Theodore Roosevelt, , and the Emergence of the Modern Presidency: An Introductory Essay Author(s): LEWIS L. GOULD Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1, Part I: American Foreign Policy for the 1990s and Part II: T. R., Wilson and the , 1901-1919 (WINTER 1989), pp. 41-50 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574563 Accessed: 22-01-2020 13:21 UTC

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This content downloaded from 65.51.207.226 on Wed, 22 Jan 2020 13:21:17 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms , Woodrow Wilson, and the Emergence of the Modern Presidency: An Introductory Essay

LEWIS L. GOULD

Eugene C. Barker Centennial Professor in American History The University of Texas at Austin

Writing in May 1903 about "The Hampered Executive," the journalist Henry Loomis Nelson argued that the President of the was not the powerful figure of popular legend. "The President is denied the right to the free exercise of the powers which are essentially executive" because of the influence of Congress. Moreover, "the power necessary to meet the unjust responsibility which the country places upon him has not been bestowed upon him." Nelson conceded that in moments of national crisis the president had been able to act without usual restraints, "but the very exercise of ultra-constitutional and illegal powers by the President has but illustrated his powerlessness under the provisions of the law establishing his office, defining its functions, and limiting his jurisdiction." As the years went by, Nelson concluded, "it will eventually be necessary to give to the President the power which ought to accompany responsibility."1 During the two decades that followed Nelson's essay, the American presidency went through a dramatic growth in its power and influence in the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Even the conservative interim of Wil- liam Howard Taft produced important institutional changes in the presidential office. By 1926 Senator James A. Reed of Missouri complained that "The most dangerous trend today is the custom of creating an atmosphere of omnipotence about the Chief Executive, whatever his party."2 Reed exaggerated the situation, of course, but there had been an expansion of presidential authority since the turn of the century. Presi- dents shaped legislative programs for Congress to consider, the mechanisms of pub- licity and mass information were at their disposal, and the nation expected the chief executive to act vigorously in foreign affairs. The system of checks and balances prevented presidents from doing whatever they wanted, and the size of the presidency as an institution was still tiny by modern standards. Nonetheless the range of presidential activity and influence was far wider when Woodrow Wilson gave way to Warren G. Harding than when Roosevelt succeeded William McKinley in September 1901. One measure of the change in the presidency was the number of long-standing precedents about what the chief executive should and should not do that were ren- dered obsolete between 1900 and 1921. Under Theodore Roosevelt, the presidential message to Congress moved from an event that occurred once a year or at a moment

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of national crisis to a regular transmission of presidential opinion and priorities. Woodrow Wilson made the crucial innovation in 1913 when he addressed Congress in person, a practice that Thomas Jefferson had abandoned in 1801. Once it was delivered by the president himself, rather than being read by bored congressional clerks, the State of the Union message attained a greater importance as a public assertion of the presi- dent's program. At the end of the nineteenth century custom dictated that the president not leave the continental United States during his term of office. William McKinley had made plans to break this precedent in his second term by traveling to Hawaii, , and Cuba. The president told the French ambassador in July 1901 that the "slightly mixed character" of the Cuban government "would be a step made on the path that would allow the President to leave the soil of the United States."3 Theodore Roosevelt went to the zone in 1906, and crossed the border into Mexico briefly in 1909. Woodrow Wilson then ended the informal but powerful sanction against international presidential travel when he went to Europe and the Paris Peace Conference in 1918-1919. Stay-at-home presidents could not have become world leaders in this century. Within the borders of the United States itself, presidents became more visible and well-traveled figures during these twenty years. McKinley had made more tours of the nation than his predecessors. Roosevelt went out to the country with even greater frequency and popular acclaim. Taft's propensity to tour, however, became one of the liabilities of his administration when the public believed that he preferred touring to the duties of his office. Wilson used speaking events to rouse support for his pre- paredness program in 1916, and the physical effects of his speeches for the League of Nations in helped bring about the tragic conclusion of his presi- dency. The Progressive Era also found presidential candidates and even incumbent chief executives more actively involved in the campaigns for the . The front porch campaigns of Benjamin Harrison and McKinley brought the voters to the can- didates in controlled situations with extensive newspaper coverage . in 1896 made a full-scale whistle stop tour of the key states, a tactic that he repeated in 1900 and 1908. McKinley's reelection campaign in 1900, Roosevelt's race against Alton B. Parker in 1904, and Taft's futile reelection bid in 1912 all followed the tradition that a sitting president made no formal campaign appearances. Earlier in 1912, however, Taft made speeches and fought publicly to defeat Roosevelt's chal- lenge for the Republican nomination. Then Woodrow Wilson in 1916 shattered the taboo against a president campaigning for his own return to the White House in his race against Charles Evans Hughes. Presidential relations with the press also began to move in small steps toward modern practices. During the McKinley years the press corps had been moved inside the White House and given a table on the second floor. The president's secretary, first John Addison Porter and then George B. Cortelyou, gave briefings at noon and 4:00 p.m. Cortelyou stayed on into the first Roosevelt term before moving on to the Cabinet. His innovations regarding the advance texts of presidential messages, facili-

