IRAQ: INTELLIGENCE UPDATE No. 21 30 APR 2004 CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ: INTELLIGENCE UPDATE No. 21

30 APR 2004

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS:

(I) Executive Summary 2

(II) Iraq Operations Risk Matrix: Review of Order of Threat to Olive Client Teams 3

(III) Security-Nationwide: 4

a) Summary: Attacks on Foreign Civilians 22 Apr – 29 Apr 2004 4

b) Graph showing trends of attacks 4

c) New Insurgent/Terrorist MOs & TTPs 22 Apr – 29 Apr 2004 7

d) Forward Intel Alerts Nationwide 8

e) Road Travel Security Nationwide 9

f) Aviation Security Nationwide 22 Apr – 29 Apr 2004 14

g) Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) attacks 22 Apr – 29 Apr 2004 15

(IV) Security - Regional Breakdown: 17

a) Northern Iraq: 17

• Foreign Civilian/NGO/Media attacks 22 Apr – 29 Apr 2004 • Forward Intel Alerts

b) Central & Western Iraq: 17

• Foreign Civilian/NGO/Media attacks 22 Apr – 29 Apr 2004 • Forward Intel Alerts

c) Southern Iraq: 20

• Foreign Civilian/NGO/Media attacks 22 Apr – 29 Apr 2004 • Forward Intel Alerts

(V) Progress Index 22

(VI) Overview 23

(VII) Glossary 25

(VII) Appendix 26

SOURCES: The Olive Iraq reports are compiled from intelligence provided by deployed Olive consultants. This reporting is supplemented by information received from a variety of closed IZ and Coalition/CPA and private security firm sources. The identities of some sources are withheld to protect pre-agreed source anonymity. Information is always assessed for its worth and its veracity prior to inclusion in these reports.

© Olive Security (UK) Ltd. All rights Reserved. No portion of this document may be reproduced without the prior consent of the company. This report is for guidance purposes only and should not be interpreted as definitive advice. For further information please contact Olive Security 40-46 Headfort Place, London SW1X 7DH Tel: +44 (0)20 7201 5560 Fax: +44 (0)20 7201 5561 [email protected] www.olivesecurity.com Registered in England: 04222657

(I) Executive Summary

• In Iraq in April 2004 there have been 1369 reported ‘hostile contacts’ (attacks on Coalition and Iraqi Security force targets), up from 884 in March, 678 in February and 583 in January. There have been at least 140 CF troops KIA this month - the record monthly figure since the occupation began a year ago. 33 soldiers have died in the last six days alone. Whilst the frequency of attacks has moderately subsided since the spike in mid April, the lethality and accuracy of attacks continues to grow exponentially.

• Since last Friday, three FCs (Foreign Civilians) have been killed and at least four sustained injuries in 5 separate attacks on PSC protected convoys (in Mosul, Bayji, Baghdad, Nasiriyah, Al Amarah and Basrah). These latest fatalities bring the total FC death toll this year to 44, occurring in a total of 178 reported attacks.

• The risk-level in the Southeast Sector is increasing. While cooperation from the majority of the local population will ensure that Basrah province remains – comparatively speaking – permissive, recent attacks suggest a dramatic evolution in insurgents/terrorists’ capabilities and operational reach within the region.

• Olive intel analysts have not received specific information relating to an imminent VBIED attack on CNI targets in Iraq. However, we assess that the botched suicide attack on the Basrah oil terminal in the Persian Gulf last weekend may mark a new point of departure in terms of terrorists' selection of targets in Iraq. The attack demonstrated a desire to prioritize oil infrastructure targets and a willingness to die in a strike on aggressively secured key locations.

• The threat level on the roads has remained consistently high throughout April and is likely to remain heightened throughout May. Because the situation on the MSRs is extremely fluid, it is now imperative that the status of routes are checked with Force Protection immediately prior to travel, preferably within the hour of departure. The BIAP road / Route 10 Baghdad to Ramadi should remain off-limits until we receive clear indications that levels of insurgent activity on this stretch of highway are subsiding.

• Despite clear signs of dwindling resources and support outside of Sadr city and Kufrah, those Sadrists still active in the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, remain determined to try to goad the newly deployed USCF (who have replaced the Spanish) into conducting attacks in the vicinity of the two cities’ holy sites. However, CF are aware of how explosive the consequences of military action near the holy sites would be, thus are unlikely to be lured into such a confrontation.

• Late on 28 Apr, under intense pressure from the international community, the CF reached a tentative agreement that Marine forces will pull back to the outskirts of Fallujah over the next 24 hours and allow a newly assembled all Iraqi force called the Fallujah Protective Army (FPA), to assume control. The response to the deployment of an autonomous Iraqi security force onto what is, effectively Iraq’s frontline, will help determine two crucial factors: the prospects for an independent Iraqi security force coming to fruition in the near future and the make up and durability of the resistance in Anbar Province.

• If the siege of Fallujah and the stand-off in Najaf cannot be resolved without significant ‘collateral damage’, then deteriorations in both areas will act as catalysts for a further intensification of violence across the country. In addition, clear evidence of the regional ‘ripple effect’ of violence in Iraq has emerged over the past fortnight with a marked intensification of terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia, a multiple RPG attack on the Diplomatic neighbourhood in Damascus and raised terrorist threat levels in Jordan and Kuwait respectively.

Forecast: The fluidity of the current situation in Iraq complicates the ability to forecast. Bolder attacks by Former Regime Loyalists, Iraqi Nationalists/Tribal Fighters and Patriots, in collaboration with domestic and extra-territorial Islamists, often acting in larger numbers, will ensure that Baghdad, the ‘Sunni Triangle’ and Mosul continue to be the most high-risk environments for FCCs. The Kurdish regions have been spared Sadr-related troubles and will remain less high-risk despite rising ethnic tensions. The Southeast will also remain comparatively permissive despite increased Shia militancy, a raised terrorist threat and ongoing potential for civil unrest. CF/Coalition relations will remain strained with an Iraqi population angered and disappointed by increasingly lethal terrorist capabilities, the level of violence employed in the siege of Fallujah and aggressive COIN operations elsewhere. A further strike on a Shia target remains a priority for Wahabbi extremists seeking to maintain their divisive momentum. The upcoming deadline for the transfer of power will see all factions maintain, if not step-up, the tempo of their resistance. In their bid to undermine reconstruction efforts, militants will increasingly seek not only to target physical infrastructure sites but also to attack and abduct the FCs involved in the reconstruction process. 2

II) Iraq Operations: Review of Order of Threat to Olive / Client teams 29 Apr 04

Security Risk Review S.E Sector

Threat Probability Frequency Impact

1 RTA Highest No change HIGH

2 IED Ambush High No Change MEDIUM

3 DBS Ambush High Increasing HIGH

4 Carjacking Medium Decreasing MEDIUM

5 Mortar/Rocket Medium Increased MEDIUM

6 Riot Medium Increasing HIGH

7 VBIED/PBIED Low Increasing HIGH

8 Kidnapping Low Increasing HIGH

9 CQA or Sniping Low Increasing HIGH

10 Friendly Fire Low No Change HIGH

Security Risk Review Central, West and North

Threat Probability Frequency Impact

1 IED/SAF/RPG Ambush on road Highest Increasing v. NTVs HIGH

2 Mortar/Rocket High Increasing MEDIUM

3 CQA or Sniping High Increasing Significantly HIGH

4 RTA High No Change HIGH

5 Kidnapping Medium Increasing HIGH

6 VBIED/ PBIED Medium Increasing HIGH

7 Friendly Fire Medium Increasing as troops rotate HIGH

8 Riot Medium No Change MEDIUM

9 Carjacking Medium No Change HIGH

10 All out assault Medium Increasing HIGH

11 Chemical attack Low Unprecedented VERY HIGH

Security Risk Review: Threats to Contractors on CNI Sites

Threat Probability Frequency Impact

1 Hoax alerts Highest Increasing HIGH

2 Sabotage/ Arson High No Change MEDIUM

3 Mortar / Rocket High Increasing HIGH

4 IED Medium Decreasing MEDIUM

5 VBIED/PBIED Medium Increasing MEDIUM

6 Raids / Kidnap Low Increasing HIGH

7 Sniping / CQA Low Increasing HIGH

8 Friendly Fire Low No Change HIGH

COMMENT: The above orders of threat factor in Olive CP Teams' Risk Mitigation Strategies and the degree of accuracy / error characteristic of each type of attack. It does not purport to be an exhaustive list. CF/PSC sources involved in the protection of Iraq’s oil infrastructure provided some of the suggestions for attacks on CNI sites. END COMMENT.

III) Security Nationwide: a) Summary: Attacks on FCs 22 Apr - 29 Apr 04

Total Incidents Reported: 6 (Five in transit, 1 x RPG attack on Hotel)

Regional Breakdown: North: 1 (Mosul) North Central: 1 (Bayji) Central (Baghdad) 2 (Abu Ghurayb, Khalid Hotel, Baghdad) West: 0 Central South: 0 South East: 2 (Basrah & Nasiriayah)

Total FC Fatalities Reported: 3 Total FC Injuries Reported: 4+ Missing: Approx 14-18 (of a total of 65 FCs kidnapped since 05 April 2004)

COMMENT: Some incidents go unreported. END COMMENT.

