chair: We would like that. That would be going to speak on their behalf. It is not my job and I very helpful. could mislead you, but what I will say is that what is cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o003_th_121030 CORRECTED HC 413-iii.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 47
30 October 2012 Lieutenant General David Capewell, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG and Brigadier James Stevenson done in ISAF and by our armed forces is a small part wrong, there is nothing much that armed forces can of that longer-term picture. do to put that back on to the right track. You have Turning to the bit that is my job—what NATO is spoken in terms of inputs of international aid after doing now and for the future—I think we need to 2015 rather than in terms of the fundamental quality continue to look very closely, with full engagement, of the governance of Afghanistan. Is that right? at NATO’s main effort. That is making the transition Dame Mariot Leslie: What I am saying is that the work according to the plan, fine-tuning it persistently Government of Afghanistan will be getting a lot of as we go along and doing so persistently with the other support with issues such as governance, Afghan Government: listening to them; working with alongside the military support and the security support them; making it work; holding them to the that we are offering via our own armed forces in this accountability that we have all agreed on, but also country and NATO and ISAF elsewhere. Afghanistan listening to them when they have good reason to want now and after 2014 will not be standing on its own to make changes. On the armed forces, I will not on any of these issues. Equally, the responsibility for speak for the General—he can speak for himself—but getting them right fundamentally lies with the Afghan they need to do their part within it. people and the Afghan Government, but they will Then we need to make sure that the post-2014 NATO have support from us in other areas. mission is similarly part of a broader international Lt-Gen Capewell: That is why we have made such a effort that makes sense, that has consistency in it and profound investment in the Afghan security apparatus. that works with the grain of Afghan society while Unless there is a secure environment across giving them the wherewithal to do the things we want. Afghanistan, the space for that to occur is simply not That is what the international community said at the delivered. When I view this security effort, it is in Chicago conference, which is that Afghanistan is no terms not only of what we have done so far—we can longer to be, and is never to be again, a safe haven see the results of that on the ground today—but of for terrorists. taking a longer-term view about the momentum we That does not mean that we confidently anticipate we are delivering to those Afghan security agencies to will reach 2014 and there will be no more insurgency allow this polity to settle, to allow this development in Afghanistan, that it will be a thoroughly safe to occur, to keep this moving in the right direction environment with very high levels of development. It through funding and other support, and to give it the means that we are pretty confident that the plan we oxygen it needs to allow accommodation to occur. put in place is working in the way we envisaged, and that those capabilities for the Afghan forces to go on Q229 Chair: After we leave, to whom will this tackling their residual security problems with the security force that we have created be loyal? support of the international community are getting our Lt-Gen Capewell: Well, I rather hope it will be loyal best shot and are going pretty well according to that to the Afghan Government. plan. Chair: Thank you. That was a fascinating evidence session, and we are extremely grateful to all of you Q228 Chair: The implication of what you have said, for giving such clear evidence, as you have. Given the Dame Mariot, is that there is only so much that armed state of decision making on some of this, it was much forces and security forces can do, and that it depends clearer than I was expecting. That does not mean that rather heavily on the quality of governance in you need look worried, by the way. We are most Afghanistan. The implication is that if that goes grateful to you for a very good evidence session. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SE] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Ev 48 Defence Committee: Evidence
Tuesday 20 November 2012
Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)
Mr Julian Brazier Penny Mordaunt Thomas Docherty Sandra Osborne Mr Dai Havard Sir Bob Russell Mrs Madeleine Moon Ms Gisela Stuart ______
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations), Vincent Devine, Director Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence, and Mark Sedwill, Political Director and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.
Chair: Gentlemen, welcome. I think this is the fourth still weak; in some areas, it is of course contested, evidence session of our inquiry into Afghanistan, particularly in the south and the east, and in others it which is a longer inquiry than we normally do, but is still weak. But provincial governance as a whole this is a matter of huge importance to the country, and has improved, and we are seeing in the progress of I think to the world. We have lots of questions to ask the transition plan, which is the piece of work that I you. Some we will have to ask in writing because of focused on in my last few months, a real sign that the the sheer number of things we want to get to the Afghans are beginning to fill the gap that is being bottom of. You are most welcome, and I wonder if opened up for them as we gradually draw down and you would like to begin by introducing yourselves. leave. Lt-Gen Barrons: I am Lieutenant-General Richard Barrons. I am the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff for Q231 Chair: You mentioned the presidential Military Strategy and Operations, and therefore the elections. I do not expect you to tell us who is likely Director of Operations for the Ministry of Defence. to take over from President Karzai, but could you give Vincent Devine: I am Vincent Devine, Director of us the general characteristics of the person who might Operational Policy at the Ministry of Defence. take over from him? What would you expect? Mark Sedwill: Mark Sedwill, Political Director at the Mark Sedwill: In the 2009 election, both leading Foreign Office, also the Prime Minister’s Special candidates ran on balanced tickets. The president and Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, former two vice-presidential candidates will stand. In Ambassador, and formerly the NATO representative President Karzai you had a Pashtun from the south, there. and then in the two vice-presidents a Tajik and a Hazara. I would expect to see the principal tickets Q230 Chair: Okay, thank you. Mr Sedwill, we last being of that same kind of ethnic balance. Others may saw you some time ago in Afghanistan. I wonder if run, but I would expect that to be the case. I think you could explain how the political situation has most Afghans would expect still to see a Pashtun as developed since then, and how you would describe it President. About 40% of the population are Pashtun, now, particularly in relation to national governance and clearly that is the area that is contested by the and how it is doing. Taliban. It is very important, therefore, that the Mark Sedwill: I think there has been significant Pashtun community in Afghanistan feels a connection progress. Of course, there have been setbacks as well. to the President, but it will be a balanced ticket. The I left Afghanistan in the spring of 2011, and I think exact nature of the individual is very difficult to tell. the Committee visited a few months before I left. There are a number of names out there, but no one is Essentially, we have seen since then significant yet emerging as the strongest or the natural candidate. progress in the Government’s financial capacity, so I suppose that, 18 months out, one would not expect they have improved their customs collection, their that yet. revenue collection and their tax collection, which has gone up quite significantly. They have started to tackle Q232 Chair: As we draw down, and as 2014 comes some of the abuses, such as Kabul Bank, and ever closer, is it possible to say now whether prosecutions have just begun this week. They have Afghanistan will have a fully functioning Government started to put in place the pillars for the next after 2014—the sort of Government that would have presidential election in 2014. The date has been an inherent stability built into it? announced, and laws are going through the Afghan Mark Sedwill: I think the answer is probably yes, but Parliament for the Independent Electoral Commission of course there are very significant challenges, and to manage the elections. particularly in the south and east of the country. In Of course, very significant challenges remain, largely Kabul, in the north and the west, there is already a related to the security situation. Corruption is still, and functioning Government and it is led by Afghans. will be for some time, a major challenge. There are Even in Helmand, as you know, our PRT has worked significant issues with the nexus of drugs and criminal hard behind and in support of the Governor, rather patronage, and networks in governance as a whole are than seeking to crowd out Afghan governance. That, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 49
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill to be honest, has been the pattern in one or two other aid-dependent to some degree for probably the next parts of the country. I think there is a good prospect decade, maybe through till the mid 2020s. The World of Afghan governance that essentially is country-wide, Bank’s estimate is that there is a fiscal gap of around but of course it depends particularly on the political 40% now and up until about 2014, and that will be situation and whether there has been some kind of 20% by the end of the decade and by the mid-2020s political accommodation—some kind of reconciliation should close, if Afghanistan remains on its current with the Taliban—that enables Afghan governance to track. Growth per year has been about 9% per year, function effectively throughout the whole country, which you would expect from a very low base, as we particularly the south and east. have seen in Afghanistan. Their own revenue I would expect it would be effective by the standards collection has grown quite significantly. In about of a country at Afghanistan’s stage of development. 2005, it was 3% of GDP. It is now 11%. Clearly, that Let’s remember this is one of the poorest countries in needs to continue, which is one reason we focus so the world and will be for some time to come. We heavily on customs collection, and so on. would expect it to be effective in the main urban The main staple for the economy is still agriculture. centres, the main population centres, even in those In the previous eras, they exported high-quality soft contested areas. But clearly rural areas, if the Taliban fruits into the Indian market. Therefore the AfPak- are still strong in those areas, it would inevitably India trade agreements—the AfPak transit trade remain much weaker. agreement—is important to the agricultural sector for Afghanistan. Pomegranates and other exports of this Q233 Chair: Lord Ashdown says we should leave kind. Towards the end of the decade we hope that now. What do you say to that? mineral resources will come on-stream. You have Mark Sedwill: There is a great deal in what Lord probably seen the reports of the vast mineral resources Ashdown has said, not only in his recent articles but Afghanistan has. Properly managed, they have a over many years, that I would agree with, but I do not genuinely prosperous future, not just a future above think that is right. I think if we raced for the exit, then subsistence level. all of the fears that we have about Afghanistan’s I would expect to see that economic progress future would become that much likelier. It is not in continue, but gradually, of course, they need to wean their interests, or indeed in our national security themselves off being an aid-dependent—and interest, for us to race for the exit. essentially a security dependent—economy. That is If you just look—I know it does not seem long—at what DFID and other major donors are working with the period over the next two years and what we might them on. be able to achieve, and should be able to achieve if we are resolute about it—perhaps I can just use the Q235 Mr Brazier: Correct me if I am wrong: the example of the last 18 months, which General Barrons main mineral resources are not actually in Helmand, will know a little more about. When I left Afghanistan are they? I do not think any of the major finds are. Is in May 2011, less than 20% of operations were led by that right or not? the Afghan national security forces. It is now over Mark Sedwill: I cannot remember the exact 80% and of the remaining 20%, half are co-led by distribution; essentially they are country wide. There them. That is a dramatic change in 18 months and are different resources country wide: precious gems, demonstrates that the transition process—when we some hydrocarbons, rare earths, lithium and so on. I say it is making progress, that is real. cannot remember exactly the mineral resources in Violence in the three areas that transition has already Helmand, although there are significant ones, been taken through in covers about 75% of the certainly, in Kandahar, just next door. population. Violence in those areas is down 15%. The security, of course, as we all know, is absolutely Q236 Mr Brazier: General Barrons, what are we critical to creating the space for decent governance, doing to protect the economic fabric? We have enabling the population to hold the Government to discussed in many of these sessions particular account. If that continues and if we remain resolute protection and particular steps that we are taking on over the next two years and see the project through to the rule of law and the fabric of government, but the end of the combat mission in 2014—and then, of without livelihood one clearly cannot have order. course, there will be a continuing commitment What are we doing to protect and enhance the thereafter—then I think we can achieve our core economy? goals, which are to ensure that Afghanistan is no Lt-Gen Barrons: I will confine myself to the military longer a source of threat to the region or to the wider contribution to this piece. Our significant achievement international community, including the terrorist threat is, with the ANSF, to push the fighting away from the to the UK. centres of population and the main routes. By doing Chair: Thank you. that, you create a space in which governance and development and prosperity can flourish without the Q234 Mr Brazier: Mr Sedwill, what needs to happen dead hand of the insurgency interfering. In Helmand, to the economy to promote a successful Afghanistan as we talked about before, that is pretty much what post-2014? I will give General Barrons advance notice we are accomplishing. that I am then going to ask him what we are doing I think there are a couple of other minor contributions about defending those key objectives. that we might make. The first is in Kabul, by Mark Sedwill: The key thing with the economy is contributing to the institutional development of the essentially to keep it on track. It is going to remain Ministries of Defence and of Interior and the NDS. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Ev 50 Defence Committee: Evidence
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill
We are helping to promote institutions that can protect some of the support of the principal power brokers the Afghan state more generally, and that is work that within Afghanistan, so he had to manage that very will take some time to complete. We need to be carefully and it took longer than we had expected or sensitive to the economic effect of the draw-down and wanted for them really to take a grip on it and start to departure of ISAF. We are in the order of—we have recover some of the funds and, indeed, follow up with an expert here—15% of the economy, so as we criminal prosecutions and sort out the bank. remove our investment, as it were, in the Afghan After a year, the right measures were in place, and it economy, we need to ensure that there is a soft was really as a result of that that commitments were landing. possible at the Bonn conference, and, indeed, The final thing, which is just coming over the radar international commitments from the IMF essentially from my perspective, is that there must be a recertified that aid programmes that had been discussion about the return of the airports at Kabul suspended could restart. So the experts essentially and Kandahar and Jalalabad to the Afghan civil concluded that the Kabul Bank was on track, but it economy, so that they can take advantage of them and remains the most visible sign of the underlying reduce and remove eventually the military pressure on corruption problem. those runways. Corruption is going to take a generation to resolve in Afghanistan. It is absolutely woven into the nature of Q237 Mr Brazier: Thank you. To pick up on that a conflict society, just as the narcotics trade is, which final point, are we looking quite closely at the will also take a generation. There is a very difficult economic, as well as the military, impact of the nexus here between the perception that people have removal of ISAF? and what they suffer in corruption and the abuse of Mark Sedwill: Indeed, the World Bank has looked at power. So, in Helmand for example, corruption was this, as has the IMF, and DFID provided some support really a symptom of the abuse of power, led by certain to that. They expect to see a decline in growth, which tribal groups to the detriment of other tribal groups, is inevitable because of the sheer scale, as General until we were able to start to get a grip on it, and some Barrons has pointed out, of the security presence, but of those features will continue. not, at this stage, for it to flip into recession. They Essentially, there are two things that I would say that think growth will come down from the 7% to 9%— we have done in the last year to tackle this: one by 9% average over the last decade—to low single us, one by the Afghans themselves. At the Tokyo figures before starting to pick up again. conference, we agreed with them a very challenging Quite a lot will depend on how we, essentially, mutual accountability framework, which requires repatriate some of the people whom we have them to take corruption seriously and to get a grip on employed. We employ a vast number of interpreters it throughout the system—not just high-profile cases, and highly skilled people within the ISAF mission. As but throughout the system. The aid that we have we have seen elsewhere, if given lump sums and the committed over the period after 2014 is dependent right kind of training, they can come out and start upon them honouring those commitments. setting up businesses of their own. The World Bank Just a few days later—I think it was 26 July— has taken that into account, and that is a big part of President Karzai issued a decree with 164 time-bound the underlying work on the transition. measures on corruption, and some of those are starting to take effect. Of course, declaratory policy is all very Q238 Ms Stuart: All that economic growth and well, but it does mean that we have some specific increased security will not add up to anything if we commitments against which we can hold them to do not deal with corruption at all levels. The last time account. we saw you, the Kabul Bank was just coming ahead, However, you are absolutely right to focus on the and we then thought it would be sorted. In your judiciary, the prison system and the rule of law introductory remarks, I think you said that generally. As you know, again I have spoken quite prosecutions are just starting to happen. Can you give often about this in the past. I think this remains one us a general idea of what you think is happening to of the most significant risks to Afghanistan’s own deal with corruption? Can you illustrate that with what stability—the connection of their people to their own has happened to the Kabul Bank? Should we have Government and system, but of course our own acted earlier? Do you think the judicial system is up attitude to the resilience of the state. It is going to be to prosecuting? If anybody gets sentenced to anything, a long process and it remains one of the most do we have prisons where people can be contained? significant risks. Mark Sedwill: The answer to all of those questions is essentially “partially”, and let me develop that a bit. Q239 Ms Stuart: Would you say that there are any Kabul Bank, as I think I said in an interview on the prisons now that could actually hold someone day that I left Afghanistan, was the worst moment of convicted as a result of the prosecutions in the Kabul my time there, because it was the moment at which I Bank, and who may well be a member of the Karzai just felt that the whole campaign was at a tipping point family? Do you think there would be a prison where had it not been tackled. To be candid, it took about a you could safely keep someone? year after the Kabul Bank incident itself for the Mark Sedwill: There are some, but it is far from Afghan Government to grip it. There were some very country wide, and one of the problems with the powerful political interests involved and, as we all prisons is that people are, of course, able to bribe their know, that was very challenging for President Karzai way out—not in a high-profile case, because it’s self- and his Ministers to work through. They faced losing evident if it happens there, but at lower levels it is cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 51
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill possible for people to do so and the prison system presume you worked with Marc Grossman—is he still remains a significant gap. So, I think there are prisons doing that for the USA? that meet that test, but it’s far from all of the prisons, Mark Sedwill: Yes. let alone all of the detention facilities that exist in Afghanistan so far. Q244 Mr Havard: But you have a process brokered through Qatar. You have the Stanekzai process—is Q240 Ms Stuart: Just pursuing the Kabul Bank issue that right? again, one of the reasons why it was so significant is Mark Sedwill: Stanekzai, yes. that, first, we were so late coming into it; secondly, the people implicated were very close to the President; Q245 Mr Havard: But then you have the President and, thirdly, which is much more important to our who, whenever he fancies it, steps outside all these inquiry, as I understand it the cash terminals of the things, sets up a Loya Jirga and does a deal with the Kabul Bank were part of the ways that we thought tribes or whatever. There is a variable set of processes we could deal with corruption in the Afghan National involved. Can you tell us something about how you Police, because there wouldn’t be an intermediary feel that is happening, if at all? who would be handing out the cash who then Mark Sedwill: You’re absolutely right to point to the disappeared, because they were getting it out of the complexity of it, but the complexity reflects, cash machines. Can they do that now? Has that been essentially, the fragmentation of the political situation dealt with, so that the people on the ground actually in Afghanistan, both sitting in legitimate politics— now get paid directly rather than through third parties? very fractionalised, no organised parties, with most Mark Sedwill: They do very largely, I think. I can’t affiliations being ethnic or relating to the mujaheddin remember the exact numbers; maybe one of my period—and, essentially, the same on the Taliban side, colleagues knows. But most Afghan policemen and so it is not as binary as the labels we use suggest, as soldiers are paid essentially electronically. you have pointed to. It is complex. To simplify it, I would say that there are really three Q241 Chair: By electronic phone? Afghan constituencies. There are Government, Mark Sedwill: By mobile phone, and so on. Opposition and insurgency, and all three need What happened with the Kabul Bank was the actual relationships with one another. The Doha office, operations of the bank weren’t affected by the major which is where, essentially, the Taliban political corruption scandal; it was really on the balance sheet commission have located themselves, seems to be an of the bank. The bank’s transactional operations were authoritative voice for the Quetta Shura and the maintained, essentially through the whole period, so Taliban leadership. It does seem that that has the although the balance sheet was frozen, in effect, and authority of the leadership, and indeed of Mullah there was, in effect, a money laundering scheme being Omar himself, to connect with the outside world. run through the balance sheet of the Kabul Bank, the There have been some connections, not only by international figures, including Marc Grossman, but actual operations on the ground weren’t as badly by, for example, members of the Afghan Government. affected as we feared they might be. There is also the internal process—the reintegration programme—which General Barrons was one of the Q242 Ms Stuart: Very finally, a quick question— architects of, when he was there in charge of the force with hindsight, could we have acted earlier on this? reintegration cell, in his most recent deployment. It Mark Sedwill: I think we acted as quickly as we has now reintegrated around 5,000 fighters, so that is could. The Kabul Bank came out of, in essence, an internal component of this. There are other internal almost a clear blue sky. We didn’t know that that components, such as outreach to the tribes, as you scandal was going to hit, and when it did hit the rightly point out, which can be done through either international community responded quickly. I think national or local Jirga mechanisms, so they are the Afghans took longer, and they took longer partly looking at the support base of the Taliban. The one because it wasn’t just members close to the President’s you did not refer to, except in your initial remarks— family, but actually the most significant shareholders but I think it is as important as the others—is the were among other very senior power-brokers in AfPak relationship, because that state-to-state Afghanistan, and he had to manage that. I think that relationship, as you hinted, sets the context for took longer than we expected and there were very everything else. some difficult exchanges, including exchanges in the We have to work all of those tracks, in effect. It is not Afghan National Security Council, which I and others yet at the stage where we can say there is a single, had with him and his Ministers over exactly that, load-bearing channel that we could expect to conduct where we had to confront them with the prospects for a formal negotiation. It has not reached that point yet, international support for Afghanistan were they not to but there are genuine channels of communication open take the right action. It was a very, very difficult and we are seeing from the Taliban—including from period. the Taliban leadership, including in some of their public statements—a genuine interest in engaging in Q243 Mr Havard: Can I ask you about a political process. They recognise that they are not reconciliation and reintegration? Where to start with going to win their objectives on the battlefield. They this? There seem to be several processes involved need to engage in a political process, at least after we here, as you know, and it’s interesting that you have have left, and they can set conditions for that now. some responsibilities in relation to Pakistan as well. I The prospects for some kind of political cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Ev 52 Defence Committee: Evidence
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill accommodation are positive, but it is at an early stage, that it will fragment. But, if we are to bring this to a and it will be very complex and difficult to follow for durable settlement of the kind that is in Afghanistan’s most of the next few years. and, indeed, Pakistan’s interest, we have to continue to reach for a comprehensive settlement if we can. Q246 Mr Havard: There are different Talibans and nothing in Afghanistan is binary. Before you start, that Q249 Mr Havard: But we are saying that we are is where I am—right? going to have Sandhurst in the sand. We are going to Mark Sedwill: Agreed. help to train the officer corps. Is the ANSF—the army bit anyway—going to be taken out of competition Q247 Mr Havard: Absolutely. There are different with its corruption, so we will not see sons of warlords groups of people, so what are the incentives to do come back and all of sudden rock up as lieutenant- this? One of the questions about corruption is that, colonels, brigadiers or whatever. What are we doing through the military process, we have a process of about this reconciliation and reintegration process— containment of bandits and what have you, so that the reintegration bit? What are you reintegrating into? various accommodations can be made that are corrupt, Is it what we declare it will be? What will we be frankly, in the process that people come back into. So prepared to put into that, and when are we going to are sons of warlords going to come back and occupy be prepared to stop if it is wrong in terms of controls? positions within the military? Are people going to Mark Sedwill: Again, General Barrons may want to come back in and take positions in these wonderful add something. In terms of the capacity of the army, new ministerial structures? What are the incentives, the army is probably the most respected and, in some and where is the UK? What is the UK’s contribution ways, the best-developed institution in Afghanistan. It to that discussion? has very high degrees of Afghan public confidence. It Mark Sedwill: Sorry, to the reconciliation, or— has also managed largely to avoid being split along ethnic lines. If you talk to a young Afghan soldier and Q248 Mr Havard: To ensure the standards that you ask, “Are you a Tajik or a Pashtun?”, he will tend to are talking about, because the declaratory remarks of say, “I am an Afghan”. They are combined units. It is ISAF and all the rest have been “Brilliant, lovely, best probably the most successful institution so far in of luck—not going to happen as described.” So what Afghanistan. is going to happen and where is the UK in ensuring The officer training academy and similar work to this? develop NCOs, for example, is so important because Mark Sedwill: On corruption, one of the important we are building leadership capacity. As those of you points of context is the stage of development that who have worked in the military or focus on this Afghanistan is at. Corruption is a problem right the know, leadership capacity is absolutely critical. The way across south Asia—a huge problem in Pakistan officer training academy is an important contribution and in India—and just as in Afghanistan, where of to the sustainability of a decent professional army in course it is very visible to us because it is our money Afghanistan in the future. and our people at risk largely, it is associated with The police were more challenging. Up until 2009, the the underlying political and power structures, many of police were recruited, deployed and then trained. It them almost semi-feudal. You are right to point to was only with the formation of the NATO training that, and that will be a feature of Afghanistan for mission that that was turned around, so they were many years to come. It is going to take a long time to recruited, trained and deployed. If you recruit wipe that out gradually. There are Ministries that have untrained policemen, do not pay them properly, put done an effective job. We referred earlier to the them out in small units in villages— mineral resources. The Ministry of Mines, for example, has a good Minister, Wahidullah Shahrani, Q250 Mr Havard: Guess what? who again comes from a long respectable political Mark Sedwill: Exactly. If you ask the Afghan public, family. He really cracked down on corruption within it was really the police, in particular, at that time that that Ministry. He is trying to sign up to the extractor they would see as their main interface with the industries’ transparency index and make sure that Government. It was corrupt behaviour by the police Afghanistan’s minerals are properly exploited, not at the very local level that most people suffered from. primarily because of corruption in a way, although he cares about that, but because, unless that is done Q251 Mr Havard: We will come back and ask you properly, the corruption relating to exploiting mineral some more questions about that particular area. Mr resources could be the trigger for the next round of Devine, do you want to say anything about all of this? conflict. Just as we have seen with conflict diamonds Vincent Devine: I was going to make exactly the same in Africa, all of those risks exist. point that Mark made about increasing public As for the other part of your question about the confidence in the Afghan National Army and the complexity of the Taliban, all of the Taliban groups Afghan National Police. I thought that the figures that including some of those like the Haqqanis, who are came out of the Asia Foundation survey, which is a semi-autonomous, recognise the overall authority of pretty widely respected document, were really rather the Quetta Shura and the overall authority of Mullah encouraging in this area. Omar so, if he is interested and they are interested in More than four out of five respondents agreed that the a genuine political settlement, there is the prospect of ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people: The at least most of the movement being brought back into figure was around 85%. 81% believed that the ANP the legitimate political system. If not, it is more likely helped improve security; 75% said that the ANP is cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 53
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill efficient in arresting those who have committed distrust in that relationship, while there are frictions crimes and bringing them to justice; 93% agree that along the border and while they essentially fear each the ANA—the national army—is honest and fair with other’s motives, it is inevitable that insecurity will the Afghan people and 87% think that the ANA is continue along the border. It is very difficult in those helping to improve security. So working on the circumstances to get Pakistan and the Pakistani principle that nobody is better placed to judge security apparatus to commit to an Afghan political progress in Afghanistan than the Afghan people settlement and use their influence to try to push or themselves, which is a lesson that we have learnt over encourage the Afghan Taliban, many of whom are recent years, these really are quite encouraging. operating from their territory—although, in many cases, ungoverned parts of Pakistan’s territory—to Q252 Mr Havard: But this is before the people have commit to a political settlement. It is really important reconciled. As General Barrons was saying, that we stabilise that relationship. As you will be presumably some of the people at that level—the local aware, that is something that the UK has been directly boys and girls—have already reintegrated. Is that involved in seeking to facilitate, including when the correct? Prime Minister met the two Presidents in New York Lt-Gen Barrons: If we work on the assumption that in September, where they committed to a bilateral 80% of the insurgency operate within 30 miles of their strategic partnership agreement to be negotiated homes, there is an element of this insurgency that is within a year. We continue to work very hard on clearly local. As part of a rapprochement, we will helping them with that. need the sons and daughters. Again, based on the Asia Foundation survey, about 30% of the population of In terms of the Afghan reconciliation itself, we are all Afghanistan has some favourable inclination towards very clear that it must be Afghan-led and Afghan- insurgency. We need their children to commit to this owned. We are starting to see the channels of new Afghan offer and to join the police and the army communication opened between the Government and at the bottom. Provided that they commit to the same the insurgency and between some of the legitimate standards as everybody else and meet the standards of opposition—the northerners and others—and the the training and therefore commission or qualify as insurgency. It is very exploratory and it is really early necessary, that is a really healthy thing. It can be seen days, but the Afghans have done this before. If you in many other campaigns where, as part of bringing a look at the Afghan Government and at when they have community together, they all have to bind into their their version of the state opening of Parliament, they army and their police. There will be some generosity have, as they refer to them, all of the jihadi leaders of spirit required to do that, but the thing that does sitting on the front row. Those are people who fought not work is someone coming back from the each other to a standstill during the civil war and are insurgency having spent some time abroad and actually responsible for killing more of each other’s announcing that they now want to be in charge of a supporters than have been lost since. Yet they found a security institution. They will have to earn that and it way of accommodating themselves to each other, will take a little bit of time. because they recognise the penalties of not doing so. To go back to Mr Havard’s point about not seeing this Q253 Mrs Moon: Mr Sedwill and Mr Devine, what as binary, it is easy for us to think in those terms, but do you think the prospects are for any sort of peace if you think as the Taliban as just another Afghan settlement in Afghanistan? faction with a particular label and a particular Vincent Devine: That is absolutely one for Mark. connection to al-Qaeda and others, it is possible to see Mark Sedwill: I do not have a crystal ball, but I think how they could accommodate themselves to each we are beginning to set the right conditions for it. other. It will be done in a very Afghan way—we What is absolutely crucial is that we do not allow probably will not be in the room, or in the tent, when history to repeat itself. If you talk to them, most much of it is decided. We can encourage it from Afghans are really fearful that the experience of the outside, and those channels of communication are early 1990s will be repeated. That is why, in the first open. As 2014 comes into view, we will probably see half of this year, we put so much effort into securing the pace and energy that both sides give to it increase. the commitments from the international community— It is very early days, and I would not want to put a we got $4 billion over several years from the national figure on the prospect for success, but I think we are security forces at Chicago and from the economic and starting to see a completely different situation development side at Tokyo—partly for the practical effect, which is very important, but partly for the politically to how it was when I was there: we are political effect in order to convince the Afghans and starting to see the pieces begin to move into place. their neighbours that we were not about to make the Vincent Devine: Can I stress one thing, from our same mistake and abandon them, and that they should perspective? The underlying point to Mark’s is that therefore no longer make decisions based on their this is not a big bang. We are talking about a process. fears. That sounds slightly conceptual, but it is really We are not transitioning the force in expectation of a important as a signal into Afghanistan that we are political settlement. We are transitioning in parallel going to commit to the long term and that they can with a political process, as Mark described. It is not start making decisions on that basis. It is important to the big bang moment that we are waiting for in 2013 register that point. or 2014. This is a process which is already very much Second—if I work in from the outside—is the under way, and the transition of military forces will Afghan-Pakistani bilateral relationship. While there is be running in parallel with that. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Ev 54 Defence Committee: Evidence
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill
Q254 Mrs Moon: How durable do you think it can resources and so on. Quite a lot of the fight is for that be? reason. That is not really about policy or ideology. Mark Sedwill: It depends on how many people are It is a complex picture, but I don’t see, myself, that involved, and on the terms. We have all made clear the ideological motive is going to be the primary what we believe the terms should be: there needs to motive after western troops have withdrawn. As be a renunciation of violence and association with Vincent Devine pointed out, this will be a process that terrorist groups, and there needs to be respect for the will go through 2014. It took us a decade in Northern Afghan constitution, including, of course, the human Ireland after the Good Friday agreement; it will be rights provisions—inevitably, many of us have the same order of magnitude in Afghanistan, I would focused on women’s rights, but also children’s rights expect, before we can say that we can be confident and the rights of other disadvantaged groups. That is that a durable and inclusive political settlement has not just right, it is actually necessary, if it is to be been reached. durable, because there is a constituency in Afghanistan who have really benefited from the last Q256 Mrs Moon: What areas are our greatest risks 10 years. Of course the implementation of what we in terms of instability and insecurity remaining? How, would regard as acceptable standards of human rights, for example, is Helmand shaping up? Is that going to including women’s rights, throughout the country is be a particular problem? Are the provinces along the still very uneven. It is particularly uneven in rural border with Pakistan a particular issue? The north areas in terms of levels of education and so on, and seems to have been settled for some time. Are we social exclusion is still high, but you would expect getting a mixed picture in different areas of that in a country at Afghanistan’s stage of Afghanistan, and are we making a major mistake in development. But there is a constituency that will not trying to think of the country as a whole, rather than give those things up without a fight. picking off where the risks are? As we have seen through the Arab Spring, it would Mark Sedwill: I think you are absolutely right to point be impossible to impose a durable settlement that did to that. Essentially, the short answer to your question not accommodate the very strong desires of the people is yes. Almost half the enemy-initiated violence in to be included in it and for their Government to be Afghanistan is in 10 of the 364 districts in inclusive. Again, we are simply sowing the seeds of Afghanistan. Less than 1% is in Kabul, where 15% of the next round. Most encouragingly, the Afghans the population live. Over half, I believe, is in RC themselves see it in those terms. South and RC Southwest, which includes Helmand Although I would not like to put too much emphasis and Kandahar and the immediate provinces, where on this, we are, interestingly, starting to see some about 11% of the population live. It is a very uneven recognition—I would not put it any higher than that— picture. in some of the Taliban statements, including There are pockets of violence in the north, but those statements around Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, that are containable, and a lot of that, although it may carry they need to move on that issue and accommodate the flag of the town, is actually criminal or tribal the positions that the rest of Afghanistan hold and the violence. One of the issues for us is that it is the area commitment that the rest of Afghanistan has to girls’ where we have been in probably the toughest fight in education, to women’s rights and to the other Afghanistan over the last decade, and that area will advances of the last 10 years. remain one of the most difficult and challenging after we have handed over responsibility to the Afghans. Q255 Mrs Moon: If we accept that the Taliban isn’t There are one or two provinces in the east—Khost, an single entity—there are as many Talibans, almost, for example. Physically, if you look at the geography, as Afghanis—how consistent a message are you that faces into Pakistan. There is Nuristan on the hearing across Taliban groups and across those who border. There has been some infiltration back into would, in the past, have totally opposed any sort of there. It is exactly as you point out. Some of the centralised state within Afghanistan? provinces along the Pakistan border, particularly the Mark Sedwill: It is a very important question, and our core of the south, will remain the most challenging. understanding is limited, to be honest. We have some insight into internal debate within the Taliban and Q257 Mrs Moon: I would cite the ISAF partnership, where different groups and leaders positions but where are the critical players in ensuring a lasting themselves, but that insight, inevitably, is far from peace settlement? Is it Russia? Is it Pakistan? Is it complete. I think the leadership of the Taliban is China? beginning to accommodate itself to the need for a Mark Sedwill: All the region has a role to play. It is political settlement, but their objectives are still not important that Afghanistan is embedded economically, the same as ours: they don’t want the Afghanistan that and, in terms of security, in the region as a whole. we would see as acceptable and most of the Afghan There are various processes to encourage that. The population would see as acceptable. Again, you would Turks have been leading one called the Heart of Asia expect that at this stage. There are many people within process, but there are others as well. The key external the Taliban who are essentially fighting to protect their player—other than ourselves, of course—is Pakistan. local interests. As General Barrons pointed out, most It is where the insurgency is based. The border of the Taliban, and most of the insurgency as a whole, between the two countries bifurcates the Pashtun belt. essentially fight in their own areas. Therefore, quite a There are 18 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan and lot of this is driven by local tribal frictions, access to about 30 million in Pakistan. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 55
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill
In Pakistan they face a severe problem with their own delivery of justice, governance and development right Taliban, the TTP. Of course, that is why they point now—they are replaced by competent Afghan out that they cannot afford instability in the Pashtun counterparts connected to Ministries in Kabul that areas of Afghanistan, because it will spill back into deliver guidance, policy and resources. For me, in this Pakistan and make their own problems even worse. period of the next two years, just as important as the That is why we are hoping that Pakistan will take way we transition the lead for security is the way the more effective action to promote a political space that we enable is filled with a good offer from settlement. Of all the external players, I think Pakistan the Kabul-based Government. I don’t know if Mark is the most crucial. has anything to add. Mark Sedwill: Just one point of detail. We have, as Q258 Mrs Moon: If I could bring in General the General said, a parallel plan to transition the PRT. Barrons. There is always the possibility that we do not In effect, most of the work of the PRT has already get a settlement and that the instability remains as we been transitioned. It has been for several years, and move towards 2014, and indeed into 2014. has been in support of the provincial Government, Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes. designed to enable their capacity and help them build a provincial education capability, health capability, Q259 Mrs Moon: So what happens if there is no district governance and so on. Some of that could peace settlement? Do we have a plan B? Do we have involve just building a district centre or giving the a contingency plan as to what we will do if the district governor a motorbike to be able to get around instability rises as we decrease our presence and our his area—really simple things of that kind. troops across ISAF? We currently have five district stabilisation teams. Lt-Gen Barrons: In fact, our assumption is that the Over the next year we will draw back to three hubs— insurgency will not have been brought to a close by north, central and southern—and then we will December 2014, but the point is that the insurgency essentially have a reserve or support base in Camp will have been reduced and the ANSF capability will Bastion. So we are gradually, in parallel, drawing the have been increased to the point where the ANSF civilian effort back from being in the field on the overface the residual insurgency. I don’t think many ground to enabling the provincial Afghan of us expect full political accommodation in 2014 or Government, and then gradually stepping back so that even 2015. The Afghans and their neighbours will the transition is to them, rather than to the UN or take some time to reach it. anyone else. The issue for me as a military man is whether, by the end of our combat role at the end of December 2014, Q261 Mrs Moon: You failed to mention the the ANSF will be good enough to take on the residual contractors in the servicing and maintenance roles. insurgency. On the point you made a moment or two They will need to remain there for some considerable ago, not all of the country is equal. There are large time to ensure that equipment is still operating, and tracts of mountains and desert that are sparsely no doubt to train Afghans in whatever we leave populated, where, frankly, if they swing to a residual behind. You did not mention them. insurgency, it does not matter a whole lot. Our focus Lt-Gen Barrons: Well, I will ask Vincent maybe to and that of our Afghan partners must be on the key add something. The contractors come in a number of centres of population and the routes that connect them. guises. Those contractors that are from the west fulfil That is what we are doing now, and we are confident a number of roles, but they will tend to be either about that outcome. behind the wire in places such as Camp Bastion or absolutely integral to our own movement. There are Q260 Mrs Moon: For the British public, the focus is third-party contractors who are much more going to be on Helmand and on the security of our comfortable operating in a very light way among the military personnel, but also on our civilian contractors local population. Provided they remain funded and are there as we reduce our presence. How secure can happy to work alongside the ANSF, that is a more people feel? Military personnel will remain as we than reasonable proposition. Then, of course, there are draw down, and civilian contractors, who are going to those people the Afghans in future choose to hire. be critical to keeping it going, will remain. How That will be for them to arrange. secure can they feel that they will be safe and that Vincent Devine: You did cover some of this in detail their protection will be at the forefront? with David Capewell. As he plans this complex Lt-Gen Barrons: For our part, in our three districts in transition, force protection will be a priority both for Helmand, we will manage the transition to an ANSF UK forces and personnel working alongside us. David lead and the draw-down of our own force, so that has been absolutely clear on that and Ministers have there is no question of our civilian counterparts being been absolutely clear in the direction they have given. left, as it were, high and dry. The way the military That is one of the complexities of the process. step down through 2013Ð14 will be paralleled by the Mark Sedwill: It is worth just mentioning the Afghan way our civilian counterparts and the PRT adjust their public protection force. profile. One issue to be addressed is how much the Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes. You will know that over time, UN chooses to take over some of our role in Helmand there has been an assertion by the Afghan as we step down and depart. That is for others to Government of its sovereign control over the use of decide. private military security companies. Increasingly, The key plank for us is that, as we remove the UK what we have now is an Afghan Government- civilian footprint—those people who are helping the provided force. They are happy with how it is cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Ev 56 Defence Committee: Evidence
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill constituted, how it is resourced and how it works and Afghanistan will continue to achieve the campaign works with the police. Increasingly, as they take over objectives and Afghanistan will be, not peaceful in the the protection of Afghan Government work, that will sense we understand it, but peaceful in the sense that be on terms with which they are fully happy. I should it will no longer be a threat to the region. Afghan also mention that right now we use a lot of Government writ will run throughout its territory and contractors—for example, trucking companies—that they will be able to contain what criminal violence take our stuff to and from Camp Bastion. They operate and what other political violence remains. entirely under their own auspices and they may or not may work with the APPF help. There is an awful lot Q264 Ms Stuart: I was very struck the first time I of activity that will go on regardless of the ISAF went to Kabul by a small plaque which said, “This international presence. was opened by the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office”. Then you went into Q262 Sandra Osborne: You’re sounding cautiously another room and there was a much larger plaque optimistic about the political process, as has every which said, “This was opened by the Secretary of ambassador who has given evidence to the State for the Department for International Committee. When they leave the FCO they say Development”. Then there were MOD people something almost completely different and sound very crawling all over the place. If we were to go in five pessimistic about the whole thing. Can you talk about years’ time, which Departments would have the the role of the FCO post-2014? You have talked about biggest plaque and which would be in charge? progress in governance, but that is not much use Mark Sedwill: I think the Prime Minister would without a political settlement. What is the role of the remind us who is in charge, as would any Prime FCO going to be post-2014? Minister. As ambassador, you work for the Mark Sedwill: As we have said, the political Government. When I was there as ambassador I was accommodation, the political process, will almost very clear that I did not actually work for the FCO— certainly continue beyond 2014, not least because if that was my managerial chain—but I worked for the you think back to an earlier question, the new Government and in many ways directly to Downing president and the new Government will have to be street and the Cabinet Office. In a place like part of that, not just the outgoing Administration of Afghanistan that is quite natural. Inevitably the President Karzai. He is partly setting the conditions mission will change. We have or have had 10,000 for that. After 2014, I expect us still to have a very big British troops on the ground. That number is coming embassy in Kabul, and that will still contain around a down. Inevitably the military component of the dozen Government Departments—the Foreign Office, mission has been the dominant component as we have DFID and all the others. There will still probably be been managing the conflict. people there from SOCA or the National Crime Actually, I think for the UK we have managed that Agency, as it will become, working on counter- relationship and, frankly, that balance between the narcotics. There will still be military people there and civilian and the military much better than some of our so on. But as in other places, our role will become counterparts have. We have had very good increasingly one of diplomatic influence on a political relationships between successive ambassadors and the process, which will be an Afghan political process, deputy commander of ISAF, who is the senior British rather than direct intervention. officer in theatre. There have been very good That, of course, is the right way to go. We don’t relationships between the heads of PRTs and the expect to have a mission on the ground in Helmand military commanders on the ground in Helmand. In after 2014. The PRT, as they will throughout the 2015, 2016, my guess is that there will be a significant country, will close and we will maintain our legacy Foreign Office presence, but not dozens and dozens programmes in Helmand, essentially working through of people. Probably DFID will be the biggest single our teams and from Kabul and one or two regional operator in Afghanistan for the British Government centres. We will continue to work, as we do in other after 2015, I would expect. countries, on the political process but it will look, as Mr Havard: You aren’t going to tell us who the it did in Iraq and as it has elsewhere, much more like Prime Minister is going to be. I thought we might a normal embassy in a country like Afghanistan than have a punt. it does at the moment. [Interruption.] I may not have Mark Sedwill: I’m not predicting Afghan or British quite understood your question. politics.
