U.S. ONLINE TRAINING FOR OSCE, INCLUDING REACT

Module 4 Eastern Europe

This module is designed to introduce you to the work of OSCE field missions in eastern Europe. The module focuses on the work of the OSCE in: • Belarus (OSCE Office in Minsk closed in 2011) • Ukraine • Moldova

1 Table of Contents

Belarus...... 3 Key information...... 4 Historical background...... 6 Before Russian rule...... 7 Under Russian and Soviet rule...... 8 From Perestroika to independence...... 9 Domestic politics...... 10 Elections...... 11 The economy...... 16 Ethnic relations...... 17 Foreign relations...... 19 Russia...... 20 CIS...... 23 Eurasian Economic Community...... 24 The West...... 25 EU...... 26 OSCE...... 27

Ukraine...... 29 Key information...... 30 Regions and Culture of Ukraine ...... 32 Historical background...... 39 Before Russian rule...... 40 Under Russian and Soviet rule...... 41 From Perestroika to independence...... 43 Domestic politics...... 45 Elections ...... 46 Challenges to Ukraine’s democracy...... 62 Crimea...... 65 Foreign relations...... 72 Russia...... 73 The West, including NATO and EU...... 77 Ethnic relations...... 83 Conflict with Pro-Russian Separatists ...... 85 Conflict overview...... 86 International involvement in the conflict...... 91

Moldova...... 95 Key information...... 96 Historical background...... 98 Before Russian rule...... 99 Under Soviet rule...... 100 From Perestroika to independence...... 102 Domestic politics...... 103 Elections since independence...... 104 The Gagauz conflict...... 113 The “frozen” Transdniester conflict...... 115 Foreign relations...... 128 Russia...... 129

MODULE 4 Eastern Europe 2 The West...... 130 Romania...... 132 Ethnic relations...... 133 Is the Transdniester conflict an ethnic conflict?...... 134 Right Bank Moldova...... 135 Language policy...... 136 Culture...... 139 Countryside...... 141 The Economy...... 142 Folk traditions...... 143 Cuisine...... 144

MODULE 4 Eastern Europe 3 CHAPTER 1 Belarus Belarus is a sovereign state in Eastern Europe that was formerly part of the Soviet Union. This chapter contains the following sections that describe Belarus: • Key information • Historical background • Domestic politics • Foreign relations

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Key information Geography

Item Description Area 81,000 square miles Natural resources Potatoes, grains, flax, and sugar beet are grown. There are no significant natural resources apart from wood and peat, the main local source of fuel.

People

Item Description Population 9.626 million (2013 est.) Ethnic groups Belarusians 84%, Russians 8%, Poles 3%, Ukrainians 2%, others 3%. People in the southern area of Belarus with a mixed Belarusian-Ukrainian identity and dialect are called Poleshchuks. Religions Eastern Orthodox 80%, other (including Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim) 20% (1997 est.) Languages The Belarusian language belongs to the eastern branch of the Slavic group of the Indo-European family of languages. It is written in an adapted form of the Cyrillic script that is used for Russian. Although the official state language is Belarusian, the language in most common use is Russian.

Government

Item Description Capital Minsk Type Presidential republic System of In formal terms, Belarus has evolved from a parliamentary into a government presidential republic. In practice, the political system is a presidential dictatorship with a strructural democratic veneer. Head of state Alexander Lukashenko (1994-present)

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Item Description Currency Belarusian Ruble

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Historical background This section describes the historical background of Belarus: • Before Russian rule • Under Russian and Soviet rule • From Perestroika to independence

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Before Russian rule From 1386 to 1569, Belarus was part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a large multi-ethnic state that stretched from the Baltics to what is now western Ukraine. Its official language was Belarusian. Despite its name, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is regarded as a precursor of present-day Belarus. Belarus’ flag and emblem are based on those of the Grand Duchy.

Belarus absorbed into the Kingdom of Poland In 1569, the Grand Duchy was absorbed into the Kingdom of Poland. As a result, Belarus came under strong Polish influence. In the 17th century, Poland fought for control of Belarus against an expanding Russia. In 1795 Poland was divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria; and Belarus was incorporated into the Russian Empire.

Belarusian republic established Intellectuals in Belarus started to think of themselves as belonging to a Belarusian nation in the mid-nineteenth century. However, the Russian government suppressed expression of Belarusian identity, and the nationalist movement remained weak. In March 1918, an independent Belarusian People’s Republic was proclaimed, made possible by the chaos that followed the Russian Revolution. In 1920-21, Poland and now Soviet Russia again fought over Belarusian territory. The newborn Belarusian republic was crushed, and the treaty that ended the Polish-Soviet war divided Belarus in two. Western Belarus came under Polish rule, while eastern Belarus became the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (Belarusian SSR), within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

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Under Russian and Soviet rule In the 1920s, the Soviet government encouraged the development of Belarusian culture in the part of the country under its control, while the Polish government tried to suppress all expression of Belarusian identity in the part under its rule. This helps explain the strength of pro-Russian and pro-Soviet attitudes in Belarus.

War devastated Belarus In 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact led to Nazi Germany’s occupation of Poland (except for western Belarus) and the Soviet annexation of western Belarus, which was incorporated into the Belarusian SSR. In 1941, the Nazis overran Belarus as they invaded the Soviet Union. The war devastated Belarus, leaving its cities in ruins and its population reduced by one quarter.

Steady Russification After the war, the cities of Belarus were rebuilt and its economy restored. By the 1970s, a new industrial base was taking shape, including textiles, motor vehicles, chemicals, and electrical equipment. Belarus’ industry was completely integrated into the Soviet economy and dependent on Russia and other Union Republics for fuel and other supplies. Belarus underwent steady Russification, so that by 1980 over a quarter of Belarusians no longer used Belarusian as their primary language.

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From Perestroika to independence In 1986, Gorbachev’s moves to liberalize the Soviet system opened the floodgates of public protest in Belarus. Demonstrators demanded higher status for the Belarusian language and protested against the policies that caused the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in April 1986. Chernobyl is on the Ukrainian side of the Belarus-Ukraine border, but radioactivity affected Belarus the most because of the direction of the wind following the accident.

Belarusian Popular Front In 1988 the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) was established, and became the main organization behind the protest movement. In the March 1990 elections, many BPF candidates won seats in the Supreme Soviet of the Belarusian SSR and entered into a power-sharing arrangement with representatives of the old establishment. In July 1990, the Supreme Soviet adopted a Declaration of State Sovereignty that proclaimed the Belarusian SSR a neutral state and a nuclear-free zone. Belarusian was declared the state language.

Belarusian independence After the collapse in August 1991 of the hard-line coup in Moscow, Belarus declared full independence. The Belarusian SSR was renamed the Republic of Belarus. The scientist Stanislav Shushkevich, who was close to the BPF, was appointed chairman of the Supreme Soviet, which made him head of state (there being no presidency in Belarus at that time). In December 1991, Shushkevich met with President Yeltsin of Russia and President Kravchuk of Ukraine at a hunting lodge near Minsk to formalize the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

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Domestic politics This section describes domestic issues in Belarus including: • Elections • Economic situation • Ethnic relations

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Elections In the early years of independence, Belarus was a parliamentary republic. A multiparty system quickly took shape, with the following key participants:

Party Description National Democrats Includes the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) and the Social-Democratic Union Communists Sought the restoration of the Soviet Union Agrarian Left-wing party that supported Belarusian independence United Civic Party Supported democracy and economic reform, but opposed Belarusian nationalism and favored close integration with Russia

In March 1994, the parliament adopted a new constitution, creating a presidency that would be the head of government rather than the prime minister. But Belarus’ first presidential elections, held in the summer of 1994, led to the surprise defeat of incumbent Prime Minister Vyachaslaw Kyebich. The winner, with 82% of the vote, was former collective farm chairman Alexander Lukashenko, who ran as an independent and had only recently started to gain popularity as an anti-corruption campaigner.

Lukashenko Lukashenko moved quickly to consolidate his position. He filled the government with loyalists, brought the media under his control, and reintroduced press censorship. Lukashenko proposed that the parliamentary elections scheduled for May 1995 be accompanied by a referendum. The referendum was to grant Russian equal status with Belarusian as a state language, return the Soviet-era flag minus soviet symbols, approve economic integration with Russia, and give the president the right to dissolve parliament in a crisis. Parliamentary opposition to the referendum (especially the president’s right to dissolve parliament) was quickly broken by Lukashenko. Hunger-striking deputies were forcibly evicted from parliament during the search for an alleged bomb, and they were prevented from telling their story to the public because state television and radio were blocked off due to the search for another alleged bomb. Parliament soon approved Lukashenko’s referendum questions. The electorate endorsed the referendum propositions, but the elections were undermined by severe restrictions on campaigning and a media blackout. Still, despite two rounds of voting, not enough candidates were elected for a quorum in parliament. International monitors judged the elections “neither free nor fair,” leading to the suspension of Belarus’ application to join the Council of Europe. New elections were again held late in 1995, with evidence that the results were falsified. In January 1996, the new parliament convened and elected Agrarian Party leader Semyon Sharetsky as its chairman. In 1996 jailing of opposition activists began, and some BPF leaders sought political asylum in the United States.

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The extension of presidential powers culminated in November 1996, when yet another constitution was approved by referendum. Presidential powers were now virtually unlimited.

OSCE, Council of Europe, and European Parliament concerned While electoral institutions have not been formally eliminated, political conditions in Belarus today are close to those of a dictatorship. The OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament have expressed concern at the poor human rights situation in Belarus. These have included revelations of a government-sponsored death squad that had assassinated about thirty opposition figures from 1997 to 2001. The most notable disappearances were Yuri Zakharenko, the former Minister of the Interior (disappeared on 7 May 1999), Victor Gonchar, former Vice-President of the Parliament of Belarus (disappeared on 16 September 1999), Anatoly Krasovski, businessman (disappeared with Mr Gonchar) and Dmitri Zavadski, cameraman for the Russian TV channel ORT (disappeared on 7 July 2000).

2001 Presidential election Presidential elections were held in September 2001. The main opposition candidate was head of the Trade Union Federation Vladimir Goncharik. According to the official results, Lukashenko was re-elected with 76% of the vote. According to an independent count, Lukashenko had obtained only 46%. OSCE monitors found that the election failed to meet international standards.

2004 Parliamentary elections and referendum Parliamentary elections held in October 2004 were said by the OSCE to have fallen significantly short of OSCE commitments. The OSCE said the rights of association and expression were seriously challenged by the authorities, while the right to seek political office without discrimination, for candidates to present views, and voters to learn about and discuss them, were largely ignored. A referendum held at the same time proposing the removal of the two-term limit on holding the presidency was reportedly approved by 77% of the voters, allowing Lukashenko to continue to run and hold office. The referendum was scheduled to coincide with the parliamentary elections at the last minute, so the OSCE, although it was invited to observe it, was only able to take note of its impact on the elections. Nonetheless, the OSCE noted the government’s unrestrained bias in favor of the referendum campaign, and its unregulated intrusion into the polling stations, which contributed to a highly distorted campaign environment. After the 2004 election, on October 19, riot police carried out violent attacks on Belarusian opposition leaders after a political demonstration in Minsk. An independent journalist was stabbed to death in her apartment days later. In December 2004, authorities sentenced opposition figure Mikhail Marynich, a former government minister and diplomat, to jail for 3 1/2 years on spurious charges (the sentence was later reduced by one year). At least five other opposition politicians were jailed or arrested. Local student activists, together with Russian, Ukrainian, and Georgian activists, were also detained.

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An election official places ballot papers on the table as other officials prepare to count the votes at a polling station in Tolochin during parliamentary elections in Belarus, 17 October 2004.

Opposition unites Nearly 800 delegates from opposition parties and NGOs held a “Congress of Democratic Forces” to agree on a single candidate to oppose Lukashenko in the 2006 presidential elections. Civil society representative and former regional civil servant Alexander Milinkevich was selected over opposition party leader Anatoly Lebedko by 399 to 391 ballots.

2006 presidential election Lukashenko won 82.6% of the votes and reelection in the March 2006 presidential election, according to Belarus election officials. The OSCE reported that the election did not meet required international standards for free and fair elections, noting that arbitrary use of state power and widespread detentions showed a disregard for basic rights and raised doubts regarding the authorities’ willingness to tolerate political competition. In contrast, a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) observer mission stated that despite some technical violations, the election had taken place within the requirements of Belarusian law.

Government repression In July 2006 opposition leader Alyaksandr Kazulin was sentenced to five and a half years in prison for “hooliganism” and “incitement to mass disorder.” Other activists were sentenced to shorter terms. Andrei Kim, another opposition activist considered a political prisoner in the West, was sentenced to 18 months in jail in April 2008 for allegedly attacking a policeman at a protest by small businessmen. Milinkevich worked with other opposition parties to highlight the goal of holding free and democratic elections in Belarus. His own party also focused on countering government

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statements of economic success under Lukashenko.

Demonstrations against Lukashenko An estimated 10,000 protestors participated in one of the largest demonstrations against Lukashenko in the Belarus capital of Minsk on March 25, 2007. Milinkevich addressed the crowd. A demonstration by 3,000 commemorating the 90th anniversary of the formation of the Belarusian National Republic in Minsk in March 2008 was violently broken up by police. Belarusian KGB raids on the homes of regime opponents and journalists followed. The For Freedom Movement led by Milinkevich organized a “Chernobyl Way” March in Minsk on August 28, mirroring earlier mass protest marches.

2008 parliamentary elections The September 2008 election for the House of Representatives was a landslide for the parties and non-partisan candidates loyal to Lukashenko. The opposition parties failed to gain any of the 110 available seats. The OSCE/International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) reported that the election fell short of OSCE commitments for democratic elections. Its report stated that promises made by the authorities to ensure the transparency of the vote count were not properly implemented. The election environment was also strictly controlled, with a barely visible campaign. Further substantial efforts would be required were Belarus to conduct genuine democratic elections, according to the IEOM. In contrast, the CIS Election Monitoring organization again asserted that the elections conformed to international standards.

2010 presidential election According to the Central Electoral Commission, there was a 90% voter turnout, with 79.67% of voters re-electing Lukashenko. The OSCE called the election "flawed," saying it fell well short of democratic standards. Opposition candidate Andrei Sannikau, who had the second highest percentage of the popular votes was charged with inciting a riot and setenced to five years imprisonment, but was eventually pardoned by Lukashenko, following international criticism, and released in April 2012. Sannikau's wife, noted journalist Iryna Khalip, was put under house arrest. Authorities threatened to remove their 3-year old son, who was staying with his grandparents, and place him in a state orphanage. Opposition lawyers acted to prevent the government action. Khalip later stood trial, charged with inciting mass unrest, and sentenced to two years imprisonment.A large opposition demonstration was held following announcement of the election results to protest the outcome. The demonstration was not sanctioned and resulted in the mass arrest of over 1000 people, the majority of whom were sentenced to fifteen days detention. Opposition candidates were also arrested along with human rights activists and journalists. Opposition candidate, Uladzimir Nyaklyayew was seriously beaten on election day by unidentified men when he was on his way to the opposition protest rally in Minsk. He sustained a head injury during this beating and was later taken from intensive care by the Belarusian authorities. On

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January 28, 2011, Nyaklyayew was transferred from prison to house arrest. Later that same year in May, a district judge in Minsk sentenced Nyaklyayew to a suspended two-year prison term with two years` probation, finding him guilty of instigating disturbances in connection with the post-election protest.

2012 parliamentary elections The opposition United Civic and BPS parties boycotted the election, and Lukashenko supporters took all110 seats in the House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Assembly of Belarus. Almost all the winners won an absolute majority with the necessary turnout, with only one constituency failing to elect a candidate in the first round. The Central Election Commission declared nationwide voter turnout at least 65.9%, validating the results. Independent monitors suggested a turnout of 30%. The two main opposition parties called for voters to go fishing or pick mushrooms, and avoid voting so as not to give the election and new parliament legitimacy. Opposition activists accused the government of forcing higher education students to vote under threat of losing subsidies. In the week prior to the election, state security police broke up gatherings and arrested activists who had urged voters to cook borshch, a traditional soup instead of going to vote. Journalists were also arrested, but later released. Alexander Milinkevich, who ran in the 2006 presidential election tried to register as a candidate for the elections but was disqualified for technical reasons. Other known opposition leaders who ran in the 2010 Presidential Election did not participate in the election.

Next presidential election The next presidential election is scheduled for November 2015.

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The economy Belarus was more fortunate than many of the former Soviet Republics because it had a well-developed industrial sector before the collapse. The country still produces machinery, television sets, refrigerators, furniture, and beauty products for export. State ownership has deterred the large-scale asset stripping and other corrupt practices that accompanied privatization in some other CIS countries. Some state enterprises were privatized from 1991-94, but 80% of all industry remains state-controlled. The few banks privatized after independence were renationalized. The agricultural sector, due to lack of investment, is in steady decline. Belarus has also been able to shield its inefficient economy thanks to Russia, which subsidized Belarus directly with cheap energy and indirectly by accepting barter in mutual trade. These subsidies contributed to the relative stability of the Belarusian economy for years. In 2006, Russia began to reduce its subsidies on oil and gas to Belarus when Lukashenko refused the Russian Federation priority on privatization deals. The tensions between the two countries escalated in December 2010 when Russia stopped the export of subsidized oil to Belarus. In November 2011, Belarus and Russia reached an agreement in which the price of natural gas would be reduced in exchange for the sale of the remaining shares of Beltransgaz, the Belarusian natural gas pipeline operator. The reduction in subsidized energy and the financial crisis led to the three-fold devaluation of the Belarusian ruble in 2011. The situation stabilized due to a $3 billion loan from the Russian state-owned bank Sberbank, and the $2.5 billion sale of Beltransgaz to the Russian state-owned gas company, Gazprom. At the beginning of 2012, Belarus became part of the Single Economic Space with Kazakhstan and Russia, which means that goods, services, capital and labor forces can move freely between the three countries. With Russia now a member of the World Trade Organization, there is increased pressure on Belarus to adopt structural reforms that will make its industry more productive and competitive. In order to prevent Belarus businesses from moving abroad, the Belarusian government issued a decree liberalizing the business climate for entrepreneurs in rural areas and medium-size towns. Decree No. 6 exempts companies from income and property taxes, and a tax on individual entrepreneurs that produce their own goods and services. It also releases these entrepreneurs from mandatory contributions to state innovation funds and no longer requires them to sell 30% of their foreign currency revenues to the state. Despite the recent decree, no strategy is in place to restructure and privatize state-owned enterprises. In 2011 Belarus had 100% inflation and the government is hoping that the inflationary level will not exceed 25-30% in 2012. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that Belarus will attract significant foreign direct investment, and Belarus businesses may have no other choice but to move overseas.

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Ethnic relations Inter-ethnic relations are not a serious problem in Belarus. Most Belarusians do not see the main ethnic minority, the Russians, as culturally alien or a threat to national identity. There is, however, governmental and societal discrimination against Belarus’ Polish and Roma minorities. Authorities have harassed the Warsaw-sponsored Union of Poles in Belarus, including detention of its leaders. There is also a Belarus government-approved organization by the same name. The two organizations are the product of a split in 2005.

Language The relative status of the Belarusian and Russian languages is a sensitive issue. However, it is primarily a matter of dispute not between Belarusians and Russians, but rather between more and less Russified sections of the Belarusian population: • Russified Belarusians, represented by the communists and the centrists, emphasize the fraternal links between Russians and Belarusians. They want Russian to be a state language. • Non-Russified Belarusians, represented by the national democrats, stress the distinctiveness of Belarusian identity. They want Belarusian to remain the sole state language.

Religious tensions There is potential for tension between Orthodox and Catholic Belarusians. Lukashenko has accused Catholic priests in areas near the Belarus-Poland border of promoting loyalty to Poland instead of Belarus. There is also potential for tension between the state-backed Russian Orthodox Church and the developing Protestant communities. Belarus adopted a law in July 2002 banning organized prayer by religious communities of less than 20 people. It also prohibited religions that have been in Belarus for less than 20 years from publishing materials or setting up missions. A 2003 government concordat with the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC), a branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, granted the BOC privileged status.

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Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, center, and head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Alexy II, left, attend a service in an old church in the Belarusian village of Lenino. 27 June 2001 (©AP/Wide World Photo/Pool, Vasily Fedosenko)

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Foreign relations This section describes Belarus' relations with: • Russia • CIS • Eurasian Economic Community • The West • EU • OSCE

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Russia Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, geography, economics and the preferences of its leadership contributed to the continuation of Belarus’ close relationship with Russia.

Security Under Lukashenko, Belarus entered into a close security alliance with Russia. It is integrated into Russia’s military system. Russia has troops on the Belarus-Poland border and long-term leases on air defense and other strategic facilities in Belarus, including the early warning radar at Baranovichi in the southwest.

The Pechora-type large phased array radar (LPAR) at Baranovichi in Belarus (Wikipedia)

Economics and politics Belarus under Lukashenko sought economic and political integration with Russia. Its industry is deeply dependent on Russia for fuel and other supplies, and also—being non-competitive in Western markets—for export outlets. A role is also played by nostalgia for the Soviet Union and the idea of Slavic brotherhood: Lukashenko has advocated a Slavic Union of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Russia’s interest in further integration with Belarus is doubtful.

Russia-Belarus Union Treaty During 1996-2000, Moscow and Minsk signed treaties providing for greater political, economic and social integration. Joint governmental, parliamentary, and judicial institutions were to be set up, and there was to be further policy coordination in customs, taxation, defense, and other fields. When Putin became Russian president in May 2000, the movement toward union clearly stalled. Putin expressed irritation at Lukashenko’s demands and opposed confederal arrangements that gave Belarus veto powers. He proposed instead direct incorporation of Belarus’ six provinces into the Russian Federation—an idea that Lukashenko found unacceptable.

