Solvent Leadership Series: Workshop 5
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Solvent Operations: Lessons Learned Solvent Leadership Series: Workshop 5 Vanessa White, Director - Recovery Technologies November 14, 2019 Agenda • 9:00 am: Presentations • Alberta Innovates Welcome and Introduction – Vanessa White • Suncor Energy – Steve Forbes • Cenovus Energy – Natasha Pounder • Imperial Oil – Richard Smith • 10:45 am: Coffee Break • 11:00 am: Question Period with the Presenters • 12:00 pm: Wrap Up • 12:15 pm: Networking Lunch 2 Clean Energy • AI Clean Energy develops and invests in strategic research and innovation programs to achieve Alberta’s goals for energy, the environment and economic prosperity. • We provide technical insights to the GOA on resource development, energy diversification, climate leadership and water/land polices. • The Clean Energy supports Emissions Reduction Alberta in technical due diligence and project management. • Clean Energy’s strength is creating the partnerships necessary to achieve the goals. 3 4 Clean Energy 5 Recovery Technologies Portfolio 6 Clean Energy Funding • Funding ranges between $100k to $2M • Continuous Intake Process • Open Calls • Target TRLs 3-7 Clean Energy Website: https://albertainnovates.ca/focus-areas/clean-energy/ 7 In Situ Solvent Operational Experience Alberta Innovates Workshop November 14, 2019 Agenda • Injected Hydrocarbon Technologies • Safety • Operations • Regulatory, Reporting , & Monitoring “We are advancing a portfolio of in situ technologies with the potential to lower the carbon intensity of producing bitumen.” -Suncor’s Report on Sustainability, 2019 2 Injected Hydrocarbon Technologies Steam Enhancements Solvent+ • Approx. 15%+ GHG reduction • Approx. 50-70% GHG reduction • 20+ years of industry experiments • NCG Injection • In Situ Demonstration Facility (ISDF) • ES SAGD Pilot – Optimize and test Solvent+ technology – 12 month demonstration – Recently kicked off FEED – 10-15% solvent injection into steam – Regulatory approvals at MacKay River – Solvent injection April 2019 on 4 Well Pairs – Open to participation from other operators – Investigating commercial deployment SAGD ES SAGD Solvent + 3 Safety Above All Else • Fire and Explosion – Area Classifications – Auto Ignition • EHT sheath temperatures • Steam line temperatures – High risk release scenarios • Situational Awareness – Steam System Contamination • Utility steam • Fugitive emissions – Lockouts / maintenance 4 Operational Challenges • Sub surface – Forecasting rates → surface design – Downhole chemistry → H2S, TDS, Solids… • Surface – Solvent in produced vapour condensing with water -> impact on CPF – Commodity imbalance SAGD → ES- SAGD – Inlet separation density control – High temperature separators • Logistics – Supply – Recovery / migration – Cost (demand) 5 Regulatory, Reporting, & Monitoring • Regulatory / Reporting – Collaboration with AER (frequency etc.) – Royalty sampling • Monitoring – Solvent accounting vs. Ops cost – Lab requirements vs. 3rd Party – Staffing – Retrofitting • Technology – No accurate online analyzer to measure solvent in annulus gas (vapour or liquid) and emulsion 6 Additional Information Suncor’s Report on Sustainability • https://sustainability.suncor.com/en/innovation Chat with us! We’re here to build and contribute to an industry network 7 Disclaimer • Suncor Energy Inc. and its affiliates (collectively "Suncor") do not make any express or implied representations or warranties as to the accuracy, timeliness or completeness of the statements, information, data and content contained in this presentation and any materials or information (written or otherwise) provided in conjunction with this presentation (collectively, the "Information"). The Information has been prepared solely for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon. Suncor is not responsible for and is hereby released from any liabilities whatsoever for any errors or omissions in the Information and/or arising out of a person’s use of, or reliance on, the Information. 8 Natasha Pounder Sr. Process Engineer November 14th, 2019 Process Design and Safety Improvements Required for Solvent Operations Solvent Pilots at Cenovus Energy Overview of Foster Creek Current Pilots at Foster Creek W06 Pad • One well: W06P08 • Solvent Driven Process (50-95% Solvent) N Pad • Two Wells: NP06 and NP07 • Solvent-Aided Process (3-10% Solvent) Solvent Skid Overview Unloading Skid Injection Skid 6 Safety Issues Experienced Solvent Contamination - PSV Freezing Solvent Injection Skid Fire Date here 7 Solvent Contamination Issues Date here 8 PSV Overview Thermal Expansion and Blocked Flow Case PSVs on Solvent Unloading and Injection Skids PSV Freezing Issues PSVs discharge to the Solvent Bullet, variable back pressure • Farris 3800 pilot operated