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20170516-Travel-Advisory-Iranian LATEST TRAVEL ADVISORY POLITICAL RISK TRAVEL ADVISORY • 16 MAY 2017 Iranian Presidential Election KEY POINTS • On May 19th, Iran is due to hold elections to choose the next President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. • In the past, the presidential elections have been strongly contested between moderate and hardline politicians. • The presidential election is likely to showcase Iranian sentiments towards the United States, following the 2015 nuclear deal. SITUATIONAL SUMMARY Political: On 19 May, Iranian citizens will vote throughout the country for a new president. Presidential elections occur every four years, and in 2013 Hassan Rouhani won in a landslide victory. On 20 April 2016, six presidential candidates were chosen by Iran’s clerical watchdog, the Guardian Council, to run in the election. Former hardline President Ahmadinejad, in power from 2005 to 2013, was barred from running. This was seen as a personal snub from Khamenei, who had previously criticized Ahmadinejad for running again. It is widely believed that current President Rouhani will win a second term in office. Rouhani’s main opponent is thought to be the conservative cleric and politician Ebrahim Raisi, who has been endorsed by Khamenei. Key issues in the ensuing presidential debates are likely to focus on the role of Iran in the Middle East, the Iran-US relationship, and Iran’s nuclear program. Contact: +44 ( 0 ) 1202 795 801 SOLACEGLOBAL.COM 1 of 3 POLITICAL RISK TRAVEL ADVISORY • 16 MAY 2017 SOLACE GLOBAL COMMENT Politics in Iran is heavily directed by religion. Although the president is elected as the country’s senior politician, their power is severely curbed by the Religious Council and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The main role of the president primarily encompasses domestic policies and legislation. Foreign policy, economics, and military affairs are governed by the Religious Council, the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard. However, the president can influence such policies to an extent, especially if they are adept at dealing with the religious authorities. Indeed, the relationship between the Supreme Leader and the President can be heavily influential in Iranian policy making. The leading candidate in the forthcoming election is incumbent President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani is a moderate candidate, who previously ran on a reformist platform. During his time in office, Rouhani has attempted to facilitate greater political and social freedom in Iran, while also pushing for better relationships with the West. Rouhani has in the past been backed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, most recently in September 2016. However, the Ayatollah has since dropped his support for Rouhani in favour of Ebrahim Raisi. Rouhani is thought to have a majority in terms of the popular vote. Rouhani’s main opposition comes from the senior cleric Ebrahim Raisi. Raisi is the leading hardline candidate, and is very close to Ayatollah Khamenei. Indeed, it is believed that Raisi is the preferred successor to Khamenei. As such, Raisi appeals to the religious authorities in Iran, and is likely to gain the vote of religious conservatives and hardliners in Iran. Multiple clerical groups have pledged support to Raisi; on 01 May 2017, the influential Jame Modarresin seminary group from Qom chose Raisi as their favoured candidate. There are four more presidential candidates: Iran’s former Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri, former conservative culture minister Mostafa Mirsalim, former pro-reform Vice President Mostafa Hashemitaba, and Mayor of Tehran Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf. On 15 May 2017, Bagher Qalibaf withdrew his candidacy. These candidates seem not to have the popular or religious support needed to launch an effective enough campaign to dislodge Rouhani. This being said, Eshaq Jahangiri has gained popularity due to good performances in the televised debates. Jahangari was seen as a placeholder candidate, aiming to supplement the reformist candidacy of Rouhani. His successes indicate the public discontent towards Rouhani. There are several key areas of political debate which are likely to define the upcoming presidential election. The first is the state of the Iranian economy. President Rouhani has been criticised by both Khamenei and Raisi over Iran’s economic performance. Although the country has been making economic gains, these have been slower than predicted. In addition, Iran has a problem with unemployment. Estimates suggest that 3.2 million Iranians are jobless, out of a population of 80 million. Ebrahim Raisi has pledged to create six million jobs over four years, although this seems unrealistic as the yearly record for job creation is only six hundred thousand. Another area of debate is over social freedoms. Rouhani has recently criticised judicial and security forces for invasions of the publics rights and privacy. This seems likely to win Rouhani popular support. Possibly the largest issue of political contention