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The most recent session of the Supreme Council of the Russia-Belarus State Union, attended by Lukashenko and Putin, took place March 2013. The highlights were an agreement to speed up formation of joint Russian-Belarus stock companies in return for a Russian loan of $2 billion to modernize Belarus industry.

Conflicts of interest Conflicts of interest between the two governments are increasingly significant. The economic systems of Russia and Belarus are no longer compatible. Russia chafes at the economic burden of supporting Belarus, as shown in disputes over the supply of subsidized Russian gas to Belarus. Belarus has deferred plans to privatize certain enterprises in order to halt further Russian penetration of its economy (Russian corporations such as the gas and oil giants Gazprom and Lukoil had been acquiring Belarusian enterprises).

Currency There was a plan for Belarus to adopt the Russian ruble as its currency at the beginning of 2005, but Lukashenko postponed transitional measures and called the plan premature. He expressed concern that currency unification would undermine Belarus’ sovereignty. The Belarusian side demanded that Russia and Belarus jointly control circulation of the ruble and that Russia pay Belarus $2.1 billion as compensation for the costs of adopting the ruble. Neither demand was acceptable to Russia.

Energy Disputes with Russia over natural gas Disputes over the cost of Russian-supplied (and subsidized) gas to Belarus has resulted in high-stakes face-offs between the two states over the last decade. Belarus faced a Russian cutoff in 2007, but agreed at the last moment to a five-year contract with Gazprom providing for a doubling of its subsidized price of gas, coupled with the Russian gas monopoly’s purchase of 50% of the Beltrangaz Belarusian state-controlled gas pipeline network. Another part of their energy dispute is the cost of Russian oil through Ukrainian pipelines to western Europe. Belarus’ 2007 imposition of a tariff on crude oil from Russia resulted in a short-lived Russian cut-off of oil. Belarus quickly backed down and repealed the tariff. Another episode in the “gas war” took place in 2010. An acrimonious standoff was resolved after Belarus took a loan from Azerbaijan and paid off a $192 million debt for gas imported from Russia, and Moscow paid off $228 million for gas transit fees. Nuclear power plant under construction Belarus has considered for decades replacing imported natural gas by constructing a nuclear power plant. Russia would be the source of both funding and provision of the power plant. Construction of the $10 billion project in Grodno Oblast, 32 miles from Vilnius, Lithuania, started in 2013. The station is due to be commissioned in 2018. At the same time, Russia agreed in 2013 to continue to ship crude oil to Belarus duty free, with Belarus exporting refined oil products back to Russia.

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Politics and economics Other issues have added to their mutual irritation: Russia’s banning of Belarus dairy products in 2009, Belarus’ refusal to follow Russia’s lead in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and a Russian media campaign against Lukashenko in mid-2010,

Economic crisis The Belarus National Bank devalued the Belarus currency in 2011 in response to mounting economic problems, triggered by government directed salary hikes unsupported by productivity, plus the increased costs of Russian energy and an over-valued Belarus ruble. Belarus had to turn to the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union’s Emergency Fund for a $3 billion loan, to the Russian state-owned bank Sberbank for a $1 billion loan, and sold its remaining shares in Beltranzgas to Russian state-owned Gazprom for $2.5 billion.

Defense against further Russian economic penetration? "Golden share" rule re-adopted in 2013 Belarus' parliament revived the "golden share" rule enabling state representatives in any firm that used to be state-run or partially ruled by the state to block decisions made by management. This rule, which had been in force from 1997-2008, is reportedly intended to provide the authority to selectively block, if necessary, Russian economic penetration of the Belarus economy.

Trade with Russia declines Trade between Belarus and Russia declined by 30% in the first quarter of 2013 (compared to 2012), possibly due to Moscow's accession to the World Trade Organization and the entrance of new competitors to Belarus in the Russia market.

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CIS Belarus is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), founded by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in 1991 as a successor entity to the dissolved Soviet Union open to all the republics of the former USSR. Member states were recognized as sovereign and independent. Ukraine ultimately did not sign the CIS Charter, the Baltic states rejected joining, and Georgia withdrew after the 2008 war with Russia. The CIS has functioned mainly as a consultative forum and an optional framework for cooperation in various fields.

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Eurasian Economic Community Belarus is a member of the Eurasian Economic Community that was created in 2000. The other members are Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2005 and suspended its membership in 2008. Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed in 2007 to create a customs union, which was established in 2010. The union will likely be most advantageous to Russia in economic terms. Kazakhstan may hope that the union will facilitate its penetration of Europe’s energy markets through Russia and Belarus, although it could just as easily find itself becoming a raw materials supplier to Russia within the union. Belarus may have acceded to the union to ease its political differences with Russia, but this will probably not suffice to paper over the many issues that have damaged their relationship. In May 2014, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed a treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Union, to come into force January 1.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev (centre) and President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko. May 29, 2014 (Russian Presidential Press and Information Office)

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The West Human rights violations played a major role in the deterioration of Belarus’ relations with the West. In 2006, the U.S. issued a report entitled “The Last Dictatorship in Europe,” also accusing Lukashenko’s government of sales of arms and weapons-related technologies to countries of concern, including state sponsors of terrorism. After the 2006 post-election crackdown on demonstrators and the opposition, the EU and the U.S. applied targeted travel restrictions and financial sanctions against Lukashenko and other regime leaders. The travel ban was widened in 2007 to include directors and deputy directors of state-owned enterprises. Later in 2007 the U.S. imposed sanctions on the state oil company, Belneftekhim, which Washington charged was personally controlled by Lukashenko. The Treasury Department froze the company’s U.S. assets and barred Americans from doing business with it. The U.S. subsequently allowed a broad interpretation of a list of firms linked to Belneftekhim. The U.S. and the EU continued to call for the release of political prisoners, including Alaksandar Kazulin. In 2008 Belarus withdrew its ambassador from Washington, and the U.S. ambassador in Minsk was asked to leave the country. In addition, the U.S. embassy was asked to reduce its staff by the Belarus government, and later asked to cut its staff further down to five diplomats. In 2008 the U.S. suspended its ban on U.S. companies dealing with two Belarusan firms, Lakokraska and Polotsk-Steklovolokno, although continuing the ban on the state oil and chemical company Belneftekhim. The move followed the release of several opposition activists by the government, including Alaksandar Kazulin. A short-term positive development in the relationship was Belarus’ agreement to give up its stock of weapons-grade uranium, announced in a joint statement by Secretary of State Clinton and Belarus Foreign Minister Martynov issued after a meeting on the margins of the OSCE Summit in Astana in 2010. Two shipments of uranium had already left Belarus during October and November, according to the statement, with the remainder to be eliminated by 2012. The statement was also noteworthy because it included Belarus’ acceptance of language that enhanced respect for democracy and human rights in Belarus was central to improvement of the bilateral relationship.

Alienation from the West The Lukashenko regime’s repression of former presidential candidates and protesters led to a sharp backlash from the West in 2011. The harsh sentences led to EU and U.S. travel bans on Belarus leaders. President Obama termed the situation in Belarus “unacceptable,” while Polish Prime Minister Tusk stated that the Lukashenko regime “had no future in Europe.”

Cooperation with U.S. and NATO on Afghanistan Despite sanctions, Belarus has continued to participate in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), through which non-lethal supplies are shipped overland to American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The volume of goods that transited the Belarus route of NDN reportedly doubled during 2012. Belarus will be playing a similar role in the reverse transit when the U.S. and NATO forces exit from Afghanistan in 2014.

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EU The 2009 visit of Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, pointed to a short-term end to Belarus’ isolation and a warming of relations with the EU. Solana met with government officials and opposition figures. The leader of the opposition “For Freedom” movement, Alyaksandr Milinkevich, publicly termed the visit a great chance for the country and called for the continuation of the dialogue. Previously, senior representatives of the Council of Europe had visited Minsk. By 2009 an EU-Belarus political dialogue had been established, a human rights dialogue had been launched, technical cooperation had increased, and Belarus was actively participating in the EU’s Eastern Partnership Program . EU Sanctions after 2010 Elections By early 2011, however, the EU (together with the U.S.) had added new sanctions on Belarus in response to the violent crackdown on protests following the December 2010 presidential election. The EU Foreign Affairs Council banned Lukashenko and 150 other officials from traveling to the EU, and extended a list of those hit by an EU assets freeze. 2011 Eastern Partnership Summit Flap The EU opted not to invite Lukashenko to attend the 2011 Eastern Partnership Summit as part of its sanctions on Belarus. In response, Belarus' foreign minister refused to attend and the Belarus delegation eventually departed claiming "discrimination" (because it was not allowed to attend events meant for heads of state/government). Perhaps more likely, Belarus authorities were miffed that senior EU leaders were demonstratively meeting with opposition figures and criticizing government behavior. Belarus reportedly did not respond positively to a nine billion Euro EU proposal of assistance in return for democratization. Withdrawal of EU Ambassadors EU ambassadors were temporarily withdrawn from Belarus in 2012, after Minsk expelled all Swedish diplomats in Minsk in response to a Swedish advertising agency's air-drop of teddy bears.

Belarus at 2013 EU Eastern Partnership Summit Belarus was invited to the 2013 EU Eastern Partnership Summit at Vilnius, and was represented by Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makei. He was interpreted as taking a somewhat conciliatory position, calling for a common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Belarus also resumed visa simplification talks with the EU.

West's policy dilemma The West's approach to Belarus has fluctuated between whether to seek democratization as its policy priority and apply carrots and sticks to this objective, or to accept that the Lukashenko regime is not going to go away soon and so engage the Belarus elite and seek opportunities for limited, but realistic cooperation.

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OSCE An OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group was established in Belarus in 1997, primarily to assist in promoting democratic institutions. Increasingly, the relationship between the OSCE and the Lukashenko regime deteriorated. By the end of 2002, after the regime refused to grant or extend visas to OSCE staff to show its irritation with the mission’s operations, the mission no longer had any international staff. Subsequently, the OSCE and Belarus negotiated an agreement to establish a new OSCE Office in Minsk with a new mandate as of January 1, 2003. The OSCE Office in Minsk’s revised and final mandate was to assist the Belarusian government in promoting institution building, consolidating the rule of law and in developing relations with civil society; and assisting with its economic and environmental activities.

Head of the OSCE Office in Minsk, Amb. Benedikt Haller (2nd r), Economic and Environmental Programme Manager Francois-Vadim de Hartingh (r) and Core-Agri Programme Co-ordinator S. Tarasiuk (l) visit a farm in Belarus' Chernobyl-affected area, 3 June 2010. (OSCE)

Mission closed Belarus refused to join consensus on extension of the mandate of the OSCE Office in Minsk, and the mandate expired at the end of 2010. The mission was formally closed in March 2011.

OSCE Moscow Mechanism on Human Rights Invoked In 2011, 14 OSCE participating states invoked the Moscow Mechanism on the human rights situation in Belarus. This mechanism allowed an investigation to be launched without consensus and independently of the OSCE Chairmanship, institutions and decision making bodies if one state, supported by at least nine others, believed that "a serious threat to the fulfillment of the provisions of the human dimension had arisen in another participating state." The Mechanism also required that the Rapporteur's report be sent to the Permanent Council. The report can be found

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at http://www.osce.org/node/78705.

MODULE 4 Eastern Europe 28 CHAPTER 2 Ukraine Ukraine is a sovereign state in Eastern Europe that was formerly part of the Soviet Union. This chapter contains the following sections: • Key information • Historical background • Domestic politics • Foreign relations • Conflict with pro-Russian separatists

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Key information This section describes key information on Ukraine, including: • Geography • People • Government • Heads of state

Geography

Item Description Area 235,000 square miles Natural resources Ukraine, especially eastern Ukraine, is rich in coal, iron ore and other metals, salts and other minerals. There are unexploited reserves of oil and natural gas.Ukraine's soil is highly fertile; 30% of the world's "black soil" is located there. Two-thirds of Ukraine's territory is agricultural.

People

Item Description Population 44.573 Million (2013 est.) Ethnic groups Ukrainian 77%, Russian 17.3%, Other 5%. Many people, especially in eastern Ukraine, are of mixed Russian and Ukrainian origin. The balance between Ukrainians and Russians varies widely from one part of Ukraine to another. Religions Ukrainian Orthodox - Kyiv Patriarchate 50.4%, Ukrainian Orthodox - Moscow Patriarchate 26.1%, Ukrainian Greek Catholic 8%, Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox 7.2%, Roman Catholic 2.2%, Protestant 2.2%, Jewish 0.6% Other 3.2% (2006 est.) Languages Ukrainian belongs to the East Slavic group of the Indo-European family of languages and is written in a variant of the Cyrillic script. The state language of Ukraine is Ukrainian, but many people speak Russian or are bilingual in Russian and Ukrainian. Many people speak a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian known as Surzhyk.

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Government

Item Description Capital Kyiv System of Ukraine is a republic of mixed presidential-parliamentary type, including government a multi-party system. Head of state Petro Poroshenko Currency the Hryvna

Heads of state

Date Name 12/1991 - 7/1994 Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk 7/1994 - 1/2005 Leonid Danylovych Kuchma 1/2005 - 2/2010 Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko 2/2010 - 2/2014 Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych 2/2014 - 6/2014 Oleksandr Turchinov (acting)

6/2014 - present Petro Poroshenko

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Regions and Culture of Ukraine Ukraine is usually thought of as consisting of five regions: • Eastern Ukraine • Southern Ukraine • Crimea • Central Ukraine • Western Ukraine

Eastern Ukraine Eastern Ukraine is the center of the country’s heavy industry (metallurgy, petrochemicals, and engineering). In the southeast there is an old coal-mining area called the Donbass. The main city of the Donbass is Donetsk. To the northeast lies Kharkiv, which was Ukraine’s capital in the early Soviet period. Eastern Ukraine is ethnically mixed (60% Ukrainian, 40% Russian) but mainly Russian- speaking. It has close links with neighboring areas of southern Russia.

Southern Ukraine Southern Ukraine, along the Black Sea coast, is less heavily industrialized. There are a number of ports with shipbuilding, the most famous being the cosmopolitan city of Odessa. The ethnic composition of Southern Ukraine is similar to that of Eastern Ukraine. It is also mainly Russian-speaking.

Crimea Attached by a narrow isthmus to Southern Ukraine is the beautiful peninsula of Crimea, which has the status of an autonomous republic within Ukraine (capital Simferopol). Here are famous seaside resorts such as Yalta. The Russian Federation's Black Sea Fleet is also located here, with its main base at Sevastopol. About two-thirds of the population of Crimea is Russian. Besides Russians and Ukrainians, there are the Crimean Tatars, who are indigenous to Crimea.

Central Ukraine Central Ukraine comprises the country’s rural heartland and the area around the capital. The population is mainly Ukrainian. Both the Ukrainian and the Russian languages are widely spoken.

Western Ukraine Western Ukraine is mainly rural, and overwhelmingly Ukrainian and Ukrainian-speaking. There is a Polish as well as a Russian minority. Western Ukraine, and especially the province of Galicia, with its main city of Lviv, is the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism. Western Ukraine includes the province of Transcarpathia. This province is not as “Ukrainian” as

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the rest of Western Ukraine. Many people there feel that they belong to a separate Slavic group called Rusyns or Ruthenes, although officially they are regarded simply as Ukrainians. There is also a sizable Hungarian minority in the province.

The Dnieper Ukraine’s greatest river, the Dnieper, starts in the marshlands of eastern Belarus, flows south through Kyiv, then southeast to Dnipropetrovsk, and finally southwest into the Black Sea. Ukraine east of the Dnieper is called “Left Bank Ukraine.” Ukraine west of the Dnieper is called “Right Bank Ukraine” (that is, left or right as you face south, toward the Black Sea).

Culture in Kyiv Kyiv, the capital city of 2.6 million, stands astride Ukraine’s greatest river, the broad and majestic Dnieper. The modern center and the surviving parts of the old city are on the hilly west bank of the river. The main street, called the Khreshchatik, runs between two steep hills. Here are the big hotels, department stores, and government buildings. Opposite the metro station is an open square, the Maydan, with fountains where people gather to rest and talk. On the street corners one can buy hot snacks, books, and other things at outdoor stalls. The Maydan was the principal site of the demonstrations supporting the Orange Revolution during the 2004 presidential elections.

A view of Maidan Nezalezhnosty (Independence Square) in the center of Kyiv. The huge plaza has been the site of many political protests, the most famous being the Orange Revolution of 2004. During holidays the square is the scene of parades and open air concerts. (CIA Factbook)

Pecherskaya Lavra A short trolley ride will take you up to the ancient Monastery of the Caves (Percherskaya Lavra).

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Back to Thumbnails Previous Image Next Image Caption The Uspensky Sobor (Dormition Cathedral) at the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra (Kyiv Monastery of the Caves) complex. Originally constructed between 1073 and 1078, it was further enlarged over the subsequent centuries. Destroyed by the Soviet Army in 1941, the cathedral was rebuilt between 1998 and 2000. (CIA Factbook)

Babi Yar A slightly longer bus trip goes to Old Woman’s Ravine (Babi Yar) and the memorial to the 33,000 Jewish victims of the Nazis murdered there.

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Babi Yar Memorial (by permission of Roland Geider)

Old Kyiv A little to the west of the Khreshchatik is Old Kiev. Great damage was done to its architecture and art treasures under Stalin and during World War II, but much of the old city has now been restored. The recently reconstructed Golden Gate marks where the city’s fortified wall once stood, while the Cathedral of St. Sophia has mosaics and frescoes dating back to the 11th century.

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Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv was completed in 1037 during the reign of Yaroslav the Wise. The ruler was buried in the church in 1054 in a six-ton marble sarcophagus that still survives. Although the cathedral's exterior was remodeled into the Ukrainian Baroque style in the 17th century, its original Byzantine interior was preserved. It was the first Ukrainian monument to be inscribed onto the World Heritage List. (CIA Factbook)

Dnieper River Above them looms the giant statue of a sword-bearing woman who represents the Soviet Motherland defying the invader. Across the bridge is the flat east bank of the Dnieper, with the newer sections of the capital, dominated by big clusters of apartment blocks and industrial zones. Approaching the river, the slopes are covered by woods and parkland.

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The Soviet-era Motherland Monument, sometimes referred to as the "Iron Lady," was supposed to symbolize the Soviet "Motherland." The 62-meter-high statue stands at the National Museum of the History of World War II in Kyiv, and still displays the Soviet coat of arms on its shield. (CIA Factbook)

Other Cities Ukraine has several other big cities besides Kyiv. In the east of the country are the old and decaying centers of heavy industry and coal and iron ore mining as well as the republic’s former capital Kharkiv. In the south, on the Black Sea coast, lies the famous cosmopolitan port city of Odessa, while the historic center of western Ukraine is the city of Lviv.

Geography Over a third of the country’s people live in the countryside, mostly in large villages of 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants. Rich black soil and a mild climate with adequate rainfall provide excellent conditions for agriculture, compensating to some extent for the effects of communism and economic stagnation. The south is open and flat, watered by many streams that empty into the badly polluted Black

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Sea. Further north the terrain becomes hilly and wooded, except for marshlands in the northwest. In the far west of Ukraine the land rises to the wooded heights of the Carpathian Mountains.

Crimea The beautiful Crimean peninsula, in the south, juts out into the Black Sea. Crimea is known for its health spas and ancient ruins, for its wines and garlic — and for the world’s longest trolley bus route (from the capital of Simferopol to the resort of Yalta). Rocky mountains provide the backdrop for the palm-lined beaches that used to serve as the Soviet Union’s playground.

Cuisine Ukrainian cooking is famous for its dumplings. Varenyky are dough pockets filled with potato, cheese, blueberries, cherries or prunes, often served with onions and sour cream, while vushka are boiled dumplings filled with chopped mushroom and onion. There are various kinds of sausage, like the smoked ham kovbasa and kyshka, which is made from buckwheat and blood. Other popular dishes are borshch (beet soup), nalysnyky (crepes), and holubtsi — baked cabbage-leaf rolls made in the shape of doves, stuffed with rice and covered with tomato sauce. Two specialties traditionally served on Christmas Eve are “God’s food” or kutia, a cold dish of boiled wheat mixed with poppy seeds and honey, and “God’s drink” or uzvar, a mixture of 12 different stewed fruits. Linked to the celebration of Christmas and Easter are many old customs going back to pagan times.

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Historical background This section describes the historical background of Ukraine: • Before Russian rule • Under Russian and Soviet rule • From Perestroika to independence

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Before Russian rule The Ukrainians, like the Russians and Belarusians, are descendant of the East Slavic tribes. The first great state associated with these East Slavic tribes was the Kyiv-based principality of Rus, which lasted from the late 9th century to 1240, when the Mongols captured Kyiv. Both Russian and Ukrainian nationalists now claim Kyivan Rus as the oldest part of their national heritage, although there were no such people as “Russians” or “Ukrainians” at that time.

The word “Ukraine” The word “Ukraine” came into use to denote the area roughly corresponding to present-day Ukraine in the late 16th century, when this area fell under the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Ukraine had the literal meaning of borderland, for that was how Russians, Poles, and Turks all perceived the area.