Q263 Sandra Osborne: Yes, but what if the whole Q265 Mr Havard: Not even the president of thing unravels and it is the big mess that we are Afghanistan. reading about in books? Let me ask you a serious set of questions about what Mark Sedwill: People who write books are looking is now euphemistically known as green on blue, and for a headline because that is what sells books. It is the situation for our troops currently and how they tempting in those circumstances always to point to the will be protected and will protect themselves through negatives, risks, gaps, challenges, failures—the the period up to and beyond 2014, but certainly up to mistakes that we have made. I cannot give you a 2014. At the moment, there are ANSF—apparently; guarantee about the outcome in Afghanistan, but I can certainly people wearing uniforms, or mock uniforms, tell you that the decisions lie in our hands and the and some who are absolutely members of it—engaged hands of the Afghans and their neighbours. If we in the attacks that are all over the press. The ANSF is make the right decisions, there is a good prospect that a rather broad category and there is variability cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 57
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill between army and police, so can you please tell us that is a work in progress, and which is in very large what is happening in terms of protecting all our measure heading in the right direction. What we have personnel, who are engaged with all those differently to do is contain the risk of insider threat, which will badged groups? diminish as we step back over time and thin our forces Mark Sedwill: Perhaps I should allow General down. It is bounded by time and the nature of the task, Barrons to take the lead on that. I can fill in some of but it cannot be eliminated entirely. the political context if it is helpful. Lt-Gen Barrons: You are absolutely right. Right now Q267 Mr Havard: Okay. We will ask you some there are a very large number of ISAF soldiers of all questions later. nations working shoulder to shoulder with their One thing that has happened is that ISAF have been Afghan— looking at revising the vetting process and so on; it is a problem across the whole of Afghanistan, not just Q266 Mr Havard: Before you go too far, I know we where British troops are. Are the proportions you are going to have a discussion with you later, but what talked about—one in 10,000, or whatever it is— you can say publicly will be helpful. Sorry to variable across the piece? Is Helmand a significant everybody watching—if anybody is. difference in terms of the numbers per capita? Is there Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes. I will confine myself to some a different look, as it were, because the Brits have a general remarks and we can do the detail privately particular view of what they are doing in the area they later. have control of, in terms of that vetting process? Can Mr Havard: Thank you. you give us any confidence that the British have a Lt-Gen Barrons: A very large number of ISAF significant input into the area we are dealing with, soldiers of all nations are working shoulder to albeit there is an ISAF process operating at the centre? shoulder with their Afghan army, police and Afghan Lt-Gen Barrons: I will show you a picture later, but local police colleagues. They are doing this in a these attacks occur when most of the fighting is under number of settings, which range from institutions in way, so more in the south and east than in the north. Kabul right through to very small patrol bases in the We have looked very carefully at whether this is more difficult parts of places like Helmand. We are particularly targeted at the Brits in our three districts engaged in a process of transition. As you well know, in central Helmand, and the answer to that is no, but there was a time when basically we did the fighting, we do operate in some of the more difficult parts of but now we have grown Afghan national security the country. These attacks have been targeted against forces to begin to take our place. We are partnering a whole range of ISAF nations, and, of course, against with them and as they get better, we step back and the Afghan national security forces themselves, so provide mentoring and some enablement. Eventually, they are not specifically focused on us. The question we will have each other in eyesight, but they will that has also been asked is whether there are things effectively be as independent as possible. we are doing that are different from other nations that Whilst we have been going through that process, it is a expose us to greater risk. The answer to that, to the fact that there have been a number of occasions when best knowledge of the commanders on the site, is no. members of those institutions have turned their weapons on members of ISAF. This is an extremely Q268 Mr Havard: Can I ask you the question that significant and very unfortunate turn of events. The people ask me? Why are we still patrolling then? thing we need to be clear about first of all is why it is What is the answer to the man on the Merthyr occurring. The fact is that roughly half the omnibus, who says to me, “What’s happening? Why perpetrators of those attacks either do not survive the are my boys walking about there?”? experience or, in a few cases, escape, so we cannot Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes, I think it is a good question for ask them. Of the balance, there are very clear him to ask, but the answer is that we are patrolling a indications that a relatively modest proportion are whole lot less, because as we hand over the leadership directly connected to the insurgency, and rather more to the Afghan national security forces, they are taking have turned their weapons on us as a result of some the fight on themselves. As a rule of thumb, over the grievance or slight, or the co-option of their family or last 12 weeks, the number of attacks against the some other response to a very localised event. But the Afghan national security forces across Afghanistan outcome is the same: in some cases, our soldiers have has risen north of 150%. That reflects the fact that been killed and in other cases, wounded. It is they are very firmly in the front as we begin to step completely clearly understood by the leadership of the back. There are some areas—the more difficult ANSF and their political masters that this is a highly areas—where we will continue to take the lead for a unfortunate turn of events, and our Afghan little while yet, and there are other areas where, for counterparts are as keen as we are to do everything our own force protection, we will always wish to have we can to contain it. We are going to talk later about our hand on the ground. The area around Camp some of the measures—which I wouldn’t be willing Bastion is an example of where, for our own reasons, to put in the public domain. we will need to be outside the wire. As a rule of thumb statistic, the incidence is that for about every 10,000 members of the Afghan national Q269 Mr Havard: If there is still the overriding army, one of them is engaging in an act of that nature condition that withdrawal, change and particularly and the other, roughly, 9,999 are getting on with the transition are to be conditions-based, which maybe job alongside us. We have to bear in mind that we are achieves a particular level for a period of time but all—ourselves and the Afghans—committed to a plan then falls back and needs remedial action and so on, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Ev 58 Defence Committee: Evidence
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill where does the conditions-based analysis then sit, in handing over responsibility to the Afghan forces to do terms of the process of withdrawal? Is that why patrolling? Could we be a bit quicker and trust them patrolling is continuing? a bit more to do patrolling and to take on the security Lt-Gen Barrons: There are three parts to the responsibilities that, at the moment, some British conditions-based thing that I would highlight. First, troops are doing? the capability of the ANSF: in the early days, we are Lt-Gen Barrons: I think the first part of my answer going to start by being alongside them at company would be that we need to approach this from an level. As they improve, you will step up to battalion, alliance perspective. It would be unhelpful in to brigade, and eventually to corps. Now, how fast principle if the UK decided to move at a different you do that should be based on how well they speed from the rest of the alliance. It would be equally perform, and that is welcome progress. Secondly, we unhelpful, in my view, if the UK was somehow would need to decide how long we needed to maintain dragging its feet behind the rest of the alliance. There a footprint in various parts of our area. For example, is a debate that will occur among capitals in January how long should we remain in the district centres or February next year about the trajectory of force during the course of ’13 and ’14? Thirdly, there are departures through 2013Ð14. Part of that debate will other bits of the ANSF—for example, their aviators, be to judge—it will be a political judgment—whether medics, communicators and logisticians—where they are behind in the development process, so they will this must go slower or faster. An element of it is need more help for longer, but much of that help is conditions-based, as we have talked about, and an not in the eye of the fight, as it were. element of it will be a political judgment about, “Well, Chair: I would like to bring in Sir Bob Russell. this is roughly where we would like to be by the end of 2013, to be set up for the end of combat at the end Q270 Sir Bob Russell: General, following on, are the of 2014.” attacks by the ANSF personnel premeditated, Vincent Devine: It is also worth stressing that organised or spontaneous? Or are they a mixture of decisions on transition are taken in partnership with all three? the Afghans, who take their own view on progress on Lt-Gen Barrons: Again, later I am going to give you conditions—on both the development of the ANSF a couple of examples to illustrate the problem, but and improvements in security on the ground. It is a the fact is that some of them have had a degree of decision taken across the alliance and with our Afghan premeditation, and some of them appear simply to be partners. It is on schedule. There may be scope to a spur of the moment reaction. The motivation behind accelerate it, but that is a matter for discussion with that is very hard to gauge, particularly for the more the Afghans. than half that are not speaking any longer, but it seems Lt-Gen Barrons: The vital point here is the that only a very modest percentage are the result of confidence of the ANSF in the field. If we pull our some heavily constructed plan. help away before they are confident, even if we assert The thought that is often presented is: how many are that they are quite capable, they have to be sufficiently the result of the insurgency planting people in the confident to stay with the fight and be resilient. There Afghan national security forces? The answer to that is is a difficult risk judgment to be taken. that we think it is a tiny number. However, we would condition that by saying that if you are a member of Q273 Mr Havard: Finally on this, I know that in the insurgency and you went to all the trouble of discussion about lay-down and so on, it was argued, putting people in the Afghan national security forces, thankfully, that that should be after the presidential you would have choices about whether you kept them elections in America, and that will now come in for intelligence, to steal equipment, or to inflict an February, or March or whatever, next year. I attack, which is clearly a one-off event. We need to understand that. However, what you are saying to me distinguish very carefully between what the is that with regard to local policing initiatives, insurgency is bound to say, which is that these attacks confidence building and capacity building—not for are a tactic that they will adopt, and the truth of the front-end attacks by ANSF forces but for logistics, matter, which is that only a very small number are supply and all those other ancillary tasks—it is indisputably linked to the insurgency—many others occur for a wider ranger of reasons. necessary to have patrolling with those things to build those up between now and February. Am I understanding that correctly? Q271 Sir Bob Russell: Thank you for that. If I can just move on to Afghan attacks on Afghans, which I Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes. I would say that there is not a do not think the British media pick up on, how serious single commander at any level in Helmand, up to the is that? Clearly, it must be damaging to the morale of Chief of Joint Operations, who would want to the Afghan national forces if their own kith and kin maintain patrolling activity as some sort of diversion are killing them. for troops that are away— Lt-Gen Barrons: It is a serious issue. I will not, if I may say so, give figures now, but I will be able to do Q274 Mr Havard: But there is value in the process. so later. Yes, of course, it matters to them as much as Lt-Gen Barrons: There is absolutely value in the it matters to us. process. How could we look our own people in the eye if we were putting them in harm’s way Q272 Chair: On the general point, though, do you unnecessarily? That is not what we do. think that we are dragging our feet slightly about Mr Havard: That is what I am asking. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 59
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill
Q275 Ms Gisela Stuart: General Barrons, you said Lt-Gen Barrons: In terms of the enablers for the it is absolutely essential that the Afghans have ANSF, they will have some of those things. They confidence, and that there will be a political process already have some helicopters—Mi-17s—which they in January on withdrawal. That race to the exit door are flying. During the course of 2013Ð14, they will across capitals within ISAF is getting faster and faster. begin to get more fixed-wing aircraft. There is a What is plan B, if the exit, as we are planning it, is considerable amount more in the US-funded effort to not working? What is your contingency planning? improve their logistics communications and medical Lt-Gen Barrons: We could produce any number of capacity, but of course it will not reflect the quality or plans to regulate the trajectory of our departure from the quantity of the enabling capability that we enjoy. Afghanistan. It needs to be selected by the Alliance There is an issue here, in that if you arrive at the end in conjunction with the Afghans, so that there is a of 2014 and the ANSF is not generally self-standing benchmark performance. Some things will regulate in every regard, what is it that the international the speed at which we depart, and one of the key community, in the shape of ISAF, is still prepared to things is how long it actually takes to move our stuff do to enable the ANSF? That is not a debate that safely, securely and in good order out of Afghanistan. people are willing to have yet, but everyone That is a two-year project. As a rule of thumb, our US acknowledges that there is an issue there. colleagues need to move a 20-foot container out of The other key thing is that the Afghans will never Afghanistan every seven and a half minutes between operate as a mirror image of us. They function now and 2015 in order to get their things out. That is a differently on the ground; they are much less reliant measure of the logistic challenge. We could, of course, on technology; they are much more human simply cease work and fall back on our camps and intelligence-focused; and the standards that they remove ourselves as quickly as possible. require in terms of equipment and method of operating are slightly different. They will produce local solutions in the way that they operate that Q276 Ms Stuart: One of my colleagues will pursue require less enablement than the ones that we have that exit. At this stage, I am much more worried about enjoyed as a foreign army. what would happen if all your assumptions about how you are going to get out do not come about. You say Q280 Ms Stuart: So let us assume that, given their that you can have any number of plans, but do you work on the ground and that they work differently, have just one plan that says, “My confidence was not you are confident that they will be able to deal with warranted. Things are actually much worse, and it insurgents in terms of logistics, helicopters and ain’t working”? health care. Lt-Gen Barrons: You would expect me, as a military Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes. man, to be absolutely assured of my own force protection in Afghanistan, so there is nothing that is Q281 Ms Stuart: I still wonder—even if you do not going to happen in Afghanistan that will overface our want to tell us this in open session—what your ability to protect ourselves. fallback position is, your plan B. What is developing over the next 12 months that will allow our guys to Q277 Ms Stuart: So you have got a reserve, or a withdraw, so that there are fewer and fewer of them contingency? there, and they are safe and secure? Other than faith, Lt-Gen Barrons: Oh yes. For the Chief of the which is nice, but— Defence Staff, it is an article of faith, of which I am Lt-Gen Barrons: The key thing for me is our reminded regularly, that we will always be able to confidence in the developing capability of the Afghan look after ourselves if the situation deteriorates. national security forces.
Q278 Ms Stuart: You know that Reagan said “trust, Q282 Ms Stuart: That is not quite enough. You must but verify”. Could you tell us a bit more about what have a bit more than just your confidence in what they that utter faith is based on? are going to do. I would not go into a general election Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes. The first point is that, right just with confidence in what everyone else is doing— now, we have a centre at Camp Bastion and we have I would have something in my back pocket that I a distribution of forces around the central districts of could do when they are not delivering. Helmand. We would always be able to make sure that Sir Bob Russell: Do you? those people in the outposts are folks that we can go Ms Stuart: Yes. and help, much as we can go and help the ANSF if Lt-Gen Barrons: But as we reduce our capability over necessary. So we will not, in any way, remove our that same time, we will never be at a position where military ability to secure our destiny and move we are so exposed that we cannot look after ourselves ourselves back into Bastion and, if necessary, out of up to the day we go. Eventually, we will fall back on theatre. Camp Bastion, which has a perimeter the size of Mr Havard: Can I be clear on this very thing— Reading and an enormous American population. This is not like a fighting withdrawal through the jungles Q279 Ms Stuart: May I just finish that train of of the second world war. It is completely different. thought? You are confident. The ANSF will not have helicopters, and they will not have our health care— Q283 Ms Stuart: So Camp Bastion is your other they will not have all those kinds of bits. How are you strategic reserve, and if things get so tough, we just going to bridge that gap? go within the perimeters of Reading? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Ev 60 Defence Committee: Evidence
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill
Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes. I have been very struck by just how committed the Germans have been and how, for the first time in their Q284 Ms Stuart: Are you serious? whole post-war history, they have been prepared to Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes. There is nothing that the put troops, special forces and others into genuine insurgency is capable of doing that would put our combat roles in the northern area. They are talking basic force protection at risk somewhere like Camp about retaining a presence in that region beyond 2014 Bastion. to help mentor at the core level. Chair: That is very valuable, thank you. Q285 Ms Stuart: Just to be absolutely clear, our fallback position in this strategy—what we do when Q289 Sandra Osborne: Lieutenant-General Barrons, things do not work—is bury ourselves in Camp how would you define a successful withdrawal of UK Bastion. combat troops? Lt-Gen Barrons: Unless you were interested in Lt-Gen Barrons: Militarily, the first priority is an committing to another surge and going back in again, Afghan national security force organisation, military but I sense that— and police, that is sufficiently capable, confident and Vincent Devine: Can I just come back and challenge large to take on the residual insurgency—in other one assumption? It is an absolutely critical point. You words, to have completed transition to them to the said that the race to the door is getting faster and point where they can take this fight on without our faster. But I do not think that that is true, and it is not direct help. Secondly, that we have recovered our men fair to our allies and partners in NATO. Our allies and and matériel successfully from Afghanistan and taken partners committed to a strategy and to time lines, I them back to the UK in good order. Thirdly, that we think in Lisbon, and overwhelmingly they have stayed have come to some sort of accommodation or on that strategy and on those time line., So I do not agreement about what we will continue to do in a very think it is fair to say that the race to the door is getting small way with the Afghan national security forces faster and faster. We are implementing a process of after the end of ISAF. transition as set out some years ago. Q290 Sandra Osborne: Gisela has touched on this, Q286 Ms Stuart: In that case, we are clearly reading but do you believe that you have a robust plan that is different foreign press cuttings on what goes on in the sufficient to enable you to cope if you are forced to other capitals of Europe and how quickly they want withdraw in contact? to get out. Lt-Gen Barrons: I am afraid that this question keeps Mark Sedwill: I think that there is the same political coming up—the idea that we are somehow going to urge to withdraw as fast as possible, but if you look be forced to withdraw in contact. We just do not see at the nature of the alliance since 2010, the number of the capacity in the insurgency to force that. There was countries committed to Afghanistan has gone up: it a time, between 2006 and 2008, when the insurgency was 42 when I first got to Afghanistan, and it is over was tempted to take us on in a more orthodox 50 now in ISAF. There have been some high-profile confrontation, so you would have groups of up to 50, withdrawals: in 2009Ð10, the Canadians and Dutch or sometimes 100, insurgents who decided to take us withdrew. One of the things we achieved at Lisbon, on in a very conventional way. Every time that by setting out the 2014 plan and the transition to it, occurred they took a lot of casualties and were was to stem that, because there was a risk at that time defeated, because they are simply incapable of that others would go in a disorganised way. Now there replicating the combat power that we can focus on is a plan and the vast majority of the alliance, as those sorts of encounters. The next instalment of this Vincent says, is committed to that plan and to campaign has been falling back on IEDs and very withdrawing forces along that plan. ISAF has actually small-scale small arms encounters. That is the limit of increased as a coalition. their capability. Since then, not only has their capability reduced a Q287 Ms Stuart: The French are withdrawing little, but Afghan national security forces have got earlier, and the Germans want to get out quickly. better, so not only do we have robust capability, but Vincent Devine: I did say “overwhelmingly”. we have Afghan colleagues who can match us. At no point in this business of getting out of Afghanistan are Q288 Ms Stuart: If it is the Americans, the French, we going to allow ourselves to be in the position the Germans and us, who is left in any significant where these tiny packets of insurgents and their little numbers? bits of asymmetric capability would overface us. That Mark Sedwill: On the French, there was a campaign is not going to happen. promise by President Hollande. It was possible—this was on al-Jazeera, I think, today—for them to end Q291 Sandra Osborne: In relation to withdrawal, is their combat mission in Kapisa, in line with the ISAF there any possibility of UK troops being withdrawn transition plan, in RC East. It was challenging, but it earlier than 2014? was a campaign commitment by a democratically Lt-Gen Barrons: It is not a decision for me, because elected Government. That is one of the things we just this is a matter for Governments. We will continue to have to respect in an alliance. In the same way, other write a military plan and prosecute a military countries will come in. They will come in for a range operation that delivers policy objectives set by of different motives, of course—this is not just about Government. That must be mindful of the fact that we Afghanistan. are operating as part of an alliance, but if cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 61
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill
Governments were to come to the conclusion that they glide path is disturbed? What happens if, for example, wanted to leave sooner, we would leave sooner. I you cannot do the deal with Pakistan and get all this could write a plan that goes with this either way. Right stuff out by sea? What happens if you have to go now, we have a plan that sees us completing the north? What happens if you have to go to the process of transition, coming out of combat at the end Kazakhs? What happens if you have to go through of ’14, and then completing the process of removing Russia? And then where is the contingency reserve to our stuff. From a military perspective, I could do it fight your way out, effectively—not necessarily in a either way, but I think that question had better be classic sense, but in the sense of withdrawing in a directed at the Government. rather more difficult way than is predicted? What is happening in terms of that debate? Q292 Sandra Osborne: You could do it either way, Lt-Gen Barrons: If I start with the more basic and therefore some of the deaths that we hear about question about alternative routes, we have in the order every week at Prime Minister’s questions could be of 10,000 20-foot containers-worth of equipment that avoided if we withdrew earlier. we need to get out. There are a number of ways of Lt-Gen Barrons: I would not subscribe to that, getting it out. By road, you could go south through provided you are committed to the current plan. There Pakistan. As you know, those routes have been closed is a price to be paid for seeing through the process of for a while, but we are quite close to resetting that ANSF development and the process of transition. For agreement and we are reasonably confident—although as long as you choose—it is not a military decision, this is not quite yet in the bag—that by December, ultimately—to continue to see that plan through, there maybe January, we will have reverse flow through will be a price to be paid, but it is declining over time, Pakistan to Karachi. That is the cheapest, most and, as I said earlier, there is no sense of military efficient and most attractive way of moving our stuff adventurism about this. We are not trying to hang on out. As you know, it is moved not by us, but by to operations for longer because we think it is a good civilian contractors. But we need alternatives. idea. That is not what we are about. Provided you The next alternative is to have a number of routes that agree to stick to the current plan, there will be a price would go from the north of Afghanistan through the to be paid. If you were to decide that the most “stans” and through Russia. We can construct important thing is the force protection of our people, agreements to do that bilaterally, but it is better that then, like any operation, tell us to come home, but we do it on a NATO basis. Those agreements are in that would be at the price of the operation that we are place, or are coming into place. They are generally currently embarked on not succeeding. more expensive, they take a bit longer to get our stuff home and they need to be accompanied by similar Q293 Sandra Osborne: What about the US and arrangements over the air lines of communication. NATO? Is there any likelihood of a substantial Right now, we can fly matériel from the south, and at withdrawal on their part before 2014? the minute we can bring matériel in, but not exit it, Mark Sedwill: Exactly the same process is being through the north, so that is a next step in the worked through in every NATO capital, and, of agreements that we will work through. course, at NATO itself. The Americans, now that the There is a third route that will allow us to fly things Obama Administration are back, will be going from Bastion to somewhere in the Middle East, where through precisely this debate themselves. As the we can then try to ship it. The final way, which is a Defence Secretary said to you, we expect there to be little bit more expensive, but only a little bit, is flying a significant draw-down in 2013 and 2014 to get to your matériel from Bastion directly back to the UK in the enduring presence, but there have been no a mixture of Air Force and commercial transport. decisions that we are aware of yet in Washington or Quite soon, we will be moving in the order of 1,000 elsewhere about the exact trajectory. They are still metric tonnes a month by air. The things that really working on that and are still committed to doing it in matter to us, not least the key vehicles that the Army a way that enables us to see the campaign plan needs for its future equipment programme, will come through. As General Barrons said, in the end it is a back to us by air, pretty much. political decision. Are we committed to the pillars of the campaign, a viable state, resilient Afghan national Q295 Mr Havard: They went in by air. You take my security forces and an inclusive political process that point, however. What if you are harassed in the we believe will deliver our core objective, which is process, to the border and beyond the border? What the national security of the UK? If we are, we will be, is the position for those who have to do the work and broadly speaking, on the trajectory that has already get the stuff out? Where is their protection? Where is been set. their reserve to ensure that that does not go wrong? Lt-Gen Barrons: For us, this is only about Camp Q294 Mr Havard: Can I press you a little more on Bastion, because the materiel that leaves Bastion by how this withdrawal is going to happen? You are road is on a contractor’s truck, accompanied by the creating a situation where there is security in the form security that the contractor provides. There is no risk of containment, so that the Afghans can get on with to UK personnel on the movement of stuff that we their lives, trade can happen, and all of that. We are send by road. If you only send by road the stuff that on this glide path set out by Chicago and all these you care less about and it does not make it, it will be conferences somewhere else about how we are going expensive and the National Audit Office will be cross to do all this and exit. That is why we ask you and you will be cross, but it is not the end of the questions about strategic reserve. What happens if that world. The stuff that matters, not least all our warm cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Ev 62 Defence Committee: Evidence
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill bodies, we will fly out. That is it. There is not much it in partnership with the Afghans. However, it is peril attached with the extraction of stuff. The greatest simply too early to talk in any detail about what kind peril is the sheer volume of ISAF materiel, of the of mission we will have post-2014. order of 100,000 20-foot container equivalents, which needs to get down the same routes in much the same Q299 Penny Mordaunt: Given the timetable you time frame. That is where NATO will have to exercise have just outlined, does that give you any cause for some regulation. concern that, by the time people might have decided what that mission is for NATO, people will have had Q296 Mr Havard: Financial peril, not peril to enough time to plan? individuals. Vincent Devine: No. The advice from the military is Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes, exactly. that that kind of time scale will give us sufficient time to plan to deploy in 2015 and, importantly, to manage Q297 Penny Mordaunt: You have spoken a bit that transition from ISAF to whatever follow-on about the nitty-gritty post-2014, but what do you think presence we have. It is important that NATO made the the NATO mission should be? statement in the middle of this year that we as an Lt-Gen Barrons: We have an initial implementing alliance were planning a follow-on mission, to directive agreed by the Council. Do you want to demonstrate our commitment to Afghanistan and to describe that, Mark? The Council has described in the Afghan national security forces and to increase the very basic terms the sort of mission that it wants to confidence of those forces. That is why we want to see at the end of ISAF. The first point is that ISAF bring our thinking forward in the first half of next finishes and a new NATO mission will replace it. It year, in order to demonstrate again our long-term will be called an international training, advice and commitment. However, we could probably complete assist mission, or ITAM. It will be limited, as the precise details towards the end of next year and Ambassador Leslie described to you, to training, the military could still deliver. advising and assisting. It is a non-combat mission. The question is what that will actually involve, and Q300 Penny Mordaunt: Presumably the specific there is a debate yet to be had about what functions capabilities that you would need to retain there would need to be met and where they need to be done. There be contingent on that entirely? will be an opinion that, to start with, this new mission Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes they would, absolutely. So if will need to have a presence in many parts of you take the officer academy as an example, we will Afghanistan, much scaled down from ISAF and not have people who are there to help the Afghans conducting combat missions, but roughly aligned with instruct: there will be mentors. They will need life the ANSF core headquarters. There will be another support. When the students go on to the ranges or out school of thought that says that if that is not absolutely for exercises, we will have to provide enough force necessary, this ITAM mission could be focused on a protection and enablement, and support for that. But more institutional level in Kabul. The only things that it is very modest stuff. If the Government elected to I am sure about are that we are committed to being do more for the ANSF after that, the bill would go up the leading light of the Afghan national army officer a bit. academy, which will start to train Afghan student officers next year and will deliver, when it is at full Q301 Sir Bob Russell: General, so there is no strength, about 1,300 male cadets and about 150 misunderstanding—although British troops will be in female cadets a year; we will provide very modest a non-combat role, they will have all the weapons they mentoring in Kabul. Anything more than that will be require for defensive purposes. So they will be fully subject to a debate in NATO, not yet had, on what we armed? as an alliance think we should do, and to a national Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes. debate about our appetite, and that political debate will occur over the next three or four months. Q302 Sir Bob Russell: I know that that was an obvious question, but we need to have that on the Q298 Penny Mordaunt: The academy is a clear record. Can you tell me what will be the size of the example and a clear objective with the volume of British armed forces deployment? people that you have going through it. For NATO, are Lt-Gen Barrons: We don’t know the answer to that there similar objectives that have been spelled out? question, because we need an Alliance debate to talk Vincent Devine: As I said, we are really at a very about the general concept of operations first. Then, we early stage of planning in NATO. The military need our Government to decide what they want to authorities have been asked to bring forward a concept contribute. So I know what the threshold is—and of operations, which we expect to see later this year, indeed, that may be the total bill—but I could not say but probably will not discuss with Ministers until about anything else. somewhere towards the middle of next year. So it is at a very early stage of planning. NATO is committed Q303 Sir Bob Russell: What do you anticipate to staying on post-2014; it will be a training, advisory would be the deployment period for each time a and assistance role. But beyond that, the scale, the British soldier, airman or sailor was deployed to lay-down and precise tasks is still to be determined by Afghanistan? Ministers. Again, I would stress that the Afghans will Lt-Gen Barrons: I don’t see our current yardstick have a strong voice in that discussion. Whatever we changing significantly, so for those people who are in decide to do post-2014, we as an alliance will decide very Afghan-facing roles, particularly the more senior cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 63
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill ones, the benchmark would be a year, so that you can that units are of mixed ethnicities and that there is establish a relationship. You are doing a job—you are a balance. not lying in a ditch with grass in your helmet every In the officer corps of the army, that balance is not yet day. It is a Kabul-based environment. For those people quite what we would like to see in, for example, in more energetic roles, perhaps very dull things like bringing Pashtun young officers through. There is a force protection, maybe six months would be genuine commitment in the Afghan national security sufficient. forces to the nation. I have been struck by Afghanistan—if you think of other countries under Q304 Sir Bob Russell: The next question is not a this kind of pressure, with ethnic divisions and all the pedantic one. Would those deployed be entitled to a other sectarian divides, they have fallen apart. We campaign medal? worry about that happening in Syria. We worried Lt-Gen Barrons: That’s a very tricky question. That about it happening in Iraq. Indeed, we saw it happen would depend on how the Alliance viewed it, and on there. But largely since the civil war, Afghanistan has the degree of risk and rigour. I am delighted to say held together. That is because they have been through that that is not my side of the helm. it before. They know what happens to their country if they allow themselves to go that way. There is a Q305 Chair: A final couple of questions before we genuine commitment to Afghanistan in the army. I go on to the final briefing. Presumably there must be take you back to the example that I used earlier: you a risk that after 2014, Afghanistan will fall into civil talk to a young Afghan soldier and ask him whether war. Would you accept that there is a risk of that? he is a Tajik, a Pashtun or a Hazara, and he will Mark Sedwill: Yes: of course there is a risk of that. probably tell you, “I am an Afghan”. Chair: That is a most encouraging reply. Q306 Chair: What do you think that we as a nation—or possibly that we as an Alliance—can do Q309 Mr Havard: The Afghans expect the further than we are already doing to minimise that international community to continue to give financial possibility? support in substantial numbers up until 2023, by Mark Sedwill: Maintain both the practical but, more which time they may have built an economy where importantly, the political commitment that we make. they might be able to afford to have a civil war. Is So loose talk about rushing for the exit, and so on, in that essentially where we are—that we would not newspaper articles and books actually has a political necessarily expect this to collapse until such time as effect, because it undermines Afghan, Pakistani and that? The national army will hold the ring because it regional confidence in our determination to see it is the one nationalised institution, until such time as through, and if they act on their fears then the worse they are ready to have that discussion—albeit kinetic scenarios that you set up become that much more or otherwise—among themselves. That is one view. likely. So this has to be about transition and Mark Sedwill: It is not the one I share, and I would commitment, not withdrawal and exit. We have to be not characterise it that way. Afghanistan will need clear that 2014 is the moment at which we complete development support for many years to come. It will our combat mission and that our commitment to still be a developing country in 2023, 2024 and 2025, Afghanistan continues. That way we give the Afghans and I expect that we and others will still be providing the best prospect of securing and governing their own it with development aid. But by then, our aim is for country to their own standards and recognising all the it to be a normal developing country rather than a challenges that will remain, but doing so in a way that special case. essentially protects the reason we are there in the first The pressures on Afghanistan will be in a period place, which is to protect our national security and to before that. They will by then, we hope, have brought prevent another threat emerging which directly their mineral resources on stream and their economy threatens our national security. will be viable in its own terms. But, of course, as I said at the beginning, I do not have a crystal ball. This Q307 Chair: So, maintain our nerve is essentially it. is not just down to us. Our crucial part is commitment Let us suppose that we do, and that we find that we as we go beyond 2014, but the Afghans themselves have, in Afghanistan, national security forces and a have to manage their political transition. The Afghans new post-Karzai Government. To whom will those themselves have to hold together under the pressures national security forces be loyal? they will face. The Afghans themselves have to reach Mark Sedwill: To that Government, I think. a political accommodation with the Taliban and bring them in, and they have to remain committed to a Q308 Chair: Last time I asked that question, the society that holds together. We can talk about it; we answer was “To that Government, I hope”. You said, can influence it; we can provide the resources that “To that Government, I think”. You are more underpin it; but in the end, the Afghans themselves optimistic. will determine the outcome for their own country. Mark Sedwill: “Hope isn’t a plan”, as we used to say Lt-Gen Barrons: May I add one point on the security when I was there. I genuinely think that that is the of the Afghan national army and their performance case. It is quite striking how the army is the most after 2014? I absolutely subscribe to the view that they important part of this because it is the national force. see themselves as a national instrument and they Although designated as national, the police is much really believe in that, and they see themselves as more—as it is in any country—local. The army is a Afghans; but the supporting key factor is that the pay, national force, and it has been very careful to ensure careers, appointments and promotions come from cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o004_th_121120 CORRECTED HC 413-iv.xml
Ev 64 Defence Committee: Evidence
20 November 2012 Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, Vincent Devine and Mark Sedwill
Kabul. So, provided the ANSF remains funded from are most grateful to you for this evidence session; it Kabul—loyalty being a bought commodity in many has been very interesting and rather encouraging. Mr parts of the world—you can be significantly reassured Sedwill, you are welcome to stay if you would like. that it will do what it is required to do for the central It is entirely a matter for you, but everybody else, Government. please leave. Chair: Thank you very much; that is indeed Mark Sedwill: Mr Chairman, if you will excuse me, I reassuring. Gentlemen, we will now go into a private have to go to a diplomatic meeting. briefing, which is not part of the evidence session. We cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 65
Wednesday 23 January 2013
Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)
Mr Julian Brazier Sandra Osborne Thomas Docherty Sir Bob Russell Mr Dai Havard Bob Stewart Mr Adam Holloway Ms Gisela Stuart Penny Mordaunt ______
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Rt Hon Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons, CBE, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations), gave evidence.
Q310 Chair: Secretary of State and General Barrons, I don’t expect dramatic progress, but I think we are thank you both very much for coming to give heading gently in the right direction, rather than in the evidence. This is the fifth evidence session of our wrong direction. inquiry into Afghanistan. We had an excellent visit to Afghanistan in November and we are most grateful to Q311 Chair: What do you think will happen if there you, Secretary of State, your Department and the is not a peace settlement achieved by the time of Foreign and Commonwealth Office for organising withdrawal? that. I will begin with a rather broad question, asking Mr Hammond: I suspect that the Afghan National you to describe how you see the political situation in Security Forces would effectively hold the important Afghanistan and what you see to be the prospects of parts of the country—the population centres, the key a peace settlement. towns and cities, the principal communications Mr Hammond: I should make the point, which is well arteries and the major economically important areas. I known to you, that the political process is a Foreign would expect attempts at dialogue, at groping towards and Commonwealth Office lead. The ability to see a a peace process, to continue. I would expect the long-term, sustainable peace in Afghanistan situation to be messier than it is today with ISAF fundamentally rests upon a political compromise—a present on the ground, but I sense that there is a political accommodation—being made within that growing recognition on both sides of this fight that country between the different ethnic groups, and neither side can win outright. The Government cannot between the Government and the Taliban. Such an defeat the Taliban and secure every inch of Afghan accommodation will require the active support of the space. The Taliban sense—and we have had some neighbours, in particular Pakistan. evidence of acknowledgment of this—that they cannot There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic. The defeat the Afghan Government in military terms. So dialogue that is going on, brokered by the UK—the both sides will want to make progress ultimately to trilateral discussions between Pakistan, Afghanistan some kind of political accommodation. and the UK—suggests a level of Pakistani Our own experience in similar situations suggests that engagement with the issue, and a commitment to this might not be a smooth process. It might go in fits trying to find a solution to the problem that we have and starts. There may be periods when it looks as not always seen in the past. That is a very healthy though the political process is making way and there indicator. There are signs that there is a dawning may be other periods when it looks as though the realisation in Pakistan that as ISAF troops withdraw political process is stalled and the focus is on the from Afghanistan, it is very much in Pakistan’s ability of the security forces to maintain the ground. interest to have a stable settlement in Afghanistan. But I would expect slow and messy progress. Otherwise, Pakistan runs the risk of becoming the mirror image of Afghanistan today—a country Q312 Chair: Is there any prospect of any sort of potentially destabilised by people who find refuge in national or pattern of local ceasefires? an unstable neighbour. There are good, self-interested Mr Hammond: I suspect that a feature of post-2014 reasons why Pakistan is engaging, and thus those Afghan control will be very much a pattern of local reasons are likely to be enduring. accommodations, more or less formal, which in I am not as close to the issue of the Afghanistan practice on the ground amount to regional or very Government as my right hon. Friend the Foreign localised ceasefire arrangements—accommodations Secretary. However, I sense a dawning realism, a between local Afghan commanders and other commitment to trying to reach an accommodation powerful forces in the areas they are responsible for. with those elements of the Taliban that are prepared to renounce violence and distance themselves from al- Q313 Mr Holloway: You said that the Foreign Office Qaeda and international terrorism. The is responsible for the policy side of it, but it seems announcements made during the recent meeting that a very large bulk of the Afghan body politic that between the US President and President Karzai around is not part of the Karzai clique believes that there will the Doha office and that process are also quite be civil war if the elections re-elect a Karzai positive. It is going to be a slow and careful process. candidate, because the Taliban will never make peace cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Ev 66 Defence Committee: Evidence
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons with President Karzai or his clique. What, if anything, staff, where they showed us the same maps and the are we and the Americans able to do to make those areas where people who have absolutely no economic presidential elections rather more meaningful and prospects have been driven out to, dug illegal wells maybe the possibility of an opposition candidate and are now harvesting poppies. Of course, those were winning, rather than a Karzai one? the areas that the military told us were now supporting Mr Hammond: I think we have made it clear—and I the Taliban. The impression one was left with was that am sure the Americans are making it clear to President we had two highly effective groups of people Karzai—that the elections must be free and fair. They operating entirely independently. How are we joining must be seen to be an expression of the will of the all of this up? Afghan people. It would be a disaster, both for Mr Hammond: My impression in Afghanistan is that President Karzai’s status and for the future of the PRT and the military work very closely together. Afghanistan, if there were any doubt about the Lt-GenBarrons: The unity starts in London, where the fairness of those elections. I get the very clear drawing together of the Ministry of Defence, the impression that President Karzai understands that. Foreign Office and the Department for International Certainly in his public remarks he acknowledges the Development is now a very well worked-up piece of importance of the 2014 elections. Government machinery. It is reflected in Kabul, where Chair: We’ll come back to this issue in a moment. the Department for International Development staff are part of the embassy grouping and work very Q314 Mr Brazier: Secretary of State, in a number of closely with ISAF and its stabilisation arms. The key other successful campaigns we have engaged in actor is the PRT, which is civilian-led and military- around the world, the concept of an amnesty has been supported. I do not think they would recognise the fundamental. In Afghanistan at the moment there is a picture as you have described it, where there was an nominal amnesty, but it is so narrowly drawn that in enormous difference between the two of them. There practice, almost any member of the Taliban who may be differences of local interpretation—you might comes forward—and a number have come forward— expect that—but we have been at this now for a can get prosecuted for something else subsequently, number of years, and in my experience this is the best such as drug dealing. Have we actually pressed the illustration of how you bring these arms together that Afghan authorities to introduce a proper amnesty, we have ever managed to establish. which guarantees that someone who comes and hands in his weapon will not be prosecuted? Q316 Chair: Do you think the Afghans have a Mr Hammond: I don’t know the specific answer to solution to this issue of the dispossessed growing that question. As you know, there is a substantial poppy with illegal wells, outside the areas that are reintegration under way; about 6,000 Afghans joined controlled by the Afghan national security forces and the formal re-integration programme. We suspect that ISAF? there are many more Taliban adherents who simply Mr Hammond: At the heart of every insurgency of melt back into civil society—who simply go back to this nature are people with poor economic prospects, their village and melt back into what they were doing who have no obvious incentive to compromise and before. I do not claim to be an expert on Afghan come inside the envelope of civil society. The answer society, but I wonder how meaningful is the concept must be economic development but, as we have found of handing in your weapon in an amnesty, in a society out in other areas of the world where the economic where everybody has a weapon. We must be realistic about the realities of Afghan society on the ground. attractions of cultivating illegal narcotics are very We have got to promote the reintegration process and powerful, it is not a simple problem to solve. I had the idea that at the margin some compromises may be some experience in the 1980s discussing this problem needed in order to make it realistic. On the other hand, in Latin America and the same persistent issues I do not think we would want to say to the Afghans prevail today that prevailed then. It is difficult to find that they have to pass up the right to take action other crops that represent equivalent opportunities in against any criminal in Afghan society, no matter what the climatic conditions that prevail. That is the area of crime he has been involved in. challenge. Chair: This is going to run and run. Q315 Mr Brazier: As an historical point, it was the most bitter argument in our successful campaign in Q317 Mr Brazier: Can I ask you about the message? Malaya. In fact, it was finally settled in favour of a A number of people, including journalists and general amnesty. But point taken. intelligence analysts have suggested to us that, while Could I ask you a question about the relationship the Taliban and their supporters have a very clear and between our forces and our international development simple message around getting the infidels out and operation in Afghanistan? Forgive me for painting a establishing certain Koranic rules, our message is picture, but we visited a forward operating base where rather over-complicated. we were very impressed with the training team. They I have two questions. First, what exactly is the short painted a picture of how, each time an Afghan or message that we are trying to put out, and secondly, a British patrol went out through the gates, usually specific point raised by one of the senior Afghan together, within minutes this would be reported to the officers who complained to us that, while the Taliban enemy. They pointed out to us on the maps and on the have a whole range of muftis who are quoting the horizon roughly where the enemy were. An hour or Koran and other religious texts to the people, there two later, we were with the international development seems to be a lack of Islamic scholars deployed by cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 67
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons the Government to respond to them—to people who Mr Hammond: Yes. To be honest, it is not our song take their religion very seriously? sheet. While the PRT work is heavily co-operative Mr Hammond: On the last point, my understanding with the military on the ground, planning forward is that quite a lot of progress has been made within the post-2014, when our aid programme to Afghanistan Afghan security forces in deploying religious liaison will be delivered through Afghan organisations and officers into units specifically to put out a non- intermediaries, is very much the responsibility of extremist Islamist message in the security forces. I DFID. Those are precisely the issues that it will wish cannot speak about the wider Government to address. I remember the International Development programme. I do not know if there is a Ministry of Secretary making the point in the House just before Religious Affairs and how effective it is. If we look Christmas that women’s issues would continue to be at this from the Taliban side of the coin, our problem an important part of the funding. would be that Afghan society is changing quite dramatically. The economy has been growing for a Q320 Sir Bob Russell: I think you are confirming number of years. Afghans have had, for people at that to me that officials and Ministers across those three level of development, unprecedented levels of Departments are in regular dialogue. So we are all on exposure to westerners and international people over the same song sheet. the past few years. The country has developed in ways Mr Hammond: We do work together. Absolutely that probably the previous Afghan regime—the right. Taliban regime—would never have envisaged. The use of the mobile phone is pretty much as prevalent Q321 Sir Bob Russell: As part of that dialogue, just in Afghanistan as it is here, so people’s expectations as an aside, I wonder whether your officials, next time and aspirations have changed. they are in discussion with FCO and DFID about There is some evidence that the thinking Taliban, and alternative crops, might raise the subject of that will not be all of them, but it is certainly some of pomegranates. There is a UK charity headed by the them, are recognising that the pitch for popular Marquess of Reading promoting them as an support five years ago may not work any more. It is alternative crop. one thing to make a theoretical pitch about the role of Mr Hammond: Thank you for that. I will pass that women in society, but once people have experienced on. Pomegranates are a new one on me. When I was their daughters going to school, for example, to in Latin America in the 1980s we looked at all sorts suggest that you should turn the clock back is a very of crops as alternatives to coca, and we hit upon different proposition. garlic, which is also a high-value, low-volume crop. I suspect that the Taliban are struggling to grapple Pomegranates are a new idea for me. with the changes in Afghan society, and that their Chair: We never realised quite what your job as message, if they are going to be part of the future in Secretary of State for Defence involved. Afghanistan, will have to change. Those who Sir Bob Russell: When I had a briefing, about two recognise that the message will have to change to years ago, I was assured that Afghan pomegranates respond to changes in Afghan society will be the ones are the best in the world, and if only they could who prevail and become the key figures in the future. produce and export them, it would be much better than poppies for everybody. Chair: Talking of the role of women in society, Sir Bob Russell. Q322 Sandra Osborne: To go back to women, quite a number of the NGOs and women in Afghanistan are Q318 Sir Bob Russell: Secretary of State, in the very concerned about the discussions with the Taliban. spirit of joined-up government, your officials, if not They are worried about the gains they have achieved yourself, will be aware that in FCO Questions being lost post-2014. They feel they are not being yesterday I think there were five questions to do with included enough in the discussions about the security women’s equality in Afghanistan. That is in accord situation. What is your response to that? with United Nations resolutions to which the UK has Mr Hammond: One has to be careful how one states signed up. Are you able to inform the committee this case. Many women in Afghanistan are concerned whether the UK is going to match the Australian about the discussions with the Taliban. Discussions commitment of providing funds to improve women’s with the Taliban must be the way forward; that is not position and gender equality in Afghanistan? You an optional extra. In my judgment, there will not be a have alluded to how progress has already been made. lasting settlement in Afghanistan without discussions Mr Hammond: This is a DFID matter, of course. It is with the Taliban. I understand that there will be the case that DFID has a component within its funding concerns about the expressed agenda of some parts of plans for Afghanistan that is focused on women and the Taliban. I think there should be some reason for gender issues, and it intends to maintain that post- optimism, though. We have seen—it is a matter of 2014. public record—that there is debate within the Taliban about the popularity of some of the policies that they Q319 Sir Bob Russell: I asked that question in the have previously espoused, particularly with regard to spirit of joined-up government, following what Mr women’s education. Again, I don’t claim to be an Brazier said about different interpretations of the same expert on this, but my understanding is that the map. I was hoping that DFID, FCO and MOD were rhetoric around women’s education has subsided singing from same song sheet. You have indicated that somewhat over the past few years and there is you are. evidence that the Taliban recognise that this is not an cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Ev 68 Defence Committee: Evidence
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons issue that they should focus major attention on if they Chair: Yes, because Iran also has a border with want to establish broad support across the population. Afghanistan. I am not suggesting that we are necessarily co-operating with Iran or Iran with us, but Q323 Sandra Osborne: But what about the inclusion Iran has a role to play in the future prospects of of women in discussions about the security situation? Afghanistan. Do you have anything to say about that? Whether they involve the Taliban or not, they feel they Mr Hammond: You are absolutely right, of course: are being excluded. Iran has a border with Afghanistan; it has an interest Mr Hammond: Women have the vote in Afghanistan; in and has had an involvement in Afghan politics, they are not excluded from the political process. We including active involvement in the last presidential have to recognise that we are in an evolutionary election process. For obvious reasons, we have rather process from a society that just a few years ago looked limited visibility of Iranian manoeuvring in relation to quite primitive on some of these matters. It has come Afghanistan. I think everybody, including the Afghan an awfully long way, but changing attitudes and Government, is conscious of the fact that if relations educating people is a process, not a point. It looks to between Iran and other ISAF powers were to me as though it is a process that is continuing to make deteriorate, the ability of Iran to make mischief in progress, and I think we should encourage that: we Afghanistan could become one of the levers that is should not constantly focus only on what they are not pulled. We need to be constantly aware of that. doing, but should be praising for what they are doing Chair: Moving on now to the transition to Afghan and encouraging them to continue development in national security Gisela Stuart. that direction. Q328 Ms Stuart: In a previous evidence session, we Q324 Chair: And we should be aware of the speed raised with Dame Mariot Leslie and Brigadier with which we are demanding changes that took this Stevenson the way in which, even once you hand over country centuries. security responsibility completely, the Afghans will Mr Hammond: Absolutely. not have access to close air support, helicopters or ISTAR capability. In their answers, they said there Q325 Bob Stewart: Secretary of State, I know it is would be transition period to 2014, and of course the not strictly your bag, but it—the Government—does air force may take until about 2017. It is my have an impact on the fact that we are training the understanding that some parts of Afghanistan are like Afghan national army and the Afghan national police. where the Norwegians were: they already had a To follow up Adam Holloway’s question, do you have complete withdrawal, and the experience of the a view on the group of people, or perhaps one person, Afghan national forces’ capability to hold the ring has who may well replace the President when he stands not been terribly encouraging. down, as he has announced he will? Obviously, rotten Mr Hammond: That is not my understanding. government will not help the Afghan national army or Lt-Gen Barrons: We are in a process of transition, the Afghan national police when we withdraw. now just starting the fourth of five tranches. The Mr Hammond: It is for the Afghan political system to general experience to date is that where transition has throw up the candidates who will fight the presidential occurred, the ANSF are doing a very good job. They election. Not only would it be not helpful for ISAF do it differently—we have talked before about how Governments to speculate about who the candidates they have different capabilities and different might be, but it is very important that ISAF expectations—and the amount of challenge they get Governments clearly state that they will not get from the insurgency will vary across the country. As involved in this process. They will hold the ring, to you know, in the north of the country the insurgency ensure a fair and free competition, but they must not is generally less—less prevalent and smaller—but get involved in backing individual candidates; that there are other factions in play that may be nothing to way would lead to disaster. do with the Pashtun-based insurgency. I do not have any sense of the ANSF having to give ground in any Q326 Bob Stewart: I totally accept and understand part of Afghanistan where they have taken the lead, that reticence. My question is really, in general, do but we are still in the middle of a process that will you think people are coming forward? If you wish to endure through ’13-’14 and beyond. refuse that question, I will accept it. The question we need to ask ourselves now is: how Mr Hammond: I don’t think that is something I can do we finish this process off really well, as we step comment on. I know no more than anyone else who out of combat at the end of 2014? There is plenty that has been reading the various reports from Kabul of we can do as we begin to stand behind the ANSF, the manoeuvrings behind the scenes, which are no rather than alongside them or in front of them, and the different from the manoeuvrings that we would expect signs are generally positive. to see behind the scenes in many democratic countries ahead of an election. Q329 Ms Stuart: It may be worth looking back at the reports on the “Today” programme last week. Some of Q327 Chair: You mentioned Pakistan and the co- the journalists who were on the ground had returned operation looking rather more optimistic and positive from the area where the Norwegians were. They may than used to be the case. What about co-operation in be wrong, but their strong impression was that the relation to Iran? absence of air support and of intelligence led to an Mr Hammond: In relation to Iran? inability to operate strategically on the ground. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 69
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons
Mr Hammond: You have heard a military perspective A number of measures are in place to attempt to on this. What we have to recognise is that, regardless address some of the drivers. They include making sure of the availability or otherwise of enablers, the that Afghan soldiers on leave can get back to their Afghans will operate differently from the way in home villages by chartering more air transport to which ISAF has operated; they will have a different enable them to do that; making sure that pay gets concept and they will approach things in a different through to them—a very large percentage of all way. It may very well be that at the tactical level, they Afghan forces are now paid by electronic transfer, have a different approach to which bits of ground are making it less likely that the funds will stick to worth holding and which bits are not. The important someone else’s hands along the way; and thing is whether the overall effect of what they are improvements to clothing allowances and doing delivers the outcome that is required. It is clear accommodation. They are issues of that nature that that delivering to the Afghans the full panoply of you would expect to have a generally beneficial enablers that ISAF routinely uses would not be impact on retention rates. efficacious as they would not able to maintain them, and it would encourage them to try to conduct their Q332 Ms Stuart: Would you care to put a figure on operations in a way that mimicked western concepts the word significant? When you talked about attrition, of operations, rather than adapt and adopt an approach you said that it is significantly higher than the target. that is more appropriate to their capabilities and their Lt-Gen Barrons: In terms of attrition, the target is sustainable levels of equipment. 1.6% a month.1 In the Army it is now averaging The key thing is sustainability. The ANSF that we 2.6% or so, and it peaked in October-November at leave behind in 2014 has to be sustainable. An ANSF 3.1%.2 The reasons are exactly as the Secretary of that is over-dependent on western-style enablers will State described. It is a combination of leadership, not be sustainable. Intelligence gathering is a good because good leaders make them stay, and good example: ISAF is heavily dependent on electronic leaders are being grown in the ANSF, and the need to intelligence gathering; the ANSF will have much get paid—most pay is now done electronically, but greater dependence on, but also much greater they still need to get home in order to deliver that capability to deliver, human intelligence gathering; in money to their families. consequence, it will operate in a different way. That does not mean it will be less effective; it just means Q333 Ms Stuart: But we are still talking about 1.6% it will operate in a different way. or 2.6%. Is there any significant difference between the army and the police, or are the figures similar? Q330 Ms Stuart: I think the argument was that you Lt-Gen Barrons: No, the figures are different, because probably need both: the human intelligence on the the police are much more local. For the great majority ground, and the ISTAR ability to give you something of the Afghan national police, if they do not turn up strategic. for work, they are easy to find. Mr Hammond: But the reality is that they will not have the ISTAR capability that ISAF has, or the same Q334 Ms Stuart: So the attrition rate is lower. level of sophisticated enablers. The important thing Lt-Gen Barrons: It is lower, but people may come over the next two years is to ensure that, during the and go. Within the Afghan national army there may transition, their method of operating adapts be a seasonal element to this. The fighting season appropriately to conducting operations with the sort of takes people in different ways and people often go level of enabler support that they will have after 2014. home to bring in the harvest at home. The absolutely key drivers against Afghan national army attrition are Q331 Ms Stuart: Can you give us some indication leadership, pay, decent food, absence of corruption of the trends in both casualties and desertions in the and getting home for leave. Afghan national army, particularly in the second half Mr Hammond: To support that, I was reading in my of 2012? briefing pack here that a supplier has recently been Mr Hammond: I might be able to turn up more jailed for supplying substandard rice to the Afghan precise numbers, but in big handful numbers—we national army. So somebody is taking the problem have to enter a caveat about the quality of the data, seriously—an army does march on its stomach. including the baseline data that we have—as the Ms Stuart: He will probably have to buy his way out Afghans have taken over the leading role in security, of jail with high quality rice a few months later. clearly their casualties have gone up very significantly. They have possibly doubled over the Q335 Mr Holloway: Post-2014, do you anticipate past year or so, with that caveat about the quality of that the insurgency and levels of violence in Helmand the baseline data that we are looking at. In terms of will stay the same, come down a bit, or increase? what I think is known as attrition rather than Mr Hammond: First, as is perhaps inferred by your desertion, it is important that we recognise the cultural question, the violence across Afghanistan is very factors. If you talk to commanders on the ground, they variable by region. Helmand, which I think accounts will tell you that it is not at all unusual for people to for about 13% of the population, accounts for nearly disappear for several months and then reappear. The half of the violence in the country. It is an area of rate of attrition is significantly higher than the target, focus for the insurgency. We would expect—our and there was a blip in October or November when it understanding of their strategic plans supports this— shot up rather alarmingly. That appears to have been 1 Note by witness: subsequently corrected to 1.4% a month a one-off blip. 2 Note by witness: subsequently corrected to 3.5% cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Ev 70 Defence Committee: Evidence
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons the ANSF to regard Helmand as a high-priority area of will need to continue to get the ANSF confident. Our which to retain control, because it is an economically achievement will be that when we complete the important area as well as a population centre. I would transition and draw down, we will leave behind an expect that the ANSF will devote resources to ANSF that is reliably and on an enduring basis retaining control of Helmand. I would hope that what protecting the people, particularly in those key we will see is a continuation of the gradual decline in populated areas of Helmand. incidents of violence across the country that we have seen over the last couple of years. Q338 Mr Holloway: Finally, in those key populated I think there are two competing factors. On the one areas of Helmand, what percentage of the ANSF is hand, the withdrawal of ISAF troops might suggest now southern Pashtuns, meaning, from the same tribal that there might be an upsurge in violence, but on the grouping? What percentage of the ANSF deployed in other, clearly, one of the most powerful motivators of Helmand province even speak Pashto? the insurgency, particularly at low level, is the sense Lt-Gen Barrons: Of the army, it is a relatively modest of a crusade to drive out foreigners from the country. proportion of southern Pashtuns. Once foreigners are gone, and the ask is to go and Mr Holloway: Four per cent.? fight your own people and your own national army in Lt-Gen Barrons: I would have to look at the figures. your national territory, that is rather a different Of the police, because they are locally recruited, there proposition. is a higher percentage of southern Pashtuns. It is the dynamic between the nationally recruited Q336 Mr Holloway: Yes. In a way it is a terrifying army and the locally recruited police service. One of truth, after all the people who have died there, that the the dimensions of the coming two years and beyond violence might go down when we leave, so one has will be how that police service migrates from to ask the question— protecting the community to a more conventional Mr Hammond: If I may say so, if we hadn’t been policing role. That will be the next evolution of there, there wouldn’t be an ANSF that was able to security sector reform. hold the line after we have gone. The purpose of the Mr Hammond: Just to pick up on that last point, the mission was, first of all, to clear al-Qaeda; secondly, new Afghan Minister of the Interior was here on to push back the insurgency and create a space where Monday, and I had a chance to talk to him. I know the Afghan civil state could start to establish its that he also met the Home Secretary to talk about his credentials; and thirdly, to train the ANSF to take over plans for the future of the Afghan police forces. I must the role of ISAF and to maintain that space for the say that it was a very reassuring discussion. He is a Afghan Government to exercise their jurisdiction. professional police officer and he very much sees the While we are still in this live operation—people talk transition of the Afghan police force from a security about it having taken a very long time—I suspect that role to a law-enforcement role as being his big when history looks back on this, it will be seen as a challenge over the next few years. relatively efficient exercise in clearing al-Qaeda, pushing back the insurgency, creating space for civil Q339 Chair: We met him in November, and we were governance and training a 350,000-strong indigenous similarly impressed. military force to take over. I think that that is quite Precisely what is the purpose over the next few an achievement. months of British forces patrolling alongside Afghan national forces? Q337 Mr Holloway: But the team that did the MOD- Mr Hammond: Transition is a process. At the FCO recce before our NATO deployment to Helmand beginning of that process, you have areas where took the view that there wasn’t an insurgency in 2005 British forces are leading. At the end of that process, in Helmand. If we say that the level of violence may you have Afghan forces carrying the full weight of go down after international forces leave, does that not the security burden. In between, there will be some rather beg the question—perhaps this is a question for areas—there is work this summer—where British the general—what are our soldiers likely to achieve in forces are continuing to patrol with Afghan forces in this coming summer fighting season that we haven’t Nahri Sarraj, which is the last district to go into achieved in the last seven years? What will the daily transition, and where the process of upscaling the activity of the BRF achieve over the next 12 months Afghans’ capabilities to take over that role is not yet or so? complete. It is essentially part of a training process What are we actually doing? Forget about all the other that is embedded within the transition. issues. In terms of Britain’s national security, what are Lt-Gen Barrons: Nationally, the ANSF lead on 80% we going to achieve in the next 18 months? of conventional operations. One key difference for the Lt-Gen Barrons: The achievement of this summer British deployment during the course of this summer and indeed into next year will be to make the ANSF is that there is far less patrolling on foot compared confident, competent and resilient. It is already the with past years and far more movement in vehicles. case that the ANSF are firmly in the lead and are As the ANSF take the lead and become more responsible for engaging in most of the encounters independent, our contribution to it is changing in style with the Taliban. and nature as well. We will need to do two things this summer. The first is preserve our own force protection, and you know Q340 Mr Holloway: But this presupposes that the well how we will have to go about doing that, which country is not going to lurch into civil war because is more than simply sitting in our bases. Secondly, we the politics are not right. Forgive me for asking the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 71
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons question again, but what do you say to the families of Lt-Gen Barrons: It is a very hard thing to calibrate. the kids who die in the next 18 months or so? What On the one hand, the very worst outcome is that the do you tell their families was achieved in terms of ANSF goes into the field unassisted and fails and, as Britain’s national security by what they did on patrol a result of that, its confidence, resilience and its in Helmand province from now on? reputation are shattered. On the other, to lead it by the Mr Hammond: We have a plan, which is quite nose for so long that, when the stabilisers are finally ambitious, to transfer security responsibility to the taken off, it is not ready, but you are, would not work Afghan national security forces and to be out of a either. We are calibrating operations in that middle combat role by the end of 2014. We want to do that space. It varies over time, and it varies by geography. in a way that allows the Afghans to maintain control Some days in Nahri Sarraj now, the Afghans will be of their territory and to deny it to international very confident. On other days, they will want a bit terrorists of the type that we have had a reminder of more help, but the general trend is for transition to just over the last few days in another part of the world. move faster now and for Afghan confidence to lag Mr Holloway: And move there. slightly behind its real capability. I judge that this is a Mr Hammond: It is easy to forget, because effectively process that is accelerating rather than decelerating. Afghanistan is not now harbouring international Mr Hammond: Thinking about a discussion that I had terrorists on any scale, that just a few years ago we when last in Afghanistan, at the strategic level the were looking at these kinds of threats coming from Afghans are planning most of these operations now. Afghanistan. We have a process that is very much The Afghans decide what ISAF support they want. driven by Britain’s own national security interest, and For example, I am thinking about a specific operation we cannot cut and run before we have completed that that I was shown the planning for; the main operation process. Everybody who has contributed to the was to be conducted by the Afghans. That was the campaign in Afghanistan and those who have made Afghans’ decision. They had asked ISAF forces to the ultimate sacrifice have done so in support of protect their flanks, while they conducted the delivering our long-term national security interest by operation. denying the territory of Afghanistan to al-Qaeda and To somebody at a relatively tactical level, that might its associates. still look like a lot of UK force deployment but, at a strategic planning level, it is very much a supportive Q341 Penny Mordaunt: Secretary of State, one role with the main operation being conducted by the suggestion that was made to us on our last visit was Afghans. I am not aware of the problem, and it has that, although we needed to be there, we were still not been expressed to me, certainly by senior officers. actually doing too much on a day-to-day basis. Rather No one is putting pressure on them to do more for than supporting the Afghans in going out on patrol any reasons generated from here. It is very much as I and whatever, we were actually still taking the lead understand it, which is that the Afghans are too much on those sorts of issues. In fact, a soldier determining the level of support that we give them. It put it very well to us when he said, “It would be better is what they ask for that we try to provide. that we were there and let the Afghans get a bloody nose and pick up the pieces, than to leave and they go Q345 Mr Havard: I should like to echo what you and break their necks.” Has that view been expressed were saying, General. For example, on a late to you before? What is your view on that? afternoon in a forward-operating base, the recce team Mr Hammond: I can only repeat what I have said. were quite capable of going out on their own. They Transition is a process and the level of British activity did not need Brits with them on that particular day, will vary depending on the area that you are talking because the mission that they had planned, they could about and what stage we are at in that process. In do on their own. The engineering component needs some areas, such as Lashkar Gah, there would be very Brits to go with them because they are not capable. little British leading or even joint patrolling. This idea of conditions-based is not something necessarily at a broad top level; it is down to that Q342 Penny Mordaunt: That is where we were. level. It was whether the major, who was on the Mr Hammond: My understanding is that, in Lashkar ground, running the troops, and the local commanders Gah city, there is very little joint patrolling. I do not had the opportunity and the support to make those know who you spoke to, and at what rank. Obviously, tactical decisions at the time. It might be different one different people—depending on their function in the day to another or one week to another, but where it battle space—might have a different degree of vision. did not need to happen, it did not have to happen.