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ties for the press when the president traveled, and briefings for White House jour- nalists made him one of the important forerunners of the modern press secretary. What Cortelyou and his successor under Roosevelt, William Loeb, had achieved slipped back under Taft, whose relations with newsmen started badly and got steadily worse throughout his single term. Under Woodrow Wilson, however, the regular presiden- tial press conference came into being early in his first term. For two years, until July 1915, the president met the press corps on Tuesday mornings. Wilson came to dislike the innovation and dropped the practice. He returned to it briefly in late 1916, and then abandoned press conferences again until 1919. Yet, the precedent had been estab- lished for the chief executive to hold sessions with journalists on a regular basis. Wilson's difficulties also foreshadowed the problems that future president would encounter with the news conference concept. The range of expanded presidential activities between 1900 and 1920 included many other diverse topics, as each of the essays in this thematic issue on the presidency in the Progressive Era will show in their individual ways. One of the singular contri- butions that Theodore Roosevelt made to the nation's highest office was his status as the first modern celebrity president. Before reaching the White House, he had at- tained fame as an author, western cattle rancher, politician, and military hero in the war with Spain in 1898. As Leo Braudy has noted about him, in Roosevelt "the in- dividual American might glimpse an image of himself or at least of someone whom the expanding world of newspapers, magazines, photography, films, and radio made seem as emotionally close as a friend or a member of the family."4 Roosevelt had an instinct for the spotlight as president that became a trademark of his years in office and afterward. "Yes, it is true that T.R. liked the centre of the stage, loved it in fact," wrote the New York editor, Henry L. Stoddard, "but when he sought it he always had something to say or do that made the centre of the stage the appropriate place for him."5 Historians are just beginning to measure the impact of the phenomenon of being a celebrity on the lives of public figures such as presi- dents. Like Ernest Hemingway, Douglas Fairbanks, and Charles A. Lindbergh, Roosevelt both used his notoriety and was to some degree its victim after he left the White House. The popular obsession with Theodore Roosevelt spilled over into a related fasci- nation with the president's family. Among the other Roosevelts, the first lady, Edith , limited her visibility to those social occasions when she might ap- propriately set a moral tone for the country through her musicales and afternoon teas. The Roosevelt children from the president's second marriage, especially the younger boys, Archie and Quentin, made good newspaper copy as the "White House Gang" that rollicked through the Mansion with their playmates and romped vigorously with their father. It was the president's daughter by his first marriage, Alice Lee Roosevelt, who dominated the headlines until her wedding to Congressman Nicholas Longworth in 1906. In an unstated rivalry with her father, the youthful and high-spirited Alice used outrageous behavior, within the decorous standards of the time, to assert her own identity. President Roosevelt found his daughter both a distraction and a political asset. Their relationship offers an insightful perspective on Theodore Roosevelt's character,

