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What to Do About Hugo Chávez: Venezuela's Challenge to Security

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What to Do About Hugo Chávez: Venezuela's Challenge to Security No. 2243 February 19, 2009 What to Do about Hugo Chávez: Venezuela’s Challenge to Security in the Americas Ray Walser, Ph.D. As the Obama Administration settles into the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The Obama White House and reviews its foreign policy agenda, Administration, like its predecessor, also recognizes one significant topic likely to emerge early will be the potentially damaging economic and strategic U.S. relations with Venezuela and its radical, anti- consequences of U.S. dependency on imported oil American president Hugo Chávez. Relations from Venezuela, a challenge somewhat lessened by between the two countries deteriorated significantly the current drop in oil prices. when Chávez expelled the U.S. ambassador to Car- Chávez generously used Venezuela’s oil revenue acas without cause in September 2008. The press to maintain popular support and subsidize a range will try to make any Obama–Chávez encounter at of clients that include totalitarian Cuba, faction-torn the April 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad Bolivia, and an increasingly polarized Nicaragua. a defining moment for the future of U.S.–Venezu- Using the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas ela–Latin America relations. (ALBA) and an oil facility, Petrocaribe, he broadened The recent orderly transition from a Republican economic and political ties with much of the Carib- to a Democratic White House contrasts with the bean and Central America. Argentina, battling polarizing political battle underway in Venezuela chronic economic instability under Nestor Kirchner over perpetuating Chávez’s ability to remain in and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, remained a office. A new constitutional referendum, the second privileged friend of Chávez and a ready recipient of in less than two years, took place on February 15. Venezuelan financial largess. Its passage will allow Chávez to run for additional Throughout 2008, President Chávez moved six-year terms in 2012 and beyond, giving him the aggressively to strengthen ties with Iran, Russia, and time he says he needs to consolidate his Bolivarian China as he undertook to build a broader, anti- Revolution. It is increasingly apparent that Presi- American global coalition. Expanded Venezuela– dent Chávez equates popular democracy in Venezu- ela with personal immobility in executive power. During the electoral campaign and in the run-up This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: to his January 20 inauguration, President Obama www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg2243.cfm Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison expressed interest in improving relations with Ven- Center for Foreign Policy Studies ezuela. Nonetheless, Obama had also signaled con- of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis tinued concern about Chávez’s assault on liberal Institute for International Studies democracy and his support for non-state actors, Published by The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE such as the narco-terrorists of the Revolutionary Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 2243 February 19, 2009 Iran ties included regular air service between Cara- vigilant of any evidence of Venezuela’s ties to cas and Tehran and increased Iranian investment in FARC, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Venezuela. Iranian actions drew closer U.S. scrutiny • Increase support for elements of Venezuelan civil leading to measures against sanction-dodging finan- society that support the rule of law, pluralism, cial agencies of the Iranian regime located in Cara- media freedom, and respect for human rights. cas. Chávez’s recent efforts to offer support to the radical Islamist Hamas regime in Gaza and his • Not seek agrément for a new ambassador to Ven- expulsion of Israel’s ambassador to Caracas are ezuela until it is confident that Chávez is ready to indicators of a tilt in favor of Islamist extremism. address key security concerns, for example, Likewise, Chávez’s support for Russia during the renewed action to prevent drug trafficking Georgia crisis, substantial purchases of Russian (including cooperation with the U.S. Drug arms, a highly publicized visit to the Caribbean by Enforcement Administration), an end to all sup- Russian warships, and the November 2008 visit of port for FARC, resumption of cooperation on Russian President Medvedev to Caracas highlighted anti-terrorism measures, and an end to virulent a year of deepening Russian–Venezuelan ties. China anti-Americanism. has emerged as a major commercial partner, and • Consider, if Chávez refuses to cooperate, 1) Chávez is banking in the long run on selling his oil stepping up targeted sanctions against individ- to China rather than to the U.S. ual government officials and unofficial agents of While many are quick to proclaim the demise