On the Explanation and Implementation of Three Open-Source Fully Homomorphic Encryption Libraries
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A Survey Report on Partially Homomorphic Encryption Techniques in Cloud Computing
International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT) ISSN: 2278-0181 Vol. 2 Issue 12, December - 2013 A Survey Report On Partially Homomorphic Encryption Techniques In Cloud Computing 1. S. Ramachandram 2. R.Sridevi 3. P. Srivani 1. Professor &Vice Principal, Oucollege Of Engineering,Dept Of Cse,Hyd 2. Associate Professor, Jntuh, Dept Of Cse,Hyd 3. Research Scholar & Asso.Prof., Det Of Cse, Hitam, Hyd Abstract: Homomorphic encryption is a used to create secure voting systems, form of encryption which allows specific collision-resistant hash functions, private types of computations to be carried out on information retrieval schemes and enable cipher text and obtain an encrypted result widespread use of cloud computing by which decrypted matches the result of ensuring the confidentiality of processed operations performed on the plaintext. As data. cloud computing provides different services, homomorphic encryption techniques can be There are several efficient, partially used to achieve security. In this paper , We homomorphic cryptosystems. Although a presented the partially homomorphic cryptosystem which is unintentionally encryption techniques. homomorphic can be subject to attacks on this basis, if treated carefully, Keywords: Homomorphic, ElGamal, Pailler, homomorphism can also be used to perform RSA, Goldwasser–Micali , Benaloh, computations securely. Section 2 describes Okamoto Uchiyama cryptosystemIJERT, IJERTabout the partially homomorphic encryption Naccache–Stern cryptosystem, RNS. techniques. 2. Partially Homomorphic Encryption Techniques 1. INTRODUCTION RSA Security is a desirable feature in modern system architectures. Homomorphic In cryptography, RSA[1] is an asymmetric encryption would allow the chaining encryption system. If the RSA public key is together of different services without modulus and exponent , then the exposing the data to each of those services. -
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE and ALGORITHMIC LIABILITY a Technology and Risk Engineering Perspective from Zurich Insurance Group and Microsoft Corp
White Paper ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ALGORITHMIC LIABILITY A technology and risk engineering perspective from Zurich Insurance Group and Microsoft Corp. July 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Executive summary 03 This paper introduces the growing notion of AI algorithmic 2. Introduction 05 risk, explores the drivers and A. What is algorithmic risk and why is it so complex? ‘Because the computer says so!’ 05 B. Microsoft and Zurich: Market-leading Cyber Security and Risk Expertise 06 implications of algorithmic liability, and provides practical 3. Algorithmic risk : Intended or not, AI can foster discrimination 07 guidance as to the successful A. Creating bias through intended negative externalities 07 B. Bias as a result of unintended negative externalities 07 mitigation of such risk to enable the ethical and responsible use of 4. Data and design flaws as key triggers of algorithmic liability 08 AI. A. Model input phase 08 B. Model design and development phase 09 C. Model operation and output phase 10 Authors: D. Potential complications can cloud liability, make remedies difficult 11 Zurich Insurance Group 5. How to determine algorithmic liability? 13 Elisabeth Bechtold A. General legal approaches: Caution in a fast-changing field 13 Rui Manuel Melo Da Silva Ferreira B. Challenges and limitations of existing legal approaches 14 C. AI-specific best practice standards and emerging regulation 15 D. New approaches to tackle algorithmic liability risk? 17 Microsoft Corp. Rachel Azafrani 6. Principles and tools to manage algorithmic liability risk 18 A. Tools and methodologies for responsible AI and data usage 18 Christian Bucher B. Governance and principles for responsible AI and data usage 20 Franziska-Juliette Klebôn C. -
NASA Develops Wireless Tile Scanner for Space Shuttle Inspection