PSVs selected • Equipped with reverse backflow preventer December 2017 – January 2018: • Exhaust on PSV pilot venting solvent • PSV main body then: • wept solvent to bullet, and; • Failed to open at set pressure Date here 10 Other Freezing Issues Differential Pressure Level Sensor on Solvent Bullet • False High level reading from water contamination (filling dead leg above lower PIT) • Required routine draining of dead-leg SAFETY RISK: DRAIN VALVES CAN FREEZE OPEN! Drain was rod-able and steamer truck on standby Flowmeters, PITs and TITs freezing, causing false trips Date here 11 Why did the PSVs Freeze Open? Joule-Thomson effect while venting out exhaust Filled plastic jar with solvent, wait for evaporation • Water remaining in jar! o Potential Sources: <-50 C • PSVs were pop-tested on water (vendor could not empty dome space of all water) • Equipment Commissioning • Solvent Supply: • Trucks (cleaning of trucks; previous fluids hauled) • Loading Storage (stored in salt caverns; water used to push solvent out of cavern) Date here 12 Troubleshooting PSVs were pop-tested on water Not likely.. Other equipment freezing too… • Have to service PSVs once venting or frozen conditions discovered • Frozen and Venting – required to be serviced • Non-Venting could be frozen shut (no way to confirm) – proactively removed for service • PSVs were pop-tested on glycol only; procedure updated Equipment Commissioning Not likely.. Level sensor was working previously… • System in operation for >2 months; any water contamination should be clear • All dead legs and low point drains were drained of potential water SAME SAFETY RISK: DRAIN VALVES CAN FREEZE OPEN! Drains were rod-able and steamer truck on standby Date here 13 Troubleshooting Solvent Supply: Vendor was confident it wasn’t them (No other customer has these issues) Freeze Valve Test Kit used to trace source! • Confirmed solvent failed freeze valve test from injection point back to truck connection Vendor obtained Valve Freeze Test Kit - Tested tanker loading and unloading • Every test passed on filling tankers • Tests failed on unloading tankers! Tankers were hauling Condensates and other water-containing fluids Date here 14 Corrective Actions 1. External Heaters on PSVs First winter, to get up and running 2. Ongoing Freeze Valve Testing; reject tankers that fail; new dry tanker in 24 hours 3. Condition in contract: Dedicated solvent trucks 4. Add heat trace to critical valves (ESDVs) and PSV inlet/outlet with temp indication lights 5. Switch to non-dP based level indication (i.e. Magnetic, Guided Wave Radar) 6. Update Technical Specifications to include above considerations Date here 15 Solvent Injection Skid Fire Date here 16 Solvent Injection Skid Fire Solvent Injection Skid Overview Sequence of Events Risk Assessment Root Cause Investigation Corrective Action Next Steps Sequence of Events Timeline of July 20th, 2018 18 July 20th, 2018 ~ 21:45 LIGHTNING STRIKE! What Happened Next… • Several Pads tripped • Field Run Op job to check out pads prior to re-start • Drives past W06 Pad • Observes a flame • Notifies Panel Op • Panel Op Triggers ERP • Ops meet Emergency Responders • ERs evaluate area, give “all clear” • Investigating Ops enter area 20 …and then… • Investigating Ops trace vent line to source • Op Close the 3x ¼ needle valves on vents Safe Location! • FIRE IS EXTINGHUISHED at ~22:20 21 Safety First! • Immediate Actions Taken: • Shut down N Pad Solvent Injection Skid • Keep W06 Pad Solvent Injection Skid shut down Operations requests formal Risk Assessment prior to restart Incident reported through internal Incident Management System (IMS) initiated • assigned incident low impact rating for both actual and potential risk 22 Risk Assessment 23 Team Composition Risk Assessment scheduled, with a broad scope of participants: • Major Projects Process Engineer (designed the skid) • RFO Team Leads (commissioned the skid) • Site Operations (first responders of incident) • Site Facilities Engineer (involved in response to incident) • TD Operations and Facilities Engineer (operate the skid on a daily basis) Source of ignition was unable to determined. Conducted risk assessment under assumption that one exists – regardless of how or why. Three Impact Categories addressed: Health and Safety, Environment & Regulatory and Productive Assets. Risk Assessment Findings First Responders provided sequence of events and showed which vent was on fire Reviewed P&IDs • Packing Vent under constant pressure • No way for air ingress • Only act as a pilot light (no explosion) • Potential low impact assumption plausible But wait.... Three vent lines, not two? 25 Where does the third vent come from? Trace the line back…. The OIL SUMP VENT! 26 Sump Vent History Lube Oil Drainage Sump vent to atmosphere Originally designed with candy-cane