is over Iran’s relationship with the West. President Rouhani seems keen to continue his diplomatic negotiations with the United States and other Western states. Indeed, the 2015 nuclear deal, which resulted in the lifting of sanction on Iran, has been heralded as Rouhani’s greatest victory. However, this deal needed the consent of Ayatollah Khamenei, who only gave it very reluctantly. The slow progress achieved since this deal may mean the Supreme Leader reneges on his consent, preferring a more traditionally isolationist approach. In contrast to Rouhani, Raisi is far more cautious of Iran-US negotiations. Raisi has indicated that further diplomacy between the two could be viewed as Iranian capitulation. This is more in line with the thinking of the religious establishment and Ayatollah Khamenei. It is believed that there is widespread disappointment with the 2015 nuclear deal and Rouhani. This is because ordinary Iranians, who make up Rouhani’s support base, have yet to feel any significant positive impacts from the deal. This will be used to advance the prospects of Raisi. In the lead up to the presidential election, there has been widespread controversy over the initial banning of live TV debates. This was reportedly done to reduce the risk of candidates stoking up their supporters. Due to the public outrage, this decision was reversed, and on 28 April the first live TV debate occurred. The outcome of the debate seemed to be a political stalemate, with Rouhani being heavily criticised over the lack of reforms following the 2015 Nuclear deal. There has been no clear winner of the debate. The final TV debate occurred on 12 May 2017; this resulted in increasingly angry exchanges between candidates, with Rouhani being targeted by most candidates. There have also been accusations that elements of Rouhani’s campaign have been Contact: +44 ( 0 ) 1202 795 801 SOLACEGLOBAL.COM 2 of 3 POLITICAL RISK TRAVEL ADVISORY • 16 MAY 2017 censored by the state media; On 6 May 2017, a campaign video for Rouhani was only aired after the broadcasters cut out elements deemed politically insensitive. One major element of the upcoming presidential election is how it will affect Iran’s relationship with the US. President Rouhani has already shown that he is willing to negotiate with the US. These attempts are likely to continue should he be re-elected. However, increasing US hostility from the Trump White House may force Rouhani to take a more hardline approach to such negotiations. In addition, conservative candidates such as Ebrahim Raisi may stop such negotiations altogether, preferring instead to continue Iran’s nuclear program. These political developments are as much dependent on US policy, as they are on the outcome of the upcoming election. A second major issue in the Iranian presidential election will be Iran’s role as a regional power in the Middle East. While Iranian foreign policy is primarily determined by the Supreme Leader and the Religious Council, the President does have some influence in Iranian international affairs. Iran is currently involved in three regional conflicts: Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. In Iraq and Syria, Iran is a major combatant, fielding the Revolutionary Guards and training Shiite militias. Indeed, the President of Iran will be responsible for continuing friendly relationships with the heads of state in Iraq and Syria. In Yemen, Iran funds the Shiite Houthi militias, in an overt display of competition with Saudi Arabia. This presidential election is likely to give some indication of how Iranian authorities seek to proceed with the Yemen campaign and engage with the region as a whole. There is a fear over serious civil unrest in the lead up to, and aftermath of, the election, similar to those seen in relation to the 2009 election of President Ahmadinejad. This resulted in severe repressions from Iranian security services. There has also already been a marked increase in security presence in Tehran. This was shown following the barring of former President Ahmadinejad from running in this election. Police in Tehran blocked the street outside Ahmadinejad’s house, in order to stop his supporters from gathering outside. This police and security presence will only increase in the lead up to the vote. SECURITY ADVICE MODERATE POLITICAL RISK Travellers are advised of the threat of potential unrest before and after the election on 19 May. While there are no specific threats of unrest, protests and localised political violence is very possible. Travellers should make all sensible efforts to avoid large public gatherings and maintain situational awareness. Routes should be planned to avoid large open areas near key government buildings as these are particularly likely to attract crowds and protests. While crowds and protests may initially seem peaceful, they have the potential to turn violent. Due to the potential for unrest, there is likely to be a heightened police and military presence in main cities in Iran. This may lead to some travel disruption. Travellers are also advised of the potential for terror attacks during this period also.
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