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and Stacy Rozek recaptures a time when "Princess Alice" was becoming the tart and lively Washington wit whose wisecracks became her stock in trade for more than six decades. This examination of Alice Roosevelt also underscores the analytic possibilities in the study of presidents as parents. The role of presidential wives is receiving greater scrutiny as first ladies become a recognized topic for serious investigation. The rela- tionship of chief executives to their children, in and out of the White House, has been little explored. The family of Franklin D. Roosevelt has had a little anecdotal attention, but not yet sustained coverage. There are also interesting questions in the other offspring of Theodore Roosevelt, the children of William Howard Taft, and the daughters of Woodrow Wilson. In many ways, as Rozek's article demonstrates, Alice Roosevelt went through at a more intense level a common experience of presi- dential progeny. The issue of the extent to which the nation should be a champion of human rights internationally has been much debated in the past two decades. The problem is an old one in American history, as Stuart Knee's survey of Theodore Roosevelt's response to Russian pogroms reveals. The president had to balance the limited impact on the Russian autocracy of American protests about the treatment of Jews in that country against the enthusiasm and fervor of those in the United States who were outraged at the repressive policies of Czar Nicholas II and his government. The human rights aspect of the matter also became entangled with Roosevelt's Asian diplomacy that sought to restrain Russian power in Manchuria and elsewhere in North China and Korea. Added to all this was the president's suspicion and distrust of the Russians as international actors. As Secretary of State noted, "dealing with a govern- ment with whom mendacity is a science is an extremely difficult and delicate matter."6 Among the significant spokesmen for the cause of Jews in Russia were Oscar S. Straus and Jacob Schiff. Roosevelt was careful to consult them about his actions toward the Russian pogroms, and he furnished Straus with diplomatic cables and autho- rized statements to use with those who wished to know what the United States govern- ment was doing. Roosevelt was very deft at this kind of semi-public diplomacy which encouraged a sense of participation among those who had approached him. In November 1904 during a White House visit, Straus heard the portions of Roosevelt's annual message concerning Russian and Rumanian Jews. "I should like to have you pay spe- cial attention to this," the president told him, "as I have consulted you all along in regard to the action that I have taken."7 The care with which Roosevelt approached the issue of Jews in Russia reflected his sensitivity to the electoral dimensions of subjects relating to the ethnically diverse American population. He named Straus as his secretary of commerce in 1906 in part, as he told Straus himself, because "I want to show Russia and some other countries what we think of Jews in this country." The president responded to similar impulses in his selection of Catholics for posts in the cabinet, the Philippines, and federal ap- pointments generally. His public posture was that every man was "to have a , no more and no less, without regard to his creed," but he used his office to push ethnic inclusiveness as one of the political hallmarks of his presidency.8 Other

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sustained explorations of Roosevelt's use of the powers of his office in this way would be illuminating. The most controversial foreign policy decision of Theodore Roosevelt's presi- dency remains the acquisition of the Zone in 1903-1904. Despite the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, the emotions that grew out of the president's actions have an effect on the current controversy over General , his alleged connections to the drug traffic, and the future of the international waterway. The events of 1903 and afterward thus continue to fascinate scholars. A recent article by John Major plays down the role of Philippe Bunau-Varilla in writing the Hay-Bunau- Varilla Convention of 1903, and argues that the State Department drafted the docu- ment. Similarly, James F. Vivian in 1980 reexamined Roosevelt's celebrated statement in 1911 that "I took the Canal Zone," and concluded that the former president meant to say "I took a trip to the Isthmus." Roosevelt's words were probably misquoted and he likely did not say the famous phrase so often attributed to him.9 J. Michael Hogan's concern is with the period after the ratification of the Hay- Bunau-Varilla pact, the years when the United States constructed the Panama Canal itself. Though several distinguished historians have written extensively about this phase of the canal's history, the decade of building has not been analyzed as fully as the events of 1903. Hogan considers the way in which popular perceptions about what was taking place in Panama changed under the guidance of Theodore Roosevelt and his administration. The presidential trip outside the United States in 1906 was not simply an inspection tour or a junket. It was the centerpiece of an effort to define the terms of the debate about the Canal in a manner that would quiet critics and disarm skeptics. Hogan indicates that the larger process of mythmaking about heroism in Panama had lasting consequences and recent events underscore the relevance of his argument. The years after a president leaves office can be an extended phase in the lives of these historical figures. Herbert Hoover lived three decades after his term ended, Wil- liam Howard Taft had seventeen years and a term as Chief Justice of the United States to his credit, and Harry S. Truman spent twenty years in Independence, Missouri at his own presidential library. For Theodore Roosevelt the almost ten years of the post- presidential career had many vivid episodes lived out in the glare of public notoriety. One of the most closely watched was the trial of the suit that William Barnes, Jr. brought against him for libel in 1915. Barnes charged that Roosevelt had libeled him in 1914 when he accused him of being a political boss in New York State. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British ambassador, wrote of the case: "His great popularity is ap- parent in the way in which everybody is reading the reports of the trial now begun at Syracuse. Full telegraphic reports are being sent to all parts of the country and are read with great avidity. T.R. never bores the public."10 These years were not for Theodore Roosevelt a time of political triumphs and personal victories. A bid for the White House in 1912 fell short, the Progressive Party had a brief and troubled life, and his role in the 1916 campaign did more to injure Charles Evans Hughes than to block Woodrow Wilson's chances for reelection. One bright spot amid these reverses was the outcome of the Barnes case when the jury

