ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 4, pp 743± 766, 1997

Thepolitical economy of Islamic resurgencein Turkey: the rise of the WelfareParty in perspective

ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË

Therising electoral fortunes of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi ( RP)), a party thatdifferentiates itself sharply from the `orthodox’ parties of theright or leftof thepolitical spectrum by campaigning explicitly on an Islamist platform, constitutesthe most obvious or visible sign of Islamicresurgence in theTurkish context.1 Theturning-point in the evolution of RP intoa majorpolitical move- mentcame withthe municipal government elections of March 1994 during whichthe party managed to capturethe mayorships of thetwo key metropolitan areas ofIstanbul and Ankara. This victory dramatically altered the previous imageof the party in the public mind, namely as amarginaland parochial politicalforce on the extreme right with a strongregional orientation. RP’ s rise tothestatus of anationwidepolitical movement, as opposedto apartycon® ned mainlyto its inner Anatolian roots, was consolidatedfurther by the general electionsof December1995. The Welfare Party managed to increaseits share of thenational vote from 7.2% in 1987 to 21.4% in 1995 and it emerged as the leadingpolitical party in the country, although its share ofthe vote was not suf® cientto grant it a mandateto form a governmenton an outright basis. Followinga series ofunsuccessful attempts to form a durablecoalition govern- menton thepart of theestablished right of centreparties, the `Motherland Party’ (ANAP)andthe `True Path Party’ ( DYP)duringthe early months of 1996, a new coalitiongovernment was establishedbetween RP and DYP, in which RP emerged as thedominant partner. This development clearly constitutes a landmarkin a countrywhich is uniquein the Muslim world in terms ofthe strength of its secularisttraditions and its explicit pro-Western orientation. The emergence of RP as amajorpolitical force undoubtedly represents a paradoxicalphenomenon forobservers of the Turkish scene, a phenomenonwhich many interpret as a fundamentalconstitutional challenge to the secular foundations of theRepublic, raisingdeep questions concerning the compatibility of a strongIslamic party withthe process ofconsolidating liberal democracy. Beforeembarking on an analysis of why RP has emergedas amajorpolitical forceso recentlyin thecontext of the1990s, two important quali® cations ought tobe made at the outset. The ® rst is thatthe presence of an Islamic political partyon the electoral scene inTurkey is nota novelphenomenon. In fact, the originsof the present day RP canbe traced back to the `National Order Party’

Ziya OÈ nisËis attheDepartment of Economics, Bog ÆazicËiUniversity, 80815Bebek, Istanbul,Turkey .

0143-6597/97/040743-24$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 743 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË

(MilliNizam Partisi), of® cially founded in 1970, banned during the military coupof 1971, and subsequently reemerging under a differentname, the `Na- tionalSalvation Party’ (Milli Selamet Partisi ( MSP)),duringthe 1970s. Both partieswere under the leadership of NecmettinErbakan, whose resilience on the Turkishpolitical scene is strikinggiven that he is alsothe undisputed leader of theWelfare Party at the present juncture. MSP infact made its mark on Turkish politicsby participating in a numberof coalition governments in the highly unstablepolitical environment of themid and late 1970s. Yet, in contrastto the currentstature of RP, MSP was asmallparty with an essentially marginal and parochialelectoral base. 2 Thesecond quali® cation that deserves emphasisis that,despite the emergence of RP as anationwidemass politicalmovement in recent years, its weight or in¯uence in the Turkish setting should neither be underestimated nor overexag- gerated.In spite of the fact that the party emerged as theleading party on the basis ofthe national vote, its superiority to other national parties on both the rightand left of thepolitical spectrum, and notably the edge that it has managed toestablish relative to the two leading contenders on the right, DYP and ANAP, is onlymarginal. 3 Moresigni® cantly, RP’scurrentposition should be placed in properperspective in the sense thataround 80% percent of the population in Turkeycontinues to vote in favour of parties, both right and left, which are predominantlysecular and Western in theirbasic orientations. RP has alongway togo before it is ableto obtain a majorityvote in parliament that may provide amandate,in principle, for putting its comprehensive economic, legal, political andcultural package into action. This brings us tothe point that a major dichotomyis evidentin the current position of RP inthe context of democratic politicsin Turkey today. The party has undoubtedlyemerged as amajorsource ofpolitical power in recent years. Nonetheless, it represents a peripheralforce comparedwith the position of the political parties of the established secular order,in the sense thatany major or radical attempt by RP totransform society alongIslamic lines will threaten the basic principles of the Republic’ s consti- tutionalorder and thus the very foundations of the regime and the liberal democraticorder which, as manyleading analysts, would agree is some distance awayfrom being fully consolidated. 4 Theconsequences of the Welfare Party’ s electoralsuccess anda potentially strong RP presencefor the future of thedemocratic regime in Turkeyis anissue thatdeserves seriousinvestigation in its own right. The primary focus in the presentcontext, however, will be onthe underlying causes oftheparty’ s rise to power.The central question to address, considering that political Islam has deep-seatedhistorical roots in Turkey, is therise of RP tothe status of a major politicalforce speci® cally in the context of the 1990s. A numberof scholars has singledout the speci® c domesticorigins of the process andthose features thatare uniqueto the Turkish Republic, with a strongfocus on the position ofthe state in relation to the Islamic movement. These scholars have high- lightedthe tensions between the authoritarian secularism of the Republican eliteat the `centre’ and the broad masses quitecongenial to Islamic principles andvalues on the `periphery’ , andthe attempts to resolve these tensions followingthe transition to multipartydemocracy in thepost-1950 era. 5 While not 744 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE negatingthe importance of the uniquely historical features of the Turkish case, thepresent analysis draws attention more explicitly to the external dimension, andattempts to conceptualise the rise ofpolitical Islam inTurkey during the 1990sas amanifestationor a re¯ection of the far-reaching transformations that are occurringat the global level both in the economic and the cultural sphere. Particularlysigni® cant in this context are thepressures associatedwith the globalisationof the world economy and the process ofneoliberal economic restructuringthat is profoundlyaffecting societies in very different parts of the world.At thesame time,we observethe profound and yet contradictory images transmittedby theprocess ofculturalglobalisation that also explains why parties witha strongreligious or fundamentalist orientation paradoxically have a chance ofelectoral success inthe current historical conjuncture.