1648 - 1775 In 1648 Cossacks led by Bogdan Khmelnitsky set off a peasant uprising, which was accompanied by massacres of Poles and Jews. In 1649 Khmelnitsky entered Kyiv and proclaimed a new state. This state, the Hetmanate, may be regarded as the first independent Ukrainian state. But a series of Cossack defeats by the Polish army forced Khmelnitsky to turn to Moscow for protection. In 1654 the Treaty of Pereyaslav united Ukraine with Russia. The Ukrainians interpreted the treaty as guaranteeing autonomy for Ukraine within the Russian Empire, but the Czars did not share this interpretation. Ukraine’s autonomy was whittled away and finally abolished in 1775.

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Under Russian and Soviet rule The Czarist government refused to recognize the Ukrainians as a nation distinct from the Russians, or Ukrainian as a language distinct from Russian. Russians were called "Great Russians," Ukrainians were referred to as "Little Russians," and Belarusians were known as "White Russians."

Mid-19th century The mid-19th century witnessed a revival of Ukrainian culture and ethnic consciousness. The key figure in this revival was Taras Shevchenko, who came to be regarded as Ukraine’s national poet. The Czarist government responded in 1863 by banning the publication of books in the Ukrainian language. Shevchenko was exiled to Kazakhstan, where he was forbidden to write or draw. At the same time, there was no discrimination against Ukrainians who did not insist on a separate identity. This continued to be true throughout the Soviet period.

Ukrainian Republic In November 1917, following the Russian Revolution, an independent Ukrainian People’s Republic was proclaimed in Kyiv. Although this Republic was to be a lasting source of inspiration to Ukrainian nationalists, it survived for only three months. A rival Soviet Ukrainian government was formed in Kharkiv, and in February 1918 the Red Army captured Kyiv. But then, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany, Ukraine came under German occupation. A German puppet regime was established. The defeat of Germany by the Western allies in 1918 led to the Soviet recapture of Kyiv in February 1919 and the creation of the Ukrainian SSR. Ukrainian SSR During the 1920s the Soviet regime allowed Ukraine a measure of autonomy under the control of Ukrainian communists, who promoted the Ukrainian language and culture. In the 1930s Stalin reversed this policy. Many Ukrainian communists perished in the purges, and millions of peasants starved in the man-made famine of 1933, the result of forced collectivization and excessive grain requisitions. Ukrainians refer to this man-made famine as the Holodomor.

Western Ukraine. Western Ukraine escaped Russian and Soviet rule until 1939. Up to 1914 it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while between the wars most of it belonged to Poland (except for Transcarpathia, which belonged to Czechoslovakia, and another small area that belonged to Romania). This is why, even today, West Ukrainians are oriented more toward Central Europe than toward Russia. In 1939, when Poland was dismembered following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, its west Ukrainian territories were absorbed by the Soviet Union. The USSR annexed the rest of western Ukraine in 1940 (from Romania) and 1946 (from Czechoslovakia). It took the Soviet authorities several years to suppress guerrilla resistance mounted in the newly Sovietized territories by nationalists.

World War II and after

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Ukraine was devastated during the Second World War, with deaths in the millions. In the postwar period Ukraine underwent extensive industrialization. After Stalin’s death, greater scope was again allowed to Ukrainian culture, but the policy of Russification resumed in the 1970s.

Kiev in ruins during World War II. (Ukrainian SSR)

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From Perestroika to independence Gorbachev’s perestroika at first had little effect on Ukraine. Mass demonstrations against Soviet rule began only in 1988. In September 1989, the opposition moderate nationalists (“national democrats”) of Rukh held their first congress. In the same month, the hard-line Communist Party boss was removed. Leonid Kravchuk, who was willing to make concessions to the Ukrainian nationalists and forge an alliance with Rukh, replaced him as party leader. It was at this time that Ukrainian was declared the sole official language.

Leonid Kravchuk (Permission by Jan van Steenbergen)

Full independence After the collapse of the attempted hard-line coup in Moscow in August 1991, Ukraine moved to claim full independence, confirmed by referendum on December 1, 1991, with 90% voting in favor. On the same day, Kravchuk was elected the first president of independent Ukraine. He played the decisive role in the decision, made later that month by the heads of state of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, to abolish the Soviet Union. Everyone accepted that “there can be no union without Ukraine”— and Ukraine did not want a union.

Nationalized military forces In contrast to the Baltic states, which sought to expel Soviet military forces, and Belarus, which accepted their continued presence under Russian control, Ukraine “nationalized”— or took

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control of—almost all military forces that were on its territory when the Soviet Union was abolished. However, nuclear weapons were given up under Russian and Western pressure. Officers were given the choice of swearing an oath of loyalty to Ukraine or leaving the country.

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Domestic politics National government Ukraine's government is divided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches.The president serves as Head of State and is directly elected for a maximum of two consecutive 5-year terms. The President serves primarily to represent Ukraine in international affairs and foreign policy objectives. The President's powers include the capacity to to approve/veto bills adopted by Parliament, act as Commander-in-Chiev of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and to appoint key posts in the Presidential Administration. Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada or "Supreme Council" is the country's legislative body. The Rada consists of 450 members that serve 4-year terms, half of which are elected by majority vote and half of which are elected proportionally. Currently, the Verkhovna Rada is dominated by President Petro Poroshenko's Solidarity party, which holds 144 seats. Other political parties that hold seats in parliament include People's Front (82 seats), Opposition Bloc (42 seats), Self Reliance (30 seats), Revival (22 seats), People's Will (19 seats), and Fatherland (18 seats). The remaining 71 seats are unaffiliated (42 seats) or vacant (29 seats). The Prime Minister of Ukraine, currently Arseniy Yatsenyuk, presides over the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the highest body of state executive power. Appointed by the President, but subject to approval by the Verkhovna Rada. The Cabinet of Ministers (otherwise known as the Government of Ukraine), consists of 17 ministries which are responsible for implementing state policies within a specific field of government.

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Elections This section provides a chronological review of the evolution of domestic politics in Ukraine since the fall of the USSR.

First post-Soviet elections 1991 presidential election Leonid Kravchuk was elected president in the first round with 61.59 percent of the vote. Kravchuk had been secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee and chairman of Ukraine's parliament, and thus acting head of state during the 1991 hard-line coup in Moscow. He had resigned from the Communist Party in response and declared Ukraine independent. 1994 presidential election Kravchuk was defeated by Leonid Kuchma, who had been his prime minister and had resigned complaining of the slow pace of reform. Ukraine thereby passed the test of a peaceful transfer of power. Kuchma, an industrial manager from eastern Ukraine, was widely expected to tilt the balance away from nationalist western Ukraine. Indeed, he himself spoke very poor Ukrainian when he took office. 1998 parliamentary elections The Communist Party of Ukraine emerged as the largest party with 121 of 445 seats (and 24.7% of the vote). The other winners were Rukh with 46 seats (and 9.4% of the vote), Socialist Party/Peasants Party bloc with 34 seats (and 8.6% of the vote), Green Party with 19 seats (and 5.3% of the vote), People's Democratic Party with 28 seats (and 5% of the vote), Hromada with 24 seats (and 4.7% of the vote), and another 11 parties with fewer seats, plus 119 unaffiliated candidates. The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission's report noted that the campaign had been marred by incidents of violence, arrests and actions against candidates, with abuse of public office representing a serious shortcoming, raising questions about the neutrality of the state apparatus, even if the elections were conducted under a generally adequate legal and administrative framework. 1999 presidential election Kuchma was reelected, running as an independent, in the second round with 56.25% of the vote. The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission's report stated that the election failed to meet a significant number of OSCE election-related commitments.

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Leonid Kuchma (by permission of Agência Brasil)

2002 parliamentary elections "Our Ukraine" Bloc wins most seats The "Our Ukraine" 10-party bloc led by Viktor Yushchenko took 111 seats. The "For a United Ukraine" Bloc, consisting of five parties that supported President Kuchma, came in second with 101 seats. The Communist Party running on its own came in third with 66 seats. The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission's report noted progress compared to the 1998 parliamentary elections, stating that these elections brought Ukraine closer to meeting international commitments. It did emphasize, however, that the government failed to guarantee a level playing field, pointing to extreme bias in the state media and other abuses of authority. Other observers reported instances of vote-rigging, physical intimidation, and violence. In December 2012, the ruling eastern Ukraine-based Party of Regions government adopted a law reaffirming Ukrainian as the official language, but allowing local and regional governments to give official status to Russian and other languages spoken by at least 10 percent of their residents.

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Viktor Yushchenko (Flickr/European People's Party)

A voter studies the ballot paper before voting during the Ukrainian parliamentary elections, Kyiv, 31 March 2002. (OSCE/Jens Eschenbaecher)

Coalition government formed In November 2002, parliament endorsed the formation of a new coalition government with Donetsk region governor Viktor Yanukovych as prime minister. While the government included representatives of several factions, the Donetsk clan was the dominant force.

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Viktor Yanukovych (premier.gov.ru)

2004 presidential election In the first round, Yanukovych received 40.03% of the vote, while Yushchenko received 39.16% of the vote. Since neither candidate received more than 50% of the vote, a second round was held. The first round had not met OSCE, COE and other European standards for democratic elections, according to the OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation Mission (IEOM). The results of the second round were disputed. The Ukrainian Central Election Commission said Yanukovych won 49.2% of the vote, with Yushchenko receiving 46.69% of the vote. The opposition claimed fraud. The IEOM stated that the elections had not met international standards. The Orange Revolution Following the announcement of the electoral results, a massive campaign of pro-Yushchenko protests and civil disobedience spread throughout the country, especially in the western regions and in Kyiv, named the “Orange Revolution.” Orange was originally adopted by the Yushchenko camp as its election campaign color, but came to represent the entire sequence of protest events after the disputed election. When the Ukrainian Constitutional Court decided (like the IEOM) that

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the election outcome was fraudulent, Yanukovych, decided that there was no alternative but to accept another second round of voting. In December 2004, Yushchenko won the repeat election sanctioned by the Constitutional Court. He captured 52% of the vote, compared to 44% for Yanukovych. The Electoral Commission verified the result in January 2005.

Demonstrators in Independence Square, Kyiv, November 22, 2004 (Creative Commons Attribution)

Yushchenko’s first year The new president initially faced serious challenges, including a possible hostile parliament. He also had to win the support of former rivals and build bridges with ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians living mostly in the east and south, including Crimea, in order to govern effectively. His choice of Yulia Tymoshenko, widely considered populist and anti-Russian, as prime minister did not ease his task. Internationally, the new government received widespread support from the West. The OSCE CiO, Foreign Minister Rupel of Slovenia, welcomed Yushchenko’s election and attended his inauguration. In its first year, the new Ukrainian government faced political infighting, reports of continued corruption, a ballooning deficit, and reduced economic growth. Facing heavy criticism, Yushchenko fired Tymoshenko and dismissed the cabinet in September 2005 and nominated Dnipropetrovsk Governor Yuri Yekhanurov as prime minister. The Yekhanurov government was ousted by Parliament in January 2006 over the issue of the price Ukraine would pay Russia for natural gas, and served in a caretaker status until the March 2006 parliamentary elections.

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Yulia Tymoshenko (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

March 2006 parliamentary elections Yanukovych’s Party of Regions won 31.37% of the vote, with the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc unexpectedly coming in second with 22.44% of the vote, and President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine Bloc a disappointing 14.44%. The Socialist Party won 5.86% and the Communist Party won 3.63%, with none of the other 45 parties contesting the election passing the 3% hurdle to enter Parliament. The International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) report stated that these elections were conducted largely in line with OSCE and international standards, further consolidating the December 2004 breakthrough for the conduct of democratic elections in Ukraine.

Yushchenko, 2005 (OSCE/BOBO)

“Orange Revolution” partners fail to form government

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Yushchenko and Yanukovych turn to each other The Tymoshenko Bloc, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc and the Socialist Party concluded a coalition agreement after months of acrimonious negotiation in June 2006, but mistrust and disagreement over the sharing of posts led to its unraveling. Yushchenko clearly did not want the increasingly ascendant Tymoshenko as prime minister. Finally, Yushchenko and Yanukovych formed a coalition in August, with Yanukovych becaming prime minister. The Tymoshenko Bloc went into opposition. Nonetheless, Yushchenko and Yanukovych disagreed over Ukraine's foreign policy orientation, ministerial appointments, and the roles and powers of the president and prime minister. Conflict over who held executive power escalated during an eight-month confrontation between the president and the Yanukovych-led parliament. New parliamentary elections were eventually set for September 2007

2007 parliamentary elections Although Yanukovych's Party of Regions won 175 seats, Tymoshenko’s BYuT Bloc with 156 seats and Our Ukraine-Peoples Self-Defense (NUNS) Bloc with 72 seats held a majority in parliament, and were able to form a government. The Party of Regions was pushed into the opposition. The Communist Party of Ukraine with 27 seats and the Ltyvyn Bloc with 20 seats were the only other parties of the 20 contesting the election that passed the 3% required minimum. Over 63% of registered voters participated in the election. The OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation Monitoring Mission reported that the elections were conducted mostly in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. Areas of concern included amendments to the Election Law (procedures for compiling voter lists, provisions on home voting, and provisions for removing voters) and the quality of voter lists.

Tymoshenko returns as prime minister Tymoshenko narrowly won election in parliament as prime minister by a majority plus one vote on December 2007. All the opposition parliamentarians -- Party of Regions, Communist Party of Ukraine and Lytvin Bloc -- voted against her. She won the support of all the NUNS parliamentarians only thanks to pressure by Yushchenko.

Tymoshenko-Yushchenko rivalry Nonetheless, the Tymoshenko-Yushchenko relationship increasingly frayed. Tymoshenko’s BYuT blockaded parliament in May 2008 to protest what it termed the “sabotage” of government policies. BYuT’s blockade prevented the president from giving his annual address, which had not happened since Ukraine’s independence from the USSR. Tymoshenko also disagreed with Yushchenko's condemnation of Russia during the Russian war with Georgia, preferring a more neutral position. In addition, Tymoshenko’s BYuT appeared ready to join the opposition Party of Regions in supporting constitutional amendments to strengthen the power of parliament. This appeared to end Yushchenko’s longstanding hopes to rebuild presidential powers reduced by the parliament’s 2004-06 constitutional reforms.

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Going into 2009, there was hardly an issue on which Tymoshenko and Yushchenko did not disagree, and criticize each other in the media. Their conflict, added to the international economic crisis, made it increasingly difficult for Ukraine to implement the necessary governmental response. Only pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which insisted on a joint letter of intent to follow a coordinated policy in return for increased funding, convinced the two to agree to resolve some key policy differences.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko at European People's Party Summit in Lisbon, Ocober 18, 2008 (Flickr)

2010 presidential election Eighteen candidates contested the first round in January. Front-runners were Yanukovych with 35.32% of the vote, followed by Tymoshenko with 25.05%, Sergei Tigipko with 13%, Arseniy Yatsenyuk with 7%, and President Yushchenko with just above 5%. The International Election Observation Mission reported that the first round of the election was of high quality, showed significant improvement over previous elections, and met most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments. Since no candidate won more than 50% of the vote, Yanukovych and Tymoshenko faced each other in a February 2010 run-off. Yanukovych won the second round with 48.95% to Tymoshenko’s 45.47% of the vote. The International Election Observation Mission reported that the February election met most OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections and consolidated progress achieved since 2004. The report noted that the process was transparent and offered voters a genuine choice between candidates representing diverse political views. However, it added that the unsubstantiated allegations of large-scale electoral fraud negatively affected the election atmosphere and voter confidence in the process. The results for the presidential election underlined the country’s continuing deep divisions: the western and central regions voted for Tymoshenko, while the eastern and southern regions voted for Yanukovych.

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The Downfall of Yulia Tymoshenko Tymoshenko claimed the vote was rigged and petitioned the Higher Administrative Court in Kiev to scrutinize documents from the election districts in the Crimea, but the Court rejected her petition. Tymoshenko withdrew her petition to the Supreme Court of Ukraine, because she believed there were no legal provisions on which she could base an appeal. In mid-March Tymoshenko was ousted as prime minister by a parliamentary vote of no-confidence and a pro-Yanukovych cabinet was approved headed by Mykola Azarov. In May 2011 Tymoshenko was arrested and charged with abuse of office for having signed a gas import contract with Russia that included overly high gas prices. In October 2011 Tymoshenko was found guilty of the charges against her and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The U.S. and EU criticized the Ukrainian government's handling of the case. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Ashton stated the verdict showed justice in Ukraine was being applied selectively in politically-motivated prosecutions and would have implications for the country's future EU integration. Russia also criticized the trial's lack of impartiality and anti-Russian undertones. Belarusian President Lukashenko repeatedly called on the Ukrainian government to release Tymoshenko and offered her asylum in Belarus. In 2012 the Czech Republic granted asylum to Tymoshenko's husband, Oleksandr Tymoshenko. Their daughter remains in the Ukraine and actively supports her mother. Ten additional criminal charges ranging from tax evasion, to theft of state funds, to murder were brought against Tymoshenko. In April 2012 Tymoshenko refused, due to poor health, to attend her trial to face renewed charges on tax invasion and the 2001 theft of state funds in from United Energy Systems Ukraine. Soon after, she was forcibly taken to hospital where she began a 20-day hunger strike to protest eroding democracy in the Ukraine and her prison conditions. Her doctors found her ill and were not permitted to conduct the necessary tests to determine the cause of her illness. Tymoshenko has been treated for stress-related illness, and her condition worsened as a result of her hunger strike to protest the outcome of the elections. In February 2013, a Kyiv court launched proceedings against Tymoshenko for allegedly funding the 1996 murder of Ukranian oligarch Yevhen Scherban. In April 2013, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Tymoshenko's jailing was for other reasons than those permitted by law. (The Court issued a similar decision regarding another jailed Tymoshenko ally, former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko in 2012. He was paid compensation per the court ruling, but only released after Yanukovych pardoned him on humanitarian grounds, not in response to the court ruling.) Tymoshenko was released by the new government established with Yanukovych's ouster in April 2014 (see below).

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Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko speaks during her trial, with Judge, Rodion Kireyev, left, reading the indictment at the Pecherskiy District Court in Kiev, Ukraine, October 11, 2011. (Voice of America)

2012 parliamentary elections Due to changes in the electoral law, the 2012 parliamentary election used a mixed voting system (50% under party lists and 50% under simple-majority constituencies) with a 5% election threshold. Participation by blocs of political parties was not permitted. A total of 445 deputies were elected of the 450 seats in parliament. The Central Electoral Commission was ordered by the Supreme Court to conduct repeat elections in five single-mandate constituencies. Yanukovych's Party of Regions won 185 seats (with 41.56% of the vote), Tymoshenko's Fatherland United Opposition dropped in support to 101 seats (with 22.67% of the vote), heavyweight boxer Vitali Klitschko's Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR - "punch" in Ukrainian) won 40 seats (with 8.99% of the vote), Communist Party of Ukraine won 32 seats (with 7.11 % of the vote) and the right-wing nationalist Svoboda won 37 seats (with 8.44% of the vote). Yushchenko's Our Ukraine failed to win any seats and some members sought to dissolve the party in May 2013. The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission report characterized the elections as lacking a level playing field, caused primarily by the abuse of administrative resources, lack of transparency of campaign and party financing, and lack of balanced media coverage. Voting and counting were assessed mostly positively. Tabulation was assessed negatively as it lacked transparency.

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Dame Audrey Glover, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to the 28 October 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, presents the international observers’ Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions to journalists at a press conference, Kyiv, 29 October 2012. (OSCE/Jaroslav Francisko)

Yanukovych removed from power November 2013 decision to suspend talks with EU sparked the Euromaidan Revolution: three months of protests that led to his ouster Yanukovych's decision to suspend talks with the EU on association and free trade sparked mass protests in Kyiv and western Ukraine. Demonstrations took place as Ukraine, the OSCE's departing CiO, hosted the December 5-6 OSCE ministerial meeting. Yanukovych's three predecessors as president -- Kravchuk, Kuchma, and Yushchenko -- criticized his decision to turn away from the EU. Protestors called for Yanukovych to resign, the holding of early presidential elections, granting the opposition the political power to negotiate agreements with the EU, and an IMF financial aid package to replace the loan from Moscow. (Other outstanding issues were the breakdown of authority as protestors seized government buildings outside of Kyiv, Ukraine's economic problems, reform of the internal security forces -- essentially unchanged since Soviet times, and Russia's role in Ukraine.) OSCE CiO Swiss Foreign Minister Burkhalter appealed to all to refrain from violence and called for peaceful dialogue. He noted that OSCE had the tools and mechanisms to act as an impartial broker and offered to support Ukrainian authorities to lower tensions and prevent further escalation. He monitored a deal in which protestors left Kyiv City Hall in return for the dropping of charges. He also proposed nomination of an impartial international facilitator, possibly working with a respected Ukrainian personality, and dispatching of an international expert team to establish facts on violent incidents and human rights violations. The crisis escalated in February when protestors and police clashed in central Kyiv. During two days over a hundred were killed and many more wounded as security forces fired at protestors in

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Kyiv. A group of EU foreign ministers and their Russian colleague mediated a deal between Yanukovych and protest leaders to return to the 2004 Constitution, which shifted power from the president to parliament, the holding of earlier presidential elections in 2015, and establishment of a government of national trust. Yanukovych then fled Kyiv to Russia, security forces withdrew from the city center, and a more significant shift in power took place. Parliament voted to remove Yanukovych from power and the acting interior minister issued an arrest warrant for his arrest for the killing of civilians. Tymoshenko was released from prison and went to Maidan Square in Kyiv to speak to protestors. Oleksandr Turchynov, the deputy leader of Tymoshenko's Fatherland party, was named parliamentary speaker and interim president until new presidential elections were held May 25. Fatherland leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk was named prime minister and other members of the cabinet were drawn from the Fatherland and Swoboda parties, and Maidan protest leaders. Klitschko's UDAR party declined to participate in the new government.

