Ghana's Commission on Human Rights and Administrative

Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies

EARNING A REPUTATION FOR INDEPENDENCE: GHANA’S COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE, 1993 - 2003

SYNOPSIS In 1993, Emile Short, a private practice lawyer, took on the challenging job of leading Ghana’s new Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice. Created by the 1992 constitution, the commission had a triple mandate: ombudsman, anti-corruption agency and human rights monitor. Short had to construct the organization from scratch and make it relevant in a political landscape dominated by the presidency. He had to execute a constitutionally broad mandate and develop a public reputation for independence, despite a limited resource base and no enforcement authority. The commission’s power lay in its evidence-based investigations and public hearings, which, combined with media and public support, helped to expose high-level corruption and mobilize social pressures for greater accountability. Short focused on building the commission’s credibility, developing public education programs and creating a network of anti-corruption civil society groups. Short asserted the commission’s independence early on, investigating allegations of corruption against sitting ministers in 1996. For the first time in Ghana, public investigations of incumbent politicians triggered ministerial resignations.

Deepa Iyer drafted this case on the basis of interviews conducted in Accra, Ghana, in July 2011. Itumeleng Makgetla contributed interviews in September 2009. Case published November 2011.

ISS is program of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs: successfulsocieties.princeton.edu. ISS invites readers to share feedback and information on how these cases are being used: [email protected]. © 2011, Trustees of Princeton University. This case study is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies

INTRODUCTION purging the government of opposition from In July 1993, Emile Short was surprised prior governments. In 1985, soon after the to hear the local radio station announce that second Rawlings military government took he would lead Ghana’s new Commission on over, the International Country Risk Guide Human Rights and Administrative Justice. assigned Ghana a corruption score of 2 on a A lawyer who had practiced in the southern scale of 0-6, with 6 as the least risk, city of Cape Coast since 1974, Short had indicating high risks emerging from political made a name for himself locally by serving corruption. on the human rights committee of the Although previous Ghanaian Central Region Bar Association. A year governments had created ombudsman earlier, members of regional political parties institutions to gather public complaints, had approached Short to consider a post in these offices had little investigative or Ghana’s new democratic government, but enforcement authority. During the 1991 nothing had come of the conversation. His deliberations to produce a new multiparty appointment to the commission, which was constitution, the nine members of the created by Ghana’s 1992 constitution, drafting group appointed by Rawlings, called catapulted him onto the national scene. the Committee of Experts, recommended After Ghana’s independence in 1957, the creation of a government agency that repeated military coups had interrupted would have the ability to investigate brief periods of civilian rule. The complaints and allegations of corruption, government of the Provisional National human rights violations and administrative Defense Council (PNDC), headed by Flight injustice. In August 1991, the government Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, came to power convened a 258-member consultative via military coup in June 1979. While the assembly that debated the Committee of PNDC tightened its grip on the country Experts’ report and drafted a constitution. through the 1980s, civil society groups and On April 29, 1992, Ghanaians approved the international financial institutions pressured constitution in a national referendum. the government to democratize. Rawlings Elections followed. Rawlings founded a stepped down after creating a civilian political party, the National Democratic government, took power again at the end of Congress (NDC), and ran as a civilian. He 1983, and then moved once more to create a won 58.4% of the vote and took office in multiparty system embodied in the country’s January 1993. 1992 constitution. Six months later, Parliament passed Act The new constitution created a 456, creating the Commission on Human commission to investigate complaints Rights and Administrative Justice, which concerning human rights violations, became known by its acronym CHRAJ. administrative injustice and corruption. Rawlings appointed Short as CHRAJ’s first Corruption, a dearth of accountability, and commissioner, based on recommendations infringements of justice were common from members of the Council of State, a under past authoritarian and civilian group of presidential advisers. Short had regimes. Quasi-judicial institutions spent 20 years working in private legal addressing these issues mainly focused on practice in Ghana, the United States, and