Beyondthe traditional left-right divide: the ascendanceof identity politics in the post-cold warcontext and Islamic resurgence Theintense process ofglobalisation in the economic and cultural realms is underminingmany of the established contours of political activity both in advancedindustrialised countries and in the developing world. What appears to beunder challenge is thenation-state as wellas theclassical organisation of politicswithin the familiar left versus rightnexus. The nation-state and its securityis threatenedby the new international division of production and labour.6 Thelogic of the global market place pays no attention to where a productis made.Similarly, the international ® nancialrevolution, a process facilitatedby major improvements in communications and information technol- ogy,brings its own challenges to the sovereignty of the nation-state. The paradoxof our era is thatthe nation state is progressivelylosing control over economicactivity within its own national borders in an increasingly borderless world.The pressures are torelocateauthority upwards either to supranationalor internationalinstitutions such as theEuropean Union or the World Trade Organizationor todelegateauthority downwards to local or municipalorganisa- tions.Yet, at the same time,the nation state continues to be the dominant politicalunit. For most people the nation-state is stillthe primary source of identity.Thus a paradoxis emerging.People’ s expectationsof what the state oughtto deliver is increasingwhile the state’ s capacityto provide these much neededservices is rapidlyin decline. This phenomenon creates acrisis of governanceand a loss ofauthority on the part of the state. The globalisation process inthe economic sphere is creatingmajor opportunities for expansion andindividual enrichment. The process, however, is proceedingat an extremelyuneven pace creating both winners and losers. The losers are naturally turningto the nation-state for protection, but the nation-state’ s abilityto circumventthe negative repercussions of these massive economicchanges and shieldthe `excluded’ from unfavourable consequences is becomingincreasingly limited. Thedecline of the nation-state and the decline of the left are essentially parallelphenomena. One can justi® ably argue that the major blow to centre-left, social-democraticmovements came fromthe collapse of thecommunist regimes, 745 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË leavingcapitalism as theonly viable economic system inexistence.It wouldbe misleading,however, to explain the decline of the left simply in these terms. Whatis moresigni® cant is thatthe globalisation process has steadilyunder- minedthe foundations of the post-war Keynesian consensus based on capital- labourcooperation at the national level supported by a largeredistributive welfarestate. In an environment where transnational corporations can relocate economicactivity with great ease indifferentparts of theworld, the capacity of thenation-state and domestic labour to bargain with transnational capital has becomeextremely limited. As yet,no parallel forces existin terms ofthe transnationalisationof the nation-state and labour to counteract the power of capitalat the global level. Clearly, these challenges have resulted in a steady erosionof social rights and a steadydecline in the ability of the nation-state to providewelfare, a trendwhich is visibleto varying degrees in all advanced industrialisedcountries. Similarpressures, perhapsin a moreintense form, are occurringin developing countriesand are helpingto underminethe very foundations of thedevelopmen- talstate. The process ofneoliberaleconomic restructuring which is takingplace ona massive scale everywherearound the globe, including the ex-communist world,though at varying pace and intensity, implies a radicalshift of emphasis awayfrom the state towards the market-determined allocation of economic activity.Associated with this process, we observe rising unemployment and inequalityand a correspondingerosion in social rights, including both a decline inthe bargaining capacity of labour unions as wellas areductionin the degree ofentitlement to key social services inthe areas ofeducation,health and social security.The process describedis clearlymore painful in a developingcountry contextwhere per capita incomes are lowerand the developmental state’ s ability toprovide welfare and protection for the poor has traditionallybeen far more limitedcompared with the Western-style welfare state. Thestructural pressures wehave drawn attention to have pushed the social democraticparties both in the West and in the emerging societies at the peripheryinto a deepcrisis. Social-democratic parties, traditionally identi® ed withredistributive policies involving an improvement in the positions of the poorand the disadvantaged, have been left with little room to manoeuvre, at leastin thematerial or theeconomic realm. Consequently, the economic policies ofthe social-democratic parties in government have become indistinguishable fromthose of thecentre right parties. As aresult,a majordiscrepancy has arisen betweenthe expectations of the traditional clientele of social-democraticparties, namelylabour, peasants, lower level bureaucrats and other materially deprived groupsand the impact of social-democratic policies, which in many cases isno differentfrom what a typicalright of centre government would generate. The keyconclusion to emerge from these observations is thatthe process ofintense globalisationof theworld economy has beenassociated with the aggravation of incomeand wealth disparities and the distribution of economic opportunities withinthe individual nation state. The increasing incapacity of the nation state, especiallythe failure of social-democratic movements within the individual nation-stateto cater explicitly for the needs of thepoor, the disadvantaged or the excluded,has createda vacuumin political space. This vacuum has provideda 746 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE gatewayfor the proliferation of political movements organised on the basis of extremenationalism or religious fundamentalism. It isinterestingand paradoxi- calthat economic globalisation has producedforces whichhave helped not only toerode the political power as wellas theorganisational and interventionist capacityof the left, but also to fragment the right of thepolitical spectrum into mutuallyincompatible political movements. These movements range from the partiesof the liberal right, representing primarily the interests of the rising bourgeoisie,whose interests increasingly coincide with those of transnational capital,to parties organised along fundamentalist lines catering primarily for the disadvantagedor the excluded segments of society. Akeypoint to remember,however, is thatglobalisation is notcon® ned to the economicspace. In fact,an equally intense process ofglobalisationseems tobe occurringin thecultural realm with two contradictory dimensions, one involving ahomogenisationprocess across societies,the other working in the direction of greaterfragmentation. At one level, we observe cultural forces orsignals that havethe effect of pulling societies together in terms offorming common tastes orvalues. These common elements include the increasing emphasis on individ- ualism,material values and consumerism, forces thatare progressivelyho- mogenisingtastes, values or behavioural norms across highlydiverse societies aroundthe globe. Associated with this trend is theparallel tendency involving thetransmission of liberal democracy and the discourse on citizenship and humanrights. Very few societies, if any,are ableto escape fromthese powerful culturalforces. It is alsointeresting and paradoxical, however, that the cultural impulsestransmitted to manysocieties in thepostmodern age are alsoproducing astrongtendency towards cultural relativism. A strikingtrend associated with the`postmodern condition’ is theacceptance of diversity,the recognition of local andtraditional cultures including religion, and the right for multiple perspectives orpathsto modernityto co-existas opposedto asingle,unilinear conception of modernityassociated with the West and the tradition of theEnlightenment. The culturalpluralism associated with the postmodern age also implies a radicalshift inthe direction of politicalactivity away from the traditional left-right divide to issues surroundingindividual identity. In retrospect,the process ofglobalisation occurringsimultaneously in theeconomic and cultural spheres has beeninteract- ingand producing powerful impulses leading to therise ofidentitypolitics as the primaryform of political discourse or con¯ ict in the current historical context. Themassive transformationsand dislocations in the economic sphere tend to generateprofound crises ofidentity and a parallelsearch forgreater certainty, controland protection on the part of threatened individuals and communities. Moreover,the pressures orimpulses originating from the cultural sphere, associatedwith the dissemination of democratic values, acceptance of diversity andpluralism provide an extended public space forgroups or communities to express theirown identities and organise themselves around issues concerning individualor groupidentity. The nature of identitypolitics varies markedly from onesociety to another.The issues are as diverseas regionalintegration and loss ofsovereignty,religion and secularism, linguistic and racial minority rights, and theenvironment. This is notto say thatthe traditional right± left nexus has totally disappeared.As longas majorinequalities continue to exist within and between 747 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË individualnation-states we can safely predict that the classical left± right axis willremain intact. What is strikingin the current context, however, is thatthe traditionalleft-right split has beenconsiderably complicated by new cleavages basedon expressions of identity. These cleavages range from religious funda- mentalismversus secularismto national sovereignty versus membershipof a widertransnational integration project, to the rights of aparticularethnic group versus theunity of the nationÐ state and uncompromising industrial growth versus environmentalconservation. These are clearlyissues whichdo not ® t neatlyinto the traditional left versus rightclassi® cation.These cleavages based onidentity have, in fact, been superimposed on the traditional left-right nexus complicating,fragmenting and possibly destabilising political discourse in the post-coldwar context. Thebroad perspective that we have tried to elaborate so far helpsus to appreciatethe rise ofpolitical Islam as apotentforce in thecontext of the1990s. Atone level, political Islam inalateindustrialising society ® llsthe void left by thedecline of the orthodox or secular social democratic politics of the left. In otherwords, it emerges as apoliticalmovement expressing the grievances of the poorand the disadvantaged in both rural and urban areas ina socialdemocratic guise.The appeal of political Islam as aviablealternative to secular social democracyarises notonly from the strength of its moral argument in favour of equitybut also from speci® c andconcrete anti-poverty projects designed to improvethe material conditions of the disadvantaged, albeit on a highly target-orientated,selective and visible basis. It would be extremely misleading, however,to characterise Islamic political movements as simplythe political expressionof thepoorest and most marginalised strata, largely excluded from the bene®ts ofthe globalisation process. A numberof observers of Islamic move- mentshave drawn attention to the fact that a signi®cant component of these movementsare individualsbased in urban areas, whoare atthe same time extremelywell educated professionals or businessmen well versed in modern technology. 7 Theseare clearlypeople with a modernistorientation who are experiencinga risingstatus in society,and yet are notfully incorporated into an elitegroup. Stating it somewhatdifferently, they are partof a rising,potential or secondaryelite who are tryingto consolidate their position in society on the basis ofa commonIslamic identity. 8 Itis importantto acknowledge, therefore, thatpolitical Islam is amovementthat binds together individuals at very differentlevels of thesocial strata as partof abroadlybased political movement. Thereligious symbolism associated with political Islam providesthe unifying bondthat helps to engineer a cross-class alliance,bringing together individuals withmarkedly different status in society.What is commonto bothgroups is that theyare partof the`excluded’ , butexcluded in averydifferent sense oftheterm. Thepoor and the disadvantaged who form the principal electoral base of politicalIslam are excludedin thesense thatthey do notshare inthebene® ts of growthin the age of globalisation. The professionals, the businessmen and the intellectualswhom we would classify as therising `Islamic bourgeoisie’ , are clearlybene® ting from globalisation and modernity, yet also feel part of the excludedby not being part of the real elite in society. In this sense, political Islam as aprotestmovement and the ideology of the excluded constitutes a 748 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE challengeto both left and right-wing parties of the established secular political order.