Q343 Penny Mordaunt: It was a view that was Q346 Chair: Does that strike a chord with you? expressed to us quite consistently by various ranks. Lt-Gen Barrons: It does. As a key indicator, we now They fully accepted that they needed to be there, but no longer mentor totally at company level. We are they felt that they were not actually doing the Afghans standing away from them. That has occurred three a favour by still taking the lead too much. They felt months sooner than I thought it would. that they would be better serving the Afghans if they let them get on with it and were there to help when Q347 Sandra Osborne: You talked about the new things did not work out. sustainability of the ANSF, and acknowledged the fact that they will not have the same capabilities and will Q344 Chair: The point has been made. go about their business in different ways from the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Ev 72 Defence Committee: Evidence
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons
ISAF. If there were an increase in insurgent activity, Quite an interesting example is the two incidents that do you think that they would be able to cope? occurred in Kabul over the last week or so. Both, in Mr Hammond: I did not say that they would not have themselves, were attempts at spectacular attacks in an the same capabilities in terms of the military effect area which is actually pretty safe. There are relatively that they can deliver, but that they would deliver it in few attacks in Kabul, despite it being by far the most a different way. important centre in the country. The first, the attack on the NDS, was pretty much a failure. It was dealt Q348 Sandra Osborne: But in terms of their with by Afghan troops very effectively, without any support, logistics and helicopters, for example, and call on ISAF support, and it failed in its objective. ISTAR, they will not have the same capability. The second, which was not so obviously a failure, was Mr Hammond: Let us take each of those in turn. an attack on a very soft target, the unarmed Afghan Logistics is an area where they are improving. It is traffic police. Again, it was dealt with efficiently and very clear on the ground that some harsh lessons have effectively by ANSF without any call on ISAF been learned about logistics. That is an area where support. This does not look to me like an insurgency ISAF is adopting the approach of letting them with lots of reserve firepower. It is struggling to mount experience the consequences of poor logistics in order an effective attack, even when it decides to launch to enhance their thirst for better logistic planning. My what is clearly designed to be a spectacular attack in understanding is that that is an area where there has the capital. been significant improvement. They are never going to have the level of ISTAR that ISAF forces can Q351 Mr Brazier: The two items that came out top, provide. It would not be sustainable without ISAF when we asked one senior commander, were IED forces to operate it, so they will have to change the equipment, which they can operate but they need help way in which they gather and use intelligence in their to maintain. Secondly, you mentioned medical. There operations for it to be sustainable. is indeed a plan in place to get surface CASEVAC to On air support, including rotary, there is a plan to replace the current heli one. Ironically, Helmand is the provide basic air capability to the Afghans through the only province without a military hospital either in Afghan air force, and I talked with the US Defence place or under construction. Those two things were Secretary on Saturday in London about this. But it particularly highlighted. would be nothing like the level of air capability that Mr Hammond: An Afghan military hospital? the ISAF forces have. That will require them to adapt Mr Brazier: Yes. their method of operations to the level of enablers that Mr Hammond: Okay. are available for them. Lt-Gen Barrons: If I may start with the EOD aspects Medical is the other one you didn’t mention, where of this, in 2012, President Karzai signed off on a there is a developed plan to build an ANSF medical strategy for dealing with the ANSF counter-IED service that is appropriate to Afghan conditions. That capability. That will take some time to deliver. For will provide a proper level of medical support, which example, they will have 19 EOD teams and they is not dependent on western-style medical currently have 11. Better equipment is coming on enablement. stream, including American vehicles—Humvees, in fact—some ECM and better detector equipment. In Q349 Sandra Osborne: You talked a lot about the Mazar-e-Sharif, a school has been established to plan, and we clearly had explained to us why we are improve the higher-skilled training of Afghan forces. in Afghanistan. Do you think that more could be done The performance on the ground of the ANSF teams, to explain to the British people how that plan is in even at battalion level, is improving. Although there progress, in order to make the case that the plan has has been an increase in the number of IED attacks on to be stuck to until the date for withdrawal? the ANSF and they are taking substantial casualties— Mr Hammond: There is always, in theory, more that in the past six months, the ANSF have had some 1,100 one can do to communicate what is going on to the fatalities, so it is a significant issue—their ability to public, but there is a limited appetite for detail, I deal with it is getting better. generally find. Of course, the media is often more interested in specific events than long-term evolutions. Q352 Mr Brazier: But on maintenance for the equipment, they say that they are a long way away Q350 Chair: What do you think would happen if from being able to maintain it. there were a significant upsurge in the insurgency? Lt-Gen Barrons: Yes, they are a long way away from Mr Hammond: I don’t think I can really comment on maintaining almost anything that they have, because a hypothetical situation. It is like the recurring the maintenance culture in the ANSF has been grown question of whether we could retake the Falkland from scratch. There is a risk that if you give them a Islands if they were captured. The answer is, we don’t piece of equipment that is too complicated, they will intend that they should be captured. All the evidence not be able to repair it when it breaks. One of the I see suggests that the Taliban, while still a significant reasons why the process of gifting and equipping the force, is struggling to maintain the momentum of the ANSF is so carefully regulated in theatre is so that insurgency. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest what is delivered is appropriate and is not cutting edge that it has the kind of reserves that would allow it to western technology, which would overface them. press a button and significantly increase the tempo of In terms of hospitals, I do not know whether there is the insurgency. a plan to build a military hospital in Helmand, but the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 73
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons
Afghan hospital in Lashkar Gah is where the military number of people, detained at Bastion whom we casualties will go. They go there now, in fact. cannot put into the system. Partly that is because of Chair: Moving on to the funding of the ANSF, we our fear that we are putting them into a system to have Sir Bob Russell. which we would be vulnerable in our own courts. There are cases in our own courts relating to this Q353 Sir Bob Russell: The Committee has been told problem. Could you give us some idea of what this that the international agreement for funding the ANSF means because we are collecting a large number of assumed a reduced number of personnel after 2014 prisoners at Bastion at the moment, and it clearly has from 352,000 to 228,500, but that the Afghan an effect, especially when the Americans seem to be Government intended to maintain numbers at current making a different decision about how they will put levels. Do you have any idea where they are going to people into the Afghan justice system? get the money from to maintain that level? Mr Hammond: Just to deal with the American Mr Hammond: Yes, two points to make. The number situation, the Americans put their detainees through of 232,000 is the enduring intended force level. the detention centre at Parwan which is a modern, Lt-Gen Barrons: It is currently 352,000 and it will purpose-built facility—I think the Committee has step down to 228,000.3 probably visited it—now run by the Afghans. The Mr Hammond: The expectation was never that it UNAMA report does not make any negative comment would be down to 228,000 by the end of 2014.4 about the Parwan facility. The history here is that, as There was always going to be a process of draw-down you may know, a number of cases have been going to that level. The assumption is that US support will through the UK courts. At one time last year there bridge a gap if one exists. I have to say that the former was an injunction in place preventing the transfer of Afghan Defence Minister expressed to me on more UK detainees into the Afghan system. In response to than one occasion—I know he has expressed it to my that injunction and in preparing a case to challenge it US counterpart—the view that the Afghans would be in the courts, a great deal of work was done in the able to sustain a force larger than 228,000 with the $4 MOD. In the course of that work, material came to billion. He believed, in calculating the unit costs, that light that caused me to make a policy decision, the Americans or ISAF had erred on the side of independent of the injunction under which we were caution and that, in taking proper account of Afghan placed, to suspend transfers into the Afghan system conditions, he would be able to sustain a much bigger until further notice. force with that sum. The injunction is no longer in place. The policy decision remains in place. We have given the court an Q354 Sir Bob Russell: So how long will that undertaking that I will give them, I think, 14 day’s contingency taper be there? We are talking about a notice before we resume transfers.7 We would fully reduction from 352,000 to 228,000.5 That is a expect that in that 14 days there will be a challenge significant drop. Over what period will that drop take from the original plaintiffs seeking an injunction to place and will the Americans maintain that prevent us from doing that.8 We are very clear what contingency taper right the way down? the challenge is now. We have to establish or re- Mr Hammond: I think that that will be one of the establish a route to transfer detainees into the Afghan things that the Americans will want to look at in their judicial system. These are people in respect of whom emerging agreement with the Afghans. Certainly no the NDS believes it has a case for prosecution. So we one expects to see the ANSF fall off a cliff edge in have to establish a route that will be not only terms of numbers at the end of 2014. I think that the acceptable to me in policy terms but will be general expectation is that it will be towards the end acceptable to the High Court here to allow that of 2017 that the ANSF reaches the long-term process to resume. We are looking at different sustainable number of 228,000.6 Bear in mind the approaches as a matter of urgency in theatre and we discussion that we had earlier about attrition rates. The very much hope that it will be possible to resume question that has sometimes been posed to me, transfers some time during the course of the spring. including in the Chamber, about what we are going to do with all the people that we are going to sack from Q356 Mr Havard: It is encouraging that those the ANSF seems to be unlikely to arise, given the problems are moving forward. We visited NDS40. We level of attrition rates that we are seeing. looked at the new prison that is being built. We discussed with them how their processes worked, Q355 Mr Havard: Can I ask you about policing and particularly their relationship with their own police the justice system? We have a series of people services, how good their police service was on the detained because we are having difficulty putting them ground, their forensics and their ability to prosecute into the Afghan justice system. You will be aware that in a proper way. As I understand it, we have stopped there was a report this week or at the end of last training Afghan police in Helmand now. There was a week—the UNAMA report—about the condition of period where we were training Afghan police, along Afghan justice, the prisons where there was torture with the marines, as well as them being trained and so on. As a consequence of this we are told that centrally in Kabul. The concern that was expressed to we have a number of people, possibly a growing us on the ground was less to do with ANSF forces. Local councillors in Lashkar Gah would say that their 3 Note by witness: subsequently corrected to 228,500 4 Note by witness: subsequently corrected to 228,500 7 Note by witness: subsequently corrected to “21 days notice 5 Note by witness: subsequently corrected to 228,500 in writing to the public interest lawyers” 6 Note by witness: subsequently corrected to 228,500 8 Note by witness: subsequently corrected to 21 days cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Ev 74 Defence Committee: Evidence
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons problems were with the police in terms of security international trainers indefinitely in this institution. It now rather than the ANA. Could you perhaps update is intended that it will become a self-sustaining us on what is happening with the development of the institution. Clearly, we will expect to shape its agenda, police service as we draw back from some of the front its curriculum and ethos around the ethos of the line activity of patrolling and assisting them locally? British Army, in particular in regard to respect for Could you say something about local police as well human rights, and a proper understanding of the in that? relationship between the army and the civil authorities Lt-Gen Barrons: I will start on police training. The in the country. Having the opportunity for the UK to first point to make is that it is widely recognised that shape this institution at the outset could be one of the the Afghan police, in all its various forms, is behind most important and enduring contributions that we are the Army. It is a longer term challenge and actually it able to make to the future stability and sustainability is a more difficult challenge, particularly if you are of Afghanistan. going to convert a police force that sees its role as Chair: There are more questions that we want to ask protecting its community to something that looks about the defence academy, but before we do so, I more like a normal constabulary. So we have spent remember now that there was a further question that some time training on the ground, to a very basic we wanted to ask about police training. level, Afghan policemen to do what are effectively security tasks through a combination of patrolling and Q359 Sir Bob Russell: General, are any British royal military police and other service police components still involved with the training of the assistance. As we go through transition—and we are Afghan police? now, in common with the Army, stepping up to a Lt-Gen Barrons: The only part I am certain about is higher level—we are dealing with the leadership of that we still have British policemen as part of the PRT the police service, and much less with the rank and in Helmand, but they are part of the training of the file on the ground. That responsibility falls to the more senior leadership there. We would be training regional and national training facilities that are turning Afghan national police where we encountered them out policemen. Now, there is quite a concerted, but on patrol, as part of our combined operations with the long-term plan to improve the recruiting, vetting, Afghan national army. There is much less of a formal training, leadership and support of the police—both role, and I am not at all sure what our commitment is Afghan national police and their national counterpart, to the regional and national training facilities. the Afghan national civil order police, which are higher calibre organisations. Q360 Sir Bob Russell: Who are these British police officers engaged with the training of the Afghan Q357 Mr Havard: Is some of that vetting now being police force? done more locally as well as nationally? Lt-Gen Barrons: They are a very small number, and Lt-Gen Barrons: I can give a better example from the they are placed as part of the PRT. In part, they are Army. If you are recruited into the Army, you are recruited from a county constabulary, but a significant vetted by four Afghans, who have a spread of proportion have come from the MOD police service. interests. In terms of recruiting police locally, the local elders have always had a hand on who goes forward. Q361 Sir Bob Russell: I ask that question because It is not a perfect system, but it is better than no on my last visit to Afghanistan, which I admit was 18 system at all. months or so ago, the only British police I saw Mr Hammond: On the ALP, we believe that it does training the Afghan police were exclusively MOD provide a valuable contribution, and my police, both males and females. Of course, the latter understanding is that that contribution is probably are very important in the context. more developed in Helmand than anywhere else in the My follow-up question to the Secretary of State is that country. Certainly, the full tashkil available has been this is the very police force that is being heavily axed. utilised in Helmand. The MOD police are an important part of the MOD, On Monday, I had a very interesting discussion with and there they were in Afghanistan training, and now the Minister of the Interior about the long-term future they are being chopped. of the ALP, and he does envisage it being incorporated Chair: That is a question. over time into mainstream Afghan police, and coming Mr Hammond: It sounded like statement to me. under its direct command. This is seen as a force Sir Bob Russell: Well, it was an observation. It is alongside the police, which will gradually integrate true, is it not? into the formal police structure. Mr Hammond: The MOD police and guarding service is one of the areas where we are having to make Q358 Chair: Moving on from training the police to significant savings, as part of the balancing of the training the Army, we have a role to play in that in MOD budget. Of course, their primary task is relation to the defence academy. What are your goals guarding MOD establishments and carrying out for that academy? policing roles around those establishments; it is not Mr Hammond: Our plans for the Afghan National their primary task to deliver training in-theatre. Army Officer Academy are to establish a multinational training cadre, which will train the Q362 Sir Bob Russell: I will only make the further officer cadre of the Afghan army to international observation that the training of Afghan police officers standards. Crucially, there is a “train the trainer” was left to the Ministry of Defence constabulary and concept; it is not intended that there will be British or not the county constabularies, because the counties, at cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 75
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons that time, did not have any police officers either able think it is a tough target, but it is deliverable. It is or willing to be dispatched to Afghanistan. certainly not out of reach. Mr Hammond: Let me make this point—it is a micro- point, but it is relevant. The reductions we are making Q365 Chair: But another ambition for the defence in MOD police are efficiencies driven by budget academy is that it should be based on the general pressure—budget constraints. To the extent that there British model that we can see at Sandhurst—for is a requirement for MOD police officers in theatre, example, that there should be a strong cadre of non- the cost of those would be made from outside the commissioned officers doing the training. There is no MOD budget, which would represent a relief of that tradition of a non-commissioned officer in pressure on funding. I am not sure that it is necessarily Afghanistan. What do you think the prospects of the case that because we have a plan to reduce MOD success are of trying to introduce a training academy police numbers, it would mean that if there was a that produces a large number, or a reasonably large requirement for small numbers to go to theatre we number, of women but is based on a tradition that would not be able to accommodate that within our does not exist in Afghanistan of non-commissioned plans, because additional funding would become officers? available. Mr Hammond: I am not sure whether we are going to refer to them as non-commissioned officers or as Q363 Chair: We did meet some police officers trainers with some other description, but the principle supporting the Minister of the Interior when we were of a dedicated group of Afghan individuals who are in Afghanistan in November. trained to be trainers of future cohorts of officer cadets Mr Hammond: Yes, I think there are two senior will certainly be reflected in our approach. I British ex-police officers there. understand it is also the approach that the Americans Chair: We met both of them. will take in the officer training academy that they are Mr Brazier: Just a quick observation: there are of constructing, again based on the West Point model. I course quite a lot of police officers in the TA, and I, see no reason why that should not be successful. It may be that we need to be culturally sensitive: calling by coincidence, a few weeks before we left for the trainers NCOs and expecting officers to defer to Afghanistan, met a SOCA officer, who had just come them may be difficult in the Afghan culture, in which back from a tour as an infantry officer in Helmand, case, let’s call them something else. working on police mentoring. Lt-Gen Barrons: You are right, Chair, the Afghans do Chair: Getting back to the defence academy, which not have a tradition as established as our own, so they is going to be our role, or at least a part of our role, will not have many people who are as outstanding as after 2014, Penny Mordaunt. our senior NCO instructors at Sandhurst, but they now have 12 years’ experience of growing NCOs at the Q364 Penny Mordaunt: Are you being a bit too regional military training centres and an awful lot of ambitious with some of your targets for the academy? operational experience. Given that the head of the I am thinking of, for example, the goal to recruit and army, General Karimi, who was trained at Sandhurst, train 150 women a year, when the number in service understands the value of the model, and that the is 400. We identified a number of barriers to recruiting Afghans have seen our senior NCOs training their and training women, not least that they have to have candacs for some time now, there is buy-in to the idea, permission from every male member of their family. and now we have to grow the people. The first Afghan Given that challenge, have you set the bar a bit high? national army academy sergeant-major has been Mr Hammond: The 150 female students a year appointed, so we have got the senior leadership in, represent about 12% of the total throughput, which and we have until September this year to grow a is a relatively small percentage. This will have been sufficient cadre of ANA senior NCO and warrant discussed and agreed with the Afghans—it is not officer instructors to get us started. something that we have done on our own in a closed room. I do not know whether the General wants to Q366 Bob Stewart: Secretary of State, how are we comment, but it seems to me unlikely that the target going to protect those trainers and those troops that would have been set had there not been a consensus we leave behind when we withdraw, presumably up that it was deliverable. to December 2014? Lt-Gen Barrons: The first point is that the total has Mr Hammond: In the Afghan national officer been agreed with the Afghans, so it is a level of academy? ambition that we are all comfortable with. Secondly, Bob Stewart: Throughout the country, wherever we might not get there at the first pass, but if we they are. lowered our sights and said our ambition is not 150 Mr Hammond: First of all, the ability to protect but 100, we might have 60, whereas if we say it is whatever force we have on the ground will be 150, we might get 80. We want to try to pull this thing absolutely paramount; we will not leave forces behind by the nose a little bit. Given that we are going to be if we cannot adequately protect them. At the present doing this for a number of years, even if the first year time, the arrangements around the ANAOA and the does not hit 150, perhaps we will in year two or three. protection arrangements are not entirely resolved, Mr Hammond: Let me add to that. There are because it is not yet clear the extent to which we will encouraging signs. The recent national military be working within an American compound, how much academy selection saw 100 female applicants and 30 protection the Americans will provide, how much life have been selected to commence training this term. I support the Americans will provide, and what the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Ev 76 Defence Committee: Evidence
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons
Afghans will provide. We have a range of estimates and obviously they will be an important factor in our for our total force number associated with the approach. We do not know what is going to happen ANAOA, at the lowest end being the basic numbers on the ground during the course of this year, and the required to provide the training and basic UK aspects plan has to be flexible enough to respond to any of life support, but assuming that the majority of the quickening, or indeed slowing, of the pace of force protection is provided by others; and, at the transition. opposite end of the spectrum, a number based on an assumption that we have to provide our own force Q370 Sir Bob Russell: I wonder if I may press that protection to the ANAOA. Outside the ANAOA, if point. What plans do you have for a strategic reserve we decide to do anything else anywhere in in the event of withdrawal plans going awry if an Afghanistan, we will either include UK forces for unexpected situation arises? force protection purposes, or it will be on the basis Mr Hammond: You will be aware that we hold a that we are working within an ISAF construct, where theatre reserve battalion in Cyprus, and we will force protection will be provided by ISAF allies—I continue to hold that theatre reserve battalion in should say NATO allies, post-2014. Cyprus if short-notice reinforcement is required at any point. Q367 Sir Bob Russell: Secretary of State, you have Sir Bob Russell: Thank you for that assurance. announced that the number of UK forces in Afghanistan by the end of this calendar year will be Q371 Mr Havard: You have started to answer some reduced to 5,200. Will it be a case of troops in of the question that I was going to ask you, which is Afghanistan being brought back early, or is it a about what happens post-’14, and the states of forces question of their not being sent in the first place, so agreements, and the things that have to be done in that you get to that figure at 31 December? order to decide and agree exactly will happen post- Mr Hammond: It is too early to say at this stage. ’14. One of the things that we had described to us was Depending on what is happening on the ground, depending on what our allies are doing, it is that there will be a series of agreements. President conceivable that we could get to the 5,200 number Karzai wants bilateral agreements. So there may be an through the RIP in September/October. ISAF-type agreement. There will be a USA Chair: The RIP being— agreement, a British agreement and so on—all in Mr Hammond: The relief in place. But it is equally order to achieve three basic things. possible that we will deploy a higher number in Maybe you do not want to talk about certain parts of September/October and then withdraw some by the this publicly. I can understand why and I would not end of the year, as in fact happened at the end of 2012. press you, because one of the elements will be the continuation of a counter-terrorism mission in Q368 Sir Bob Russell: But do you envisage, as we Afghanistan. We might ask you at a future date how approach Christmas, the figure still being around that is done, who participates in that and whether there 9,000? Or would it be nearer 5,200? is to be any British component in that, as remains to Mr Hammond: As we approach—we have just had be determined. The training mission is clear and we Christmas. Next Christmas? have made some commitment to that. How it may Sir Bob Russell: Yes, you have got 11 months in extend will come out in the agreements. The other one which to achieve your target. was the idea of a third element, which is to support the Mr Hammond: We have got 11 months to look Afghan-fielded force and whether or not any British forward to Christmas. We will not be deploying 9,000 elements are likely to be involved in that process, troops in the RIP in April, so there will be a step down given that they do not have certain enablers. Is there in April. There is a clear expectation that there will anything you can say about the development of these be a further step down in September/October. What I discussions now that you have not already said? cannot tell you is whether those two steps will take us Mr Hammond: Only that I think that you have down to 5,200, or whether it will be a question of broadly correctly identified the potential areas for bringing some people out of theatre. I suspect that post-2014 NATO engagement, together with possibly once we embark on this process, if things go support at strategic level at Ministry of Defence smoothly, the curve will look broadly smooth, so that headquarters level. The commitment that we have there will be a combination of a reduction at each made so far is to the ANAOA, because we were RIP but the withdrawal of some elements from theatre specifically asked to make that commitment by the during the course of each six-month deployment. Afghan Government. Our judgment is that we do not yet need to make firm decisions on what, if any, Q369 Sir Bob Russell: I recognise that you have to additional military presence we will have after 2014. be careful how you answer the question; that is why I We are clear that it will not be in a combat role, but deliberately phrased it in that roundish way. So the we are keeping our options open and we will watch simple answer is that you are keeping everything carefully what is happening on the ground. under review. We will watch carefully what is happening in the Mr Hammond: Yes, and we do not know some of the political situation, and we will look carefully at what crucial building blocks of the picture yet. We do not other allies are proposing to do and, indeed, whether know what other ISAF nations, in particular the US, there are proposals made by other allies that seek a are going to do in fine-grain detail. We expect that contribution from us. The National Security Council over the next few weeks the US plans will emerge, will probably later on this year or early next come to cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 77
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons a conclusion about what our post-2014 footprint needs Mr Hammond: I am not aware of any proposal for a to look like. UN military presence. Lt-Gen Barrons: No. The only UN military presence Q372 Mr Havard: So if we ask you the specific right now is a pair of military advisers in the question about what specific capabilities will the UK headquarters of the mission in Kabul, and there is no be required to retain post-’14, it is not really possible intention for that to change. to answer that question in detail. Mr Hammond: It is not a question that we could Q379 Thomas Docherty: On a very practical level, answer at this stage. This is not a UK issue; this is a Secretary of State, would you expect that the air much broader NATO post-2014 issue, and there will bridge that will have to continue beyond 2014 will be be a shaping of this discussion over the next 12 delivered by the RAF? months. Mr Hammond: I am sorry—the air bridge that will have to continue beyond 2014? Q373 Mr Havard: The one element you did say that Thomas Docherty: Well, we are going to have a you had some certainty about was our involvement in number of personnel in the country, so is it the the training, but even that over a period of time may thinking at this stage that it will be the RAF who will well change its shape and its component, presumably deliver that air bridge? in terms of numbers. Mr Hammond: To be honest, I don’t think we have Mr Hammond: Over time, it will, because our reached that level of detailed thinking. There will have proposal is a “train the trainer” construct. So there to be a supply chain to whatever we have left in will come a point where our role in the Afghan Afghanistan, so depending on where the people are National Army Officer Academy is effectively located and what the scale of the operation is, we will complete. There will then be at the very least a make appropriate arrangements, which may be by significant step down in the number of foreign collaboration with allies or by RAF provision, or some personnel involved. There will not be a full foreign of it may be via commercial provision, because there training team in perpetuity. are also commercial operators flying into and out of Kabul. Q374 Mr Havard: Can I just ask you a cheeky question? We are planning to visit the US after Easter Q380 Thomas Docherty: I take that point, but as so, hopefully by that time, we will have a slightly much as we wish it may not happen, there is also the better idea, will we, about the future shape of the possibility that there will be British casualties post- discussion, given the US agreements and lay-down? 2014, so is it the MOD’s thinking at this stage that we Mr Hammond: You may have. The Americans, of course, will have made it clear that any post-2014 would not have an air bridge and they would be presence will be dependent on reaching the treated in country rather than, as at the moment, being appropriate agreements with the Afghans. American brought back to the UK? forces will only be there if they are invited to be there Mr Hammond: As with force protection, we will only by the Afghans, and they will only be there if the put people into a situation if we are confident that we appropriate status of forces provisions can be put in are able to provide appropriate medical support to place. Whether that will have been achieved by April, them, because as you say, even if they won’t be in a I would not like to speculate. combat role, there will be risk in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. But it is likely that that in-theatre Q375 Chair: Would you make those same conditions medical support will be provided—I could say by clear in relation to British forces? allies, but let’s not beat about the bush: it would Mr Hammond: Yes, absolutely. almost certainly be provided by the United States, under an agreement, as it is highly unlikely that we Q376 Chair: All those three things remain in relation would have enough people in theatre post-2014 to to British forces. make the provision of dedicated UK medical facilities Mr Hammond: I think that I mentioned two. practical, I would think.
Q377 Chair: No. I think you mentioned three: Q381 Mr Brazier: What will be the strategic invited, status of forces agreement. There was message when we withdraw? Clearly, the Taliban will something else. tip over from “We are fighting the foreign infidels,” Mr Hammond: It is immunities. Clearly, this is a to “The foreign infidels are on the run.” sovereign nation. Our troops can only be in it, if they Mr Hammond: Our strategic message will be that we are invited to be in it, and they will have to be present went into Afghanistan for a purpose, that the mission under a status of forces agreement that gives our has evolved in function, going through the phases that forces immunity from prosecution under Afghan law. I mentioned earlier—the defeat of al-Qaeda, pushback We have to be able to deal with offences under our of the insurgency, creation of credible civil own military law and the US position will be exactly government, and then growing the ANSF to the the same. capability that it will have when we leave at the end of 2014—and that the job that we set out to do has Q378 Mr Havard: So the expectation is that UN been done. We have delivered those four phases of the involvement will not involve the military aspect, but intervention and we have left an Afghanistan with an it may well be there for other reasons. ANSF that has demonstrated itself to be capable of cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Ev 78 Defence Committee: Evidence
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons holding the ground that ISAF has held over the past Q384 Chair: When Julian Brazier asked the specific few years. question about General Capewell staying in post, you gave a very reassuring and very helpful but rather Q382 Mr Brazier: That is clearly the message for general answer. home, but I meant what will the strategic message for Mr Hammond: Sorry, was it a specific question about the Afghan people be? General Capewell? Mr Hammond: You are inviting me, on the hoof, to Mr Brazier: Well, that follows naturally from it, as write a substantial document. The broad thrust of it the Chairman says. will be, “We, the foreigners, have carried out this four- Mr Hammond: Okay, I cannot give you any assurance stage process. We cannot build the future of your about specific individuals in post, but he was only country; we can build the conditions that give you a appointed six months ago. reasonable, sporting chance of doing it for yourselves, Lt-Gen Barrons: He expects to see this through. but the future lies with you, in political compromise and agreement, in allowing the institutions of civil Q385 Thomas Docherty: On money, can you afford government to flourish, and in tackling the corruption the recuperation costs of equipment that will become that is still a major problem at every level of Afghan part of the core equipment programme? society. We have given you an Afghan security force Mr Hammond: We will only bring back equipment that is credible to hold the ring. You now have to do that we need as part of our equipment plan. your bit in delivering the type of society that you want Equipment that is in Afghanistan as an urgent to live in in the future.” operational requirement is not assumed to form part As Afghanistan changes—and it has changed of the future equipment plan. If it is to be brought dramatically over the last decade—many Afghans will back into the equipment plan, it will have to have a want to seize that opportunity now and they will not budget line exactly like any other equipment. In this be attracted to the prospect of going backwards into case, there will not be a capital cost of procurement, the dark ages that the extreme end of the Taliban but there will be a cost of any adaptation or offers as an alternative future for that society. refurbishment that is required for use in core, and of Mr Brazier: On the nitty-gritty, we had a very good course for the ongoing sustainment of that equipment. session with General Capewell, and we asked who had There will be a value for money case on each overall control of the logistic process of the individual line of equipment; for example, within the withdrawal. We got a very straight answer. He said, defence equipment plan, we have already taken the “I do.” It is always nice to get such a straight answer. decision to reduce the allocation that was originally Mr Hammond: I hope he remembers that if anything planned for new armoured fighting vehicles. goes wrong with it. Significant numbers of UORs have been acquired for Afghanistan in particular—350-odd brand new Q383 Mr Brazier: On that very point, Secretary of Foxhound vehicles. Some have just been delivered, State, in our earlier reports on Afghanistan, one thing and many more will be delivered over the next two that was very clear is that some of the worst things years. They will be brought back into core, and they that went wrong in the early years were that key will form the backbone of the Army’s light armoured people changed at bad moments and often vehicle fleet for the future. simultaneously. Is that a post where you will see In many cases, recuperating UORs, refurbishing them continuity at the crucial stages being important? and sustaining them in core will be the best value for Mr Hammond: It is a very good question, which has money option for delivering equipment to UK armed a broader application. One of the key findings of Lord forces. Where equipment does not represent value for Levene’s defence review was that we have to tackle money, after taking into account the cost of getting it the culture of two-year rotations in functional back from theatre and then refurbishing it into core, it positions. We are already doing that. More and more will not be brought back; it will either be sold, gifted senior military appointments are being made for or destroyed, as appropriate. periods of three or four years. Clearly, these types of roles, where there is a mission to be accomplished, Q386 Thomas Docherty: On a point of clarification, cry out for an appointment for the duration of the when we start bringing home, is it the anticipation at mission rather than for some arbitrary rotational this stage that it will be to the UK or that equipment period. I am very supportive of moving us towards a might be put in, say, Cyprus or Germany? Can you situation where most senior appointments are related clarify where? to the completion of a task rather than an arbitrary Mr Hammond: Given the commitment that we are figure. making to draw down from Germany, it is unlikely We have created something called the operational that we would want to move significant quantities of planning group (redeployment), which will execute a equipment to Germany. If there is equipment that is redeployment and transition support plan; it is co- not going to be needed routinely—reserve equipment, signed by the chief of joint operations and the as it were, to be stored—there are very significant commander of logistics. There is a clear ownership of storage facilities at Akrotiri that are not used. The the agenda and a clear mechanism for oversight of it. base commander there never lets anyone in Defence It is a very big and complex operation, and no one in forget that we have some very good empty storage the MOD or in the military is under any illusion about facilities at Akrotiri. That might make sense for the scale and complexity of the task ahead. vehicles that were likely to be used in that region. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 79
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons
Q387 Thomas Docherty: That is very helpful. On within Europe, and how the Americans view it. Quite the point that you made before about if something is a number of our allies in Europe do not currently meet deemed not to be required—surplus to requirement— the 2% target. how much equipment, or what types, are you Mr Hammond: All of them bar one. anticipating at this stage that ANSF would want to acquire? Would you be using the same model as the Q392 Ms Stuart: But some of them have interesting Americans have previously, which is to gift rather ways for what they count in—whether the than expecting a price? gendarmerie counted. Mr Hammond: Too early to say, I think is the answer. Mr Hammond: NATO has a way of counting that is The key principle, though, will be that equipment that entirely consistent, and in NATO’s way of counting is gifted has to be sustainable in the hands of the the only European NATO country, apart from the UK, recipient—not giving people a bunch of equipment that meets the 2% target is Greece. that does not work. I was in Indonesia last week, and it has been donated some C130 aircraft by a nameless Q393 Ms Stuart: That is interesting. If the House of ally of ours, only unfortunately without any engines. Commons Library is asked, they give figures that say Giving people equipment that they will have to spend that with some qualifications, Italy and France do as large amounts of money on to bring into service or well, and just tip over the 2%, but I will take that up that will be beyond their capabilities to sustain with the Library. Do you agree that ours is currently operationally is not helpful in the long run. We want 2.6% of GDP, and that the projection after the current to be careful that we calibrate any offer we make to cuts is that we will sink down to 2.2% of GDP? the Afghans on gifted equipment, to make sure that it Mr Hammond: That sounds about right to me. Yes, is stuff that they really can use and deploy in a way 2.6% is our current level, and that includes the that adds to their capability, not detracts from it by spending from the Treasury’s reserve on operations sucking resources into something that is inappropriate in Afghanistan. to their needs. Q394 Chair: And if you strip that out, what is it? Q388 Thomas Docherty: I was intrigued by your Mr Hammond: I think that takes us down to the suggestion that you might sell some of this 2.2% figure. equipment? Would you imagine it being through Auto Trader or eBay? Given where it is— Q395 Ms Stuart: Within the whole Government Mr Philip Hammond: We have our very own eBay, envelope we are still committed to the 0.7% of GDP the Defence Disposals Agency, which disposes of for international development, are we not, which is military equipment to achieve the best possible value ring-fenced? Are you expecting to have some slightly for the taxpayer when it is surplus to requirements. searching conversations with your fellow NATO We will look at all the options for equipment that is defence Ministers, and particularly Americans, as to not required in core. Is it useful to the Afghans? Is it whether, given the continued cutting of the defence sustainable by the Afghans? Can we afford to gift it budget, post-2014 we will hold the line of 2%? to the Afghans? Is there a sale route for it? Is it Mr Hammond: On our current projections for something that we can sensibly attempt to sell? We 2013Ð14 and 2014Ð15, based on the Chancellor’s will make a case-by-case judgment. announcement in the autumn statement, we will If it helps to give a general feel, I will extract this continue to exceed the 2% NATO target. For 2015Ð16, from the briefing I was reading just before I came of course, there is a spending review to be conducted in here. We think that we have about 11,000 20-foot so it would be premature of me to say what defence equivalent container units of equipment in spending as a percentage of GDP will be then. Afghanistan at the moment. Our planning assumption is that we will be bringing 6,500 container loads back Q396 Ms Stuart: Would you agree, however, that if to the UK—just to give you a sense of the scale. we were not going to meet the NATO target, it would be a significant political statement as to how we see Q389 Thomas Docherty: Who funds personnel who our role within NATO, and that we would see it as a stay beyond 2014? Do they come out of the MOD diminished role? core budget? Is that your anticipation? Mr Hammond: I would agree that if we were not Mr Hammond: Our expectation would be that going to meet the NATO target, British Ministers anything related to the operation in Afghanistan would would have to stop going to Europe and lecturing our be funded from the Treasury reserve. NATO colleagues on the need to meet the NATO target. That is absolutely clear. Q390 Thomas Docherty: From the Treasury rather than the MOD. Q397 Ms Stuart: And are you lecturing some fellow Mr Hammond: From the Treasury reserve. That European members by saying that, as we all now are would be my expectation; that is the established cutting back but co-operating more, you expect them principle. to step up to our target? Chair: Sticking with the issue of money, but a Mr Hammond: I have tried not to lecture because—I different point, Gisela Stuart. have said this in speeches in the States and Berlin— the reality is that now is not the moment when anyone Q391 Ms Stuart: There is a serious question about in Europe is looking at increasing defence the future of NATO, and the commitment, particularly expenditure, except for the Norwegians, who are in a cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Ev 80 Defence Committee: Evidence
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons fortunate and different position from most of us, and with. You are all gaining from that same shrinking the Poles, who have a constitutional requirement to cake. spend 1.9% of their GDP on defence, and they have a Mr Hammond: I am not sure that that is true; but healthily growing GDP at the moment. In reality, no again, I would make the distinction between an one else is a position to make significant increases in agenda that is about efficiency, pooling and sharing defence expenditure. capabilities. There are some good examples. The We need a twin-track approach. We must not lose Dutch and the Belgians have a shared sustainment for sight of the 2% target, nor let anyone off the hook their F16 fleet. The Swedes and the Norwegians have over that target. We need an understanding that, when a joint C130 fleet. As I understand it, both economic growth resumes across the NATO European arrangements are working perfectly well. There are countries, we will expect our partners again to focus clearly further opportunities in that area. There are on how they will deliver that 2%. In the meantime, some challenges. Sovereignty—when it comes to the we must focus on efficiency, including efficiency crunch, everybody has an issue about sovereignty and generated by international collaboration, and on we have to be able to address that if we are going to ensuring that the money that is spent is focused be able to get effective pooling and sharing. aggressively and relentlessly on deployable The second part of the agenda, which is within capabilities. national boundaries, is about shaping individual Germany—I am not saying anything I have not nations’ forces to be maximally deployable and already said in Berlin—spends 1.3% of its GDP on interoperable with other allies, so that collectively we defence,9 but of course it has a significantly larger have the greatest possible deployability. That is GDP than we do, yet Germany does not deliver for simply about a change of approach, of culture and that expenditure anything like the deployable military sometimes of political will in the countries involved. capability that we have. That is partly because of how it chooses to spend its money, and it is partly because Q401 Ms Stuart: Wasn’t that what the new European of political constraints on deployment. But if we want agency was also supposed to be doing? quick wins in European NATO capability, ensuring Mr Hammond: The EDA—the European Defence that the money that is already being spent by key Agency? NATO allies is targeted in areas that maximise deployability and interoperability will be the way to Q402 Ms Stuart: Isn’t it supposed to be co- get there in the short term. ordinating capability and making it more efficient, slimmer, trimmer? Q398 Ms Stuart: When we go to America, would Mr Hammond: In terms of pooling and sharing you expect American colleagues to express a sense of arrangements, that is one of the agendas that the dissatisfaction with the extent that Europe is stepping EDA has. up to the plate? Mr Hammond: Yes. Q403 Ms Stuart: Is it doing it? Has it done anything useful yet? Q399 Chair: And will you be expressing similar Mr Hammond: I think that the joint helicopter dissatisfaction when you go to Munich in, what, two training initiative has been a useful value-adding weeks’ time? output from the EDA, but the work in other areas of Mr Hammond: My position on this is clear. As I have pooling and sharing is still quite immature. The EDA said, I have taken the view that, given the fiscal has an aspiration to be a provider of a sort of situation across Europe, simply wagging the finger at framework that groups of nations can adopt in order my European NATO colleagues and telling them that to pool and share capability. Our experience has been they need to increase their defence budget by 50% is that these kind of arrangements tend to work best if possibly not a very realistic approach; but making they are bilateral or, at most, trilateral. The more clear that, in the absence of an increase in absolute nations you try to work with, the more difficult it gets defence spending, a refocusing of that spending into to make it a general workable arrangement. areas that represent deployable capability is the very minimum that we should expect from them. Q404 Thomas Docherty: On a point of clarification, Perhaps I should say that I have found a very Secretary of State, does the 2.6% figure include significant degree of agreement with that approach spending on deterrent? among key European allies. That does not mean to Mr Hammond: Yes. say that there are not in some countries political issues to be overcome in getting that additional Q405 Thomas Docherty: So what percentage of that deployability, but there is recognition that that is the 2.6% is the deterrent? way to go in a period of austerity and budget Mr Hammond: That is a difficult question to answer, constraint. because we are in the early stages of a programme to replace the Vanguard submarine, so the funding of the Q400 Ms Stuart: But isn’t each one of them saying, deterrent is extremely lumpy. If we look at it over the “We’re going to be more efficient. We’re going to be 40-year life that we would expect replacement more strategic. We’re going to do more partnership Vanguard submarines to have, and we look at the cost work.”? But actually that doesn’t take into account of the deterrent averaged over time, we are looking at that there are fewer and fewer partners to do anything something like 7% or 7.5% of our total defence 9 Note by witness: subsequently corrected to 1.4% budget being represented by the full cost of building cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG05 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_o005_th_130123 CORRECTED HC 413-v.doc!docid=1226421!.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 81
23 January 2013 Rt Hon Philip Hammond and Lieutenant General Richard Barrons and sustaining the deterrent. I think it is about £2.5 issue that we raised in our last report and have also billion a year on a £33 billion budget, approximately. raised with regard to other operations, such as Libya, and that is on the quality of the supply chain for Q406 Thomas Docherty: I do not wish to put you ordnance. We had issues with the Brimstone missile on the spot, so could you write to us with what is in and stockpiles waiting to be reconditioned, and this spending round? elsewhere we raised the issue of ordnance on our Mr Hammond: In this spending review period, I can warships. Can you reassure the Committee that there answer that question—no, probably I can’t. There is a are structures now in place at your Department to £3 billion budget for the work on the successor, but of ensure that whatever ordnance we need is where we course there are also sustainment costs on the current need it, in the condition we need it, when we need it? deterrent. Let me write to you and give you a figure. Mr Hammond: That is a very all-embracing Chair: It is a very important question. statement. What I can say to you is that there is a much greater focus, post-Libya, on the supply chain Q407 Mr Havard: We have had NATO for complex weapons, including things like transformation taking place, apparently, and there is Brimstone. We have also been able over the last 12 this outfit in Virginia, which I have visited on more months to make some significant investments in than one occasion. I am not going again. This was rebuilding stockpiles of complex weapons. meant to provide the efficiency discussion that you Lt-Gen Barrons: With the more challenging complex were talking about—the interoperability and munitions, part of the peril is that they are so deployment aspects of all this—so do you see a new complex—they are machines rather than things that life for a regeneration, as it were, of NATO simply explode—so we would expect to hold some transformation to provide what you would like to see? that are at high readiness, some at lower readiness to Is that the organisation, because that not only brings preserve their life and there then has to be some in the Europeans, but it brings in our United States rotation. One of the key lessons from Libya is that allies to provide what you say could be a better, more the amount that you hold at high readiness has to be efficient expenditure of existing money? sufficient to keep up with demand if you go into an Mr Hammond: Yes, and I think it is called operation like that. There is a relationship between the Transformation Command, isn’t it? rate at which you expend munitions and the rate at Lt-Gen Barrons: Allied Command Transformation. which industry can replace them. We have had to look Mr Hammond: It is a French lead and the commander again at that. of it is an impressive individual. NATO has some Mr Hammond: If I may make an observation as well: significant mechanisms, which we would argue—and there is a juggling act here. Bringing additional do argue—are not being effectively deployed to munitions up to readiness has a cost and the military achieve these objectives. NATO has a huge planning has to make judgments, trying to read what is staff, but the planning process of future NATO happening in the sort of foreign affairs/security space. capabilities and the planning of how NATO It is almost trying to work in a vacuum, really, without collectively is going to deliver them is extremely clear political instructions, because for very obvious opaque and does not, in our judgment, and I think in reasons politicians don’t routinely want to send the judgment of quite a few of our allies, have messages to the military saying, “Make ready 500 of sufficient political control of it. Ministers at recent the following.” So the military has to kind of juggle NATO ministerials have made it clear that they want this and judge where to invest scarce capital to bring to have a greater oversight of that process by which munitions up to readiness, where to deploy them and NATO’s level of ambition is set and then the detailed how to make sure that we are as ready as we can be military planning and the allocation of tasks to for the kind of eventualities that look most likely at individual nations is worked out. any given point of time. NATO also has a vast library of NATO standards for interoperability, which we still do not Q409 Chair: Secretary of State, we have held you comprehensively apply, so it is still the case that a now for nearly two and a quarter hours, and I think great deal of NATO equipment is not fully we’re done. Are you done? Is there anything that interoperable, and if you wanted to address one single you’d like to add that you haven’t said? thing that would improve NATO’s effectiveness over Mr Hammond: No, I think we have covered a lot of time, it would be insisting on full interoperability to ground, and I will answer the point about deterrent NATO standards. Would that be a fair statement? spending. It is probably in the pack somewhere, but I Lt-Gen Barrons: Absolutely. will write to you tomorrow with the answer. Mr Havard: So with a French commander and a Chair: That would be extremely helpful. Probably it British deputy, we have a great opportunity within needs to be graphically done. Perhaps you could do a NATO transformation to lead this discussion. graph over the next 10 years or so, to give us an idea Chair: They are both impressive people. of what percentage of defence spending is going to be covered by the nuclear deterrent and whether we are Q408 Penny Mordaunt: There are clearly lessons to going to take advantage of that to reduce some of our be learnt from Afghanistan. The Committee is other defence spending, which might be a shame. obviously very interested in how they are going to be Thank you very much, both of you, for an excellent taken forward. I want you to comment on a particular evidence session. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SE] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 82 Defence Committee: Evidence
Written evidence
Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence This memorandum provides evidence on a range of topics related to the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan and requested by the House of Commons Defence Committee. The information provided in the text is principally drawn from HM Government sources. Acknowledgment is made as appropriate for sections which draw significantly from ISAF or other sources.