• The number of reported attacks on FCs has again declined, from 13 recorded between Apr 16 – Apr 22, to 6 in this reporting period. This decline may be explained by the lockdown status adopted by many FCCs in the Central and Western regions (where attacks tend to occur).

• Since last Friday, three FCs (Foreign Civilians) have been killed and at least four sustained injuries in 5 separate attacks on PSC protected convoys (in Mosul, Bayji, Baghdad, Nasiriyah and Basrah). This is the first SAF ambush on PSD/FC in Basrah to cause loss of life that Olive analysts are aware of. These latest fatalities bring the total FC death toll so far this year to 44, occurring in a total of 178 reported attacks

• Five attacks were on PSD protected vehicles; two occurred in the north (Bayji and Mosul), and two occurred in the South (Nasiriyah and Basrah). Bar the random SAF attk on a PSD convoy near Nasiriyah, all this weeks attacks were pre-planned, professional and politically motivated ambush strikes (explaining the high number of fatalities arising from a relatively low number of incidents).

b) Graphs showing trends of attacks nationwide i) Trend of Total Attacks for Jan, Feb Mar and Apr 2004

100

40 Number of Attacks 30

0 01/01/2004 08/01/2004 15/01/2004 22/01/2004 29/01/2004 05/02/2004 12/02/2004 19/02/2004 26/02/2004 04/03/2004 11/03/2004 18/03/2004 25/03/2004 01/04/2004 08/04/2004 15/04/2004 22/04/2004 Date

ii) Total attacks on foreign civilians (FCs) 01 Jan – 29 April ‘04

iii) Total daily hostile contacts on CF, IZ and FC reported 1st – 28th April

100

50 Volume 40

0 12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728 April

iv) Comparison of Number of Attacks on Foreign Civilians by region 1 Jan – 28 Apr

15 1-31 Jan

1-29 Feb Volume 10 1-31 March

5 1-21 Apr

0 North North Central Baghdad West South-Central South-East Region

v) Total IED incidents 1st Jan – 28th April

100

50 IED Attacks Volume 40

30 IED's Found

0 1-7 Apr 1-7 1-7 Jan 1-7 8-14 Apr 8-14 8-14 Jan 8-14 15-21Jan 5-11 Feb 5-11 15-21 Apr 15-21 Apr 22-28 22-28 Jan 22-28 12-18 Feb 12-18 Feb 19-25 4-10 March 4-10 11-17 March 18-24 March 25-31 March 29 Jan- 4 Feb 29 Jan- 26 Feb- 3 March 3 Feb- 26 Week

[The above graphs were calculated using daily incident reports provided by O.Cs, CPA, CF and other PSCs]

c) New Insurgent/Terrorist MOs & TTPs

Apr 24/ Basrah Waterborne Suicide IEDs The botched suicide bombings of the key Oil CNI targets at used against CNI target Basrah’s offshore terminal marked the first time that a suicide strike against a CNI target has been attempted in Iraq (although the strikes were reminiscent of two Al Qaeda ‘suicide boat’ strikes against the Limburg (French Oil tanker, Oct 2002) and U.S.S Cole (Oct 2000), both off the coast of Yemen.

Apr 21 / Basrah Light traffic conditions UK military intelligence assess that the three VBIEDS strikes exploited by Islamists to against the three IP stations were timed to occur at 0730hrs ensure simultaneous because traffic at this time is generally lighter, increasing the delivery of VBIEDs likelihood of the three VBIEDS arriving at separate destinations at the same time.

Apr / Baghdad Munitions placed on Olive sources have observed that ‘all different types of munitions’ MSRs in order to force are being placed on MSRs (in full view of anyone travelling on the convoys onto side roads road) between USCF call signs. USCF then treat the suspicious munitions as an IED and close off the MSR. Olive assess that this is for the following reasons: to disrupt convoy movement and to force convoys into a particular area where attacks are planned and carried out. Resulting attacks are more criminally than politically motivated with the convoy’s cargo being the intended goal of the assailants.

Apr / Baghdad Insurgents in possession In a raid this week USCF found advanced non-handheld radio of ‘sophisticated scanners which would require expert know-how in order to be communications used. The seizure of these scanners, believed to have belonged to intercept facilities’ / radio former-regime elements, has raised USCF concerns relating to scanners Coalition communications.

d) Forward Alerts Nationwide:

ALERT: May 02, Anniversary of the Birth of the Prophet Mohammad Religious sensitivities will be heightened on this day. In addition, Islamist terrorists may mount ‘martyrdom operations’ on this date believing that doing so will ensure themselves a ‘revered martyrdom status’.

ALERT: Further Verification that Hostile Groups are able to Monitor Coalition telecommunications Security sources report that ‘Sophisticated communications intercept facilities with which [insurgents] could listen in on CF military and civilian communications’ were discovered during a raid in Baghdad this week. This finding should act as a reminder to all Olive/Client teams to maintain OPSEC awareness during all telephone communications.

ALERT: Probability of random ‘rage attacks’ on CF troops and Foreign Civilians is increasing. Security sources report that on 24 April an Iraqi citizen attempted to strangle a USCF soldier. The soldier was reportedly able to draw his bayonet and stab the attacker. On the same day, a lone Iraqi driver drove up to a VCP in the capital and opened fire. Under retaliatory fire from the CF, the assailant then crashed his vehicle into the checkpoint before being arrested. These incidents occurred two days after a lone-gunmen shot and killed a South African PSC contractor in a Hadaba supermarket in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah district. All three solo attackers appeared to have been motivated by spontaneous outbursts of anger. Although all three incidents occurred in the capital, Olive analysts assess that they are representative of increasing frustration and xenophobia at street-level in most urban areas. This in turn raises the probability of further random close-quarter attacks over the coming days and weeks.

ALERT: Increased Threat of Suicide VBIED strikes on CNI sites and co-located contractor camps (See the Overview section of this report for analysis as to why the VBIED threat to CNI sites has risen).

ALERT: Targeting of CNI-sites set to increase In addition to the heightened VBIED threat to CNI, an increase in the targeting of CNI contractor sites with indirect fire, SAF and IEDs on access roads is considered highly probable, given that insurgents are now operating in larger, bolder gangs, and are actively pursuing alternative, ‘soft-target’ static locations in response to target hardening around CF and IP installations. The attempted suicide strike on the Basrah Oil Terminal last weekend also demonstrates that attacks on oil infrastructure are a strategic priority for some insurgent and terrorist units. In addition, since the start of April, foreign security contractors working alongside Iraqi guard forces / contractors on CNI sites in North, West, Central and Southeast Iraq have reported suspicions of security leaks amongst local contractors thought to be providing insurgent attack cells with insider information on FC routines and force protection procedures. We expect further attacks on soft-target contractor sites and residences over the coming weeks.

ALERT: Heightened VBIED threat Numerous reports have been received regarding the preparation and use of VBIEDS in April (most recently on Apr 29 in Mahmudiyah causing 8 USCF fatalities). This report was received from UKCF intelligence on 20th April:

On 16 April a reliable walk-in reported that fifteen VBIEDs were in the Northern Provinces and are now moving to conduct operations against the CF. He stated that they will be used by Al Qaeda and other organisations. Al Qaeda is a term often used by Iraqis to mean any foreign terrorists operating in Iraq. Two of the vehicles to be used were identified as a red Volkswagen Brazilia, VRM: NINAWA 4105, and a red Volkswagen, Brazilia, VRM: DAHUK 21006.

It is not yet known whether any of the VBIEDs referred to in the above report were employed in the multiple strikes of Apr 21st in Basrah/Az Zubayr. Three VBIEDs were seized by IZ security forces in Kirkuk on the 20th April. Olive assess that the VBIED threat (against both static and moving CF/FC targets) should continue to be classified as heightened nationwide.

ALERT: Civil Unrest in Urban Areas Ongoing unemployment issues/pay-related disputes and problems relating to the insufficient water and electricity supply problems are set to cause civil unrest as the temperatures rise, particularly in S.E sector. This may not 8

translate into a targeted threat to PSD / FCC traffic but angry crowds/rioting will represent an ambient risk given the propensity for demonstrators to attack Westerners/parties connected to the Coalition if they find themselves ‘in the wrong place at the wrong time’.

ALERT: Insurgents / Criminals exploit increased availability of Iraqi Police uniforms It is credibly reported that many police uniforms were stolen/looted during the Sadr-related disturbances when police stations were taken over/abandoned in various cities across Iraq. Significantly more IP uniforms will now be available, many of which are likely to have fallen in to Sadrist / insurgent hands. Reports suggest that in one recent incident kidnappers in Basrah entered a Hotel to take their hostage wearing IP uniforms. Moreover, unconfirmed reporting relating to the multiple VBIED attacks in Basrah/Zubayr on Apr 21 suggests that one bomber was wearing IP uniform. Iraqi sources have also reported that Sadrists in Najaf are wearing IP uniform.

e) Road Travel Security Nationwide

Caveat: Olive Security intel analysts endeavour to provide as much up to date information and trend analysis regarding the security status of different routes as is possible in these reports. However, given the fluidity of the security situation on all Iraq’s major and minor roads, the following assessments should not be taken as absolute guides for travel. Wherever possible, Force Protection should always be contacted immediately prior to departure for the latest reports on the current status of a route selected for travel that day.