Neoliberal restructuring in Turkeyin the post-1980era and the rise ofthe welfareparty to power Theyear 1980 marks inmany ways a crucialturning point in Turkey’s political economy.The shift from a state-dominated,heavily interventionist economic modeltowards neoliberalism and market-orientation ,as partof abroaderglobal trend,effectively dates back to the implementation of a majorstructural adjustmentprogramme under the auspices of theWorld Bank and IMF in January 1980.9 Ourobjective in the present context is certainlynot to enter into the speci®c detailsof the neoliberal adjustment process; ratherit is tohighlight the linkagesand mechanisms whereby the process ofneoliberal restructuring in Turkeyhas contributedto the rise ofthe Welfare Party, a partycampaigning explicitlyon aradicalIslamic platform. The linkage between the Turkish version ofneoliberalism and the rise ofthe Welfare Party to political power during the 1990shas anumberof different dimensions that deserve emphasis. The® rst importantfactor to highlight concerns the role of the military in the post-1980context. The second half of the1970s in Turkeywas characterisedby considerableeconomic and political instability. On the economic front, the major balanceof paymentscrisis ofthelate 1970s represented the combined impact of theexhaustion of the dominant model of accumulation, the import-substituti on modelof developmentand external shocks in theform of oilprice increases. On thepolitical front, a successionof weak coalition governments further con- tributedto economic instability by postponing the adjustment process andwere unableto checkthe proliferation of terrorismand urban violence, threatening the securityand everyday existence of the average citizen. In this type of environ- ment,it was notsurprising that the military intervened for the third time in the postwarperiod, leading to the termination of democratic politics, albeit on a temporarybasis. In retrospect, military rule in Turkey was shortby Latin Americanstandards. It lasted from September 1980 up to the elections of November1983 that marked the return to parliamentary democracy, albeit in a restrictedform. Yet the comparatively short period of military rule embodied some far-reachingconsequences for the future course of thedemocratic regime. Theobjective of the military during what they considered to be a transitional periodleading up to the re-establishment of democracywas toinject a substan- tialmeasure ofstabilityinto the political system. The basic idea was toeliminate anypotential threats to theconsolidation of themarket-orientated reform process byaccomplishinga series ofmeasures designedto depoliticisethe economy. The Constitutionof 1982 was alandmarkin this context. The new constitution, diametricallyopposed to the liberal constitution of 1961, was designedto concentrateauthority with the executive and limit the social rights previously grantedconcerning the activities of labour unions and interest associations in general.Within the broad contours of the new constitution, two speci® c pieces ofaction by the military have been particularly in¯ uential. Both measures were designedto introduce considerable elements of stability into the system andto 749 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË helpdepoliticize the market. Yet the outcome of the measures insubsequent years has provedparadoxical in the sense thatattempts to impose stability and orderin theshort term have created the seeds ofgreaterinstability in thelonger term. Themilitary in Turkeyhave always been one of thecentral institutions of the Republicanelite and a traditionaland uncompromising stronghold of secularand territorialnationalism. With the turbulent experience of the1970s at the back of theirminds, however, the military elite conceived Islam as amajorinstrument forpromoting social and political stability. Consequently, they favoured legis- lationwithin the broad framework of what is knownas the`Turkish± Islamic synthesis’, amixtureof nationalismand Islam, as a®rm barrieragainst potential sources ofinstability. The key element in the strategy of the military was to weakenthe political power of theleft, which they regarded as themajor source ofpotential con¯ ict and disorder in the post-1980 context. Hence, rather surprisingly,Islam was employedby themilitary as aninstrument for consolidat- ingand institutionalising the post-1980 regime. 10 Inconcrete terms, the steps takenin thisdirection in Turkey involved the introduction of religiouseducation inprimary schools as wellas anincrease in the powers of the Directorate of ReligiousAffairs, the key state institution responsible for the administration of religiousaffairs inan otherwise secular state. This was doneby increasing the ®nancialresources availableto it. The introduction of compulsory religious educationclearly represented a retreatfrom the basic principles of militant secularism.Similarly, the ® nancialresources allocatedto the Directorate of ReligiousAffairs have resulted in a furtherproliferation of religious secondary schools,which have emerged as majorcentres of support for the Welfare Party insubsequent years. Thesecond major piece of action on the part of the military with signi® cant longer-termrepercussions concerns the closure of the major political parties of thepre-1980 political order and the bans imposed on their respective leaders. Thekey institutions of the pre-1980 regime, notably the right-of-centre `Justice Party’ (AP),theleft-of-centre `Republican People’ s Party’, ( CHP) and the MSP, the forerunnerof the present day Welfare Party, were removed from the political scene.Similarly the major political ® guresassociated with these parties and dominantpersonalities of the 1960s and the 1970s such as Demirel,Ecevit and Erbakanwere banned from active participation in politics, at least for a decade. Theintention underlying these measures was tomakea newbeginning with new politicalparties under a newset ofleaders,hence marking a completebreak with thepast as ameans ofestablishing a stablepolitical order. According to the militaryelite, a majorsource of political instability in the past has beenthe extremefragmentation of theparty system, with the existence of alargenumber ofparties on both the right and left of the political spectrum. Also engineered was a10%national threshold as anelectoral rule, designed to limit the participationof smalland peripheral parties in thedemocratic process. What the militaryessentially wanted was atwo-partysystem, with a right-of-centreparty confrontinga partymildly on the centre-left, under the direction of a strong executive,with political authority relocated from the parliament towards a strong presidency. Thesenew designs appear sensible at ® rst sightfrom the perspective of 750 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE politicalstability as amajorsafeguard for radical market-orientated reforms, if notfrom the perspective of liberal democracy. In retrospect, however, the measures failedto achieve their original objectives. In fact, the reverse was the case inthe sense thatthe measures contributedto the further fragmentation of theparty system, a process thateffectively started with the return of the key politiciansof the old pre-1980 order to politics in the general elections of November1987. Their return was madepossible by the referendum of Septem- ber1987 which lifted the 10 year ban imposed by the military regime. Thesekey politicians, however, rather than returning to the new parties establishedunder the auspices of the post-1980 regime, chose to contest in politicsunder parties formed by themselves individually and, hence, under their owndirect control. In more concrete terms, Demirel, for example, returned to parliamentarypolitics not in the context of the Motherland Party, the key centre-rightpolitical party of thepost-1983 era, but under the banner of theTrue PathParty. Similarly, Ecevit founded the Democratic Left Party ( DSP) instead of joiningthe Social Democratic Populist Party ( SHP),theprincipal successor tothe RepublicanPeople’ s Partyduring the post-1983 era. Consequently, the previous institutionalpattern was interruptedand dismantled in thesense that,in placeof thetwo principal political parties at each end of the political spectrum, we observethe emergence of two separate parties on the centre right confronting twoseparate parties on the centre left, with both sets ofparties claiming to be heirsto the old, established parties of the pre-1980 order. A closeinvestigation suggeststhat apart from their leadership no majordifferences exist or havebeen detectedbetween DYP and ANAP,ontheone hand, and SHP and DSP,ontheother, interms ofbasic programme or ideological orientation. The weakening of the establishedparties in the process has providedan opportunity for fringe parties, includingthe extreme nationalists, to emerge as signi®cant participants in the electoralcontest. To the surprise of many, despite the 10% electoral threshold, theparty system inTurkeystarting with the municipal elections of March1989, has displayeda highdegree of instability and fragmentation. It is thisfragmen- tationof the party system whichprovided a majoravenue for the rise ofthe WelfareParty as apoliticalforce in the context of the mid-1990s. Turningour attention to the economic plane, the neoliberal experiment in Turkeyappears to have produced a mixedset ofresults. At one level, the experimentwas quitesuccessful. An average of 5%± 6% real GNP growth per annum,if not outstanding, was highby international standards. The ability to shiftfrom a highlyinward-orientated economy to a signi®cant exporter of manufactureswas alsoquite striking. A rosypicture can thus be drawn highlightingeconomic dynamism, rising entrepreneurship and the growing powerof private capital, as theeconomy became steadily integrated into internationalmarkets. Yet there was alsoa darkerside to theprofound economic transformationunderlying the period. The process ofneoliberalrestructuring has intensi®ed income and wealth disparities in the Turkish context. Turkey is classi® edas oneof the `emerging markets’ in terms ofthe degree and depth of economicdynamism and expansion according to WorldBank criteria, but at the same timeit isacountrywith one of the least equal distributions of income, with thegini coef® cient for 1994 estimated as 0.50. 11 Thepattern of high income 751 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË inequalityin Turkey has undoubtedlybeen exacerbated by the chronically high rates ofin¯ ation that have existed over the past two decades. A parallel phenomenonto rising inequality has beenthe mass exodusfrom rural, agricul- turalareas tothe periphery of major metropolitan centres, with migrants emergingas amajorelement of supportfor the Islamic Welfare Party. We shall attemptto demonstrate, however, that RP has bene®ted both from the positive andnegative aspects ofneoliberaleconomic restructuring in theTurkish context. As a®nalelement, the changing position of the state within the newly institutedneoliberal order deserves seriousconsideration. Neoliberalism in Turkey,as inmanyother societies, did not signify a shiftfrom a state-ledmodel ofdevelopment to an idealised free-market economy, with minimal state inter- ventionism.In fact,in spiteof signi®cant liberalisation in keyareas ofeconomic activitysuch as the® nancialsector, international trade and capital movements and,to a lesser extent,privatisation of publiceconomic enterprises, the state has managedto resume itsrole as akeyactor in the economy as wellas akey distributorof economic rents to the private sector. Substantial rents associated withpublic sector activity continued to characterise the various stages ofthe post-1980regime, ranging from export subsidies during the early and mid-1980s tothehigh interest earnings associated with lending to thegovernment (resulting fromthe government’ s strategyof heavy borrowing from the public) and the opportunitiescreated by the sale ofpublicenterprises in thecontext of the 1990s. Furthermore,the devolution of economicpower from central authorities to local governments,a newtrend associated with the 1980s, gave substantial powers to localgovernments to distribute rents in the form of new construction permits. Thus,allocation of public lands to private companies became another source of rentallocation in the new regime. While the state continued to be a major spenderand allocator of rents in the neoliberal order, it was alsosubjected to majortransformations, notably during the ANAP years ofthe 1980s. What we observein thecontext of themid-1980s is anincreasing politicisation of thestate anda correspondingweakening of the traditional bureaucracy as akeyelement ofthe centralised state. 12 Theincreasing politicisation of the state meant that directcontact with politicians became increasingly important for businessmen or private® rms toachieve greater and preferential access tostate resources. Associatedwith this process, there was arelaxedattitude towards disciplining economiccrimes ina periodassociated with rising instances of bribery, corrup- tionand embezzlement, of which the scandal involving `® ctitiousexports’ duringthe late 1980s was amajorexample. Similarly, widespread tax evasion andthe growth of theunderground economy were features regularly highlighted duringthat period. In retrospect, the neoliberal state in Turkey exhibits a dual face,a dualitywhich is ofsome signi®cance in the context of our subsequent analysis.At one level, it is amajorplayer in the economic arena and a major allocatorof economicrents. As aresult,the private sector’ s dynamismcontinues tobe heavily dependent not only on its own initiatives but also on its ability to achieveaccess tostateresources andincentives. The retreat of thestate from the economyis, therefore, a myth.At another level, however, associated with the politicisationof rent distribution is aloss ofcon® dence and a declinein the moralauthority of the state in Turkey. We hypothesise that a signi®cant link 752 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE existsbetween the dual face ofthestate and the rise oftheWelfare Party, a link thatwill become more explicit in the subsequent sections of this essay.