1. Background 1.1 Population Located at the crossroads of Central Asia, Afghanistan shares borders with Pakistan, Iran, China and the central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Afghanistan has a population estimated at 28.7 million1 but also has a large number of refugees (as many as two million) living in Pakistan and Iran. The population comprises numerous ethnic groups, the largest being the Pashtuns (c.40%) who live predominantly in the south and the Tajiks (c.35%) who are found mostly in the north. The other main ethnic groups are the Hazaras, Uzbeks, Chahar, Aimaks, Turkmen and Balochs. The overwhelming majority of Afghans (about 99%) are Muslims. Of these 84% are Sunnis and 15% Shiites (mostly the Hazaras and Tajiks). Small groups of Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis and Jews are scattered in the towns.
1.2 Overview Over 30 years of conflict have left Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world. Afghanistan ranks 172 out of 187 countries and territories on the UN’s Human Development Index—the lowest outside of Africa.2 A third of Afghans live below the poverty line; one in six children die before their fifth birthday; and average life expectancy is just 48. Only one in four Afghans are able to read and write. Afghanistan remains off-track on all the Millennium Development Goals and has agreed a five year extension until 2020. Corruption is a problem felt personally by many Afghans, fuelled by patronage politics and a war economy. Women and girls still face enormous challenges and huge disadvantages in the areas of political participation and decision-making. A weak and politically unstable state fosters insecurity and holds back social and economic development. Afghanistan’s diverse cultural and ethnic mix, and resistance to change from external influences, are contributing factors. Poor governance and corruption undermine trust in the government, while weak public sector capacity hinders service delivery. The transition process is now well underway but it will likely be another decade before the Afghan Government is able to pay for its own security costs without external support. From this low base, progress has been made over the last ten years. 5.8 million children now attend school, over a third of whom are girls, up from virtually none under the Taliban. 85% of Afghans are now covered by basic health services, compared to 9% in 2002. The economy has grown by an average of 11% per annum since 2002, and tax revenue has risen from $200 million in 2004 to a preliminary estimate of $2 billion in 2011–12; progress is being made on strengthening public financial management, and local government is improving in some areas. The Afghan government is increasingly taking the lead, in working for better security, governance, social and economic opportunities for Afghan people. Long term stability in Afghanistan will also be dependent on increased regional cooperation and integration, particularly on issues such as security, trade and economic infrastructure. While improvements have been made, considerable challenges still lie ahead.
1.3 Security Violence levels in Afghanistan remain broadly commensurate with 2011 figures. In the three months from May-July 2012 ISAF reported an overall increase by 6% of enemy initiated attacks (EIAs) compared to the same quarter in 2011. The increase was principally in southern Afghanistan, where the ten most kinetic districts in the country generated 45% of nationwide EIAs. The rise in incidents was mainly attributed to a shortened poppy harvest,3 an earlier seasonal pre-Ramadan rise in insurgents’ activity, improved reporting of attacks against the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the high operational tempo initiated and maintained by ANSF and ISAF forces. Levels of violence largely follow seasonal patterns. The number of incidents are typically suppressed during the winter as harsh climatic conditions restrict insurgent freedom of movement leading many fighters to return to their homes. The onset of spring historically sees insurgents rejoin the fight until diverted by the annual 1 UN—Aug 2008 2 http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/ 3 The annual spring poppy harvest is usually characterised by a temporary decrease in EIAs, the early conclusion of the 2012 harvest resulted in a notable increase in EIAs in May and June, however, year-on-year EIAs subsequently dropped in July. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 83
poppy harvest. Insurgent activity typically peaks over the summer months, albeit with a slight dip over Ramadan, before dipping at the end of the year with the return of cold weather and the Afghan winter.
ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS: NATIONWIDE MONTHLY YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE4
4500
3500
2500
1500 YoY Differecne YoY
500
-500 Enemy-Initiated Attacks
INCREASE from last yr
DECREASE from last yr -1500 Jul 08 Jul 09 Jul 10 Jul 11 Jul 12 Jan 08 Jan 09 Jan 10 Jan 11 Jan 12 Sep 08 Sep 09 Sep 10 Sep 11 Sep Mar 08 Mar 09 Mar 10 Mar 11 Mar 12 Nov 08 Nov 09 Nov 10 Nov 11 Nov May 08 May 09 May 10 May 12 May may 11 may
Regionally the security situation remains varied with the overwhelming majority of violent incidents taking place in the south, south west and east of the country.5 In Regional Command (South West) (RC (SW)), which includes the UK’s area of operations, violence levels in 2012 remain broadly similar to 2011. Between January and July 2012 ISAF recorded a 3% decrease in EIAs compared to the same period in 2011. The insurgents’ operating environment continues to be disrupted by Combined Force (ANSF and ISAF) operations. This year we have seen growing evidence that violent incidents are being increasingly displaced to the rural fringes as the momentum generated by ISAF and an increasingly capable ANSF forces the insurgents to focus on protecting their safe havens away from the key population centres. Two factors will need to be closely monitored across RC(SW) over the coming months: the reduction of US surge forces (and the degree to which the ANSF are able to compensate for this reduction), and the impact of an early Ramadan which could be followed by a longer insurgent fighting season before the effects of winter reduce the scale of their operations. Though tangible progress has been made we must continue to expect challenges ahead. The insurgency is a resilient and determined force; as transition continues the Central Helmand River Valley will remain important to them and as such they are likely to continue to contest it both with ISAF and the ANSF.
ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS: MONTHLY YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE REGIONAL COMMANDS SOUTH WEST AND CAPITAL (JAN 08–JUL 12)
1200 1200 1000 1000 800 800 600 600 400 400 200 200 0 0 -200 -200 -400 -400 -600 -600 -800 -800 Jul 08 Jul 09 Jul 10 Jul 11 Jul 12 Jan 08 Jan 09 Jan 10 Jan 11 Jan 12 Jul 08 Jul 09 Jul 10 Jul 11 Jul 12 Sep 08 Sep 09 Sep 10 Sep 11 Mar 08 Mar 09 Mar 10 Mar 11 Mar 12 Nov 08 Nov 09 Nov 10 Nov 11 Nov Jan 08 Jan 09 Jan 10 Jan 11 Jan 12 May 08 May 09 May 10 May 11 May 12 May Sep 08 Sep 09 Sep 10 Sep 11 Mar 08 Mar 09 Mar 10 Mar 11 Mar 12 Nov 08 Nov 09 Nov 10 Nov 11 Nov May 08 May 09 May 10 May 11 May 12 May
Regional Command Capital (RC (C)) continues to receive less than 1% of EIAs despite being home to approximately 15% of the population and a large number of high-profile targets. As transition continues the 4 Source: ISAF 5 ISAF reporting from July 11–July 12 shows the following regional breakdown of EIAs by Regional Command: RC(E) 39%; RC(SW) 31%; RC(S) 21%; RC(W) 5%; RC(N) 4%; RC(C) >1% cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 84 Defence Committee: Evidence
insurgents are likely to make further attempts to attack Kabul due to the significant media and political attention such incidents receive. Linked to this is the insurgents’ continued focus on assassination attempts of Government and ANSF officials in order to discredit the Afghan Government (and Government institutions) and disrupt its ability to carry out effective governance. Afghan security agencies, supported where needed by ISAF, have and will continue to disrupt threat streams to the capital.6 Afghan and coalition security forces will sustain a high tempo of operations, thereby maintaining pressure on the insurgency with the aim of minimising the threat they pose to long-term stability. Despite continued insurgent intent to conduct a violent campaign in Afghanistan the majority of their attacks have been unable to achieve their strategic objectives. While significant media attention is generated by high profile “spectaculars” ANSF reaction to them has generally been fast, professional and increasingly independent of ISAF. In an attempt to avoid direct engagement with ANSF and ISAF forces, the insurgency continues to rely heavily on the use of asymmetric tactics, such as indirect fire and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), to execute their campaign. Indiscriminate use of IEDs represent a major threat to both the civil and military populations and continue to cause the greatest number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Considerable effort has been invested in Counter-IED technology and ISAF reporting covering July records that more than half of IEDs and mines were found and cleared rather than exploded.
1.4 Transition Transition is proceeding well. On 13 May, the Afghan Government announced those areas that would be part of the third tranche of transition. Once fully implemented, 75% of the Afghan population will live in areas where the ANSF have the lead responsibility for security. The ANSF are steadily increasing their overall force size and remain on track to reach their approved “surge” end strength of 352,000 by the end of October. The surge target is intended to provide Afghan-led security for all of Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and is designed to enable the consolidation of ISAF gains by maintaining a high tempo of operations throughout transition. ANSF quality and competence continue to improve steadily; however, there remain lags and significant enabler support from international forces is still required. The quality and lack of leaders within the ANSF, particularly at the tactical level, remains a challenging issue and efforts are being made to reduce these shortfalls. In March the ANSF and ISAF completed and approved their joint Operational Plan: Operation Naweed (“Good News”) 1391. This is the plan to synchronise ANSF and ISAF efforts over the course of the Afghan Year 13917 and involves all elements of the Afghan security forces. Naweed 1391 is the first time that the ANSF have taken the leading role in campaign planning. The plan includes a detailed concept of operations for each geographic region, including local integration of Army, Police, National Directorate of Security and ISAF activities. The operation represents a further evolution in transition and the ANSF’s capability to manage the campaign in an increasingly independent manner. The planning cycle for the Afghan year 1392 is underway. Whilst needing to meet the requirements of a gradual drawdown by the end of 2014 ISAF continues to work with the ANSF to improve Afghan enablers, prioritise the professionalisation of the forces and build an ANSF that is able to effectively manage Afghanistan’s security and prosecute any residual insurgent threat after 2014.
1.5 UK Casualties As at 16 September 2012, a total of 430 British forces personnel have died while serving in Afghanistan since the start of operations in October 2001. This includes 33 fatalities in 2012.8
6 Excluding the sectarian Ashura attacks in Dec 11 there were no high profile attacks in Kabul between Oct 11 and Apr 12. The gap of 168 days was the longest such break since 2009 and belied insurgent intent. 7 March 2012 -March 2013 8 Correct at time of writing 18 Sep 12. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 85
The most recent, detailed casualty and fatality figures, which cover the period up to 31 August 2012 are provided below:
AFGHANISTAN: UK FATALITY FIGURES BY YEAR
Fatalities 2 Year 1 Total Killed in Action Died of Wounds Other 3
Total 425 337 48 40 2001 0 0 0 0 2002 3 0 0 3 2003 0 0 0 0 2004 1 1 0 0 2005 1 1 0 0 2006 39 20 1 18 2007 42 36 1 5 2008 51 47 3 1 2009 108 91 16 1 2010 103 80 15 8 2011 46 35 8 3 2012 (to 31 Aug) 31 26 4 1 Jul-11 3 3 0 0 Aug-11 3 2 1 0 Sep-11 2 2 0 0 Oct-11 1 0 1 0 Nov-11 7 6 1 0 Dec-11 4 2 2 0 Jan-12 3 1 1 1 Feb-12 1 1 0 0 Mar-12 9 9 0 0 Apr-12 3 1 2 0 May-12 5 5 0 0 Jun-12 4 4 0 0 Jul-12 3 3 0 0 Aug-12 3 2 1 0 1. Data starts 7 October 2001. 2. Some deathsmay not have cklearly defined cause information and could be subject to change depending on the outcome of boards of Inquiry and/or Coroners Inquest. 3. These data include all deaths occuring as a result of accidental or violent causes while deployed and deaths due to disease related causes during the deployment.
AFGHANISTAN: UK CASUALTIES BY YEAR
Casualties (excluding Natural Causes)3 4 5 6 Field Hospital Admissions7 8 9 Aeromed Year 1 2 Very Seriously Seriously Wounded in Disease or Non Total Total Evacuations Injured or Injured or Action Battle Injury Wounded Wounded Total 583 258 296 6,114 2,005 4,109 6,162 2001 0 0 0 2002 1 1 0 2003 1 0 1 2004 6 3 3 2005 2 2 0 2006 31 18 13 240 85 155 262 2007 63 23 40 832 234 598 572 2008 65 27 38 1,008 235 773 800 2009 157 82 75 1,229 508 721 1,313 2010 154 80 74 1,262 518 744 1,225 2011 69 34 35 921 274 647 1,147 2012(to 31 Aug) 34 17 17 622 151 471 843 Jul-11 4 3 1 69 24 45 107 Aug-11 5 2 3 86 36 50 103 Sep-11 6 2 4 74 20 54 87 Oct-11 2 1 1 74 15 59 89 Nov-11 4 3 1 70 17 53 98 Dec-11 5 3 2 74 20 54 54 Jan-12 3 3 0 79 17 62 94 Feb-12 2 4 1 63 4 59 123 Mar-12 4 1 0 53 10 43 95 Apr-12 3 4 2 91 10 81 86 May-12 9 1 5 89 33 56 114 Jun-12 4 3 3 78 21 57 108 Jul-12 6 0 3 98 33 65 126 Aug-12 3 3 71 23 48 97 Source: Initial NOTICAS Source: UK and Coalition Medical Facilities Source: AECC
1. Data starts 7 October 2001. 2. The last three months of data are provisional and subject to change. 3. The VSI and SI data includes personnel with NOTICAS listing of VSI of SI who were alive at the time of discharge from their first hospital episode in the UK. 4. The VSI and SI injury data includes records classified as ‘Other Causes’. This classification is used when there is insufficient information to attribute a casualty to injury or natural cause. 5. Civilians are not included in the figures previous to 1 january 2006. 6. The personnel listed as VSI or SI may also appear in the UK field hospital admissions and aeromed evacuations data. 7. The admission data contain UK personnel admitted to any field hospital , whether operated by UK or Coalition Medical Facilities. 8. The disease or non battle injury figures are non battle injuries only until 27 October 2006, disease is included from October to be consistent with Op TELIC reporting. 9. Field Hospital Admissions data starts 1 March 2006. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 86 Defence Committee: Evidence
1.6 Civilian Casualties On 8 August, the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) released its Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2012 Midyear Report. The report which covered the first six months of this year recorded a 15% decrease in overall civilian casualties compared with the same period in 2011. UNAMA reported that the insurgency were responsible for 80% of civilian casualties and ISAF/ANSF operations for 10%. A further 10% of civilian casualties could not be attributed to any party in the conflict. The protection of the Afghan civilian population remains at the core of ISAF’s strategy. We will continue to take considerable steps to prevent civilian casualties.
1.7 International Support 2012 has seen several strategically important conferences for Afghanistan. At the NATO Summit in Chicago in May, nations confirmed that the ISAF mission will complete at the end of 2014 but reaffirmed their close partnership with Afghanistan beyond the transition period, recalling the firm mutual commitments made between the broader International Community and Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference in December 2011. Significantly, firm financial commitments were pledged to support the ANSF in the years after transition completes. The 8 July Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan was the next international meeting to deliver concrete commitments to the promise of the long-term partnership made at Bonn. At Tokyo the international community and the Afghan Government came together to agree on-going development support for Afghanistan for the next five years. $16bn was pledged for development until 2015, and there was also agreement to sustain support through to 2017, “at or near levels of the past decade”. The UK announced that it would maintain our current development assistance of £178 million a year until 2017. This support will help the Government of Afghanistan tackle extreme poverty, create jobs and achieve sustainable economic growth over the long term. Importantly, our continued support will depend on the Government of Afghanistan’s progress towards key governance and economic reforms as set out in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, which all partners at Tokyo signed. On 14 June, the Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference convened in Kabul. The conference was attended by 28 ministerial and high-level delegations from Heart of Asia and supporting countries, including 11eleven delegations from regional and international organisations. NATO was represented by the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul and the UK by the Foreign Secretary. The conference was the first follow-up meeting to advance the Istanbul Process (2011), intended to strengthen regional dialogue on Afghanistan, develop confidence-building measures among Heart of Asia nations and coordinate various regional cooperation efforts on key economic, political, and security issues. In spite of significant threat streams, the ANSF, in close coordination with ISAF, ensured the proceedings concluded incident free.
1.8 Political Developments On 4 July, Pakistan reopened the supply lines into Afghanistan. The agreement ends the seven month closure that forced ISAF nations to use alternative logistical routes albeit with minimal operational impact. On 4 August, the Lower House of the Afghan National Assembly, the Wolesi Jirga, passed votes of no confidence in Abdul Rahim Wardak, the Minister of Defence, and Bismullah Khan Muhammedi, the Minister of the Interior. Both Ministers had been summoned to the Wolesi Jirga to account for their response to cross- border shelling from Pakistan in Konar Province. Wardak publicly resigned three days later before being appointed as a special advisor to President Karzai on defence matters. On 15 September the Afghan Parliament ratified President Karzai’s nominations for new security ministers. Bismullah Khan former Interior Minister was duly appointed Minister of Defence. Ghulam Mujtaba Patang becomes Interior Minister and Assadullah Khalid head of the National Directorate of Security.
1.9 Governance ISAF continues to provide support to Afghan-led governance efforts, particularly in key areas of transition, reintegration, counter-corruption and rule of law improvement. The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme is still encountering challenges, but has seen improvements in implementation capacity. As of 31 July 2012 the programme has officially reintegrated more than 5,000 former insurgents although the vast majority of these are from the less challenging parts of the country. The NATO-led Building Integrity Initiative continues to develop the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) capabilities to support the ANSF. For the period 2012–14, priority will be given to the planning and management of financial and human resources. On 26 July, President Karzai issued a Presidential Decree that focuses on improving governance and tackling corruption. The Decree reflects the President’s stated determination to address these issues. NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission continues to work with The Afghan Government to improve the provision of state justice with qualified personnel at the provincial and district levels. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 87
1.10 Development/Human Rights
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are in the process of transferring their functions to the Afghan Government and channel enduring assistance through government or traditional development actors (International Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations, private sector).
ISAF stays committed to its support of monitoring and reporting violations against children by armed actors, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612. ISAF and UNAMA have jointly undertaken several practical steps to support Afghan institutions in implementing an action plan to stop and prevent grave child rights violations, including actions to prevent underage recruitment of ANSF, sexual abuse and killing and maiming of children.
As restated at the NATO summit at Chicago in May the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security remains a priority. ISAF continues to monitor and support the Afghan Government in creating a more gender sensitive environment. Although female political and social representation has increased, their effective participation in political processes and economic activities remain limited. Furthermore, women’s rights violations remain prevalent despite existing legislation, while female access to education and health services remain relatively low.
2. Political Settlement
2.1 State of the Political Process
The UK continues to support an Afghan-led, inclusive political process to help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. President Karzai has made clear that reconciliation is open to those members of the insurgency who are willing to: renounce violence; break ties with al Qaeda and respect the Afghan constitution. In July this year the Prime Minister met President Karzai and Pakistani Prime Minister Ashraf in Kabul and reaffirmed his support for a “political solution to end the violence in Afghanistan” that was “owned by Afghans, facilitated by Pakistan and other regional countries, and supported by the UK and the wider international community.”
The High Peace Council (HPC), chaired by Salahuddin Rabbani, leads the peace and reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan. This includes high-level outreach to senior Taleban leaders as well as reintegration of low and mid-level fighters through the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP). The difficult nature of the HPCs work is highlighted by the assassination of two of its membership in the last year, including its venerated former Chairman. Notwithstanding, the HPC has undertaken some encouraging outreach to Pakistan. Nationwide 5,000 former insurgents have entered the APRP since its inception, though the majority of these have been from the north and west of Afghanistan where the security environment is typically less challenging than in the south and east. Helmand, where the majority of UK Forces are based, accounts for around 1% of the number reintegrated nationally. The Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team continues to support Governor Mangal, the Provincial Peace Council and the ANSF in promoting reintegration. At the national level, we work closely with the HPC to support its outreach programme.
The international community has also played a broader role in support of Afghan efforts. At the start of the year the Taleban issued a statement on its website expressing a willingness to participate in a political office in Qatar. Both President Karzai and the Pakistani Prime Minister issued statements in support of the proposed office. However, on 15 March the Taleban announced the suspension of talks over the office until they had clarity about the US’ position. We judge that this is a tactical pause in negotiations.
In addition to reconciliation with the insurgency, it is important that any political settlement takes account of the needs of all Afghan constituencies including women, the different ethnicities and minority groups, and religious minorities. All Afghans must have confidence that the process will, over time, lead to more representative and inclusive politics. In order to secure and maintain the widest possible support for the Government, and address some of potential challenges of the period up to and beyond 2014, some improvements to governance will be required. This is likely to include reforms which will set up a better balance of power between the centre in Kabul and the provinces. Improvements to the electoral system which result in fairer and more transparent elections will also help to ensure that future elections are credible and inclusive. But these changes, if they are to stick, are for the Afghans themselves to lead and own. We can and do support them in this, as evidenced in the work we do to encourage political parties and parliament to promote inclusive politics.
A key step towards political reform was made in July 2012 at the Tokyo Conference, where, along with the international community’s pledge of $16 billion of development aid until 2015 and agreement to sustain support through 2017, the Afghan Government committed to economic and governance reforms, including tackling corruption and promoting human rights, especially those of women. The commitments are captured in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), which will be used to track progress and ensure accountability to both the international community and the Afghan people. It will also hold donors to their promises to channel funding more effectively and predictably. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 88 Defence Committee: Evidence
2.2 Challenges to a Political Settlement There remain several significant challenges to a political settlement in Afghanistan. We see signs that there is debate within the Taleban about their political outreach and role in Afghanistan’s future. Some senior Taleban figures realise that Afghanistan has changed enormously since 2001 and that they have no hope of re- establishing the Emirate. But the insurgency is a complex and disparate entity, and many continue to reject engagement with the West and/or the Afghan Government. Disagreement within the leadership about their direction, and the potential for spoilers to destabilise any progress pose a major risk to a political process. The Presidential election due to take place in 2014 will not be without risk. A credible and transparent Afghan-led election leading to a legitimate result is a key component of the enduring aim for a secure and stable Afghanistan. The Government welcomes President Karzai’s reiteration that he will step down at the end of his current term and support a constitutional transfer of power in 2014. The 2014 election will need to be inclusive, taking into account the needs of all Afghan constituencies, including the different ethnicities, minorities and women, and its result must be also supported by the losing parties. An election that is heavily flawed, or delivers a strongly disputed result that does not reflect the ethnic balance of Afghanistan, or the lack of an election at all could cause significant divisions, destabilise the country and lead to widespread protest and disruption, making progress towards a final inclusive political settlement more challenging. The UK, working with international partners, continues to support projects designed to build the capability of the Afghan Independent Elections Commission to oversee the elections through funding the UNDP’s ELECT II programme for electoral reform and capacity building, as well as financially supporting civil society groups to input into the electoral reform process and strengthen the system. The UK supports the Afghan Government to take the lead on the elections process, whilst making clear the need to adhere to the principles of a credible and broadly inclusive process.
The success of any political process will depend also on the participation and support of Afghanistan’s neighbours. Pakistan has a key role to play and a political settlement in Afghanistan would reinforce stability and security in Pakistan. We welcome former Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani’s statement calling on the Taleban to participate in a political process, and we continue to encourage the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to work together constructively on this agenda. However, we recognise that there remain obstacles to Afghanistan-Pakistan co-operation, and these form another of the key challenges to a political settlement in Afghanistan.
2.3 Regional Position
Security and stability in Afghanistan is in the mutual interest of all its neighbours. Afghanistan’s neighbours have a political as well as an economic stake in co-operation and the major ethnic groups such as Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Pashtuns all have ties to neighbouring countries. None of Afghanistan’s neighbours have an interest in either a return to Taleban rule or civil war in Afghanistan. They have all, in different ways, suffered as a result of Afghanistan’s varying levels of instability during the past 20 years and the related problems of narcotics trafficking, refugees and disrupted trade routes.
At the Istanbul Conference in November 2011 Afghanistan and its neighbours agreed the regionally-owned Process on security and co-operation. Participants also gave their collective backing to the Afghan Government’s efforts to promote an inclusive reconciliation process. The follow-up ministerial conference, which the Foreign Secretary attended, in Kabul in June 2012 endorsed the implementation of seven Confidence- Building Measures (CBMs) in security, economic and cultural fields. The UK has supporter status within this regional process and has offered to provide assistance for the Chambers of Commerce, Counter-Narcotics, Counter-Terrorism and Disaster Management CBMs. We will continue to engage with the process and will work closely with the regional countries selected to coordinate the implementation of each CBM.
In addition, Afghanistan is now a member of several regional organisations, including the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) and Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation (CAREC). Most recently, Afghanistan was granted observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). These fora can also make a positive contribution to Afghanistan’s development and its participation is an important indication of its increasing relations with the wider region.
Many of Afghanistan’s neighbours, such as Iran, are sensitive to any long-term Western military presence in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Russia and China do not want the ISAF mission to fail, and Russia has called for troops to remain beyond 2014. Russia in particular, alongside many of the Central Asian states, has provided logistical support to the ISAF mission by allowing access to transit routes.
Foreign direct investment from Afghanistan’s neighbours is increasing, particularly in the extractive industries. China and India have both won large mining contracts, including the $3.2 billion Aynak copper mine and Hajigak iron ore concession. In addition, both countries have signed Strategic Partnerships with Afghanistan, pledging to increase bilateral cooperation across a broad range of fields. India is Afghanistan’s largest regional donor, pledging $2 billion in development aid since 2001, and has agreed to lead on two regional commercial CBMs under the auspices of the Istanbul Process. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 89
2.4 Pakistan Of all Afghanistan’s neighbours, Pakistan arguably has the most to lose from instability in Afghanistan. It suffers more casualties from terrorism than any other country in the world. Pakistan and Afghanistan need to work together to root out violent extremists from either side of their border, who continue to undermine the sovereignty of both democratic governments. There must be an end to safe havens for militants in Pakistan. We recognise Pakistan does not have complete control over the situation and cannot take on every militant group at once, but it needs to acknowledge that part of the problem is its legacy of dealing with these groups. The current tone of government-to-government relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan is positive, with successful visits by Foreign Minister Khar to Kabul and President Karzai to Islamabad earlier this year. Former Prime Minister Gilani’s statement calling on the Taleban to engage in the peace process is a crucial step. It is important that Pakistan continues follow up with practical actions, including co-operating with the Afghan Government’s requests for assistance, and providing safe access for those members of the Taleban who want to enter into the political process. The UK is committed to strengthening trust between the two countries by promoting transparency and identifying opportunities for dialogue. We welcome Pakistan’s active participation in regional initiatives such as the Istanbul Process and its leadership of the Disaster Management CBM. In particular, we are keen to encourage greater economic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan, both to support long term fiscal self-sustainability and as a means of underpinning the ongoing political negotiations.
3. Transition Transition is the process by which security responsibility for Afghanistan is gradually transferred from ISAF to Afghan leadership. At the Kabul Conference in July 2010, President Karzai publicly expressed his ambition that Afghan security forces would have full security responsibility across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. This objective, an Afghan ambition fully supported by NATO, is aligned with the strategy of phased transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the ANSF that was agreed at the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010. Transition is a carefully planned, joint endeavour. It is a conditions-based process and is designed to lead to a sustainable hand-over. The assessments of these conditions are made by the Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal9 Board (JANIB). The decision to start transition in any given area is based on a thorough and regular assessment of the security, governance and development situation on the ground. The following elements are taken into consideration as part of the decision making process: — the capability of the ANSF to shoulder additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF; — the level of security allowing the population to pursue routine daily activities; — the degree of development of local governance, so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced; and — whether ISAF is postured properly to reduce the coalition footprint as ANSF capabilities increase. Formal announcement of individual tranches for transition are made by the Afghan Government. Successful transition of security responsibility requires that Afghan security forces, under effective Afghan civilian control, will be capable of tackling security challenges on a sustainable and irreversible basis—with NATO support coming through training, advising and institutional development. Transition will take place in five tranches, with the third tranche currently underway. We expect the final set of provinces and districts, tranche 5, to commence in mid-2013. This will be an important milestone marking the point where the Afghans have lead security responsibility across Afghanistan. Transition to full Afghan leadership will be complete by end of 2014 as set out at Lisbon. As a district commences its transition process and ISAF conducts transfer of lead security responsibility to the ANSF, that area then enters the first of four transitional stages with ISAF moving from a partnering, to mentoring, to enabling, to sustaining role, (Support-Mentor-Enable-Sustain), each of which delineates changing responsibilities between ISAF and the ANSF which then determines the role of ISAF forces. Transition from one stage to the next is a conditions based activity. As the stages progress, ISAF/ANSF partnering reduces with a commensurately increased emphasis on advising and mentoring the ANSF, and on ANSF ownership of security for the area. As the transition process continues, the ANSF become increasingly independent, ISAF forces in turn gradually step back and the level of command at which the Afghans are advised, lifts. According to the process agreed at Lisbon, ISAF forces should be able to step back to an operational overwatch role after 12 to 18 months, at the conclusion of stage four. This is why the Prime Minister has able to confirm that by the middle of next year British forces will have shifted their focus from primarily combat to principally support in all three of the districts of Helmand for which we have been responsible. The Afghans will therefore have lead responsibility for security a year before the transition process completes and our troops leave their combat role at the end of 2014. 9 Inteqal translates in Dari and Pashtu as Transition. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 90 Defence Committee: Evidence
3.1 Transition Tranches Tranche 1 transition was announced by President Karzai in March 2011 and commenced in July of that year. Tranche one covered 32 districts (8%) across seven provinces. It included Kabul and, within Task Force Helmand, Lashkar Gah. Tranche 2 was announced by the Afghan Government in November 2011 and commenced in December. The second tranche included 106 districts (26%) across 18 provinces. Tranche two included three Helmand districts (Marjah, Nawah-ye-Barakazai and, within Task Force Helmand, Nad-e Ali). Tranche 3 was announced by the Afghan Government in May 2012 and implementation began from July. Tranche three covers 122 districts (30%) across 25 provinces. The tranche 3 announcement will see all 34 provinces in Afghanistan have districts within the transition process. While this is a notable sign of increasing ANSF capability it is anticipated that Tranche 3 which includes some of the more kinetic areas, may be more challenging operationally than Tranches 1 and 2. Tranche 3 includes five Helmand districts (Dishu, Garmer Ser, Reg-e-Khan Neshin, Washer and Nahr-e Saraj). The inclusion of Nahr-e Saraj by the end of October 2012 will see all three central Helmand districts within the Task Force Helmand area of operations within the transition process. Tranche one and two districts cover areas home to roughly half of the Afghan population. Once implementation of tranche three areas is complete, 75% of the population will live in areas where the ANSF have the security lead. There are still 143 districts (35%) yet to enter the transition process. The remaining Helmand districts are all in the north of the Province (Baghran, Kajaki, Musa Qal’ah, Now Zad and Sangin). Further transition announcements (tranches 4 and 5) will be at the discretion of the Afghan Government but we anticipate future announcements later this year.
TRANSITION TRANCHES 1–310
10 Source: NATO cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 91
TRANSITION IN HELMAND
Nahr-e Saraj inc Nad-e Geresk (T3) Ali (T2)
Lashkar Gah inc LKG City (T1)
T1 and T2
T3
Not yet selected for transition
3.2 Security Force Assistance Security Forces Assistance is a conceptual approach to the nature of the ISAF campaign, as it shifts from an ISAF led counterinsurgency campaign to an ANSF one. This defines the evolution of coalition support to the ANSF through transition. ISAF force elements will shift from being a partner unit, to a transition support unit. The provision of advisory teams will reinforce the existing advisor construct provided by the Brigade Advisory Group. Each of these levels has a progressively lighter relationship with the ANSF, will be generally smaller, and will enable greater flexibility, generating gains for troop-contributing nations. The construct was implemented this year and will be fully operational by 2013, when the final Afghan districts enter transition.
THE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE MODEL
Stage 1 - Local Support Stage 2 - Tactical Support Stage 3 - Operational Stage 4 - Strategic Support Support Afghan Forces take ISAF continue to support ISAF continues to mentor ISAF presence recovers from the lead for all Afghan led operations and and provide enablers but Transitioned Districts. Non- operations and are provide enablers but focus support reduces as Afghan combat NATO forces will supported by ISAF more effort on training and capability grows. continue to provide support to mentors. Quick institutional effort. the ANSF through training. Reaction Forces remain on hand to provide assistance.
3.3 Security Assessment National Picture Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 districts continue to make progress, thereby building public confidence. Afghan capabilities to secure, govern and develop Tranche 1 areas continue to improve at a steady pace as the transition cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 92 Defence Committee: Evidence
process moves forward. There is optimism over the continued success and progress in Tranche 1 areas, and while there will inevitably continue to be insurgent attacks and criminally-based violence in transitioning areas, the ANSF has the capability (with ISAF support) to manage these incidents. It is our assessment that all of the Tranche 2 areas are challenging but manageable.
Task Force Helmand Lashkar Gah District divided into eight precincts entered transition in July 2011 as part of Tranche 1. With effect from March 2012 security for all these precincts and Route 601 (the main arterial route into Lashkar Gah) had transferred to the ANSF. Security for the entire district is now an Afghan lead (“stage 3”). A police presence is evident in all precincts with security in the District Centre entirely ANSF led. Along route 601 the Afghan National Army provides freedom of movement for local nationals supported by the Afghan Uniformed Police who man a number of checkpoints along the route. Additional support is provided by the Afghan National Army Quick Reactive Force that has been used on several occasions to provide an entirely Afghan solution to security incidents. The Afghan focus is now increasingly on developing their ability to police in- depth and to expand the security bubble along the route. ISAF are moving from partnering the ANSF to an advisory role whilst providing continued support to the Afghans by focussing their efforts outside the protected communities. ISAF forces currently represent less than 20% of security forces in Lashkar Gah. Nad-e Ali District entered transition in December 2011 as part of Tranche 2. Since then, and in line with a conditions based assessment, lead security responsibility has been handed from ISAF to the ANSF in seven out of ten precincts. The remainder are set to transfer responsibility later this year and ISAF forces will enter stage 2 (tactical support) by the end of 2012. In those precincts where the Afghan security forces have the lead, they are delivering effective security allowing the local population to go about their day-to-day business within a protected community. ISAF no longer provide security in these areas, purely advice and mentoring support to their Afghan partners.
ISAF forces currently represent less than 50% of security forces in Nad-e Ali.
Nar-e Saraj District was announced in May as one of the districts in Tranche 3 of transition. While, at the time of writing, no date has been set for when Nar–e Saraj will formally enter this process, it is expected that implementation will take place before the end of October 2012.
For those districts in Helmand which have entered transition, there has been a marked decrease in enemy initiated attacks. Within Helmand Tranche 1 (Lashkar Gah) there has been a 57% year on year decrease in attacks, and in Tranche 2 (Nad-e Ali, Marjah and Nawa) a 15% reduction.
4. Counter Narcotics The UK recognises that the drugs trade poses a critical threat to the stability of Afghanistan. It undermines security and has a corrosive effect on governance. The drugs trade and the insurgency benefit one another through funding and protection, and the trade fuels institutional corruption at every level, eroding governance and public confidence.
The UK supports the comprehensive approach set out in the Government of Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). This strategy balances law enforcement action with capacity-building and the development of sustainable alternative livelihoods, and we offer both policy and practical support in a number of dimensions. The Afghan Government has renewed its commitment to delivery of the NDCS which has recently been subject to a comprehensive review.
In 2011, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Afghan Opium Survey reported that opium poppy cultivation rose nationally by 7% compared to 2010. This follows two successive years of declining cultivation (reductions of 19% in 2008 and a further 22% in 2009) and a flat figure in 2010. It is still about 1/3 down on the 2007 high. UNODC does not make national level predictions ahead of the release of its annual survey in September/October. Our current assumptions are that we do not expect there to be significant increases or decreases this year on a national basis.
The US and the UK are longstanding partners on Afghan counter-narcotics (CN), with a shared view that this trade represents a threat to security. We work together on a variety of projects ranging from law enforcement/interdiction to diplomatic negotiation to alternative livelihoods, all to tackle directly the drugs trade. For example, the joint UK/US Counter Narcotics Justice Centre, which includes the UK-mentored Criminal Justice Taskforce (CJTF), is a multi-departmental Afghan detention, investigation, prosecution and judicial centre targeting high level narcotics crimes. The CJTF has secured over 1000 convictions for narcotics offences since it was established in 2005. In 2010–11, the CJTF convicted 621 people of drugs trafficking offences (a significant increase from the 440 convictions in 2009–10). cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 93
5. Afghan National Security Forces Developing the ANSF is a key part of the ISAF strategy in Afghanistan: they have an essential role to play in providing long-term security and governance for the country. We continue to make steady progress in developing the ANSF.
5.1 ANSF Size Oct 0911 Dec 10 Dec 11 Jul 12 ANA12 97,011 149,553 179,610 183,392 AAF12 − − − 6,057 ANP13 94,958 116,856 143,797 147,912 AUP14 78,145 86,122 99,214 105,685 ABP 13,382 18,755 21,203 22,006 ANCOP 3,431 7,077 15,540 14,586
Targets for the ANSF were agreed by the Security Standing Committee of the NATO/Afghan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in January 2010 and supported by the international community at the London Conference in the same month. These set out targets for an ANA of 171,000 and an ANP of 134,000 by October 2011. These targets were met on time and an uplift in this total to a “surge” force of 352,000 (target date of 31 Oct 2012) was subsequently agreed by the JCMB. The growth of the ANSF to a total force of 352,000 has always been regarded as a temporary surge in order to ensure that a high operational tempo is maintained as lead security responsibility transitions to the Afghans. The enduring size of the ANSF is envisaged to be 228,500. This was agreed by the Afghan Government and the international community earlier this year and will be reviewed regularly against the developing security environment. The pace of a gradual managed force reduction from the ANSF surge peak to its sustainable level will be conditions-based and decided by the Afghan Government in consultation with the international community.
5.2 Current State There has been real progress since the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan was established in 2009. The capacity and capability of the ANSF has improved significantly. They are deploying in formed units and carrying out their own operations. Their growing strength and capability will allow them to assume full security responsibility across the country by the end of 2014. They are on schedule to meet their “surge” target of 352,000 later this year. Currently, 92% of advised ANA units are assessed as “effective with partners” or higher which is broadly in line with targets and is a positive indicator that with a further two years for the Security Force Assistance model to continue the development of the fielded ANA is on track. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is still very much in the development stage. The challenges of training, equipment maintenance and infrastructure result in an expected Full Operating Capability of 2017, although seven Mi-35 Hind attack helicopters are already operating in the central areas of the country. At the tactical level one of the long-term challenges facing the ANSF is the recruitment, training and development of leaders. Human capital is the limiting factor with a combination of experience in a rapidly expanding security force, basic education and literacy all proving to be issues. Programmes to address this gap are all in train such as; literacy, NCO training, promotion of experienced and committed soldiers and patrolmen and direct recruitment of educated Afghans. 87% of ANP units are rated “effective with advisors” or higher which is ahead of targets. There are more long-term development issues with turning the ANP into a sustainable model for Afghanistan. The renewed international community effort to support the International Police Coordination Board and the “transformation” of blue policing in Afghanistan intends to deliver this effect. This transformation programme will become enduring post-ISAF supported by the international community.
Security Ministries Whilst fielded units are capable of delivering security, and are on track to do so independently by 2014, there are a number of longer term development issues. Firstly the Afghan MOD is currently rated as, “requiring some coalition assistance to complete its mission”. This is in line with expectation but there is still significant progress to be made before it can run independently. It is likely that it will still require a degree of senior 11 NATO Training Mission Afghanistan stood up in Nov 09. 12 Until Apr 2012 ANA strength included AAF figures and civilians working for the Afghan Government and employed by the Afghan Ministry of Defence 13 Overall ANP figures also include students in the Police Academy, Foreign Scholarships and NCO courses; and those officers who are awaiting training (i.e. officers that are on hold waiting to be placed in a billet). Members of the ANP in any of these groups are not counted within AUP, ABP pr ANCOP figures. This results in the reported variance between overall ANP levels and AUP, ABP and ANCOP totals. 14 Includes all AUP enablers: Intelligence, Counter Narcotics, Anti-Crime, Medical, Fire, Traffic, Training Centres, MOI Headquarters. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 94 Defence Committee: Evidence
engagement beyond 2014, classed as “coalition oversight” with full transition to independence not expected before 2015. The MOI lags behind the MOD and is classed as “still requiring significant coalition assistance” and is likely to require substantial coalition assistance beyond 2014.
5.3 Future State ANSF Funding Following the NATO Chicago Summit there is now a credible funding plan in place to sustain the ANSF post-2014. The international community (excluding the US) has so far made pledges totalling around $1 billion a year towards a US request of $1.3 billion for the funding of the security forces. The UK has pledged £70 million.15 The level of our funding will be contingent on ongoing agreement between the international community and the Afghans on their security requirements. UK funding will come from the cross-government Conflict Pool and will be reviewed each year. The UK’s contribution will form part of a wider pool of some $4.1bn that the international community and the Afghans are putting together. As the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly funding share of the ANSF will increase progressively from at least $500 million in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. In light of this, during the “transformation decade”16 we expect international donors will gradually reduce their financial contributions commensurate with the assumption by the Afghan Government of increasing financial responsibility. We expect other countries to finalise their contributions over the coming months. We will continue to work with our Afghan, NATO and US partners to ensure the ANSF are sustainable.
ANSF Future Force The ANSF are expected to remain at their “surge” target of 352,000 until the end of 2015 before a conditions based reduction to an envisaged size of 228,500 (123,500 ANA, 97,000 ANP and 8,000 AAF). The reduction in size is based on a continuing degradation of the insurgent’s capability and the financial realities of supporting the ANSF into the future. It will be increasingly an Afghan lead to structure the force within the available funding envelope and the quoted force figures are a guide only. The ISAF/NATO effort will increasingly shift from generating the force to refining ministerial capacity and developing its enablers such as logistic capability, air support and medical care. There will need to be a managed drawdown to reach the enduring level agreed between the Afghan Government and the international community at some point after 2014. The pace of that drawdown will be based on conditions on the ground. The costs of the enduring size of the ANSF are envisaged at $4.1 billion per annum.
6. ANSF Training 6.1 NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan Established on 21 November 2009, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) brings together national training efforts under one single umbrella. It works in close partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, as well as in collaboration with the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). NTMA’s key tasks include the provision of training and mentoring to the ANSF, support to the ANA’s institutional training base, and ANP reform at the district level and below. It also aims at addressing the ANA enabling capability shortfalls (including close air support, medevac, and intelligence) through “train the trainer”-modeled programmes. NTM-A was established in parallel with ISAF’s Joint Command (IJC), which is focused on operations. Whilst NTM-A focuses on training the initial recruits and building the institutional training capability of the Afghan national security forces, development of the Afghan army and police continues in the field. The IJC is responsible for developing fielded ANSF units through advising and assisting. There are now 38 nations contributing to NTM-A. The role of NTM-A after 2014 is currently unclear.