Analyzing roadside IED attack rates on MSRs details the geographical spread and frequency of the insurgents’ preferred stand-off method of attack.

IED Regional Attacks 1st April – 28th April

South East 5% Region IED Attacks South Central Central 98 12% (Baghdad) Central (Baghdad) North 20 33% West North Central 79 16% West 46

South Central 35 North 7% North Central South East 15 27%

Border Access: (statuses provided by USCF)

Jordan: open although adverse road security precludes this option Syria: to be established; Turkey: open; Iran: open at Muntheria, Zurbatia and Al-Shalamacha; visa required before entry; Kuwait: open

The following Route assessments are provided by O.Cs and CF. Changes as of this week are italicized. Extreme Vigilance should be employed in the following areas:

Northern Iraq:

Choke Points in Mosul SAF ambushes on FCCs at choke point intersections and access roads to CNI sites in Mosul, are established insurgent MOs. 9

Route 1 MSR Tampa (HWY1) from Baghdad north to Mosul There have been a number of drive-by shootings on MSR Tampa between Baghdad and Bayji with attacks on convoys and patrols on MSR Tampa occurring most regularly between Taji and Samarra, especially around Samarra. On 20 April O.Cs commented on the high frequency of IED attacks on Highway 1 in the Bayji area. Insurgents in this area have adopted the MO of planting IEDs on access roads to CNI sites in an effort to target the contractors, both local and foreign that work on these sites.

Route 19 (MSR Phoenix) Bayji to Haditha In mid-April US Marines assessed this route to be ‘dangerous but passable in some areas’. The kidnap threat on Route 19, Bayji to Haditha, is heightened following the 12 April abduction of Italian security contractors on this road. Insurgents are employing the MO of mounting IVCPs to halt FC convoys on this route. (Olive sources have suggested that the group who conducted the 12 Apr attack on the Italian PSD were ‘out of control’ ‘tribal militiamen’ rather than part of an organized resistance group.)

Route 2 (MSR Cheyenne) Baghdad –Tuz – Kirkuk O.C reports that all 15 VCPS on Route 2 had been abandoned on 18 April suggested that the risk to FC convoys using this road had risen significantly. There has also been an upsurge this month in insurgent attacks both in and around the town of Tuz. On 19 April other security sources relayed anecdotal reports that taxi drivers are no longer willing to take customers along this road for fear of bandits now that the VCPs are unmanned. However, O.Cs have made this journey on several occasions this week without event and observed a significant number of checkpoints, suggesting that security along this route has moderately improved.

Central Iraq:

Baghdad Hostile forces continue to attack CF and FC targets of opportunity throughout Baghdad. The threat of a close quarter attack (CQA) with pistols, rifles, grenades or IEDs on FC convoys on all roads in Baghdad is assessed to be heightened. O.Cs assess that the 14th July street north of the Green Zone along with the Souk area of Rusafa district to be areas of high threat in Baghdad. At times of heavy traffic, there is an increased risk to FCCs travelling to the CPA Green Zone, along the main street through the Karadah district, via the 14th July Bridge Checkpoint. The large numbers of Westerners transiting through this commercial/residential area offer attractive ‘targets of opportunity’ for insurgents operating in the capital. Friendly Fire risks at VCPs both within and outside the Green Zone remain heightened now that the newly deployed 1st Cavalry Division has supplemented 1st Infantry Division in Baghdad. Protests often converge at the gates to the Green Zone. All such demonstrations should be avoided. Intelligence reports indicate that insurgent/ terrorist / radical Shia ‘rent-a-mob’ gangs may use these crowds to launch attacks on the CPA HQ perimeter. Two drive-by SAF/RPG attacks on the Assassin’s Gate entrance were reported in mid April.

On Thursday 08 April the Coalition recorded 43 attacks occurring within the Baghdad area during the previous 24hrs – this was a record number of incidents for a daily reporting period. In concordance with the downward trend of attacks on CF nationwide, this rate dropped to 17 attacks on 17 April and 11 on 19 April. However on 29 April CF informed O.Cs that 16 attacks had been reported in the previous 24 hours – suggesting a moderate re-escalation in the capital. SAF/RPG/IED attacks on CF are likely to continue to occur daily along the arterial MSRs through the Baghdad and the main routes between CF base camps. Choke points such as junctions are high-risk areas as is the Canal Road and the road to the BIAP. On 29 April Force Protection advised that movement should be restricted along the BIAP Road to armoured elements if possible. No movement should take place along or North of Canal Street before the route has been checked with Force Protection. O.Cs observe that when attacks on key routes such as the BIAP road force temporary closure, this obliges CF traffic to use routes such as the al-Douro expressway, which in turn increases the risk of FC convoys using such roads regularly of becoming caught up in attacks.

Abu Ghurayb, a small town immediately NW of BIAP (along Route 10) has been a flashpoint area for IED and SAF attacks since December 2003 and remains high-risk. April has seen a marked increase in the rate and lethality of ambushes on FCC convoys in Abu Ghurayb – Olive strongly advises against travel in the vicinity of this western suburb where insurgents are now warning locals not to use the roads. The major insurgent attack on Abu Ghurayb prison – one of the most heavily secured sites in Iraq - on 20 April demonstrated how bold anti-CF groups operating in this area are becoming. On 29 April a PSC reported that a contractor convoy travelling along the Abu Ghurayb Expressway between Abu Ghurayb and Baghdad was attacked with an IED in the approximate location of grid MB3187. At least one driver was injured who has subsequently died of his injuries. Security sources have also recently voiced suspicion that insurgents are aware of international flight arrivals and plan operations to target PSDs returning with their passengers from BIAP. The BIAP road remains exceptionally high risk and should remain off- limits for all bar emergency travel. 10

Reported attacks on CF en route from the Green Zone to BIAP, on HWY 1 heading north (MSR Tampa) as far north as GR 2810 and on HWY 2 (MSR Cheyenne) as far north as GR 4206 04 Apr – 28 Apr 2004:

BIAP 6 HWY 1 Volume

4 HWY 2

0 1st - 7th 8th - 14th 15th - 21st 22nd - 28th April

COMMENT: Be aware: approx 60% of the attacks on the BIAP road this month have occurred within the grid reference, 34N 83W. Some incidents go unreported. These figures have been collated by drawing data from multiple security sources that have provided grid references for certain attacks; some incidents may therefore not be included as the actual location is sometimes not digressed by the CF. This data should not be read as absolute. Rather it should be seen as an indication of the threats currently manifest on these three routes. END COMMENT.

West Iraq:

In late April CF sources in West Iraq provided the following assessment of road travel security risks in Anbar Province.

MSR Mobile (Hy-1) Considered dangerous but passable in some area. However, when you get in the Fallujah AO engagement is highly likely: AO is Amber Alert: HY 97(ASR Gold) to HY 23(ASR Tampa)-RED

ASR Michigan (Hy-10) Considered dangerous. Not passable. Engagement is highly likely: AO is RED

ASR Bronze (Hy-12) Considered dangerous but passable in some area. However when you get in the Fallujah AO engagement is highly likely: AO is Amber

ASR Jackson (Hy-8) Considered dangerous but passable in some area. Engagement is highly likely: AO is Amber

MSR Tampa (Hy-E1) Considered dangerous but passable. Engagement is highly likely: (Bridge 22A, 12A out) AO is Amber Alert: HY 97(ASR Gold) to HY 23(ASR Tampa)-RED

ASR Phoenix (Hy-19) Considered dangerous but passable in some area. However when you get in the Fallujah AO: engagement is highly likely: AO is Amber 11

Green – Go Amber - Passable but dangerous Red-NO GO

Olive Security’s current assessment of routes from Central to West Iraq as follows:

Route 10 west of Baghdad to Ramadi: Out of Bounds The Al Fallujah to Ar Ramadi corridor on MSRs Michigan and Mobile and ASRs San Juan and Boston should be considered off-limits for all but emergency travel. USCF report that 62 IEDs were cleared from route 10 on Apr 23. The security situation on Routes 10 and 12 through Anbar Province is extremely fluid thus is under review on an hour-to-hour basis. The Out Of Bounds advisory will remain in place until O.Cs and Olive intel analysts detect clear signs that the risk of attack on these roads has subsided. In terms of threats to FC convoys in this area, the reality of the risks was brought brutally home by the murder and subsequent mutilation of the 4 occupants of a PSD convoy that had been forced to divert into Fallujah on 31 Mar 04. Roads east, west and south of Fallujah and Ramadi have been ambush hotspots since September. As a result of the siege, USCF manpower remain concentrated around Fallujah. This has squeezed emboldened insurgent activity out onto the outlying roads where April has seen larger groups launch increasingly complex and fatal attacks. Trends indicate that the Al Asad turn off from HWY 12 (ivo the village of Al Baghdadi) on the approach to the Hadithah Dam from Ar Ramadi has become a flashpoint for SAF/IED ambushes.