Religious nationalism anda cross-class alliance: whatmakes the Welfare Partydistinct fromthe political parties ofthe established order? Thetransformation of the Welfare Party from a marginal,parochial entity to a mass politicalmovement constitutes a realparadox. To uncover the paradox we needto identify features of RP’sprogramme,organisation and base ofsupport thattruly differentiate the party from the other political parties of the `centre’ . RP is anenigmatic entity in the sense thatconventional terms suchas `right’, `left’, `conservative’or `radical’fail to captureits broad message andare unable toprovide a correctcharacterisation of where the party actually stands. Judged byits position on gender, involving a subordinaterole for women at home and insociety at large, it is apoliticalmovement on the extreme right. Yet, judged byits`just economic order’ ( adilekonomik du Èzen )rhetoric,with an emphasis on incomedistribution and the moral necessity of improving the material position ofthe poor, it is notfundamentally different from a typicalsocial-democratic partyon the left. 13 Atthe same time,it differs from a conventionalsocial democraticparty in thesense thatit placesmajor emphasis on free enterpriseand privatecapital as theprincipal engine of growth, downgrading the role of the statein the process. The basic message is thatprivate enterprise, commercial activityand the pro® t motiveare perfectlyconsistent with the basic principles of Islam,as longas thegains generated are aproductof legitimate and truly productiveeconomic activity. A closereading of the party programmes and electionmanifestos of the Welfare Party would lead to the following character- isationof the party on a numberof key issues, differentiatingit from other politicalparties of the established order. First, RP’sperspectiverepresents a paradoxicalcombination of `tradition’and `modernity’. Theparty is trulymodernist in its uncompromising faith in the bene®ts ofcapital accumulation and economic growth facilitated by the acqui- sitionand use ofadvanced technology. Its emphasison the importance of scienti®c educationand modern technology is certainlyno less thanthe similar emphasisto be found in the context of other secular parties on the right or the left.What is surprisingto an outside observer is thelack of emphasis on issues relatingto conservation and environment, or the possible dangers of single- mindedconcentration on economic growth considering that `balance’ , `equilib- rium’and `moderation’ are amongthe basic Islamic values. In contrast to its majoremphasis, however, the party is truly`traditionalist’ in thecultural sphere onissues relatingto gender for example. Second,a recurringtheme in the RP literatureis anessentially Third Worldist perspectiveinvolving a relentlessattack on the West, with a particularfocus on Westernvalues and Western imperialism. Parallel to theattack on theWest itself is acritiquelabelling the established parties as `imitatorsof the West’ , while portraying RP as theonly party faithful to the country’ s ownhistorical and culturalheritage. Third,the economic model set outunder the controversial just order rhetoric 753 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË is,in fact, consistent with the Third Worldist, anti-imperialist language fre- quentlyemployed in RP’spropagandaliterature. The `just order’ model is portrayedas athirdroad, a mixedeconomy structure lying somewhere between thefree marketcapitalism of the West and the state controlled socialism of the formerEastern Block. In themixed economy model, private initiative constitutes themain engine of economic growth, yet the state also has animportant role to playin terms ofproviding basic infrastructure and distributional assistance. The justorder document also contains a numberof speci® cally Islamic elements, notablya vibrantcase forinterest-free banking. In retrospect, what the architects ofthe just order rhetoric have in mind is amodelof hyper-populism based on amorallyjusti® ed cross-class compromise,designed to forma broadcoalition of politicalsupport ranging from private business to the poorest segments of society.In a sense thisis quitedifferent from the position of the major right-of-centrepolitical parties, which tend to place more emphasis on the individualand the market and less emphasison socialjustice. It isalsomarkedly differentfrom the position of social-democratic parties on the left who place moreemphasis on democracy,human rights and social justice and less emphasis onprivate entrepreneurship and initiative. Fourth,the Welfare Party is heavilycritical of the traditional conception of secularism,erected right from the very foundation and forming one of the central pillarsof theRepublic, wholeheartedly accepted by themajor parties on the left andright. According to RP,themilitant or authoritarian secularism associated withthe Republic has limitedthe rights of individuals in a countrywith a predominantlyMuslim population to practise their religion freely. The natural corollaryof this perspective is thattrue secularisation requires true religious freedoms.An interestingcontrast is evidentin thiscontext between RP and other establishedparties. The primary focus of social democratic politics is onsocial rightsand entitlements as wellas civiland human rights. The key focus of centre-rightparties is onthe rights and freedoms associated with property ownershipand engaging in entrepreneurialactivity. The principal concern of the WelfareParty, however, is onthe right to practise one’ s religionfreely. Hence RP aims toestablisha truly`secular’ regime in whichany restrictions concerning thefree practiceof Islam willno longer be tolerated. Fifth,the foreign policy orientation of the Welfare Party also makes astrong contrastwith other established parties of the political order. As partof its anti-Westernorientation, RP’sprincipalgoal is toforge a closerunion between Turkeyand the rest ofthe Islamic world. Special emphasis is accordedto strengtheningrelations with countries of the Middle East, the emerging states of post-SovietCentral Asia and the highly dynamic second generation NICs of SoutheastAsia, which include key countries with predominantly Islamic popula- tionssuch as Malaysiaand Indonesia. RP’sforeign-policystance re¯ ects a curiousmixture of nationalism and Islamic transnationalism. At one level, RP’ s approachis transnationalistin the sense thatthe emphasis is onthe brotherhood ofand cooperation among Islamic countries. Yet, at the same time,there is a strongnationalistic ¯ avourto RP’sforeign-policyapproach. In terms ofits economicpotential and geopolitical position, Turkey is singledout as thenatural candidatefor the leadership of the Islamic world. The recovery of the Islamic 754 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE worldfrom centuries of oblivion and its rise toa positionof prominence in the globalpolitical economy goes hand in handwith the rise ofTurkey to the status ofa signi®cant power, in the broader context of Islamic cooperation. It is no coincidence,therefore, that RP is extremelycritical of and rejects any future unionwith Europe. In fact one of the electoral promises of RP,relegatedto the backgroundonce elected, was todismantlethe Customs Union agreement signed in1995, which came intoeffect from the beginning of 1996. There have been othergroups in the country, notably on the social-democratic front, who have alsobeen critical of the terms ofthe Customs Union agreement. RP’sposition, however,is diametricallyopposed to the position of thesecular, Western-orien- tatedparties of the centre. For the Welfare Party, reversing the Customs Union agreementand loosening the ties with Europe was amatterof fundamental principlerather than simply an outcome of the debate concerning the terms of thespeci® c agreementconcluded. A vibrantcriticism of the USA as an imperialistpower in theregion, as wellas arelentlessattack on Israel,constitute equallydominant themes in RP’sforeign-policyrhetoric. Acloseexamination of RP’sprogrammaticstatements is importantbecause ultimatelyone of thegreat achievements of