© 2011, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies the United Kingdom. “I had little the constitution, CHRAJ could investigate experience in this area and, in 1993, there complaints of administrative injustice, were very few such commissions in Africa corruption and human rights violations and therefore few examples to go by,” Short against the public service commission, all said. “We had just made a transition from administrative units of the state, the armed military rule to democracy, so there was still forces, the police service and the prison a legacy of authoritarianism in the body service. CHRAJ also could specifically politic. Here we were, a democratic investigate allegations that a public officer institution that was supposed to be failed to comply with the Code of Conduct independent of any other institution, of Public Officers in the Constitution and especially the government, and promote the allegations of corruption, submitting reports rule of law in a new era of constitutional to the attorney general and auditor general rule. We had to build up this institution.” concerning findings. Last, CHRAJ was This case study assesses CHRAJ’s anti- responsible for educating the public on corruption functions. The study sheds light corruption, human rights and administrative on how a poorly resourced institution justice. The commission had to report funded by the government managed to take annually to Parliament on its performance. on controversial cases, conduct evidence- CHRAJ’s commissioner and two deputy based investigations, establish a reputation commissioners, all of whom were appointed for political independence, and, ultimately, by the president, had the same status as raise the political costs of corruption thanks appeals court and high court judges in largely to strong leadership in its formative Ghana, with the same security of lifelong years and the support of vibrant media. tenure. The purpose of the tenure provision Under Short, CHRAJ placed both was to enable the commissioners to make prevention and correction of corruption decisions impartially, without fear of losing onto postcolonial Ghana’s political their jobs. The Committee of Experts also landscape for the first time. CHRAJ created empowered CHRAJ to enforce its remedies a network of anti-corruption organizations to “through such means as are fair, proper and facilitate prevention effective,” including reporting findings to a and produced some of Africa’s first real superior officer, bringing court proceedings examples of incumbent public servants to stop or change actions that violate rights, suffering exposure for corruption. challenging any law that violated constitutional rights, and submitting reports THE CHALLENGE to the attorney general and auditor general From the start, the commission’s design on corruption limited its reach. CHRAJ combined the investigations. CHRAJ could issue mandates of an ombudsman, a human rights subpoenas requiring people to appear before commission and an anti-corruption the commission and to produce records institution under one umbrella. The relevant to the investigation, bring court Committee of Experts had envisioned the proceedings against anyone who refused to extraordinarily broad mandate as a way to comply with its subpoenas, question any keep costs low. According to Act 456 and person on any subject under investigation,

© 2011, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies and require any person to disclose, under initially. There was so much to do. It was a oath, any knowledge relevant to an struggle from the start, but one that we felt investigation. able and ready to address.” Short recognized that key elements of the commission’s design directly hindered FRAMING A RESPONSE the performance of these functions. In a Short realized that three preconditions concession to the Provisional National were critical to building a functioning Defense Council (Rawlings’ military regime organization: staff, outreach and funding. when the constitution was being written), When Short joined the commission in 1993, the Committee of Experts had limited he and his two deputy commissioners, CHRAJ’s mandate. CHRAJ’s jurisdiction Domakyaareh and Benjamin Oppong, had did not extend to matters pending before a no support staff. All three had been private court or judicial tribunal, to matters practice lawyers. Cases began to pour into involving Ghanaians’ dealings with other the commission’s central headquarters in governments or international organizations, Accra, adding to a deep backlog from the or to matters dealing with executive pardons. ombudsman’s office, which was abolished Additionally, parts of CHRAJ’s mandate with the creation of CHRAJ. Short needed were vague and open to conflicting staff—lawyers, investigators and interpretation, for example, issues like administrative personnel—to start whether CHRAJ could focus on the former addressing incoming cases. He wanted to pre-1993 PNDC regime and whether CHRAJ use meritocratic recruitment methods to could only investigate public officials as create a competent and dedicated pool of opposed to private sector individuals. Last, employees. CHRAJ’s broad mandate meant that staff Short worked with administrators from and finances would be spread thin. the Public Service Commission to identify Given these constraints in CHRAJ’s the qualifications and skills needed for design, Short had to find ways to endow the various CHRAJ positions: investigators, commission with relevance. He faced a lawyers, directors of departments and threefold challenge: to build operational administrative staff. The commission then capacity, to execute a constitutionally broad advertised the positions in the media. Short mandate given a limited resource base, and and the deputy commissioners conducted to develop a public reputation for interviews with candidates along with a independence. “The previous ombudsman representative of the Public Service institution was not effective, and now we Commission on the interview panel. Hiring had a successor: one that had a wider reach decisions hinged on applicants’ background, than anything before it, although not experience and references. Short said he without its limits,” Short said. “We had to and the deputy commissioners favored make this institution work.” Angelina candidates with strong personal integrity, Mornah Domakyaareh, a founding deputy although he conceded that this characteristic commissioner of CHRAJ, said, “It really was was often difficult to identify. Short hired an enormous task several retired police officers as commission