Route Tampa south of Baghdad to An Nasiriyah There has been a notable rise in attacks on FCCs on Highway 1 south of Baghdad since the start of 2004. This has, metaphorically speaking, turned the so-called ‘Sunni triangle’, wherein 60-70% of hostile action is consistently concentrated, into a diamond. In particular, Al Mahmudiyah /Latifiyah/ Al Iskandiriyah are high risk areas (MSR Tampa and ASRs Jackson, San Juan, Sue, Peg and Temple). Two lethal attacks on FCs occurred ivo Mussayib, south of Mahmudiyah in the second week of March.

Olive/Client teams continue to encounter increased risks on Tampa relating to the size of CF convoys using the route (notably delays, convoy separation, friendly fire risks and reduced visibility due to dust). O.Cs travelling north from Umm Qasr to Baghdad in March described troop rotations as having caused ‘one long convoy top to bottom’ of Tampa. On Apr 21 it was reported that Route Tampa between Baghdad and Scania is now only being used by CF & PSD convoys, with USCF units positioned between 15kms and 40kms apart at varying intervals along the route.

Route 8 - Baghdad-Al Hillah-Diwaniyah This route is notorious for attacks on FCCs. Attacks along Route 8 often occur in Al Mahmudiyah, Latifiyah and Al Iskandiriyah. Recent incidents suggest that FCC vehicles have been increasingly targeted in the area south of Baghdad and north of Al Hillah. Assailants in this area identify targets via mobile patrols and then attack using a rolling ambush MO. Roadside hijacking attacks and kidnap incidents suggest a concordant criminal threat to FCCs travelling on Route 8 Hillah-Diwaniyah, particularly at night.

Route 6 Baghdad – Zubaydiyah - Kut On 17 April O.Cs received a report from a reliable source stating that “Al Kut is impassable at present either by CF roadblocks or illegal (Sadr Militia) VCPs.” Demonstrating that there is now a concerted effort amongst insurgent units to disrupt crucial supply lines into Baghdad, O.Cs also reported on 17 April that a sabotage attack had buckled a bridge at the junction of Route 6 and Route 1 south of Baghdad. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) were assessing whether the damage was sufficient to render the bridge impassable in the short-term. ACE are erecting pre- fabricated modular steel bridges to temporarily replace spans of bridge such as the above that have been damaged in a coordinated series of attacks that began in the first week of April.

Southern Iraq:

Route 8- An Nasiriyah - Basrah - Safwan February saw a dramatic increase in criminally motivated carjacking incidents along this stretch of road. However, in March and so far in April, attacks on FC convoys in this area have subsided. J2 note that criminals still active on Route 8 are becoming more calculated in MO in order to obtain maximum profits. As is often the case across Iraq, a visible and aggressive security posture, if threatened or confronted, results in carjackers being deterred.

Basrah – Az Zubayr 12

By the more permissive standards of the South East, there have been frequent IED attacks en route between these towns, particularly ivo the SW suburb of Basrah where a PSD convoy was attacked with an IED on 13 April.

Route 1 MSR Tampa – Basrah – Safwan & MSR Dallas (South of Sukh Ash Suyuckh) Criminal gangs involved in hijackings and robberies regularly operate along these routes.

Route 6 Al Amarah – Basrah The notorious Geramsha tribe / criminal fraternity are suspected to be responsible for many of the hostile contact incidents occurring on this road. Given that a low-level conflict persists between FRLs, Al Mahdi militants, (often indistinguishable from Geramsha criminals) and UKCF in Maysan Province, there is a heightened risk of attacks on FC Convoys using Route 6. March had already seen an increase in the IED threat in the Al Amarah area. (Significantly, suspects apprehended following an IED attack in Al Amarah were ‘roamers’ who had come down from Baghdad rather than locals).

Hijacking activity is common in the area between Basrah and Al Amarah. Walk-ins report that highway police on Route 6 ivo Al Qurnah collaborate with the carjackers. The police only pull over ‘new and expensive looking’ vehicles, check the value of the goods inside, and then phone carjackers waiting further down the road, telling them which vehicles to target. Reporting suggests that hijack groups in Maysan Province are now operating in larger groups.

Al Amarah – Al Kut – An Nasiriyah In addition, since the Sadrist troubles there has been an increased risk to travel along the route running from the south of Al Amarah west towards the Al Kut – An Nasiriyah road. CF provide the following grid references relating to possible ambush positions:

QA 033 254 QA 0430 2535 QA 046 264 QA 0345 2370 QA 150 050 QA 200 050 QA 150 080 QA 200 080

Route Topeka - Az Zubayr - Safwan UK military sources state that hijacking activity in the South East is centred in the Az Zubayr area, particularly along Route Topeka, between Az Zubayr and Safwan. The MO of the gangs launching attacks from Az Zubayr involves targeting the rear vehicle of undefended convoys.

Nationwide:

Illegal VCPs The Islamist ‘terror offensive’, the Sadrist uprising, VBIED attacks and the current heightened security has seen Shia, Sunni and Kurdish security elements mount illegal VCPs (IVCPs) in the Kurdish North, near Sunni enclaves and in the Shia-dominated areas. Recent IVCPs have been reported in and around Umm Qasr, Az Zubayr, Al Amarah, Nasiriyah, Najaf, Kufa, Hillah and Arbil, for example. Be aware that in some incidents, Mahdi militia manning IVCPs have, and probably continue to attempt to disarm PSC CP teams before allowing them entry into urban areas. In addition, insurgents may masquerade as police or ICDC units in order to lead FCs into ambushes (see New MOs on p.5).

Friendly Fire from other PSDs Improbable as it may sound, this risk is manifest and will increase in concordance with the heightened threat level and as more contractors with PSD escorts enter Iraq. (There are approximately 15000 contractors now operating in Iraq; that is, a ratio of 1 contractor for every 10 coalition troops). A PSD was involved in a contact with another PSD on 25 Mar in West Iraq, for instance. There were no casualties and the PSD that instigated the contact was ‘extremely apologetic’.

Friendly Fire from IP / ICDC / IBG/ IZ security guards Due to the amount of attacks on IZ security forces, along with O.C observations of ‘increased independent activity on the part of these fledgling units’, there is a growing risk of IP/ICDC or IZ guard force members engaging PSDs in 13

error. The rush to establish an independent Iraqi security force means that weapons training amongst new recruits, sometimes prone to a ‘trigger-happy’ stance, is often minimal. Olive teams should also be aware of persisting reports of enemy infiltration of the Iraqi Police force, particularly in light of the 09 March ‘IP’ murder of two US citizens at a VCP near Hillah and a potential role played by ‘friendly’ ICDC in the Fallujah murders of the Blackwater employees.

Friendly Fire Risks from CF During debriefs, virtually all Olive consultants now rank Friendly-Fire within the top six highest probability threats faced by PSD convoys. These observations made by deployed CP agents justify concern about risks posed to FCCs by the CF, particularly when PSD convoys are attempting to overtake military convoys. Rear gunners who ‘approve passage’ do not necessarily have radio communications to inform vehicles ahead that the passing FCC vehicle is not a potential threat. COMMENT: Given the levels of violence witnessed so far in April CF are likely to be even more nervous and trigger-happy, significantly raising the friendly fire risk. END COMMENT

Risk Management Recommendations:

• Be cautious approaching military convoys. ‘Green troops’ new in theatre will be prone to firing on FCCs if they feel threatened. • Communicate with local unit commanders and inform them of your missions, vehicle types and markings. • Put VS17 panels on the dashboard; some security providers place Union Jacks on the windscreen visor which they pull down as additional identification when required. • Make eye-contact with the rear-gunner – give him a ‘thumbs-up’ and wait for a ‘wave-on’ before passing. • Make sure all the vehicles in the convoy adopt the same procedure.

f) Aviation Security Nationwide: i) Attacks on Aircraft: 22 Apr - 29 Apr ‘04

DATE LOCATION INCIDENT

29 Apr Najaf CF reported being attacked with an RPG. NFI. (South Central)

27 Apr Ad CF reported SAF attk against air assets. NFI Diwaniyah (South Central)

26 Apr An CF air asset forced to make precautionary landing. Numaniyah CF reported that after landing it caught fire. NFI (South Central )

26 Apr Al Amarah Possible HMG fire on UKCF Puma helicopter departing Camp Abu Naji (Southeast)

23 Apr An Najaf CF air assets were attacked with RPG fire. NFI (South Central)

22 Apr Al Musayib CF helicopter was engaged with SAF. NFI (South Central)

Analysis: Insurgents are increasingly exploiting the increased exposure of CF air assets to step up attacks on aviation. On 01 April 2004 Olive sources claimed that foreign Islamists were embarking on a fresh offensive to disrupt US military and civilian air activity and highway traffic in and around Baghdad and West Iraq. 27 attempted attacks on aircraft were reported between 01 -28 April. As illustrated in the graph below, the frequency of attacks has risen 14

significantly over the past three months, signalling that insurgents have indeed regained their incentive to challenge coalition aviation security. The targeting of helicopters flying above the Green Zone (occurring in the first week of April) is a new MO, underlining the heightened vulnerability of air assets in Baghdad’s deteriorating security environment and increasing the ambient risks to Olive/Client teams abiding in the Green Zone.