August 2007 NASA, Microsoft launch collaboration with immersive photography NASA and Microsoft Corporation a more global view of the launch facil- provided us with some outstanding of Redmond, Wash., have released an ity. The software uses photographs images, and the result is an experience interactive, 3-D photographic collec- from standard digital cameras to that will wow anyone wanting to get a tion of the space shuttle Endeavour construct a 3-D view that can be navi- closer look at NASA’s missions.” preparing for its upcoming mission to gated and explored online. The NASA The NASA collections were created the International Space Station. Endea- images can be viewed at Microsoft’s in collaboration between Microsoft’s vour launched from NASA Kennedy Live Labs at: http://labs.live.com Live Lab, Kennedy and NASA Ames. Space Center in Florida on Aug. 8. “This collaboration with Microsoft “We see potential to use Photo- For the first time, people around gives the public a new way to explore synth for a variety of future mission the world can view hundreds of high and participate in America’s space activities, from inspecting the Interna- resolution photographs of Endeav- program,” said William Gerstenmaier, tional Space Station and the Hubble our, Launch Pad 39A and the Vehicle NASA’s associate administrator for Space Telescope to viewing landing Assembly Building at Kennedy in Space Operations, Washington. “We’re sites on the moon and Mars,” said a unique 3-D viewer. NASA and also looking into using this new tech- Chris C. Kemp, director of Strategic Microsoft’s Live Labs team developed nology to support future missions.” Business Development at Ames. -
Breaking Crypto Without Keys: Analyzing Data in Web Applications Chris Eng
Breaking Crypto Without Keys: Analyzing Data in Web Applications Chris Eng 1 Introduction – Chris Eng _ Director of Security Services, Veracode _ Former occupations . 2000-2006: Senior Consulting Services Technical Lead with Symantec Professional Services (@stake up until October 2004) . 1998-2000: US Department of Defense _ Primary areas of expertise . Web Application Penetration Testing . Network Penetration Testing . Product (COTS) Penetration Testing . Exploit Development (well, a long time ago...) _ Lead developer for @stake’s now-extinct WebProxy tool 2 Assumptions _ This talk is aimed primarily at penetration testers but should also be useful for developers to understand how your application might be vulnerable _ Assumes basic understanding of cryptographic terms but requires no understanding of the underlying math, etc. 3 Agenda 1 Problem Statement 2 Crypto Refresher 3 Analysis Techniques 4 Case Studies 5 Q & A 4 Problem Statement 5 Problem Statement _ What do you do when you encounter unknown data in web applications? . Cookies . Hidden fields . GET/POST parameters _ How can you tell if something is encrypted or trivially encoded? _ How much do I really have to know about cryptography in order to exploit implementation weaknesses? 6 Goals _ Understand some basic techniques for analyzing and breaking down unknown data _ Understand and recognize characteristics of bad crypto implementations _ Apply techniques to real-world penetration tests 7 Crypto Refresher 8 Types of Ciphers _ Block Cipher . Operates on fixed-length groups of bits, called blocks . Block sizes vary depending on the algorithm (most algorithms support several different block sizes) . Several different modes of operation for encrypting messages longer than the basic block size . -
Practical Homomorphic Encryption and Cryptanalysis
Practical Homomorphic Encryption and Cryptanalysis Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Naturwissenschaften (Dr. rer. nat.) an der Fakult¨atf¨urMathematik der Ruhr-Universit¨atBochum vorgelegt von Dipl. Ing. Matthias Minihold unter der Betreuung von Prof. Dr. Alexander May Bochum April 2019 First reviewer: Prof. Dr. Alexander May Second reviewer: Prof. Dr. Gregor Leander Date of oral examination (Defense): 3rd May 2019 Author's declaration The work presented in this thesis is the result of original research carried out by the candidate, partly in collaboration with others, whilst enrolled in and carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Mathematics at Ruhr-University Bochum as a candidate for the degree