© 2011, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies investigators, thinking that their former ties Danish International Development Agency to the security forces lent them valuable (Danida), the United Nations Development experience. Programme, the United States Agency for The commissioners also had to expand International Development, and the U.K.’s CHRAJ’s access throughout Ghana, to Department for International Development. improve its investigative capacity. “Because Danida quickly become the commission’s approximately 70% of Ghanaians live in rural most important funding agency. “Danida areas, we needed to decentralize and make it started in 1994-1995 and invested massively clear that anybody could submit a complaint in us,” Short said. “We received sustained at a CHRAJ office,” Short said. Short and support through the 1990s and even until Oppong toured Ghana’s regions and the present day. They provided money for districts, identifying buildings to use as workshops, building offices, vehicles, the offices and giving priority to the most purchase of computer equipment, and even populous regions. Within a year, the offered overseas training to our staff. This commission had 38 offices in regional was very useful in the beginning, because we capitals and districts. Short and Oppong needed to prove our worth to the then prioritized Ghana’s other districts, government before we could expect the allocating a portion of CHRAJ’s budget government to raise our budget, and Danida annually for expansion. By 2003, at the end supported us before the government started of Short’s tenure, the commission had set to raise the budget later, in the early 2000s.” up 110 district offices and had a total staff of Developing an anti-corruption strategy 738.1 Lawyers headed regional branches, was a delicate matter. Short said, “We while university graduates manned district didn’t want it to be a witch-hunting exercise, offices to handle lower-priority complaints. which would have made public officials Short knew that the commission’s uncomfortable. We had to strike a balance annual budget was insufficient to cover the between holding public officials accountable three broad mandates of the commission. and at the same time not being unduly The budget came from the government’s intrusive by just summoning people on the consolidated fund and was allocated by the slightest allegation of corruption or illegal Ministry of Finance. Short allocated most of acquisition of wealth.” Domakyaareh said, the government’s funding to salaries, and set “We had to interpret our mandate and build about building relationships with a commission that would stand the test of international donor organizations to secure time, so it was critical to start off well, which additional funding for the commission’s we kept in our mind from the beginning.” activities. “I went, cup in hand, to many donor organizations,” he said. “I went first GETTING DOWN TO WORK to the embassies and spoke to the officials Short and his staff gave priority to the there about the need to assist us.” Short backlog, allocating cases inherited from the and the deputy commissioners wrote ombudsman. The commissioners and proposals for specific projects as the need department heads conducted in-house arose, securing grant funding for several. training sessions for staff, dividing them The commission secured funding from the regionally into clusters and by their roles.