On 22 Nov last year, A DHL cargo plane was hit by a SAM-7, forcing it to make an early landing. This was the first successful attack on an aeroplane since the beginning of the insurgency in May 03. Well over 20 previous attempts since early September had missed their target. The attack on the DHL plane prompted royal Jordanian Airlines, the only passenger carrier offering flights into Baghdad, to temporarily suspend its services. The footage in the first week of April of an F-16 executing evasive manoeuvres to escape a pursuing SAM missile was a reminder of the availability of such weaponry to insurgents in Western/Central Iraq.

In January, J2 received intelligence that FRLs from the Fallujah area are awarded $5000 for successful attacks on CF aircraft. February saw at least 18 attempted attacks on aircraft, the majority ivo BIAP or occurring in the North/North Central Regions.

The above factors lead Olive to assess that aviation security will remain consistently - and quite possibly increasingly - challenged over the coming months. As well as continued attacks on airborne helicopters and planes, Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), the Rasheed, Al Habaniyah, al-Muhammadi, Khan Al Baghdadi, Al Rutbah and Kirkuk airbases are all assessed to be at heightened risk of attack by insurgents attempting to cripple USCF air support capabilities for troops operating in West and Northern Iraq. ii) Trend of number of attack on aviation occurring each week 1st Jan – 28th Apr

5 Volume 4

0 1-7 Jan 1-7 Apr 8-14 Jan 5-11 Feb 15-21Jan 8-14 Apr 22-28 Jan 15-21 Apr 22-28 Apr 12-18 Feb 19-25 Feb 4-10 March 11-17 March 18-24 March 25-31 March 29 Jan- 4 Feb 26 Feb- 3 March Week

g) Critical National Infrastructure i) Attacks on CNI: 22 Apr – 29 Apr 2004

DATE SITE / VICINITY INCIDENT

25 Apr Mosul IED attk. IRR (Republic of Iraq Rail) reported an IED explosion south of Mosul. No (North) damage reported. NFI

24 Apr Basrah 3 synchronized waterborne IED attacks on offshore oil terminals (South East) Two suicide boats exploded alongside a ship tied up at Al Basrah's Offshore Oil terminal (ABOT). The second was intercepted by a USCF vessel 15 nautical miles offshore as it approached the exclusion zone. An explosion soon after it was boarded killed 2 USCF and wounded a number of others.

24 Mar Tharthar District Pipeline sabotaged. An official source at the Ministry of Oil said that a pipeline (North Central) linking northern and middle regions of the district refineries were sabotaged. NFI

Analysis: Critical National Infrastructure installations, sites (and co-located contractor camps) are strategic priorities and attractive targets for insurgents unwilling to attack CF head on. Significant damage can be inflicted with relative ease and minimal risk for the insurgents of capture or death.

In addition, Olive Security analysts assess that the threat of a suicide VBIED attack on CNI targets has risen following the botched suicide attack on the Basrah Oil Terminal on 24 April 2004 (see this week’s Overview for analysis as to why the threat to terrestrial CNI sites has risen).

While travel security has been consistently challenged for sometime, insurgents have also recently targeted the road infrastructure itself. All but one of the 6 reported attacks on bridges since 10 Apr have occurred on Route 1. There were no reported attacks on bridges in March. Security sources assess that attacks in the region may reflect an increase in sophistication due to outside foreign influence and training. Insurgents will continue to take advantage of stretched CF assets to continue attacks on the road infrastructure. ii) Trend of number of attack on CNI occurring each week 1st Jan – 28th Apr

4 Volume 3

0 1-7 Jan 1-7 Apr 8-14 Jan 8-14 Apr 5-11 Feb 15-21Jan 22-28 Jan 15-21 Apr 22-28 Apr 12-18 Feb 19-25 Feb 4-10 March 11-17 March 18-24 March 25-31 March 29 Jan-Feb 4 26 Feb-March 3 Week

IV) Security – Regional Breakdown: a) Northern Iraq:

►Reported Attacks on Foreign / CPA Contractor/ NGO / Media Convoys & Residences: 22 Apr - 29 Apr 04

25 April Vic. Mosul SAF ambush on two vehicle PSD convoy. (North) 1540hrs. The ambush occurred when the convoy was traveling North to South, east of, and toward, Camp Freedom. 800 meters from the slipway leading to Camp Freedom the vehicles, traveling at approx. 120 kph, received SAF from attackers on the Eastern side of the road at a distance of approx. 200 meters. The attack was initiated just after the PSD had passed a group of CF Stryker vehicles stationary on the roadside. The lead vehicle was struck with what was assessed to be an AK47 round while the second vehicle’s tyres were punctured during the attack causing the vehicle to hit the median and become inoperable. Both vehicles returned fire and one PSD reported seeing three persons firing from a rocky outcrop on the eastern side of the road. The attackers ceased fire (probably because of the presence of the Stryker vehicles even though the Strykers appeared oblivious and almost immediately left the scene) and the remaining PSD vehicle arrived at Camp Freedom from where a recovery team was sent out to the stricken vehicle. No PSD fatalities or injuries were reported.

25 Apr Vic. Bayji SAF / IED attack on PSD Convoy. (North Central) The twelve vehicle PSD convoy turned off route 1 heading towards their location near the K2 USCF base. Whilst transiting the slip road culvert a 155mm shell IED was command detonated. The blast hit the twelfth vehicle. Four ‘sedan /saloon type’ vehicles were observed to be in the vicinity (two white and two red). Occupants of one the vehicles engaged the PSD with SAF. The PSD returned fire, reportedly killing two insurgents. Initial reports suggest that the PSD suffered 1 fatality and 2 injuries.

►Forward Alerts (North)

ALERT: Further attacks on CNI compounds in and around Kirkuk and Bayji The targeted threat to contractors operating in Bayji and Kirkuk is assessed to persist.

ALERT: Illegal VCPs in the Kurdish regions The mass casualty attacks of 02 March have spurred the Kurdish militias to mount their own VCPs, to prevent revenge attacks / further attacks on their communities. (Kurdish militias, numbering approximately 50,000, are a considerable force in the Northern regions).

ALERT: Frequency of DBS attks on FCs ivo Mosul remains high. For the immediate term, Mosul should remain off-limits for Olive / Client teams.

b) Central & West Iraq

►Reported Attacks on Foreign / CPA Contractor/ NGO / Media Convoys & Residences: 22 Apr – 29 Apr ‘04

29 Apr Abu Ghurayb IED Attack on contractor convoy. Expressway, The convoy was attacked on the expressway between Abu Ghurayb and Baghdad Baghdad (GR3187), causing one fatality. (Central) 27 Apr Zone 12, RPG attack on the Khalid Hotel. Baghdad 2300hrs. At first light there was also part of a 125mm mortar warhead found. No (Central) casualties reported. Ex-pats are known to reside at the al-Khalid. NFI.

►Forward Alerts (Central):

ALERT: Possible heightened IED threat on MSRs to Sadr City On 29 Apr intelligence sources reported that Sadrist units are going to place IEDs on the MSRs from the CPA to Sadr City. Force Protection report that multiple IEDs will be sited on Port Said Street between the Republic Bridge (running from the Green Zone via the Assassin’s Gate) to Sadr City (Canal Street, otherwise known as Route Pluto). Avoid these routes.

ALERT: Propaganda flyer warns locals in Mansour to stay off the streets after 1600hrs starting 29 April Security Sources report that a propaganda leaflet circulating in the Mansour district of the Capital warns residents to stay off the streets starting 29 April at 1600hrs. The leaflet translates:

Beginning at 1600hrs on Thursday 29 April, and continuing every day at 1600hrs until further notice, we will start military operations against the American Infidel enemy. May God be with us to achieve victory.

Signed: Iraqi Islamic Resistance.

COMMENT: Similar flyers were widely circulated in the western suburb of Abu Ghurayb in early April, more or less coinciding with a spike in attacks occurring therein. This latest flyer may represent insurgent units’ desire to expand the flashpoint area further east, into the wealthy Mansour district, where a significant proportion of Ex-pats and VIPS continue to reside. Specifying the time after which attacks will be launched is unusual. END COMMENT.

ALERT: Insurgents in possession of radio scanners In a recent raid USCF found quite advanced non-handheld radio scanners which would require expert know how in order to be used. The seizure of these scanners, believed to have belonged to former-regime elements, raises the possibility of hostile parties intercepting PSD comms in order to plan attacks. The threat of hostile SIGINT is most prevalent (and probably most advanced) in Baghdad but is assessed to exist across Iraq.

ALERT: Insurgents possibly in possession of White Chevrolet Blazers IZ sources reported to a PSD that three brand new Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company white Chevrolet Blazers were stolen from a heavily guarded compound at the start of the week. This is yet to be confirmed and some PSD sources doubt that the vehicles could have been stolen from the heavily guarded compound. However, if the vehicles have indeed been stolen, they could be effectively used in attacks on Coalition targets, as the fact that they are brand new would make them appear to be CPA or contractor vehicles at first glance, thereby increasing the chances of gaining access to secured sites.