theparty under Erbakan’ s leadership concernedits ability to differentiateitself sharply from the established parties of thepolitical order. At a timewhen, as partof global trends, the sharp divisions betweencentre-right and social-democratic parties have largely been blurred, appearingto theaverage citizen on thestreet as simplydifferences in individual leadership, RP couldpresent itself to theelectorate as apoliticalmovement with clearobjectives and a consistentholistic mission, a strongmoral ¯ avour presentedwith missionary zeal. The unique position of the party on a numberof keyissues, andthe radical departures of its programme from those of the orthodoxparties, were successfully employed by the party’ s leadershipas an electoralstrategy. One of thestriking features of theelectoral campaign leading upto the general elections of December 1995 was Erbakan’s refusalto participatein television debates among major party leaders, on the grounds that allthese parties were imitators of the West and thus alien to the country’ s true cultureand traditions. The theme ` RP versus therest’ highlightedthe uncompro- misingattitude of the party leadership, vigorously distancing themselves from thecentre in an attempt to attract support from the traditional constituencies of theestablished parties. TheWelfare Party’ s greatorganisational strength proved to be another feature thatsharply distinguished the party from its competitors, in¯ uencing its electoral fortunesin apositivedirection. Paradoxically, in an age where the visual media haveestablished themselves as thedominant mode of communication, RP has placedmajor emphasis on grassrootsorganisations and face-to-face contact with theelectorate. Enormous attention has beengiven to step by stepmobilisation at thelocal level, with party militants or representatives diligently coming into contactand gradually building support by establishing close, personalised relationshipswith potential voters. Computers were employed with great effect toaccumulateand process informationon peoplelikely to votefor the party. The huge® nancialresources at RP’sdisposalplayed an important role in thiscontext. Materialbene® ts wereoffered to potential votersÐ typically poor people on the 755 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË outskirtsof majormetropolitan areasÐ in the terms offood,shelter and jobs, as wellas contributionsto weddings and other social occasions. These organisa- tionaltactics provided strategic advantages to RP whereother parties, notably the socialdemocrats, were in organisational disarray, clearly neglecting issues relatingto voter mobilisation at the grassroots level. Themunicipal elections of March 1994 were the turning point in the transformationof RP intoa nationwidepolitical force. In retrospect, RP appears tohavecapitalised on theweakness of thesocial-democratic left. This is clearly evidentin the case oftheir success inthe metropolitan centres of Ankara and Istanbul,where RP managedto replace, albeit by a smallelectoral margin, the social-democraticmayors who had been in of® ce since1989. Thus, in the contextof the 1990s, there appears to be a closecorrespondence between the declineof social democracy as amajorforce in Turkish politics and the rise of RP as aradicalalternative to traditionalsecular social democracy. The decline of thesocial-democratic left in Turkey is acomplex,multi-dimensional phenom- enonthat deserves separatetreatment. To some extentit is closelyrelated to the globalforces thatwe have already identi® ed. Also important are thestrong divisionsin the social democratic movement itself, typi® ed by the illogical divisionof the movement into two separate political parties as wellas bythe perennialleadership struggles within the individual parties themselves. In con- trastto the tightly knit, hierarchical organisation and consistent vision of the WelfareParty, the social-democratic movement in Turkeyhas beenincreasingly characterisedby fragmentation and the absence of a consistent,unifying vision. Ona numberof key issues ofpublic policy, such as privatisationfor example, thesocial-democratic parties were unable to present a coherentperspective. Internaltensions as wellas aninability to present coherent solutions to key economicproblems steadily downgraded the credibility of thesocial democratic alternative. 14 Alsosigni® cant was thesingle-minded concern of themain social-democratic partyof the early 1990s, the Social Democratic Populist Party ( SHP) under ;dIÊnoÈnuÈ,withissues relatingto democratisation, notably with respect to the advancementof civiland human rights. Although the emphasis on democratiza- tionwas ahighlyrespectable and commendable concern, it was associatedat the some timewith a relativelack of interest in economicor materialissues ofdirect concernto the poor, who formed the main electoral bones of the party. In fact, duringthe course of the coalition government between DYP and SHP, there appearedto be a curiousdivision of responsibility, with the right-of-centre DYP concerningitself with economic issues suchas privatisation,while SHP was primarilypreoccupied with democratisation and human rights abstracted from economicor material conditions. Furthermore, the concrete experience of governmentunder social-democratic mayors in the key metropolitan centres of Istanbuland Ankara and allegations concerning inef® cient, incompetent and corruptadministration strongly contradicted the image of `clean government’ thathad formed the principal electoral message ofthesocial democrats in 1989. TheWelfare Party, with its emphasis on direct material bene® ts tothe poor as opposedto abstract notions of democracy, as wellas itspromise of honest and competentgovernment, managed to present itself to key segments of the 756 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE electorateas thenatural alternative to the social democrats in crisis. Our diagnosisthat RP’ssuccess was basedto a largeextent on the failure of social democracyin Turkey is con®rmed by the electoral performance of the party in 1994and 1995. While the party emerged as anationwidemovement during the mid-1990s,a strongregional bias continued to characterizeits electoral success. Theevidence suggests that RP has capitalisedon support in major metropolitan centressuch as Istanbuland Ankara as wellas inthe predominantly rural and poorerparts of the country in Inner, South East and Eastern Anatolia, areas where,under normal circumstances, one would expect the social democratic message tobe dominant. 15 Oneof thedramatic features of Turkishpolitics in thepost-1989 era involved thefragmentation of the centre right and the divisions within the centre left that wehave already drawn attention to. During the 1980s under the unique leadershipof Turgut O È zal, ANAP managedto form a broad-basedcoalition, claiming45% of the vote in 1983 and 36% in 1987. ANAP’sideologyrepresented aninteresting mixture of economic liberalism with heavy doses ofnationalism andreligious conservatism, though not of afundamentalistnature. It was O È zal’ s personalityand his unusual combination of a liberalWestern orientation with a strongattachment to Islam, a connectioncon® rmed by his link to the National SalvationParty in 1970, that held the `liberal’ and `conservative’ factions of ANAP togetherunder one umbrella. However, following the withdrawal of O È zal fromactive party politics in 1989 after his election to the presidency, his successor MesutYõ lmaz, essentially representing the liberal faction of ANAP, couldnot keep the conservative faction within the orbits of the party. In the 1990stherefore, we observe a muchmore homogenous ANAP in terms of ideologicaloutlook and electoral base; however,it is clearlynot in apositionto replicatethe performance of the previous decade. A detailedanalysis of the reasons underlyingthe fragmentation of ANAP andthe centre right in general is beyondour scope. The basic conclusion remains, however, that the fragmen- tationof both the right and left in Turkeyhas signi®cantly helped to advancethe electoralfortunes of the Welfare Party in the 1990s.

