280 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

A Note on Sunzik Art of and Limited War: A Modern Interpretation

Kim Arm-San

In Asian countries we are fond of citing a classic phraseology “Wengu er zhixin,” which means to find new perspectives and methods on the future by looking into the past. In this light, it is worth noting that Sunzi’s Art of War, the magnum opus written some 2,500 years ago by Sunwu of Qi in the Warring Period, is still widely recognized as a valuable source book for the development of modem science. The military value of Sunzi’s Art of War lies in that it is a comprehensive system of military thought which includes both total and limited war. In terms of general , there are two kinds of war: with limited and with unlimited objective. The former is represented by a British military the- orist, Liddel Hart and the latter by a German military theorist, Clausewitz. In particular, Sunwu’s thoughts on military tactics duly emphasize the short duration of war, a characteristic of limited war in modem times. His statements such as “To win a war is important, but it is no good for it to be prolonged” and “When a war is prolonged, become obsolete and troops dispirited can be interpreted as an emphasis on limited war. According to Robert Osgood, limited war can be defined as a military conflict in which one or both combatants intentionally pursue a goal short of total victory, use less than full military means, or both. It is, in other words, a limitation of warfare in terms of its objectives, duration, and . Limited war can be regarded as a direct reaction to the World . In short, the devastation of the First and Second World Wars, especially the invention of atom bomb in the latter, has renewed a sobering need to limit any total warfare, which can be neither justified politically nor acceptable morally. In conclusion, as more research is conducted in the field of limited war, the true value of Sunzi’s Art of War will come to light when it is aptly applied to modem limited war system. KIM ARM-SAN 245

A Note on Sunzi’s Art of War and Limited War: A Modern Interpretation

Kim Arm-San

This paper is designed to reexamine in a modern context the military theo- ry of Sunzi’s Art of War, a bible for research on .war and strategy through the ages. Considering that Sunzi’s Art of War 2,500 years ago put forward the main thrust and contents of limited war theory whose theoretical basis was not developed until the advent of the nuclear arms era, the author reevaluates it in a modern perspective. It is a clumsy prevailing trend that things old are hackneyed or that ancient wisdom is no longer useful. Through adjusting its basic thoughts and ideas to today’s reality it is worthy to reexplore the work’s essence and utilize it for research and strategy. The value of such exploration lies in the spirit of “Wengu er zhixin,” which means to find new perspectives and methods for the future by looking into the past. This Chinese classic on military theory was written in the Warring Period about 500 BC by Sunwu of Qi and supplemented 100 years afterward by his grandson Sunbin. Its strategic and theoretical values are beyond contention. Li Shimin of the Tang dynasty, esteemed as the greatest ruler in Chinese his- tory, acclaimed it highly by saying, “I have read various books on but they cannot compare to Sunzi’s Art of War.” The great French strategist Napoleon also treasured it, and German Emperor Wilhelm 11 read it after his defeat in I, He was quoted as saying “I should have read this 20 years ago.”

1 Strategic Research, ROK Army College, August 30, 1985, p. 130. 246 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

In addition, General Thomas R. Phillips, coeditor of Roots of Strategy, a five-volume compilation of the world’s military classics, stated that “It may serve as the most ingenious and valuable guidebook to military students who seek to apply its principles to the aspects of modem wars even 2,500 years after its first appearance.”’ Liddel Hart, renowned British strategist and a Clausewitz of the 20th century, said the small book contained almost every detail of strategic and tactical issues he had dealt with in his twenty publica- tions, and, “The thirteen-part volume is a culmination of all wisdom on the conduct of war. It is the oldest book on military science but surpasses any other books of the kind in depth. Clausewitz’s publications may be a match for it but seem to lag behind in theory.”3 The reasons it has been regarded as such an everlasting magnum opus are that it presents general military principles and philosophy applicable to situa- tional changes of the times and that it provides insight and direction on mod- ern national strategy. Its military value can be broadly defined into two areas. One is its contribution to the development of military thinking in the system- atic process of modem warfare. While acknowledging the difficulties of uni- fication in times of turbulence among rival Chinese nations, Sunwu traveled over several nations for seven to eight years to collect war data that might clarify the sources of wartime victory and loss. He paid keener attention to absolute ties between war and politics than any one else throughout the ages and exerted his brilliant wisdom to analyze the nature of war and present successful war performance methods in every a~pect.~He concluded that war has three determinants: first, a nation’s (or a commander’s) view on war, that is, a thought-out war plan; second, prepared- ness for war; and third, the method of war implementation, i.e., the suitability of military tactics. His empirical findings, obtained by actual field examination of the factors determining victory or loss, are widely regarded as a great contribution to the development of modem military science. The other part of its military value is his profound insight for the develop- ment of modem war theory. So long ago he accomodated both total and limit-