ALERT: ‘All-out assault’ on the Green Zone A recent upsurge in hostile incidents targeting the Green Zone has led well-placed security sources to state that insurgents may be preparing to attempt an ‘all-out assault’ on the Green Zone at some point in June as the date for the handover of authority draws close.

ALERT: Identity checking procedures at some Green Zone entrance gates is not fool-proof On 23 April an O.C reported that he was ‘stunned to be able to drive along the BIAP road and get straight through CP12 (GR 4184) in an old Deawoo with my Iraqi driver. I was waved through on production of my passport and our company passes - no GZ or CPA passes in sight. While on the one hand I welcome the relaxation of controls, the warning about an all out attack on the GZ is worrying. The change will not go unnoticed and WILL be exploited.”

ALERT: ‘Total CF lock-up’ scenario at gates to Green Zone threatens to block access to roaming contractors Olive/Client teams are warned: In the event of a further serious escalation, a planned ‘total lock-up’ scenario at the gates to the Green Zone may prevent contractors on emergency tasks outside the secured area from being permitted to re-enter. O.Cs report that USCF troops guarding the Green Zone remain extremely 'twitchy'. Friendly fire risks are heightened.

ALERT: Threat of Attacks on small Baghdad hotels by anti-CF personnel Reports from an unconfirmed source have suggested that anti-CF forces planned to carry out attacks on small hotels housing foreigners deemed to be cooperating with the CF. The smaller hotels are perceived – correctly - to be easier targets. It was also noted that the same anti-CF group was intending to take foreigners hostage for ransom money to fund anti-CF activities. The threats of kidnapping and attacks on soft-target hotels in Baghdad should be considered ongoing.

ALERT: Further Rocket attks on the Baghdad Convention Centre (BCC) and Al Rasheed Hotel. The BCC and Al Rasheed are adjacent to one another. There have been 5 attacks on this specific area of the Green Zone this year (most recently on 10 Apr 1230hrs and 08 April at 1955hrs), suggesting that insurgents have astutely singled out the BCC and Al Rasheed as ‘high impact’ target zones. Assailants also appear to time attacks to coincide with occasions of political import: on 26 October last year, 6-8 rockets hit the Al Rasheed, killing an American colonel and wounding 18 people whilst Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Defence Secretary, was staying at the hotel. 24 hours later, 5 suicide bombers simultaneously attacked four police stations and the headquarters of the ICRC in Baghdad in a synchronized assault presumably timed to coincide with the start of Ramadan. The 07 March rocket attack on the BCC / Al Rasheed occurred within hours of the signing of the Iraqi interim constitution. On a less specific level, the two major spikes in rocket attacks on the Green Zone illustrated in the graph below, coincided with Ramadan and the one year anniversary of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq.

ALERT: Heightened threat of Rocket / Mortar Attack extends to Palestine and Sheraton Hotels On 14 Apr a probable rocket impacted on the 12th floor of the Baghdad Sheraton hotel. There were no reports of casualties. The threat of Mortar/Rocket attacks on the Palestine and Sheraton Hotels will remain heightened as insurgents attempt to reignite fear amongst non-military Western personnel whilst simultaneously maximising chances of major news coverage owing to the on-site presence of news teams at these hotels. Hostile surveillance is ongoing ivo the Palestine and Sheraton.

Rocket Attacks on the Green Zone: June 2003 – April 2004

►Forward Alerts (West):

ALERT: IED / RPG Ambush on Bridge south of Hadithah Dam Local intelligence sources have indicated that the bridge/overpass located seventeen kilometres south of Hadithah Dam will be subject to an IED attack followed by an RPG ambush. This area has been a point of enemy action in recent weeks.

ALERT: Further Complex RPG / SAF / IED / Mortar ambushes on CF and FC convoys expected in West Iraq. Insurgents, tribal gangs / bandits will continue to take advantage of CF assets’ distraction / involvement in fighting in the Fallujah area to launch attacks on the outlying MSRs and ASRs of Anbar Province (See overview for more).

c) Southern Iraq

►Reported Attacks on Foreign / CPA Contractor/ NGO Media Convoys & Residences: 22 Apr – 29 Apr ‘04

29 Apr Basrah Drive-by SAF ambush of PSC protected single FC vehicle. (South East) 0900hrs approx. The ambush occurred approx 600m West of the Basrah SOC (Southern Oil Company) offices. A black Land Cruiser boxed the contractor vehicle in from the front. 4x gunmen debussed and engaged from the front whilst Toyota pick up with an MMG under a tarpaulin in the back pulled alongside and engaged from the side. 1x Kuwaiti construction company TCN contractor injured, 1x South African PSC Health and Safety member KIA. COMMENT: this is the first drive-by SAF ambush attack on an FCC in Basrah. This was a professional, pre-planned strike on a foreign company perceived to be a soft-target by those who coordinated the attack. The incident follows reports from other, more aggressively protected FC /PSCs in Basrah of increased hostile surveillance and testing of PSC responses to hostile behaviour. Approximately 4 hours after the attack Al-Jazeera news agency reported that a group called Abul Abbas claimed responsibility for the attack. Abul Abbas is the name of the leader of the Palestine Liberation front who died recently under US custody. This suggests that foreign elements may have been involved in this sophisticated ambush, or, at the very least, that the group involved has pan-Arab sympathies with the Palestinian cause. NFDK.

23 Apr Al Gharaff, Vic. SAF attack on PSD. Nasiriyah The PSD + CPA staff came under sporadic and inaccurate SAF whilst in the (South East) town. There were no casualties.

► Other incidents

22 Apr Az Zubayr & As Surveillance of Armoured Vehicles (South) Samawah A PSD reports that various vehicles have been closely observing their armoured (South East) vehicles in this area. The hostile parties behaviour exhibits a degree of professionalism. See Forward Intel Alerts: South for descriptions of suspect vehicles involved.

►Forward Alerts (South)

ALERT: Insurgents in Black Landcruiser & Toyota pick-up in Basrah area On 29 Apr insurgents carried out the professionally planned ambush described above. Whilst the Landcruiser and Toyota may have since been abandoned, all PSDs/FCs should be on the look out for these vehicles.

ALERT: Professional hijacking gang conducting hostile surveillance in As Samawah & Az Zubayr area A PSD report suggest that a very professional gang is conducting hostile surveillance of PSC convoys travelling in this area. There has been a number of incidents recently that indicate a possible intention to attack an armoured vehicle convoy travelling on route TAMPA between the Kuwait border and As Samawah. Prior to future use of southern stretch of Tampa, please take note of the vehicle descriptions highlighted below. The following persons and vehicles have been closely and aggressively following and scrutinizing armoured vehicles:

• Apr 18. Two Toyota double cabs with flames painted down the sides observed on route Tampa between Nasiriyah and Basrah.

• 22 Apr, 1145hrs. One of the Toyota described above pulls alongside PSD and closely scrutinizes occupants.

• A white four wheel drive with a red stripe down the side (possibly an Iraqi Police issue Nissan) occupied by six men in Police uniforms fired SA at 2x PSD armoured vehicles in Basrah. The PSD suspect this was an attempt to test the vehicles armour.

• Apr 22, 1120-1140hrs. A white Estate (station-wagon, possibly a Dolphin) in good condition and carrying 5 men in white dish-dash shadowed and closely scrutinized two PSD armoured vehicles. 20

• Apr 22, 1530hrs. Two black 7 Series BMWs with dark tinted windows followed and blocked another two vehicle PSD convoy on Tampa, south west of Az Zubayr.

• Apr 23, 1020hrs. A PSD convoy (2x armoured, 1x soft-skinned) approaching an overpass on Tampa observed two parked ‘dicking’ vehicles (1x white transit van, 1x white sedan with the hood up) whose occupants were observing traffic and made a mobile phone call as the PSD passed. As the PSD convoy approached the turn onto Tampa three white pickups moved off. Had the PSD turned left rather than right it would have found itself in between the vehicles. Each pick-up has at least two men in the cabs with one sitting on the flat bed at the back who has a tarpaulin covered PKM. All persons wear dark coloured (black or brown) dish-dash and most wear red-checkered shamags. The three white pickups have the following descriptions:

o One is a Toyota white single cab with no distinguishing marks on the sides. Behind the driver’s head is a picture (head and shoulders) of a pretty girl. This vehicle may also have one or more bullet holes.

o The two other pickups are both white double cab Nissans with red flames painted down the sides.

The possible Dolphin, or Caprice sedan, mentioned above, acts as a spotter car and may have a piece of red tape running vertically down the rear bumper. It plays a blocking role, behind the attack, preventing other vehicles from entering the contact zone. The white transit van has been seen with this sedan with two dismounted men in white dish-dash, one with a red checkered shamag and a mobile phone.

On Apr 26 a PSD reported that its convoy was observed and then tailed by two black sedans (one being an older model Mercedes), a white sedan and a white pick up. The occupants were described as well built and dressed in western style clothes.

The PSD source reporting this flags up the risk posed to PSDs by IVCPs and insurgents/criminals wearing IP uniforms, mentioning one recent incident when an ambush was initiated at such a checkpoint. No fire was exchanged or casualties caused during any of the above incidents.

ALERT: Hostile Vehicle in Az Zubayr area UKCF report that one of the VBIED strikes against Chindit camp on Apr 21 was accompanied by SAF from persons in a red Trans Am or Pontiac vehicle.