6.2 Afghan Trainers & Instructors The ANP require 1,822 instructors by the completion of transition but currently only have 963 trained and assigned (52.5%). Across the force the ANA require 3,371 and have 3,083 trained and assigned (91.5%). Significant emphasis on “Train the Trainer” and “Train the Instructor” programmes continue with the intention of transitioning the remaining ANSF training centres which are not yet Afghan-led by 2014. The UK will expect to continue to have a training role beyond 2014 specifically at the Afghan National Army Office Academy. 15 The UK’s contribution to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy will be in addition to this £70 million. 16 2015–25. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 95
6.3 Institutional Development In terms of training and institutional development, NTM-A continues to mentor and advise at the ministerial and directorate level in the MOI and MOD. Sustainment and enablers are an area of specific focus; logistics, medical, procurement and human resources are all areas which will be supported to ensure the ANSF is sustainable. UK personnel from the Military Assistance Group are also working across RC(SW) in the CJ-10 (ANSF development) directorate and in a direct mentoring role with senior ANSF figures in Helmand.
6.4 Adviser Units Specific responsibility for the development of the fielded ANSF is primarily provided by the Brigade Advisory Group (BAG) and the Police Mentoring and Advisory Group (PMAG), with some additional mentoring of key ANSF individuals to push institutional development at senior levels.
6.5 Helmand The UK Brigade Advisor Group delivers advisory support (and training) through the ISAF Security Force Assistance Model to the ANA in 3rd Brigade, 215 Corps in Central Helmand. It does so across the full range of capabilities, from Brigade level, down through the battalion (Kandak) and infantry company (Tolay) levels, as well as to ANA combat support (Engineer, Artillery) and combat service support (logistics) Kandaks. The UK also provides support to the 3rd Brigade training centre in Camp Shorobak, which is next to Camp Bastion; although training is increasingly delivered by the ANA. The UK Police Mentoring and Advisory Group (PMAG) provides a similar function to the police in the three districts of Nad-e Ali, Nar-e-Saraj and Lashkar Gah. They embed at district police HQs, precinct HQs and also support the Lashkar Gah Provincial Police Centre (alongside the PRT and EUPOL police advisors) and the Lashkar Gah Police Training Centre. Embedded within the military are 17 MOD and UK Home Office Police, six EUPOL and six Danish civilian police who deliver traditional civilian policing advice to senior police leaders at district level. There are also a number of US contractor civilian police advisers, funded by NTM-A, working at the district level. In addition to this dedicated mentoring and advisory effort, the ANSF are partnered by the UK manoeuvre or combat support unit that it is collocated with, or in close proximity to. UK troops within these organisations perform three functions: develop the professionalism of ANSF in their area through planning and conducting operations with their partnered unit; provide practical and operational assistance; and task Army and Police Advisory Teams in their area in support of district security priorities. As a district enters transition, the local ISAF unit changes its role both seeking to transfer as many of the responsibilities for security lead as conditions allow to the ANSF and switching its focus, as quickly as the situation permits, from partnering to that of synchronising, resourcing, and supporting the efforts of the Advisory Teams from the BAG and PMAG., The lead advisors for the Kandak commander and the Deputy Chief of Police will be delivered by the respective BAG and PMAG advisors.
7. Literacy Training The nationwide literacy rate is low in Afghanistan at only about 28%. On entry into the ANSF only about 13% of recruits have already passed the initial literacy test and all ANSF training includes a literacy component. During ANA/ANP basic training, recruits receive 64 hours of literacy and arithmetic instruction designed to bring them to the first of three literacy levels. At the end of this portion of their literacy instruction, soldiers/police will know the alphabet, will be able to write their own name and read a few words. They will be able to count to 1,000 and add and subtract triple-digit numbers. An additional 248 hours of training to Level 3,17 functional literacy, is provided in pre-branch training or in the fielded force. Mandatory literacy for the ANSF began in March 2010. Today, more than 3,000 instructors deliver training in more than 5,700 classes across the nation. Raising the literacy and numeracy rate among Afghan soldiers, air force personnel and police is a crucial stage in the development of a modern, professional force capable of handling Afghanistan’s security needs. Literacy training also has wider, long-term benefits for the country as a whole.
17 Level three—the ability to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and used printed and written materials associated with varying contexts. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 96 Defence Committee: Evidence
As of 1 August 116,245 ANSF are in literacy training (70,760 ANA; 45,485 ANP). Split between the ANA and the ANP literacy figures are as follows:
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY ANA Totals Through Oct 09 Nov 09—1 Aug 12 Total Grads Percentage Increase Tested Graduated ANA Literacy 7,596 151,193 144,842 152,438 >2000% ANA 1st Grade 298 107,036 101,871 102,169 >5000% ANA 2nd Grade − 25,615 24,982 24,982 NA ANA 3rd Grade 29 18,542 17,989 18,018 >12000%
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE ANP Totals Through Oct 09 Nov 09—1 Aug 12 Total Grads Percentage Increase Tested Graduated ANP Literacy 6,345 128,401 114,285 120,630 1901% ANP 1st Grade 575 65,614 58,720 59,295 10312% ANP 2nd Grade − 38,932 34,997 34,997 NA ANP 3rd Grade − 23,855 20,568 20,568 NA
The current level 1 literacy (basic) target is ahead of schedule, however, greater emphasis on accelerating literacy training is being discussed as part of the Enabler Acceleration Plan18 with programmes proposed to ensure that the continued improvements in ANSF literacy and education training is sustainable in the long term. Literacy improvement is vital for future NCOs, Train the Trainer capacity, and maintaining complex enablers like the AAF, logistics and artillery capability.
8. Ethnicity The ethnic split of the ANA and ANP are shown in the table below: Pashtun Tajik Hazara Uzbek Others19 ANA 46 35 9 7 3 ANP 42 42 5 6 5
These figures represent an improvement to overall Pashtun recruitment in the ANA, and no change in the ANP. Pashtuns are the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan and comprise roughly 40% of the population. The Afghan MOD is maintaining its effort to recruit Southern Pashtuns into the ANA by encouraging the recruiting centres and provincial councils to identify suitable recruits. ANA recruited 756 Southern Pashtun in Q1 of 2012, 3.7% of the total against a target of 4%. ANP recruited 674 Southern Pashtun patrolmen in Q1 of 2012, some 13% of the total. Challenges remain, however, to recruit or train these personnel as NCOs as the literacy and education rate in Southern Afghanistan is below the national average.
9. Attrtition The 12 month average monthly attrition rates for the ANA, AAF and ANP are 2.3%, 1.3% and 1.3% respectively against a target of 1.4% for each group.
ATTRITION RATES WITHIN THE ANSF 12 Month Attrition Average20 Oct 12 Target ANA 2.3% 1.4% AAF 1.3% 1.4% ANP21 1.3% 1.4% AUP 1.1% 1.4% ABP 1.6% 1.4% ANCOP 1.8% 1.4%
18 NTM-A has identified potential in US financial year 12/13 (between 30 September 2012 and 30 September 2013) for expenditure to accelerate enabler development within the ANSF. It seems likely that this expenditure, if it is made available, would be spread across logistics, aviation, counter-IED, intelligence and surveillance, training and joint fires, with the training spend in areas such as technical, language and literacy training. There is no further clarity at this stage as to the detail or timing of this expenditure. 19 Others includes Turkmen, Balooch, Nooristani, Bayat, Sadat, Pashayee, Arab & Qazel Bash 20 August 11–July 12. 21 Includes all elements of the ANP. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 97
A number of mechanisms have been implemented to improve the attrition rates. To counter corruption and reduce the scope for underpayment or non-payment of ANSF, 96% of the ANA and 87.7% of ANP are now paid by electronic funds transfers. Leave rotations are enforced by the ANSF chain of command and sustained infrastructure spending aims to improve the living conditions of the ANSF in their enduring bases. At the national level, and in an effort to mitigate the problem, a Joint Attrition Working Group meets weekly to monitor attrition rates. Afghan led, but supported by ISAF, this has identified six contributing factors that hinder retention within the force and has made a series of recommendations to tackle them. In addition, and acknowledging the link between good leadership and lower attrition levels, the ANA is adopting an “Army Values Framework”. This is a joint ISAF/ANA effort and ties together many longstanding Afghan and Islamic values to service in the ANA. This will focus on leadership at the unit level and build on a range of work intended to promote further professionalisation of the force. In Regional Command (South West), which includes the UK’s Area of Operations, we have been working to lower levels of attrition in Helmand by implementing the NATO Special Afghan Leave Transport Program, which has helped the ANSF develop capabilities to fly troops from and to their Regional Command for leave cycles.
10. Afghan Enablers 10.1 Logistics Improving logistics capability is a priority for 2012. The ANA still relies heavily on ISAF and contractors for some aspects of logistic support but work is in progress for the attachment of a Combat Service Support (CSS) Kandak to each ANA Brigade. The sourcing and distribution of stores and equipment from national level depots to the regional logistic support commands remains the most significant challenge, and is therefore the focus of coalition efforts. Deputy Commander (Army) within NTM-A provides the technical training for the ANA logisticians. This training will enable them to organise and run their own logistics within the fielded force. The training is undertaken at the ANA CSS School in Kabul, which is mentored by German and French advisors. The CSS School is currently rated as still requiring embedded mentors. However, progress is good and it is projected to transition to Afghan control on 1 June 2014. Current work includes: improving training quality, reviewing the programme of instruction, developing the structure of the school, introducing new courses and providing oversight of the construction project to build a new facility in Pol-e Charki, Kabul.
10.2 Medical Reconstruction and development of the ANSF healthcare system has long been an objective of both the Afghans and ISAF. Following 30 years of war, Afghanistan’s medical infrastructure had been largely destroyed, and its medical education and training resources largely non-existent. An ANSF healthcare system development support plan was published in November 2011. This concentrates on the essential medical functions needed to support the ANSF providing the blueprint for the reconstruction and development of the healthcare system and transition to self autonomy. This plan is on track to deliver an Afghan-appropriate, proficient, but realistically equipped and capable healthcare system that can sustain the ANSF from 2015 onwards. In addition to central oversight and direction, an ISAF medical team carries out regular validation visits to the National Military hospital, the four regional ANA hospitals, and the central ANP hospital. All have confirmed steady progress. The regional hospitals are now capable of damage control resuscitation, and surgery and, at the national military hospital, of secondary care. Some regional hospitals are now capable of receiving Cat A22 casualties direct from the battlefield, and ground MEDEVAC of evermore severely wounded casualties within the required timeframes is achievable. The Afghan Air Force is not yet able to deliver sustainable rotary wing MEDEVAC support.
10.3 Air/Aviation Support There are no plans for the Afghan Air Force (AAF) to develop what we would consider a “close air support” (CAS) capability. The Mi-35 attack helicopter can provide limited kinetic support now, but there are only seven aircraft available and with restricted range, endurance and speed coupled to poor hot and high performance. The aircraft have limited life remaining and will be retired from service without a rotary wing replacement around 2015. At full operating capability the AAF is planned to have a total of 56 late generation Mi-17 support helicopter aircraft, 10 of which are currently on loan to the Special Mission Wing with a further 12 on contract and yet to be delivered. The oldest aircraft will be retired as the fleet receives larger numbers of more modern aircraft. At present, the only pilots operationally available to the AAF are legacy Soviet-trained pilots. Bringing these pilots to an operational state has been a long process and lapses of skill remain common. Of note, when Afghan airspace transitions to International Civil Aviation Organisation standards in 2015, all pilots operating in Afghanistan will have to have technical English language skills. At present the AAF can mount about 20 22 Critically injured—the most serious casualties. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 98 Defence Committee: Evidence
limited combat ready crews; full manning with a mix of legacy and newly trained pilots is not likely until December 2014 at the earliest. The Mi-17 support helicopters mount M240 machine guns for self-protection and the more recent versions can fit forward-firing rocket pods, (although these would be used for enemy suppression during troop insertion rather than airborne support to troops in contact). The Afghans are some years away from having the skill base to adopt these weapons and training is not scheduled to begin until around 2016. The Light Air Support (LAS) platform will be a single-engine fixed wing turboprop similar to the RAF Tucano. The buy will be for 20 aircraft with deliveries commencing in summer 2014. The intent is for this aircraft to provide a limited kinetic support capability, replacing the Mi-35s with a faster, more flexible aircraft that is cheaper and easier to support. LAS will be based at Shindand and Kandahar and will provide nationwide kinetic support. However, it will still fall short of a full close air support capability, and with no trained Forward Air Controllers, interaction between the pilots and troops in contact is likely to be rudimentary. A fixed wing platform will also be ill-suited to operations in mountainous terrain and it is likely that operational support will concentrate upon the plains to the west and south of the country. 10.4. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) The Special Mission Wing have plans to procure 18 fixed wing turboprop aircraft fitted with a Full Motion Video (FMV) system such as the MX-15. Final approval of aircraft type has not been agreed. Aircraft delivery is planned to start around July 2013 with full manning achieved around May 2015.
11. Afghan Local Police The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established by decree by President Karzai in 2010. It is an Afghan- owned community focussed programme, which provides locally based security in areas with little or no ANSF presence. The ALP initiative is executed by the MOI to secure local villages and deny insurgents access and support. ALP forces are requested by Afghan District Governors and Provincial Governors. The UK supports the ALP at 11 sites in Helmand province, providing assistance with recruitment, training and mentoring to approximately 625 ALP. Nationally, the ALP approved force level (or Tashkiel) stands at 30,000, with the number of ALP recruited currently at about 16,300. The ALP has made a very valuable contribution to improving security and governance in many areas in Afghanistan, including Central Helmand. The main objectives of the ALP are to empower local Afghans to provide security while giving the ANSF time to grow in numbers and capacity, prevent insurgent freedom of movement and to link communities with the Afghan government. The ALP are also a useful security tool in communities who are beginning to engage with the Afghan Government and are ready for local security solutions. Currently there are insufficient numbers of Afghan Police in Helmand to provide local security across the whole province. The ALP are helping to fill in the gaps by enabling locals to take more responsibility for their own security. The ALP complement and do not undermine the mainstream Afghan Police. They are overseen by the local District Chief of Police. They are subject to the same rules and regulations as the Afghan Uniformed Police and have detention but not arrest capabilities. In recognition of the fact that they are not required to deploy nationally, they are paid only 60% of the wage that a member of the ANP receives. ALP recruits are subject to a rigorous vetting process, including biometric testing and approval by local shuras (committees) and district police chiefs. ALP sites are monitored by the local shura, the District Chief of Police, District and Provincial Governors and the Ministry of the Interior. There are several measures within the ALP programme that are designed to promote respect for human rights, in addition to the practices set out above. The ALP receive training on techniques and procedures that are human rights compliant. ALP training also includes lessons specifically on the appropriate use of force, values and ethics, professional development, fundamental standards of human rights and the Afghan constitution. There are specific handling procedures in place for UK forces and MOD civilians to follow in the event that they witness, or receive allegation of, acts of misconduct committed by the ANSF or the ALP against local nationals. On 2 September, the US military announced that it had temporarily halted the training of 1,000 new recruits for the Afghan Local Police to introduce tougher screening and vetting procedures. NATO’s training mission is not affected by this temporary pause. The UK has not initiated a similar suspension in ALP training at the sites we mentor, as we have already increased screening and vetting in the recruiting process. We continue to do all we can to reduce the risk posed by insider threat attacks.
12. Counter Insurgency Strategy With the improved force densities that resulted from the US surge in 2010, the UK has developed and evolved a clear counterinsurgency model for central Helmand which has increasingly placed the ANSF in the lead. The first phase was to establish force concentrations within the most populated areas, in order to set the conditions within which Afghan governance and development activity could begin to have an effect. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 99
Throughout Herrick 12 and Herrick 13 (April 2010 to April 2011), 4 Mechanised and 16 Air Assault Brigade sought to establish security zones around the key population centres, particularly Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and the green zone around the river Helmand. These were then gradually but aggressively expanded, increasing the proportion of the central Helmand population under the ISAF and Afghan security footprint and, consequently, Afghan governance. This activity also had the effect of disrupting insurgent attempts to concentrate its activity, providing space within which the ANA and AUP could develop in both capability and confidence. This model was sufficiently advanced by July 2011 that the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah and its surrounding environs was included in tranche 1 of transition. During Herrick 15, there were no requests for ISAF to support the ANSF in delivering security within the transitioned areas. During 3 Commando Brigade’s tour on Herrick 14, there was also a clear focus on consolidating the gains that had been made, as well as on developing ANSF operational and planning capability. The Operation “Omid” (Hope) series in Herrick 13 and 14 saw, for the first time, large scale operations planned and led by the ANSF, with ISAF providing support with an increasingly lighter touch. In September/October 2011, the Nad-e Ali South and North Battlegroup Headquarters merged to simplify engagement with the district authorities, reflecting the shifting focus to governance and transition, as well as the significant improvements in security that had been achieved. In December 2011 Nad-e Ali formally entered transition. By that point, a model which saw the AUP providing security in the centre, with ANA disrupting activity in the periphery areas and ISAF providing support throughout, as well as the ability to conduct and enable disruption operations in the peripheral areas, was well established. By March 2012 security responsibility for the entire Lashkar Gah district had been transferred to the Afghans. ANSF capability was such that they were now capable of planning and executing operations independently of ISAF support, and frequently did so during the Herrick 15. In early 2012 an ANSF operational design for central Helmand emerged. This plan, written and owned by the Afghans, mapped for the first time security activity against the Provincial Governor’s security priorities. This outlined a succession of complementary operations, planned and led by the Afghans with UK forces providing a supporting and advisory role, to further expand the ANSF security footprint, dominate contested areas and target insurgent supply routes. In the early operations the insurgent resistance was often light, suggesting that they were aware in advance of these operations; but the operations nevertheless demonstrated publicly that the ANSF were capable of delivering security in a coordinated way. In May 2012 Nahr-e Saraj was announced as entering tranche 3 of transition, which is due to begin before the end of October. This is the final district for which the UK has responsibility. There are still areas within the three districts where the insurgent has relative freedom of movement, and he will remain capable of launching attacks into the protected communities. However, he is unable to concentrate his forces in a meaningful way. The ANSF operational design has exposed operational-level Afghan thinking which emphasises the importance of the main population centres and transport routes between them. As a result, it has identified those areas which are of less significance to the ANSF and has allowed UK forces to realign themselves to better reflect Afghan priorities. Increasingly, operations will be Afghan run with UK adviser or mentoring support and enablers, which will themselves gradually decrease over time. The focus of the UK counterinsurgency campaign in central Helmand is now on delivering a capable, confident ANSF which is able to protect the gains that have been made over the past six years.
13. Task Force Helmand Significant Operations Herrick 13–Herrick 16 Operation Omid Char in October 2010 was devised and led by Afghan National Army forces from 3rd Brigade 215 Corps, in close consultation with the district governor. It was the largest operation in terms of size, numbers of soldiers and duration to have been planned, led and conducted by the ANA. Its objective was to secure a key area near Gereshk in Nahr-e Saraj; restrict insurgent freedom of movement; and visibly raise the profile of the Afghan Army in this important area of central Helmand. Operation Omid Panj in January 2011 built on the success of Omid Char. It was conducted at the request of the district governor (and with even less ISAF input) by the ANA in the green zone north of the Helmand river. Its objective was to expand security around Gereshk and disrupt key insurgent supply routes in the area. Operation Omid Shash in February 2011 saw a four day partnered Battlegroup level operation in Nahr-e Saraj (South) involving around 800 ANA and 500 British forces. It demonstrated the ability of the ANA to conduct large scale insertions, for the first time using helicopters in this role, to dominate battlespace which had previously been heavily contested by the insurgency. Operation Omid Haft between 26 May and 7 June 2011 focussed on the Malgir and Loy Mandeh areas to expand the security zone around the key population centres in Nad-e Ali (North) and Nahr-e Saraj (South). It was a partnered operation that involved coordination operations within all three central Helmand districts to negate the insurgent threat in the tri boundary area bordering the three UK battlegroups areas of Lashkar Gah, Nad-e Ali (North) and Nahr-e Saraj (South). Operation Qali Sharqay between 18 June and September 2011 was an ANA planned, Task Force Helmand (TFH) enabled operation to support the transition of lead security authority in Lashkar Gah, and to develop the independence and capability of 3rd Brigade 215 Corps building on the lessons from Omid Haft. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 100 Defence Committee: Evidence
Operation Zamestani Peerozi ran between 17 and 23 December 2011. Planned and led by the ANA, with TFH in support. The aim was to insert a permanent ANSF presence into the tri-boundary area in order to set the conditions for the transition of security responsibility for Nad-e Ali and the transition of security responsibility for the police precinct of Babaji in Lashkar Gah to an ANSF lead. Operation Shamali Kamarband in January 2012 was the TFH support to the ANSF Operational Design for central Helmand and aimed to establish and consolidate a security zone to the north of Gereshk, in Nahr-e Saraj. The ANSF Operational Design was a significant development, demonstrating for the first time a coherent ANSF plan for delivering against the provincial governor’s security priorities for the three central Helmand districts. Operation Dastkash Muttahidana in February 2012 covered three concurrent operations to clear and hold the areas of Kopak, the Bowri dashte and Kopak in the Nad-e Ali district. This operation, planned and led by the ANSF, was in accordance with their Operational Design and aimed to support the transition of lead security responsibility for the district by taking and holding areas that had previously been insurgent areas of strength. Operation Janubi Kamarband was a three day operation in February 2012 to secure the area south of Gereshk. This effectively established a security bubble to the south and, as a result of the earlier Shamali Kamarband, the north of the important economic hub of Gereshk. Operation Now Roz in March 2012 was planned and led by the ANA to clear the areas of Yakchal and Gavband in the central part of TFH’s area of responsibility. These had previously been areas where the insurgent had enjoyed freedom of movement and was able to move supplies and weapons down towards the population centres of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk. Operation Shafuq between 18 and 22 April 2012 was an ANA operation in combination with AUP, ANCOP and NDS forces to clear the Nad-e Ali dashte to the north of the Canal. It was an independent ANSF operation in support of governor led eradication of the poppy crop. TFH’s role was limited to providing support through wider disruption operations on the flanks. Operation Axolamal in May 2012—a series of operations across the TFH area was intended to pre-emptively suppress any attempted spring offensive by the insurgent. It aimed to demonstrate visible ANSF control and domination of the populated areas, and disrupt the movement of insurgents, supplies and weaponry within the more remote areas of the three districts. Operation Maahi Buzurg was a Regional Command (South West) level operation into the Upper Gereshk Valley, within the TFH area of operations. The operation’s aim was to deliver an enduring security presence and expand Afghan governance into the area. TFH supported ANSF activity to the north of Gereshk and provided a screen to the east and west of the US Marine Corps operation in the area.
14. ISAF Force Laydown The following table gives the approximate troop contributions from each of the 50 troop contributing nations as at 15 May 2012. As such, it does not reflect the full extent of US surge recovery. These figures are indicative and actual numbers will fluctuate daily.
ISAF TROOP CONTRIBUTIING NATIONS23
23 Source: ISAF cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 101
15. UK Force Laydown The UK currently contributes 9,500 troops to the ISAF mission to Afghanistan on an enduring basis, although as the then Secretary of State for Defence announced on 14 February 2011, actual numbers on the ground fluctuate daily. The variations in the precise number deployed at any one time are for various reasons including periods of overlap during the roulement of units and individuals into and out of theatre, rest and recuperation, and routine surges of personnel to meet specific and time-limited tasks. Our enduring force level has remained unchanged since the then Prime Minister announced an uplift in our contribution to the ISAF mission in 2009. This number excludes UK Special Forces, who we have acknowledged operate in Afghanistan but in accordance with long standing practice do not specify the scale or nature of their activities. This enduring force also excludes “surge” deployments, such as the Theatre Redeployment Pool (TRP) which deploys up to a maximum of 500 personnel into theatre focused purely on redeployment activity; or deployment of the Theatre Reserve Battalion (TRB) which is based in Cyprus but can be deployed rapidly and on the authority of the Chief of Joint Operations when a temporary need for additional troops is identified. The TRB was last deployed to central Helmand in July 2010 for a three-month period to further progress and consolidate gains in the UK’s area of operations following recent operations in the area. The Prime Minister announced in July 2011 that our force levels would drawdown by 500 to 9,000 by the end of this year. The 500 troops drawing down as part of this reduction will all come from Helmand and will primarily consist of combat troops. The Secretary of State for Defence briefed the House in April in more detail on those manpower savings in April 2012. Currently we have around 8,500 troops assigned to Helmand, most—but not all—in central Helmand where we are responsible, with the ANSF, for providing security for approximately 32% of the Helmand population. Camp Bastion, located to the north-west of the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, is our main logistics hub for the province; the main point of entry and departure by aircraft for UK troops; as well as the base for elements of the UK’s helicopter fleet. It is also the location of our main in-country medical facility. The UK also has forces assigned to Kandahar Air Field (approximately 500), to headquarters in Kabul (approximately 500), and holds several key command positions, including Deputy Commander ISAF (on a permanent basis).
16. Helmand Province International forces deployed to Helmand province operate within Regional Command (South West) currently commanded by the US Marine Corps (USMC) under Major General Charles Gurganus. The majority of UK personnel serving in Afghanistan operate under the command of the UK-led Task Force Helmand (TFH). TFH, which also contains significant Danish, Estonian and, to a lesser degree, Bosnian contingents, has responsibility for providing security in the centre of the province alongside the ANSF. Approximate figures for international forces operating within Task Force Helmand are as follows: — Denmark—c. 360 pax Denmark provides an infantry company, tank platoon, police mentors and associated support divisions to assist operations within Task Force Helmand. Additionally Danish training teams are based at the Regional Military Centre (Camp Bastion) and in Lashkar Gah training the Helmand Provincial Response Teams. — Estonia—c.150 pax Primarily comprised of a ground holding infantry company however, the Estonians also supply an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team and some staff posts. — Bosnia Herzegovina—c. 50 pax Force protection duties. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 102 Defence Committee: Evidence
ISAF REGIONAL COMMANDS AND MAJOR UNITS24
17. Insider Threat25 Insider-threat attacks are defined as those incidents where an ANSF member or members knowingly attacks and/or helps facilitate an attack against their ISAF Coalition partners or Afghan colleagues. ISAF record data on insider threat attacks from across the Coalition.26 Between May 2007 and 15 September 2012 ISAF report a total of 79 incidents where members of the ANSF attacked their Coalition partners. Of the 79 attacks, 67 resulted in Coalition casualties (120 deaths and 183 wounded). 18 members of the UK Armed Forces have been killed in seven fatal insider threat attacks. Such attacks against ISAF personnel have nearly doubled year-on-year since 2008 (albeit from a low base, and set against the backdrop of a threefold increase in ANSF numbers since 2007). Attacks in 2012 have already surpassed those recorded in 2011. Those responsible for these attacks are not representative of the ANSF, the Afghan Government, or the Afghan people. Despite these tragic incidents the overwhelming majority of UK and ISAF troops work well with their Afghan counterparts. Every day there are tens of thousands of interactions, without incident, between Coalition and Afghan forces. They share the same mission and goals.
INSIDER THREAT ATTACKS Year Attacks Coalition Fatalities27 2007 2 2 2008 2 2 2009 6 10 2010 11 20 2011 21 35 201228 37 51 Total 79 120
24 Source: ISAF 25 COMISAF has changed the overarching name to recognise that both ISAF and ANSF are the target of attacks. In many attacks against Coalition forces members of the ANSF are also killed or injured. Attacks against contractors are also covered by the overarching Insider Threat term. The subset terms “Green on Blue”, “Green on Green” and “Green on Brown (contractors)” are still used to distinguish between the intended targets of attacks. 26 Including civilian contractors. 27 Including civilian contractors. 28 Figures correct at 15 Sep. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 103
The UK, ISAF and the Afghan Government are acutely aware of the threat posed by these incidents. At the most senior levels the Afghan Government recently held an emergency shura to examine the issue while in August ISAF called its inaugural Insider Threat Action Group meeting where ISAF and the ANSF agreed to a range of collaborative actions to further mitigate the risk. Commander ISAF has discussed the issue personally with President Karzai and has represented the concerns of the ISAF nations in the strongest possible terms. We routinely assess and refine our force protection to best ensure the personal safety of our forces and meet mission requirements. ISAF and its Afghan partners have already taken extensive measures to reduce the threat from insider attacks. These have ranged from improved vetting procedures for ANSF members, tactical precautions such as the use of armed “Guardian Angels” to overwatch ISAF/ANSF interactions, an enhanced Afghan counter-intelligence presence in the ANSF and additional cultural awareness training. Vetting remains a critical pillar of the mitigation strategy and the Afghans are strengthening the existing eight-step vetting process for recruits.29 Amongst other measures the ANSF have: introduced re-vetting procedures for ANA soldiers returning from leave to check for signs that they have been radicalised while the Afghan MOD; doubled its numbers of dedicated counterintelligence personnel and recruited 900 religious and cultural affairs officers. These are assigned throughout the ANA down to Kandak (battalion) level to train and educate members of the ANA on cultural differences in order to mitigate the risk of insider attacks caused by disagreements, grievances or perceived offences. UK national mitigation plans run in parallel to ISAF and Afghan Government work. Conceptual training on the threat delivered to personnel deploying on operations to Afghanistan places particular emphasis on cultural understanding in order to mitigate the threat posed by personally motivated attacks. Practical training is also provided both at home, as part of pre-deployment training and upon arrival in Theatre.30 Analysis indicates that there is no single overriding factor which triggers insider threat attacks. For a number of reasons understanding the motivation behind these attacks is challenging. In many instances the perpetrator is either killed or escapes, and in a significant number of cases it is simply not possible to attribute a motive with any certainty. Inflammatory events can act as a catalyst for insider threat attacks although they do not necessarily provide any greater clarity on trends. For example, following the mishandling of religious materials at Bagram Airfield in February 2012 there were a then unprecedented seven incidents within 14 days—five of which were confirmed as having religious motivations as the primary cause. In contrast, there were no such incidents attributed to the killings of civilians in Kandahar by a rogue US soldier in March 2012. ISAF are not the only ones affected by the threat of insider attacks, since May 2007 the ANSF have suffered almost twice the number of attacks as ISAF. In the first seven months of this year 27 incidents were recorded where members of the ANSF were attacked from within their own forces. These attacks resulted in the deaths of 36 ANSF with another 30 left injured. Significantly there have also been multiple incidents where members of the Afghan security forces have risked their own lives to prevent or suppress attacks on Coalition forces and other ANSF members. On 16 September ISAF issued a fragmentary order which included a change to the level at which partnering and mentoring of the ANSF is scrutinised and authorised. This is a prudent and temporary response to elevated threat levels arising, in part, from the release of the “Innocence of Muslims” video. These measures are intended to reduce our profile and vulnerability to civil disturbances or insider attacks at a time of high tension. We have adjusted our force protection measures in other high periods of the campaign in response to conditions on the ground. These actions balance the tension of the recent video with force protection, while maintaining the momentum of the campaign. Under this guidance, and as conditions change, we will continue to adapt our force posture and force protection measures. This directive is not a suspension of operations below Kandak level. Rather this is a change to the way ISAF forces assess and mitigate the risks associated with partnering. British commanders retain the flexibility to mentor at all levels in consultation with the Regional Commander. As General Allen, Commander ISAF has stated “ISAF remains absolutely committed to partnering with, training, advising and assisting our ANSF counterparts”. We recognise the risk that UK, ISAF and Afghan forces face from insider attacks. The personal safety of our deployed personnel remains a Defence priority—it is an issue that all in Government and the military chain of command take extremely seriously. We keep the level at which we mentor under review and will continue to do so through the process of security transition. Partnering is not without risk but it is an essential component of our military strategy in Afghanistan and is key to the success of our security objectives. Developing the ANSF is a fundamental part of our work in Afghanistan, they have an essential role to play in providing long-term security and governance in the country. We continue to examine additional options to prevent this type of attack and are working with our Afghan partners at every level from ministers to soldiers and policemen, to decrease the threat to an irreducible minimum without prejudicing mission achievement. These incidents are of great concern but they will not derail our strategy. 29 This includes endorsement by local elders, biometric data checking and medical (including drug) screening 30 As part of the Reception Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSOI) training. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:54] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 104 Defence Committee: Evidence
18. Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team
The Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is a UK-led, multinational (UK, US, Denmark, Estonia), multi-agency effort comprising 200 staff in Lashkar Gah and in district centres across the Province (60% civilian; 20% military and police; 20% Afghan nationals).
UK STAFF COMPRISE FCO, DFID AND STABILISATION UNIT (SU) (CONFLICT POOL FUNDED) Headcounts FCO 19 UK British (UKB) 15 Locally Engaged (LE) DFID 7 UKB, 2 LE SU/CP 18 UKB PRT, 13 UKB District Stabilisation Teams Total 31 UKB, 31 LE Totals 57 UKB, 48 LE
The Helmand PRT coordinates stabilisation and development work across Helmand, in collaboration with the Afghan Government. The PRT is working to achieve transition to Afghan-led delivery of security, governance and services by end of 2014.
Efforts are guided by the Helmand Plan, agreed between the Afghan Government and its international partners. The plan coordinates five core work strands: Governance and Politics; Rule of Law; Counter- Narcotics; Population Engagement; and Socio-Economic Development. PRT priorities are focused on supporting Afghan Government accountability and legitimacy.
The Helmand Plan 2011–14 provides the current, jointly agreed, guidance for intervention in Helmand. It seeks to develop the Government’s effectiveness and promote its legitimacy so that: By the end of 2014, GIRoA31 has the capacity independently to control, employ and maintain state institutions to ensure the insurgency, narco networks and criminality effects are reduced to a point where they do not pose a threat to the sustainability of GIRoA’s provision of governance to the population of Helmand.
Core Helmand PRT Priorities 2012–14
The key message from the PRT’s recent Transition Review is to accelerate the transition to Afghan leadership in a way which increases legitimacy and accountability of the Afghan Government to the people of Helmand. There are three aspects to this: (i) inclusive legitimate political settlements; (ii) accountable governance; and (iii) accountable rule of law.
Inclusive Legitimate Political Settlements
The Afghan Government is creating the conditions for legitimate, inclusive political settlements. Experience suggests that the critical enabler is sufficiently capable ANSF to create freedom of movement. On the back of this the provincial government can take the lead in establishing Afghan Government governance and justice systems, and enable delivery of a package of basic services. To support inclusive and legitimate political settlements the PRT will: (a) Continue to invest in understanding Helmand politics and use its knowledge and networks to inform and, where appropriate, facilitate local political reconciliation, working at the Kabul, Provincial and District levels as needed. (b) Continue to support implementation and delivery of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) in line with national and ISAF policy. The PRT will encourage Governor Mangal to link up every political settlement he makes, where feasible, with the APRP, to make them more accountable. (c) Support the reinforcement of political settlements with more formal governance structures such as District Community Councils and District Delivery Programme funding. (d) Share the lessons learned from Helmand, so that they can be applied elsewhere.
Accountable Governance
Government will only have the trust and consent of the people for so long as it can deliver on their priorities. Just as at the national level, Afghan government in Helmand must be able to continue providing basic services beyond 2014. 31 The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 105
The PRT will continue to work at Provincial level on developing the capacity of the provincial departments and institutions, and on the funding mechanisms on which sub-national governance at all levels will depend. The PRT will continue work to connect the District to the Province and the Province to Kabul. We will do this by: (a) Building on the District Delivery Plan the PRT will support the provincial administration in piloting locally accountable participatory planning and budgeting models. These will be designed to further incentivise political stability and be consistent with national developments in provincial planning, with a particular focus in less secure, contested areas. (b) Working with counterparts in the Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Director’s of Line Ministries and District Governors to develop their capacity and processes both to communicate their plans and service commitments; and for government to account for its activities both to local councils and civil society. (c) Supporting local government to become more responsive—by 2013 the PRT will have worked with counterparts in the Provincial Governor’s Office and Provincial Directors of the Ministry of Economy to develop simple and robust approaches to monitoring and evaluation that can inform future planning and programming.
Accountable Rule of Law A fair justice system ranks second only to security for Helmandis in terms of perceptions of legitimacy of the Afghan Government. In many areas the Afghan police are the most visible face of the Afghan Government. Effectiveness and behaviour are fundamental to trust in the Government. (a) The PRT will focus more on values and behaviours in police training and place more emphasis on developing closer ties between the different police agencies and local governance to strengthen local accountability. (b) The PRT will ensure police training (delivered in large part by the military) is directed by senior police professionals to ensure development of core policing skills. (c) The PRT will continue work to strengthen the end-to-end justice system and to link the informal justice system to the formal and to protect informal justice actors from ideological insurgents and predation from informal powerbrokers and government officials. (d) On the counter-narcotics (CN) side, the PRT will support interventions to reduce the amount of opium revenue funding the insurgency and corrupt lifestyles through tackling money laundering and a strong CN judicial process. It will channel support for alternative livelihoods through the mainstream agriculture growth programmes and will fund a further year of support for Governor Led Eradication, in a way which puts it on a trajectory for Afghan Ownership and sustainability and tackles high levels of perceived corruption. (e) On the counter-terrorism (CT) side the PRT will continue to support development of an Afghan end-to-end CT capability with a rule of law emphasis on the collation of evidence and case preparation. This is critical to achieve security objectives but also to ensure confidence in the fairness of the system.
19. Stabilisation and Re-constrcution In Helmand The Helmand PRT Socio-Economic Development and Governance teams lead programmes contributing to stabilisation and development efforts. These are funded by DFID and the UK Conflict Pool, as well as the US, Danish and Estonian Governments. International support to Helmand’s development process is planned and executed on the basis of sustainable, ongoing support to the province beyond 2014, either through new implementing partners or national programmes. The aim of transition planning is to increase Afghan Government ownership and capacity, and “normalise” the development relationship. In line with military drawdown, the Socio Economic Development team has streamlined into three priority thematic delivery areas: social development, health and education; growth and livelihoods (private sector development and agriculture) and economic infrastructure. The focus is on building sustainability with a shift to on-budget programmes, away from direct delivery to capacity building support—equipping local government with the skills and tools necessary to manage budgets and links with central government, and operate and maintain key economic infrastructure (eg roads, power networks and waterways). The governance team is securing support for provincial and district government in Helmand by improving public administration and allowing it to respond to people’s priorities. Helmand has been innovative on government accountability and elections; there are now seven elected district councils plus one elected municipal council, neither of which exists anywhere else in Afghanistan. Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme data shows councils are perceived as legitimate and credible connectors between government and people and election turnout is consistently increasing. They are providing a critically-needed accountability function over local Government and to some extent security forces, improving their quality and discouraging misconduct. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 106 Defence Committee: Evidence
Quantity and Impact of Stabilisation and Reconstruction Activities in Helmand With the help of DFID and Conflict Pool funding, Helmand has seen improvements to vital basic services: Sector Key improvements Education — 51% increase since 2008 in the number of schools open (164) — 55% increase since 2008 in the number of students enrolled (now 121,797 of which 23% are girls) — Perceptions of the government’s improvements to education services is high in central districts at 76% (13% increase since Sept 2010)32 Health 96% of the province’s health facilities open (58) — By 2013, 15 Comprehensive Health Clinics funded by the PRT will be complete — By 2013, a new midwifery school will have trained 58 midwives (52% more than in 2009) — Perceptions of the government’s improvements to health services is high in central districts at 76% (14% increase since Sept 2010) Private — To date, 7,366 students have graduated from UK-funded vocational training programme sector operating in six districts—including 1,251 females — Business development support given to 20 SMEs through UK-funded rural development programme — Perceptions of the government’s improvements to employment opportunities has increased by 19% since Sept 2010 to 61% Infrastructure— Between 2010 and 2012, the PRT has funded 270km of roads linking key economic district centres and repaired 45 key canal assets essential for irrigation. — Since Sept 2010 there has been a 20% increase in people in central districts believing the government has improved road conditions and a 31% increase in those believing road security has improved. Governance— 40 development projects (on rural rehabilitation, health, education, agriculture, irrigation and justice) will be implemented through GIRoA systems via the District Delivery Programme. — 77% of people in central districts currently believe the district government acts in their interests.
20. Logistic Support Changeable political relations between ISAF and the Pakistan Government and the associated vulnerability of the Pakistan Ground Lines Of Communication (GLOCs)33 make clear the need for alternative supply routes into and out of Afghanistan. During the most recent closure of the Pakistan GLOCs from November 2011 to July 2012, all non warlike UK surface freight destined for Afghanistan was diverted to the Northern Line of Communication (NLOC) via Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Prior to the recent GLOC closure, approximately one third of UK non–warlike supplies used this route. The closure of the Pakistani borders to ISAF traffic while limiting in terms of good logistic management did not constrain UK operations on the ground. Alternative means were found to support forces in the field including maximising the use of available freight space on aircraft. Owing to the increased reliance on the airbridge during the GLOC closure greater scrutiny of UK in-theatre priorities was applied by Joint Force Support Afghanistan34 to ensure the most pressing operational requirements were met. As a response to the closure of the GLOC and in view of the requirement to prepare to redeploy our holdings back to the UK, stores in Afghanistan have been subject to “aggressive housekeeping” and sustainment reviews both of which have reduced the demands for routine re-supply and by extension have lessened the overall requirement to hold certain stores in theatre. During the closure a backlog in materiel for the Reverse Supply Chain (RSC) and increased delivery times for some commodities were encountered however, these were again mitigated through prioritisation and increased use of the airbridge. The Pakistan GLOC is now in the process of re-opening with the current focus being on clearing the backlog of freight (963 20 Foot Equivalent units35 as at 24 August) held in Pakistan which is not expected to be complete before November. The introduction of new freight onto the GLOC from either direction is subject to ongoing NATO MOU negotiations with the Pakistani Government, and will not be authorised to take place before the backlog is cleared. The Air Line of Communication (ALOC) via Pakistan is currently the MOD’s only option for transporting warlike supplies (ie armoured vehicles, ammunition and personal weapons) into and out of Afghanistan. Movement of freight by air, though subject to a number of variables (such as fly/sail/rail options) is a more 32 Statistics are taken from the Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme’s (HMEP) quarterly household surveys. Key districts (HMEP’s “group 1” districts) are defined here as the most densely populated districts in the Central Helmand River Valley (Lashkar Gah, Nahr-e Saraj, Nad Ali, Nawa, Garmsir and Marjah). These are the first districts to enter transition. Districts included in “group 2” are those lesser populated outer lying districts (Musa Qala, Sangin, Now Zad and Khaneshin). 33 The Pakistan GLOC closes periodically for a variety of reasons. The most significant closure prior to Nov 11–Jul 12 was in summer 2011 when the GLOC was closed for nine weeks. 34 The in-theatre Headquarters that oversees UK logistics. 35 Based on the size of a standard container and used as the standard metric for redeployment activity. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 107
expensive way to move materiel than ground transport alone, but there will always be a requirement to move some, more sensitive, loads by air. At present, the majority of equipment and materiel travels by air, and less sensitive and lesser priority materiel on the NLOC. However, the relative proportions are likely to change in favour of movement by ground routes once the Pakistan GLOC fully re-opens.
21. Operational Support (Health) 21.1 Overview Defence Medical Services (DMS) is responsible for delivering and sustaining a deployed medical system, within an ISAF framework, configured to provide optimal consultant delivered care to UK Forces and other ISAF troops in the UK area of responsibility. DMS also provides consultant delivered emergency care to ANSF and local civilians, in accordance with ISAF medical eligibility criteria, and in support of the UK’s strategic end state of a stable and secure Afghanistan. The UK is the lead nation for the Role 3 Hospital at Camp Bastion, setting the standards of care and governance practices within the hospital on behalf of ISAF. However, we continue to benefit from the support of other allies in the coalition. The US has contributed staff since April 2009; with the US Army currently providing 87 clinical and administrative personnel. Denmark provided a large proportion of the hospital staff for three months in 2009 and has subsequently provided a surgical team during the summer of 2011 and a number of intensive care nurses. Estonia has also supported the hospital through two deployments of surgical personnel, most recently in July 2012. These multinational contributions to the care of ISAF and ANSF casualties in Regional Command (South West) are a successful demonstration of NATO medical interoperability and wider ISAF cooperation. Capacity at the Role 3 Hospital in Bastion has remained sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of the deployed UK force, as well as ISAF and ANSF casualties. The operational medical framework is continually monitored to ensure that sufficient capability/capacity is maintained, specifically reflecting both changes in casualty numbers and wounding patterns.
21.2 Aeromedical Evacuation to the UK The Defence Medical Services continue to provide for the timely and rapid evacuation of patients from point of wounding to appropriate care in the UK, and the airbridge is prioritised as required to facilitate this. This is achieved whilst maintaining the highest standards of intensive care, clinical care and ongoing treatment whilst in transit. In 2011, 1,147 patients were aeromedically evacuated from Afghanistan. To the end of July, 746 patients have been evacuated in 2012.
21.3 Disease and Non-Battle Injuries While disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) rates in Afghanistan continue to fluctuate, levels remain within the norm for operations and peacetime duties. An unexpected peak of 11.2% (of deployed personnel per week) in May 2011—for one week only—was investigated by the DMS Defence Consultant Advisor for Public Health, who concluded that the reported figures were due to a number of factors including better pre- deployment training of medical personnel on EPINATO (the system used to record medical attendances), an active campaign amongst troops to report illness at the earliest opportunity, and an element of over-reporting of certain conditions before a definitive diagnosis. There was no impact on operations and rates quickly returned to within expected levels, of between 5–10%.
21.4 Manning and International Aspects The current operational tempo continues to challenge manning with delivery of capability sustained by contributions from all three Services, volunteer Reserves, and use of contractors. National Health Service personnel were deployed to Afghanistan on a trial basis until 2011. However, while they proved a useful addition, particularly in niche specialities, contractors provide greater long-term flexibility and cost- effectiveness.
21.5 In-Theatre Capability Enhancements DMS Defence Consultant Advisors continually review deployed medical equipment to ensure that deployed UK troops have the most appropriate capability available. There are ongoing developments in the level of care on operations, contributing to increased survival and improved long-term morbidity rates. The following are exemplars of enhancement: — The introduction of novel haemostatic (bleeding control) techniques to the front line is saving lives in the critical first few minutes, with regular updates of equipment as it evolves; — The UK Medical Emergency Response Team, continues to deliver critical consultant led emergency care to the front line; cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 108 Defence Committee: Evidence
— Advances in resuscitation and blood transfusion, consequent upon Defence research; — Allows maintenance of critical life support in readiness for surgery—ongoing research effort continues to refine these capabilities; — Integration of Consultant led Emergency Medicine, Anaesthetic and Surgical teams on arrival at the Role 3; — The deployment of advanced diagnostic capabilities, to a level never before deployed brings emergency care ever closer to that available in a major trauma centre; — Two additional new Computerised Tomography scanners at Bastion; and — A new coalition MRI scanner at Bastion.
21.6 Royal Centre for Defence Medicine/Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham The new Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (QEHB) opened in June 2010. The transfer of services is staged over six phases; the military ward capability transferred as part of Phase 1 and is fully operational. The military ward provides care for Service personnel in single or four bedded rooms further instilling the military ethos within the establishment. The QEHB has the UK’s largest single floor critical care unit consisting of 100 beds. As part of the switchover the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine (RCDM) Clinical Unit Headquarters transferred to the QEHB in November 2011. Leading edge care for the most complex and challenging polytrauma has been an enduring feature of the current campaign with a requirement for proven capacity to respond to an increase in casualty numbers. The treatment of these highly complex cases has afforded QEHB a level of experience and expertise that is unique in the UK. Much of this is due to changes in medical doctrine, informed by academic work at RCDM.
21.7 Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre, Headley Court The numbers and complexity of trauma survivors with amputations continues to rise. This has resulted in a requirement to increase staff numbers overall at Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre (DMRC) including within the prosthetics department, and in the physical space required to support the prosthetics unit; this has required urgent estate works. In September 2010 the construction of additional ward accommodation and associated dining space increased the in-patient bed capacity at DMRC to 96 established beds with access to 15 step-down beds within Wood House. Since then, the Jubilee Complex—comprising a 48-bed ward and separate therapy building—has been built to take the total number of beds to 144. The complex was declared operational in July 12, with the formal opening of the facility taking place in September 2012.
21.8 Mental Health Support All deployed personnel undergo pre-operational stress briefing. In theatre psychological-education is delivered on arrival and throughout deployment the TRiM system36 provides individuals with early support following traumatic events. A Force Mental Health Team consisting of three mental health nurses provides in- theatre mental health assessments and mental health liaison in forward areas. A Consultant Psychiatrist visits every three months, providing oversight and support. A permanent on-call consultant psychiatrist is available to provide specialist support by phone 24/7, and a UK-based team of a psychiatrist and a mental health nurse is at immediate readiness to deploy to the operational theatre to support the local team if required.