2 Ibid., p. 130. 3 Ibid. 4 Outline ofStrategy, Korea , 1991, p. 45. KIM ARM-SAN 247 ed war alike and in particular explored in depth limited-war theory, which has been in brisk discussion with the advent of the nuclear weapons age. He warned against war and stressed that because it always risks life and property, as well as the fate of a nation, insisting that it must be waged only as a last resort. He emphasized: to achieve victory without going to is the best strategy; therefore, one should destroy the enemy’s intention to wage war.5 This war theory pointed out the imprudence of indiscreet war and stressed the need for limited war. His concepts deserve today’s reappraisal. This paper is: first, to reexamine his responses to three strategic proposi- tions in terms of military thought; second, in comparison with Sunzi’s Art of War,to explain the theoretical structure of limited war that has been devel- oped as an integral part of strategic theories since World War 11; lastly, to dis- close the limited-war nature of the , a major research subject as an example of limited war, to modern strategy scholars through employing Sunwu’s strategic propositions.

The Strategic Propositions of Sunzi’s Art of War

A major feature of Sunzi’s Art of War is that it establishes a systematic the- oretical structure on military thought, designating three propositions that determine victory and loss of a war. Military thought generally means the basic perception on war and intellectual theoretical structure on the construc- tion and operation of military capability. It can also be interpreted as a driv- ing force that governs war behavior, so it implies two tasks. One, based of course upon the basic understanding of warfare, is to find its characteristics, goals, forms and especially its causes of victory and loss. The other is to con- ceptualize the best strategic and tactical guidelines for the conduct of war to attain victory. Military thought thus deals with the basic perception of mili- tary construction and war science. In this sense, this article briefly reviews Sunwu’s strategic propositions that offer a systematic theoretical structure on modem military thought. His first proposition deals with the root perception of war., often defined as a special act to achieve national goals through the use of force. Sunwu believed that war is a national issue deciding the life and death of people and

5 Sunzi’s Art of War, in Korean by Kang Mu-hak, Jipmundang, 1986, pp. 111-13. 248 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS the survival of a nation. He thus underscored that it should be avoided by any means, but that if it does occur it should be won and there is no second best.‘ He contended that the best victory is to win without engagement in battle, which expressed his pacifist stance. Nonmilitary means, i.e., political, diplomatic, social, and economic means, may be employed to gain victory by defeating the enemy without any engagement in battle. He believed this is the ultimate , but to make nonmilitary means successful he stressed the need to maintain a strong and superior armed force.7 With regard to the methods for a victory without war, he advocated defeat- ing a hostile nation without arousing it, and only if that cannot be achieved did he suggest achieving the nation’s will by destroying the other side.8 Under these assumptions, he advocated a “false attack strategy,” first to sub- due the enemy’s intentions with a superior and detailed plan and to conduct a war only if absolutely necessary. Sunwu’s second proposition is on how to prepare for war. His emphasis on the thought of “If prepared, no cause for fear” can be found in his statement, “A good commander exerts his best to prepare for a war and waits patiently for the proper timing.” He also says war preparation should be centered on five considerations-method, weather, terrain, wisdom and organization-and seven norms: lordship, the general, weather and terrain, ordinance, military capability, discipline, and reward and punishment. He warns never to engage in a war without definite possibility of victory; in other words, a victorious army begins a war after victory but an army seeking victory after being engaged in a war will lose. He defines the concept of a sure war or a winning war as having prepared for the war costs and materials that would cover the mobilization of 100,000 troops, that is, complete war preparedness. Sunwu’s third proposition deals with how to conduct a war. He maintained that there are two ways: to engage in battle or subdue the enemy by deception. Between the two he duly emphasized the importance of the latter.g