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found him innocent. John Robert Greene shows that Barnes and Roosevelt had never been more than uneasy political co-workers in New York Republican politics before 1912. The trial episode became a test of the conservative and progressive approaches to the future of the GOP. Roosevelt won this round of the struggle, but the conserva- tives prevailed in the long run. More scrutiny is needed of Roosevelt's career after the presidency along the lines of what Greene has provided. During the era of Roosevelt and Wilson, the United States underwent a fun- damental change in the way it financed the operations of the federal government. Before 1914 the major sources of revenue were excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol, and customs duties collected on imported products. With the enactment of the Un- derwood Tariff of 1913, the income tax, authorized by the Sixteenth Amendment, opened the way to a new and larger source of funding for the government. In the process the issue of the protective tariff began to lose the central place it had held for a half century and more within the American political arena. While not passed to provide revenue for larger government programs, the income tax became the means by which Washington paid for its broadened presence in the lives of the American people. The passage of the income tax law in 1913 did not at first seem likely to affect the incumbent president, the federal judges, or state employees, since these individuals were specifically exempted under the terms of the new law. As James Vivian shows, however, that was far from the end of the question. During the First World War, Congress removed the exemption for the president and other officers. The exigencies of war finance and the determination of Congressman Claude Kitchin of North Caro- lina led lawmakers to tax the salaries of the president and federal judges in February 1919. A Supreme Court decision in June 1920 overturned the provision as it applied to judges and therefore presumably also the president. President Warren G. Harding decided in 1921 to pay his taxes like any other citizen, and the practice evolved to the point where presidential tax returns are regularly made public each year. Tax returns for presidential hopefuls are also similarly scrutinized. The nation has come a substan- tial distance from Chester Alan Arthur's remark to a woman who inquired about his drinking habits: "Madam, I may be President of the United States, but my private life is nobody's damned business."11 In contrast to President Arthur's aloofness, Woodrow Wilson's private and public life seems in recent years to have become everyone's business. Because of the central part that his stroke in October 1919 played in the outcome of the League of Nations battle and the fate of his presidency, Wilson's physical condition before the White House and while he was in office has come under the closest review. The president's brain, eyes, and other organs have become the arena for doctors, surgeons, and scholars. Meanwhile Wilson's two marriages have also been examined in detail for their impact on the president's emotions and sentiments. The fascination with Wilson's character and personality would seem to have virtually no limits at this time.12 Ronald H. Carpenter's concern is with how Woodrow Wilson used words, espe- cially the words that George Creel of the Committee on Public Information supplied to him during . The president had long been interested in achieving an