of doctor rerum naturalium (Dr. rer. nat.). Except where indicated by reference in the text, the work is the candidates own work and has not been submitted for any other degree or award in any other university or educational establishment. Views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author. Place, Date Signature Chapter 1 Abstract My thesis on Practical Homomorphic Encryption and Cryptanalysis, is dedicated to efficient homomor- phic constructions, underlying primitives, and their practical security vetted by cryptanalytic methods. The wide-spread RSA cryptosystem serves as an early (partially) homomorphic example of a public- key encryption scheme, whose security reduction leads to problems believed to be have lower solution- complexity on average than nowadays fully homomorphic encryption schemes are based on. The reader goes on a journey towards designing a practical fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and one exemplary application of growing importance: privacy-preserving use of machine learning. -
Information Guide
INFORMATION GUIDE 7 ALL-PRO 7 NFL MVP LAMAR JACKSON 2018 - 1ST ROUND (32ND PICK) RONNIE STANLEY 2016 - 1ST ROUND (6TH PICK) 2020 BALTIMORE DRAFT PICKS FIRST 28TH SECOND 55TH (VIA ATL.) SECOND 60TH THIRD 92ND THIRD 106TH (COMP) FOURTH 129TH (VIA NE) FOURTH 143RD (COMP) 7 ALL-PRO MARLON HUMPHREY FIFTH 170TH (VIA MIN.) SEVENTH 225TH (VIA NYJ) 2017 - 1ST ROUND (16TH PICK) 2020 RAVENS DRAFT GUIDE “[The Draft] is the lifeblood of this Ozzie Newsome organization, and we take it very Executive Vice President seriously. We try to make it a science, 25th Season w/ Ravens we really do. But in the end, it’s probably more of an art than a science. There’s a lot of nuance involved. It’s Joe Hortiz a big-picture thing. It’s a lot of bits and Director of Player Personnel pieces of information. It’s gut instinct. 23rd Season w/ Ravens It’s experience, which I think is really, really important.” Eric DeCosta George Kokinis Executive VP & General Manager Director of Player Personnel 25th Season w/ Ravens, 2nd as EVP/GM 24th Season w/ Ravens Pat Moriarty Brandon Berning Bobby Vega “Q” Attenoukon Sarah Mallepalle Sr. VP of Football Operations MW/SW Area Scout East Area Scout Player Personnel Assistant Player Personnel Analyst Vincent Newsome David Blackburn Kevin Weidl Patrick McDonough Derrick Yam Sr. Player Personnel Exec. West Area Scout SE/SW Area Scout Player Personnel Assistant Quantitative Analyst Nick Matteo Joey Cleary Corey Frazier Chas Stallard Director of Football Admin. Northeast Area Scout Pro Scout Player Personnel Assistant David McDonald Dwaune Jones Patrick Williams Jenn Werner Dir. -
Decentralized Evaluation of Quadratic Polynomials on Encrypted Data
This paper is a slight variant of the Extended Abstract that appears in the Proceedings of the 22nd Information Security Conference, ISC 2019 (September 16–18, New-York, USA) Springer-Verlag, LNCS ?????, pages ???–???. Decentralized Evaluation of Quadratic Polynomials on Encrypted Data Chloé Hébant1,2, Duong Hieu Phan3, and David Pointcheval1,2 1 DIENS, École normale supérieure, CNRS, PSL University, Paris, France 2 INRIA, Paris, France 3 Université de Limoges, France Abstract Since the seminal paper on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) by Gentry in 2009, a lot of work and improvements have been proposed, with an amazing number of possible applications. It allows outsourcing any kind of computations on encrypted data, and thus without leaking any information to the provider who performs the computations. This is quite useful for many sensitive data (finance, medical, etc.). Unfortunately, FHE fails at providing some computation on private inputs to a third party, in cleartext: the user that can decrypt the result is able to decrypt the inputs. A classical approach to allow limited decryption power is distributed decryption. But none of the actual FHE schemes allows distributed decryption, at least with an efficient protocol. In this paper, we revisit the Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) cryptosystem, and the Freeman’s variant, that allow evaluation of quadratic polynomials, or any 2-DNF formula. Whereas the BGN scheme relies on integer factoring for the trapdoor in the composite-order group, and thus possesses one public/secret key only, the Freeman’s scheme can handle multiple users with one general setup that just needs to define a pairing-based algebraic structure. -