6 Sunzi ’s Art of War, in Korean by Nam Man-sung, Hyunamsa, 1965, p. 10. 7 Outline of Strategy, p. 45. 8 Nam Man-sung, p. 89. 9 Ibid., p. 51 KIM ARM-SAN 249

This statement is parallel with Laozi’s view, “Govern a country with prop- er politics and conduct war with skillful tactics,” and also with that of Hsunzi, who emphasized the importance of situation-specific responses and deception in the conduct of war. He recommends as the best strategy sub- duing the enemy without losing men through a tactic of false attack, and only if this strategy fails, employ armed forces. This to say, engage in battle only as a last resort. In particular, Sunwu’s thoughts on tactics duly emphasizes short duration: when a war is prolonged many lives will be lost, the national economy will be devastated, and a third party will benefit.” When troops are long stationed on the battlefront, he said weapons become obsolete, troops dispirited, offen- sive capability weakened, and the nation’s resources exhausted, so the third party will take advantage to make an assault. He argued that it is no good for war to be prolonged; even if a battle is not finished it should end quickly.

War Perception and Limited-War Thinking

The basic perception on war revealed throughout Sunzi’s Art of War is in harmony with the limited-war theory of modern times. His statements such as “War is the last venture when it is unavoidable” and “To win a war is impor- tant, but not through a prolonged fighting” can all be interpreted as an emphasis on what is now termed limited war. Sunwu asserted in his section on the false attack by deception a limited war: “The best strategy to win a war is to subdue the enemy leaving him intact. The best war fighting strategy is not to win a hundred times but to sub- due the enemy without battle. In this regard, the best strategy is to crush the enemy’s will to wage war, the second best to isolate him by severing his alliance ties, next to conquer his troops by force, and the worst to attack his territory.” l1 Herein lies his step-by-step method of war implementation. Sunwu also wrote, “Leaders who are good at false attack by deception can defeat enemy troops without battle engagement, seize his castle without an assault and conquer him quickly. They attempt to ensure that their troops remain unharmed even while striving to win a large-scale battle. This makes

10 Outline of Strategy, p. 53. 11 Ibid., p. 5 1. 250 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS it possible for them to guarantee profit out of war without loss of troops, and serves as the best military strategy.”12 He regarded the avoidance of any long-term and the limited attainment of war objectives as two most important principles. Of course, since his war perception was intro- duced long before today’s limited war theory, the ancient and the modern do not greatly conform to each other in theoretical structure and specific content. They are, however, in accord in that they both seek to avoid the risk of national downfall in the wake of reckless war implementation and are both concerned about people’s life and property. Limited war is not new. It has been waged many times for a variety of rea- sons. Since the first appearance of war on the earth, it is believed that human beings have agonized over attempts to block or restrict warfare. Limited-war thinking was most strikingly disclosed in the real world: first, the so-called people’s war period between the appearance of the Westphalian system in 1648 and the French Revolution in 1792; second, a period between the Vienna Conference in 1815 and World War I. Wars waged during these peri- ods clearly exhibited limits in that they neither dared threaten a rival’s exis- tence, nor force an adversary to shoulder excessive economic burden. They also imposed relatively few hardships upon the combatants. Wars were fought in the limited sense of changing the territorial borders, trade terms, and accession rights among nations, to break down the power ba1an~es.I~ Extensive research on limited war did not come to be implemented until the end of World War 11; interest in it had been growing due to strong reac- tion against the atrocity of the two global wars. War scholars agreed that through the experiences of both World Wars it became evident that carrying out a can be neither justified politically and nor accepted morally. Thus they vehemently raised the necessity of restriction upon war. The global military environment has now made transformation toward limited war inevitable. Restrictive factors on war have been witnessed: political realism has come to the fore; research on security has been energetically promoted throughout the world; efforts to promote collective security system have borne fruit; strategic alternatives to nuclear war and massive retaliation have