Staff participated in training on the served as a testament to the commission’s principles and techniques of investigation, independence even though Rawlings had which emphasized systematic analysis of appointed all three commissioners. evidence, while district-level staff studied In 1996, CHRAJ seized the opportunity dispute arbitration and mediation. Training to handle its first high-profile anti- sessions involved lectures, case studies, corruption case. Newspapers had carried simulation exercises and group work. allegations of illegal acquisition of wealth, Additionally, managers produced video- abuse of office and misappropriation of recorded vignettes of staff members doing public funds by two ministers and two their jobs, and provided critiques and senior presidential advisers. Rawlings, feedback on their performance. seeking to demonstrate his faith in the democratic process, invited CHRAJ to Building a reputation for independence investigate the allegations, in accordance Short and the deputy commissioners with provisions in the constitution and the knew that the commission needed to assert law that gave the commission responsibility its independence early on. The for investigating suspected corruption. commission’s first face-to-face encounter Short directed CHRAJ’s investigators to with the government arose in 1994. Under conduct a preliminary inquiry. They asked the 1992 constitution’s transitional newspapers to submit their evidence and provisions, the commission had to return evaluated the findings in light of public private assets that had been seized by the records and independent witness accounts. PNDC regime if evidence proved that the The commission’s investigators also sought PNDC had confiscated the property without to determine whether the officials in sufficient grounds. CHRAJ investigators question had complied with Article 286 of assembled historical records and witness the constitution, which required public accounts, and held hearings attended by officers to submit an asset declaration within petitioners and plaintiffs. At the hearings, three months of the constitution’s effective defendants and plaintiffs presented their date in 1992, every four years thereafter, and versions of the story, after which the at the end of their terms of office. In light of commissioners publicly evaluated the the evidence uncovered by CHRAJ’S evidence and asked questions of both sides. preliminary inquiry, Short and the deputy The commissioners then issued rulings and, commissioners decided that the original if needed, submitted recommendations for allegations were credible and that it made action to the attorney general. Between 1994 sense to move ahead with further and 1997, CHRAJ ordered the return of investigations and hearings. citizen properties in 153 cases following The commissioners asked the accused public hearings. Further, CHRAJ reversed officials to provide their versions of the several executive decisions taken during the events in question. Dissatisfied with the PNDC era that had dismissed public officials officials’ responses, the commissioners without due process. These rulings against summoned the four to a series of public Rawlings’ former regime, which still held hearings that were open to citizens and power after being elected democratically, media. “The hearings were public. We

© 2011, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies wanted the process to be as transparent and December 1996 elections in a bid to accountable as possible,” Short said. The influence voters. In response, CHRAJ hearings generally followed a courtroom issued its own white paper, condemning the format, as CHRAJ lawyers presented government’s position as incongruent with evidence compiled by commission the commission’s mandate under the 1992 investigators and attorneys for the accused constitution and criticizing government responded to questions and presented a reluctance to take action against corruption. defense. Citizen resentment grew as media Following the hearings, the covered the public hearings, the commissioners exonerated one presidential government’s outright denial of the findings, adviser and ruled against the three other and CHRAJ’s stern rejoinder. The officials, two of whom were ministers. The commission garnered public support, and commission recommended that the minister eventually Rawlings acquiesced and forced of interior refund about 18.5 million old the three accused men to resign from their Ghanaian cedis (approximately US$1,200) to roles. the state—a sum that exceeded the amount These cases represented the first time in that he had made from the transaction that Ghanaian history that an incumbent was the subject of the investigation. The government faced investigations, earning commission found that minister of food and CHRAJ a reputation for independence agriculture had granted tax waivers to among the Ghanaian public, media and civil certain fishing companies without following society. These initial cases set the basis and proper procedures. The commission process for CHRAJ’s future anti-corruption recommended that he be reprimanded for investigations, all of which were based on negligent behavior. The commission ruled media allegations or third-party complaints. that a presidential staffer had failed to pay Typically, between 1994 and 2003, anti- the correct taxes on his earnings and to corruption cases amounted to 2% or less of disclose a house acquired in the name of his CHRAJ’s annual caseload, with perhaps one 7-year-old son on his asset-declaration form. or two high-profile cases per year. The commission recommended that the staffer pay the appropriate tax and that the Creating a network of anti-corruption government should reconsider his organizations employment. Short worked hard to partner CHRAJ Although CHRAJ had investigated the with civil society organizations and, more cases at the request of the president, the importantly, to generate a network of government officially rejected CHRAJ’s organizations in Ghana dedicated to findings. A formal document addressed corruption issues. “Over the years, we had each of the allegations in detail and “gave meetings with other institutions that dealt explanations for why each finding was not with anti-corruption,” he said. “CHRAJ correct, and why the recommendations were played a prominent role in making these flawed,” Short said. The statement also meetings happen and in developing an accused CHRAJ of intentionally releasing its agenda for fighting corruption in general.” recommendations three months before the Kenneth Attafuah, head of the anti-