Interim President Oleksandr Turchynov (Wilkipedia Commons)

U.S., Russia, EU and Ukraine agreement to de-escalate crisis in eastern Ukraine stillborn The U.S., Russia, EU and Ukraine April 17, 2014 agreement to de-escalate the crisis in eastern

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Ukraine has not been implemented. The agreement provided for pro-Russian armed groups that had occupied public buildings to depart in return for amnesty. The OSCE was to play a leading role in assisting Ukrainian authorities and local communities in implementing the de-escalation measures. Pro-Russian groups, however, refused to end their armed occupations of public buildings and facilities. Secretary of State Kerry has said that Russia’s military intelligence services and special operators are playing an active role in destabilizing eastern Ukraine with personnel, weapons, operational planning and coordination.

Ukraine loses partial control of eastern Ukraine By May 2014, Ukraine's police and security forces had lost control of the areas of Donesk and Luhansk, including about a dozen cities and 6.5 million people, to pro-Russian separatists. Local authorities sought to keep essential services running. Ukrainian security forces tried to maintain and at times reassert control. Sporadic violence has continued. Pro-Russian separatists held a May 11 referendum on autonomy, seeking to pre-empt Ukraine's presidential elections two weeks later, and subsequently declared a "Donesk People's Republic."

Oligarch Akhmetov steps in Deploys workers and stabilizes several eastern Ukraine towns Oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, a longtime sponsor of former President Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, mobilized workers from enterprises in eastern Ukraine and restored order in Mariupol and several other towns in mid-May. He arranged deals for separatists to take down their barricades and for police backed by his workers to maintain law and order. The separatists have not been pleased with his tacit support for Ukraine's integrity. Showing the limits of his power, however, his call for workers to participate in rallies on May 20 against the separatists failed to bring out the masses.

Rinat Akhmetov (Twitter website)

Run up to the May 25 elections Kyiv seeks to reassure eastern Ukraine As Ukrainian officials stepped up their preparations to hold the May 25 elections, Parliament adopted a memorandum of peace and understanding to reassure the public that significant government changes would take place along with the election of a new president. The resolution included promises of a constitutional overhaul, and assurances on the status of the Russian

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language and the ability of local governments to grant official approval to languages used by other minority groups.

Presidential and local elections in May 2014 Poroshenko wins presidency with majority Petro Poroshenko--who has served as foreign minister, and owns Ukraine's largest chocolate producer and the Channel 5 television station, was victorious with about 56% of the May 25 vote. Tymoshenko came in a distant second with 13% of the vote. Unofficial estimates put the nationwide turnout at 48%. No polling station were open in the separatist-controlled town of Donesk, and only 7 out of 12 district electoral commissions were operating in the Donesk and Luhansk regions due to pressure from pro-Russian separatists. According to the International Election Observation Mission's preliminary report, the election was characterized by high voter turnout and the clear resolve of the authorities to hold what was a genuine election largely in line with international commitments and with a respect for fundamental freedoms in the vast majority of the country. This was despite the hostile security environment in two eastern regions and the increasing attempts to derail the process by armed groups in these areas. The Central and other election commissions operated impartially and collegially on the whole, although a number of transparency issues arose prior to election day and decisions taken may have been beyond their authority. The voting and counting process were transparent and largely in line with procedures, despite large lines of voters at polling stations in some parts of the country. The early stages of the tabulation process were evaluated less positively. In addition, a number of mayoral and local council elections, as well as some parliamentary by-elections were held. UDAR leader Klitschko, who supported Poroshenko, won the race for mayor of Kyiv.

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Petro Poroshenko (www.poroshenko.com.ua)

85-year old voter in Krasnoilsk, Chernivitsi region in Ukraine casts her vote during the early Presidential elections, 25 May, 2014. (Michael Forster Rothbart)

Parliamentary elections in October, 2014

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On October 26, 2014, Ukraine held elections for the country’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. However, due to the continuing annexation of Crimea and ongoing war with Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine, elections were not held in Crimea, Sevastopol, or the Donetsk Oblast. Consequently, 27 of the 450 seats in the Verkhovna Rada remain empty. Local and international observers largely considered the elections to be free and fair, despite a relatively low voter turnout of 52%. The results awarded the most seats to the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (132 seats) followed by the People’s Front (82 seats). The remaining seats were earned predominately by Self Reliance, Opposition Bloc, the Radical Party, and Fatherland, in addition to various independent candidates. However, because no party successfully earned the 226 votes necessary to form a parliamentary majority, the Poroshenko Block and People’s Front now form a coalition parliament. Pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine held their own elections on November 2, 2014, which were denounces as illegitimate by the United States, European Union, and Kyiv. However, Russia has recognized the elected leader, Alexander Zakharchenko, who won over 81% of the vote.

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Challenges to Ukraine’s democracy Despite its abundance of parties, Ukraine’s democracy has faced serious challenges from within: • Dysfunctional government due to conflicts between presidents and prime ministers. • Presidents and parliaments have not worked together effectively. • Corruption has been rampant. In 2004, a U.S. court convicted former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko of money laundering, wire fraud, and 24 other charges. Lazarenko reportedly embezzled $114 million while in office. • Scores of opposition politicians and journalists have disappeared or died under suspicious circumstances. One longstanding unsolved case was the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze, who disappeared in 2000. (Former President Kuchma was arrested in 2011 and charged with involvement in the murder, but released when a judge ruled the evidence inadmissible because it had been illegally obtained. In 2013, a former senior police officer was convicted of strangling and beheading Gongadze and sentenced to life in prison. He said that he had committed the crime on the orders of then Interior Minister Kravchenko - who himself was found dead in 2005). More recently, Vladimir Goncharenko, editor of the environmental security newspaper EKO Bezpeka, was killed in 2012 but no arrests have been made. • Use of judicial means for political ends. • Involvement of organized crime in Ukrainian politics. • Regional divisions between east and west. • Attacks on journalists for their reporting or while covering the news.

From without, Russian intervention, propaganda, and political influence has impacted on political developments.

Protesters hold a placard with the portrait of Ukrainian

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President Kuchma, dressed in prison overalls and with the inscription "Pakhan" (criminal boss) on his chest, Kyiv, Ukraine. Opposition supporters called for Kuchma's resignation or early elections. 12 October 2002 (©AP/Wide World Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)

Regional divisions The regional division between Ukraine's Russified east and Ukrainian nationalist west has been an important factor in its electoral politics, as has been the rivalry between Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk, the two big industrial centers of eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian politics is very complicated and fragmented, with no fewer than 122 registered political parties. Moreover, the parliamentary election law has been changed four times, shifting from single seat constituencies, to a mixed proportional representation/single seat constituency, to a full proportional representation system.

Energy and Economic Development Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia has a direct impact on its economic development. The country currently imports Russian gas at $415 per 1,000 cubic meters. Past bilateral negotiations determined the import price, which fell far below European prices. Over time the Ukraine fell behind in payments and even diverted gas intended for Europe for industrial consumption. In 2005, Gazprom informed the Ukrainian government that it was raising gas prices to match prices on the world market. The Ukrainian government responded by asking for additional payment in transit fees. (Two thirds of Gazprom's profit comes from gas sold to Europe that transits the Ukraine.) The two countries were unable to agree on a price, which resulted in Gazprom cutting its supplies to Europe mid-winter. Nevertheless due to contractual obligations and fear of being sued by European countries, Gazprom soon returned the supply to its normal delivery level. A similar dispute over gas prices erupted again in 2009 and was resolved when Tymoshenko and Putin negotiated a 10-year agreement on gas prices. Tymoshenko was later accused of abuse of office and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment due to this agreement. Ukraine also has its own domestic natural gas reserves, which are approximately 1 trillion cubic meters, and are managed by the UkrGasProduction company. The company has the capacity to extract 15 billion cubic meters, which is worth $5.5 billion at current 2012 European gas prices. UkrGasProduction supplies heating to households at a subsidized rate of $90 per 1,000 cubic meters, which is four times lower than the Russian import price. There has been no attempt by the Ukrainian government to end domestic subsidies and raise the fees for residential consumers. This is despite the fact that other unpopular social welfare reform policies have been implemented in the last five years. It is suspected that some of this domestic gas is being bought by corrupt government officials who then profit from its export to Europe at world market prices or its sale to internal industrial consumers. In order to achieve true energy security, the Ukrainian government must reform the energy sector. This means charging citizens unsubsidized tariffs for energy consumption (with an exception for the truly vulnerable) and installing meters and a proper municipal billing system.

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The increased revenue from fees for domestic energy consumption could be reinvested with the aim of increasing domestic extraction capacity or diversifying supply by investing in renewable energy and promoting an energy efficiency policy. The annexation of Crimea and the possible secession of the eastern regions from Ukraine could have serious consequences for Ukraine’s economy and energy situation. The east and the south together have around 640bcm or 93 percent of Ukraine’s known remaining conventional gas reserves. This is equivalent to roughly 11 years of total gas consumption or 30 years of district heating and household gas consumption. Without its eastern regions, Ukraine would become even more dependent on Russian gas. Through a deal brokered by the EU, Russia resumes gas exports to Ukraine October 31, 2015. However, the issue of energy security remains a prominent barrier to development and continues to complicate the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

2014 Agreement with the IMF The IMF board approved the $17.5 billion four-year loan under the Extended Fund Facility, of which Ukraine's $5 billion will come front-loaded. The bailout loan is based on a comprehensive economic reform program supported by the fund as well as by additional resources from the international community. According to IMF President Christine Lagarde, this new arrangement will "support immediate economic stabilization in Ukraine and a set of deep and wide-ranging policy reforms aimed at restoring robust growth over the medium term and improving living standards for the Ukrainian people." However, this agreement comes with severe restrictions. Ukraine will have to cut social spending sharply. Prime Minister Yatsenyuk assessed that the gross domestic product will decline 3 percent with the new loans and reforms--but would drop 10 percent without them.

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Crimea Crimea has a special history. Until the late 18th century it belonged to a Turkic people, the Crimean Tatars, whose khans were allied with Ottoman Turkey. The Khanate was conquered by Russia in 1776, and annexed to the Russian Empire by Empress Catherine II in 1783. Many Russian colonists settled in Crimea, while many Crimean Tatars emigrated.

1921-1954 In 1921 the Soviet leadership made Crimea an autonomous republic (ASSR) within Russia (the RSFSR). However, the cultural autonomy of the Crimean Tatars was suppressed under Stalin. In 1944 the whole Crimean Tatar population was deported to Central Asia on suspicion of disloyalty. Many died on the way. In 1945 Crimea was made an ordinary province of Russia. Then in 1954, after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine, on the grounds that its economy was more closely connected to Ukraine.

Crimean Tatars return to homeland For many years the Crimean Tatars campaigned for the right to return to their homeland. But it was only in the late 1980s, under Gorbachev, that they were finally allowed to return. Others had long since occupied the land and houses where they used to live, so they established makeshift settlements. The return of Crimean Tatars caused alarm among the Slavic (Russian and Ukrainian) population of Crimea, who feared that they would be dispossessed. Disputes over land on the southern coast of the peninsula sparked violent ethnic clashes in 2004. Besides the land question, there are other contentious issues, such as the political representation of the Crimean Tatars and the status of their language. Other confrontations have been triggered by police attempts to remove Crimean Tatar settlements and by criminals killing Crimean Tatar traders for refusing to pay protection money.

Tensions between Simferopol and Kyiv Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of an indepdendent Ukrainian state, another aspect of the Crimean problem involved relations between the regional authorities in Crimea’s capital Simferopol and the central government in Kyiv. In the early 1990s Crimea had a special autonomous status within Ukraine. Crimea was the only region of Ukraine where Russians formed a large majority—about two-thirds of the population. Many Russians thought that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1954 was unjustified, and wanted to see Crimea either again part of Russia or a separate republic with close ties to both Russia and Ukraine. Neither of these options was acceptable to the majority of Ukrainians. Tension between Simferopol and Kyiv rose following the 1994 election of secessionist Yuri Meshkov as Crimea’s president. However, Meshkov did not take decisive steps to secede from Ukraine. This was partly the result of conflict between Meshkov and other local pro-Russian politicians, but the crucial factor was probably the unwillingness of the Russian government to back Meshkov.

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Ukrainian parliament reasserts Kyiv’s control In 1995, the Ukrainian parliament reasserted Kyiv’s control over Crimea, annulling the constitution that Crimea had adopted in 1992 and abolishing the Crimean presidency. By overreaching, the Crimean authorities lost most of the prerogatives that they previously enjoyed. In 1995-96, the Ukrainian and Crimean governments and parliaments succeeded in negotiating a mutually acceptable solution. A new constitution adopted by the Crimean parliament in November 1995 was amended to bring it into accordance with the Ukrainian constitution, and in June 1996 the Ukrainian parliament reaffirmed Crimea’s status as an autonomous republic within Ukraine.

Role of OSCE The OSCE, which hosted a conference on Crimea in Locarno (Switzerland) in June 1995, played an important mediating and advisory role in resolving the dispute. Conflict prevention with regard to Crimea was the main mandate of the OSCE Mission to Ukraine, which monitored the situation in the country from 1994 to 1999. In 1999, with the improvement of inter-ethnic relations, the OSCE and Ukraine agreed to close the OSCE Mission to Ukraine and established “the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine ” to develop programs in support of democratization. Recent projects include: • A review of legislation to bring it into line with international human rights standards • Support to the office of the Ombudsman • Assistance to the judiciary • Media freedom • Military reform

Example The OSCE implemented its largest donor-funded project to date in removing toxic rocket fuel components called melange from Ukraine. The most recent train with 760 tons of melange was shipped from Ukraine to Russia for disposal in September 2013. The project was funded by the U.S., Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain and Sweden. The last of the 16,000 tons of melange was removed in March 2014. See final press release.

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L-r: Lubomir Kopaj, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, Yuriy Kluchkovskyy, member of the Ukrainian parliament and Oleksandr Chupakhin, member of Central Election Commission of Ukraine at a conference in Kyiv, November 29, 2010. (OSCE/Oksana Polyuga)

Ukrainian armed forces personnel helped remove the last melange from the Kalynivka storage site in the Vinnytsya region of Ukraine in January 2010. (OSCE/Leonid Kalashnyk)

Tatars' reintegration faces additional challenges after Crimea's annexation by Russia Reintegration of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea remains problematic. The new constitutional arrangements adopted in Crimea in 1995 were a step backward, as Crimean Tatars lost the representation that they were previously guaranteed in the Crimean parliament. After the Orange Revolution, a power-sharing agreement marked a step forward in interethnic relations in Crimea, providing Crimean Tatars with two local ministerial posts as well as the

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position of deputy prime minister. The agreement also provided for the establishment of native-language media. The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People worked to restore the national and political rights of the Crimean Tatar people. Representatives from the Mejlis met with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and asked his office to research and prepare recommendations on the restoration of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people. The research results were presented at the 2013 International Forum on Restoration of Rights of the Crimean Tatar people to their Homeland. Political realignment add to inter-ethnic tensions The Party of Regions entered into an alliance with Russian nationalists in Crimea in 2006, strengthened by support from central government authorities after Yanukovych became prime minister in 2010 and then president. The Russian nationalists justification and/or denial of the 1944 ethnic cleansing of the Crimean Tatars has increased Tatar-Russian tensions. Russia's annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 (see below) put the Tatar's, who genrally aligned themselves with Ukraine, in an uncomfortable position.

Crimean Tatars are praying in the center of Simferopol during a meeting devoted to the 59th anniversary of deportation of the Crimean Tatars from Crimea. 18 May 2003. (©AP/Wide World Photo SSR. EPA Photo EPA/ Sergey Svetlitskiy/sd)

Situation of national minorities in Crimea The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities published a needs assessment report titled "The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine" in August 2013. The report provided an analysis of the situation of national minorities in Crimea and offered recommendations for easing inter-ethnic tensions and increasing the integration of Crimean society, as well as attempts to raise awareness of the issue. Ukraine Foreign Minister Kozhara, then OSCE CiO, stated in September 2013 that while the report (and its recommendations) might be correct under European law, they were not correct under

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Ukrainian law.

Cover of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities' report "The integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs Assessment". (OSCE)

Anti-Tatar violence in Crimea Anti-Tatar attacks on Mosques and Muslim religious sites have taken place in Crimea, such as the arson of two mosques in October 2013. A settlement of Tatars who had been squatting in Molodojnoc, outside of Simferopol, was attacked by a mob in 2012. There were no arrests for any of these crimes.

Yanukovych's downfall leads to Russian annexation of Crimea Responding to the change of authority in Kyiv, pro-Russian groups moved to seize power in Crimea. By the end of February 2014, Russian military forces had taken effective control of the Crimean peninsula. The pro-Russian Crimean parliament voted to leave Ukraine and join Russia, and held a referendum March 16 with 97% in favor of joining Russia. Russia's parliament had already expressed willingness to accept the predictable results of the referendum, i.e., to join Russia. Putin signed an order to approve the draft treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on adopting the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Ukraine's Acting President Turchynov termed the referendum illegitimate and unconstitutional, and said Ukraine would never accept Russian annexation of Crimea. The UN Security Council met on the situation in Ukraine. Deputy UN Secretary General Eliasson visited Kyiv to assess the situation. OSCE CiO Burkhalter sent his Special Representative for Ukraine Guldimann and High Commissioner on National Minorities Thors to Crimea. See report on Personal Envoy Guldimann's press conference. CiO Burkhalter stated on March 11 that the Crimean referendum was illegal in its current form and called for alternative ways to address the Crimean issue. Eighteen OSCE participating states sent 35 unarmed military observers to Ukraine, destination Crimea, at the request of the Ukrainian government, as a confidence-building measure under

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Chapter 11 of the 2011 Vienna Document. This was the first time this OSCE mechanism had been activated. This step was taken at a joint meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council and Forum for Security Cooperation on March 4. The observers were prevented from entering Crimea by armed groups (Russian military personnel without insignia or militias controlled by Russia) who controlled the entry points to the Crimean peninsula.

Ambassador Tim Guldimann, Personal Envoy of the Swiss OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Ukraine, briefing OSCE participating States and senior OSCE officials, Vienna, 3 March 2014. (OSCE, Jonathan Perfect)

UNGA dismisses annexation as illegal Resolution has no enforcement power The UN General Assembly adopted in March 2014 a resolution proposed by Ukraine and backed by the U.S. and EU, with 100 votes in favor, 11 votes against, and 59 abstentions, describing the referendum in Crimea as having no legal validity and calling on states not to recognize the change in Ukraine's borders.

Putin visits Crimea Russian President Putin visited Sevastapol in Crimea May 9 to attend a Victory Day parade commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany, underlining the annexation of the territory by Russia.

Economic Relations of Crimea since annexation President Poroshenko signed a law on economic operations in Crimea on August 14, 2014. This law created a free customs zone within the free economic zone of Crimea. The free economic zone is created without agreeing it with the relevant local government or executive power agencies. National taxes and duties are not collected on the territory of the free economic zone. Goods which were made, processed or were in free turnover on the occupied territory of Ukraine until the law on ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens are considered goods with a Ukrainian status that can be freely moved to other territory of Ukraine without the application of the tariff and non-tariff regulation of foreign economic operations until January 1, 2015. This

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guarantees the protection of property and non-property rights of individuals and companies on the territory of the free economic zone of Crimea according to Ukrainian law.

Implications of annexation of Crimea Most powerful fleet on the Black Sea Russia now has unfettered use of Sevastapol and other bases on the peninsula, their shipyards and defense industry, and whatever it wanted of the Ukrainian Navy. This gives Russia the most powerful fleet on the Black Sea. In addition, Russian Navy Commander Chirkov has stated that thirty new warships will be added to the Black Sea Fleet over the next six years. Extension of Russia's maritime boundary in the Black Sea Russia can claim a vastly greater exclusive economic zone with potential gas and oil resources, while depriving Ukraine of possible energy independence.

Incoming President Poroshenko asserts Ukraine will never accept Russian annexation of Crimea Poroshenko reiterated at his June 2014 inauguration as Ukraine's president that "Russia occupied Crimea, which was, is and will be Ukrainian soil." This sentiment has been mirrored by Ukraine’s Prime Minister Pavlo Klimkin, who urges “there could be no slightest way of normalizing or getting back to business in the relations between Ukraine and Russia without returning to status quo and establishing full Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea.”

International recognition of Crimea The majority of the international community has vehemently rejected Russia’s annexation of Crimea as illegitmate, and consider Crimea an administrative division of Ukraine. UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 entitled “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine” was supported by 100 UN member states (11 rejected, 58 abstaining) and seeks to uphold Ukraine’s territorial integrity and denounces Russia’s annexation of Crimea as illegitimate. This resolution was adopted on March 27, 2014. UNESCO has confirmed Crimea as part of Ukraine. In October 2014, the agency voted with 22 out of the 25 member countries (Russia, China, and Cuba rejecting) to approve non-recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The European Union also maintains a policy of non-recognition towards Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The EU has denounced pro-Russian violence in Ukraine from inception, and has condemned the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity by Russia. Still, others consider Crimea to be under a Russian federal district. On March 17, 2014, shortly after Crimea’s vote for integration into Russia, President Vladimir Putin signed an order officially recognizing Crimea as a sovereign and independent state.