22. Personnel Welfare 22.1 Deployed Welfare Package The Deployed Welfare Package (Overseas) (DWP(O)) Version 6 of May 2012 maintains its focus on communications from the operational Theatre to home, to maintain contact with families. Wi-Fi continues to be provided and rolled out to other forward areas where possible. The ratio of personnel to satellite telephone handsets is 15:1 and e-bluey (electronic letter system) machines have been provided to Theatre. Service personnel get free phone calls at public expense based upon their tour length. These start at 30 minutes per week for short tours to 120 minutes per week for longer ones, and there is an additional 30 minutes over the Christmas period. There is also the Forces Mail and in Afghanistan, as in any other operational theatre, Free Forces Air Letters—more commonly known as “blueys”—are available to all Service personnel, including, under certain criteria, Commonwealth forces. The Service families can use this method freely and have the benefit of the Enduring Families Free Mail Service (EFFMS) under which they can send packages under 2kg to named service personnel deployed on operations free of charge. 36 TRiM—Trauma Risk Management, a peer delivered risk assessment at three and 28 days following traumatic events, aiming to detect problems early, signpost personnel at risk to medical services and address stigma. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 109
22.2 Leave Arrangements
There are two main elements to the operational leave—the Post Operational Leave (POL) which wherever possible is taken within one month of returning from operations and is calculated at one day’s leave for every nine spent in theatre plus all missed Bank Holidays. The other is Rest and Recuperation (R&R), taken during the tour of duty and in most cases taken back at home. With the normal Op HERRICK tour being six months, personnel will get a single two week period of R&R. A tour length of seven to 11 months qualifies for two periods and over 11 months qualifies for three periods. Where exceptional circumstances dictate personnel cannot take all that R&R during their tour, they will receive additional POL in compensation.
22.3 Decompression
Decompression is provided with the aim of reducing the stresses incurred on operations, as a first stage to returning to a normal life tempo. All Service personnel (and with effect from 1 July 12 all MOD civilian personnel) who have deployed from more than 31 days will undertake a period of decompression in Cyprus, as they return from operations. Decompression lasts for about 24 hours and is the first part of normalisation. Decompression allows personnel time to relax, adjust and reflect in a controlled environment prior to returning home.
23. Cost of Operations
The Defence Budget is not used to fund the additional costs of current operations—they are met from the Treasury Reserve. HMT funds the net additional costs MOD has incurred, but not the costs that the Department would have incurred regardless of the operation taking place (eg salaries). Costs which would otherwise have been incurred by the MOD, such as the procurement of “core” programmes, lie where they fall, and are not separately assigned to the Afghanistan operation. Any savings on activities that have not occurred because of the operation (eg training exercises) are also taken into account in arriving at the net figures.
Defence Resources can provide the actual net operating and capital costs of operations in Afghanistan funded by the Treasury, which to March 2011 totalled c.£13.3 billion. However, given the Department’s purpose and how it is funded, it is not possible to identify which elements of the core Defence budget are being spent in Afghanistan.
THE ANNUAL AUDITED FIGURES FOR THE COSTS OF OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE 2001–02 (£M) 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 Total Resource 187 236 36 58 148 560 1,071 1,655 2,330 2,720 9,001 Capital 34 75 10 9 51 178 433 968 1,491 1,054 4,303 Costs FY Total 221 311 46 67 199 738 1,504 2,623 3,821 3,774 13,304
THE ESTIMATED COST OF OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AT SUPPLEMENTAL ESTIMATES 2011/12 FOR FY 2011–12 (£M) 2011–12 Forecast Total Resource DEL £ 2,982 Total Capital DEL £ 1,156 Total Estimated Costs £ 4,138
These figures conform to HM Government’s Clear Line of Sight (CLoS), or Alignment, project and do not account for Cost of Capital, nor do they include the cost of provisions
The audited cost of the operation in Afghanistan will be published in the annual report and accounts later this year. Until that is published the best estimate is provided in the Supplemental Estimates, published earlier this year.
The total Net Additional Cost of Military Operations in Afghanistan in FY 11–12 is estimated to be £4.138 billion (excluding provisions). This is the figure which compares with the following numbers for previous financial years: 2010–11 £3.774 2009–10 £3.821 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 110 Defence Committee: Evidence
The breakdown is shown in the following table: Total SE Total ME Direct Non Cash Total SE DEL AME request Resource Resource Capital Request Request 2011–12 Operation DEL £M DEL £M DEL £M 2011–12 £M 2011–12 £M £M Afghanistan 2,469.4 512.9 1,156.1 4,138.4 8.7 4,025.6
In addition, the Conflict Pool provides funding for conflict prevention, stabilisation and discretionary peacekeeping activities, including for Afghanistan. Funding comes from a Treasury settlement which is separate and additional to departmental DELs. The Conflict Pool is jointly managed by FCO, DFID and MOD. The allocations and outturn for Afghanistan for FYs 2002/3 to present are given below. (£M) 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 Total Allocation − 18 13.73 15.35 10 13.38 18.2 53.69 67 68.5 68.5 209.34 Spend − 11.04 12.83 15.72 9.36 9.17 18.87 52.5 62.75 75.3 72.6 192.24 Allocation − − 10.08 11.47 10 10 10 − − 51.54 (CN) Spend − − 8.1 9.91 10.15 9.67 9.85 − − 47.68 (CN)
In FY08/09 a new spending instrument, the Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF), was established to provide stabilisation resources for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was in addition to the Conflict Pool. The SAF existed for one year; it was then subsumed into the Conflict Prevention Pool. The Conflict Prevention Pool, as it then was, was renamed the Conflict Pool at the start of FY 09/10.
Final outrun for the SAF showed a total spend of £71.6 million against a budget of £73 million. £53.7 million of SAF funding was in Afghanistan. Programmes were run by MOD, FCO and DFID.
24. Communications Strategy
24.1 Cross Government Approach
The Cross-Government Afghanistan Communications Strategy sets out three objectives: — To increase UK public confidence in HMG’s strategy in Afghanistan to build a secure, stable and viable Afghan state to protect our national security and reassure them that the mission is worthwhile. — To build understanding and support amongst Afghans for the international mission, and increase the confidence of the Afghan people in Afghan-led security, governance and development. — To ensure the support of international allies, including Pakistan, to achieve shared policy objectives and make a long-term commitment to Afghanistan.
This is delivered through a wide range of communications activity, both by HMG and the through international military coalition in Kabul.
The Communications Strategy is directed by the National Security Council (Afghanistan) (NSC(A)). The NSC communications team work in close partnership with communications and policy officials in No. 10, FCO, MOD, DFID, Stabilisation Unit, British Embassy Kabul, Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team and the UK Delegation to NATO to discuss current issues. It will provide direction from the centre and ensure accountability and delivery of cross-government policy communications through the Pakistan Afghanistan Strategy Group, Pakistan Afghanistan Strategy Group (Deputies) and regular strategic communications groups.
Communication activities include regular media briefings by Ministers, a programme of Cross-Government briefings, a media embed programme to Helmand, quarterly meetings with key interest groups including NGOs and Parliament and the Afghan diaspora, digital diplomacy (websites, Twitter, Q&A), outreach events, seminars, debates and visits. The Strategy is also underpinned by detailed implementation plans led by Departments and coordinated by the NSC Communications Team, such as the Chicago, Kabul, and Tokyo implementation plans.
The UK public remains supportive of the Armed Forces serving in Afghanistan,37 but less supportive of overall UK involvement in the country.38 Opposition has grown over recent years at the same time as a reduced perception of progress. Media focus on the security challenge and continuing British casualties in the fight against the insurgency continues to impact upon public opinion on the international campaign. 37 Source: MOD polling. 38 Source: various polling. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 111
24.2 MOD Communications Strategy The Cross-Government Afghanistan Communications Strategy sets out three objectives: — To increase UK public confidence in HMG’s strategy in Afghanistan to build a secure, stable and viable Afghan state to protect our national security and reassure them that the mission is worthwhile. — To build understanding and support amongst Afghans for the international mission, and increase the confidence of the Afghan people in Afghan-led security, governance and development. — To ensure the support of international allies, including Pakistan, to achieve shared policy objectives and make a long-term commitment to Afghanistan. This is delivered through a wide range of communications activity, both by HMG and the through international military coalition in Kabul. The Communications Strategy is directed by the National Security Council (Afghanistan) (NSC(A)). The NSC communications team work in close partnership with communications and policy officials in No. 10, FCO, MOD, DFID, Stabilisation Unit, British Embassy Kabul, Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team and the UK Delegation to NATO to discuss current issues. It will provide direction from the centre and ensure accountability and delivery of cross-government policy communications through the Pakistan Afghanistan Strategy Group, Pakistan Afghanistan Strategy Group (Deputies) and regular strategic communications groups. Communication activities include regular media briefings by Ministers, a programme of Cross-Government briefings, a media embed programme to Helmand, quarterly meetings with key interest groups including NGOs and Parliament and the Afghan diaspora, digital diplomacy (websites, Twitter, Q&A), outreach events, seminars, debates and visits. The Strategy is also underpinned by detailed implementation plans led by Departments and coordinated by the NSC Communications Team, such as the Chicago, Kabul, and Tokyo implementation plans. The UK public remains supportive of the Armed Forces serving in Afghanistan,39 but less supportive of overall UK involvement in the country.40 Opposition has grown over recent years at the same time as a reduced perception of progress. Media focus on the security challenge and continuing British casualties in the fight against the insurgency continues to impact upon public opinion on the international campaign.
24.3 Helmand Effort Helmand effort The PRT’s Strategic Communications team is focused on: — developing the capacity of the Afghan Government to communicate to local nationals in Helmand; — developing a sustainable private and state radio environment to convey those messages and hold the Afghan Government to account; and — publicising the work of the PRT to people in the UK through an embedded journalists programme and digital engagement. Funded through the UK Conflict Pool, the PRT’s Strategic Communication team established the Helmand Media and Information Centre (HMIC) in 2009. The HMIC is the press office for the provincial level government and issues press released on Afghan Government activity to a range of provincial and national level media outlets. The PRT continues to mentor the HMIC to develop its capacity to delivery public information campaigns on health, security and other issues. The PRT has supported the expansion of State Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA) and is working with the US State Department to support the expansion of private station Radio Sabawoon, through providing equipment and radio transmitters. The expansion of the RTA’s AM signal across all of Helmand in June 2012 ensured that the province had access to non-ISAF radio for the first time. The expansion of Radio Sabawoon through the construction of three UK-funded towers in Musa Qalah, Garmsir and Gereshk will be completed by the end of 2012. The PRT’s main vehicle for communicating back to the UK is through the cross-Government journalist embed programme. Working alongside Whitehall partners and Task Force Helmand, the PRT’s Strategic Communications Team organises and facilitates tailored embeds for visiting journalists. The objective of the embed programme is to highlight the progress that is taking place in Helmand as well as the successes of the PRT and the wider international community. The embed programme works to the NSC’s communication strategy on Afghanistan. 39 Source: MOD polling. 40 Source: various polling. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 112 Defence Committee: Evidence
The PRT also has a significant digital presence. We conduct digital outreach via the PRT Facebook page, the PRT website, and the Head of Mission’s blog and Twitter channel. The majority of our digital audience is based in the UK, the US and Afghanistan.
25. Drawdown of UK Forces 25.1 Current Planning President Karzai has stated, many times, his goal that the ANSF will have full security responsibility across the whole of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Aligned with both this and the strategy agreed at the NATO Lisbon summit in 2010, ISAF is gradually and responsibly drawing down its forces to complete its mission by 31 December 2014. The Prime Minister has been clear that British troops will not be in a combat role in Afghanistan beyond 2014 or in numbers comparable to those deployed there today. Our drawdown in Afghanistan will be steady and measured. In July the Prime Minister restated that there will be no immediate withdrawal of UK forces in Afghanistan nor will there be a cliff-edge reduction of our troops in 2014. The UK will reduce its conventional force levels in Afghanistan from 9,500 to 9,000 by the end of this year. Though no further decisions on our force levels in Afghanistan have been made detailed planning continues to consider our force trajectory through to the end of 2014. The Defence Secretary recently explained how commanders have been “surprised by the extent to which they have been able to draw back and leave the Afghans to take the lion’s share of the combat role”. Military commanders in Task Force Helmand believe that their force requirements during 2013 will allow more flexibility in the way we drawdown as transition progresses. This idea is consistent with the Prime Minister’s desire to avoid a cliff-edge reduction in force levels, where all UK troops are pulled out en masse in 2014. Decisions on UK force levels will be taken by the National Security Council, taking into account military advice, the pace of transition and conditions on the ground. The National Security Council will discuss the pace of our drawdown over the autumn and we expect to make announcements on our force levels in the coming months. Across Afghanistan ISAF force levels will drawdown in a coordinated and coherent manner and at an appropriate pace for each area so as not to leave a security vacuum that could breed extremism. ISAF partners, including the UK, remain committed to helping the Afghans provide their national security until the ANSF take over full security responsibility across the country by the end of 2014.
25.2 Redeployment Work on managing the recovery of UK equipment is underway. Current plans aim to keep all relevant Line of Communication (LOC) options open to add resilience to redeployment. This includes surface routes through either Pakistan or the Central Asian Republics, where agreements are being progressed, and also by moving freight through a combination of air/sail and fly/rail/sail (the latter through NATO) routes. This is a complex area; each agreement is brokered separately and is subject to specific criteria and conditions. The MOD is currently advancing agreements with the Central Asian Republics to secure bilateral, two-way surface transit and overflight options. We currently have an overflight agreement with Kazakhstan who are also considering a two-way surface agreement. We have finalised the text of three agreements (overflight, reverse41 and armoured transport vehicles) with Uzbekistan and formal bilateral transit agreements were signed in September 2012. We have discussed combined overflight and surface transit agreements with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and expect to conclude these negotiations in the autumn. NATO has secured two-way transit agreements with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; which are for surface transit only and not overflight. NATO has also signed a sail/rail/fly agreement with Russia, which enables commercial flights from the Russian air base at Ulyanovsk into and out of Afghanistan to link with rail transit to the Baltic Sea.
41 Moving equipment from Afghanistan to the UK cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 113
OP HERRICK LINES OF COMMUNICATION INDIA KABUL KARACHI HAIRATAN Capacity Capacity Security Resilience KANDAHAR • • • PAKISTAN KAZAKSTAN BASTION UZBEKISTAN RUSSIA TURKMENISTAN CHINA MUSANAH OMAN IRAN AFGHANISTAN ULYANOSK MINHAD / / MINHAD JEBEL ALI JEBEL YEMEN IRAQ MOSCOW SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ADANA AKROTIRI TURKEY RIGA Op CATALINAOp (AKT- IL-76) Op CATALINA (Supreme B747) NLoC NATO Sail/Rail/Fly Op CATALINA C-17 (MAB) LIBYA EGYPT Potential LoCs RSC C-17 Freight Routing Freight C-17 Op CATALINA Strat Ro-Ro C-17 CATALINA Op (NHD) B747 Freight Schedule Ro-RoStrat & Liner Service GLoC MARCHWOOD Current RSC LoCsCurrent RSC NORTON KEY RAF BRIZE BRIZE RAF
Where there are no time pressures, low grade materiel, equipment and supplies will be recovered by surface means in shipping containers. However, redeployment by air forms a significant part of the UK redeployment plan particularly for Protected Mobility vehicles, sensitive materiel and outsized loads. The approximate costs of the redeployment of surface containers range from £5,000 to £12,000 per container equivalent. The Air Line of Communication costs range between £10,000 and £30,000 per container equivalent, either returning directly to the UK by air or by one of the fly/rail/sail options. The detailed costs will vary depending on the specific option used.
Routine clearance has already started in Theatre to prepare for redeployment which, based on planning, will begin in earnest from 1 October 2012. Operational analysis is ongoing to enable full understanding of both the scale of redeployment and the flow of materiel and equipment out of Theatre. The initial estimate of the total quantity of UK in-theatre equipment was 11,000 20 foot equivalent units; (this includes approximately 3,000 vehicles). This figure is being constantly refined as planning progresses. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 114 Defence Committee: Evidence
Considerable analysis to determine exactly how much materiel and equipment needs to move is also underway. A figure of approximately 6,50042 20 foot equivalent units of materiel is currently being used for movements planning after the consumption, selling, scrapping and gifting of materiel in theatre. Further analysis is being conducted on the range of options under consideration but planning is ongoing. Greater fidelity will be achieved on completion of the Force Element Table (FET)43 during Herrick 17. Within the overall policy umbrella decisions on what to do with equipment will be made on a case-by-case basis using the principles of operational priority and value for money to the UK taxpayer. We are reviewing our policies on gifting to ensure that any gifted equipment is appropriate and follows Parliamentary, Treasury and National Audit Office rules. We are conscious that uncoordinated gifting could put ANSF sustainability at risk. The underlying requirement of any gifting must be that all gifted equipment is sustainable in terms of cost of ownership, support and enduring training. Our approach on gifting will, therefore, be coordinated with that of NATO and ISAF. Cross-ISAF coordination will be an important factor in ensuring successful redeployment. To this end, strategic liaison with NATO continues through Joint Forces Command Brunssum44 and SHAPE45 working groups which are attended by MOD representatives. The SHAPE Air Movements Control Cell collates all multi-national reporting of each country’s Detailed Deployment Plans (DDP) to provide the ISAF fusion cell with oversight of country redeployment plans and flow rates. DDPs are typically submitted quarterly with the next submission scheduled for mid-November. Coordination of the ISAF nations’ DDPs will ensure better use of resources, de-confliction and where possible shared use of assets for ISAF redeployment.
25.3 Enduring Presence The UK and the international community are committed to Afghanistan for the long-term. At the NATO Summit at Chicago in May ISAF nations reaffirmed their enduring commitment to the country. At Chicago it was announced that a new NATO-led mission will be established in Afghanistan after transition completes. This mission will be based on the principles of train, advise and assist and will not involve international troops deployed in a combat role. NATO is currently working to clearly define its post-2014 mission which the UK, as a NATO member, will support. Until that planning has matured, it remains premature to speculate what residual military presence, if any, the UK will have in Afghanistan after 2014 beyond our firm commitment to support the Afghan National Army Officer Academy. It is likely that some UK forces will need to remain in Afghanistan in a non-combat role for a short period after completion of security transition to finalise logistics drawdown.
Afghan National Army Officer Academy As illustrated by our Enduring Strategic Partnership document signed by the Prime Minister and President Karzai in January 2012, the UK will continue to have a close relationship with Afghanistan after transition completes. From 2013, and as announced by the Prime Minister in July 2011, UK troops will support the development of the ANA by providing lead coalition support at the new Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANA OA). The UK will provide approximately 90 mentoring staff in total to the academy. Around 30 other mentoring staff will be provided by coalition partners. UK military personnel will also be deployed to sustain and protect the UK mentoring staff. The coalition manpower commitment will diminish over time as the Afghans increasingly take over the lead for the academy. The academy is being built by the NATO Training Mission— Afghanistan and is due to open its doors to its first intake of students in 2013. Once fully operational it will accept three intakes of students per year; with an expected total of 1,350 male students and 150 female students trained annually. Specifically UK forces will be mentoring, assisting and advising Afghan instructors to run one year courses—based around the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst model—designed to teach Afghan National Army officers leadership and tactical skills.
Force Protection Practical force protection measures are in place for all international troops who work closely with our partners in the ANSF and we will continue to review and employ best practice across the force. We will retain sufficient force numbers to ensure that we can properly protect our advisor footprint after 2014, and that we continue to have sufficient access to enablers such as medical facilities and support helicopters. The safety of our personnel is, and will remain, our top priority. On the insider threat, we continue to work with the Afghans to ensure that recruits are properly vetted before they enter into any type of ANSF training in Afghanistan. In addition we work closely with our Afghan 42 This figure is an estimate only and is liable to change as planning continues. 43 The definitive document listing all capabilities and equipment that are to be moved. 44 One of NATO’s three operational Headquarters, Brunssum in the Netherlands, serves as the higher Headquarters for ISAF. 45 The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe is the Headquarters of Allied Command Operations—one of NATO’s two strategic military commands. SHAPE is located in Belgium. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 115
counterparts to improve our ability to identify and respond to any indicators of an internal threat before it leads to an attack. Recruits at the academy will be subject to a rigorous selection process before they are accepted on the course.
Support The ongoing welfare of our deployed forces is a defence priority and the dynamic nature of transition will require agile and innovative application to ensure the underlying aims of welfare provision are met. This must be balanced finely with setting realistic expectation. Planning is ongoing that will ensure that any UK troops remaining in Afghanistan beyond 2014 will be resourced and supported appropriately.
Acronyms AAF Afghan Air Force ABP Afghan Border Police ALOC Air Line of Communication ALP Afghan Local Police AME Annually Managed Expenditure ANA Afghan National Army ANA OA Afghan National Army Officer Academy ANCOP Afghan Civil Order Police ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces APRP Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme AUP Afghan Uniformed Police BAG Brigade Advisory Group CAREC Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation CBM Confidence Building Measure CJTF Criminal Justice Taskforce CLoS Clear Line of Sight CN Counter Narcotics CP Conflict Pool CSS Combat Service Support CT Counter Terrorism DDP Detailed Deployment Plans DEL Departmental Expenditure Limit DFID Department For International Development DMC Defence medical Services DMC Directorate of Media and Communications DMRC Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre DNBI Disease and Non-Battle Injury DSTS DWP(O) Deployed Welfare Package (Overseas) ECO Economic Co-operation Organisation EFFMS Enduring Families Free Mail EGF European Gendarmerie Force EIA Enemy Initiated Attack EUPOL European Police Mission in Afghanistan FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FET Force Element Table FY Financial Year GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GLOC Ground Line of Communication HMEP Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programmes HMG Her Majesty’s Government HMIC Helmand Media and Information Centre HMT Her Majesty’s Treasury HPC High Peace Council IED Improvised Explosive Device IJC ISAF Joint Command ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISTAR Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance JANIB Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board LAS Light Air Support LE Locally Employed LOC Line of Communication ME Main Estimate cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 116 Defence Committee: Evidence
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation MOD Ministry of Defence MOI Ministry of Interior MOU Memorandum of Understanding MRI Magnetic Response Imagery NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCDC National Drug Control Strategy NCO Non Commissioned Officer NDS National Directorate of Security NGO Non Governmental Organisation NLOC Northern Line of Communication NSC National Security Council NTM-A NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters PMAG Police Mentoring and Advisory Group PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team QEHB Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham R&R Rest and Recuperation RC (C) Regional Command (Capital) RC (E) Regional Command (East) RC (S) Regional Command (South) RC (SW) Regional Command (South West) RC (W) Regional Command (West) RC(N) Regional Command (North) RCDM Royal Centre for Defence Medicine RSC Reverse Supply Chain RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration RTA Radio Television Afghanistan SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation SAF Stabilisation Air Fund SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SE Supplementary Estimate SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe SI Seriously Injured SU Stabilisation Unit TFH Task Force Helmand TMAF Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework TRiM Trauma Risk Management UKB UK British UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution USMC United States Marine Corps VSI Very Seriously Injured
Herrick Tour Dates
UK operations in Afghanistan are conducted under the name Operation Herrick. Operation Herrick manning rotates on a six monthly basis with the exception of a small number of continuity posts which rotate every 12 months.
Dates of each Herrick tour referred to in the memorandum are as follows: HERRICK 12 Apr 10–Oct 10 HERRICK 13 Oct 10–Apr 11 HERRICK 14 Apr 11–Oct 11 HERRICK 15 Oct 11–Apr 12 HERRICK 16 Apr 12–Oct 12 HERRICK 17 Oct 12–Apr 13 September 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 117
Supplementary written evidence from the Ministry of Defence
This memorandum provides further evidence on a range of topics related to the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan as requested by the House of Commons Defence Committee.
The information provided in the text is principally drawn from HM Government sources. Acknowledgment is made as appropriate for sections which draw significantly from ISAF or other sources.
1. Security Overview
In Afghanistan we continue to see evidence that insurgent activity is increasingly displaced from the major population centres. Since 2010 there has been a steady decline in the number of Afghans living in close proximity to violent incidents. Comparison of the third quarters of 2012 and 2011 shows a 13% reduction (about 100,000) in those living within a 1km radius of an enemy initiated attack. This shift of violence away from the towns, markets and extensively farmed areas is significant: it provides space for Afghan local confidence to grow and for security and economic gains to have a tangible effect on an increasing number of Afghan lives.
ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS: NATIONWIDE MONTHLY YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE46
4500
3500
2500
1500
YoY Differecne YoY 500
-500 Enemy-Initiated Attacks INCREASE from last yr DECREASE from last yr -1500 Jul 08 Jul 09 Jul 10 Jul 11 Jul 12 Jan 08 Jan 09 Jan 10 Jan 11 Jan 12 Sep 08 Sep 09 Sep 10 Sep 11 Sep 12 Sep Mar 08 Mar 09 Mar 10 Mar 11 Mar 12 Nov 08 Nov 09 Nov 10 Nov 11 Nov 12 Nov May 08 May 09 May 10 May 11 May 12 May
There remain parts of Afghanistan where the insurgency is able to operate with relative freedom of movement and exert a dominant influence on the local population. However, both nationally and in Helmand this affects only a relatively small minority of the Afghan population. These areas are not clearly defined and the nature of insurgent influence is complex; who has influence in an area cannot be described in simple black or white terms. The areas where the insurgents maintain a degree of influence, or one that is at least not regularly challenged, are within the large rural areas of the country and not the major population centres.
UK and ISAF drawdown planning reflects both conditions on the ground and President Karzai’s stated objective that the ANSF will have the security lead in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. For the remainder of the ISAF mission our planning will stay suitably flexible to adapt to the security situation and the threat posed by the insurgency. We do not seek a perfect Afghanistan but rather one that does not provide safe haven for international terrorists, such as al’ Qaeda, who will pose a threat to the UK and our allies.
Our Armed Forces continue to support the development of the ANSF (and with our NATO and ISAF partners will do so long after the end of NATO-led combat operations in 2014). In addition we are working with our Afghan partners to degrade insurgent capability to a point where the ANSF will be able to manage effectively any residual threat in the years after 2014. 46 Source: ISAF cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 118 Defence Committee: Evidence
However, our work in Afghanistan is necessarily broader than security in isolation. UK and international efforts also focus on development, reconstruction, governance and civil society reform which complement the military campaign. The construction of clinics and schools has not only helped provide vitally needed services but should also promote the opportunity for a generational improvement that was not possible under the Taleban. The work of the FCO, DFID and a number of Government Agencies is key to this work. The Afghan Government’s ability to provide services, better governance and to continue development is, therefore, vital for promoting domestic confidence in Afghanistan in the longer term. The country’s future stability also requires a political process involving Afghanistan’s key political leaders and powerbrokers who can sustain the credibility and authority of the Afghan state. The UK is supporting the Government’s efforts to hold a broad and inclusive dialogue that achieves a political settlement. As ANSF capability further increases and the Afghan Government establishes legitimacy across more of the country we anticipate that the level of threat posed by the insurgency will diminish. In addition the UK continues to support an Afghan-led, inclusive political process to help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.
2. Civilian Casualties Protecting the Afghan civilian population is a cornerstone of the ISAF mission, and all British troops undergo comprehensive training on the strict rules of engagement. There are clear procedures, frequently updated in light of experience, intended to both minimise the risk of casualties occurring and to investigate any incidents that do happen. ISAF forces have worked hard to reduce the levels of civilian casualties, including by introducing new rules to govern the use of force. They work closely with the ANSF to protect civilians from insurgent attacks. The vast majority (80% according to the UN47) of civilian casualties are caused by insurgents. The key difference is that ISAF and the ANSF place a high priority on protecting civilians during combat, while the insurgents use tactics that do not discriminate and sometimes actively target civilians. US and UK policy on compensation arrangements following allegations of civilian casualties are broadly in alignment, with small variations in the amounts paid. The UK has a rigorous procedure of investigation for all incidents involving UK forces which result in alleged civilian casualties. A series of investigatory procedures take place including UK, NATO and ISAF processes. All ISAF countries make immediate ex-gratia payments where appropriate, and may make larger payments if subsequent investigations suggest it is appropriate. The UK has an Area Claims Officer (ACO) located in Lashkar Gah. We work hard to ensure that Afghan locals are aware of the claims scheme available to them through announcements on local radio and leaflets distributed by Military Stabilisation Support Teams, who collate the details of claims for those that can not reach the ACO. Provincial and District Governors are also aware of the compensation process.
3. Afghan National Security Forces 3.1 Strength Tangible progress has been made in building the ANSF both in size and capability since the establishment of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) in 2009. In October 2012 ISAF reported that the ANA and ANP had reached their surge targets of 187,000 and 157,000 respectively. These figures relate to personnel who have been recruited only as some await induction at the training centres. The most recently available data shows that as of November approximately 94% of the recruited forces48 had been inducted and were either in training or had been fielded. By February 2013 all recruited personnel are expected to have been inducted into their respective Service with all personnel fully trained, equipped and fielded by the end of 2013. The development of the Afghan Air Force (AAF) follows a longer trajectory owing to the distinct challenges involved in growing an air capability. As a result the AAF is not expected to reach its Full Operating Capacity until 2017. In November 2012 ISAF reported the AAF numbered 5,870 personnel, this will ultimately grow to an end strength of approximately 8,000.
3.2 Attrition High attrition rates within the ANA continue to represent a risk to the sustainability of the future force. In October and November ANA attrition was recorded at 3.5% per month—considerably higher than the targeted rate of 1.4%.49 There are a number of reasons that can affect attrition rates throughout all branches of the ANSF. Attrition can be attributed to factors ranging from the time of the harvest, through to poor leadership and individual factors such as pay, leave and food allowances. 47 Source: United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Report Jul 12. 48 174,500 ANA and 148,500 ANP 49 To put these figures in context the twelve month average attrition rate for the ANA stands at 2.3%—between Nov 11 and Aug 12 monthly attrition within the ANA stood between 1.2% and 2.6%. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 119
The Afghan Government are working to tackle the attrition rate. At the national level the Afghan chaired Joint Attrition Working Group (JAWG) meets weekly, and reports to a steering committee on a bi-monthly basis. The JAWG has been in existence for over two years and while initially focused on leave and leave transportation, is now considering a wider range of issues. The working group is ongoing and as such there will be no final report. In a further attempt to reduce attrition within the ANA and as part of continued efforts to ensure proper leadership the Afghan Ministry of Defense has formed an evaluation committee to assess over 500 army commanders, and, if need be replace unsatisfactory personnel from Battalion through to Corps level. The Ministry has also emphasized increased use of contracted flights to meet the challenge of home sickness among ANA warriors serving in locations far from their home towns and villages. The lack of timely payment has also been cited as a possible factor behind attrition. ANSF payment is now primarily made by electronic transfer. Automated systems are perceived as beneficial as they cannot be so easily diverted, although some units in remote areas are still paid in cash.
3.3 Afghan Air Force Planning the development of the Afghan Air Force (AAF) is a dynamic, on-going process that will continue until the AAF reaches Full Operating Capacity in 2017. Plans concerning two remaining major elements to be put in place should be finalised by spring 2013. These are: — the replacement medium lift capability of four C130 Hercules which were the subject of a December 2012 Letter of Request to the US Government signed by the Afghan Defense Minister. These are intended to replace the AAF’s current fleet of C-27 transport aircraft; and — a decision on which type of Light Air Support (LAS) platform will be procured for the AAF which should be the subject of a formal downselect in early 2013. Details of how these and other AAF aircraft will be supported will change over time as the AAF maintenance capability develops and contracted support can be reduced. Though current planning does not expect the development of the AAF to be fully complete until 2017, Afghan Mi-17 helicopter capability has already developed to the point that it is making real contributions to ANSF operations now, including the resupply of troops in combat, Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations and the honourable recovery of human remains. Crews and aircraft are being deployed over the coming months to ensure that maximum support is given to the 2013 fighting season. In addition to the well established bases at Kabul and Kandahar the development of Forward Operating Bases at Herat, Mazar-e-Shariff and Jalalabad is progressing well with permanently based Mi-17 aircraft already operational from these sites. The geographical location of these bases will ensure a reasonable degree of AAF coverage across Afghanistan. All AAF Cessna C208 aircraft have now been delivered, with specialist MEDEVAC equipment on schedule to follow shortly, and the first AAF crews qualifying on type in the next few months. By late 2015 it is envisaged that the AAF will have a fully manned and equipped Mi-17 fleet, with crews able to conduct advanced air assault and Night Vision Goggles operations and with some crews qualified to provide armed escort using forward-firing weapons from the Mi-17 V5. By the same point we expect that some, but not all, the crews for the C208 aircraft will be trained and capable of conducting cargo, passenger and MEDEVAC missions across the country. A nascent medium lift capability should be provided by the first AAF crews qualified on the C130 Hercules, and the first AAF pilots should be graduating onto the LAS platform, capable of delivering close attack support in concert with ANA units. Experience and skill levels should develop steadily as operational missions will be woven into the training development programmes for junior squadron pilots. The last elements of the AAF to develop fully will be an organic flying training system and an effective and fully manned AAF maintenance system. It is primarily these that drive the 2017 transition date; a high degree of operational effectiveness will be evident some years before.
3.4 National Military Academy of Afghanistan The National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), modelled after the US Military Academy at West Point, is a US-sponsored officer training institution running since November 2008. It reached full operating capacity in November 2011 with four intakes in training. It provides a four year, degree earning, undergraduate officer training programme. The first intake graduated in August 2012. NMAA is capable of training up to 500 students per intake but is currently expected to reduce output to around 350 officers per year. The US have led the transition programme mentoring one complete course. They currently have one mentor remaining who is due to leave the NMAA in April 2013. The NMAA is located at the Qargha site, outside Kabul, which will also be home to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy which together form part of the Afghan National Defence University. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 120 Defence Committee: Evidence
3.5 ANSF Funding At the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012 ISAF nations committed to support the Afghan Government to sustain the ANSF in the years after 2014. The international community (excluding the US) has so far made pledges totalling around $1bn a year towards a target of $1.3bn for the funding of the Afghan security forces. Coordination of the international effort has been led by the US. Over time it is envisaged that the size of the ANSF will reduce from its surge size of 352,000 to an indicative force size of 228,500 set against an annual budget of $4.1bn. Detail on how to address the funding gap between a higher surge figure and the ANSF’s enduring size is yet to be finalised. However, with two years of the current ISAF campaign left to run it is envisaged that any funding delta will be addressed on a bilateral basis between the Afghan Government and donor nations.
4. Redeployment 4.1 UK Redeployment Planning As the ANSF continue to grow in capability and capacity and increasingly take the security lead throughout Afghanistan we expect ISAF nations will be able to gradually draw down their force levels. In December the Prime Minister announced that UK forces in Afghanistan would be able to reduce to around 5,200 troops by the end of 2013. Following the completion of the ISAF mission and our combat role at the end of 2014 it is likely that some UK forces will need to remain in Afghanistan in a non-combat role to finalise our logistics drawdown and oversee the recovery of materiel. This process could take a period of months—but will complete in 2015. During this period those involved will continue to have access to appropriate enablers, including force protection and medical support.
4.2 ISAF Troop Contributing Nations The timing and numbers of troop redeployments is a matter for individual countries in discussion with ISAF. Key participants in ISAF are yet to make announcements on the profile of their redeployment through to the end of the ISAF mission in December 2014. As conditions on the ground improve and transition progresses, there will, however, be opportunities for nations to confirm their plans publicly. Importantly, force reductions have been, and will continue to be, made in close consultation with ISAF and the Afghan Government.
4.3 Redeployment Governance Ultimately the National Security Council (NSC) is responsible for the drawdown of UK Forces from Afghanistan. Decisions will take into account military advice, the rate of transition and progress on the ground. Commander Joint Operations (CJO) is responsible for the redeployment from Theatre and the physical movement of materiel from Afghanistan. Chief of Materiel (Land) ((COM(L)) is responsible for the receipt of materiel and equipment into the UK strategic base, (which includes UK sites in Germany and elsewhere). Redeployment Governance has been assessed through a Defence Internal Audit report. Engagement with the National Audit Office (NAO) via HM Treasury is ongoing to ensure that redeployment remains in good order and achieves value for money to the UK taxpayer. In December NAO staff were briefed by MOD personnel on the redeployment process including gifting and disposal options. The NAO have been invited to visit Theatre in the spring. Coordination with ISAF partners will play an important part in ensuring successful redeployment from Afghanistan and the UK will continue to routinely submit detailed redeployment planning data to SHAPE.50 SHAPE are using this data to produce the Multinational Redeployment Plan which will provide the necessary oversight to ISAF. However, redeployment ultimately remains a national responsibility.
4.4 Redeployment Logistics The UK has developed an end-to-end Redeployment and Transition Support Plan (RTSP) that is co-signed by CJO and COM(L). This plan, and its regular revision, provides suitable and detailed critical path analysis for redeployment. Extensive multinational engagement through NATO ensures that the required analysis is extended into the coalition environment. The UK is also working closely with ISAF to assist with coordination of flow through the known pinch points. The UK submits detailed redeployment plans to enable NATO to update the multinational redeployment plan to provide oversight. Indeed UK and ISAF continue to develop a variety of movement options in order to lessen reliance on one route and thus reduce potential choke points. To build added operational resilience into our redeployment plans the UK approach is seeking to open as many Lines of Communication (LOCs) as possible. Since 2011 the UK has been working to extend the number of potential equipment and personnel recovery options by examining reverse transit routes (surface and air) 50 The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 121
through Central Asia and Russia—collectively known as the Northern Lines of Communication (NLOC). NLOC surface reverse transit options are: — Rail through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia to Riga (Latvia). — Road and rail transit through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, joining the main rail NLOC in Kazakhstan and proceeding through Russia to Riga. — Rail through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the Caspian port of Aktau; sea transit to Baku, Azerbaijan; and then by rail to Georgia, from which there are multiple onward transit options. NLOC air reverse transit options are: — Overflying Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. — Overflying Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia. — Overflying Turkmenistan for Medevac and non-military freight. Negotiations are well underway with the Central Asian Republics to secure the necessary transit permissions. In addition we are also seeking to reopen the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (for surface freight) and working nationally to develop fly/sail routes through the Gulf. Detailed operational analysis is allowing us to develop a full understanding of the impact of every possible combination of LOC availability on a scale from air only through to all routes being open. Acceleration of redeployment remains possible. However, any shortening of the timescale will inevitably increase cost (through additional reliance on the airbridge), the resource bill and potentially impact on the achievement of good order during redeployment. A wide range of LOCs available will, however, be especially valuable should timescales be accelerated.
4.5 Camp Bastion We are clear that Camp Bastion will play a key role in our redeployment plans and those of our allies based there. The longer-term future of Bastion remains under review and we anticipate that decisions on this will be made later this year. In December, the Defence Secretary told the House that the US was considering where to retain its strategic bases in Afghanistan after 2014, commenting that it was likely, though not certain, that the US would choose to occupy Camp Bastion after the end of the ISAF mission.
4.6 Contractors Contractor security is a key consideration in our planning for Op HERRICK. Contractors have proved robust in maintaining support in past operations and have continued to provide support to our current operation in Afghanistan. The MOD aims to retain an appropriately broad contractor base in Afghanistan in order to mitigate any possible contractor fragility. We recognise that regular and effective engagement is important for retaining contractors who are free to make their own decisions with respect to redeployment, and that this needs to include commercial opportunities and threat assessments. Both contractors on deployed operations and local Afghan contractors are likely to redeploy in step with UK forces or outstay the majority of them. There will be commercial opportunity for some of our contractors post 2014 supporting UK and other nation’s forces who remain in Afghanistan as part of the post-2014 mission. To address any risk of contractor fragility and to meet our obligations to provide an appropriate level of information to the contracting community, Joint Force Support (Afghanistan)51 have recently launched a Contract Capability Coordinator (CCC) initiative which, amongst other things, has been tasked with: — providing a single in-theatre point of focus for contractors, (including the maintenance of an effective information flow); — aligning MOD and Contractor/Supplier intent and objectives; and — developing a contracting strategy and capability up to 2014 and beyond. The team will be supplemented later in January by an additional Contract Support Office within HQ Joint Force Support, who will assist with the management of contractors through the transition and redeployment phase of the Operation. Additionally, at the operational level, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) staff are developing a Drawdown and Redeployment Strategy for Contractors deployed in Afghanistan, consistent with our own planning and with advice from contractors on their intentions. It will provide a strategic framework for our Contractor Drawdown Plan that will be developed, implemented and managed by the CCC team. Strategically, we also draw on NATO contracts in order to deliver redundancy. 51 The in-Theatre Headquarters that oversees logistics. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 122 Defence Committee: Evidence
4.7 Costs The costs of redeploying personnel and equipment from Afghanistan will be met from the Treasury Special Reserve. Equipment will only be redeployed if it has further use and its redeployment represents good value for money for Defence. Any subsequent costs of repairing or adapting the equipment to ensure it continues to be useful for Defence will be met from the MOD’s core budget.
4.7.1 Urgent Operational Requirements The MOD is still in the process of deciding which pieces of Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) equipment should be brought into the core equipment programme, and we are therefore currently unable to give precise figures for the cost of doing so. However, affordability has been and will continue to be a key consideration in these decisions. Each proposal to bring UOR equipment into core will be scrutinised to ensure that it is the most cost-effective method of delivering a required capability, and the whole programme will be checked for affordability. Bringing UORs into the core programme has the potential to deliver significant extra value for the money that the Government has already expended in purchasing them.
5. Post 2014 5.1 Post 2014 NATO Mission NATO, as part of the broader international community, is committed to supporting Afghanistan through to 2014 and beyond. At the Chicago Summit allies agreed to launch a new NATO mission that will continue to support the development of the ANSF after the ISAF mission completes at the end of 2014. This will be a new mission to ISAF. It will be based on the concepts of train, advise and assist and will not involve international troops/NATO forces deploying in a combat role. This will not affect our ability to operate for reasons of self-defence. Planning for the post-2014 mission has started. A broad political framework for the new mission, was endorsed by NATO Defence Ministers and their counterparts from ISAF troop contributing nations in October 2012. We expect a Concept of Operations as drawn up by military authorities to be presented to Ministers later this year. To date eight, non-NATO, partner nations52 have announced their intentions to contribute to the new mission. Wider cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan will also continue beyond 2014 under the Enduring Partnership—an agreement signed at NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010. This document which marks NATO’s continued commitment to Afghanistan, provides a political framework for future enhanced cooperation, particularly in the field of ANSF capacity-building and security sector reform. The initial set of Enduring Partnership activities, agreed by foreign ministers in April 2011, brings together a number of previously separate initiatives. Over time, the Enduring Partnership will evolve to reflect the changing nature of NATO’s mission and its relationship with Afghanistan.
5.2 UK Enduring Presence The Prime Minister has clearly stated that UK Armed Forces will not operate in numbers comparable to current levels or in a combat role after the ISAF mission completes at the end of 2014. However, as a NATO member, the UK will support the post-2014 NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. We have responded to the Afghan Government’s specific request that the UK will take the coalition lead at the new Afghan National Army Officer Academy. We will also retain sufficient force numbers to ensure we can properly protect our advisor footprint. Our Armed Forces will therefore continue to have sufficient access to enablers such as medical facilities and support helicopters but our troops will not be deploying in a combat role. Speaking in the House on 19 December the Prime Minister confirmed that “we are prepared to look at other issues above and beyond [the Afghan National Army Officer Academy], but that is the starting baseline”. In consultation with our NATO partners and the Afghan Government we will continue to consider the size, shape and remit of our enduring presence in Afghanistan over the remaining two years of the ISAF mission. But the National Security Council has been clear that we do not need to make firm decisions at this stage.
6. Afghan Economy Nearly $9.5 billion was spent by the international community on security in Afghanistan in 2010–11. The World Bank estimates that of this the security funding directly feeding into the domestic economy constituted around 12–13% of GDP. The redeployment of ISAF troops and the scaling back of donor assistance post-2014 will present economic challenges and the international community are working to mitigate any negative economic effects of transition. At the Tokyo Development conference in July 2012 $16 billion was pledged by the international community against Afghanistan’s development priorities until 2015. There was also agreement to sustaining support until 2017 at or near levels of the past decade. This is in addition to the $4 billion per year pledged at the NATO Chicago conference in May towards the funding of the ANSF. 52 Australia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Sweden and Ukraine. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 123
Together these contributions will help bridge the “fiscal gap” identified by the World Bank in the immediate years after transition, ensuring Afghanistan’s security and development is adequately funded. The World Bank estimates that Afghanistan will achieve average yearly economic growth of 5.9% over the next six years. Ahead of the Tokyo conference in July 2012 the World Bank conducted an analysis into the prospects for Afghanistan’s economy post-transition. The analysis highlighted that at the point of transition the country would face an unmanageable fiscal gap of around 40% (between expenditure and income). In addition, a joint World Bank and IMF assessment in June 2012 also found Afghanistan to be at high risk of debt distress. The reports recommended long term foreign assistance to help the country meet both its security and non- security needs and cautioned against abrupt reduction of aid flows. The World Bank also identified mining and agriculture as two key pillars for economic development in Afghanistan. This analysis proved crucial in coalescing international support around the objectives of the Tokyo Development Conference. The international community came together to pledge long-term support to Afghanistan in return for strong commitments from the Afghans on key reforms. The World Bank and IMF continue to monitor the situation, releasing regular papers on debt and sustainability. An IMF team visited Kabul in November and reported that the economic outlook for Afghanistan was broadly positive and considerable progress has been made on structural reforms to strengthen the financial sector, mobilise domestic revenue, and improve governance.
6.1 Kabul Bank The $900 million fraud at Kabul Bank in 2010, one of the largest banking frauds ever relative to size of a nation’s GDP, implicated senior figures in the Afghan establishment. Funds were siphoned to overseas accounts and property. The fraud led to delays, of over a year, in agreeing a new International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme in Afghanistan (the Extended Credit Facility (ECF)). This led to a temporary withholding of donor funding, led by DFID, to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) in 2011. UK efforts have been instrumental throughout this process. We have worked with the Afghan Government and the IMF on negotiations to establish a new ECF and then led the international community in withholding and then reinstating development assistance via the ARTF (following a positive report from the IMF in 2012). In addition The UK and the Canadians co-funded a forensic audit of the Kabul Bank which is now being used in evidence to the Special Tribunal who are handling the prosecution. While corruption remains a serious problem in Afghanistan the news that the Government of Afghanistan is actively pursuing prosecutions against those who stole money from the Kabul Bank is welcome. The Special Tribunal “preliminary hearing” started on 14 November. Contrary to its name, this is the actual trial, with charges read and defence statements lodged against all those indicted. The UK will continue to strongly encourage the Afghan Government to pursue all means to recover assets that were lost from the Kabul Bank. Following any subsequent convictions, penalties should be considered that would allow the recovery of assets in and outside Afghanistan.
7. Development 7.1 Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team As requested by the Afghan Government, the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) (along with all PRTs across Afghanistan) will close by the end of 2014. However, much valuable progress has been achieved and evidence suggests that the people now have confidence in their own government. Support for the Taliban has dropped dramatically from a year ago53 and 88% of Helmandis now feel their government is doing a good job in delivering security. The drawdown of our civilian and military presence in Helmand has been planned to ensure that the substantial progress made since 2007 on security, development, justice and governance continue after our departure. Helmand will continue to benefit from DFID’s national programmes as well as our support to the Afghan government designed to boost economic growth and increase the ability of provincial government to deliver basic services and security. We have also been working to mitigate the impact of transition by building local government capacity to prioritise, plan and deliver development projects.
7.2 Existing Helmand Development Projects UK funded schools and clinics in Helmand have not had to close. The Helmand provincial education and health departments are responsible for the future of these facilities and they have stated that all are open and active and that they intend to maintain these services in the future. 53 Survey data collected by the Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Program show that in April 2011 25% of respondents had some interest in supporting the Taleban, by October 2012 that figure had dropped to 11%. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 124 Defence Committee: Evidence
The UK-led Helmand PRT is in regular contact with the Afghan Government, in Helmand and Kabul, to ensure that adequate funding is provided for future operation and maintenance of these services.