© 2011, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies corruption and public education unit at Governance Program, the Institute of CHRAJ from 1998 to 2003, said, “We built Economic Affairs, and the Center for bridges with civil society and enlisted their Democratic Development. As a collective support in serving as additional eyes and platform for anti-corruption advocacy, the ears on the ground for us.” CHRAJ GACC developed training and monitoring frequently worked with the Center for programs, including public surveys that Democratic Development, an independent measured corruption perceptions. The Ghanaian think tank founded in 1998 and group also published, with the based in Accra. Short said, “By helping to encouragement and participation of CHRAJ, build a stronger civil society base on a 10-year national agenda to fight corruption issues, I hoped that CHRAJ and corruption. these groups could all work together, as a Attafuah said, “As the foremost national broad coalition, to promote public sector anti-corruption institution in Ghana’s evolution on tackling corruption.” Fourth Republic, the CHRAJ was Short was instrumental in bringing instrumental in strengthening the capacity of Transparency International to Ghana. The civil society groups committed to the global anti-corruption organization promotion of integrity and high ethics in contacted him in 1999 for advice on how to Ghana, and today, we have multiple set up a branch in Ghana, as the group had a organizations oriented towards the issue.” policy of securing government approval prior to opening local chapters. Short Public education initiatives broached the issue with the then-speaker of As part of its mandate, CHRAJ focused Parliament, Justice Daniel Annan, and with on prevention work through public Rawlings, who agreed to the idea. That education programs. Short and the December, Transparency International commissioners started by identifying target established its local branch, called the groups of interest for public education—for Ghana Integrity Initiative, with Short example, public officials, the police service, serving as chairman of the board, a position journalists, the military and schoolchildren. that he held until his departure from With the help of CHRAJ staff, they then CHRAJ in 2003. developed a specific curriculum for each In 2000, Short and CHRAJ, with sector. The program focused on issues support from donor organizations, facilitated pertinent to CHRAJ’s broad mandate, both the formation of the Ghana Anti-Corruption in terms of anti-corruption and human Coalition (GACC), an alliance of public, rights. private and civil society organizations CHRAJ hosted workshops and training focused on building a national effort to sessions on investigative techniques for confront corruption. Member organizations journalists. For public officials, workshops included CHRAJ, the Private Enterprise concentrated on issues related to conflicts of Foundation, the Forum of Religious Bodies, interest, looking into ways for public the Ghana Integrity Initiative, the Ghana officials to separate their public and private Journalists’ Association, the Economic and lives. For the police force, workshops Organized Crime Office, the National focused on human rights violations, bribery

© 2011, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies and similar concerns. According to Democratic Development on public Attafuah, curriculum development “involved corruption perceptions in the delivery of providing insights into international health care and education services. “It was standards of integrity and universal an extremely rewarding experience,” perceptions of what makes for a better Domakyaareh said, “and it set the stage to society, while remaining attentive to the build a larger network of anti-corruption unique cultural practices in the Ghanaian organizations in Ghana. People sat up and context.” Training sessions involved listened, rather than deriding anti- lectures, role playing, writing exercises, corruption issues like they had before.” video-recorded vignettes, and case studies. Domakyaareh said, “We often fed staff to OVERCOMING OBSTACLES other public sector institutions, because the Over a period of years, several public sector knew that CHRAJ trained its constraints undermined CHRAJ’s efforts. staff well. For example, several CHRAJ First, the institution’s broad mandate lawyers left to join the judiciary and other resulted in a heavy workload for all public sector institutions.” employees. For example, in 2002, the 12 The commission also held a National lawyers at the commission’s main office in Integrity Workshop, in close collaboration Accra handled an average of 200 cases each. with the Center for Democratic The triple mandate of ombudsman, human Development and Transparency rights agency and anti-corruption International, in October of 1998, focused commission created a heavy caseload and a largely on anti-corruption issues. The congested docket. In 1993-1994, CHRAJ workshop brought together public officials, received 3,197 cases. In 2003, it received CHRAJ officials, civil society groups, and 13,726 cases. members of international anti-corruption Lack of money impeded the bodies. At the workshop, Short said that commission’s efforts. “The government,” previous efforts to curb corruption had been said Short, “did not see us as three separate focused too narrowly and concentrated on institutions: ombudsman, anti-corruption legal enforcement, and he urged a institution, and human rights commission. collaborative effort that emphasized They saw us as a single institution from the prevention. start, which resulted in the institution At the workshop, participants receiving inadequate funding.” CHRAJ brainstormed ways of generating public reported to Parliament, which approved its awareness of corruption’s economic and budget, although the Ministry of Finance social costs, and developing the framework typically proposed cuts. Budgets were for a national integrity system that addressed funded quarterly and were not guaranteed. anti-corruption issues. Workshop Increases in CHRAJ’s staff size between participants stressed the importance of 1993 and 2003 (from three commissioners in isolating the factors that promoted 1993 to 738 staff in 2003) were not matched corruption in Ghana and building targeted by corresponding budget increases. In 1993, solutions. The workshop also launched a CHRAJ’s budget was approximately 8.5 study conducted by the Center for billion old Ghanaian cedis, or about