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Foreign relations This section deals with Ukraine’s shifting relationships with: • Russia • The West, including NATO and EU • Ethnic relations

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Russia Soviet Black Sea Fleet After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine argued over possession of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which is based in Crimea. In 1997, after several years of negotiation, agreement was reached on how to divide the fleet. Ukraine ended up with only a small proportion of the ships, but kept the shore facilities (though agreeing to lease some of them back to Russia). Tensions between Ukraine and Russia rose in 2008 after President Yushchenko stated that Ukraine would not extend Russia’s lease of Black Sea Fleet facilities after 2017, and urged the start of preparations for its departure. Russian use of Black Sea Fleet ships during its war with Georgia in August 2008 presented another problem for Ukraine, which sided with Georgia during the conflict. Yushchenko subsequently signed a directive requiring Russia to notify Ukrainian authorities of all movements by Black Sea Fleet naval vessels and aircraft. Russia asserted that this contradicted the 1997 agreement.

Russian Navy Flagship anti-submarine ship "Kerch" fires a live rocket during the Ukraine-Russia joint naval exercises not far from Sevastopol, Crimea. 31 October 1997 (©AP/Wide World Photo/Vladimir Strumkovsky)

The Evolving Status of Crimea Newly-elected Ukrainian President Yanukovych agreed in 2010 to extend Russia’s lease of naval facilities in Crimea from 2017 for another 25 years with an additional five-year renewal option, in exchange for a multi-year discounted contract for Russian gas. The Ukrainian opposition sharply criticized the deal. Former PM Tymoshenko asserted that the Constitution forbid the continuation of foreign bases after 2017. Ukrainian President Yanukovych, was ousted in February 2014 and fled to Russia following months of protests. Russia claimed the ouster was a coup and that the new Ukrainian authorities

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were nationalist fascists who would abuse Ukraine's large ethnic Russian population. The grass roots movement and widespread demonstrations that sparked the ouster of Yanukovych and the ascent of a pro-west interim Ukrainian government created a political crisis in Ukraine that led to demonstrations against the new government. These were quickly supported and exploited by Russia. When the Crimean prime minister Anatoly Mohyliov announced that his government recognized the new provisional government in Kiev, and that the Crimean autonomous government would carry out all laws passed by the Ukrainian parliament, counterdemonstrations by predominantly pro-Russian groups quickly spread. On 27 February, 2014, unidentified soldiers, presumed to be Russian special forces, seized the Supreme Council of Crimea and the building of the Council of Ministers, quickly raising Russian flags over the buildings. The Crimean Parliament then voted to terminate the Crimean government, and replace Prime Minister Mohyliov with Sergei Aksyonov, leader of the fringe Russian Unity party. Aksyonov then asked Russian President Putin for "assistance in ensuring peace and public order" in Crimea, claiming that Yanukovych remained the legal President in Ukraine. Putin then was given authorization from the Federation Council of Russia for military intervention in Ukraine until the situation "normalized." By 2 March, Russian forces had moved into Crimea and soon were in control over the entire Crimean Peninsula. Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in March of 2014 after a hastily called referendum just two weeks after the Russian forces took control of the Black Sea region. While Ukraine and the West have rejected the vote, . The status of Crimea remains one of the main points of contention between Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin noted in March 2015 that without "establishing full Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea" there could be no way to "normalize or get back to business in the relations between Ukraine and Russia."

Energy Ukraine and Russia have engaged in recurring disputes over payments for Russian natural gas, often resulting in cut-offs of shipments. Ukraine currently buys Russian gas under a 2009 ten-year contract that links the price of gas to that of oil. Ukraine is also obligated to buy 40 billion cubic meters of gas a year, which is more than Ukraine wants and at a price more than it wants to pay. Russian President Putin and Gazprom CEO Miller publicly proposed building a new pipeline to ship Russian gas to western Europe through Poland -- bypassing Ukrain e-- in 2013. Miller followed this up with a threat that Gazprom would "never, under any circumstances" use Ukraine's extensive gas storage system to deliver Russian gas to Europe unless Ukraine agreed to a partnership with Gazprom. If Kyiv had forgotten, Moscow reminded it of Russian energy/economic leverage over Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian purchase of Russian gas has decreased by 75 percent since 2011. Russian gas delivery through Ukraine has also dropped by a third since its high in 2004, and Gazprom has no other similar gas storage system to that in Ukraine available. As the 2014 crisis over Crimea continued, Gazprom demanded that Ukraine settle its $1.89 billion

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debt or it would cut off gas shipments. Russia and Ukraine have been negotiating a new price -- Ukraine had been paying a subsidized rate lower than Gazprom's European customers. Russia has proposed a 44 percent price increase, and reduced supplies by half earlier this year. In June 2014, Gazprom stopped supplying natural gas to Ukraine after it failed to pay its outstanding bill. However, Ukraine and Russia, facilitated by the EU, reached an agreement in October of 2014 that resumed the flow of gas supplied from Russia to Ukraine.

Inconclusive high level visits Yanukovych's visit to Moscow in 2012 did not result in agreements on outstanding issues in the bilateral relationship. These include Ukrainian interest in a discount on gas prices, inventorying of property in Crimea leased to the Black Sea Fleet, arrangements on Fleet movements (notification procedures, timing and responsible authorities), and Russian interest in modernizing/replacing its increasingly obsolete ships. Putin's return visit to Kyiv in July 2013 took place against the backdrop of Russia's push for Ukrainian entry into the Moscow-led Eurasian Union. In addition, Putin publicly pushed for the integration of the armed forces of the two countries in an address made to both navies in Sevastopol. Yanukovych supported defense cooperation, but far short of Kyiv's consent to modernization of the Black Sea Fleet or allowing Ukrainian defense contractors to take part in such naval modernization.

Ukraine’s geopolitical dilemma Ukraine has steered a cautious course between Russia and the West. One reason is Ukraine’s geopolitical dilemma. While Ukraine has had some Western support, there are no realistic prospects for it to join the EU or NATO in the near term. Ukraine’s relations with the West have been strained by such issues as the fate of the Chernobyl nuclear power station and the absence of significant economic reform, and more recently by Ukraine’s failure to act effectively against economic crime, and politically-motivated trials of opposition figures. (see Challenges to Ukraine's Democracy). Meanwhile, the Ukrainian economy, including the arms industry and the energy supply, depends heavily on close ties with Russia. In defense issues as well, Ukraine has taken advantage of the opportunities provided by the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to participate in air defense and air force exercises, while doing he same with NATO's Air Situation Data Exchange Program.

Divergent wishes of eastern and western Ukraine Another constraint on Ukraine's foreign relations with both Russia and the West is the divergent wishes in large groups in eastern and western Ukraine. Many in eastern Ukraine want closer ties with Russia and more effective cooperation within the CIS, while many in western Ukraine want Ukraine to keep its distance from Russia and leave the CIS altogether. By way of compromise, Ukraine has remained a member of the CIS but blocked its development into an effective supranational union. Ukraine has been willing to cooperate with other post-Soviet states only on conditions that preserved its full sovereignty. For example, Ukraine has rejected Russia’s view that CIS member-states are collectively responsible for defending the “external borders of the CIS.”

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Russian-sponsored international economic institutions Ukraine maintains observer status in the Eurasian Economic Community.

Russia occupies Crimea In response to Yanukovych's ouster and the change of government in Kyiv, Russian military forces occupied Crimea at the end of February 2014 and annexed it the following month.

Russian military pressure on Ukraine Russia has been conducting military maneuvers and overflights along its border with eastern Ukraine, threatening to protect Russian interests and ethnic Russians if Ukrainian authorities act against pro-Russian groups that have seized public building and facilities in eastern Ukraine. Putin announced on May 7 that Russian forces had withdrawn from along the border with Ukraine (withdrawal of significant forces was finally confirmed as happening towards the end of May), asked Russian separatists to drop their plans for a referendum on sovereignty on May 11 (they held the referendum anyway), and said Russia would accept the May 25 presidential election if demands for autonomy from eastern Ukraine were recognized. On May 23 Putin said he would respect the results of the presidential election. Nonetheless, hundreds of purported Russian civilians have crossed the border into eastern Ukraine and engaged in armed attacks, including against the Donesk Airport in late May and a Ukrainian border guard base in Luhansk on June 2. NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen stated on June 19 that several thousand more Russian troops had deployed to the border with Ukraine and that Russian troop maneuvers were taking place in the area. Speaking at an August 28 press conference on the most recent Russian military incursions into Ukraine, President Obama said: “I consider the actions that we’ve seen in the last week a continuation of what’s been taking place for months now. The separatists are backed, trained, armed, and financed by Russia. Throughout this process, we’ve seen deep Russian involvement in everything that they’ve done.”

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The West, including NATO and EU NATO The NATO-Ukraine relationship dates back to 1991, soon after Ukraine’s independence when it joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Ukraine joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994. In 1997, the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership identified areas for consultation and cooperation, and established the NATO-Ukraine Commission. A NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was adopted in 2002, and an Intensified Dialogue launched in 2005. After the 2004 Orange Revolution, there were some Ukrainian hopes of rapid integration into NATO and perhaps even the EU. Relations with Europe were set back, however, when the pro-Russia Party of Regions entered the government. Ukraine ended its 2-year deployment of 1,650 troops in Iraq in 2005, fulfilling a Yanukovych election promise. Although strongly supported by the U.S., Ukraine was not offered a Membership Action Plan at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit. The Summit did pledge, however, that Ukraine would eventually be offered membership. Still, the impact of the Russian-Georgia War of 2008 and strident Russian opposition have reduced support among key NATO members like Germany and France for Ukrainian entry into the Alliance. In addition, while Yushchenko was a strong advocate, Tymoshenko was not. Pointing to Russian opposition and domestic divisions, she stated at a 2009 NATO Security Conference that participation in some kind of all-European collective security system in which Russia was a full participant might be the best option for Ukraine. During the first NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting in 2010, following formation of a new more Moscow-friendly government, Ukraine made clear that it wished to maintain its current level of cooperation with the Alliance, fulfill existing agreements, and implement partnership programs. In 2010, President Yanukovych signed legislation asserting a non-bloc policy (despite agreeing to the extension of the lease for Russian bases in the Crimea), apparently dropping interest in membership in NATO. Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued to co-host, together with the United States, the annual two-week long Partnership for Peace “Sea Breeze” joint air, naval and land military exercises in the Black Sea area, which included 15 NATO and Middle East countries in its 15th iteration in 2012. Yanukovych approved the Annual National Program of Ukraine-NATO cooperation for 2013. With respect to the recent Ukraine-Russia crisis, NATO allies have continued to express their full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. NATO pledges to support the efforts of Ukraine to pursue a political path that meets the aspirations of the people in all regions of Ukraine without external interference. In response to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, President Petro Poroshenko has signed a law abandoning Ukraine’s neutral non-bloc status, declaring that Ukrainians will decide whether the country should seek NATO membership once it meets the standards of the military alliance.

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BLACK SEA, July 12, 2012. Ukrainian navy frigate Hetman Sahaydachniy (U 130) leads Turkish navy patrol boats TCG Kalkan (P 331), TCG Tufan (P 333), and the Georgian coast guard vessel Sokhumi (P 24) during a ship handling exercise during Exercise Sea Breeze 2012 (SB12). SB12, co-hosted by the Ukrainian and U.S. navies, aims to improve maritime safety, security and stability engagements in the Black Sea by enhancing the capabilities of Partnership for Peace and Black Sea regional maritime security forces. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class William Jamieson/Released)

The EU Association and free trade agreements with Ukraine were ready for signing by 2012, but the EU delayed in part in protest against political use of the judiciary against former Prime Minister Tymoshenko and former Interior Minister Lutsenko. The outcome of the February 2013 EU-Ukraine Summit appeared to be that the agreements could be signed at the November EU Neighborhood Summit if Ukraine made progress on key issues. To the EU, this meant releasing Tymoshenko, and making progress on adapting Ukrainian law to EU norms on corruption, justice, and electoral reform. Yanukovych pardoned Lutsenko and former Minister of the Environment Heorhiy Filpchuk in April 2013, receiving from the EU a cautious but positive reaction accompanied by criticism for selective justice. The European Council approved a visa facilitation agreement and took preparatory steps for signing the association and free trade agreements in November. Still, Kyiv was expected to do more on the key issues to enable the signings to take place.

Yanukovych suspends negotiations with EU In a surprising November 2013 reversal just prior to the Neighborhood Summit, Ukraine suspended talks with the EU on the agreements. The same day, Ukraine's parliament rejected draft laws that would have allowed Tymoshenko to leave the country for medical treatment. Ukraine Prime Minister Azarov said the decision to suspend the talks was motivated solely by economics, including placing blame on the International Monetary Fund for overly tough terms for assistance Ukraine needs to deal with its financial problems. However, many condemned the

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rejection as a political move to appease Russia, who vehmently disagreed with the deal. The move sparked massive demonstrations in Kyiv in addition to international backlash, as US Secrety of State Kerry canceled a long-planned visit to Ukraine in December 2013 to demonstrate American irritation with the move. The EU broke off talks with Ukraine in mid-December, with EU enlargement chief Stefan Fule all but calling Yanukovych a liar, and saying resumption of talks depended on a clear signal from the government that it intended to go forward to sign an agreement. This followed statements by Yanukovych to EU foreign policy chief Ashton and U.S. Assistant secretary of State Nuland that he intended to sign an agreement with the EU and not join the Russia-backed customs union. Yanukovych's response after a December visit to Moscow to meet with Putin was an agreement to receive $15 billion in loans and a sharp reduction in natural gas prices from Russia. Russia made an initial $3 billion purchase of Ukrainian bonds, suspended purchases for a month, then made another purchase of $2 billion in February 2014.

Yanukovych meeting with Putin in Moscow, December 17, 2013 (Russia Presidency website)

Poroshenko and the EU Ukraine’s relationship with the EU changed dramatically under Poroshenko. The President signed the economic part of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement (the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area chapter) on June 27, 2014, which many considered the beginning of Ukrainian integration into the European Union. Ukraine urged the EU to play a larger supporting role in the ongoing conflict with Russia. In March, 2015, the European Union approved three Macro-Financial Assistance operations to Ukraine totaling over $685 million, and in May, 2015, the European Investment Bank agreed to provide approximately $225 million in loans to Ukraine. Still, the EU remains reluctant to provide more than economic advisement and assistance.

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The signing of the Association Agreement and the Final Act between Ukraine and the European Union

Western responses to Russian occupation of Crimea and continuing pressure on Ukraine The United States President Obama authorized sanctions and visa restrictions against those responsible for or complicit in threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. He met with Ukrainian Prime Minster Yatsenyuk in Washington, and warned that Russia would face costs if it didn't shift gears on Ukraine. Obama and Yatsenyuk also outlined a plan to defuse the crisis by starting a dialogue between Kiev and Moscow on the status of Crimea. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Kerry visited Kyiv as well to show support for the new Ukrainian government. The US approved a $1 billion loan guarantee to Ukraine; and suspended military exercises, port visits and planning meetings, as well as called off trade talks with Russia. Vice President Biden also made a visit to Kyiv in a continuing demonstration of U.S. support, which included an additional package of $50 million and technical assistance. The United States has also committed millions of dollars in non-lethal aid to Ukraine, including drones, communications and medical equipment, and transportation equipment. The U.S. is also deploying small ground forces units to Poland and the Baltic states in exercises to underline NATO resolve against possible Russian pressure against alliance members. Relations between the United States and Russia have been strained as a result of Russia's ongoing aggression in Crimea. The US has been outspoken in its disapproval of Russia’s actions and has enacted economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia that Putin has vehemently opposed. However, the United States’ first high-level visit to Russia in May 2015 suggests that the relationship may be improving. Western organizations The EU announced aid packages to Ukraine in loans, grants, and credits over the next two years. In addition, the EU suspended bilateral talks with Russia on visa matters and agreed to a framework of asset freezes and travel bans.

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The US and Europeans also suspended Russia from the G8 group in March 2014. Decisions on further sanctions against Russia were taken by both the United States and European Council in July 2014. The European Council agreed to prepare additional sanctions and restrictive measures on Russian access to European capital markets, defense and dual use items, and sensitive technology, if Russia does not stop the supply of weapons, equipment and militants to Ukraine and withdraw the additional troops it has deployed to the border area. The UN passed Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity on Ukraine, confirming Russia’s annexation of Crimea as a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. The IMF provided loans to Ukraine to mitigate the ensuing economic crisis.

U.S. President Barack Obama, right, shakes hands with Ukraine president-elect Petro Poroshenko in Warsaw, Poland, Wednesday,

at a ceremony to mark the 25th anniversary of Poland's return to democracy. (VOA)

Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine The Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) on Ukraine was formed following the election of President Petro Poroshenko in May, 2014. It is comprised of representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE and operates to facilitate a diplomatic resolution to the war in Eastern Ukraine. The group

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has conducted ongoing talks between the parties since June, 2014 and was instrumental in negotiating ceasefires, most notably the Minsk Protocol. The TCG continues to work closely with monitoring the ongoing ceasefire and mitigating the impacts of violations

Attempts to strengthen the Minsk II Ceasfire Agreement (February 2015) On March 6, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steimeier stated that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to double the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine. The size of the overall mission increased to 1,000 personnel, although the OSCE continued to face obstacles in gaining access to many of the key areas covered by the February 12th ceasefire. On April 17, 300 U.S. troops from the 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived in Western Ukraine for a six-month training mission known as Operation Fearless Guardian. This training mission had been postponed from earlier in 2014 in order not to become an obstacle in the implementation of the Minsk II ceasefire agreement. The United States and Britain are the only states to deploy trainers to Ukraine. The arrival of the American paratroopers was strongly condemned by Vladimir Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov who claimed that the movement could "destabilize the situation."

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Ethnic relations Although the relative status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages has been a sensitive issue, relations between Ukrainians and Russians as ethnic communities in Ukraine have not been tense in most places. One exception is Crimea (see below). Another is Lviv in western Ukraine, where the local Russian community is treated with greater intolerance than in central and eastern Ukraine. The initially overwhelming public support for independence obscured a deep division in attitudes. Only in western Ukraine was independence valued for its own sake, as an ideal for which it was worth making sacrifices. In Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine and Crimea, most of those who voted for independence did so under the illusion that it would quickly bring prosperity. When it turned out that independence was instead followed by economic decline, they became increasingly hostile to the Ukrainian nationalists and the government in Kyiv. Their hostility was exacerbated by exaggerated fears that they would be forced to stop speaking Russian and use only Ukrainian.

Caution on "Ukrainianization" The lack of tension is due in large measure to the cautious approach of government regarding the “Ukrainianization” of the Russian-speaking regions. Despite the influence of Ukrainian nationalism in the early years of independence, an inclusive concept of the state has prevailed, based on common citizenship rather than ethnicity. Ethnic polarization between Russians and Ukrainians is also restrained by the presence of a large intermediate group of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and others of mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity. Even geography has helped in avoiding conflict. Between nationalist western Ukraine and anti-nationalist eastern Ukraine stretches the broad expanse of central Ukraine. Language, however, has continued to be a sensitive issue. In 2006, several pro-Russian legislators declared Russian a “regional” language. Then President Yushchenko called the change in language status unconstitutional. In 2012 government policy shifted. President Yanukovych signed a law allowing local and regional governments to give official status to Russian and other languages spoken by at least 10 percent of residents. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Knut Vollebaek expresed concern that the new language law could divide the country. he noted that Russian is spoken primarily in the country's east and south, while Ukrainian is spoken in the west and center. Ukrainian speakers fear that Russian could crowd out Ukrainian, as it did in Soviet times. The High Commissioner also expressed concern at the manner in which the law was adopted. He particularly referred to the parliamentary majority’s refusal to consider any of the more than 2,000 amendments put forward. In the immediate aftermath of Yanukovych's February 2014 downfall, parliament canceled the 2012 law on the "Principles of State Language Policy." The parliamentary speaker, however, reportedly vetoed the draft law. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Thors urged that the new Ukrainian authorities take measures to ensure that the concerns of all ethnic and linguistic groups are taken into consideration.

Little conflict between ethnic groups

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There has also been little conflict between the two main ethnic groups and the various small ethnic minorities—again with the exception of Crimea. In 1992 the governments of Ukraine and Hungary negotiated an agreement to guarantee the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. The issue of whether the Rusyns in Transcarpathia should be recognized as an ethnic group distinct from Ukrainians is potentially a source of tension.

Religious conflict There has been religious conflict between four Christian Churches, and most recently between some of the churches and the regime. These are: • The Russian Orthodox Church, led by Patriarch Filaret in Moscow. (Filaret is an ally of Russian President Putin.) • The breakaway Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate, loyal to independent Ukraine (The Church has been actively supporting the protests against Yanukovych's decision to back away from a closer relationship with the EU.) • The rival Ukrainian Orthodox Church, established by Ukrainian emigres in North America after World War Two. • The Uniate Church, a local variety of Catholicism that recognizes the authority of the Pope but retains some Orthodox rites. This Church is dominant in the west of the country. (Major Archbishop Shevchuk has urged Ukrainian authorities not to shed the blood of the anti-Yanukovych protesters, and a former Church leader spoke at one of the protest rallies.)

Parishioners of these different confessions have struggled with each other for possession of church buildings.