SGX Secure Enclaves in Practice Security and Crypto Review
SGX Secure Enclaves in Practice Security and Crypto Review JP Aumasson, Luis Merino This talk ● First SGX review from real hardware and SDK ● Revealing undocumented parts of SGX ● Tool and application releases Props Victor Costan (MIT) Shay Gueron (Intel) Simon Johnson (Intel) Samuel Neves (Uni Coimbra) Joanna Rutkowska (Invisible Things Lab) Arrigo Triulzi Dan Zimmerman (Intel) Kudelski Security for supporting this research Agenda .theory What's SGX, how secure is it? .practice Developing for SGX on Windows and Linux .theory Cryptography schemes and implementations .practice Our projects: reencryption, metadata extraction What's SGX, how secure is it? New instruction set in Skylake Intel CPUs since autumn 2015 SGX as a reverse sandbox Protects enclaves of code/data from ● Operating System, or hypervisor ● BIOS, firmware, drivers ● System Management Mode (SMM) ○ aka ring -2 ○ Software “between BIOS and OS” ● Intel Management Engine (ME) ○ aka ring -3 ○ “CPU in the CPU” ● By extension, any remote attack = reverse sandbox Simplified workflow 1. Write enclave program (no secrets) 2. Get it attested (signed, bound to a CPU) 3. Provision secrets, from a remote client 4. Run enclave program in the CPU 5. Get the result, and a proof that it's the result of the intended computation Example: make reverse engineer impossible 1. Enclave generates a key pair a. Seals the private key b. Shares the public key with the authenticated client 2. Client sends code encrypted with the enclave's public key 3. CPU decrypts the code and executes it A trusted -
Homomorphic Encryption Library
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit¨at Munchen¨ Prof. Dr. D. Kranzlmuller,¨ Dr. N. gentschen Felde Data Science & Ethics { Microsoft SEAL { Exercise 1: Library for Matrix Operations Microsoft's Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL)1 is a publicly available homomorphic encryption library. It can be found and downloaded at http://sealcrypto.codeplex.com/. Implement a library 13b MS-SEAL.h supporting matrix operations using homomorphic encryption on basis of the MS SEAL. due date: 01.07.2018 (EOB) no. of students: 2 deliverables: 1. Implemenatation (including source code(s)) 2. Documentation (max. 10 pages) 3. Presentation (10 { max. 15 minutes) 13b MS-SEAL.h #i n c l u d e <f l o a t . h> #i n c l u d e <s t d b o o l . h> typedef struct f double ∗ e n t r i e s ; unsigned int width; unsigned int height; g matrix ; /∗ Initialize new matrix: − reserve memory only ∗/ matrix initMatrix(unsigned int width, unsigned int height); /∗ Initialize new matrix: − reserve memory − set any value to 0 ∗/ matrix initMatrixZero(unsigned int width, unsigned int height); /∗ Initialize new matrix: − reserve memory − set any value to random number ∗/ matrix initMatrixRand(unsigned int width, unsigned int height); 1https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/simple-encrypted-arithmetic-library-seal-v2-0/# 1 /∗ copy a matrix and return its copy ∗/ matrix copyMatrix(matrix toCopy); /∗ destroy matrix − f r e e memory − set any remaining value to NULL ∗/ void freeMatrix(matrix toDestroy); /∗ return entry at position (xPos, yPos), DBL MAX in case of error -
Fundamentals of Fully Homomorphic Encryption – a Survey
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, Report No. 125 (2018) Fundamentals of Fully Homomorphic Encryption { A Survey Zvika Brakerski∗ Abstract A homomorphic encryption scheme is one that allows computing on encrypted data without decrypting it first. In fully homomorphic encryption it is possible to apply any efficiently com- putable function to encrypted data. We provide a survey on the origins, definitions, properties, constructions and uses of fully homomorphic encryption. 