US$557,000, and rose by early 2004 to involved state confiscation without approximately 25.9 billion old Ghanaian compensation. cedis, or about US$1.7 million. Not surprisingly, CHRAJ investigations Several CHRAJ employees suggested encountered resistance. CHRAJ’s design that low annual budget allocations limited its investigators’ ability to obtain represented a way for the executive branch information. CHRAJ could not compel a to weaken the institution. Indeed, the defendant to give evidence or produce a commission’s lack of financial resources document if the defendant was bound by resulted in low staff salaries that led to high law to maintain secrecy. Additionally, the staff attrition. “The unfortunate part of it is Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction that we lose quite a number of the people over whether an official document could be that we train because of the unattractive produced in a hearing or in court. Only the conditions of service,” Short said. In the Supreme Court could decide if the context of these budgetary constraints, the disclosure of a document would be commission tried to reward its staff by giving prejudicial to state security or public awards for long service and recognizing interest. Sam Asibuo, professor at the those who had served a particular length of University of Ghana, made the point that the time. definition of confidential documentation Under the law, the commission had to and the rules surrounding nondisclosure investigate all complaints that came before were subjective and provided public officials it, which meant that other aspects of its plenty of room to maneuver. mandate received less attention. In rural During the Rawlings era, which ended areas, the commission was often the only in 2001, the commission often faced resource for free and fair dispute resolution. outspoken opposition from government “Our experience has been that a lot of officials. Complaints against the people bring complaints which are not commission appeared occasionally in within our remit,” Short said. “And they government-run publications. One example expect us to take those cases because they was the government’s white-paper response don’t have the means to take these cases to to the commission’s decision in the seminal court. Also, our services are free, and 1996 anti-corruption case. In his annual people have confidence New Year’s address, Rawlings publicly in the commission.” Typically, 70% to 80% attacked Short, insinuating that Short and of the commission’s cases involved dealing CHRAJ were eroding the gains of the with private grievances in rural districts, and revolution. A member of the cabinet later most of the remaining cases dealt with called Short to apologize. However, this administrative justice. opposition diminished in 2001 with the To cope with the heavy caseload, the democratic transition of power to President commissioners developed guidelines for John Kufuor. “When there was a leadership priorities. In the area of property rights, for transition in 2001 … the tension between the example, they tried to avoid investigating government and the commission had waned landlord-tenant disputes, Short said. considerably, and so we did not face the Rather, they focused on instances that kinds of challenges that we faced during the