12 Ibid., pp.51-52. 13 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: A Challenge to American Strategy, University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 62-63. KIM ARM-SAN 251 been pursued. The perception has become widespread that every measure must be taken to prevent another total war whose charateristics would include mass destruction and massacre. Therefore, war scholars and strategy specialists have developed limited war theories, placing their philosophical emphasis on a critique of “How can military capability be used within the limits of consuming little resource and provoking in the nuclear age no risk beyond profit?” Along with their discus- sions on limited war, scholars in other fields including politics have present- ed a wide range of views on what limited war is and how its boundaries can be set. To sum, limited war theory can be defined as containing the following logical structure and ~0ntent.l~ First, objectives based upon political superiority: a nation may adjust mili- tary action in accordance with the value of respective objectives. In other words, the level of force employed will be determined in direct proportion to the value of a goal. A nation’s leader must try to limit political goals of a war and to make public to the enemy the specifics and nature of its limited objec- tives. Second, restriction on the level of the physical violence: the parties con- cerned restrict mutually the quality and quantity of weapons used for war implementation. Today’s warfare is limited by means, not by ends. Bernard Brodie claims that although a close relationship exists between war objectives and the level of the physical violence, the level of force always has to be re~tricted.’~If the emphasis is placed on restricting physical violence, how- ever, rather than on attaining political objectives, the operational concept of military capability can easily lose its credibility. In this regard, Henry A. Kissinger stressed that a major issue confronting yesterday’s strategists was integration of superior powers, but a more pending issue of the present is in what context and how one can practice force serviceable to objectives.I6 Third, restriction on time or duration: one party quickly attacks and destroys the other to attain one’s own objective before either the other side gets enough time to reinforce itself or its logistics or economy collapses. For

14 Choi Byong-gab, Nah Gab-su et al., Survey on Modern Military Strategy Ill: Strategy on Limited War and Irregular Wa$are (Uljiseojuk, 1988), pp. 16-62. 15 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in rhe Missile Age, (Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 313. 252 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS example, in the 1967 war between the Arabs and Israelis made a very rapid assault within an extremely brief time and won before any third party could render support to the Arabs. This kind of limit on war duration could be successful when one uses its armed force to punish an enemy or compel him not to carry out a certain action. Lastly, restriction on geographical boundary of the war theater to a limit- ed area, to minimize the risk of increasing the number of participating nations. The -Pakistan War of 1968 and the Korean War are cases in point: both wars were fought within limited bounds. William V. OBrien put forth the following “Guidelines for Limited War“ after summing up definitions, principles, and themes established by such prominent scholars as Osgood, Kissinger, Brodie, Halperin, and Deitchman:” first, political superiority and control over the military instrument; second, limited objectives; third, economy of force-proportionality of means to lim- ited objectives; fourth, voluntary, self-imposed rules on conflict-ommuni- cation between belligerents and the development of explicit and implicit rules of the conflict, avoidance of direct superpower confrontation, no nuclear weapons, geographical confinement of the conflict, invocation of claims that a conflict is legally permissible, limited mobilization, in the use of the psychological instrument, and fight-and-negotiate strategies, introduction of third-party mediators and inspectors; fifth, flexible response based on a will to prevent escalation. Basic spirit, concept, and principles were clearly demonstrated in discus- sions of ancient strategy philosophers, and the most outstanding is Sunwu. It is well known that long before Clausewitz, an authority on war theory of the people’s war period, presented the famous proposition that “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means,”Sunwu underscored subordination of war to policy and restriction upon war. His main concepts are as follows. First, as for political superiority and control over the military instrument, he advocated a sound relationship between political leaders and military commanders. The result would be the military commander’s becoming the cornerstone of the nation. He also stated that when a military commander has a sound view of his nation and is willing to risk his life, the nation will