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Conflict with Pro-Russian Separatists This section contains the following: • Conflict overview • International involvement in the conflict

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Conflict overview The ongoing conflict in Ukraine began in November 2013, when Ukraine’s President Yanukovych rejected an agreement with the EU in favor of closer relations with Russia. The move sparked protests, which swelled through December, as citizens voiced their disapproval of the move. Tensions escalated and violence emerged as the government took action to stifle protestors. Although the government took steps to assuage protestors, such as eliminating anti-protest laws and releasing those arrested, violence between the government and opposition leaders escalated. On February 22, 2014, President Yanukovych abandoned Kyiv and protestors gained control of government buildings. Parliament appoints Olexander Turchynov as interim president. Parliament also votes to ban Russia as the official second language of Ukraine, causing outrage among millions within Russian-speaking regions. The move sparked protests among pro-Russian citizens, who initiated uprisings in Crimea, gaining control of government buildings in the capital of Simferopol. During April 2014, pro-Russian groups seized more than a dozen government buildings in eastern Ukraine and called for a referendum on autonomy. The seizures appeared to be far from spontaneous acts. Ukrainian authorities asserted that they were prepared to launch operations to recover the occupied buildings, but quickly showed a lack of capability. Russia became involved on March 1, 2014, when Russia’s parliament approved a use of force. Putin justified the intervention as a means to protect Russian interests in a country that was experiencing "violent instability" (although the Euromaidan Movement that unseated Yanukovych was largely nonviolent). On March 16, 2014, a Russia-backed referendum in Crimea, supported by 97% of voters, voted for Crimea’s integration into Russia. This development that sparked international outrage and was widely contested by the international community. Despite pressure from the West, Russia continued its involvement in Ukraine and support for pro-Russian rebels. On March 18, 2014, Russian President Putin signed a bill effectively accepting Crimea into the Russian Federation. Russia now maintains unfettered use of Sevastapol and other crucial bases on the Crimean peninsula, in addition to their shipyards and defense industry. This gives Russia the most powerful fleet on the Black Sea, and Russian Navy Commander Chirkov has stated that Russia will be adding more warships to the existing fleet. Soon following the annexation of Crimea, pro-Russian protests spread to East Ukraine, where rebels seized government buildings in key cities of Donetsk and Luhansk seeking independence. On May 11, 2014, Donetsk and Luhansk hold a referendum and subsequently declare independence. Ukraine holds elections on May 25, 2014 for the replacement of interim President Turchynov, although due to the ongoing crisis, elections are not held in Crimea or much of the East. Petro Poroshenko wins the presidential election. On June 25, 2014, Russia officially cancels its March resolution authorizing the use of force in Ukraine, and denies any subsequent contribution of support for rebels in Ukraine. However, the international community largely doubted Russia’s commitment to this policy. Substantial violence continued throughout Eastern Ukraine. On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over Ukraine, killing all 298 persons on board. According to US government officials, the BUK SAM system and training responsible for the attack was provided to rebels by Russia. Russia vehemently denies this, instead blaming Ukraine. Days after the

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shootdown of MH17, two Ukrainian high-performance SU-25 military jets were shot down in the same area. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission staff played a key role in gaining international access to the crash site and facilitating the emergency service personnel recovery of remains, and the work of crash and forensic investigators.

In June 2014, Russia began stepping up the supply of heavy material, including tanks and multiple launch rocket systems, to the separatists in eastern Ukraine, as well as providing them with artillery fire support from inside Russia.

In August 2014, Ukrainian forces appeared to have regained three-quarters of the area of eastern Ukraine that had been seized by separatists, reportedly pushing into Luhansk and encircling Donetsk. In response, seeking to preserve the separatist revolt, Russia expanded its involvement in Ukraine, making additional incursions into the border town of Novazovsk, the area near the coastal city of Mariupol and south of Donesk. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen stated that Russian artillery support has been used against Ukrainian forces from inside Ukraine and from across the border in Russia. Meanwhile, Russia sent a 280-truck humanitarian aid convoy to Eastern Ukraine in mid-August. Concerned that the approaching convoy might be a cover for assistance to the separatists, the Ukrainian government insisted on a coordinated process involving International Committee of the Red Cross verification of the contents of the trucks. After a first group of 32 trucks was inspected by the ICRC on August 22 and allowed to proceed, the arrangement broke down. The remaining Russian trucks entered Ukraine without access being given to the ICRC or Ukrainian customs officials or border guards, and proceeded to an area controlled by the separatists. The contents of the trucks remain unknown. The Minsk Protocol, a ceasefire agreement, was signed in Minsk on September 5, 2014. The agreement included: 1. Immediate bilateral ceasefire 2. OSCE to monitor the ceasefire 3. Decentralization of power in Ukraine (law on special status of Donetsk and Luhansk) 4. Permanent monitoring at the Ukraine-Russia border and creation of safety zon 5. Immediately free all hostages and prisoners 6. Amnesty law for those involved in certain events in Donetsk and Luhansk 7. Continue dialogue 8. Humanitarian relief to Donbas 9. Conduct early elections in Donetsk and Luhansk (in accordance with law on special status granted to Donetsk and luhansk) 10. Eliminate illegal military stations and equipment in Ukraine

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11. Program for economic development in Donbas 12. Guarantee security for consultants of ceasefire

The ceasefire was repeatedly violated by both sides but by September 24 NATO reported significant withdrawal of troops. In addition, President Poroshenko proposed limited self-rule and amnesty elections for a new Ukrainian parliament were held on October 26 but the elections were protested by many in East Ukraine. Separate parliamentary elections in the Donbas region, made up of the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics, were held in the East on November 2. By the start of the new year, fighting had resumed to pre-ceasefire intensity. Rebels gained control of the Donetsk airport on January 22, 2015, and battled fiercely for Debaltseve, a crucial rail hub linking Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukrainian forces worried that complete cession of these key cities would allow rebels the opportunity to resupply, perpetuating the conflict and bolstering their ability to expand. In January 2015, fighting between the army and the rebels intensified in and around Donesk and Luhansk. On 22 January 2015, Ukrainian forces withdrew from Donesk airport's main terminal, after weeks of bitter fighting. Government forces had been able to shell rebel positions inside nearby Donesk - the largest city held by the militants. There were fears its capture could help the rebels to resupply - allowing munitions, hardware and manpower to be airlifted into the conflict zone but much of the airport suffered considerable destruction. The rebels continued their offensive in February. The fiercest fighting was near the town of Debaltseve, a crucial rail hub linking Donesk and Luhansk, where the rebels tried to surround Ukrainian troops. The military situation created strong incentives for the government in Kiev to reach a ceasefire. A second ceasefire agreement was reached in Minsk on February 12, 2015, referred to as Minsk II. The full-text can be found here (Russian), or an unofficial English translation can be found here. This agreement consists of goals similar to those outlined in its predecessor: 1. Immediate bilateral ceasefire, to take effect within three days 2. Bilateral withdrawal of heavy weapons, to be completed within two weeks 3. OSCE monitoring 4. Dialogue on local elections for the separatist-held regions 5. Complete amnesty for participants in the conflict 6. “All for all” release of hostages and detainees 7. Internationally supervised delivery of humanitarian aid 8. Restoration of full social and economic linkages, including pension payments and banking services, to affected regions 9. Restoration of full Ukrainian government control of its border, contingent upon a political settlement 10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, weapons, and mercenaries, monitored by OSCE 11. Constitutional reform by the end of 2015, including decentralization and permanent

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special status for the separatist-held regions.

Sporadic fighting persisted, particularly in Debaltseve. Violence ebbed slightly through February and March, as Ukrainian forces and rebels withdrew slowly from the region. In early March, Ukraine and Russia agreed to double the capacity of the present OSCE monitoring mission in the region to promote peace. Each side has accused the other side of not living up to the terms of the ceasefire. Ukraine has continued to ask the European countries and the US to continue sanctions on Russia while Russia has called on those same countries to increase pressure on the Kiev government to adhere to the ceasefire conditions. OSCE head Lamberto Zannier stated in early March that while there were still violations, the ceasefire was broadly holding in eastern Ukraine because neither side was using large artillery systems and in some cases such heavy weapons systems were moved away from the ceasefire line. However, tensions escalated in April 2015 with an increasing number of ceasefire violations from both sides. This continued through June, when severe fighting broke out in Maryinka and Krasnohorivka, areas just outside of Donetsk. The OSCE notes increasing violations of the ceasefire. Ukraine continues to report that pro-Russian rebels are bolstered substantially by Russia. Reports in May 2015 suggest that fighting in Donetsk has reverted to pre-ceasefire intensity as the rebels battle for Shirokino, Peski, and surrounding villages. In early July 2015, pro-Russian forces in Southeast Ukraine withdrew from the village of Shyrokyne, located near the port city of Mariupol, a significant development due to the town’s strategic location. Separatist forces began retreating unilaterally, although tensions in the town remain high. Demilitarization in the town included militant withdrawals and de-mining observed by the OSCE. Despite this, reports in July point to a substantial increase in fighting in regions of Donetsk, Svitlordarsk, and Horlivka. In August, intensity rose to a level not seen since February, as fighting gradually moved closer to the port of Mariupol. In late August 2015, the Contact Group negotiated a ceasefire to begin September 1, 2015 to affirm the Minsk II agreement from February. Despite low-intensity violations, the agreement largely holds through September, and Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists agree to withdraw small arms from the line of contact to begin October 3, 2015. Substantial withdrawals from both sides are reported by the OSCE by October 20 in both Donetsk and Luhansk. Meanwhile, local elections in the self-proclaimed People’s Republic of Donetsk and Luhansk are postponed until February.

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Members of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine examine the MH17 crash site.(OSCE)

Satellite images pointing to movement of Russian tanks to eastern Ukraine, June 2014 (NATO)

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International involvement in the conflict Russia Russia has been an integral component to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea helped spur action among pro-Russian citizens of Ukraine. Putin insists that Crimea is historically, culturally, and politically a part of Russia, despite substantial global disagreement. Still, Russia has vehemently denied providing weapons or human capital to support rebels in Ukraine. However, evidence suggests otherwise, as experts have identified Russian equipment, soldiers, and arms among the rebels. Putin denies sending soldiers or support to rebels in Ukraine, and continues to insist that any Russians fighting in Ukraine are volunteers.

The United States In reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, President Obama authorized sanctions and visa restrictions against those responsible for or complicit in threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. This has included allies of Putin and former Yanukovych officials. Additionally, the US has repeatedly demonstrated its support for Ukraine by engaging with the country’s government and providing assistance throughout the crisis. The United States has offered support in the form of advisement, humanitarian aid, and non-lethal assistance. The United States deployed advisors to Ukraine to mitigate economic instability following the initiation of the crisis in March 2014. Additionally, the United States has spent billions in aid to Ukraine. Non-lethal assistance to Ukraine’s armed forces has included military training and equipment, such as protective gear, vehicles, training, and medical supplies. Humanitarian assistance has emphasized IDPs, reconstruction, food provision, and medical aid. Although the United States’ assistance remains non-lethal as of November 2015, the Senate continues to pressure the administration to arm Ukrainian forces.

The United Nations The United Nations has played a limited role in the Ukraine conflict. Russia’s veto power has prevented the organization from taking substantial action against aggression in the region. On March 27, 2014, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 68/262 in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Approved with 100 member states in favor, 11 against, and 58 abstaining, the resolution upheld the territorial integrity of Ukraine and condemned Russia’s actions as clear violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty. The resolution described the referendum in Crime as having no legal validity and called on states to not recognize the change in Ukraine’s borders. On February 12, 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2202 confirming and endorsing the Minsk II ceasefire agreement.

OSCE The OSCE has sought to play a stabilizing role in Ukraine at many levels. This has included actions by the OSCE Chair in Office, Secretary General, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Representative on Freedom of the Media, ODIHR, and CiP Personal envoy for Ukraine. OSCE CiO Burkhalter sent his Special Representative for Ukraine Guldimann and High Commissioner on National Minorities Thors to Crimea. See report on Personal Envoy Guldimann's

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press conference. CiO Burkhalter stated on March 11 that the Crimean referendum was illegal in its current form and called for alternative ways to address the Crimean issue. Eighteen OSCE participating states sent 35 unarmed military observers to Ukraine, destination Crimea, at the request of the Ukrainian government, as a confidence-building measure under Chapter 11 of the 2011 Vienna Document. This was the first time this OSCE mechanism had been activated. This step was taken at a joint meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council and Forum for Security Cooperation on March 4. The observers were prevented from entering Crimea by armed groups (Russian military personnel without insignia or militias controlled by Russia) who controlled the entry points to the Crimean peninsula. The OSCE Permanent Council agreed in March 2014 to deploy a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine. The Chief Monitor is Ertogrul Apakan from Turkey, and his two deputies are Mark Etherington from the United Kingdom and Alexander Hug from Switzerland. Staffed by an initial 100 civilian monitors (now up to 543 from 44 participating states plus Ukrainian local staff), the mission was renewed by the PC for another six months (through September 20, 2014) at the request of Ukraine. The SMM is operating out of nine cities in eastern and southern Ukraine. The OSCE is issuing daily updates on the ongoing situation in eastern Ukraine to increase transparency and ensure accurate information on ongoing developments. SMM monitors have at times been detained by separatist groups, with two teams held by separatists for more than a month before they were released towards the end of June. Russia has barred SMM monitors from Crimea, which it has annexed. OSCE deployed a team of 15 experts to Ukraine to initiate a National Dialogue project to identify areas for further OSCE activities to support confidence-building between different parts of Ukrainian society. The team deployed for four weeks in locations agreed with the Ukrainian government to gather information on political, humanitarian and minority issues. The project sought to contribute to a peaceful and sustainable political transition in the country by supporting a national, inclusive and impartial dialogue throughout Ukraine. The team was deployed following a request by Ukraine and was carried out by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine. The 15-person expert team headed by Ambassador Hidajet Biščević of Croatia submitted a report with recommendations on how the OSCE can support dialogue and restore confidence in Ukraine on the local, regional and national levels. The first National Dialogue Roundtable was held in Kyiv May 14, the second in Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine on May 17, and a third in Mykolaiv in southern Ukraine May 21. Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger is the OSCE CiO's representative to the National Dialogue Roundtables. ODIHR and the High Commissioner on National Minorities also sent teams of human rights and minority rights experts to Ukraine respectively during March and April, and issued a joint report in May. OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Mijatović has also highlighted the threat to journalists from violence, intimidation and psychological warfare in the conflict areas of eastern Ukraine. See her May 23 report. Thirty OSCE participating states also sent 56 military/civilian observers in response to an invitation by Ukraine under the Vienna Document 2011 on military transparency. An observer team and their Ukrainian military escort were taken hostage by a pro-Russian group in Slavyansk in eastern Ukraine on April 25 and released on May 3.

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The Swiss CiO announced next steps to "reverse the logic of escalation in Ukraine" on May 4 and is engaged in its implementation. A Contact Group of Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE was set up in July 2014 (by Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia), to work with the Ukrainian government and separatists to set up a lasting truce. The OSCE PC approved in late July the deployment of a new Observer Mission of 15 personnel in Russia to observe the border of Russia and Ukraine. At the request of the Russian government, the OSCE launched the Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk in August 2014, led by Chief Observer Paul Picard. The OSCE stations observers to report with impartiality and transparency on the situation at the checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk in addition to other border regions. The key goals of this mission include border management and conflict prevention and resolution. The OSCE seeks to bolster border security while facilitating travel and commerce, and provides support to reduce ongoing tensions.

Ambassador Tim Guldimann, Personal Envoy of the Swiss OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Ukraine, briefing OSCE participating States and senior OSCE officials, Vienna, 3 March 2014. (OSCE, Jonathan Perfect)

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OSCE Monitors prepare for deployment, Kyiv, 6 April 2014. (OSCE)

A map marked with the Russian checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk, where OSCE Observers will be stationed. (Google Maps)

MODULE 4 Eastern Europe 94 CHAPTER 3 Moldova Moldova is a sovereign state in Eastern Europe that was formerly part of the Soviet Union. This chapter contains the following sections on Moldova: • Key information • Historical background • Domestic politics • Foreign relations • Ethnic relations • Culture

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Key information Geography

Item Description Area 13,000 square miles Natural resources Moldova is best known for its grapes and wines. There is some brown coal (lignite) and minerals.

People

Item Description Population 3.620 million (2013 est.). There are estimates that a quarter or more of the population are working outside the country. Ethnic groups According to the 2004 census (which did not include the Transdniester region): Moldovans/Romanians 78.2%, Ukrainians 8.4%, Russians 5.8%, Gagauz 4.4%, Bulgarian 1.9%, Other 1.3%. A separate census held in the Transdniester region recorded Moldovans at 32% of the region’s population; Russians, 30%; and Ukrainians, 29%. Gagauz live mainly in the area around Comrat, profess Orthodox Christianity, and speak a form of classical Ottoman Turkish. Religions Eastern Orthodox 98%, Jewish 1.5%, Baptist and other 0.5% (2000 est.) Languages Moldovan is virtually identical to Romanian, which belongs to the Romance group of the Indo-European language family. Moldovan was written in the Cyrillic script to emphasize the supposed difference during the Soviet period. The Latin script is now again in use (except in the Transdniester region).

Government

Item Description Capital Chisinau System of Parliamentary democracy government

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Item Description Head of state Nicolae Timofti Currency Leu

Regions The present-day Republic of Moldova occupies the same territory as the Soviet republic that it replaced, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. To understand the historical background of this territory, we must make a clear distinction between the two main regions.

Region Description Right Bank Between the Rivers Prut and Dniester, an area that corresponds to the greater part of what was known in the 19th and early 20th centuries as Bessarabia Left Bank Also known as the Transdniester region

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Historical background This section describes the historical background of Moldova: • Before Russian rule • Under Russian and Soviet rule • From Perestroika to independence

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Before Russian rule In the Late Middle Ages, Bessarabia was part of the principality of Moldova. During the second half of the 15th century, the principality fought off attacks from Ottoman Turkey under the leadership of Prince Stephen the Great, who is now regarded as the father of the Moldovan nation. However, when Stephen died in 1504, Moldova became a Turkish dependency. In the 18th century it came increasingly under Russian influence. In 1812, Bessarabia was incorporated into the Russian Empire. Then in 1918, during the Russian Civil War, it was incorporated into Romania, where it remained until 1940.

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Under Soviet rule Before the Soviet period, the Transdniester region had always been regarded as part of Ukraine, not of Moldova or Bessarabia. Only in 1924 was it artificially given a Moldovan identity as part of a new Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the Ukrainian SSR. This formation was created to facilitate the eventual re-absorption of Bessarabia into the Soviet Union—a goal finally achieved in 1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov signs the German-Soviet non-aggression pact in Moscow, August 23, 1939. In the background also appear Joachim von Ribbentrop and Joseph Stalin standing among the translators and secretaries. (nara.gov)

Moldavian SSR In 1941 Romania joined its ally, Nazi Germany, in attacking the USSR, and occupied Bessarabia together with a broad swath of Ukrainian land further to the east. In 1944 the Soviet army re-conquered Bessarabia. Only then were the two parts of present-day Moldova joined together to form the Moldavian SSR. At the same time, about one-third of Bessarabia, including its entire Black Sea coastline, was incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR.

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However, the two parts of the Moldavian SSR remained different in important ways. The Transdniester region, having long been part of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, remained more Russified and Sovietized than Right-Bank Moldavia. The difference widened with intensive postwar industrialization that brought a big influx of Russian and Ukrainian workers into the Transdniester region.

Moldovan Popular Front (MPF) Latent tensions came out into the open when President Gorbachev started liberalizing the Soviet political system. In May 1989, the Moldovan Popular Front (MPF) was established in Right-Bank Moldova. The MPF served as an umbrella organization for Moldovans who sought Moldova’s secession from the USSR and (in most cases) unification with Romania. Two opposing movements also developed: • The Intermovement, representing pro-Soviet Russian-speakers, and • Gagauz Khalky, representing the Gagauz minority.

Soon after, there began the long series of rallies, protests, and strikes that led to violent clashes and eventually civil war.

Clashes in October 1990 lead to split In March 1990, the MPF gained control of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR in the first competitive elections to that body. Alarmed at the apparent prospect of finding themselves unwelcome minorities within a Greater Romania, the Gagauz and Russian-speakers of Left-Bank Moldova reacted by proclaiming Gagauz and Transdniester autonomous republics (ASSRs) within Moldova (in November 1989 and January 1990 respectively). The MPF-dominated Supreme Soviet, however, refused to recognize these autonomous republics. In June 1990, the Supreme Soviet declared the sovereignty of the Moldovan (no longer the term "Moldavian," which expresses inclusiveness of all ethnic groups) SSR, and appointed its chairman Mircea Snegur president. Although that did not mean full independence yet, this was evidently the goal. In September 1990, the Gagauz area and the Transdniester region proclaimed themselves Republics of the USSR (SSRs) outside Moldova. In October 1990, a confrontation between crowds of MPF and Gagauz activists, many armed, ended without violence thanks to the intervention of Soviet troops and the negotiation of mutual concessions. But in November 1990 the first violent clashes did occur between Transdniester volunteers and Moldovan police in the city of Dubossary on the Dniester River.

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From Perestroika to independence The Republic of Moldova (the country’s official name since May 1991) declared independence in the wake of the attempted hard-line coup in Moscow in August 1991. The Communist Party of Moldavia was banned. The Transdniester region immediately responded by declaring its independence as the Transdniester Moldovan Republic, with Tiraspol as its capital.

Flag of the Transdneister Moldovan Repbulic

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Domestic politics This section describes domestic politics in Moldova, including: • Elections since independence • The Gagauz conflict • The “frozen” Transdniester conflict

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Elections since independence 1991 presidential election Marcea Snegur, a former communist party official who advocated independence, ran unopposed as an independent and was elected the first president of Moldova in 1991. Meanwhile, Moldovan politics became increasingly polarized between the Moldovan Popular Front (renamed in February 1992 the Popular Christian Democratic Party (PPCD) on one side and communist and post-communist forces on the other. From about 1993 a realignment began to take shape.