© 2011, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies first seven years of the administration that had triggered ministerial resignations, took over the reins of power on the ultimately improving accountability. transition to constitutional rule,” Short said. Although anti-corruption cases accounted The commission also faced opposition for 2% or less of the total caseload from the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), later throughout CHRAJ’s existence, these cases renamed the Economic and Organized were typically high-profile and controversial. Crimes Office (EOCO), which was CHRAJ set a precedent in Ghanaian established in 1998 to address fraud and political history. For the first time, sitting embezzlement in public and private ministers suffered exposure and faced institutions. The Serious Fraud Office political costs for their misdemeanors. lacked CHRAJ’s credibility and public CHRAJ built a strong public constituency, reputation for independence. Given that including citizens and Ghana’s vibrant mass CHRAJ also possessed an anti-corruption media. CHRAJ’s reputation was greatly mandate, the two institutions often butted aided by its role as an ombudsman and heads over cases. “There were some human rights institution in addition to an occasions when we both investigated the anti-corruption agency; its work offering free same cases, or when neither of us dispute-resolution services in rural areas and investigated a case when we thought that the its campaigns against cultural practices that other was doing so. We had two meetings to violated human rights, although discuss the overlap, but the collaboration contributing to a heavy influx of cases, has not been as effective as it should be,” increasingly made CHRAJ’s presence felt Short said. However, over time, Short and throughout the country. A survey the deputy commissioners came to an conducted by the Center for Democratic understanding with the SFO that CHRAJ Development found that only 8.4% of the would limit itself to corruption involving surveyed sample stated that they did not public officials, while the SFO would focus trust CHRAJ—much lower than the other on pure fraud (instances of forgery, money public institutions covered by the survey.3 laundering, etc.). After the SFO became the Domakyaareh, the former deputy EOCO in 2010, its mandate became more commissioner, said, “There were several distinct from that of CHRAJ. “There is a people who got a pleasant surprise: I think growing distinction between fraud and that they were cynical that we would corruption, and of course, we mainly investigate the cases. They were very happy focused on public officials while they also that we looked into it. It showed that we looked at offenses committed by the private were willing to cooperate fully with citizens sector,” said Short. and look into the matter. We always made sure that the decision was based on ASSESSING RESULTS evidence. As commissioners, we made sure Ghana experienced a gradual that we set the commission on a very sound improvement in corruption perceptions at pedestal and portrayed its independence the same time that CHRAJ was active.2 clearly and systematically. Only CHRAJ was CHRAJ’s power lay in its investigative involved in its own decision making—not capacity: The commission’s investigations the government, not the presidency.”

Brobbey, of the Center for Democratic of its impact. In 2005, Northwestern Development, said, “No other institutions in University in the U.S. awarded Short an Ghana investigated sitting ministers or honorary doctorate, stating, “Despite public officials. That gave CHRAJ respect, chronic underfunding and the loss of and allowed CHRAJ’s findings to carry personnel to organizations offering higher weight. Although governments might not levels of compensation, CHRAJ has act on CHRAJ’s findings, it still leaves a admirably discharged its broad mandate.” question mark, a stain, on the individual. Similarly, Asibuo of the University of Ghana The question is what happens after concluded his report on the commission by CHRAJ’s issues its recommendations. To stating that CHRAJ “has established itself as date, when a person is found guilty of a credible institution which enjoys public corruption, the attorney general has often confidence.” Asibuo recommended that the not acted on CHRAJ findings. Public and government should ease CHRAJ’s media pressure supporting CHRAJ triggered resourcing problems and enhance its ministerial resignation.” enforcement powers. In Ghana, where the attorney general Ultimately, CHRAJ was able to build a also served as minister of justice, this lack of reputation for itself as an institution of prosecution came as little surprise. Brobbey integrity, willing to take on political said, “The chief legal adviser within the heavyweights in pursuit of its mandate to government and the chief prosecutor are the tackle corruption, uphold administrative same person. The attorney general has justice and defend human rights. It also tender to refuse to prosecute any of his built a popular constituency by working with colleagues in the cabinet, and therefore, and catalyzing the creation of civil society CHRAJ’s recommendations were organizations while ensuring media coverage consistently ignored.” to keep the public abreast of its CHRAJ recommendations carried investigations. Another key factor weight with the donor community. In 2005, underlying the commission’s performance the government had to nominate an was motivated, sustained leadership individual to head Ghana’s Millennium supported by constitutional protections of Challenge Corporation account and tenure. implementation efforts. The individual Several studies made the point that the nominated by the president had previously performance of CHRAJ relied too heavily on come under a CHRAJ investigation that the choice of the commissioner, a yielded adverse findings. When USAID and presidential appointee. Other criticisms the American government had to confirm pointed to CHRAJ’s potentially crippling the nomination, they found the candidate weaknesses—high staff turnover, low budget unsuitable, largely because of CHRAJ’s and salaries, hefty caseload and weak findings. enforcement power. “To continue The commission received widespread sustainably, CHRAJ really needs to tackle commendation for its work despite the these problems, which are eating away at the resource constraints that narrowed the scope institution,” Brobbey said.