Business interests andIslamic resurgence: the signi® canceof MUÈ SIAD Theconceptualisation of the Welfare Party as apartyof the weak and disadvantagedis seriouslyincomplete in sofar as itfails to takeinto account the signi®cant rise ofIslamiccapital or theIslamic bourgeoisie in Turkeyduring the post-1980neoliberal era. Islamic business, in turn, has constituteda major ®nancialbase forthe Welfare Party. It isundoubtedlythe case that,without the degreeof ® nancialresources available,the Welfare Party could not have found itselfin apositionto implement its unique organisational tactics, paving the way forthe electoral success ofthemid-1990s. During the 1970s small businessmen andshop keepers in the small or medium-sizedInner Anatolian towns had been animportant constituency of theNational Salvation Party, the predecessor of the WelfareParty. Hence a certainlink between Islamic business interests and politicalparty campaigning on explicitlyIslamic grounds has beenevident right 757 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË fromthe beginning in thelate 1960s. It was duringthe 1980s, however, that we observea profoundtake-off in thevolume and depth of Islamicbusiness activity, aprocess thatclearly received a signi®cant boost from the major in¯ ows of Saudicapital arriving in the country to take advantage of the new opportunities providedby the liberal economic environment, notably in the ® nancialsphere. 16 Similarly,the savings of themigrant working community in Germanyhave been ¯owingback to Turkey, contributing to the rise ofIslamic business activity as wellas providingan important source of ®nancialsupport for the Welfare Party. Theopportunities for pro® t providedby theshift to amarket-orientatedeconomy alsoencouraged Islamic brotherhood organisations or networks ( tarikat) to engagein investment activity on a substantialscale. By the 1990s Islamic networkshad grown signi® cantly in strength, establishing themselves as major actorson the economic scene. A quali®cation is calledfor at this point in the sense thatthere is noone-to-one correspondence between Islamic brotherhoods andthe Welfare Party. There exist well known examples of Islamic brother- hoods,whose conception of Islam differssigni® cantly from that of the Welfare Partyand whose followers are thereforeencouraged to vote for other parties, notablyon the right-of-centre of the political spectrum. 17 Thisquali® cation, however,does not contradict the basic observation that there exists a signi®cant linkbetween a substantialmajority of Islamicbusinesses, strengthened consider- ablyin the market-orientated environment of the 1980s and the rise ofthe WelfareParty. In other words, RP constitutesthe political expression of these risingbusiness interests. Itwould be instructive to draw attention in this context to the principal associationof Islamic business interests in Turkey, namely the Independent Associationof Industrialists and Businessmen ( MUÈ SIAD).Anexamination of MUÈ SIAD isilluminatingin terms ofillustrating the depth and extent of the surge inIslamicbusiness activity in Turkey.The formation of thebusiness association isaveryrecent development. The organisation was foundedin 1990 by agroup ofyoung businessmen with an average age of 33. Over a periodof afewyears membershipof the organisation has grownsteadily to around 3000 individual companies.The numbers are expectedto rise to5000 by the year 2000. In fact theorganisation has establisheditself as thelargest voluntary business associ- ationin the country. The key voluntary business association in Turkey that representsthe interests of large conglomerates, the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association( TUÈ SIAD)has amembershipof around 400. MUÈ SIAD members includesome verylarge companies, of which the most strikingcase is Kombassanlocated in Konya, the traditional stronghold of Islamicbusiness and the Welfare Party. Kombassan is itselfan interesting case inthe sense thatit constitutes a network® rmrepresentingthe combined capital ofmore than 30 000shareholders, many of whom are migrantworkers in Germany.With the exception of some largecompanies, however, it is fairto say thatthe majority of MUÈ SIAD members are medium-sized® rms. Anotherstriking characteristicinvolves the spread of geographic location. In contrast to TUÈ SIAD members whoare locatedin Istanbul and the surrounding Marmara region, MUÈ SIAD membershipis distributedall over the country. An examination of MUÈ SIAD membershipsuggests that the largest membership is tobefoundin some 758 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE ofthe major metropolitan centres such as Istanbul,Bursa andIzmir, as wellas inthe key traditional Inner Anatolian strongholds such as Konyaand Kayseri. 18 MUÈ SIAD members alsoinclude, however, ® rms fromsmaller Anatolian towns that havebeen identi® ed as signi®cant success storiesby the media, resulting in the labelthe `Anatolian tigers’ . 19 Thetowns in questioninclude Denizli, Kahraman- marasË,CËorum,Gaziantep and S Ëanhurfa.The characteristic of these towns is that anumberof relativelysmall or medium-sized® rms locatedin thesecentres have managedto establish themselves as signi®cant exporters of manufactures to the worldmarket, while at the same receivinglittle or nosubsidyfrom the state for thispurpose. It would be wrong to claim that the whole of the booming small ormedium-sized business activity in Turkey is representedunder the umbrella of MUÈ SIAD,however.Indeed, a largecomponent of successful smallor medium- sizedbusiness communities do not have an explicit Islamic orientation and wouldnormally vote for the established, secular parties of the centre. Nonethe- less, thisobservation does not invalidate the point that a certainkey element of successful businessactivity in small or medium-sized® rms doeshave an Islamic orientationand is af® liatedwith MUÈ SIAD. Acentralquestion to ask atthis stage is whatexactly MUÈ SIAD’spositionis on outstandingissues ofpublicpolicy and how it differs from the views of itsrival organisation, TUÈ SIAD,anassociation with a secular,Western orientation and the representativeof bigbusiness in Turkey.On thebasis ofacursoryexamination, onemay argue that MUÈ SIAD’sannualreports on theTurkish economy and reports basedon specialisedresearch intovarious key areas ofeconomicpolicy have the ¯avourof the serious TUÈ SIAD reports,unlike the election propaganda of the WelfareParty, notably the `just order’ document. Nonetheless, a closeexamin- ationreveals a numberof features that distinguishes MUÈ SIAD’spositionsharply from TUÈ SIAD’sapproachin the economic and non-economic spheres. By similar logic,a closecorrespondence may be identi® ed between MUÈ SIAD’spositionand theperspective of theWelfare Party on anumberof keyissues ofeconomicand foreignpolicy. 20 Thepromotion of small and medium-sized ® rms andthe mobilisation of publicresources andthe ® nancialsystem forthis purpose constitutes one of the recurringthemes in the MUÈ SIAD perspective.The emphasis on smalland medium- sized® rms, however,is notunique to MUÈ SIAD sincea numberof other organisationsexist in Turkey, both public and private, who also seek topromote smalland medium-sized establishments. What is uniqueto MUÈ SIAD,however,in linewith the position of the Welfare Party, is astrongrejection of theCustoms Unionwith Europe and a correspondingemphasis on the need to reorient the country’s economicrelationship and foreign policy stance away from the West towardsa closerunion with the Islamic world. A numberof the association’ s research publicationsinvestigate the potential bene® ts tobe derived from closer cooperationbetween Turkey and other Islamic countries. As partof its grand strategyinvolving a closerunion with the Islamic world, the organisation has alsoformulated concrete projects for economic union among Islamic countries. Oneof these steps concernsthe much publicised project called the `Cotton Union’.Theproject covers four main Islamic countriesÐ Turkey, Pakistan, Uzbekistanand TurkmenistanÐ and visualises a combinedstrategy of expansion 759 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË toaugment international competitiveness in cotton textiles and related ® eldsin thefour countries concerned. 21 Itis strikingthat both MUÈ SIAD andthe Welfare Party have been heavily in¯uenced by the successful modelsof East Asian capitalism. Looking towards theEast for a broadmodel of development, the hierarchic, semi-authoritarian modelsof capitalism in East Asia and Southeast Asia, with a strongcommuni- tarianelement, appear more congenial from an Islamic perspective compared to Westernmodels of capitalism and their associated emphasis on individualism, secularismand liberal democracy. These broad observations might be used to highlightthe key differences between the underlying perspectives of TUÈ SIAD and MUÈ SIAD.First,the former is Western-orientated,securalist and a strongsupporter ofeconomic and political union with Europe as abasis forboth economic prosperityand the consolidation of liberal democracy in Turkey. The latter is moreEastern-orientated, heavily in¯ uenced by the successful cases ofEast and SoutheastAsian capitalism and ® ndingclose af® nitiesbetween the communitar- iantraditions of Islam andthe communitarian features of the Asian models. Second,there appears to be a strikingdifference in the approach of the two organisationsto the question of `democracy’ itself, although the issue requires seriousseparate investigation. TUÈ SIAD as anorganization seems tohave placed muchmore emphasis in recent years onexpandingthe rights and freedoms of the individual. 22 Atthesame time,however, it tendsto placeless emphasison social rightsand income distribution as majorpublic policy issues. MUÈ SIAD,incontrast, tendsto downgradeand de-emphasise issues relatingto freedoms associated with liberaldemocracy, which it labelsas aspeci®cally Western phenomenon. Hence, discussionsof individual rights and civil liberties do not ® gurein MUÈ SIAD reports,while there are frequentreferences tosocial rights and the importance ofachieving social justice, more so than those to be found in the TUÈ SIAD literature. Withthe discussion of Islamic business and the growth of MUÈ SIAD as a key associationof Islamicbusiness in thebackground, we mayreturn to ourprincipal themeand venture the following hypothesis. The transformation of the Welfare Partyfrom a marginalforce to a signi®cant political movement is aparallel phenomenonto and a re¯ection of thegrowing power of Islamicbusiness in the Turkisheconomy and society in the context of the1990s. More speci® cally, the rise ofthe Welfare Party re¯ ects, in part, the growing aspirations of the rising Islamicbourgeoisie to consolidate their positions in society, to achieve elite statusalso and, in purely economic terms, to obtain a greatershare ofpublic resources,both at the central and local levels, in competition with other segmentsof privatebusiness in Turkey. Considering the importance of thestate as akeyallocator of rentsin majorareas oftheeconomy, it isnotsurprising that businessmenwith an Islamic orientation are cooperatingwith activities being organisedat both the associational level ( MUÈ SIAD)andthe political level (the WelfareParty) to obtaina largeshare ofthepublic pie. Recent press reportson MUÈ SIAD’sentryas acollectiveunit into major privatisation deals as wellas on thebene® ts thatseem tohave accrued to Islamic capital from the deals establishedas aresultof its close contact with RP mayorsin Istanbuland Ankara appearto lend support to our hypothesis. 760 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE

Earlieron, we highlighted the unique organisational tactics that distinguished theWelfare Party from its principal competitors. The parallel at the level of Islamicbusiness appears to bethenetwork ® rm.It isclearthat the Islamic bond is provingto be the key element in the intense cooperation among a multitude ofsmallor medium-sizedeconomic units to achieve the type of competitiveness andaccess topublicresources thatwould certainly not be feasiblein theabsence ofsuch cooperation. In fact, MUÈ SIAD itselfis operatinglike a consortiumor network® rm,as is evidentin the organisation’ s recentinterest in privatisation offers.What is alsoclear from this discussion is thatany consideration concerningthe rise ofthe Welfare Party as simplya temporaryor transient phenomenonhas totake into account the growing strength and dynamism, and thecooperative element embodied in Islamiccapital that form the economic and ®nancialbackbone of the party.

The welfareparty and democratic consolidation in turkey:the challenges anddilemmas ahead Withthe Welfare Party installed as thedominant partner in a coalitiongovern- ment,the key question in everybody’ s mindis whethera strong RP presence in governmentis compatiblewith the consolidation of theliberal democratic order inTurkey. To many foreign observers, looking at the Turkish experience in a comparativeperspective and taking account of some ofthe more radical and militantversions of political Islam inthe Middle East and North Africa, RP appearsto be a mildand democratic variant of political Islam. 23 There is no doubtthat the Turkish version of political Islam has beenstrongly in¯ uenced and conditionedby the country’ s democraticpolitical culture, since, in spite of certainruptures and limitations multiparty democracy has beena majorcharac- teristicof Turkey during the postwar period. There is alsono doubt about RP’ s strongfaith in thepeaceful mechanisms of parliamentarydemocracy as ameans ofgaining access topower and putting its wideÐ ranging programme into effectiveaction. It would be fair to say thatany violent attempt to gain power wouldbe rejected except perhaps by a verysmall minority. The major problem posedby the presence of RP forthe liberal democratic order, however, arises fromthe fact that political Islam, by de® nition, has anencompassing vision of societycovering all aspects ofdailyexistence, ranging from dress toeducation, moralconduct and the position of women in society. What is commonto the majorityof the leadership and the rank and ® leof the movement is thatthey wouldlike to move forward, albeit gradually and in a peacefulmanner, to an idealisedform of a Muslimsociety. Although it is notstated explicitly, what manysupporters of RP havein mind is ultimatelythe establishment of Sharia, theIslamic Law, with its all-encompassing vision of society. TheIslamic movement in Turkey and elsewhere has bene®ted from the postmoderndemocratisation wave during the 1990s, involving the transmission ofvaluesconducive to liberaldemocracy, namely the importance of a strongand pluralisticsociety, as wellas aculturalrelativism that recognised the right of `others’to co-exist. These in¯ uences were conducive to the emergence of Islamicmovements on the political scene alongsideother, secular groups or 761 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË movements.In other words, the postmodern wave has openedup public space forIslamic movements to ¯ ourish,a space thatwas notpreviously available, at leastnot on acomparablescale. The crucial point to emphasise,however, is that, whilethe environment of postmodernity is consistentwith political Islam, the holistic,all-encompassing vision of political Islam is notequally compatible withthe postmodern message ofa pluralisticsociety. 24 Turningour attention back to the Turkish context, a fundamentalchallenge is posedby the presence of a powerful RP forthe future of the liberal political order.If ourview concerning the encompassing, totalistic vision of political Islam iscorrect,then that vision comes intodirect con¯ ict with the fundamental principlesof secularismand Western orientation that have been the hallmark of theRepublic for a periodof over 70 years. Any attempt by the RP to legislate itsidealised vision of Islam intoaction will run up against a majorwall of oppositionfrom the vast majority of the population, as wellas fromthe establishedbastions of the Republican constitutional order, including the ma- jorityof the parliament, the judiciary and, most important of all, the military. Althoughit has unintentionallycontributed to the rise ofpolitical Islam in Turkey,the military constitutes a majorbarrier towards its further advancement inthe current conjuncture. In fact,at the time of writingthis essay, some ofthe strongestreactions to the proposed RP legislationin the cultural realm have originatedfrom the military itself. Inastudyattempting to characterisethe Welfare Party, a wellknown Turkish journalist,Rus ËenC Ëakir,employs the label `neither sharia nor democracy’ . 25 This characterisationsuggests that RP is notfully democratic measured by the standardsof liberal democracy, but is alsoin part signi® cantly different in its visionof Islam as comparedwith the Iranian or Saudi Arabian versions of Islamicfundamentalism, for example. This characterisation may be valid insofar as boththe party leadership and party militants recognise that radical change in thedirections that political Islam favours,even by peaceful and parliamentary methods,will face hugeopposition in a countrywhich is uniquein the Islamic worldin terms ofthe depth of its secularism and Western orientation. With the commonvision of an idealised Islamic society in the background, what distin- guishes RP sharplyfrom its counterparts in theMiddle East is arealisationof the limitsof what it can achieve in the environment in which it is operating. Inanother in¯ uential study, TheFailure of PoliticalIslam ,Frenchanalyst OlivierRoy argues that political Islam islikelyto degenerate into either a small, parochial,militant political movement or a Western-typeright-of-centre party similarto the Christian Democratic parties to be found in many European countries.26 Inimmediateterms, both of these possibilities seem tobe remote in Turkey.In fact an interesting feature of the Turkish case beforethe 1990s was theexistence of parties that dominated government and whose basic orientation was quiteclose to European style Christian democracy. Examples include the DemocratParty led by Menderes in the 1950s, the Justice Party led by Demirel inthe1960s and 1970s and the Motherland Party under O È zal’s leadershipduring the1980s. One of the underlying features of the right-of-centre political parties was thatthey used Islam as amajorpolitical weapon as ameans ofbuilding supportand broad electoral coalitions against the more overtly secular social 762 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE democraticparties of the left, notably the Republican People’ s Party.Nonethe- less, thesepowerful right-of-centre parties managed to combine Islam as atool ofpolitical mobilisation with a broadlysecular perspective. It is obvious, therefore,that RP is ofa differentvintage and departs radically in its basic perspectivefrom the established centre-right parties; it is unlikelyto change its basiccourse in the foreseeable future. Afragileequilibrium appears to exist in the Turkish context. Considering its strongbase ofpolitical support, from both marginalised groups in poverty as wellas risingbusiness interests, RP is unlikelyto fade overnight. At the same time,there exists an inherent tension confronting the leadership of theparty. Any concreteand radical steps inthedirection of puttinginto action key elements of theIslamic programme, notably in the cultural sphere, are likelyto generate retaliationand a constitutionalcrisis, jeopardising the future of the liberal order andthe future of theparty itself. Yet another tension facing the party arises from thefact that one of theunderlying reasons for RP’ssuccess concernedits ability todifferentiate itself sharply from its competitors. A partythat distanced itself so muchfrom the rest andpromised a radicalproject of restructuring cannot simplybehave like everybody else whenin government. Total pragmatism or inactionis likelyto undermine future political support for the party. So RP appearsto be sittingon aknife-edgeequilibrium. Any attempt to instituteradical changeis likelyto elicit severe resistance,while a policyof complete inaction is likelyto undermine political support, both of which are clearlydetrimental fromthe point of view of the party’ s futuregrowth prospects.

Concludingobservations Economicglobalisation is ahighlyuneven phenomenon that generates both winnersand losers inthe process. What the present analysis has attemptedto establishis thatthe mechanisms of economic globalisation and the associated process ofneoliberal restructuring have been instrumental in the rise ofthe pro-IslamicWelfare Party to a positionof prominence in the mid-1990s. Furthermore,the cultural impulses associated with globalisation have also preparedthe way for the rise ofpoliticalIslam intheTurkish context. A striking featureof the Turkish experience, from a comparativeperspective, is thatthe WelfareParty emerged as across-class coalition,incorporating into its orbit the poorand marginalised strataÐ the obvious losers ofthe neoliberal restructuring processÐas wellas certainsegments of the rising business interest, a group clearlyemerging as abene®ciary of theglobalisation process. In factthe Welfare Partyas thepolitical expression of risingIslamic capital re¯ ects thecooperative attemptsof these groups to obtain a largeshare ofthe bene® ts associatedwith globalisation.At a morespeci® c level,a multitudeof factors has beenrespon- siblefor the rise oftheWelfare Party to thestatus of amass politicalmovement. Suchfactors include fragmentation of the existing party system, a highlyuneven distributionof income and a declinein the redistributive capacity and moral authorityof the state. External factors were also relevant. The massive in¯ows ofSaudi capital into the country as wellas thesizable in¯ ows of remittances frommigrant workers in Europe contributed to the process ofIslamic re- 763 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË surgence.Although not suf® cientlyemphasised in the present context, the disappointmentsassociated with Turkey’ s failureto obtain full- membership of theEU as wellas themuch publicised European indifference to atrocitiesagainst Muslimsduring the Bosnian War have also in¯ uenced public sentiment in the countryand may have helped to swing the pendulum somewhat in thedirection ofthe Islamic camp. On a positivenote, the rise of RP toa positionof prominencein Turkishpolitics has helpedto drawpublic attention to twomajor issues, namelythe right to practise religion freely as partof the broader menu ofcivil, social and human rights as wellas theneed to diversify Turkey’ s externalrelations away from a single-mindedconcern with Europe to greaterand closercontact with other regions of the world with common cultural bonds. Forthe social democrats, the main lesson to be drawn is that,in the current domesticand global context, it is notpossible to winelections simply as aclass partyof thepoor and disadvantaged. What the social democrats need to decipher from the RP success is thatthey have to construct a broadercoalition that includessegments of the small and medium-scale businesses whichare onthe increase.They need to develop a policyagenda that caters forthe interests of boththe poor and small-medium scale businessin a consistentfashion. Social democratsas wellas otherparties also have lessons tolearn from the organisa- tionaltactics of the Welfare Party and they also have to come to terms with Islam as animportant social and cultural force. Finally, at a moregeneral level, akeylesson that emerges fromthe Turkish experience is thatidentity politics cannotbe divorced from its broader economic context. More speci® cally, the Turkishcase illuminatesthe dif® culties of consolidatingliberal democracy fully inan environment where income and wealth is highlyunevenly distributed. Seriousquestions must be raised,however, concerning the democratic creden- tialsof theWelfare Party. While there is nodoubting RP’srespectfor parliamen- tarydemocracy as ameans ofgaining and exercising power, its underlying visionis essentiallya majoritarianconception of democracywith limited respect forminority rights or therights of `others’. Inthat respect, its vision of identity politicsis authoritarianin thesense thata societyconsisting of apredominantly Muslimpopulation is dividedinto two con¯ icting camps, namely `us against them’or `true believers versus non-believers’. Asharpdistinction is calledfor inthis context between cultural Islam andpolitical Islam. Cultural Islam, as an importantcomponent of the country’ s culturalheritage, may prove to be a unifyingforce in the democratic process inTurkey. Political Islam, in contrast, islikelyto constitute a divisivein¯ uence and, therefore, an important source of instabilityin the context of the democratic regime.