16 Choi Byong-gab, N,ah Gab-su, et al., p. 19. 17 W. O’Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited Wac Praeger, 1981, pp. 207-37. KIM ARM-SAN 253 become strong; otherwise it will be weakened. All this indicated that Sunwu believed in the political superiority over the military, yet that political leaders should not interfere in a commander‘s discretion. Second, as for limited war objectives and duration, his statements such as “To win a war is important, but it is no good for it to be prolonged” and “When a war is prolonged, weapons become obsolete and troops dispirited” can be interpreted as an emphasis on limited war of brief duration. By advo- cating that “It is no good for a war to be prolonged,” and “Even if a war is not complete, it should be ended quickly,” he put an emphasis on the short War. . Third, as for economy of force, by advocating that “A good commander never mobilizes his troops twice and never transports war supplies three times,” and “Weapons and equipment are transported from the homeland, but war provisions are acquired from the enemy,” he emphasized the reduction of war costs and economy of force. Fourth, as for rules of conflict, he put forth “Four Controls.” They are: (1) control esprit de corps-Avoid attacking the enemy when its spirit is high; attack when it is low, (2) control mind-Avoid attacking when the enemy troops are in order; attack when they are in disorder, (3) control power-Wait until distant enemy troops come near, until they get tired, and until they are hungry, and (4)control change-Avoid attacking when the enemy’s spirit is high and never when their ranks are imposing. In addition, he advocated the following nine principles: (1) never position yourself toward high hills, (2) never engage the enemy against hills, (3) do not engage in a long battle with the enemy in a mountainous area, (4)do not chase an enemy in false retreat, (5)do not attack the enemy’s elite troops, (6) do not attack decoy troops, (7) do not block the retreat routes of a retreating enemy, (8) when encircling him, always leave him a retreating route, (9) do not pursue him to a dead end. Fifth, as for flexible response, he underlined “Do not believe that the enemy will not attack, but prepare yourself so that him cannot attack.” These strategic thoughts in Sunzi’s Art of War seem to concur with the guidelines of limited war prepared by contemporary war theoreticians and strategic experts. These scholars seem to agree in principle that whether it be a nuclear or conventional war, a superpower’s or small nation’s war, an inter- national or -in order to be of limited nature a war should meet the following three major guidelines: political superiority and control over the military instrument; limited political objectives; and economy of force. 254 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

Application of Limited-War Theory to the Korean War

We reviewed limited war thinking as a basic perception on war, a starting point in discussing all strategic propositions of Sunzi’s Art of War and tried to find its common features with the concept and principles of limited war established by modern strategic theoreticians. Of course, there do exist differ- ences in logical description and specific contents. These are due to varying situations of the times and people’s ways of thinking. For example, since weapons systems have drastically improved, the objectives and conduct of war have changed accordingly. We could find out that both Sunzi’s Art of War and the modern limited war concept and principles are in accord in that they both pointed out the need to restrict warfare given its irrationality and cruelty, and recornended ways to restrict it. This section will analyze the limited nature of the Korean War based on the principles. Many strategic theoreticians regard the Korean War as a model case for limited war among the wars fought since World War 11. Some scholars, however, believe it was only a comparatively limited war in terms of size in participation and resources mobilized by belligerents. Consider the contro- versy between General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces during the Korean War, and US President Truman, the highest politi- cal figure who led the conduct of the war. In this we can detect the war’s lim- ited nature.18 MacArthur‘s position appeared to be based on a concept of pure war as a last resort after politics had failed to find a peaceful solution. War was not a continuation of politics but an extreme alternative to politics. MacArthur contended that once politics had failed and war took over, the sole function of politics was to set goals for the military. He also noted that once.the goals were set, the military instrument took over. Military commanders should, at this point, follow the logic of war and be guided by military science alone, unhampered by political limits on the military means. MacArthur believed that once the military instrument is turned on, it should be used to the full

18 Osgood, pp. 173-78; US Congress Joint Senate Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations Hearing, Military Situation in the , 82nd Con., 1st Sess., 1951; David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (St. Martin’s Press, 1964), pp. 196-229; Mathew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Doubleday, 1967), pp. 141-83. KIM ARM-SAN 255 extent of its capacity until victory was secured. He thus rejected political superiority, the most crucial precondition and principle of limited war. l9 On the other hand, President Truman and his political advisers refused to accept MacArthur‘s concept. His administration had various reasons for seek- ing limited-war alternatives to total war. First, there was an underlying con- cern about the possibility of a third world war with the and efforts were made toeavoid this possibility2’ Second, Truman refused to risk a war with the People’sRepublic of (PRC) on its own territory.” Third, American political leaders insisted on husbanding resources for the defense of Western Europe, out of the fear that the whole Korean venture may have been a massive feint by the Soviets to set up European aggressionZ2 In other words, they maintained that once a war starts, military considerations have to be gov- erned by political ones. This conflict of views did not come to an end until the discharge of MacArthur, who objected to political superiority in the conduct of war. As a result, the Korean War was conducted within the limited objectives set by political leaders. If the Truman administration had taken a total-war approach that might have fundamentally included an of the Communist bloc, the Korean War could have escalated into a third world war. Truman and the UN, however, conducted military action from the very start with war objec- tives of defense of Korea and its restoration to the original state. The US also sought economy of force and restriction on resource mobi- lization. It is estimated that since the Truman administration believed its mili- tary stockpiles fell short of the requirements needed to conduct the Korean War, the administration was unwilling to mobilize a massive force although it had already dispatched an adequate troop size. Moreover, because the US confronted the stark reality of having to defend Western Europe, it felt that to mobilize all of its military capability was not desirable. Therefore, the US observed the principle of economy of force by maintaining the established objective to secure South Korea and restricting the use of military stockpiles