7.3 Malnutrition Malnutrition is a problem across South Asia. National child malnutrition rates for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh—and Afghanistan—range between 38% and 51%. The UN survey of southern Afghanistan shows a lower percentage for the region but parts of Afghanistan remain highly vulnerable to food shortages. This is due mostly to a lack of market access, price fluctuations and an adverse environment, marked by conflict, poor infrastructure, extreme weather (including droughts in 2012) and the remoteness of many communities. These conditions are pronounced in Helmand, among other regions of Afghanistan, and result in significant challenges for the donor community and for ISAF. In recognition of the problem, in 2011–12 the UK provided £10 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross’s national emergency programme in Afghanistan, helping to run seven hospitals and eleven health centres for civilians in conflict areas and providing 150,000 displaced persons with food aid. We also contributed £7 million to the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2011. Last year the WFP provided nearly 5,000 metric tonnes of high energy biscuits to 1.4 million school children in 25 Afghan provinces. However, the UK recognises that more must be done and the UK is developing a programme for 2013 to help deliver emergency food support to more than 500,000 people in Afghanistan in partnership with the Afghan Government and NGOs. This support will address immediate needs and help feed acutely malnourished or highly vulnerable people in food insecure areas. It is the Afghan Government, not ISAF, who should be seen to deliver basic services and security for the Afghan people and over the past two years support for the Afghan Government in Helmand has increased (from 69% in Dec 2010 to 78% in August 201254). Satisfaction with the provision of basic health care has remained stable over the past 12 months at around 80%.
8. Counter Narcotics While the Home Office is the HMG lead on Counter Narcotics and Organised Crime, currently, for Afghanistan the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is the Government lead. As part of the UK’s global drug strategy, our approach to counter narcotics in Afghanistan is to support the Government of Afghanistan in implementing its National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). The objective of the NDCS is to secure sustainable decreases in cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs with a view to complete and sustainable elimination. Experience in other drug producing countries suggests tackling the drugs trade can take decades and progress is unlikely to be consistent year on year. We believe the comprehensive approach, ranging from developing alternative livelihoods to targeted eradication and law enforcement, as outlined in the NDCS represents the best chance of achieving sustainable elimination. In comparison to successful efforts in other drug producing countries where results have been produced over the course of generations, the counter narcotics effort in Afghanistan is relatively young. This, in combination with the complexity of the drug trade in Afghanistan, makes it difficult to assess and evidence the strategic impact of our efforts. Working closely with the US Government and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the UK has supported delivery of the NDCS by: — Building capacity in key Afghan counter narcotics institutions. — Providing licit alternatives to poppy cultivation in rural communities. — Facilitating targeted eradication of opium poppy. — Promoting regional engagement. — Supporting Afghan law enforcement through mentoring support to intelligence and investigation units and legal mentoring to the Criminal Justice Task Force (the end to end judicial system for prosecuting narcotics cases in Afghanistan). Across this work we have seen positive indicators of progress which demonstrate an increase in capability of the Afghan government to tackle this problem. This includes a rise in the number of convictions at the Criminal Justice Taskforce, an increase of targeted eradication and seizures of drugs, alcohol and chemical precursors (more recent cases involved seizures of 3.5 tonnes of heroin, 28.4 tonnes of opium, 18,000 litres of alcohol and 78,000 litres of chemical precursors). Nevertheless, Afghanistan continues to be the source of the majority of the world’s opiates and is now believed to be the world’s largest cannabis resin producer. 95% of the heroin on UK streets originates from Afghanistan (but represents only 5% of Afghan heroin production). Approximately 18–23 tonnes of heroin are imported annually from Afghanistan to supply the UK market, where there are around 250,000 heroin users, impacting on UK society and economy through crime, cost to the NHS and disruption to communities. The 54 Source: Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 125
Home Office works to restrict the supply of drugs to the UK, reduce demand for drugs and support recovery from addiction through the UK Drug Control Strategy. Although it is difficult to measure the effect of specific interventions in Afghanistan on the UK heroin market, it is clear that our global enforcement actions are having an impact. Wholesale prices of heroin have increased from c.£16,000 a kilo in 2009, with evidence that dealers are now prepared to pay upwards of £20,000 a kilo. There has also been a gradual and continuing, albeit irregular, decline in street heroin purity in the UK falling from 46% in 2009 to around 32% in 2010. For the Government of Afghanistan a key measure of strategic success would be reductions in cultivation. Following a peak in 2007, cultivation fell in successive years until 2011 when cultivation rose nationally by 7% compared to 2010. We are disappointed that the trend of declining cultivation has not continued, but this should not draw away from positive gains made; cultivation levels 40,000 hectares below the 2007 peak and 17 provinces categorized as poppy-free in 2011 remain so in 2012. Following security transition in 2014 the context for these efforts is likely to become more challenging. We believe that progress can continue to be made but this will require strong leadership and political will from the Afghan Government. The UK continues to support the Government of Afghanistan to deliver the NDCS, and ensure sustainable progress in the run up to security transition and beyond.
9. Afghan Polling The UN Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) report published in June 2012 reported on surveys carried out in 2010–11. It said that some significant improvements have been made in the health, education and wellbeing of women and children in Afghanistan, that many Afghans have improved access to drinking water, that school attendance was up for both boys and girls and child mortality was down. While significant challenges remain the 2012 Asia Foundation Poll reported on surveys carried out in June 2012. It reported that the household situation and well-being had improved in all indicators since 2011. More Afghans said they were better off than in 2011 (53% in 2012 compared to 44% in 2011). 50% of Afghans said their household financial wellbeing has improved during the past year, and half (51%) said that access to schools has improved. Since 2008 income levels had increased 20%. The number of children attending school had increased significantly. There had been an increase of 62% in the number of health centres open and 50% increase in the number of midwifes serving the Helmand population. January 2013
Written evidence from Professor Michael Clarke, Director, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) AFGHANISTAN SCENARIOS Within the spectrum of possibilities for Afghanistan after 2014, when combat operations are drawn down, three possible markers can be defined, from immediate failure to evident and sustained success. The outcome will lie somewhere along this spectrum, though it is also possible that the outcome will be so mixed that some aspects might represent the more successful end of the spectrum while others are closer to failure. The three possibilities are: (a) The transition process works 1. There is EITHER a political settlement that creates a government of national unity creating in Kabul a viable entity with political authority; OR a continuing process of discussion and bargaining about new governments which keeps all factions sufficiently committed and maintains consensus for a national unity government. 2. A post-Karzai leader emerges who is strong enough to hold most of the Afghan factions together and is at least minimally acceptable to the international community with a policy that keeps international terrorists out of the country and maintains some basic human rights within Afghanistan. 3. The ANSF proves to be an operationally competent force and is increasingly seen by Afghans as a national backbone for the creation of a stronger society. Taliban (and other) attacks continue to occur in Afghanistan, but are effectively handled by the ANSF who draw strength from their operations. 4. The process of governance continues to improve throughout Afghanistan with; i) an evolving balance between central government authority and authority at the provincial and district level; ii) curbs on the most egregious examples of corruption throughout the political system; and iii) an acceptance among the population that the status quo of 2015 remains the best mechanism for the improvement of their daily lives. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 126 Defence Committee: Evidence
5. The international community’s development work in Afghanistan continues at about the same financial level and is able to build on the successful sectors that presently exist— particularly in national infrastructure, education and small business development. 6. Narcotics cultivation does not significantly diminish (thus maintaining small livelihoods) but the proceeds are not channelled through insurgents and the narcotics issue is susceptible to Kabul government policies. 7. Pakistan and India recognise a common interest in the stability of Afghanistan and refrain from antagonistic competition in the country, even though they both have national interests in Afghanistan’s future. 8. China defines and expresses a significant interest in Afghanistan’s stability for its own economic reasons—mineral extraction. 9. Pakistan does not implode as a viable state and does not thereby create fall-out causing instability across the Afghan border. 10. ISAF forces remaining in Afghanistan in training and mentoring roles are relatively invisible from 2015, but exert cumulative effects on the capabilities of the ANSF. 11. ISAF’s counter-terrorism role continues, but is less kinetic and able to remain discreet and draw down gradually to an intelligence role only.
Judgement on Western policy: Western policy is seen as a success, not in converting Afghanistan into a modern, prosperous state, but in giving it essential stability from which it can mould its own future and from which international terrorists cannot effectively operate. (b) The transition occurs, but is unsustainable 1. There is no definitive political settlement by 2015 and while a political process to create a viable government of national unity continues, it ultimately breaks down and leads all political actors to look for alternatives. 2. The local agendas of Afghan politics—at provincial and district level—overwhelm the (failing) political process in Kabul and create more factional pressures. 3. The post-Karzai Presidency is unable to reconcile differing factions to include an inclusive government. It continues with the process of government, but with failing legitimacy throughout the country. 4. Governmental corruption is not diminished and becomes steadily worse as government appears more factionalised at both national and local levels. 5. Narcotics cultivation continues and significant funds continue to be channelled into insurgent forces while the problem is not susceptible to Kabul governmental policies. 6. Afghan warlords regain their independent political status and pursue their own ethnic and/ or cross-border agendas. 7. The ANSF lacks competence under pressure. It is able to deal with standard operations, but is stretched when the individual loyalties of its members are tested by sustained Taliban campaigns, as opposed to sporadic attacks. 8. Development projects run out of steam, especially in education and small businesses. 9. Pakistan does not implode, but continues to maintain active links with elements of the Taliban and some warlords. Or, Pakistan does implode and creates trans-border instability which eventually spreads into the southern Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. 10. India competes for influence against Pakistan in Afghanistan. 11. China’s commitment to a stable Afghanistan, and its own interest in mineral extraction, remains ambivalent as it waits to see what happens. 12. Western forces are drawn into attempts to prop up the ailing Afghan government; OR, they explicitly stand aside and are seen by the international community to let matters take their course. 13. Afghanistan tends to split into a western province based on Herat, a series of northern provinces around Kabul and Jalalabad, and a southern Pashtun area which spreads across the border into the Pashtun heartlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan which straddle the Durand Line. If this process is seen to begin, it would probably accelerate quite rapidly. 14. Counter-terrorism operations continue in a kinetic mode which remain operationally effective but contribute to the failure of the national reconciliation process and the international community’s development efforts. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 127
Judgement on Western policy: It would depend on how long the transitional arrangements are seen to survive before a new chaos emerged. If a period of grace was around two–three years and Afghanistan was not again a training ground for international terrorism, western powers could claim a messy but limited success. (c) Immediate failure in 2015–16 1. Taliban attacks build up to become a co-ordinated (or semi-co-ordinated) campaign in 2014 as the ISAF drawdown occurs. This alters the perception of what the future holds both for Afghans and the international community. 2. A perception is created of Western withdrawal under pressure rather than a smooth transfer of power to the Government and the ANSF. 3. ANSF is seen to split, being unable to cope with systemic attacks in several places and divides into a Tajik-dominated mainstream force, while Pashtuns desert and/or join a southern Pashtun insurgency. 4. The political process to create a government of national reconciliation is stalled or explicitly breaks down with Karzai unable to command respect and no obvious successor in the wings as Karzai’s authority diminishes. 5. The political process makes national divisions worse as Afghan politicians demonstrate they have no belief in it, and its continuation as a process becomes irrelevant. 6. A perception of impending civil war dominates the vocabulary of Afghan politicians during 2014–15. External powers anticipate a growing civil war and look to safeguard their interests, both economic and political. 7. Current ISAF anti-narcotics policies break down while Taliban and insurgent groups reach out to gather more of it to fund offensives against ISAF forces. 8. Evidence emerges (even sketchy evidence) of continuing international terrorism being nurtured in Afghanistan, despite the ongoing counter-terrorist campaign. Judgement on Western policy: Western policy would be seen as an evident and expensive failure and the extent would be measured against the yardstick of Soviet failure in the country at their point of withdrawal in 1989, and a perception of the way international terrorism operates in global politics—any remaining terrorist connection to Afghanistan would reinforce a sense of strategic failure. 26 June 2012
Supplementary written evidence from the Ministry of Defence At the HCDC evidence session on Afghanistan yesterday, you asked me if Defence spending made up 2.6% of GDP, what proportion of the 2.6% was being spent on the deterrent this year. You subsequently asked if you could see what the proportion of spending on the deterrent looked like over the next 10 years, ideally as a pie chart. The answer to the first question is comparatively straight forward, but the second is less so. Consequently, I have provided background information to explain why this is the case. As I have previously stated, the in-service costs of running the deterrent is around 5–6% of the defence budget (around 0.12% of UK GDP in 2011–12), which includes the costs of the Atomic Weapons Establishment. As stated in the White Paper,55 we expect that the successor deterrent in-service costs to be similar to that of today’s. As you will be aware, we have started work on the design for the replacement Vanguard Class ballistic submarine, with a Main gate decision due after the next election in 2016. Our current assessment is that we are within the costs stated in the White Paper of £11–14 billion (2006–07 prices) for the replacement platform. The stated costs of the Successor Deterrent Programme in the 2006 White Paper were: £11–14 billion for the Submarine; £2–3 billion for the Warhead; and £2–3 billion for Infrastructure. This totals £15–20 billion with all costs at 2006–07 constant prices. As the Warhead and Infrastructure have not yet obtained Initial Gate approval, and likely costs are subject to the outcome of ongoing studies to inform Initial Gate decisions, it is not possible to provide reliable figures on planned spending over the next 10 years.
Background information Retaining the nuclear deterrent has been considered on the same basis as the 2006 White Paper where it was stated that the running cost of the future nuclear deterrent would be “similar to today (around 5–6% of the defence budget)”. This estimate is for all aspects of the nuclear deterrent such as Vanguard operation and manpower; Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) operation and weapons transportation; infrastructure and security. Our most recent analysis has indicated that we still expect the running costs of the deterrent capability to be approximately 5%. However, it would be misleading to provide absolute values or detail beyond this overall percentage, primarily due to the difficulty in determining what spending relates specifically to the deterrent. 55 As stated in the White Paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent” (Cm 6994) published in December 2006. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 128 Defence Committee: Evidence
For example, many of the support costs of the Vanguard submarines are managed within larger contracts, and they are operated and maintained in facilities used by other submarines, so providing an estimate of costs that are solely attributable to the Vanguard class would not be straightforward, and would require many caveats and assumptions. This is the case for most military capabilities where shared basing and support arrangements occur. As stated in the Successor Initial Gate Parliamentary report, SDSR concluded that we could defer decisions on the Warhead and Infrastructure elements of the programme. Therefore, no further updates to these costs have been produced and the estimates given in the 2006 White Paper of £2–3 billion for the Warhead and £2–3 billion for the Infrastructure are still valid. Investment in facilities at AWE is primarily to ensure that the in-service warhead can be maintained and not for the development of a replacement warhead. The costs for AWE have therefore been included within the costs of retaining the nuclear deterrent above, but are not considered to be a replacement cost. Planned costs over the next 10 years are held for the Successor programme, but these are subject to Main Gate review and approval, so are subject to change. There are also elements of related spending in the Nuclear Propulsion area where decisions have yet to be taken on accounting treatments, which will determine whether spending is associated with the Successor programme or with other (non-deterrent) areas of the submarine programme. It would also be necessary to determine how savings on the Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme should be taken into account. As a result, it would not be a straightforward matter to provide a robust estimate of spending on replacing Trident over the next 10 years. Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP January 2013
Supplementary written evidence from the Ministry of Defence This memorandum provides further evidence on a range of topics related to the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan as requested by the House of Commons Defence Committee. Due to the sensitive nature of information relating to the campaign, elements of the memorandum are provided in strict confidence within a classified annex and should not be disclosed outside of the Committee. The information provided in the text is principally drawn from HM Government sources. Acknowledgment is made as appropriate for sections which draw significantly from ISAF or other sources.
Q314. Have there been any discussions with the Afghan Government about a more extensive amnesty as detailed in Julian Brazier’s question? Amnesties have played a useful role in ending some of the conflicts in which the UK has been involved. Amnesty arrangements can vary and tend to reflect the particular circumstances in each conflict; this applies equally to Afghanistan. As the Secretary of State said, the primary vehicle for “reintegrating” former insurgents back into society is the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP). The APRP is an Afghan-owned and led programme. The UK provides support where necessary, in particular by encouraging the Afghan Government’s Joint Secretariat to address issues of concern. This includes how prospective reintegrees are processed and incentivised. The programme has enjoyed some success and around 6,000 former combatants are now enrolled on it. Its overall success however will be determined by the commitment and involvement of the Afghans. Under the terms of the APRP, the programme provides those who enrol with amnesty for “political acts”. However, this does not necessarily mean an amnesty or pardon for any serious crimes they may have committed. Equally, we should be clear that handing in one’s weapon is not necessarily a precondition for joining the APRP, especially in cases where the retention of a personal weapon is judged by the Afghan authorities to be necessary for personal protection. In such cases personal weapons may be registered by the Afghan authorities and then handed back to those who have chosen to reintegrate under the APRP. It is worth reiterating the importance of the Afghans themselves being in the lead on this, as with other aspects of the peace process. We will continue to play an important supporting role but, in context of transition to Afghan responsibility, it is right that we are seeing ever more Afghan leadership of key initiatives such as the APRP.
Q318. Can the Committee have an update on DFID’s work in Afghanistan on women and gender issues including the current and future funding? As part of the ongoing DFID programme of support, the UK supports Afghan women working and participating in public life. UK officials are working closely with the Afghan Ministry of Interior and through the British Embassy in Kabul, which provides funding and support to key organisations such as the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 129
In respect to women and gender issues, a new £3 million DFID Afghanistan programme has just launched and is expected to run until 2015. The programme includes plans to help women become actively involved in politics and to shape their own future. It focuses on three key themes: (1) building capacity of current female political leaders (parliamentary and provincial councillors) to support election hopes; (2) improving leadership skills of female presidential candidates, while also working with a group of male leaders to champion gender issues; (3) supporting female voters to actively participate in the upcoming 2014–15 elections. The new programme supports the UK Government’s broader aim to build the capacity of Parliament, Provincial and District Councils in Afghanistan, so that they have the confidence to perform their oversight and representative roles. Other means of influence, such as senior visits, have been a key and continuing theme. In December 2012, the Secretary of State for International Development, Justine Greening, met with President Karzai, Afghan Ministers and international partners. She stressed the importance of protecting the very real gains made for women and girls over the last decade and promoting women’s rights in the years ahead. Justine Greening also met with female MPs and womens’ rights activists, to discuss how the UK Government can support efforts to protect women. While there is a way to go, there are encouraging signs. In late November 2012, President Karzai made a public statement condemning the continued attacks against women, which along with a call for religious scholars and community leaders to push for an end to violence against women is a welcome step forward.
Q328 and 329. Can we have information on the performance of the ANSF in those areas where the Norwegians have withdrawn and, in particular, the impact of the lack of air support and intelligence? In late September 2012, under the agreed ISAF Transition process, Norway transferred security responsibilities in Faryab province in Regional Command (North) (RC(N)) to the ANSF. Norway continues to support ISAF and is now operating in Mazar-e-Sharif (another region of RC(N)) in support of the new Nordic and Latvian Transition Support Unit. With no permanent ISAF presence in Faryab province, it is not possible to provide an accurate assessment of the performance of the ANSF, nor at this early stage, the effect of the lack of air support. However, the Norwegian MOD has informed us that reports delivered by the outgoing task-group commanders suggest a “great confidence in the ANSF”. In particular, they highlighted the ANSF’s ability to successfully deliver the intelligence picture, albeit in a different way than ISAF. As the Defence Secretary set out, the ANSF will, and have in this case, developed an extensive human intelligence network which replaces ISAF intelligence enablers. Transitioned ANSF units now have lead security responsibility for around 75% of the population, including all Provincial capitals. In many cases they set their own priorities, lead their own planning and conduct and sustain their own operations. Transition in Faryab province has been possible because of the developing capability of the ANSF, who lead up to 80% of conventional operations and carry out 90% of their own training.
Q331. Can the Committee have the monthly attrition rates for the ANA and the ANP over the last two years and a commentary on the recent increase? Attrition rates for the ANA/ANP over 2011 and 2012 are shown below by solar month56 in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. The figures are calculated by ISAF’s Afghan Assessment Group,57 by dividing the total number of those that have left by the total number of the previous month’s strength. They include those who are: — dropped from roll58 (the largest contributor); — killed in action (or die of other causes); — exempted;59 — captured; — separated60 or; and — retired.
56 One twelfth of a solar year, totalling 30 days, 10 hours, 29 minutes, 3.8 seconds 57 The Afghan Assessment Group in HQ ISAF has primary responsibility for operational analysis and assessment. They hold a list of standard definitions which apply to all Theatre level analysis and represent an analytical baseline for the ISAF mission. 58 Which includes those dismissed for being Absent Without Leave (AWOL) 59 Meaning their contract is terminated by the Afghan authorities (such as through medical release). 60 Separation after completion of mandatory 3-year contract. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 130 Defence Committee: Evidence
Table 1 SHOWING ATTRITION RATES FOR ANA AND ANP THROUGH 2011 2011 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Attrition ANA 2.7% 2.8% 2.6% 1.9% 2.3% 2.9% 2.2% 3.1% 3.3% 2.4% 2.6% 2.3% rates ANP 1.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.4% 1.4% 1.6% 1.4% 1.6% 1.5% 1.9% 1.3% 1.4%
Table 2 SHOWING ATTRITION RATES FOR ANA AND ANP THROUGH 2012 2012 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Attrition ANA 1.9% 1.8% 1.2% 1.6% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.1% 3.0%* 3.5% 3.5% 2.6% rates ANP 1.0% 1.1% 0.6% 1.3% 1.0% 1.2% 1.1% 1.4% 1.1% 1.5% 1.2% 1.0% As of solar month September 2012, attrition for ANA includes planned and unplanned losses. Prior to solar month September 2012, attrition only included unplanned losses. This change does contribute to part of the increases seen from September 2012.
Figure 1 GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF ISAF DATA REPRESENTING ANA AND ANP ATTRITION RATES FOR JAN 11—DEC 12. ANA & ANP Monthly Attrition rates (indicative smoothed curve) 4.00%
3.50%
3.00%
2.50%
2.00%
1.50% Attrition Rate (%) 1.00%
0.50% ANA ANP 0.00%
Jul-11 Jul-12 Jan-11Feb-11Mar-11Apr-11May-11Jun-11 Aug-11Sep-11Oct-11Nov-11Dec-11Jan-12Feb-12Mar-12Apr-12May-12Jun-12 Aug-12Sep-12Oct-12Nov-12Dec-12 Solar Month
As General Barrons said, and as the figures above show, attrition rates for the ANP are lower than for the ANA. Figure 1 above, shows the seasonal element to attrition in both the ANA and ANP. In 2012, attrition rates in the ANA peaked at 3.5% in solar months October and November, dropping in solar month December to 2.6%, following seasonal norms. As the Defence Secretary and General Barrons said, there are many reasons for a high attrition rate. Work by the ANA-led Joint Attrition Working Group suggests the overarching reason appears to be poor leadership, although operational tempo and cultural norms are also factors. In response, the Group has implemented a number of actions. These include: — SALT(P)—a programme that seeks to get ANA soldiers home during leave periods; — Effort to ensuring a proper clothing allocation, ensuring each soldier has their winter clothing has drawn very senior interest; — Improving food standards—as the Secretary of State said a food supplier was recently jailed for supplying substandard rice to the ANA; — Improving living conditions—including things like winter fuel allocation and the provision of mattresses and sleeping mats. Developments such as the UK led Afghan National Army Officer Academy will also help to address the causes of attrition, though the effects may not be felt for some time. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 131
Q338. Can the Committee have the latest figures on the recruitment of Southern Pashtuns to the ANA and the figures for the numbers in service? The latest figures available have been provided to the committee previously. They show that the ANA recruited 756 Southern Pashtun in Quarter 1 of 2012, 3.7% of the total against a target of 4%. A breakdown of the ethnic composition in the ANA is shown at Table 3 below: Table 3 SHOWING THE ETHNIC BREAKDOWN WITHIN THE ANA Pashtun Tajik Hazara Uzbek Others61 ANA 46% 35% 9% 7% 3%
These figures represent an improvement to overall Pashtun recruitment in the ANA. There is no change in the ANP. The Afghan MOD is maintaining its effort to recruit Southern Pashtuns into the ANA by encouraging the recruiting centres and provincial councils to identify suitable recruits. General: Can you tell the Committee how you will decide on which equipment to bring back early—it was reported in Prospect (February 2013) that there was a debate in the MoD “whether if it takes out the most valuable kit first, such as mine-resistant vehicles worth £700,000 each, that will leave soldiers more vulnerable”. While some equipment has already been returned, we have not made final decisions on which equipment and material will be redeployed and in what order it will be delivered. Equipment and material will only be redeployed from Afghanistan once operational commanders are content that it is no longer required. If equipment is identified as surplus, a cross defence committee, the Operational Planning Group (Redeployment), will decide whether to gift, sell, destroy or redeploy the equipment as appropriate. What we can be clear about is that equipment and material will only be redeployed from Afghanistan once operational commanders are content that it is no longer required. Military commanders on the ground will continue to be properly resourced and equipped for the operations they need and our troops on the ground will not suffer as equipment is returned home and ongoing operations will not be compromised. As the Secretary of State said, value for money is also a key consideration; there will be a value for money case on each individual line of equipment. The MOD is working on a principle of redeploying in good order and a smooth transition to the Afghan National Security Force. Current planning therefore assumes that equipment and material will be redeployed steadily over the next two years and will be correlated with the amount of service personnel deployed to Afghanistan and with needs of other allies. General: The Committee did not have time to ask if the MoD has completed its agreements with Central Asian Republics on surface and overflight options for withdrawal of equipment. Could you please let the Committee know the latest situation? To increase operational resilience and enhance recovery options, we are seeking to establish a number of routes for equipment and personnel redeployment from Afghanistan. On Wed 13 Feb, the Secretary of State announced before Parliament, three reverse transit agreements with Uzbekistan, which will provide surface and air transit permissions. Discussions aimed at establishing similar bilateral surface and air transit permissions with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are at an advanced stage. An air transit agreement with Kazakhstan was concluded last February and negotiations are underway to establish surface reverse transit permissions. We expect that by July this year, a network of bilateral surface and air reverse transit options through Central Asia should be available for support to UK redeployment operations.
Q370. What is the size of the three reserve battalions in Cyprus? The British Army contributes forces to two distinct elements in Cyprus. The first element is British Forces in Cyprus (BFC). The Army has two battalions (known as Resident Infantry Battalions) based in the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Akrotiri and Dhekelia. They are under command of Commander Joint Forces Command (Comd JFC). Each battalion consists of around 600 personnel. At any one time, one of these battalions is conducting Cyprus Operations in support of Commander BFC (including guarding critical infrastructure); the other battalion is designated the Theatre Reserve Battalion (TRB) for Afghanistan. The TRB is prepared to deploy to Afghanistan in support of Op HERRICK, under command of the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) should the situation require it. 61 Others includes Turkmen, Balooch, Nooristani, Bayat, Sadat, Pashayee, Arab & Qazel Bash cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 132 Defence Committee: Evidence
The second element is support to the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The UK contribution (under Op TOSCA) consists of the Urban Roulement Regiment (251 personnel), and a contribution to the UNFICYP HQ staff. These troops are under command of the UN HQ, and are completely independent from BFC. February 2013
Written evidence from Ken Guest, “RAM” Seeger and Lucy Morgan Edwards A BETTER PATH TO PEACE A more optimistic solution for Afghanistan
Mujahedin at prayer, Paktia 1981 by Ken Guest ©
About the Authors Ken Guest is a former Royal Marine and photo-journalist. He has recently been working in Kabul and has now been closely involved with Afghanistan for 32 years. During its struggle against the Soviets he probably cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 133
spent more time inside Afghanistan, living and working with the Mujahedin, than any other Western witness to that conflict. As a result of that past, he has a first hand knowledge of not just how the ordinary Afghan thinks, but how the Taliban and Al Qaeda think and act. Ken has written, contributed to and illustrated several books and feature articles, eg Flashpoint! (Brassy’s) and British Battles (Harper Collins) and most recently at the request of the ICRC “The dynamic interplay between Islam and Conflict in Afghanistan” (International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 82, No. 880, Dec 2010). “RAM” Seeger is a former Royal Marine who left the Corps in 1976 after commanding the Special Boat Service. He won a Military Cross with 40 Commando during the Borneo confrontation, was an instructor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and attended the Army staff college at Camberley. After leaving the Corps he set up a Special Force for the Sultan of Oman and then became a security consultant. During the early 1980s he made a number of trips into occupied Afghanistan to give training and help to the Mujahedin. Most of these were to the Panshir valley for Ahmad Shah Massoud. After this he did an MA degree in War Studies at King’s College London. In 2001 he lobbied for Western support of Abdul Haq, along with Ken Guest and another friend and colleague—Sir John Gunston. Lucy Morgan Edwards is a researcher in politics and regional studies at the University of Exeter. She first worked in Afghanistan during the Taliban period running urban development projects for UNCHS in Kandahar and Heart. The “community forum” aspect of these programmes later became known as the National Solidarity Programme. After spending five years in Afghanistan as an election monitor, researcher on transitional justice for the International Crisis Group and correspondent for the Economist, she was Political Advisor to the EU Ambassador (with responsibility for security sector reform, narcotics and civil military relations). She was then “country expert” to the EU Chief Election Observer on the 2005 Parliamentary elections. She has written a book on her experiences of the current intervention whose central theme is an investigation of the internal plan for toppling the Taliban advocated by famed resistance Commander, Abdul Haq, using the ex King Zahir Shah as a rallying point.
The Writing of this Paper The authors of this paper have been watching the unfolding tragedy of these last eleven years with consternation and huge sadness. We have all had practical outside the compound experience of Afghanistan ie we have walked, talked, worked and in Ken Guest’s case, fought with ordinary Afghans over prolonged periods of time and as a consequence have much affection and great respect for the Afghan people. We also have profound admiration for the courage and fighting skills of the ISAF soldiers and deplore what is likely to become a waste of young men’s lives. Ken and RAM as former soldiers feel this especially. Ken did 34 trips into occupied Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet war, saw ISI agents at work in the “Jihad theme park” at Ja Wa, Paktia, watched their grooming of Jalaluddin Haqqani and Haqqani’s development from a resistance fighter to Jihadist leader, and most unusually perhaps, met and discussed religion with Osama bin Laden and witnessed his panicky reactions in a combat situation. None of us, however, have had the time or secretarial back up to produce a fully researched and argued academic study. We have therefore deliberately kept our paper short and to the point. We have added some notes at the end by way of elaboration, and can add to these if required. “We have bought into a policy which will fail. If we are honest, everyone is simply crossing fingers and hoping for the best. In so doing we have continued a pattern of allowing ourselves to be pushed about by events, rather than being active and creative in seeking a solution that would and will be acceptable to all Afghans save the few who have a stake in the continuation of a corrupt and discredited government. The consequences of continuing down this path will be severe, damaging and immediately apparent. As matters stand we are simply, through ennuie fatigue or laziness, consciously allowing Afghanistan to drift.” Frank Ledwidge—author of “Losing Small Wars—British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan”(1)
Introduction The aim of this paper is to stress the dangers and consequences of negotiating with the Taliban, and to present an alternative way forward. Negotiation with the Taliban will not work—at least not in the way we want or expect—and the consequences—to quote Frank Ledwidge above—will be severe, damaging and immediately apparent. Negotiation with the Taliban will be orchestrated by the ISI, will result in a Jihadist controlled government and is not the right path to follow. We are wrong to pin our hopes to it. An equally bad course of action is to continue on the present path. After eleven years of war, heavy costs and failure this is unlikely to suddenly succeed. It too will end with a Jihadist controlled government. Our only hope is that the government we supported and funded, and its large ethnically unbalanced army, will last long enough after our departure for us to claim that this was not our fault. Given these two very unsatisfactory options we should instead adopt a very different path. Rather than negotiating with the Taliban, we should be thinking in terms of negotiating with the ordinary people of cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 134 Defence Committee: Evidence
Afghanistan and giving them the space to run their affairs in the way that best suits them. This could be done through devolved government and empowerment of the tribes—a course of action that believers in the centralised Western template will, no doubt, regard as a retrograde and ill-starred step, and one requiring far too much time and effort to implement at this late stage. However, as we hope to show, given the track record and likely outcomes of the other two alternatives, our third option, although radical, is not as inapt or as impractical as it might at first appear.
Where we went Wrong To fully appreciate the dangers we are warning against and our proposals for devolved government, we need to understand and accept where we went wrong in the past. In summary only, as the intention of this paper is not to conduct a post-mortem on past failures, our main mistakes were as follows. — We declined the opportunity for a quick and acceptable solution by not backing Abdul Haq and instead selecting Hamid Karzai. Haq was an honest, independent and much respected Pushtun war leader. He bridged the ethnic divides, had reached agreement with Ahmad Shah Massoud and could have overthrown the Taliban with only modest help from the West. (2) — We fought the wrong war—Kinetic instead of Perceptional. (3) — We misjudged the role and influence of Al Qaeda and spent too much time and effort on reducing this. (4) — We tied our credibility to a Government widely perceived to be corrupt and illegitimate—a major handicap and early mistake. — We failed to play the Tribal card—see comments later in this paper. — We failed to play the Islamic card. The Taliban should have been challenged on Islam. They should have been shown to have violated Islamic principles and Pushtunwali. (5),(6) — We tried to impose a Western template (big government, big army etc) on a mainly rural, conservative, poor and primitive society. We failed to realise that “it was all about local” and failed to give the people what they wanted. Instead we tried to give them what we thought they ought to have, — Finally we allowed Pakistan to support and control the Taliban—which not only helped the Taliban to conduct an insurgency, but is one of the main reasons why negotiating with the Taliban is not a good option.
The Dangers of Negotiating with the Taliban In our desire for an early exit, we are convincing ourselves that there is a hawk/dove divide within the Taliban leadership and that we can negotiate an acceptable solution with the more reasonable and practical of the Taliban leaders (See Michael Semple interview and RUSI paper)(7) We do not think this is possible for three reasons. Firstly, because if there is any divide within the Taliban, it is between the local Afghan Taliban (who don’t like foreign soldiers on their land, have lots of relatives to avenge, want law, order and justice, and see the Government as illegal and corrupt) and the Pakistani influenced Jihadist Taliban who form the bulk of the leadership and are fighting for mainly ideological reasons, and it is this latter group that we will be forced to deal with. Secondly, because as far as this Jihadist element is concerned, they are winning or have won the war, so any negotiation is simply a discussion of surrender terms and their path to power. And thirdly, because the ISI (Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence), who support and control them, will try indirectly to orchestrate the negotiations and ensure that any agreed post conflict Government is firmly under the control of the Jihadist element. The ISI want (and need) control of Afghanistan and see the Jihadist Taliban as the best means of achieving this. They see the Jihadist Taliban as their proxies (they have, after all, supported and controlled them from the outset) and if the Jihadist Taliban are in a position to control an Afghan Government, so too will be the ISI. The ISI see control as necessary for a growing number of reasons—strategic depth, fear of Indian encirclement and to make trouble against her, to restrain Baluchi and Pakistani Pushtun aspirations for independence in the Tribal Areas, to preserve the Durand line, to gain regional influence and last but not least for financial gain—from Afghan natural resources (copper, rare earth etc), trade (and traffic into and through Afghanistan), oil and gas from the Central Asian Republics and the flow of copper out of Afghanistan into China. A strong, stable and independent Afghanistan is not perceived by Pakistan to be in Pakistan’s interest, so the ISI are unlikely to waste the opportunity of ensuring that this does not happen. To this end they will try to ensure that the “reasonable and practical” negotiators that the West appear to be choosing are in fact chosen by the ISI, that any “negotiated settlement” is framed by the ISI, that the West are excluded from the real horse cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 135
trading, and that the West can believe they have achieved “exit with honour”—military spin speak for lose without loss of face. The ISI will be aiming for three things: — Recognition of those they want to be recognised. — Collusion by the West in achieving this (so it will become near impossible for them to back out of). — The morphing from a pariah Jihadist organisation (mistakenly seen in the West as Islamic) into a UN recognised Government. On past and present showing they are likely to achieve all three of these aims. While they know what they are doing, have clear objectives and will field their best team, we have flexible objectives, uncertain hopes, and if the present Afghan government has any input, are liable to field a failed cabal of former warlords and gangsters propped up by our funding. The Jihadist Taliban, for their part, are likely to accept their proxy role, because, contrary to popular thinking, they have no supreme leader or master plan of their own (Mullah Omar is a Pakistani installed figurehead) and because they have always done what Pakistan directed (he who pays the fiddler, calls the tune). Many of them are also Pakistanis, live in the Tribal Areas and/or were brought up in Pakistan. (8) To achieve their ends both groups—the ISI and the Jihadists, will be prepared to accept any government dressed up to be acceptable to the West providing they can directly or indirectly control it. Both see control as their main aim and they will happily cede short term tactical gains for this ultimate power. Thy will be quite happy not to be seen to be in control but will of course want international recognition of the Government that they are in. Although this will be against their interests and wishes, it is unlikely that the Northern Alliance, or any other non-Pushtun or anti-Pakistani groups, will be able to do anything about it. With a Jihadist controlled but UN/ Western recognized government in power (and all the financial and military backing that this will entail) it will be very difficult for them to protest without finding themselves suddenly cast in the role of the bad guys. This apart, as soon as they see the way the wind is blowing, actors like Abdul Rashid Dostum will change sides and all opposition will fade away.
The Likely Consequences Assuming our aim is not just to get out as quickly as we can, but to achieve the best possible settlement under the circumstances, all of the above is not good news. Apart from the fact that it will not be in the best interests of the Afghan people, a Jihadist controlled Government will be widely propagated and perceived as defeat for the West. We will lose much face and the worldwide spread of Jihadism will be much encouraged. This is particularly likely in Pakistan, where their growing Jihadist movement may additionally (and ironically) be able to gain strategic depth from the use of safe havens and bases inside Afghanistan. (9) The ISI, in their vanity, think this will not happen and believe they can control Jihadism and use it for their own purposes as a “smart” weapon—to further Pakistan’s frontier and regional policies (as already explained) and as a threat to others to leave Pakistan alone. There is a real danger however that they cannot. Once the genie is out of the bottle, it is very hard to force it back in again. (10),(11) If the ISI are proved wrong, this growing and out of control force of Jihadism will threaten the Pakistan state, spread to other countries, destabilise the region, force interference from China, India and Iran and have long term implications for the security of the West. If Pakistan’s nuclear assets come under Jihadist control, there is the danger of nuclear leakage or misuse. (12),(13),(14) The end result therefore will be that we will have fought and paid for an Afghan war, only to have recognised and allowed the very things that we went to war to prevent. (15)
More of the Same Given our past mistakes and need soon to withdraw from Afghanistan, the continuation of current policies is not a serious option. If we, the West, like the Russians before us (with similar aims and policies) are unable to defeat an Afghan insurgency, it is highly unlikely that Karzai’s government and army (modelled on ours) will be any more successful. Nor are they likely to last any longer after our departure than Najibullah’s did after the Russians ended their funding. The increasing number of green on blue killings—an attempt to make amends and protect families against reprisals—is a sure sign of declining confidence. As stated earlier the end result will be the same as negotiating with the Taliban—a Jihadist controlled government.
A Better Path Contrary to common perceptions, the choice is not between more of the same—ie continuing war and corrupt government, and negotiation with the Jihadist Taliban. It should still be possible, by engaging with the Afghan cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 136 Defence Committee: Evidence
majority, to give it what it has always wanted—no war and no return of the Jihadist Taliban. Jihadist Taliban, it must never be forgotten, is an imported concept that was designed and launched by the ISI in 1993. It is not an Afghan concept and runs against the Afghan nature. The 2001 collapse of Taliban authority was widely welcomed by the vast majority of the population who were fed up with its interference in their daily and very traditional lives. We maintain that the best way of getting in contact with the ordinary Afghan and marginalising the Taliban is by reducing the power and scope of the central government, establishing semi-autonomous regions and following what we have come to call the Tribal Path. (See our paper “The Tribal Path” dated 9 June 2010)(16) Regional Government would be more in keeping with Afghanistan’s historical past. It would allow us, without loss of face, to correct past mistakes and be harder for the ISI and Jihadist Taliban to control. Instead of having to infiltrate a single central government, they would have to infiltrate multiple governments many of which would be ethnically different and jealous of their independence. By following the prescriptions advocated in the Tribal Path it should be possible to reduce most of the difficulties and dangers, win over the moderate Afghan Taliban, and bring new hope to the Afghan people. (17)
Difficulties and Dangers of Regional Government The difficulties and dangers of Regional Government could be considerable. For a start the concept is unlikely to be well received by the current Afghan Government who will see it as an unwelcome dilution of power and loss of control. It might also mean multiplying the central government corruption problems by the number of regions to which power is devolved and lead to inter-factional feuding, civil war and Balkanisation. These dangers can be minimised, providing:- — The devolution process is carefully and securely planned. — The regional division is correctly balanced—this is the essential first step. Get this wrong (as we did with the Durand line) and the concept is under a permanent handicap. — Regional governments do not mimic the strong central government we are trying to get away from. They too must have a light footprint. — Suitable regional governors are democratically elected and all decision making and ownership is as transparent and as close to the people as possible. This means devolving power to tribes and local communities and following the principles of the Tribal Path. — The Afghan Security Forces are restructured, reformed and reduced in size with the use of traditional Tribal Forces as the front line first responders.
Hope and Opportunity Whilst the difficulties and dangers should not be underestimated, we would argue that they are, at least, no less than those attached to negotiating with the Jihadist Taliban or continuing on our present course, and at best, offer far more hope of achieving a peaceful outcome. If we can accept them, make a start on devolving power to regions and local communities and reduce the Army to a more manageable and effective size, we will be giving Afghan morale what it badly needs—a highly visible indication of beneficial change. The need for this is paramount, as it is the only way of capturing the enthusiasm, hope and backing of the Afghan people and ensuring that the expenditure of blood and treasure since 2001 has not been entirely in vain.
Proposed Regions The obvious solution of forming regions round the country’s main towns leaves much to be desired. Space is as important as population, and Afghanistan is still predominantly rural. Other critical factors are trade routes, security, ethnicity, easy access to the regional capital, and speedy Quick Reaction Force (QRF) access to all corners of the region. Taking all these factors into account, we feel that the country could be divided into 17 regions. (See map at end of paper after “NOTES”. The population based regions would be Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar, while other possibilities subject to further and more detailed consideration could be: Meaymaneh (Faryab). This area offers alternative routes to Turkmenistan and splits the distance between Mazar and Herat. It will act as a trip wire aiding northern border security. Whilst the northern reach of the Afghanistan ring road is being developed, Taliban activity develops at a faster pace. Significant effort and resources need to be focussed on its completion. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 137
Kunduz. This is Hekmatyar’s home ground and the Taliban have been expanding their activity in this region. It therefore needs special attention if it is to be kept under control, not least because the Taliban are beginning to expand their circle of recruitment. This development represents a serious risk, which, if it becomes wide spread, changes the dynamics of the operational environment in the north. Badakhshan with its capital in Faizabad. This is a large area with a low population, so is often seen as less important. But it is part of the access route to the north, and includes the Wakhan corridor to China. It also borders with Pakistan and Tajikistan. Poor security here has allowed the Taliban to use the area as a rat run and supply route to Kunduz and other northern regions (18). Although the ground is physically challenging, the Taliban have been able to move through it relatively easily. As they are channelled through high passes, a focused effort by suitably trained and supported forces could cause significant disruption. Panjshir. As the Tajik heartland, this is a secure area and the purpose of placing a regional centre here would be to reward success and consolidate security. It would serve as a base against Taliban infiltration routes through southern Badakhshan and Northern Nuristan and give support to their regional centres. Nuristan. This is one of the Gateway provinces, and used by the Taliban as a passage north to Badakhshan and west to Laghman and Kapsia. Nuristan would act as a central buttress mutually supported by Panjshir to the north and Jalalabad to the south. Khost. This has to be a separate region as border crossing points are cut off from Nangarhar (Jalalabad) and Logar (Ghazni) by high mountains. The area is also the stamping ground of the Haqqani Network, so for this alone merits special attention. Paktika. This area plugs the gap between Khost and Kandahar. Development of the road from Gardez to Paktika and on to Kalat would enable an outer trip wire route, offering additional protection to the main Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar highway. Ghazni. This is an important staging point and security hub, on the highway between Kabul and Kandahar. Lashkar Gah. A region here would protect part of the main Kandahar-Herat highway and act as a point from which to connect with the Afghan Baluch community. The Baluch are ethnically different from the Pushtun. Baluchistan is also a sensitive issue for the Pakistanis, and more effective Western connection to the Baluch could be used as a pressure point to encourage co-operation by Pakistan. Farah. A regional hub in Farah would help protect the Kandahar-Herat highway. Subject to regional political needs, it might become the hub for a new border trade and supply route serviced via Iran and their deepwater port of Chah Bahar. In addition to increasing trade benefit, the potential use of Chah Bahar might prove a useful tool for leveraging more effective Pakistani support, as it competes with the new Pakistani deepwater port in Gwadar. It could also impede the transport of drugs across to Iran. Chaghcharan. This would give a region to the Aimaq people. It would help to secure the central highway trade route and impede Taliban supplies and personnel heading north towards Badghis and Faryab. It also represents a suitable staging post, as it is presently about a one day drive from Herat. Bamian. By including Bamian, the Hazaras would have their own region. The central highway trade route security would be better serviced as Bamian is about a days drive from Chagcharan. Having both Bamian and Chagcharan would mean the Herat-Kabul drive was broken down into manageable legs, with sizable staging posts and security hubs at the end of each days drive.
Increased use and security of the central highway would provide competition for the Kabul/Kandahar/Herat road ie trade and revenue would follow the most secure route. Local communities would then not only gain from improved security, but lose if they failed to provide it.
The Tribal Path
The Tribal Path paper we wrote in 2010, advocated four things, all of which are relevant to regional devolution and, if devolution is to be successful, should be incorporated into regional institutions: — Bottom up community governance. — Tribally raised and tribally controlled Tribal Forces. — The importance of building up trust and allowing the Tribes to lead the way. — A properly sponsored and authoritative study to find out more about the Tribes and local communities than is currently the case. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 138 Defence Committee: Evidence
Tribal based Community Governance Local governance should be based on the tribal system because: — Tribes and local community structures still matter in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is still a traditional, kinship-based and mainly rural society. If its people are not always as tribal as each other, they are likely at least to be clannish by nature and conservative in outlook. They are likely to have more in common with each other than divides them. They share a common experience and respond in similar ways. Tribes are used by the people (who can expect more certain and reliable support from them than from other organisations), the Central Government (to an extent), and the Taliban (see below). — For the Afghan, the traditional Jirga, with its open forum assembly, transparency and accountability, is much fairer and more democratic than a Western electoral system which can be misunderstood, difficult for rural Afghans to participate in, and easily manipulated. The system has always worked well in the past, and has shown itself to be trustworthy and sustainable. It was collective and transparent and well suited to the people it managed. There were Jirgas at different levels of society, with every member of the tribe and community being allowed to attend their meetings. Tribesmen received information through their representatives in the Jirga, and everyone was fully aware of decisions made, and allowed to ask their leaders and representatives to justify these. Jirga members were voted in on grounds of capability and included women, often from non-prominent households. (19) A common criticism is that tribal structures have been weakened by the pre-9/11 Communist, Mujahedin and Taliban regimes, and since then by the assassination of uncooperative leaders by Taliban insurgents. These have certainly damaged the structure but not fatally. Perhaps the strongest argument for following the tribal path, is the use made of it by the Taliban. Unlike the West or the Afghan Government, the Taliban have taken active (and successful) steps to utilise the tribal dynamic—at first using its support and then replacing it with its own direct influence and control. A policy of tribal empowerment and cooperation would not only give the government a very effective asset, it would deny the same to the Taliban. This is important because if the Taliban lose the support (20) of the tribes—they will ultimately fail, while if they retain their dominance over this resource, it will be almost impossible to defeat them.
Tribal Forces Our Tribal Path proposal for Tribal Forces was more controversial, but only because, quite wrongly, it evoked memories of warlord militias (paid retainers of mafia thugs) or central government militias, which were more of a source of enrichment and prestige to government ministers than a threat to the Taliban. (21) Properly structured however, Tribal Forces are a cost effective way of securing tribal lands, although they must be controlled by their own tribes-people and tribal leaders, operate in their own areas, and work for the readily perceived benefit of the tribe providing them—eg community defence and the ejection of unwelcome intruders. Local security and stability is now becoming a major issue for ordinary Afghans as they face an increasingly uncertain and turbulent future. Responsible and accountable Tribal Forces who can safeguard tribal space will do much to reduce this concern. (22) Although regional and central governments should resist the direct control of tribal forces, they must still support them, and provide escalating layers of follow up forces for situations they cannot control or deal with. Working together in this way should allow both sets of forces to develop a sense of interdependence and mutual respect. We would see the Tribal Forces being structured on traditional tribal lines. These involved three kinds of force—the Kishakee who gathered intelligence, the Lashkar who were a large grouping called together for defence against a common enemy (usually also an enemy of the country), and best known and most used, the Arbakai. The Arbakai were volunteers and respected members of the community. They were embedded in the community, engaged on community tasks, and were answerable to the community. Their main duties were to implement their Jirga’s decisions, maintain law and order, and protect the borders and boundaries of the tribe or the community. Unlike militias they were unpaid and not used for the political or financial interests of individuals. Moreover, whilst being an Arbakai member was considered an honour, belonging to a militia was considered shameful. (23)
Tribal Police Working alongside the traditional Tribal Forces should be a specially recruited and formally recognised tribal police force. This would function in a way not dissimilar to how tribal police are used in the USA on Native American reservations. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 139
Scouts Based on the old North West Frontier Scouts, should be a para-military regional organisation recruited from the Tribes, but not tribally owned or part of the Police or Army. They would be controlled by a Political Officer, and would be used to back up local forces, keep quarrelling tribes apart, or punish misdemeanours of tribe against tribe.
Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) Efficient, effective and highly mobile QRFs are essential to the concept of escalating layers of Government support for Tribal Forces. Whenever possible these should be heliborne. Where the QRFs are located is important, as this will affect how quickly they can reach likely trouble spots. Any area they are unable to reach easily will soon be realised by the insurgents and used by them to advantage. The concept of relentless pursuit is essential and to this end combat tracker teams must be developed with expert human trackers.
Building up Trust and Allowing the Tribes to Lead the Way Having decided that the Tribal Path is worth following, it is important to understand that even after finding the right people to deal with, it will take time to build up bonds of trust. And having won the trust and cooperation of the Tribes, the next step is to realise that in order to keep this and use it productively, the Tribes must lead the way in the use of Tribal Forces. Tribal Forces will work if they are raised and controlled by the Tribes and seen by the tribes as working on their behalf. They will not work if they are merely an extension of government power in tribal disguise.
Need for a Tribal and Local Community Study An independent and authoritive study is necessary as the tribal situation in Afghanistan is a complicated one. The study would involve not just tribal mapping (which to a large extent has already been done), but establishing the social, economic and historical inter-relationships between the tribes.
Restructured State Security Forces Paralleling the devolvement of power to Regions and local communities, should be a restructuring and reforming of the Afghan State Security Forces. Neither the Army nor the Police are functioning properly and despite optimistic Western forecasts are unlikely to. This should take place at the same time as changes in governance.
A More Sustainable and Acceptable Army The Army should be renamed as the Afghan Defence Force, reduced in size, and be reorganised into regionally recruited regional regiments. The Army should be of a limited size so that it can be more sustainable, better trained, better paid and more effective. It should wear local style uniforms with the traditional salwar. Basing it on the failing model of a large US/ISAF army was a mistake. (24)(25)(26)
Western Officers Initially at least, the Army could also be partially officered by Westerners—some of whom might be seconded, others of whom might be contracted. A model for this might be the highly competent and successful Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces (SOAF) during the Dhofar war. Loyalty of Afghan troops to Western officers need not be a problem. In a properly run regiment, with Western officers speaking the language of their men and committed for a period of several or more years and where the troops are well equipped, well looked after and confident about the future, the situation could be very different from the present one. In the Indian army, there was no problem in recruiting and holding the loyalty of Pushtun soldiers even when they were used on the frontier against other Pushtuns.
Restructured, Renamed and Better Paid Police A better structured and more effective police force is essential. As a first step in countering this, the pay for the Police should be increased. Rural police should be recruited on a regional basis from the areas they are to police. City police should have a wider regional and ethnic mix and more women. The force should also be renamed as the Afghan Nation Police instead of the Afghan National Police. They too should be given new uniforms with a specially coloured salwar. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 140 Defence Committee: Evidence
Regional Issues We see regions breaking down into provinces and districts under Regional and Provincial Governors and District Officers. As with the new regional boundaries, provincial and district boundaries will need to be the subject of a careful and detailed study. This should take full note of the tribal and local community study we are also proposing. The new governments should try to follow the principles and practices of the tribal path as completely as possible. Some examples of where this can be applied are the selection of Governors and District Officers, governance by committee, selection and use of Political Officers, control of budgets and allocation of funds. Governors and District Officers should be elected, governance committees should replicate the jirga system and include tribal representation from local jirgas. Political Officers should be specially qualified and appointed. Their prime duty would be to liaise with the Tribes and be responsible for tribal affairs. The Regional Government should control its own budget. Priority issues for the regions are likely to be Aid, Justice, Reconciliation and Revenue collection. Properly administered Aid will be the most visible gain for local communities so must be the top priority if their support is to be won. Next in line is Law and Order and Justice (27). This is a prime concern for the ordinary Afghan, and must run in tandem with Aid or we run the risk of Aid fuelling corruption and injustice, as is the case now. With visible local benefits and improved Law and Order, the space for local Reconciliation is created. Last in line is Revenue collection as it can only come from a stable environment, and if given priority would undermine the scope for creating the stability it needs. Note Law and Order is a rallying cry for Taliban. We need to own that banner.
Wider Consultation Our final plea, whatever the course of action, is to widen the consultation process to include those with practical experience of living and working with ordinary Afghans and travelling throughout the country. This is not to knock academic study or the efforts of MOD and FCO officials, it is simply to point out that because of the security situation getting this experience nowadays is very difficult, so those who have been lucky enough to have obtained it are a valuable and dwindling resource, which should be used more than has been the case hitherto.
Conclusion We are at the 11th hour. For the past eleven years we have failed to make sustainable progress in Afghanistan. This is mainly because we’ve used the wrong models for the development of the Government, Army and Police. If we can resist the siren call of negotiation with the Taliban, it is possible to recover from this faulty start, but only by radically changing our approach and building these institutions on different lines. If we cannot embrace such change we will, most certainly, embrace failure.
Notes (1) “Losing Small Wars—British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan” by Frank Ledwidge. ISBN 978–0–300–16671–2. (2) See Lucy Morgan Edwards’ book—“The Afghan Solution—the inside story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and how Western hubris lost Afghanistan” published by Pluto Press/Palgrave Macmillan (USA). ISBN 978–0–9568449–0–3. (3) Instead of imagining the opposition as a physical mass with a weakness at the centre, we should have seen it as a formless gas affected by all kinds of indirect factors. We should have made more of an effort to target how the enemy thinks and so perceives and structures for the contest. For example, while we might see drones as a calculated and effective way of striking at the enemy leadership, the Taliban perceive them as a sign that the West is too weak and frightened to fight man to man. (4) Al Qaeda never existed in large numbers, was never a major participant and never had a chance as a non- Afghan enterprise of functioning inside Afghanistan in the way the Americans imagined. More dangerous than the organisation is the idea that drives it. This is a general dissatisfaction with the Muslim lot, which is blamed on the West. Al Qaeda is the smoke, not the fire. (5) We should have created debate and seeded doubt. We should have attacked their pillar of presentation, that they are engaged in a war against non-Islamic occupying forces, by stressing that the only real invaders are those infiltrating from Pakistan, intent on destabilising and destroying Afghanistan. (6) Clearly the UK government has no credibility as a commentator on Islam. However, friendly Islamic authorities (ulema) could have been approached either directly or through friendly governments. Such authorities include Al Azhar University in Cairo, the centre of mainstream Sunni theology, the many sound Pakistani authorities or Islamic scholars at our own universities (there are some fine ones at Oxford for example); or all of the above. All have expressed a willingness to name Al Qaeda’s approach as heretical. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 141
(7) See the Emma Alberici/Michael Semple interview on ABC News Australia, 4 September 2012 and the RUSI Briefing paper September 2012. (8) Within ISI arsenal are firm allies, such as Jalaluddin Haqqani, but even Haqqani is not a Pakistan puppet, although he will accommodate them as long as it suits him. The proof of that is what happened immediately after 9/11. Pervez Musharraf rushed to offer Haqqani an opportunity to become the acceptable face of Taliban, replacing Mullah Omar, but Haqqani turned Musharraf down. Mullah Omar is Pakistan’s puppet, Haqqani is not. Haqqani has the capacity to become the prime focus of Jihadisim along the Pakistani N.W. Frontier, easily outpacing Mullah Omar. Mullah Omar is and always was, merely window dressing. (9) Jihadism in Pakistan developed in the 1980s out of a controlled ISI experiment. Its purpose was to use Islamic credentials to legitimise the holding onto power by the military. However as this aggressive use of Islaminisation gathered popular support—it was a powerful rallying cry among the deprived rural population for whom the government had done little—it began to gather its own momentum. This was accelerated by an unrealistic evaluation of the role played by the Islamic resistance in the “defeat” of the Soviets in Afghanistan, seen by some as proof that Allah was on their side. That perception increased the pace from Islaminisation to Jihadism. (10) Jihadism in Pakistan has now become a serious threat, as its expansion has left the ISI with a fragmented web of factions it finds hard to control. Some will be loyal cohorts, some will be allies of expediency, and some will be opposed, resenting attempts to impose controls or frustrated by any one of a number of issues which vex them. (11) Pakistan believes it won the Soviet-Afghan War by “controlling” Jihad like a “smart weapon”. It thinks it is winning now in Afghanistan in the same way. In reality it is achieving its ambition far more on the back of Western failures than its own brilliance. The “smart weapon”, overall, is not obedient and has the capacity to bite the hand that feeds it. (12) Although the ISI/Jihadist movement in Pakistan is more interested in controlling Afghanistan and influencing near neighbours than it is in exporting Jihadism world wide, its use of Jihadism as a threat to others to leave Pakistan alone is likely to increase. Meanwhile the Jihadist elements within Pakistan are likely to expand to a point where the ISI can no longer contain their threat to the state. (13) The Jihadists who morph out of ISI patronage will have a much more far reaching view of “Jihad”, not least because they are infused with Wahhabi ambitions. They will see it as their duty to overthrow the West, making penetration of Western Islamic enclaves a key part of their strategy. Interestingly, they will attempt to do what the West should have done in Afghanistan. They know they cannot hope to occupy the battle space physically, so will make their “frontline” a battle for perception among the resident Islamic community in the West. They will do this by exploiting grievances, pushing for favourable political reforms, uniting and mobilising the disaffected, agitating to seed chaos, in fact using all the essential ingredients for war by other means. Added to this will be a certain amount of kinetic activity to force heavy handed counter measures which can then be used for propaganda purposes. Their aim will be to establish cells that are self-motivating rather than operating in a conventional command and control organization. (14) The danger is that the “secure cordon” that the ISI describe as protecting their nuclear systems faces the wrong way. In theory it protects by preventing entry, in practice, the most likely source of danger is not Jihadists climbing over the wire but facility staff already inside the compound. (15) One can admire the skill of the ISI without being blind to the weak link in their armour—ego. This infuses them with an absolute conviction of their own invulnerability. Admittedly the West has given them ample reason to bond with that perception. However, in our opinion, in doing so they credit their own performance more than it deserves. It does deserve a lot but it should be balanced against the degree to which the West has defeated itself. In effect, the ISI on its own could not win. It needed the West to fail, making significant mistakes. This the West did, and it was these mistakes, more than ISI perfect planning, which is delivering victory to the ISI. (16) “The Tribal Path—Commanding the prime battle space” dated 9 June 2010 by Ken Guest, RAM Seeger and Lucy Morgan Edwards. Published earlier in March 2010 in the Small Wars Journal. See also http://thetribalpath.weebly.com/the-tribal-path-9-june-2010-pdf.html (click on view in full screen) (17) For a supporting perspective on the Tribal path and ISI manipulation see the Pushtun Awakening brief by the NWSC (New World Strategies Coalition) which describes the Taliban as “a religious mafia concocted on white boards in Rawalpindi” (http://www.eurasiareview.com/15092012-pashtun-awakening-defeat-the-taliban- by-changing-the-narrative-analysis/#comment-435357) (18) August 2010 saw the murder of 8 expatriate aid workers in one attack in Badakhshan, when it was reported the local police chief had an agreement with Taliban to allow safe passage through his space in exchange for allowing illegal smuggling of semi precious stones from mining activity he had a share in. (19) Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan—Occasional Paper no 7—dated December 2008 by Mohammed Osman Tariq from the Crisis States Research Centre. http://www.crisisstates.com/ download/op/OP7.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 142 Defence Committee: Evidence
(20) This tribal support has never equalled approval or a willingness to see the instalment of a Jihadist Taliban regime. (21) An example of what the Tribal path is not about, is the Warlord force allegedly recruited by Ahmed Wali Karzai and his associates and known as the Kandahar Strike Force. Such militias have been accused of murder, rape and extortion, while this particular one was investigated for shooting dead Matiullah Qateh, the Kandahar chief of Police (see article by Stephen Grey http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/16/afghan-prosecutor- arrest-warrant-us-officer). As mercenary forces, Warlord militias are notoriously unreliable, with loyalty, at best, questionable (as shown by the number of times people like Abdul Rashid Dostum have swapped sides) and their performance, as part of legitimate government, extremely counter-productive. (22) Recent reports recount that the going rate for an AK47 have increased to $1,000 from $300 a year ago. (23) As for Note 19. (24) Even some of its own commanders acknowledge that it is far too large and highly likely to fragment after NATO’s withdrawal. (25) It naturally follows, if the power is decentralised to natural regional locations then the military force at its disposal must also be decentralized and operate in a more local manner whilst reflecting the ethnic balance of their home regions. This removes the need for the mass mini-me preference of the US, reduces cost and permits a custom made structure for the environment in which it must function. (26) Frank Ledwidge author “Losing Small Wars” recounts a telling story of how a group of Pushtun Taliban prisoners being guarded by British and ANA soldiers watched with surprise when the ANA soldiers (Tajiks in Western style uniforms) went off to pray. They asked the British soldiers what the ANA soldiers were doing. “Praying” replied the Brits. “But why” said the Taliban, “They’re Russians aren’t they?” (27) A major justice problem is deciding how to deal with those personalities that the West empowered after 2001, who instead of being indicted (as they should have been), have remained in power and are continuing to orchestrate mafia heists of resources in Afghanistan. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 143
November 2012
Written evidence from Brigadier (Retired) David Martin of the Centre for Defence Acquisition, Cranfield University REDEPLOYMENT FROM AFGHANISTAN: THE LOGISTIC CHALLENGE To enable the redeployment of British forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 there will need to be further base closures in Theatre, and those bases will need remediation. These closures will take place over time in order to gradually reduce to a much smaller footprint—the size and shape of the remaining footprint depends on the enduring, but as yet unknown, capabilities that will remain post-2104. Taken as a whole it is clear that the consumption or disposal of an estimated 6,000 x 20-foot equivalent units (or “TEU’s”; ie a fully- packed container) of materiel will be required, together with the return to the UK of a further 7,000 x TEU’s.62 Unlike the withdrawal from Iraq, where Kuwait was used as a relatively benign staging post to load equipment onto ships, Afghanistan is land-locked with poor surface infra-structure. This withdrawal will therefore be dependent upon the use of a number of lines of communication, which will themselves collectively 62 PAC Managing the Defence Inventory HC 754-I (uncorrected) Q23. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 144 Defence Committee: Evidence
rely on a complex network of aircraft, ships, trains and trucks; a significant contribution will need to be contracted in under the umbrella of “Contractor Support to Operations” from the commercial sector. Entry into the UK will be at specific air (eg Brize Norton) and sea (eg Marchwood) ports, from where materiel will need to be returned to military depots or to Industry to be re-conditioned and then be put back into storage; most, if not all, of the vehicles will need to go through a major maintenance, repair and overhaul programme. This process—not all of which the MoD acknowledges is currently funded—will allow a progressive return to a contingent capability ie materiel ready for re-deployment on future operations, which is a—if not the—the key consideration. Responsibility for the re-deployment process ultimately lies with the Chief of the Defence Staff, who will ensure that the process is operationally sound, giving due regard to value for money (VfM) considerations and—potentially very importantly—ensure that everything is compliant with HMT and HMRC endorsed policies. Planning guidance—covering issues such as remediation and disposal policy, the re-importation of freight into the UK, etc—follows jointly from ACDS (Ops) and ACDS (Log Ops). This more detailed guidance, in turn, will allow the publication of a “redeployment support plan” that enables detailed logistic planning to be conducted, including the issuing of “orders” to DE&S operating centres for materiel and equipment husbandry. The whole process will have been modelled for the expected rate of drawdown (Plan A) and any other potential alternatives eg an early redeployment or the whole withdrawal conducted at a quicker than anticipated pace (Plan B). Uncertainties considered will include the timeliness of political decision making, actions by ISAF allies and Afghan politics. In preparation for redeployment, all of the equipment within Afghanistan will need to be recorded on one unitary database—known as the “eCompendium”; this is necessary because current Logistic Information Systems still remain fragmented. When full operational capability of the eCompendium is achieved, it will provide a means by which the MoD will be able to demonstrate what is being termed “Proof of Good Order” (POGO) for the decisions taken on the redeployment of military equipment and materiel. The full POGO process first requires the cataloguing of all items, the reconciliation and closing down of all of the materiel accounts, the correct conditioning and packaging before shipment, together with the establishment of a clear audit trail for those items that will be either gifted or sent for disposal. This is no small task but it is absolutely essential in order to comply with good materiel accounting practice and to demonstrate VfM—as well as to ensure the effective regeneration of all of the equipment to allow a swift return to contingent capability. Equipment being returned to the UK will need to meet exacting theatre exit standards before being prepared for movement. Preparation for movement (ie “export” from Afghanistan) is achieved through what is referred to as the “ANVIL” effect—a process which was successfully employed during the withdrawal from Iraq (Op TELIC). “ANVIL” is the benefit derived from the surge deployment of specialist military personnel, civil servants and industry. The additional cost for personnel is easily offset by the reduction in the processing time that would otherwise be in the UK strategic base—it enables the quicker unpacking of containers and the sorting and “putting away” of materiel, along with more timely maintenance, repair and overhaul activity. This deliberate and carefully orchestrated process should allow regeneration timelines to be met. The principal routes out of Afghanistan are: — air directly back to the UK, using RAF C17s or chartered freighter (eg 747), or; — moving south by road through Pakistan to the port of Karachi,63 or; — moving west by air to the Middle East or Cyprus for onward movement by ship, or; — going north by rail through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. Once in Russia, options are then to go as far north as Riga in Latvia for movement by sea, or to go to an airhead further south for onward movement by aircraft. All of these options will rely upon the extensive use of contractors to provide road transport, trains, ships and aircraft. The direct air route will be used for passengers and materiel deemed “war-like”.64 Moving some of the latter category, which will include out-sized items, will require some use of the very few wide-bodied aircraft available on the charter market that are capable of accommodating such loads, eg the Antonov AN- 124. These aircraft are regularly used by ISAF but they are very limited in number and their use, like the use of all civilian aircraft, is dependent on the threat. Usage will demand coordination with ISAF Allies in order to avoid unnecessary competition, thus driving down availability and driving up cost. Coordination with allies will also be required if Pakistan allows its roads to be used for so-called “reverse supply chain” activity. Other considerations on the use of routes are the need to maintain the integrity of freight (ie POGO) as it moves from one means of transport to another and how, in so doing, to ensure that effective bio-security measures can be maintained. 63 The Pakistan Ground Line of Communication is open to UK traffic going into Afghanistan but not for traffic going the other way. 64 An example of war-like stores is ammunition. Inexpensive small arms ammunition is likely to be destroyed. Complex munitions that are expensive, and relatively few in number, are likely to be recovered. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 145
Entry into the UK will be at specific air ports and sea ports, with emphasis being on RAF Brize Norton and Matchwood Military Port (MMP). Responsibility for the co-ordination of activity in the strategic base will be vested in the Chief of Defence Materiel, as the “Logistic Process Owner”, although in practice he will delegate responsibility to the Chief of Materiel (Land). Freight will flow through RAF Brize Norton, a potential pinch point, and vehicles and equipment through Marchwood Military Port. The key vehicles that the Army wishes to retain, the so-called “Protected Mobility Fleet”,65 will go through an exchange point where they will have any final work done that is necessary to make them “roadworthy”—few of these vehicles meet the legal requirements for use on UK public roads. These fleets are not necessarily of a common build standard and work to address this, along with future supportability issues—linked to decisions on what equipment/vehicles will be needed to equip Army 2020—is being considered so that funding can be secured. Although the task of redeploying from Afghanistan is complex and challenging, the detailed work that is necessary to safeguard success is now underway. Responsibilities are known and acknowledged and strong leadership is ensuring good progress. The remaining issue to bottom out is the not insignificant cost of re- deployment to the UK. Ill-informed suggestions in the Media that it may be in the order of £100 million look very optimistic; a figure nearer £500 million may well be more realistic—with a caveat against even that figure until the outcome of discussions with HMT and HMRC are concluded. January 2013
Written evidence from David James INK SPOTS OF SUCCESS, THE SMART POWER APPROACH TO OUR ENDGAME IN AFGHANISTAN Summary The insurgents in Afghanistan have access to sustainable funding through the control and taxation of opium. The Afghan Government does not. Currently the Afghan Government and the Afghan National Security Forces in particular will continue to be a significant burden to the international community’s taxpayers up until the point we are willing to allow everything we have built at great cost to collapse. By rapidly building and supporting zones of peace and economic growth in the areas least affected by the insurgency we can help the Afghan population begin to pay the tax that will make their government accountable to them and provide the motivation and resources to maintain the ANSF. The attached paper; “Ink Spots of Success” argues that supporting the Afghan professionals (who are currently losing their jobs) to lead an economic boom in the most peaceful areas of Afghanistan should be our main strategic effort. This would deny significant ground to the insurgents and create a new politically motivated business community that could become the meritocratic leaders of post Transition Afghanistan. From my own personal experience in the Wakhan Corridor I can attest that these Ink Spots of Success do exist and could grow rapidly but they are under serious threat from negligible funding and the rapid encroachment of insurgents displaced by military operations in the south. Much better soldiers than me have said we can’t win the war in the south, but I believe we could still win the peace in the north. Success in Afghanistan is not and cannot be achieved through the military defeat of the Taliban. It is the building of the viable positive alternative. But what is the alternative and how do we realise it? — Who?—the educated professional elite who have been working for the international community—they are the Afghan antithesis of the Taliban. — What?—the economy is centre of mass for success. The insurgents have access to sustainable funding through the taxation of opium. The Afghan government does not. Building the economy rapidly is critical. — Where?—the most peaceful areas of Afghanistan where the Taliban will have to overextend themselves to operate. — How?—focus strategic resources on the rapid development of Ink Spots of Success where our efforts will deliver the best return on investment, provide a tax base and deny vital ground to the advances of the insurgents.
1. Introduction 1.1 Although the international community can legitimately claim steady progress in Helmand and other parts of southern Afghanistan it is progress delivered through $120 billion of military pressure (2011 US spend on 65 ie, MASTIFF, JACKAL, COYOTE, HUSKY, WARTHOG, FOXHOUND, RIDGEBACK and WOLFHOUND cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 146 Defence Committee: Evidence
military operations). This is more than six times the entire GDP of Afghanistan and equates to $3.4 million for each of the 35,000 members of the Taliban—(based on the 2010 US National Intelligence Estimate). 1.2 This military pressure in the south is not only unsustainable but also destabilising the previously insurgent free north. 1.3 By focusing strategic resources on 0.012% of the population we are making them disproportionately powerful and forcing ourselves to respond to their agenda. The cost of military operations is more damaging to us than the Taliban themselves and we have willfully achieved Osama Bin Laden’s objective of over extending ourselves and bleeding into the sand of Afghanistan. 1.4 If we redirected “just” 10% of that spending into helping our few remaining Afghan friends build the economies of the most peaceful parts of Afghanistan we would achieve greater strategic effect faster, smarter and more sustainably than focusing all our resources on killing our enemies. If we can’t help moderate Afghans build a future to fight for and the tax base to achieve it nothing we have achieved in ten years will survive the transition.
2. The Concept and Rationale in Summary 2.1 Fundamentally I believe we have got ourselves into a difficult situation in Afghanistan because we’ve concentrated the vast majority of our resources on our enemies and not our friends. Success is not the defeat of the Taliban it is the building of the viable positive alternative. Our current approach is focused on Hard not Smart Power. 2.2 In 2001 a few hundred Special Operations Force personnel and air power helped the Northern Alliance defeat the Taliban. The Taliban were a spent, defeated and discredited force. The reason that they have become resurgent is because we did not fill the power vacuum with a viable alternative. 2.3 As we withdraw international money and military personnel we need to ensure that we leave something sustainable behind, or nothing that we have achieved in 10 years will survive the transition. 2.4 There appears to be very little international will to sustain the effort in Afghanistan over the long-term and therefore if any Afghan institutions are to survive the transition they must be resilient and self-sustaining. 2.5 I believe for the transition in Afghanistan to have any chance of being sustainable we must now focus on three key areas; the first is the economy, the second is the educated elite—who have been working for us— and the third is the geographical areas where the Taliban are least powerful. 2.6 This is the who, what and where of my proposed strategy. 2.7 The intent is to create Ink Spots of Success which once established will spread and replicate in the areas where they have the best chance to grow. 2.8 We need to have a holistic view of the entire nation of Afghanistan and the factors that will deliver ultimate victory. By making the Taliban the focus of our main economic and military resources we have given them the initiative and allowed ourselves to fight them on their terms on their ground. Our uniformed forces operate out of fixed patrol bases amongst a wary population, which the Taliban blend into. Consequently the battle and maybe war winning advantage that we had in 2001 has been lost, in fact given, to our adversaries. Our military and economic superiority has been turned against us and the high cost of operations is strategically more damaging than the Taliban themselves. 2.9 I would propose using the ongoing but reducing conventional military operations as a strategic feint designed to tie up, expend, degrade and most importantly contain the Taliban. At the same time discretely switching our strategic main effort to the areas where the Taliban will be at a strategic disadvantage. This means focusing our main effort on our friends in the most permissive parts of Afghanistan to build a new Afghan economy, ideology and power-base that will be the antithesis and nemesis of the Taliban. 2.10 This approach will deliver a better and more tangible return on investment and demonstrate most clearly to the Afghan and our own public that rapid progress is being made and normalisation is under way. 2.11 If we cannot build a tangible success that will survive the transition then the credibility of the US and its partners and NATO will be significantly diminished. Also the Islamists will claim the Afghan Mujaheddin have not only defeated but been the major cause of decline of both the World’s Super Powers thus vindicating Osama Bin Laden’s strategy.
3. Who—The Educated Elite 3.1 In 2002 I was on my first tour of Afghanistan as a soldier in the British Army. We employed five interpreters at the base; they were two engineers, a medical student, a trainee surgeon and a professor from the University. 3.2 As more international organisations arrived they employed more of Afghanistan’s most educated elite. We effectively stripped Afghan institutions of their most critical staff and made it impossible for Afghan businesses and government institutions to compete with the wages we were willing to pay. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 147
3.3 Ten years on there’s a whole generation of progressive, moderate Afghans who view working for the international community as a viable career. As spending in Afghanistan draws down thousands of them are losing their jobs. They are faced with some very stark choices; either they will have to accept up to an 80% wage cut in the real Afghan economy, or they will emigrate, or they will become engaged in nefarious activities, or they will become a new powerful voice of discontent. 3.4 An entire generation of highly educated, moderate Afghans whose expectations we have raised will be tossed aside and left to their fate. Currently there is still a sense of denial that the international community is going home and taking our money with us. But very soon that denial will turn to anger if we don’t, as a matter of urgency, help these young men and women, who have taken huge risks to work for us, to build for themselves a hopeful future to fight for. 3.5 This is a relatively straightforward thing to do. We know exactly who they are and we know exactly how to communicate with them. With relative ease we can help them build a positive vision for the future of Afghanistan and commit the appropriate resources to help them realise it. 3.6 The Taliban have absolutely nothing to offer these people. They are interested in a unique modern Islamic Afghan lifestyle full of personal development and new freedoms. If the Taliban ever did return to power they would deny these ambitious men and women everything they care about and probably kill a large number of them. 3.7 This gives these elite Afghans a very real reason to fight the Taliban and make sure they never return. However they currently don’t have any power. They don’t trust the government and they are starting to mistrust us because we are going home. 3.8 They need to be empowered and enabled to discuss, articulate and communicate their own positive vision for Afghanistan in 2018 and beyond and then helped to gain the resources to achieve it. We need to recognise that counter insurgency is a battle of ideologies and that currently our side doesn’t have one, only policy. 3.9 Right now if you talk to these young men and women about their positive vision of the future it is inevitably of leaving Afghanistan and starting a new life, ideally in the West. If Afghanistan’s most educated, most moderate and most experienced elite leave so will all hope for the future. 3.10 For too long we have made them help us implement our policy for Afghanistan. Now it’s time for us to help them implement their vision for Afghanistan. They are a movement in waiting and it is time for us to empower them.
4. What?—The Economy 4.1 The elephant in the room in Afghanistan is the economy and it is only now that we’re starting to talk about it. Currently the economy is made up of two things; opium and international spending. As international money draws down the only real economic opportunity that most businessmen will have is investing in opium. 4.2 The current cornerstone of our exit strategy in Afghanistan is the building of the Afghan National Security Forces. However without an economy there will be no tax base to pay for them and therefore they will not be the Afghan National Security Forces but ours and the insurgents will be able to use this as a rationale for continuing their violence. Further it is only a matter of time until the international commitment for paying for the Afghan National Security Forces wanes. 4.3 Conversely opium is a multi-billion dollar business that is taxed by the insurgents and provides a sustainable source of funding for their campaign of violence. As international spending continues to draw down so too will the licit economic opportunities for Afghanistan’s business and political leaders and therefore they will be tempted to return to investing in opium which increases instability and corruption. We are already seeing signs of renewed poppy planting in the north of the country which could signal the return of Northern Alliance commanders to their bad old ways. 4.4 Huge amounts of money have been spent on economic development initiatives in Afghanistan. However the international community’s spending has increased the cost of skilled personnel, real estate, goods and services and built a false, unsustainable economy that has seriously undermined real Afghan businesses. 4.5 Most of the economic development money has been spent on helping the Afghans make more of what they can produce not what they can sell. If there is no market we are unfairly raising expectations and creating huge disappointment as more and more Afghans become skilled in areas where there are no long-term prospects. 4.6 There is a patronising view that Afghans do not know how to run vertically integrated businesses or establish value chains. However the opium industry demonstrates that the Afghans are very capable of establishing complex vertically integrated supply chains to meet international demand for a product. 4.7 What is needed is new international demand for licit Afghan goods and services. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 148 Defence Committee: Evidence
4.8 One of the fundamental problems we have created is that we have provided plenty of short-term ways for international and Afghan businessmen to generate huge amounts of profit but we have not generated long- term incentives to invest in the country. Currently most of the money that is made in Afghanistan is invested abroad and there are plenty of media reports of Afghan businessmen fleeing the country with suitcases full of money. 4.9 What we need to do as a matter of extreme urgency is to rapidly build reasons to invest in Afghanistan and create a real sustainable Afghan economy. This won’t be easy because Afghanistan is a landlocked country surrounded by neighbours with a vested interest in keeping the centre weak. And let us be sensible and realistic about encouraging investment; no one is going to invest in the most dangerous parts of the country so let’s focus our efforts where we have the best chance of success.
5. Where?—The Most Peaceful & Potentially Prosperous Areas 5.1 The international community has been committing the vast majority of its resources to the parts of Afghanistan that are the most violent and where the insurgency is strongest. 5.2 We provide huge contracts for construction, security, and logistics companies owned by Afghanistan’s politicians and business leaders to support our counterinsurgency efforts in the south and east of the country. This provides them with a perverse incentive to ensure that the insurgency continues. There is no financial incentive for them to support the peace. 5.3 A U.S. Congress report found that insurgents, criminals and warlords were getting huge payouts indirectly from the US military via local companies who are paid to provide logistic support to US military bases. The local companies pay the insurgents and criminals not to attack their convoys. The report also provided evidence that a lot of attacks attributed to the Taliban are actually turf battles between the various stakeholders in the US supply line racket. Therefore the more we spend on counterinsurgency in the south and east the more money and incentives we give to the insurgents and criminals to continue their violence. 5.4 There is also a financial incentive for the local people to embrace the insurgency. We are focusing the vast majority of our development budget on the areas where the insurgency is strongest in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the local people away from the insurgents. Therefore it is the areas where there is the most violence that get the roads the schools and the development projects. 5.5 I have spoken to a number of consultants and development workers working in the most peaceful areas of Afghanistan such as Bamiyan and Badakhshan who report that the local people are asking if they should start blowing things up so they can get money for schools, irrigation and hydroelectric. 5.6 We are in effect saying to the Afghan people if you allow insurgency in your area you will get development funding, if you reject insurgency and live in peace you get almost nothing. 5.7 I believe that the counterinsurgency ink spot strategy is the best approach but I believe that we should stop pouring our ink into the fires of Helmand, Kunar and Kandahar where it evaporates and begin to start dropping it into the areas where it is most likely to spread. 5.8 This means committing more of our strategic resources to areas such as Herat, Mazar and Bamiyan so that we can rapidly build and grow strategic Ink Spots of Success. With this approach we can create large zones of peace and economic growth that will first contain and then encroach upon the insurgency. 5.9 Our current strategy of trying to defeat the insurgency in the south is like smashing a military fist into the insurgent jelly. The harder we pound the more the jelly spreads into areas previously unaffected. Whilst it may take us millions of dollars and thousands of troops to retake an area like Marjah, a dozen Taliban can ride into a village in the north of the country on motorbikes and bring the villagers under their control in a matter of minutes. There was almost no insurgency in the north before NATO went to secure the south. 5.10 With the Ink Spots of Success approach we begin to deny large areas of the country to the insurgents by providing local people with the motivation and resources to repel them. By placing these Ink Spots strategically we can cut-off insurgent supply lines until the insurgency can be contained in isolated pockets which can be managed by a limited number of troops. 5.11 We also move the media narrative from war to rebuilding and sustainable growth. 5.12 The Hindu Kush mountains are a formidable natural barrier, by concentrating our efforts in strategic areas we could create the conditions where we could deny all of the north of Afghanistan to the insurgents. There are only half a dozen or so ways over or round the Hindu Kush, if we can deny these to the insurgents we can cut-off and suffocate the pockets of insurgency in northern Afghanistan. The fact that the Taliban has been able to gain a foothold in the north amongst the people that gave their lives and limbs to defeat them in 2001 is a terrible travesty and shows how badly our former allies have been let down. 5.13 If we can create major Ink Spots of Success at Herat and Mazar-e Sharif we could create a single zone of peace and prosperity that covers the entire west and north-west of Afghanistan. If we create Ink Spots at Takhar and Faizabad and along the route through the Salang Tunnel we can isolate and suffocate the insurgency in Kunduz and turn the entire north of the country into an area of peace and prosperity. The north of the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 149
country is where the normalisation of Afghanistan can begin and an area that can provide the tax base required to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces.
6. How?
6.1 The actual strategy for how to implement the Ink Spots of Success concept is beyond the scope of this document. However the overarching principle is from Sun Tzu: “Reinforce success and starve failure.” We need to starve the insurgents of the ideological, material and financial resources they need whilst nurturing and reinforcing the power of a new successful Afghan ideology. This should be achieved with a lightness of touch by the international community to ensure the successes are truly Afghan and truly sustainable.
6.2 Here I will expand briefly on just a few of the suggested components: — Business & Communications Hubs—each Ink Spot has at least one Business Centre with fast internet, good business consultants and media resources to connect local businesses with national and international opportunities. — Air Bridges—dovetailed subsidies should be provided for national and international air cargo to connect Afghan producers with their markets. — Marketing & Public Relations—I have identified over 170 shops in the UK alone that sell Oriental carpets, most sell Afghan carpets. It would be relatively simple to increase the overall sector and the market share for Afghan carpets through public relations and point of sale promotions. Eg. Vogue magazine runs a front page story of Angelina Jolie visiting an Afghan women’s carpet weaving business then showing off the rugs at home. The same could be done for other sectors especially fruit for the Indian middle class market. — Personal Development—some of the best personal development and business books translated into Dari and Pashtu and made available as audio files under licence. — Strategic Communications—sponsoring of new business, lifestyle and personal development shows on TV and radio and new online resources to reach the one million Afghan internet users who are our target market. — Infrastructure Building—provide Afghan businessmen with contracts to build appropriate infrastructure within the Ink Spots of Success—eg micro-hydroelectric or irrigation—using their own money as capital. Once the project is complete they are paid a fee which includes significant profit. These scheme will encourage businessmen to keep reinvesting profit back into Afghanistan rather than taking it to Dubai. — Military Operations—Afghan Special Forces to cut off insurgent supply routes to the north and take high value targets. Afghan Commandos to clear the insurgent strongholds in Konduz. Afghan conventional forces to hold key terrain south and east of Kabul and south of Herat.
6.3 In conclusion I believe a tangible, recognised and sustainable success in Afghanistan is still achievable but only by focusing remaining resources on a Smart Power strategy will we be able to achieve it at an acceptable cost.
6.4 I would welcome any opportunity to further develop this or similar Smart Power approaches to complex interventions.
About the Author
David James served on two tours of Afghanistan as a military intelligence operator being awarded the QCVS for the second. In 2005 he left the army to work in defence procurement with a personal remit to help improve the way the army managed information and retained knowledge from one short tour to the next. In 2008 he recognised that the strategic situation in Afghanistan was on a course to fail and that his work in defence procurement would not deliver results fast enough to improve the situation. David subsequently moved out to the Wakhan Corridor in the Afghan Hindu Kush mountains with his wife and young family to live amongst the local people. The intent was to create a single Ink Spot of Success that could act as an example for the international community and Afghan people to replicate. This work was highly successful but was curtailed by the US troop surge in 2010 which pushed the insurgents into previously peaceful areas of Afghanistan and made his work in promoting the most peaceful area of Afghanistan as a viable destination for experienced trekking and mountaineering expeditions untenable. He now runs a consultancy providing research, analysis and communications services. May 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 150 Defence Committee: Evidence
Written evidence from Gregory J Wilson and Marcus Williamson Summary of Evidence — Afghanistan is not stable and will not be by 2014, future reductions in ANSF should be guarded against. Predictions for financial self reliance in Afghanistan are optimistic and unlikely to be met. — HMG must stay committed to a long term support strategy for good governance to underpin security gains. — Investment in government systems has to be the primary focus now before it is too late. HMG will have to review its approach to risk. — HMG should support approval of the government’s Aid Management Policy and then support its implementation. — UKG can usefully engage with USG, using its influence to bring about improvement in USG aid policies. — DFID needs to strengthen its Governance Team in Afghanistan and engage its implementing partners more in setting out strategy. 1. My name is Gregory Wilson, I have 25 years of development work experience working closely with the National School of Government (UK Government Cabinet Office), OECD, UN and World Bank, national governments, and UK and international development consultants on many projects involving institutional development, national strategic planning, good governance including security sector reform, and public sector reform issues mainly in conflict and post-conflict settings such as Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Palestine (Gaza and West Bank), Sudan, Iraq, Timor Leste and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have had a continual involvement in development projects in Afghanistan for 16 years and I am currently providing technical assistance to the Independent Directorate for Local Governance of the Government of Afghanistan. I am also a civilian expert with the UK Government Stabilisation Unit in London, and affiliated with Cranfield University at the UK Defence Academy where I am completing my PhD focused upon the limits to civil service and administrative reform in conflict and fragile state situations, using Afghanistan as a case study over the last 10 years. 2. My name is Marcus Williamson, I have nine years of development experience working with the UN, the World Bank, UK development consultants and national governments including the governments of Thailand, Colombia, Afghanistan and Southern Sudan. I was formerly a private sector management consultant and finance specialist. I have been working on Afghanistan issues since 2004 and have been engaged with the Afghanistan government agency responsible for local government, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance since early 2008, almost since the time of its inception. 3. This evidence is submitted by ourselves in a personal capacity. 4. We have prepared this submission to the Select Committee as we are concerned that the international community has to remain fully committed to the future of Afghanistan and will act faithfully upon its commitments. In this evidence we set out some of the key non-security related concerns, particularly concerning governance that are a fundamental part of a future security strategy for Afghanistan that will help Afghanistan emerge as a stable, prosperous and perhaps democratic country. In our view the current situation is not stable and there is insufficient time to achieve stability before the end of 2014. While there is a basic administration in place it is fragile. Strengthening local government has only seriously been addressed as an issue since 2007 and many current “stabilisation interventions” undermine development of government capacity, government ownership and leadership. Most Afghans we have spoken to are very worried indeed for the future post 2014 and believe the international community is “rushing to the exits” with little serious thought to what the future holds for the way Afghanistan will be governed in the future. 5. Furthermore, any substantial reductions in the future number of ANSF would evidently leave a large number of armed and trained men on the streets unemployed further posing risks to future security driven by the underlying ethnic and political tensions. This situation will be particularly problematic at the local level. The suggestion that Afghanistan will increasingly bear the burden of future ANSF costs is based upon optimistic forecasts contained in the recent Government paper submitted to the Tokyo Conference “Supporting Self Reliance in Afghanistan”. Both the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community know the economic forecasts are optimistic and unlikely to be met.
Why local governance is critical to securing Afghanistan’s future 6. District and provincial governments are the place where people meet government. District, provincial and municipal government are the tiers of government most capable of being responsive and accountable in a way that can build state credibility and promote stability. It is the level at which local political solutions can be brokered and important stakeholders can be brought into the system. Yet it is a part of government that has been ignored and bypassed. Current interventions in supporting sub national government and “governance” could be substantially improved. Initiatives supported in the past by HMG such as the UNDP Afghanistan Sub national Governance Programme (ASGP) have been found to be very poor by independent evaluations. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 151
7. Since 2002, the Government has prepared six development strategies and the international community has also prepared many parallel plans: in general both the Government and the international community have preferred to develop new plans and strategies rather than stick with implementing existing ones. We think this is particularly acute with regard to supporting the development of local government in Afghanistan. Continual renewal of strategies is a sign of dysfunction. 8. One area where planning would be useful is the development of a vision for local government and “governance” after 2014. The current model, and the policies supporting it, is a very conservative model aimed at preserving national unity in the post-Taliban era. It is not obviously appropriate now, but there has been no serious discussion at any level about what should replace it or how it should evolve.
Why local government might not be able to play a role in supporting the stability of Afghanistan on the current trajectory 9. To a large extent, the system of local government in Afghanistan really only exists “on paper”, basic arrangements for allowing local government structures to participate in the Government of the country envisaged in the Constitution and the law have only been partially implemented at best. For various reasons, including late interventions made by the international community and defects in the quality of technical support provided to date, work to implement these basic arrangements is only just starting and it is clear that it cannot be completed by 2014. It is vital that we give time to develop and support these institutional arrangements so that they can work. HMG, despite its sterling efforts in Helmand, has still basically ignored the connections between the centre of government and local government, despite the commitments made to understand, build and consolidate these links. The UK is not alone in this of course. There are many examples of where vast resources and support has been given by a variety of entities in individual Provinces and Districts but not connected to any local government system.
What should HMG do to change the trajectory and ensure that local governance can play its role in securing Afghanistan’s future? 10. DFID can consolidate their intellectual lead on public administration and local government issues. In comparative terms DFID has an outstanding track record of supporting sustainable reform to the real systems of Government in Afghanistan, for example budget and revenue collection processes, and this approach can be extended to address the structures and processes of local government. This will lead to direct increases in the ability of the local government system to generate responsiveness and accountability, both of which are essential for stabilisation. 11. One of the major problems confounding local governance to date is the fact that of the majority of Afghan Government business being done by contracted staff outside of the Afghan civil service (the so-called problem of the “Second Civil Service”). DFID has already a strong understanding of this issue and policy options for addressing it through a number of its Afghan programmes. HMG can therefore assert leadership by beginning to tackle the problem on a unilateral basis, and then encouraging other donors to support these efforts. 12. DFID projects have had some success in improving the strategic direction and operational effectiveness of a number of Afghan organisations by placing highly qualified advisors, including Governance Advisors and Public Financial Management Advisors into critical positions in those agencies. It is widely recognized across the Government that advisors placed by DFID are amongst the best, if not the best, working in the Government. There is a network of relevant Government agencies that need to perform well and make the right decisions in order to make the system of local governance in Afghanistan effective, not only the Independent Directorate of Local Governance but also the Ministry of Finance, Civil Service Commission, the Office of Administrative Affairs, the Office of the President and a number of others. Supporting these agencies to underpin and implement local government reform is a straightforward activity which DFID can easily implement and which will have positive impact. 13. The UK can lead the international community in encouraging a longer term look at the future of local government. One way to do this would be to assist IDLG in undertaking a “National Dialogue on the future of Local Government in Afghanistan”. The Dialogue could propose adoption of a National Agenda for Local Government, setting out a 20-year vision for the future development of local government in Afghanistan, specifying the strategic goals required, and the means, to fulfill the vision. Such a “National Agenda” could then drive the Government’s sector strategies, and the policies and programmes of individual Ministries and agencies. It should also provide a yardstick against which to measure the Government’s performance on issues such as service delivery and local representation. We know support for such an initiative exists in government. 14. To ensure that this assistance has impact, it can increase its efforts to avoid delays in vital programmes that support SNG through timely procurement and robust business cases. It can expand its support to the development of provincial and district government working with like minded-donors. 15. The links to security sector reform can be strengthened, encouraging more civilian engagement in the Ministries of Interior and Defence, other measures such as supporting post graduate study for security personnel, as we do in other countries such as Ethiopia, may also be appropriate. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [08-04-2013 11:55] Job: 027427 Unit: PG06 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027427/027427_w010_7Afghan Gregory Wilson & Marcus Williamson.xml
Ev 152 Defence Committee: Evidence
How can we make UK Aid more effective? 16. To date, international development assistance in Afghanistan has been fragmented, has had limited Government ownership and has often bypassed Government systems. It has therefore fallen well short of universally recognized good practices and principles agreed in inter-governmental forums on aid effectiveness. The Afghan Government has developed its own Aid Management Policy (AMP) which adapts internationally accepted principles and practices to the Afghan context. It is therefore important that HMG fully supports the approval and implementation of the policy. HMG along with the US Government and other donor nations refused to approve the AMP prior to the Tokyo Conference ostensibly to maintain pressure on the Afghans to deal with serious issues of corruption and poor economic governance. However, it is hard to believe that adherence to the existing, poor aid management practices has benefitted anybody up until now, and that insisting on continuing to adhere to them will somehow benefit anyone in the future. In particular it is time to take more risks with using Afghan government systems and genuinely support implementation of the Kabul, London and Tokyo commitments. 17. The US Government has a tendency to dominate international assistance due to the size of its programmes and its role in security. Improvements to international assistance as a whole will be difficult to realize if the US Government does not commit to, and implement improvements to its own portfolio of assistance. UKG can therefore contribute by engaging with USG and using its influence to bring about improvement in USG aid policies. 18. HMG should develop a more nuanced approach to the risk of working through Afghanistan’s own systems, for examples its Treasury, procurement and civil service. To date, the existence of the risk of abuse has pushed donor support through parallel structures such as trust funds and projects implemented by external organizations. While this has lead to a relatively low level of abuses, the capabilities of the Government and its systems have not been developed and we are in danger of leaving nothing behind when the trust funds and the external organizations are withdrawn. The reality is that while working through government may increase the risk of corruption, not working through them creates the near certainty of achieving nothing permanent; and while the former risks can be mitigated and reduced, the latter cannot. HMG has already had some notable successes in working through country systems, and can now build on this by applying the approach more widely and advocating the approach to other donors. Anti-corruption should remain a priority, but obsession with corruption should not drive the international community away from investing in the use of country systems. Working with the civil service on civil service management and the centre of government on policy reform is just as important and we ignore it at our peril. Support from HMG to public administration reform across the board has to be more coherent. This can be achieved through the current project support to the World Bank administered Capacity Building for results project. 19. DFID and FCO need to strengthen their Governance Teams. DFID has already acknowledged that they have difficulty fielding adequately qualified staff prepared to stay the course for a reasonable period, at least two years. Whilst it is beyond the scope of our evidence to suggest how DFID manages its staff, something clearly has to be done or HMG’s efforts will be compromised. Most governance work is of course implemented by consultants; these consultants should be consulted in the preparation of HMG strategy, programme and project interventions. Commercial confidentiality and procurement sensitivities can be addressed if this is to happen.
Other Related Matters 20. Support to Elections is extremely important. The 2014 Presidential election will require a level of security arrangements that are beyond the capability of the existing security forces. To ensure security in local areas and a free fair and transparent process, there will need to be international support to safeguard the process. In addition, it is timely to help the Government issue guidance to civil servants and the ANSF on their conduct during elections. It is vital that we support the government in their efforts to depoliticize the public service July 2012
Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery Office Limited 04/2013 027427 19585