of the Venezuelan government, 2) sanctioning the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. naturally recoils from Venezuelan institutions, including banks and, continued loss of influence and leverage in the potentially, the national oil company, and 3) Western Hemisphere. A realistic U.S. policy toward adding Venezuela to the list of state sponsors Venezuela will also contain an adequate plan for of terrorism. addressing U.S. energy dependence, since President • Develop a comprehensive contingency plan for a Chávez treats his nation’s oil resources as a pressure possible disruption in oil supply from Venezuela. tool and economic weapon. • Work directly with friends, paying special atten- Elements of a sound and comprehensive Venezu- tion to Colombia and Peru, particularly passing ela policy for the next four years make it incumbent the Colombia Free Trade Agreement in order to on the Obama Administration to: strengthen a firm democratic counterpoint to the • Develop a strategy for addressing Andean secu- Chávez–ALBA alliance. rity concerns raised by Chávez and Venezuela. —Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for • Assign a high priority to acquiring and reviewing Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center intelligence on terror, money-laundering, and for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and drug-trafficking in Venezuela, being especially Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. No. 2243 February 19, 2009 What to Do about Hugo Chávez: Venezuela’s Challenge to Security in the Americas Ray Walser, Ph.D. As the Obama Administration settles into the White House and reviews its foreign policy agenda, one significant topic likely to emerge early will be Talking Points U.S. relations with Venezuela and its radical, anti- • One significant foreign policy issue likely to American president Hugo Chávez. The orderly tran- emerge early for the Obama Administration sition from a Republican to a Democratic Administra- is U.S. relations with Venezuela and its radi- tion in the U.S. in January 2009 contrasts with the cal, anti-American president Hugo Chávez. polarizing battle underway in Venezuela over perpet- • Chávez is far too friendly with Colombia’s FARC narco-terrorists—over which President uating Chávez’s stay in office. A new constitutional Obama has rightly expressed concern. referendum took place on February 15. Its passage • Chávez has been consistently hostile to the will allow Chávez to run for additional six-year terms U.S.—expelling America’s ambassador, ending in 2012 and beyond, giving him the time he says he cooperation on anti-drug-trafficking mea- needs to consolidate his Bolivarian Revolution. The sures, hurling crude, aggressive, and paranoid referendum raises the specter of further restrictions accusations. Therefore, absent a firm commit- on individual freedoms and the consolidation of ment for constructive and verifiable coopera- authoritarian rule in Venezuela. tion by Chávez, the White House should not renew ambassadorial relations. During the electoral campaign and in the run-up to • Oil Matters: Venezuela recently surpassed his January 20 inauguration, President Barack Obama Mexico as the third-largest supplier of crude oil expressed interest in improving relations with Venezu- to the U.S.—after Canada and Saudi Arabia. ela. Nonetheless, President-elect Obama had also sig- Chávez has already demonstrated his willing- naled concern about Chávez’s political and economic ness to use oil as a tool against America. role in the region and over Chávez’s support for the • Under Hugo Chávez, Venezuela poses the narco-terrorists of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of most significant, multifaceted, state-based diplomatic and security challenge to U.S Colombia (FARC). interests in the Western Hemisphere. These comments provoked an angry firestorm from This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: Chávez who charged the President-elect with med- www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg2243.cfm dling in Venezuelan politics, and launched into a fresh Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies diatribe against what he called the U.S.’s effort to dom- of the inate Latin America and undermine his regime.1 It was Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies a blast reminiscent of Chávez’s anti-American tirade Published by The Heritage Foundation when he expelled the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect- ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 2243 February 19, 2009 last September 11.2 Chávez’s behavior also high- It should also consider a range of measures that lights the substantial challenge the U.S. and the include rigorous monitoring of Venezuelan banks Obama Administration face when dealing with a and companies, including the national oil com- Latin American leader who has staked his interna- pany, for potential acts of corruption, money tional and domestic policy on hostile relations with laundering, or fronting to help others evade inter- the U.S.
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