ALERT: Possible heightened FRL / Fedayeen threat in Basrah UK intelligence report that a walk-in, of unproved reliability, claimed that a Commander of the Fedayeen Militia arrived in Basrah on the 17th April. Given that Basrah is an unlikely refuge for a former regime figure it is plausible that such a figure is involved with an FRL cell.

ALERT: Magnetic IEDs reported to be for sale in Al Qurnah weapons market An IZ source informed UKCF that, during a conversation in Al Qurnah weapons market, the source had heard that magnetic ‘bombs the size of a book’ were for sale. CF assess that it is likely that these IEDs are available in theatre.

ALERT: Possible VBIED in Basrah IP in Basrah received a report on Apr 24 that a possible VBIED was entering the al Basrah al Qadima area. The vehicle is described as a white Scania tipper truck with a grey interior and white passenger seat. The vehicle has Baghdad plates. The report may be the result of increased anxiety in the wake of the multiple VBIED strikes in Basrah on Apr 21.

ALERT: Possible VBIEDs being prepared in Basrah UKCF report that an honest member of the al-Hartha tribal council provided the descriptions of the following vehicles that he believes are being prepared for possible VBIED attacks:

Blue Volkswagen Golf Saloon: VRM 321879, White Volkswagen: VRM 46503, Dahuk Baghdad Plates White Volkswagen: VRM 332634, Dahuk White Volkswagen: VRM 31451, Dahuk Red Volkswagen: VRM 410059, Ninawa Red Volkswagen: VRM 12006, Dahuk White Oldsmobile: VRM 740103, Baghdad 21

White BMW: VRM 1955 (province unknown) Mercedes, no colour given, VRM 69743 Mazda: VRM 415 (province unknown) Red Super Crown, no VRM White Mitsubishi: VRM 362 New Fiat Bijo, no VRM Toyota pickup, no colour given, VRM 1621

Although the source for this is ‘assessed to be honest’ the information may be forthcoming as a result of tribal / factional infighting whereby the source seeks to see the authorities (the CF, in this case) act against the source’s rival faction / tribe.

ALERT: Security situation in Al-Amarah continues to deteriorate as armed men gather in the town on 29 Apr On Thursday 29 Apr, PSC security sources reported that ‘the ‘situation in al Amarah has been deteriorating and may be approaching a flashpoint … South of the city today a daisy-chained IED consisting of three 152mm shells partially detonated as a CF convoy passed and two NGO vehicles were attacked with small arms fire [sustaining one non- fatal casualty]. The anti-coalition groups in al Amarah, possibly loyal to Muqtada Sadr have become more sophisticated …An estimate of the number of these men is unknown but they are probably preparing a violent response to the perception of a CF attack in Najaf. COMMENT: It is crucial that an update on the situation in al Amarah is sought prior to travel through Maysan Province over the coming days. END COMMENT.

ALERT: Terrorists plan to attack "local and foreign establishments" in Kuwait Kuwaiti Interior Minister Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah confirmed reports on April 28 of terrorist plans to attack local and foreign establishments in the emirate. Security officials told journalists that the alert status in Kuwait has been raised with police deployed to set up mobile roadblocks and security measures enhanced around possible foreign targets and all vital installations including oil facilities. According to one government spokesman “The state of security alert has definitely been raised, but it has not reached the red level. It is still precautionary and preventive in nature, taking into account the regional turmoil". Despite reported threats, no new warnings have been issued by Western embassies. NFI.

V) Progress Index:

In an effort to document the positive indicators relating to Iraq’s reconstruction, (which are generally overlooked by international coverage that focuses on anti-CF/ Coalition activity) the following points have been noted this week:

• The group of contributing donor states to Iraqi reconstruction, which pledged $33 billion at the Madrid Conference in October last year, have reaffirmed their contributions and their support for the Iraqi Interim government, despite current security concerns.

• The CPA has pledged $500 million for the reconstruction of the predominantly Sunni cities of Baghdad, Mosul and Fallujah, funded by the return of seized Iraqi money and from oil revenues. $35 million will be used immediately for reconstruction efforts in Baghdad, Baqubah, Fallujah, Mosul, Samara, Ramadi, and Tikrit. This is a key decision given the current climate in the Sunni Triangle. Specifically, according to a Baghdad newspaper, the CPA has allotted $15 million for financing reconstruction and repair projects in the most troubled towns of Fallujah and Ramadi, to include building/repairing bridges, improving social services, water works, power infrastructure, road repair and rehabilitation of school buildings. Some of these projects had been started but the security situation prevented their continuance.

• The Ministry of Public Works has provided 5000 jobs to unemployed Iraqis, and rehabilitation courses for over 4000 Iraqis from disbanded ministries. This is a significant development given that unemployment problems are likely to catalyse civil unrest in the immediate future.

• Prompted by the multiple VBIED strikes of Apr 21 there has been a rise in Iraqi ‘walk-in’ sources in southern Iraq coming forward to volunteer information on significant Fedayeen members in the Basrah area. It is reasonable to believe that their more pro-Coalition stance is representative of a wider population suggesting that misinformation relating to a CF role in the suicide VBIEDS is not believed by many in southern Iraq.

• Despite the suicide bomb attacks in Basrah on 21 Apr, the local IPS are reported to be determined to restore stability to the city. At least one ICDC unit in the south is becoming more organised, having provided its first ever intelligence summary to UKCF.

V) Overview

Although the siege in Fallujah and the standoff in and around Najaf continue to dominate discussion of events unfolding in Iraq, Olive consultants assess that it is recent incidents occurring in Basrah and the Persian Gulf that may represent the most significant developments in the country’s security environment occurring in late April.

The ‘Shia South-east’ has always been thought of as an inhospitable environment for Sunni insurgents (whether Baathist, ‘Fallujan’ or extra-territorial) and this view is likely to remain credible. However, the multiple VBIED strikes against Iraqi Police of 21 Apr, followed by an attempted triple suicide boat strike on the Basrah Oil terminal on 24 Apr and then by the first deadly ambush of its type on a PSD vehicle in West Basrah on 29 April, suggest a sudden and dramatic evolution of insurgent / terrorist capabilities and operational reach in the Southeast Sector.

Scant substantiated evidence has emerged about the identities of those behind the attacks. However, intelligence reports and the tactics employed combine to suggest that the perpetrators were from outside the area. Basrah has not been known to harbour would-be martyrs (of the type ‘deployed’ in the VBIED strikes) nor have pre-planned SAF ambush attacks on FC convoys ever been successfully executed in the city. Until now, the handful of cells conducting attacks on 4x4 vehicles in the area have fairly uniformly adhered to the utilisation of RCIEDs owing to the stand-off distance and consequent greater chance of escape that this MO allows. But the perpetrators of today’s professional ambush boldly duplicated the more high-risk ‘close-quarter’ techniques that have hitherto been confined to Central Iraq and Mosul.

Last week’s multiple VBIED attacks and today’s ambush indicate that hostile groups are beginning to fulfil their aspiration to extend the current of violence south into the MND Southeast Sector, an area that has long enjoyed relative stability under British jurisdiction. In terms of seeking to undermine the Coalition, security sources are agreed that the coordinators of the latest attacks will be aware that by stepping-up the tempo of the insurgency in Basrah Province, pressure will be mounted on the resolve of Britain, America’s strongest ally in Iraq. It is therefore possible to assess that these recent events will be followed by a sporadic effort to further destabilise the Southeast Sector characterised by a slight increase in the rate of lethal attack occurring over the coming weeks. It will be sporadic rather than sustained because Basrah is not Baghdad; insurgents lack a constituency in Southeast Iraq. Such popular support is the key enabler in terms of mobility and survival, without it COIN operations are easier to conduct and attacks more difficult to successfully execute.

Of greater significance on a nationwide level, are the implications of the botched suicide attack on the Basrah Oil Terminal for the short to mid term security of Iraq’s terrestrial CNI sites. Olive intel analysts have not received any specific information relating to an imminent major attack on CNI targets. However, we assess that last-week’s failed off-shore attack may mark a new point of departure in terms of terrorists' selection of targets in Iraq.

This was the first instance in which Islamists operating in Iraq showed a preparedness to die in a strike on a CNI target. Until recently, the threat of VBIED attacks on CNI was assessed to be low probability. Cells involved in sabotage IED, SAF or indirect fire attacks and FC/GF/Iraqi contractor targeting on-site and on the access roads to CNI were believed to be the work of domestic resistance elements. Cross-border Islamists had not shown a willingness to use the quality assets of a martyr or martyrs and large amounts of explosives against CNI. However, the attack on Sunday demonstrated a desire to prioritize oil infrastructure targets and a new willingness to take on challenging and aggressively secured key locations. In addition, we assess that the fact that this strike on a maritime target failed, may enhance the attraction of a more easily planned and executed suicide mission against a terrestrial target such as Bayji - the country's largest oil refinery.