Marcea Snegur (Moldova official presidential website)

1994 parliamentary elections In May 1993, the moderate nationalists, who opposed union with Romania, were expelled from the PPCD and founded the Social-Democratic Party of Moldova. In the parliamentary elections, the PPCD lost most of its support, retaining a mere 7.5% of the vote. Two post-communist parties -- the Agrarian Party of Moldova, whose deputies were mostly village mayors and collective farm managers, and the former Communist Party, renamed the Social Democratic Party -- won the elections. Neither the Democratic Labor Party, representing the managers of large industrial enterprises, nor the Party of Reform, representing urban professionals supportive of private enterprise, overcame the 4% threshold necessary for a party to enter parliament. A month after the election, a referendum was held in which over 90% of voters approved the

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continued independence of Moldova and rejected unification with Romania, thereby laying the issue to rest. In July parliament ratified a new constitution.

1996 presidential elections Petru Lucinschi, who had been First Secretary of the Communist Party of Moldavia from 1989 to1991, defeated President Snegur.

Petru Lucinschi (Moldova presidential official website)

1998 parliamentary elections The post-communist parties lost their majority in the parliamentary elections of March 1998. Although the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, with 30% of the vote, did better than any other single party, a governing coalition of center-right parties (together representing 45% of voters) was formed under the name “Alliance for Democracy and Reforms,” led by former President Snegur. International observers assessed Moldovan elections as largely free and fair. For most of the 1990s, Moldova had a mixed parliamentary-presidential system, with the president elected by popular vote. In 2000, parliament amended the constitution to enable it to elect the president.

2001 parliamentary elections

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The Communist Party won over 50% of the vote on pledges to bring Moldova closer to Russia and restore living standards to Soviet-era standards. The communists gained more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament, while the PPCD won only 11 seats. In March, the new parliament chose Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin as president.

Vladimir Voronin, third president of Moldova (NATO)

Government pressures on opposition In January 2002, the communist government responded to opposition demonstrations against compulsory Russian language classes in schools by suspending temporarily the activity of the PPCD. Relations between the government and the opposition were tense, and independent media (especially radio stations) were harassed.

2005 parliamentary elections The elections produced a 56-seat majority (out of 101 seats) for the ruling Communist Party. The Communist Party won 46% of the vote (down slightly) on a campaign emphasizing a pro-European orientation, the Democratic Moldova Bloc won 29% (doubling its previous showing), and the PPCD won about 10% (no change). The other 12 parties contesting the elections did not clear the 6% threshold. The International Election Observation Mission concluded that the elections were generally in compliance with most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other international election standards.

2005 presidential election Voronin easily won reelection by parliament as president with 75 votes, 14 more than required.

Continuing pressure on opposition Amnesty International criticized Moldova in September 2006 for the arrest of nine NGO activists who held an anti-government demonstration.

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2007 local elections The Communist Party took 33 % of the votes, which was considerably less than the 54% it had won four years earlier. The Party Alliance Our Moldova came in second with 14% of the votes. The International Election Observation Mission noted that the local elections gave voters a genuine choice, and were generally well administered. Other aspects of the elections, however, fell short of international commitments. Intimidation of candidates was one of the major shortcomings. Media coverage of state authorities benefited pro-government candidates. There were also cases where local authorities failed to guarantee equal conditions for all parties and candidates.

First woman prime minister

In 2008, President Voronin nominated Deputy Prime Minister Zinaida Greceanii, another Communist, as the first woman prime minister in Moldova’s history.

Zinaida Greceani (Moldova government website)

2009 parliamentary elections The Communist Party again won a majority, 60 out of 101 seats, in the April election. The opposition Liberal, Liberal Democratic and Our Moldova Alliance Parties won, 15, 15 and 11 seats respectively. Turnout was 59.49 percent, above the 50 percent needed for the election to be valid. The International Election Observation Mission reported that the election met many international standards and commitments, although further improvements were required to ensure an electoral process free from undue administrative interference and to increase public confidence.

Protests against the alleged election results

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On the second day of the protest, an estimated 10,000 protesters stormed and ransacked the presidential office and parliament in reaction to the results that were announced on April 7, claiming that the election had been rigged. Opposition leaders backed the protests, but condemned the violence. Riot police retook the two buildings, leaving one dead, more than 270 police and demonstrators injured, and hundreds arrested.The 25-year old journalist, Natalia Morar , and several other young activists organized a demonstration in front of the Molodovan parliament to protest the election results. The activists used the social media site Twitter. At the time of the protests, the bodies of four Moldovans who had taken part in the demonstrations were also discovered. They had been tortured before being killed. It is believed that the Moldovan Ministry of Interior is responsible for their deaths. President Voronin reacted to accusations that the election had been rigged by asking the Constitutional Court to conduct a recount. The opposition dismissed his action as a trick, and said it would take no part in the process. Meanwhile, Voronin accused protestors of acting on behalf of Romania to bring down his government. Russia and other members of the CIS backed Voronin. The U.S. and EU urged an end to violence. The recount confirmed the Communist Party's win. Nonetheless, the Communist Party had not garnered the 61 parliamentary votes necessary to elect its candidate, Zinaida Greceani, to the presidency.

More elections do not resolve formation stalemate Voronin dissolved parliament after it twice failed to elect a new president. New parliamentary elections were held in July, giving four opposition parties 53 seats and the Communists 48 seats. The victors established a coalition, the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), which formed the new government. The AEI’s parliamentary speaker, Mihai Ghimpu, became Acting President. But the AEI was unable to elect its candidate, Marian Lupu, to the presidency in two more parliamentary ballots. The AEI was also unable to successfully amend the constitution in a popular referendum in 2010 due to insufficient voter turnout. With the presidential electoral process deadlocked, parliamentary speaker Ghimpu continued as Acting President.

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Mihai Ghimpu (Wikimedia Commons)

Marian Lupu, leader of the Democratic Party (Council of Europe)

2010 parliamentary elections Due the failure of constitutional referendum, the Constitutional Court of Moldova ruled that acting

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president of Moldova, Mihai Ghimpu had to dissolve the parliament and hold new elections. New elections were held in November 2010. The AEI Coalition(Liberal Democratic, Democratic and Liberal Parties) ran against the Communist Party, winning 59 seats --2 short of the 61 needed to elect a President. Moldova's highest court ruled on 8 February 2011 that the government could stay in place without early elections even if it was still unable to elect a new president. Observers from the OSCE and the Council of Europe lauded the election, with the head of the Parliamentary Assembly delegation of OSCE, Tonino Picula, saying "These elections reflected the will of the people".

December 2011 and January 2012 presidential elections

Due to parliament's inability to break their deadlock and elect a president, Moldova had an acting president for 900 days. In December 2011 the Commission for Constitutional Reform in Moldova was established by presidential decree to resolve the constitutional crisis. After the December election failed to elect a president, a second attempt was made in January 2012. However, that vote was annulled as being unconstitutional since it had not been held in a secret vote. In March 2012, parliament elected Nicolae Timofti as president by 62 votes out of 101, putting an end to a political crisis that had lasted since 2009.

Current President of Moldova, Nicolae Timofti (Moldova presidential website)

Governing coalition splits Scandals and rivalries divide AEI A series of scandals, accusations and political in-fighting since December 2012 led to the collapse of the governing AEI coalition. Prime Minister Filat's criticism of an alleged cover-up by

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Prosecutor Valeriy Zubco of the shooting death of a businessman during a hunting trip led to Zubco's forced resignation. (Participants in the hunting party included Zubco, and some 20 senior judges, prosecutors and state officials). Zubco is affiliated with the Democratic Party (PDM), one of the AEI components. Subsequently, the PDM-controlled Anti-Corruption Center started investigating ministers from Filat's Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM), its AEI partner (and rival). The corruption investigations--including in the Prime Minister's own office--received heavy attention in the PDM-controlled Prime and Publika tv channels. Filat responded by terminating the coalition agreement with the PDM, saying it had to be completely revised. The AEI coalition's cohesion had been dependent on agreements giving each component party (and in practice their leaders) control of specific state institutions. The result was that private interests and corruption drove some institutional agendas, including those of law enforcement and judicial bodies. Vote of no-confidence passes The Communists took advantage of the implosion of the AEI coalition to press a parliamentary motion of no-confidence. The motion passed March 5 with the support of Communist, PDM and some independent deputies. All of Lupu's PDM voted to bring down Filat's government. Timofti reappoints prime minister(s) Timofti reappointed Filat prime minister in April 2013. Filat sought to rebuild the AEI coalition through concessions to the PDM, involving appointments in the law enforcement and judicial sectors. These concessions backfired on Filat. Responding to a petition by Ghimpu's Liberals (then aligned with the PDM but now split into two factions), the Constitutional Court ruled that reappointment of Filat would be illegal since a prime minister of a cabinet that had fallen after a no-confidence vote on suspicion of fraud cannot carry out its mandate. Timofti then turned to Deputy Prime Minister Iurie Leanca from the PLDM and appointed him interim prime minister. Leanca had been Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration in the previous government. Parliamentary response and international criticism An ad hoc parliamentary majority of Filat's PLDM and Communists--each for its own reasons-- supported a legislative package to neutralize PDM leaders Lupu and Vlad Plahotniuc (Modova's wealthiest businessman and Lupu's financial backer) in early May 2013. These measures included enabling parliament to remove judges of the Constitutional Court by a 3/5 majority of all members if the judges do not have the trust of parliament, raising the electoral threshold for election to parliament from 4 to 6%, and giving the prime minister the power to fire ministers and senior officials. President Timofti vetoed the proposed law on the removal of constitutional court judges. Although pro-European integration ministers retained their positions in the cabinet, EU, Council of Europe and OSCE ODIHR officials criticized the new legislation as a threat to democracy and to closer ties between Moldova and Europe. Leanca forms government Leanca's government--based on a new "Coalition of Pro-European Rule" consisting of Liberal Democrats, Democrats and a faction of the Liberals-- won a vote of confidence at the end of May 2013 with the backing of 31 Liberal Democrats, 15 Democrats,7 Liberals, 3 breakaway

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Communists, and 2 independent MPs.

Iurie Leanca (Government of Moldova Website)

Vlad Plahotniuc (flickr)

Parliamentary elections in 2014 Parliamentary elections should be held in November 2014.

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The Gagauz conflict Although clashes did take place between Gagauz demonstrators and Moldovan police in 1991, the situation in the Gagauz area never escalated to large-scale violence. As a fairly small minority living in a poor and isolated agricultural area, the Gagauz—unlike the Transdniester—were not perceived by other Moldovans as a significant threat to the country’s independence and territorial integrity.

Establishing a recognized autonomous territory Discussion of draft laws to create a recognized autonomous territory for the Gagauz began as early as October 1991, and in April 1993 a Gagauz congress decided that the Gagauz would remain within Moldova provided that they received the necessary guarantees. However, resolution of the conflict on this basis was blocked so long as the parliament remained dominated by the MPF. The blockage was removed in February 1994 by the election of a new and less nationalist parliament.

Special status of the Gagauz area The new constitution adopted in July 1994 envisaged the granting of special status to the Gagauz area (as well as to the Transdniester region). The basis for resolving the conflict was established in December 1994, when a law was passed codifying the autonomous status of Gagauzia. The OSCE Mission to Moldova played an important supporting role in nurturing the negotiation process and monitoring implementation of the new arrangements.

The flag of Gagauzia.

Elections Dimitru Croitor won the 1999 elections and started using the rights granted to the Gagauzia governor in the 1994 law. Tensions erupted, as central government authorities were unwilling to go along with the changes. Croitor resigned in 2002 under pressure from Chisinau. He was not allowed by the Central Elections Council to run again for governor. Mihail Formuzal was elected Gagauzia governor in 2007 and reelected again in 2010.

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OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier (l) meets the Governor of the Gagauzia autonomous territorial unit of Moldova, Mihail Formuzal, Chisinau, 17 July 2012. (OSCE/Igor Schimbător)

Challenges for Gagauzia The economic situation in the largely agricultural Gagauzia is no better than in the rest of Moldova. Governor Formuzal has requested the central government to fund Romanian language studies in the autonomous territory. In 2011 a large percentage of school children failed Romanian language exams needed for entrance to University. During Soviet times Gagauzia had mainly Russian-speaking schools. Without the Romanian language, Gagauzians have limited employment options.

Gagauzia referendum on EU or Russia-led Customs Union Preference for Russia in referendum without legal status A referendum organized by the Peoples Assembly of Gagauzia in Febuary 2014 produced overwhelming majorities for closer relations with the Russia-led Customs Union (98.4%), against a closer relationship with the EU (97.2%), and the right to independence if Moldova surrenders or loses its independence (98.9%). Turnout was reportedly over 70%. Gauguaz Autonomous Territorial Unit Governor Formuzal called on residents to participate to make their voices heard even though the central government and a local court ruled the referendum unconstitutional and without legal status. The referendum's outcome does underline the affiliation many Russian-speaking Gauguaz have for Russia, their interest in participating in the Russian labor market, and concern at the impact of Russian sanctions aimed at giving Moldova second thoughts about an association agreement with the EU..

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The “frozen” Transdniester conflict Meanwhile, Slavs in Transdniestria took the lead in declaring a “Dnestr Moldavian Republic,” with its capital at Tiraspol, as a part of the Soviet Union. Igor Smirnov was elected "president" of the Dnester Republic. Fighting broke out in the city of Dubrasary in 1990. Combatants included local militia and Moldovan police, and eventually involved the newly formed Moldovan internal security troops, soldiers of the new Moldovan National Army and Transdniester Guard, volunteers from Romania (with the Moldovans), and Cossack volunteers from Russia (with the Transdniesters). The Russian 14th Army, deployed on the Left Bank, remained officially neutral, but its members sympathized with the Transdniesters and provided them with arms. By June 1992 hundreds had been killed, over a thousand wounded, and at least 100,000 refugees. On June 25 the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania met and agreed on a plan to enforce a ceasefire. The forces of the two sides were to be separated, a peacekeeping force interposed between them, and a (Russia, Moldova, Transdneister) Joint Control Commission established in Bendery. These arrangements have been in place since August 1992. The peacekeepers are mainly Russian troops together with small Moldovan and Transdniester contingents.

Transdniestrian Leader Igor Smirnov; Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Ambassador Philip Remler, and Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, leaving the OSCE Mission's office in Bender after a meeting, 21 November 2011. (OSCE/Igor Rotari)

Negotiations and OSCE Hostilities have not resumed. Neither, however, have the numerous rounds of negotiations between the two sides made much progress toward a settlement. Negotiations have been conducted between the Moldovan government and the Transdniestrian authorities, under the joint auspices of Russia and the OSCE, with a Ukrainian representative also present from 1996 onward. (The U.S. and EU joined the process as observers in 2005.) The OSCE mission has played an active role, keeping channels of communication open and attempting to mediate a lasting political settlement between the sides. It has also sought to monitor human rights in all

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parts of the country, including Transdniestria. From an early stage Moldovan leaders have accepted that the Transdniester region should be given a special autonomous status within Moldova, including the right to secede in the event that Moldova unites with Romania. A proposal for a special status for Transdniestria was presented in 1993 by the CSCE mission to Moldova and accepted by the Moldovan government, but not by the Transdniestrian authorities. The OSCE Mission to Moldova

Some limited agreements Concessions offered by successive Moldovan governments have never been enough to satisfy Transdniester leaders, who seem willing to contemplate only a loose association with Moldova. Agreement has been reached only on the non-use of force (July 1995), some confidence-building measures, and certain practical matters. In June 2001, Smirnov and Voronin met and agreed to dismantle checkpoints, rebuild bridges across the Dniester, and cooperate in the economic field.

OSCE proposal for federation In 2002, the OSCE Mission proposed a federal solution to settle the Transdniester conflict. Several rounds of negotiations followed between the Moldovan government and Transdniestrian authorities with mediators from the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine.

Moldova federation plan A 2003 Moldovan proposal for a Joint Constitutional Commission (JCC) to draft a new constitution within three months was approved by Tiraspol. Despite several months JCC meetings, the agreement to devise a Moldovan federation masked unresolved basic differences between the two sides.

Ambassador William Hill, Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, hosts a historic meeting of a joint commission which will draft a new constutition for the country, Chisinau, 24 April 2003. (OSCE)

Russian Kozak plan As a result, later in 2003, President Voronin turned to Russia and asked it to put forward a proposal for a federation, which was announced as the Kozak plan. (Putin aide Dmitry Kozak was

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the author of the document.) Transdniester leaders accepted the plan, which envisaged an equal or symetric federation, and dropped their earlier demands for a loose confederation. In the face of U.S. and EU opposition, Voronin turned away from the Russian plan.

2005 Ukrainian initiative In May 2005, new Ukrainian President Yushchenko proposed a new peace plan to reintegrate Transdniestria into Moldova. Ukraine’s stepped-up involvement was publicly welcomed by both Transdniestrian and Moldovan authorities. A meeting was held in Ukraine attended by Moldovan and Transdniestrian representatives, but nothing followed.

5+2 Negotiating process launched In October 2005, the EU and U.S. joined the negotiating process as observers. The process thus became the 5+2 format (Moldova, Transdniestria, OSCE, Russia and Ukraine + U.S. and EU). During mid-2007, media reports asserted that the Voronin government was again engaged in secret bilateral talks on a Transdniestria package deal with Russia outside the 5+2 format.

2008 Voronin-Smirnov meeting Voronin and Smirnov unexpectedly met on April 11, 2008 for the first time in seven years. According to official reports, they agreed: • To form confidence-building working groups that would propose concrete projects in infrastructure development, road construction, security and disarmament, and in the social, cultural and humanitarian fields • On concrete steps to enhance the negotiating process • That Moldova would ask the U.S. and EU to cancel their travel bans on Transdniester leaders, and that Transdniestria would cancel its restrictions on the entry and freedom of movement for all Moldovan officials

They did not make any public comments on resumption of the 5+2 negotiating process. Smirnov reportedly put forward a “Treaty of Friendship Between Moldova and Transnistria” which treated them as equals, and included Moldova’s recognition of Transdniestria’s secession and a Russian military presence. Moldova had previously rejected these points.

Another high-level meeting in 2009 Russian President Medvedev hosted Voronin and Smirnov at a meeting outside of Moscow on March 18, 2009. The three leaders committed themselves to finding a solution to the Transdniestria conflict, but there was no suggestion of any progress in addressing the core issue of the secessionist area’s status.

5+2 Talks resume in 2011 The 5+2 Talks resumed in 2011. Five official meetings were held in 2012. The December 6-7, 2012 OSCE Dublin Ministerial meeting adopted a statement on the negotiations:

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• Welcoming adoption during 2012 of “Principles and Procedures for the Conduct of Negotiations” and "a comprehensive agenda for the negotiating process" • Looking forward to advancement of the negotiations on all three baskets of the agreed agenda: socio-economic issues, general legal and humanitarian issues and human rights, and a comprehensive settlement, including institutional, political and security issues; • Expressing satisfaction that resumption of work in the “5+2” format has been accompanied by reactivation of the work of expert working groups and direct contacts between the sides, leading to concrete achievements such as resumption of rail freight traffic through the Transdniestrian region

Chişinău Railway Station in the Moldovan capital provides the starting point for the 180km journey to Odessa – which passes through the heart of the Transdniestrian region. The region saw intense fighting in 1992, following the breakup of the Soviet Union, over control of the area mostly situated between the left bank of the Dniestr/Nistru River and the border with Ukraine. (OSCE/Jonathan Perfect)

High level meeting with new leaders in 2012 Another high level meeting, bringing together a new generation of Moldovan and Transdniestrian leaders, took place on the margins of an OSCE conference in Germany in June 2012.

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Ambassador Erwan Fouéré (c), the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian settlement process, opens the meeting between Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Filat (l) and Trans-dniestrian leader Yevgeny Shevchuk (r), in the presence of the 5+2 representatives on the margins of an OSCE conference on confidence-building measures, Rottach-Egern, Germany, 20 June 2012. (OSCE/Igor Schimbator)

Ukraine OSCE CiO: Transdniestrian settlement process "highest priority" OSCE 2013 CiO Ukrainian Foreign Minister Leonid Kozhara termed the Transdniestrian settlement process his chairmanship's "highest priority." He wanted to include political and security issues on the agenda, as well as meet with Moldovan Prime Minister Filat and Transdniestrian leader Shevchuk on the margins of the 5+2 talks in Lviv in February 2013. But Russia and Tiraspol vetoed any shift from focus on the socio-economic track to political and security issues. Russia also pressed Shevchuk not to meet with Filat on the margins of the 5+2 meeting. The meeting broke down over Tiraspol's demands on transportation -- which it termed "freedom of movement" issues -- which actually involved de facto recognition of Transdniestrian separation from Moldova. This 5+2 meeting in Odessa in May 2013 discusseed freedom of movement and removal of radioactive waste issues. A protocol decision to dismantle the cableway across the Nistru River was signed, envisaging the removal of the cable car between Rybnitsa and Rezina (two localities on opposite banks of the Nistru River) which had not been used for more than a decade, and posed a safety threat to the people living beneath it. The 5+2 talks in Vienna in July 2013 discussed freedom of movement, arrangements for dismantling the Rybnitsa-Rezina cableway, environmental and economic issues, co-operation between law enforcement structures and education. A draft joint action plan on environmental issues and sustainable use of natural resources was signed. The joint action plan included legislative cooperation, monitoring and issues related to fisheries, and was to be developed by a working group with OSCE support.