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effective writing style. He told his future wife in 1884 that he sought "a style full of life, of colour and vivacity, of soul and energy, of inexhaustible power- of a thou- sand qualities of beauty and grace and strength that would make it immortal."13 Wilson realized some of these aims at his best moments as a writer and speaker- his first inaugural address and his war message in April 1917. Scholars such as James David Barber have found in Wilson's prose what they take to be clues about the president's unwillingness to compromise in the crisis over ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. Carpenter offers a counter-argument based on Wilson's editing of Creel's submissions. With the ample volumes of Wilson's personal and public papers now available in the edition that Arthur S. Link and his colleagues have so superbly prepared, it is certain that similar efforts to penetrate the depths of Woodrow Wilson's life will be a contin- uing feature of scholarship on this period. When he spoke to Congress on April 2, 1917, Wilson said that it was a "fearful thing" to lead the nation into a conflict that was "the most terrible and disastrous of all wars."14 Once the United States had become a belligerent, Wilson proved to be a vigorous and resolute war leader. The obstacles he had to surmount were many. The country was ill-prepared to fight a modern war, the population was divided over the merits of American entry in 1917, and the position of the Allied powers relative to Germany was grim. Debate still rages over the record that Wilson made as presi- dent in 1917-1918. The attitude of his administration toward dissent and the protec- tion of civil liberties in wartime calls forth sharply contrasting verdicts among historians. His role in shaping policy on the mobilization of the American economy and his con- tribution to the political decline of the Democratic party between 1916 and 1920 has also evoked intense scholarly analysis. In the fields of civil-military relations and foreign policy, Wilson was the decisive figure during the war years. "One of the greatest of the President's powers," he had written in 1908, was the "control, which is very absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation." Two key decisions that Wilson had to make were, first, the extent of American participation in the war itself and, second, the degree of involvement that the nation would have in the peace settlement that followed the fighting. David M. Esposito is concerned with the president's conclusion in the spring of 1917 that it would be necessary to send a large army to France if he was to secure the defeat of Germany and the kind of peace that would prevent a future world war. To raise such an army, the administration used the draft on a scale that Americans had not seen even during the Civil War. As John Whiteclay Chambers has also noted, "When the United States entered World War I in the spring of 1917, power flowed to the commander-in-chief "15 The beginnings of that important process lay in the events that Esposito describes. When the war began, Woodrow Wilson announced that "politics is adjourned." Historians have for many years agreed that while the fighting lasted partisanship in the United States scarcely abated at all as Democrats and Republicans sought an ad- vantage in the elections of 1918 and 1920. The question of the terms on which the war would end inevitably became a subject with political ramifications. The personal animosity that Republicans such as Theodore Roosevelt and held

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for Wilson added to the intensity of partisan combat on this topic. The issues, how- ever, reflected serious and fundamental differences over the direction of American for- eign policy that went beyond the hatred that, for example, Lodge and Wilson felt for each other as politicians and individuals. That is why the debate over Wilson and the League endures with such fervor even among writers seventy years after these events. The range of these substantive and political disputes emerges in Edward Parsons's exploration of how Lodge and Roosevelt saw the 1918 election and extent to which their fear was justified that the president was seeking a compromise peace with Ger- many in 1918. Using British and American sources, Parsons contends that Wilson did want to preserve Germany as a bulwark against in Europe and a bal- ance to an ascendancy of Great Britain in the postwar world. The interaction of Wilson's diplomacy with domestic political concerns was complex, and Parsons's article is a reminder that the struggle over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles drew on assumptions that both the president and the Senate framed while the fighting raged. Throughout these twenty years the personalities of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as presidents and political rivals dominated the national history of the United States. Their relationship was a friendly one early in the century. They had known each other since 1896, and Wilson had visited Roosevelt at Oyster Bay at least once. Upon Wilson's selection as president of Princeton in 1902, Roosevelt wrote that he was "a perfect trump." Their congenial acquaintance did not endure, of course, as political competition and their divergent partisan allegiances drove them apart after 1905. By the time Wilson became president in 1913, with the 1912 cam- paign behind them, Roosevelt's view of the Democrat was scornful. "I regard Wilson with contemptuous dislike," he told Henry Cabot Lodge. The president was "a ridicu- lous creature in international matters."16 Despite their differences over foreign and domestic politics, Wilson and Roosevelt shared enough ideas in common about presidential power and the role of the govern- ment to make an analysis of their ideological positions a matter of relevance to stu- dents of executive power. John Milton Cooper's dual biography, published in 1983 as The Warrior and the Priest, covered their interaction and discord in an extended way. George Ruiz now examines "the ideological convergence" that these two strong presi- dents experienced as they pursued political supremacy. He finds Roosevelt to be a consistent progressive and Wilson the conservative Democrat who moved toward ad- vanced by the election of 1916. In that contest, Wilson proclaimed that, as his record on child labor, farm credits, and unions indicated, "We have in four years come very near to carrying out the platform of the Progressive Party as well as our own; for we are also progressives."17 The American electorate in 1916 faced a choice of Wilson and Democratic reform or Charles Evans Hughes and Republican conser- vatism that anticipated the voter alignments and ideological divisions of the 1930s. Howard Gillman provides a comparative survey of how Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson saw the role of the president within the emerging interest group politics of the Progressive Era. All these men had to come to grips with a public life where the older style of what Richard McCormick has termed "distributive" politics was giving way to a pro- cess that responded to the clamor of highly motivated and intensely focused groupings