REFLECTIONS and the government at large.” President In 2003, Emile Short took a leave of John Atta Mills appointed Lauretta Lamptey, absence from his post as head of Ghana’s a former lawyer and investment banker, as Commission on Human Rights and the new commissioner after Bossman Administrative Justice to serve as a justice resigned. on the International Criminal Tribunal for Early in 2011, Mills convened Ghana’s Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania. With Short’s first constitutional review process, opening extended leave of absence, his then-deputy, the door to changes in CHRAJ’s legal Anna Bossman (who succeeded Deputy structure. During the review, Short called Commissioner Angelina Mornah for CHRAJ to be made more financially Domakyaareh in 2002), stepped in as acting autonomous, receiving its annual budget commissioner. With only two allocation from Parliament rather than the commissioners and the ensuing uncertainty Ministry of Finance. He also called for concerning Short’s return, CHRAJ’s fate improvements in the terms and conditions was left hanging in the balance. Although of the commissioners and deputy several interviewees credited Bossman for commissioners, insisting on a five-year term doing an excellent job in continuing the renewable once, as he felt that life-long commission’s work, the same key tenure was contrary to international best problems—opposition from the executive, practices. “The linking of the lack of budget, high staff turnover, and commissioners’ and deputy commissioners’ broadness of mandate—continued to salaries to those of the Court of Appeal and severely inhibit the institution’s High Court Judges respectively has created a performance. After Short’s departure and glass ceiling,” Short said. “It’s very difficult eventual retirement in 2010, CHRAJ for a commissioner to progress beyond this continued to handle occasional high-profile, structure—there is no room for career controversial corruption cases. progression at the higher levels of CHRAJ.” Bossman resigned in June 2011 to take a Short also emphasized increased salaries for position at the African Development Bank. CHRAJ staff to address the problem of Despite her eight years as acting attrition, and increasing the number of commissioner, the government had never commissioners. Most importantly, Short confirmed her nor promoted her to the role made a case for narrowing CHRAJ’s of commissioner. The Center for mandate. As of August 2011, the Democratic Development, on her constitutional review was still under way. retirement, wrote, “This development also Kenneth Attafuah, former director of draws attention to the longstanding but anti-corruption and public education at anomalous and dangerous practice in which CHRAJ, said, “With all the recent changes our presidents have kept in a state of at CHRAJ, we can only await the future with uncertainty occupants of top positions in anticipation; the CHRAJ has always done its some key state governance institutions, job to the extent possible, given the severe perpetually keeping them in acting funding, logistical and human resource capacities, particularly those whose challenges constraining its effectiveness.” functions include ‘policing’ the presidency Domakyaareh added, “We always conducted

© 2011, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Deepa Iyer Innovations for Successful Societies our work with integrity, and I hope that this the leadership of CHRAJ being unhesitant continues.” to take our political leadership to account. If Short said, “Bringing about reform in it goes to CHRAJ, they won’t stop institutions requires moral courage, and investigating the matter. CHRAJ is you’re going to face a lot of challenges. increasingly respected as our democracy When I occasionally train commissioners in evolves.” other African commissions, I tell them that Short said, “I think that what other it’s not easy unless you have the institutions can learn from CHRAJ is the determination and the will to go through need to assert the independence of the difficult times to achieve what you want.” institution early on, from the inception of its Victor Brobbey, researcher at the Center establishment. It is very important that such for Democratic Development, said, institutions are not established for window- “CHRAJ’s successes can be attributed to the dressing purposes or to please the excellent initial leadership of Mr. Emile international community. On the other Short, and, following him, Ms. Anna hand, we still face so many challenges—the Bossman. Short set the institution on a broad mandate, a constant need for more strong path for the future—under a lesser resources, the brain drain, low salaries—this leader, a far more incapable institution has all been the fallout in taking a firm would likely have emerged. They’ve been stance in asserting our independence in quite fearless, and that can be attributed to accordance with the oath we took.”

1 The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice. CHRAJ Annual Report. Accra, Ghana: 2003. 2 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for Ghana started at 3.3 in 1998 and had risen to 4.1 in 2010. Zero is the lowest score on the 10-point scale, indicating a high degree of corruption. 3 Brobbey, Victor. “CDP Modelling Success—Interim Report.” Accra: Center for Democratic Development, December 2010.

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