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Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson for protracted conflicts, Ambassador Andrii Deshchytsia, chairing a 5+2 meeting on the Transdniestrian settlement process in Lviv, 19 February 2013. (OSCE/Sarah Crozier)

The OSCE Chairperson's personal representative on protracted conflicts, Ambassador Andrii Deshchytsia (c) and the chief negotiators in the Transdniestrian settlement process, Eugen Carpov and Nina Shtanski, discuss a protocol on environmental co-operation during 5+2 talks in Vienna, 17 July 2013. (OSCE/Sarah Crozier)

High-level meetings resume in 2013 The OSCE CiO and 5+2 states organized a meeting between Moldovan Prime Minister Leancă and Transdniestrian leader Shevchuk in Tiraspol September 23. The focus appears to have been on freedom of movement, with the result being resumption of full-scale freight railway service through Transdniestria.

High-level confidence-building conference

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Leanca, Shevchuk meet again OSCE CiO Kozhara. the OSCE Mission to Moldova, and the German government organized a conference in Germany October 29-November 1, 2013 focused on confidence-building, with Moldovan Prime Minister Leanca and Transdniestrian leader Shevchuk heading their respective delegations. OSCE Mission Head Brush suggested the opening of the Gura Bicului bridge, exchange of television channels, and the Latin-script schools in Transdniestria as possible areas for confidence building.

Senior Moldova official negative on "5+2 format" Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Eugen Carpov, responsible for policymaking on Moldova's territorial reintegration, told Radio Free Europe in a December 31, 2013 interview that the "5+2" negotiation format "does not bring results." He did not, however, suggest an alternative approach.

Deputy Prime Minister Eugen Caplov (Government of Moldova Website)

5+2 talks and confidence-building efforts continue in 2014 A February 2014 5+2 meeting in Vienna produced a protocol decision to remove obstacles to the free movement of permanent residents of the Transdniestian region holding foreign passports. A 5+2 meeting in Vienna in June 2014 continued to discuss dismantling the Rybnitsa-Rezina

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cableway, as well as freedom of movement of people, goods and services, the situation of the farmers in the Dubassary region, law-enforcement cooperation, and the situation of Moldova-administered Latin-script schools in Transdniestria. Subsequently, a confidence-building conference was held in Freising (Germany) in June 2014, organized by the OSCE Mission in Moldova with the support of the German government. Delegations were led by Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister and Chief Negotiator Eugen Carpov and Transdniestrian Chief Negotiator Nina Shtanski, and included representatives of expert working groups, 5+2 representatives, German officials, and international experts. Working groups discussed economic issues, trade and infrastructure; freedom of movement; ecology and environment; and education.

Jennifer Brush (l), Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, alongside the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process Ambassador Radojko Bogojević, Freising, 11 June 2014. (OSCE)

Scanlan becomes new OSCE Head of Mission Michael Scanlan from the United States became the new OSCE Head of Mission in July 2014.

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The Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Ambassador Michael Scanlan. (OSCE/Liubomir Turcanu)

Background: Related Transdniestria settlement issues Promised Russian withdrawal -- not implemented Moldova and Russia signed a 1994 agreement on the withdrawal of all Russian forces together with their equipment within three years. Transdniester representatives, concerned that the agreement would undercut their existence as a Russian entity, walked out of the talks. At the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999, Russia promised to complete the withdrawal by the end of 2002. Russia did not withdraw its troops as promised. The deadline was then extended. Of the 20,000 troops in the 14th Army (name changed in 1994 to Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova, in short OGRF), about 1,200 still remain. Moldova has called for Russia to withdraw its "peacekeeping" troops from the region, a demand rejected by Russia.

Remaining munitions, weapons, vehicles, and equipment The problems in the Transdniester region involve not just the remaining Russian troops, but also the enormous quantities of old munitions, weapons, vehicles, and equipment still stored in the area. According to the OSCE Mission to Moldova, only about half of the 42,000 tons of ammunition stored in Transdniestria was shipped back to Russia during 2001-2003. Transdniester leaders have done everything in their power to block the removal or decommissioning of the stores, which they aim to bring under their own control.

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OSCE personnel inspect a train of Russian munitions before their shipment out of Transdniestria, 4 October 2002 (OSCE).

Role of EU Border Assistance Mission A substantial majority of OSCE participating states, in the absence of full consensus, expressed great disappointment that the withdrawal of Russian forces from Transdniestria slowed considerably in 2004. CiO Passy noted at the OSCE ministerial meeting in December 2004 that “most ministers” supported a border and customs monitoring initiative on the Ukrainian border with Moldova (i.e., Transdniestria), to facilitate the often interrupted flow (by the Transdniestrian authorities) of traffic on road and rail lines across this border. Subsequently. Moldova and Ukraine asked the EU to assist their border and customs services to prevent smuggling, trafficking and customs fraud. A EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was established in 2005, and consists of about 100 EU police personnel. EUBAM has limited enforcement power, is underfunded and too short-staffed to have a significant impact along the 285-mile Transdniestria-Ukraine border. Smuggling tracks, usable by vehicles to carry contraband (mostly tobacco and food products), are visible throughout the often unmarked and porous border areas.

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EUBAM staff in the field (EUBAM)

U.S. favors multilateral peacekeepers to replace Russian force In 2007 the U.S. suggested replacement of the Russian peacekeeping force by a broader more genuine multilateral force, which would also include Russian participation.

Russia claims it has satisfied all its Moldova obligations Speaking to the media after the Bucharest NATO-Russia Council Meeting in 2008, President Putin asserted that Russia’s obligations in Moldova were limited to scrapping or evacuating heavy weaponry from Transdniestria, that it had fully complied in this, and that this compliance had been internationally verified. He also said that Russia was obligated to withdraw all its forces from Moldova by 2002 (extended to 2003), but was maintaining “peacekeeping” forces there and had transferred part of its heavy weaponry to Transdniestrian forces.

Transdniestria 2011 "presidential" election

Over 73 per cent of voters cast their ballots for Yevgeny Shevchuk in a second round run-off poll on December 25, 2011. Shevchuk beat incumbent president Igor Smirnov, who had been in power since Transnistria declared independence in 1990. Moscow was perceived as having shifted its support to Shevchuk, considering him better suited to protect its interests in Transdnistria. Soon after taking office, President Shevchuk announced that approximately 90% of Transnistria's hard currency accounts had disappeared and may have been been transferred out of the region with the knowledge of former president Smirnov. Shevchuk expressed his determination to convince international bodies to recognize Transdniester’s statehood and, in addition, cooperate more closely with Russia. He said that Moldova and Ukraine will remain good, stable neighbors, and stressed that he would work with Chisinau to facilitate freedom of movement across Transdniester's borders with Moldova. Shevchuk soon made good on his word, and in January 2012 repealed the 100 percent customs

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duty on goods imported from Moldova, which was introduced in 2006.

Yevgeny Shevchuk (Wikimedia Commona/Public Domain)

Deadly incident involving Russian peacekeepers In January 2012 a Moldovan civilian who disregarded warnings to stop while driving across a bridge between Moldovan and Transniestrian communities was shot by Russian peacekeepers and later died of his wounds. Moldovan officials were critical of the Russian action. The U.S. and Germany expressed readiness to enage in discussions to demilitarize the area and convert the current peacekeeping force into an OSCE-led one.

Russian peacekeeping contingent has been deployed in Transnistria since 1992 (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation)

Transdniestria sees Russia as its legal model? According to the Moldovan media, a group of nine Russian officials from the State Duma and scholars visited Tiraspol in February 2013 to take part in a conference called: “Adjustment of local legislation to the Russian one – baseline of the Transnistrian statehood.”

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Both Moldova and Transdniestria changing status quo Moldova says it will set up new "border" posts May 1, 2013 where it meets the breakaway republic of Transdniestria in order to secure the eastern borders of the EU. Some have interpreted this action as Chisinau's efforts to step up pressure, but whether against the Transdniestrian authorities, Transdniestrians, Russians or the EU is unclear. Transdniestria has forbidden Moldovan police in the town of Bender, which is in the security zone between the two, to wear their uniforms.

What Russia will do after a Transdniestria settlement Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said in July 2013 that the issue of Russian weapons can be resolved and a new format for an international presence can be discussed -- once there is an agreement on Transdniestria's status.

Russia unable to deliver new helicopters to Transdniestria Moldova opposed, Ukraine defers to Chisinau Russia's effort to send new helicopters for its "peacekeepers" in Transdniestra, re-opening Tiraspol military airport for the delivery, and eventually reconstructing the airport, was blocked by Moldova in July 2013. Ukraine has taken the position that it cannot allow the shipment of Russian military equipment by air or overland to Transdniestria without the consent of Chisinau. Moldova view is that Trandniestria should be demilitarized, not re-militarized through the addition of new military equipment. (Russia had military helicopters in Tiraspol 1992-1998, but they were withdrawn or mothballed at that time.) Transdniestrian authorities welcome the establishment of a new airport that would make it more indepedenent of Moldova. Transdniestria has raised the airport issue in the 5+2 talks.

Incidents in security zone The U.S. Mission to the OSCE noted a "troubling escalation of tension" in February 2014, pointing to the arrest of the principal and two colleagues of one of the eight Moldova-run Latin-script schools operating in Transdniestria, as well as of six Moldovan military observers, both in Parcani village.

"Transdnestr republic" appeals to Russia, the UN and OSCE to recognize its "independence" Parallel to developments in Ukraine The "Transdnestr republic" appealed to Russia, the UN and OSCE in April 2014 to recognize its "independence," noting its 2008 "referendum" to join Russia. In response, Russian President Putin said Trandnestr should be allowd to decide its own fate. Moldovan Prime Minister Leancu condemned the appeal, emphasizing that it ignores the reality that Transdniestria is part of Moldova. Earlier, the separatist entity had asked to be included in Russian legislation being drafted to annex Crimea.

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Foreign relations This section describes Moldova's foreign relations with: • Russia • The West • Romania

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Russia During the years after independence, Moldova’s economy remained highly dependent on the rest of the former Soviet Union, and on Russia in particular. Romania did not prove viable as an alternative economic partner. The breakdown of economic links with other post-Soviet republics had a severe impact on Moldova. The conflict with the Transdniester region, which lies astride the lines of communication connecting Moldova with Ukraine and Russia, made matters even worse, especially as nearly all of Moldova’s electricity generating capacity is on the Left Bank. Russia continue to see Moldova as its area of influence, with an actual military presence in Transdniestria and as "peacekeepers." Moscow has been disturbed by Moldova's movement toward the EU and has made clear its willingness to use pressure--including its lleverage on Transdniestria, cutoffs of natural gas, banning imports of Moldovan products (such as alcoholic beverages) for safety reasons, and reductions in visas for Moldovan workers--to reverse it.

Eurasian Economic Community In 1993 Moldova became an observer in the Eurasian Economic Community, the customs union of the core CIS countries.

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The West Moldova’s initial turn to Russia after independence neither helped it deal with its dire economic situation nor helped it find a solution to the Transdniestria problem. After 1999, Moldova increasingly started turning to the West for possible solutions, both economic and political.

The EU In 2005, the ruling Communists reversed their policy line and campaigned on a pro-European and markedly anti-Russian platform. Moldova became a partner country with the EU's European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership in 2009. During 2009-2013, the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) center-right coalition emphasized achieving an association agreement with the EU. Under the restructured "Coalition of Pro-European Rule" established in May 2013, the association agreement was initialed at the November 2013 EU Eastern Partnership Summit held in Vilnius. (Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned in July 2013 that Moldova's trade relations with Russia and the CIS would suffer if it signed the association agreement with the EU.) How would implementation of the EU Free Trade Agreement impact upon Transdniestria under current circumstances? According to the European Commission, asked this question in January 2014, “The DCFTA will apply to the territory of the Republic of Moldova in its internationally recognized borders,” but, it will be up to the Transnistrian authorities to apply the provisions of the deal and to “put in place all conditions necessary”. The Commission response added that it “encourages” Transnistrian authorities to adapt. Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the EU on June 27, 2014.

European Union Heads of State and Government sign Association Agreements with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine on June 27, 2014 (Republic of Estonia website)

The U.S. The U.S. and Moldova have had good relations since Moldova's independence. Vice President Biden visited Moldova in 2011. He reiterated U.S. support for a Transdniestria settlement that

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preserves Moldova's sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders.The U.S. passed legislation to grant Moldova permanent normal trade relations in December 2012. Secretary of State Kerry visited Moldova in December 2013, the first by a Secretary of State since 1992, to show support for the government's decision to initial the association agreement with the EU, and maintain public backing for the government decision in the face of Russian pressure.

Vice President Biden and Prime Minister Vlad Filat address several thousand people who gathered on the square of the Chisinau Theatre of Opera and Ballet, March 11, 2011. (Government of the Republic of Moldova official Website)

Secretary of State John Kerry (L) meets with Moldova’s President Nicolae Timofti (C) and Prime Minister Lurie Leanca (R) at the Official Residence in Chisinau, Moldova, Dec. 4, 2013. (Voice of America)

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Romania Romania’s entry to the European Union in 2007 made Moldova an EU neighbor. This did not produce a warmer relationship between the two states. Moldovan requests for Romanian citizenship (and documentation) appear to have increased since Romania joined the EU. The number of approved applications, however, is disputed. Moldova and Romania have agreed to start building a joint pipeline to link the two together by winter 2014. Completion of the pipleline will end Moldova's complete energy dependence on Russia.

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Ethnic relations Citizenship has never been an issue in Moldova in the way it has been in Estonia and Latvia. The Citizenship Law of June 1991 granted automatic citizenship both to those who resided in Moldova before 1940 (when it was part of Romania) and their descendants and to those who resided in Soviet Moldova before 1990.

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Is the Transdniester conflict an ethnic conflict? There are Moldovans who support the Transdniester side, while there are Russians who support the Moldovan side. Indeed, 40% of the Left Bank population is Moldovan. While not ethnic in the narrowest sense, the conflict did initially pit groups with opposed political interests and divergent linguistic and cultural orientations against each other: toward Romania on one side, toward Russia on the other. Now that Moldova has a central government that is not seeking to embrace either of its neighbors, this contrast no longer exists. If the Transdniester leaders want (and continue to be able) to preserve their enclave as an independent mini-state, it is presumably for the sake of power and the benefits, including criminal income that go with it. Moreover, the Transdniester authorities are able to maintain the status quo because they have the support of Russia. The renewed 5+2 Talks in 2012 created anxiety among some Transdeniestrians that the EU iwa pushing unification of their region with Moldova. The Union of Russian Communities, the Union of Moldavians and the Union of Ukrainians wrote a joint letter to Russian President Putin claiming that the absolute majority of the people of Transdniester have opted for close historic and spiritual ties with Russia and cited the 2006 referendum where 97% of the Transdniestrian population voted in support of integration with the Russian Federation. Approximately 170,000 residents of Transdniestria have applied for and received Russian citizenship.

Moldovan Bulgarians Call for national cultural autonomy Taraclia district council, where a large number of Moldovan Bulgarians (also called Bessarabian Bulgarians) live, called for national cultural autonomy. Some attribute this demand to continuing Russian efforts to develop pressure points on the government in Chisinau.

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Right Bank Moldova Ethnic relations in Right-Bank Moldova have greatly improved in recent years. Moreover, Russian-speakers in the capital Chisinau have always been less hostile to Moldovan independence than their counterparts on the Left Bank.

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Language policy In 1989, Moldovan was declared the sole state language. Proficiency in Moldovan was made a condition of state employment in 1990 (though this law did not come into full force until 1994). The 2002 decision by the newly-elected communist government to make Russian language classes compulsory in schools led to protest by the Popular Christian Democratic Party (PPCD), the main opposition party.

Language Policy in Transdniestria Moldovan, alongside Russian and Ukrainian, is an official language in Transdniestria, though state schools are required to teach it in the Cyrillic and not the Latin script. There are, however, seven schools in the Transdniestria region that use the Latin alphabet in teaching Romanian/Moldovan. These schools are funded by the Moldovan Government and follow the Moldovan curriculum, but have periodically been faced with closure by the Transdniestrian authorities. Supporting parent rights to choose the language of instruction, the OSCE Mission in Moldova, in cooperation with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, reached an agreement with Transdniestrian authorities in 2003. This agreement should have allowed the schools to register and function without difficulty. Transdniestrian officials, however, did not observe this agreement or an amended version mediated by the Mission later that year and tried to close the schools in 2004. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf Ekéus condemned the forced closure of a Moldovan-language high school in Tiraspol. Due to the Mission’s efforts, the schools were able to reopen. In 2005, the schools received permanent registration based on the 2003 agreement. The Mission has been mediating a dispute involving eight Moldovan schools in the Transdniestrian region which are administered by the Moldovan Government and continue to use a Moldovan curriculum. The Mission monitors the functioning of the Moldovan-administered schools in the Transdniestrian region and mediates between central and Transdniestrian region education authorities to find solutions for outstanding issues and to prevent the emergence of new crises. The OSCE Mission to Moldova and the High Commissioner on National Minorities issued a report in November 2012 on the status of the eight Moldovan-administered Latin-script schools in Transdniestria.

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Vladimir Berlinksy (right), Deputy Director of Moldovan School No. 19 in Benderi, briefing a high-level OSCE delegation in June 2004 about the threats they are facing (OSCE/Neil Brennen)

Students at the Lucian Blaga school in Tiraspol, 2 February 2012. (OSCE/Igor Schimbator)

OSCE language use In Moldova, the OSCE uses the term the “state language” to avoid calling it either Moldovan or Romanian, either of which may be divisive. Similarly, although the OSCE always refers to Transdniestria, it is important to note that it is Trans (across) the Dniester only from the perspective of Chisinau, Bucharest, and other points west. Viewed from Moscow, Kyiv, or even Tiraspol, the region is not Transdniestria, and is thus called in Russian and other Slavic languages

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“Pridnestrov’ia” or “by” or “near” the Dniester. Anyone trying to mediate in this region must be sensitive to these linguistic usages in order to avoid getting into trouble.

OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier (l) speaking with the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Ambassador Jennifer Brush, on the bridge over Dniester/Nistru River connecting the towns of Tiraspol and Bender, 18 July 2012. (OSCE/Igor Schimbător)

Court ruling could decide name of state language In December 2013 Moldova's Constitutional Court issued a ruling asserting that the 1991 Declaration of Independence prevailed over the 1994 Constitution. Although the ruling did not address the state language in any way, the decision could eventually open the way for renaming the state language from Moldovan to Romanian.

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Culture This section includes cultural information on Moldova, including: • Chisinau and Tiraspol • The countryside • Economics • Folk traditions • Cuisine

Chisinau The capital Chisinau (Russian name Kishinev) is home to about one-sixth of the country’s inhabitants. It is built along the River Bik, a tributary of Moldova’s main river, the Dniester. The Old City was built in the 15th century on seven hills west of the river. Its narrow crooked streets and intricate architecture contrast sharply with the broad and straight tree-lined boulevards of the 19th-century New City that surrounds it. The central avenue is named after Moldova’s founding prince Stefan the Great. There is a monument to Stefan the Great at the entrance to the park that also bears his name. Other sights are the Holy Gates, the three cathedrals, and several churches. The old water tower that is now the city museum is across the Bik River on the east bank, as are the circus and the railroad station. Chisinau is the main economic and cultural center of Moldova. Tiraspol Tiraspol, the capital of the Dnestr Moldavian Republic, has a large proportion of the country's industry.

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Chisinau street scene, 2004 (USIP/Ted Feifer)

A statue of Lenin is seen the city of Tiraspol in front of the government headquarters of the separatist Transdniester region of Moldova. June 18, 2000 (©AP/Wide World Photo/Vadim Ghirda)

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Countryside The countryside is fairly flat, wooded in places and with some low hills. The mild climate and rich black soil are good for growing cereals, tobacco, fruit and vegetables, and especially grapes: Moldova is well known for its wines. Milesti Mici, with almost 2 million bottles, has the largest wine collection in the world, and stretches for 250 km, of which only 120 km are currently in use. The town of Cricova also has an extensive network of underground tunnels that stretch for 120 km.

Milestii Mici,. (by permission of Moldova Photo Series.Serhio)

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The Economy The economy is in an abysmal condition. A majority live under the poverty line and most people’s wages don’t cover their basic needs. They survive thanks to their garden plots. Many seek work abroad, often illegally. Destinations include Russia, Italy, Ukraine, Romania, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and Israel. According to a 2013 Congressional Research Service report, more than one-quarter of Moldova’s economically active population works abroad.

Transportation According to the Moldova Ministry of Transport and Road Infrastructure's Transport and Logistics Strategy 2013-2022 (released in 2013), more than 70% of national roads in the country are in a bad or very bad state. This not only impacts on economic development, but also serious affects the rural population's access to social, medical and education services.For its part, almost 80% of the 1,000 km rail network's control system is in a critical state.

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Folk traditions An attempt is now underway to revive Moldovan folk traditions that were discouraged under Soviet rule. Many of these traditions are associated with Christmas and the New Year — for example, celebrating Ignat (a holiday preceding Christmas), exchanging lichie (flat wheat cakes) between relatives on Christmas Eve, and wearing fairytale masks on New Year’s Eve. In the countryside, after Christmas dinner, children carry small decorated wooden plows around the village to bring good harvests.

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Cuisine Moldovan cooking is almost the same as Romanian cooking, though it reflects a certain amount of Russian influence. A proper meal starts with a hearty soup of potatoes, vegetables, and meat, served in small pots with bread. The main course is likely to be meat with potatoes or mamaliga, which is a mixture of corn mush and salad in vinegar. Then roasted sunflower seeds may be nibbled. Plenty of wine, vodka, or palinka (Moldovan brandy) is drunk. Other dishes one may come across are chicken heads in jelly, salad made of beans and sausage, noodles with poppy seeds and cheese, and dumplings filled with cabbage or cheese.

A woman sells chicken in a market near Chisinau in Moldova, 2002 (OSCE/ Neil Brennan)

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