1 Homomorphic Encryption: Good, Bad or Ugly? In the seminal RSA cryptosystem [RSA78], the public key consists of a product of two primes ∗ N = p · q as well as an integer e, and the message space is the set of elements in ZN . Encrypting a message m involved simply raising it to the power e and taking the result modulo N, i.e. c = me (mod N). For the purpose of the current discussion we ignore the decryption process. It is not hard to see that the product of two ciphertexts c1 and c2 encrypting messages m1 and m2 allows e to compute the value c1 · c2 (mod N) = (m1m2) (mod N), i.e. to compute an encryption of m1 · m2 without knowledge of the secret private key. Rabin's cryptosystem [Rab79] exhibited similar behavior, where a product of ciphertexts corresponded to an encryption of their respective plaintexts. This behavior can be expressed in formal terms by saying that the ciphertext space and the plaintext space are homomorphic (multiplicative) groups. The decryption process defines the homomorphism by mapping a ciphertext to its image plaintext. Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [RAD78] realized the potential advantage of this property. -
Bias in the LEVIATHAN Stream Cipher
Bias in the LEVIATHAN Stream Cipher Paul Crowley1? and Stefan Lucks2?? 1 cryptolabs Amsterdam [email protected] 2 University of Mannheim [email protected] Abstract. We show two methods of distinguishing the LEVIATHAN stream cipher from a random stream using 236 bytes of output and pro- portional effort; both arise from compression within the cipher. The first models the cipher as two random functions in sequence, and shows that the probability of a collision in 64-bit output blocks is doubled as a re- sult; the second shows artifacts where the same inputs are presented to the key-dependent S-boxes in the final stage of the cipher for two suc- cessive outputs. Both distinguishers are demonstrated with experiments on a reduced variant of the cipher. 1 Introduction LEVIATHAN [5] is a stream cipher proposed by David McGrew and Scott Fluhrer for the NESSIE project [6]. Like most stream ciphers, it maps a key onto a pseudorandom keystream that can be XORed with the plaintext to generate the ciphertext. But it is unusual in that the keystream need not be generated in strict order from byte 0 onwards; arbitrary ranges of the keystream may be generated efficiently without the cost of generating and discarding all prior val- ues. In other words, the keystream is “seekable”. This property allows data from any part of a large encrypted file to be retrieved efficiently, without decrypting the whole file prior to the desired point; it is also useful for applications such as IPsec [2]. Other stream ciphers with this property include block ciphers in CTR mode [3]. -
RC4-2S: RC4 Stream Cipher with Two State Tables
RC4-2S: RC4 Stream Cipher with Two State Tables Maytham M. Hammood, Kenji Yoshigoe and Ali M. Sagheer Abstract One of the most important symmetric cryptographic algorithms is Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) stream cipher which can be applied to many security applications in real time security. However, RC4 cipher shows some weaknesses including a correlation problem between the public known outputs of the internal state. We propose RC4 stream cipher with two state tables (RC4-2S) as an enhancement to RC4. RC4-2S stream cipher system solves the correlation problem between the public known outputs of the internal state using permutation between state 1 (S1) and state 2 (S2). Furthermore, key generation time of the RC4-2S is faster than that of the original RC4 due to less number of operations per a key generation required by the former. The experimental results confirm that the output streams generated by the RC4-2S are more random than that generated by RC4 while requiring less time than RC4. Moreover, RC4-2S’s high resistivity protects against many attacks vulnerable to RC4 and solves several weaknesses of RC4 such as distinguishing attack. Keywords Stream cipher Á RC4 Á Pseudo-random number generator This work is based in part, upon research supported by the National Science Foundation (under Grant Nos. CNS-0855248 and EPS-0918970). Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author (s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies or those of the employers. M. M. Hammood Applied Science, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Little Rock, USA e-mail: [email protected] K.