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of politically involved citizens.18 Roosevelt embraced this development, especially in his Progressive Party phase, Taft resisted it, and Wilson sought first to transcend it and then yielded to it in 1916. With this exploration of the three presidents of the period, this special issue on the Presidency in the Progressive Era comes to an appropriate conclusion. Henry Loomis Nelson had been right in 1903: "The sentiment which loads the President with respon- sibility is instinctive, and it will strengthen as time goes on."19 Chief Executives like McKinley and Taft made important and often underrated contributions to the growth of the modern presidency. Of course, it was Roosevelt and Wilson who best embodied the broadened potential of the office for Americans in Henry Loomis Nelson's time and in the century that ensued. The range of topics that these authors have addressed and the interesting findings that they offer indicate that the history of the evolution of the presidency during these twenty years continues to be a rewarding and stimulating area of scholarly investigation.

Notes

1. Henry Loomis Nelson, "The Hampered Executive," The Century Magazine, 66 (May, 1903), p. 150 (first two quotations), 144 (third quotation), 151 (last quotation). 2. Henry L. Stoddard, As I Knew Them: Presidents and Politics from Grant to Coolidge (New York: Harper & Bros., 1927), p. 210. 3. Jules Cambon to Theophile Delcasse, July 13, 1901, United States, Volume 8, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris. 4. Leo Braudy, The Frenzy of Renown: Fame & Its History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 552. 5. Stoddard, As I Knew Them, pp. 310-311. 6. Hay is quoted in Eugene F. Trani, The Treaty oj Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 8. 7. "A Night at the White House as a Guest of the President, November 16, 1904," Oscar S. Straus Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 4. 8. Oscar S. Straus, Under Four Administrations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), pp. 182, 210. 9. James F. Vivian, "The Taking' of the Panama Canal Zone: Myth and Reality," Diplomatic History, 4 (Winter, 1980), pp. 95-100; John Major, "Who Wrote the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Convention?" Diplomatic History, 8 (Spring, 1984), pp. 115-123. 10. Cecil Spring-Rice to James Bryce, May 7, 1915, The Papers of Cecil Spring-Rice, F0800/241. Public Record Office, . 11. Arthur is quoted in Lewis L. Gould, "The President in the Age of the Politico," in Robert C. Post, ed., Every Four Years (Washington: Smithsonian Exposition Books, 1980), p. 126. 12. The controversy over President Wilson's health is a complex one. For the most recent contribution to the issue, see Bert E. Park, "The Impact of Wilson's Neurologic Disease During the Paris Peace Conference," Edwin A. Weinstein, "Woodrow Wilson's Neuropsychological Impairment and the Paris Peace Conference," and James F. Toole, "Some Observations on Wilson's Neurologic Illness," all in Arthur S. Link, et al, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 58: 1919 (Princeton: Press, 1988), pp. 611-640. 13. John M. Mulder, Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 78. 14. "An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, April 2, 1917," in Arthur S. Link, et al., eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 41: January 24-April 6, 1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 526.

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15. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 4; John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: The Free Press, 1987), p. 268. 16. John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 60; William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 179. 17. Lewis L. Gould, Reform and Regulation: American Politics from Roosevelt to Wilson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), p. 198. 18. Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 204-214. 19. Nelson, "The Hampered Executive," p. 151.

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