19 Osgood, p. 177. 20 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols., Doubleday, 1955, Vol. 2, pp. 333-34. 21 Osgood, p. 175. 22 Motton A. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, John Wiley & Sons, 1963, pp. 44-45. 256 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS within the maximum limit necessary to attain that objective. In addition, the US avoided comprehensive wartime mobilization in its conduct of the war. The US could by then have amassed considerable war materiel and set up military units at its will, because five years already had passed since the end of World War 11. Nonetheless, the US did not secure enough war capability to break the military deadlock on the Korean peninsu- la; mobilization basis would have been profoundly lacking had the war the- ater expanded to China. The US had no choice but to avoid escalation. The Truman administration’s restriction on resource mobilization by resulted from limited objectives in the initial conduct of the Korean War. With limited objectives, the mobilization of military resources had to be scaled down. In addition, principles of limited war were maintained through- out in various ways. After examining the whole process of the Korean War, W. OBrien con- cluded that it was an epitome of limited war in the following aspects. 23

territory Economy of Force No full-scale wartime mobilization Rules of conflict .Avoidance of confrontation with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels - No use of nuclear weapons by the US and the UN Complete restoration of sovereignty and territoq as far north as the 38th parallel Flexible response American Request for UN Security Council approval of assistance to Korea

A careful analysis of other documents regarding the Korean War also reveals that as early as late June 1950 the US had already made several important decisions that were to limit the conduct of war on the peninsula. As such, at that time the principle of political superiority over the military instru- ment was in observance; in terms of military objectives, as well, US military

23 O’Brien, pp. 7-10. KIM ARM-SAN 257 action was strictly limited through beneath the 38th parallel and was intended to restore peace and territory only south of that line.24 To meet these objectives the Truman administration imposed several mea- sures upon the selection of battlefields, weapons, and troops. Combat action against enemy troops was confined to particular areas, and ground and air action was also limited to within the Korean peninsula only. Bombing or of other areas such as the Chinese mainland was ruled out, and chasing the enemy aircraft across the Korean-Chinese border was also pro- hibited. Regarding the selection of weapons there was no use of nuclear or chemical and biological weapons. Regarding the mobilization of troops the war depended upon a partial mobilization of 380,000 reserves to active duty. The Korean War, therefore, can be regarded as a local war with the charac- teristics and appropriateness 0:’a limited war. General MacArthur stated in his memoirs that he preferred a world without war, but that once war begins, it should be won. The war he fought and led in Korea became a limited war, which he said, however, left enormous human and material costs as well as a state of “no victory, no defeat.” His remark reveals the problem of the limit- edness of war and partially acknowledged the validity of the principle of war supremacy, that is, a less-than-total war is not a war at all. Viewed in the principle of Sunzi’s Art of War of all-out war as a final resort only when unavoidable, it can be said that the Korean War conducted improperly . War is an inescapable aspect of history. To make a world without war come true is the ultimate goal of mankind, but discord in national interests among nations that can instigate war has compelled us to seek to use military capability in a selective and limited way. Given a panoply of factors since the end of World War II, including changes in international relations, the advent of political realism, security research progress in most nations, the enhance- ment of collective security and common defense, and efforts on the part of many nations to prepare against the devastation of nuclear war and massive retaliation, wars in the future will all be limited. In fact, every war since the Korean War, big or small, has been limited. As more research emerges in the field of limited war, the true value of Sunzi’s Art of War will come to light when it is appropriately applied to the modern limited war system.

24 Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950, p. 46.