Pre-Basrah, we warned of a heightened VBIED threat. The VBIED attack in Mahmudiyah in south Central Iraq on 29 Apr, in which 8 US troops were killed demonstrates that this threat is still extant across the AO despite the significant expenditure of men and resources in last Thursday's synchronized attacks in the Basrah. The attackers there showed a capability that surprised all who doubted trans-national Sunni Islamists would be able to successfully execute such attacks in the Southeast.

If the motivation and resources exist, which they do, then the key question relates to capabilities. That Islamists successfully executed major strikes in the Southeast, in a less permissive area for them, can only suggest that operating in the 'Sunni Triangle', encompassing Baghdad and with Bayji at its northern peak, is firmly within their capabilities. These factors lead us to assess that the likelihood of attempted VBIED strikes (as well as the more customary indirect fire/ SAF / DBS/ attack) against CNI targets has increased this week.

If the siege of Fallujah and the stand-off in Najaf and cannot be resolved without significant ‘collateral damage’, then deteriorations in both areas may act as catalysts for a further intensification of violence across the country. In the meantime, travel security continues to deteriorate as a result of the tying up of CF assets in West and south Central Iraq and a subsequent increase in insurgent and criminal activity on the MSRs leading from Fallujah and the Sadrist strongholds into Baghdad.

Despite clear signs of dwindling resources and support outside of Sadr city and Kufrah, those Sadrists still active in Najaf and Karbala – the Shias’ most holy cities - remain determined to try to goad the newly deployed USCF (who have replaced the Spanish) into conducting attacks on or in the vicinity of the two cities’ holy sites. Moqtada Sadr knows that any aggressive CF action that inflicts civilian casualties and/or damages the mosques would provoke uproar throughout the Shiite community and beyond, thereby increasing his chances of survival. However, CF are fully aware of just how explosive the consequences of military action near the holy sites would be. Hence the impasse in South Central Iraq is likely to continue this week, with outbreaks of fighting at a low level, confined to secular quarters of Najaf and Karbala, and to intermittent ambushes and indirect fire attacks on CF and CPA buildings in Al Amarah, Diwaniyah, Kut and Kufrah. A discreet, behind-the-scenes resolution to the Sadrist resistance, brokered by Shia clerics, is the most that can be hoped for at this stage.

In the mid-term, if the CF manages to avoid any major confrontations in Najaf or Karbala, it is probable that the Sadrist uprising will disintegrate. The outcome of the Fallujah crisis is less certain. Late on 28 Apr, under intense pressure from the international community, the CF reached a tentative agreement that Marine forces will pull back to the outskirts of the city and allow a newly assembled all Iraqi force called the Fallujah Protective Army (FPA), to assume control and begin to move into downtown Fallujah in a peacekeeping role. Whilst negotiations were underway, attacks and counter attacks continued in the North of the city – suggesting that the plan may have to be shelved until the security situation quietens down enough. If successfully initiated, the FPA will number 1,100 soldiers and police and is to be led by a veteran commander from the former regime army called General Salah.

Reports on the identity of General Salah are conflicting. Some sources state that his full name is Lt. Gen Salah Abboud al-Jabouri, a native of the Fallujah region who served as governor of Anbar Province under Saddam Hussein. If this is the case then it is possible to speculate that General Salah commands some authority and may enjoy support amongst some residents of Fallujah. However, it is equally possible that he is unpopular and will be targeted as a collaborator.

The response to the deployment of an autonomous Iraqi security force onto what is, effectively Iraq’s frontline, will determine two crucial factors. First, the current capabilities of Iraqi security forces will be put to the test (an understatement). This will in turn act as an indicator of what prospects there are of an independent Iraqi Security Force coming to fruition any time in the near future. Secondly, the identities of the resistance groups operating in the city may become easier to detect. Prospects for a return to normality and the withdrawal of the USCF may lead Former regime/ Ba’athist elements, tribal militias and neo-nationalists participating in the attacks to give up the fight. Equally, however, the deployment of a ‘stooge’ indigenous security force encouraged by the Coaltion, may inspire local resistance cells to step up their fight or move to other areas where CF / Western targets are more readily available (Baghdad for example). The role of foreign Islamists may also come to the fore, or equally, may prove to be insignificant.

How the stand-offs in Fallujah and Najaf are concluded, and perhaps more importantly, the way in which the media portrays developments in both cities will be key in determining forthcoming levels of unrest and violence across the country. The situation on both fronts is in the balance. Reports relayed by security sources that armed men gathering in al-Amarah on the evening of 29 Apr are ‘probably preparing a violent response to the perception of a CF attack in Najaf’ do not bode well and suggest that many anti-CF groups are convinced before the event that the Coalition will select the ‘military option’ rather than seek continuing to seek to negotiate. The media, both Iraqi and foreign, will, as ever, be an active protagonist in events occurring over the coming days.

Clear evidence of the regional ‘ripple effect’ of violence in Iraq has emerged over the past fortnight with significantly raised terrorist threat levels in the neighbouring countries of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Kuwait respectively. On 15 April, the US State Department’s issued a mandatory order for the evacuation of all non-essential staff from Saudi Arabia. This was followed days later by televised ‘confessions’ of terrorists detained in Jordan of an alleged Abu Al- Zarqawi-orchestrated plan to conduct a WMD strike in Amman killing ‘tens of thousands’, and a subsequent multiple RPG attack on the Diplomatic neighbourhood in Damascus. These three alarming incidents, followed by a raised terrorist alert in Kuwait, would appear to herald the beginning of a new chapter of insecurity and fear in the Middle East.

END 30 April 04 0600hrs 2

GLOSSARY

AO Area of Operation BIA Basrah International Airport BIAP Baghdad International Airport CF Coalition Forces CMOC Civilian Military Operations Centre CNI Critical National Infrastructure COIN Counter Insurgency CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CQA Close Quarter Attack CT Counter-terrorism DBS Drive-By Shooting DNBI Death Non-Battle Injury FCC Foreign Civilian FCC Foreign Civilian Contractor FRL Former Regime Loyalist IBG Iraqi Border Guard ICDC Iraqi Civil Defence Corp IED Improvised Explosive Device IRR Railroads of the Iraqi Republic IGC Iraqi Governing Council IVCP Illegal Vehicle Check-Point IZ Iraqi National IZP Iraqi National Police IPS Iraqi Police Service JAM Jaish Al- Mahdi (Sadr’s militia) J2 British Military Intelligence KIA Killed In Action MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense Systems MND Multinational Division MO Modus Operandi MRE Meals Ready to Eat NBI Non-Battle Injury NFI No Further Information NFDK No Further Details Known NTVs Non-Tactical Vehicles (civilian / white fleet) O.C Olive Security Consultant PSD Private Security Detail PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan QRF Quick Reaction Force RCIED Radio (Remote) Controlled IED RMP Royal Military Police RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade RTA Road Traffic Accident SAF Small Arms Fire (7.62mm automatic rifles, AK47 or lighter) SUV Sports Utility Vehicle TTPs Tactics, Techniques & Procedures VBIED Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device VCP Vehicle Check-Point WIA Wounded in Action

CAVEAT: The CF for political reasons (and now also as terms of convenience) employs the acronyms FRL/ FRE (Former Regime Loyalist / Former Regime Element) and IE (Islamist Extremist) to describe those partaking in armed resistance to the occupation. However, readers should be mindful that these terms may be too narrow in their range of definition, negating the possibility of the involvement of other groups / actors (e.g. Secular ‘neo-nationalist’ Sunni fighters/ Iraqi or Iranian Shia militants) in attacks on Coalition Forces, new Iraqi government/security forces, foreign NGOs, foreign contractors and other elements involved in the peacekeeping and reconstruction process. 3

Appendix: Further trend analysis of attacks on the CF, IZ and FCs

IED attacks by region in January, February, March and April 2004.

IED Regional Attacks 01 January – 31 January

Region IED Attacks Central 39 (Baghdad) North 15

North Central 36

West 44

South Central 15

South East 6

IED Regional Attacks 01 February – 29 February

Region IED Attacks Central 57 (Baghdad) North 36

North Central 36

West 50

South Central 17

South East 9

IED Regional Attacks 01 March – 25 March

Region IED Attacks Central 81 (Baghdad) North 27

North Central 46

West 83

South Central 22

South East 8

IED Regional Attacks 1st April – 28th April

South East 5% Region IED Attacks South Central Central 98 12% (Baghdad) Central (Baghdad) North 20 33% West North Central 79 16% West 46

South Central 35 North 7% North Central South East 15 27%

Regional spread of Total reported RPG/RKT Attacks Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr 2004

120

100 1- 31 Jan

1-29 Feb 80 1-31 March

60 1-28 Apr Volume

0 Baghdad North North Central West South Central South East Region

Monthly Regional MRT Attacks 1st Jan-28th Apr

1- 31 Jan 60 1-29 Feb 50 1-31 March

40 1-28 Apr Volume 30

0 Baghdad North North Central West South Central South East Region

Regional Comparison of RPG/RKT to MRT Attacks 1st Jan-28th Apr

200

180

160

140 RPG/RKT

120 MRT

100

Volume of Attacks Volume 60

0 Baghdad North North Central West South Central South East Region

Aviation Attacks by month Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr 2004

15 Volume

0 Jan Feb March April Month

CNI Attacks by Month

10 Volume 8

0 Jan Feb March April Month