Notes Paperprepared for presentation at theBRISMES International Conference on Middle Eastern Studiesheld at StCatherine’ s College,University of Oxford, 6± 9 July1997. The paper was completedin May 1997 shortly beforethe collapse of the coalition government, with the Islamist Welfare Partyas thedominant element, in June1997 after oneyear ofof® ce 764 ISLAMIC RESURGENCE INTURKEY INPERSPECTIVE

1 Theunexpected rise oftheWelfare Partyhas generateda large literature inrecent years. Fora small sample, see Sencer Ayata, `Patronage,party, and state: thepoliticization of Islam inTurkey’ , MiddleEast Journal , 50(1), 1996, pp 40± 57; Sabri Sayari, `Turkey’ s Islamist challenge’, MiddleEast Quarterly , 3 (3) 1996, pp35± 43; Jenny B White,`Islam anddemocracy: theTurkish experience’ , CurrentHistory ,94(588),1995, pp7± 12; white `Pragmatists orideologues? Turkey’ s Welfare Partyin power’ , CurrentHistory , 96 (606), 1997,pp 25± 30; and David Shankland, `The demise ofthe Republican Turkey’ s social contract’, Govern- mentand Opposition ,31(3), 1996, pp 30± 32. 2 Onthe origins and performance ofthe National Salvation Party ( MSP),theforerunner of RP inthepre-1980 paper, see IÇ lkaySunar & BinnazToprak, `Islam inpolitics: the case ofTurkey’ , Governmentand Opposition,18(4)1983, pp 421± 441. From a comparative perspective,see HootanShambayat, `The rentier state, interestgroups and the paradox of autonomy: state andbusiness in Turkey and Iran’ , Comparative Politics,26(3), 1994, pp 307±332. 3 Thedistribution of the national vote at thegeneral elections of 1995 was as follows:Welfare Party,( RP), 21.4%;True Path Party ( DYP),19.2%;Motherland Party ( ANAP),19.7%;Democratic Left Party( DSP), 14.6% andthe Republican People’ s Party( CHP,thesuccessor tothe Social Democratic PopulistParty), 10.7%. Whatis alsostriking in the context of the 1995 elections is thatthe two fringe parties, the extreme nationalists,the National Action Party ( MHP)andthe ethnic separatists, HADEP,alsoobtained a signi®cant share ofthe national vote. MHP’sshare was 8.2%,while HADEP’ sshare was 6.1%.Neither ofthese two parties couldbe represented in parliament because oftheir failure to pass the10% national electoral threshold.Nonetheless, their electoral success was signi®cant interms ofundermining the power base ofthe centre parties,clearly facilitatingthe rise ofthe Welfare Partyin the process. For detailed information on individualpolitical parties inTurkey, see MetinHeper &JacobM Landau(eds), PoliticalParties and Democracy inTurkey ,London:IB Tauris,1991. 4 Onthe challenges confronting the process ofdemocratic consolidationin Turkey, see ErgunO È zbudun, `Turkey:how far fromconsolidation?’ , Journalof Democracy ,7(3),1996, pp 123± 138. 5 Thecentre-periphery paradigm was originallydeveloped by S Ëerif Mardin.As anexample ofthis approach tothe study of Islam inTurkish politics, see his`Religion and politics in modern Turkey’ in James Piscatori (ed), Islamin the Political Process ,New York:Cambridge University Press, 1983,pp 138±159. For a recent analysisthat attempts tolocate thepost-1980 experience ina centreÐperiphery framework, see U È mit Cizre-SakalliogÆlu,`Parameters andstrategies ofIslamÐ state interactionin Republican Turkey’ , Inter- nationalJournal of Middle East Studies ,18,1996, pp 231± 251. 6 Onthe impact ofglobalisationand the rise ofidentitypolitics, see inparticular Anthony Giddens, Beyond Leftand Right: The Future of Radical Politics ,Cambridge:Polity Press, 1996;Paul Kennedy, Preparing forthe Twenty ® rst Century ,London:Fontana, 1993; Vincent Cable, TheWorld’ s New Fissures: Identities in Crisis,London:Demos, 1994;and Paul Hirst &Grahame Thompson,`Globalization and the future of the nationstate’ , Economyand Society ,24(3), 1995, pp 408±442. 7 Fora comparative MiddleEastern perspectiveemphasising Islam as anurban movement re¯ ecting the modernistaspirations of rising groups in society, see Sami Zubaida, Islam,the People and the State , London:IB Tauris,1993. 8 Ourdiscussion of the secondary elites has beenin¯ uenced by Faruk Birtek & BinnazToprak, `The con¯ictual agendas of neoliberal reconstruction and the rise ofIslamic politicsin Turkey’ , Praxis International ,13(2), 1993, pp 192± 212. 9 Onthe broad political economy of Turkey during the post-1980 era, see ZiyaO È nisË&StevenB Webb, `Turkey:democratization and adjustment from above’ , inStephan Haggard & StevenB Webb(eds) Voting forReform: Democracy, PoliticalLiberalization and Economic Adjustment pp128± 184 New York:Oxford UniversityPress, 1994.See alsothe collection of essays inAtila Eralp,Muharrem Tu Èmay &BirolYes Ëilada (ed), ThePolitical and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey ,Westport,CT: Praeger, 1993. 10 Fora detailedanalysis of the role of the military in the post-1980 context, see HuriTu Èrsan,`Ersatz democracy: Turkeyin the 1990s’ , inRichard Gillespie (ed), MediterraneanPolitics ,Vol.2, pp 215±230, London:Pinter, 1996. 11 Theevidence on relative incomeinequality is basedon the 1994 national survey whose outcome was disclosedby the State Instituteof Statistics in1996. 12 Onthe changing role of the state inTurkey during the post-1980 era, see KorkutBoratav, `I Ç ktisatTarihi, 1981±1994’ in Sina Aks Ëin(ed) TuÈrkiye Tarihi,Cilt 5, Bugu ÈnkuÈTuÈrkiye ,pp159±210, Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi,1995. 13 Ourdiscussions concerning the programmatic statements of RP are basedon election manifestos and documentssetting out the controversial `just economic order’ . Thekey documents are thefollowing: 20 Ekim 1991Genel SecËimiRefah Partisi Sec Ëim Beyannamesi ,Ankara,1991; AdilEkonomik Du Èzen: 21Soru 21 Cevap,Ankara,1991; and RefahPartisi 14 Aralik 1995 Sec Ëimleri SecËim Beyannamesi Ankara,1995. 14 Thedecline of the social democrats shouldbe placedin perspectivein the sense thatthe combined vote of thetwo principal social democratic parties exceeded theshare of RP inthe general elections of 1995.What is signi®cant, however, is thepronounced decline of the social democrats comparedwith the pre-1980 765 ZIÇ YA OÈ NISË

period,when they could obtain around 40% of the national vote and even more inthe context of the mid-1970s. 15 Fora detailedanalysis of theelectoral performance ofthe principal political parties ona regionby region basis andillustrating the regional dimension in the fragmentation of thenational vote, see AliC ËarkogÆlu,`24 Aralik1995 Sec ËimlerindeBo ÈlgesellesËme, Oynaklõk, Parc Ëalanma veTemsil Adaleti’ ,25, GoÈ ruÈ sË 1996 pp50± 54. For a studywhich emphasises thestrong regional as well as therural connection underlying supportfor the Welfare Party,see Hasan KirmanogÆlu,`Refah PartisininYu ÈkselisËininEkonomi Politig Æi’, mimeo, Facultyof Economics, University of Istanbul, 1996. 16 Inthe public image, theSaudi presence inthe Turkish economy that originated in the mid-1980s has been associated withthe formation of ® nancialinstitutions based on the principles of interest-free banking.For evidenceon Saudi capital, see BirolYes Ëilada,`Islam, dollarsand politics: the political economy of Saudi capital inTurkey’ , paperdelivered to the annual MESA Conferencein Toronto, Canada, 15± 18 November 1989. 17 Anexample ofsuch a brotherhoodthat is muchpublicised is thereligious community founded by Fethullah GuÈlen,a discipleof Said Nursi, the Nur sect. 18 Data onthe distribution of MUÈ SIAD membershipreveals thefollowing pattern. In October 1996 MUÈ SIAD had atotalmembership of 2567. The largest congregationsof members includedIstanbul (786), Bursa (246), IÇ zmir (205),Konya (184), Kayseri (175),Ankara (169) and Kocaeli (107).Of these onlyKonya and Kayseri are thetraditional RP strongholdsin the Inner Anatolian region. The rest are major metropolitancentres. It is alsointeresting that the emerging towns associated withsuccessful industrialisationin recent years, namelyC Ëorum,Kahramanmaras Ë,SËanlõurfa, Gaziantep andDenizli have a combinedmembership of 256, whichis alsosigni® cant. Thanks are dueto Dr O È mer Bolat,the General Secretary of MUÈ SIAD,forgranting me aninterview and making the information on the association’ s membershipavailable. 19 Thesuccess storyof `Anatolian tigers’ in the rising small townsof Inner and Southeast Anatolia have been highlightedin a series ofarticles thatappeared in the Turkish daily, Milliyet,duringJuly 1996. 20 Foran exposition of MUÈ SIAD’sbasic perspective,see theannual reports on the Turkish economy which start in1994. See alsothe report, EconomicCooperation Among Islamic Countries ,Istanbul.Another useful studyin terms ofilluminating the basic MUÈ SIAD perspective,is abookby the president of the Association, Erol Yarar, 21.Yu ÈzyilaGirerken DuÈnyayaYeni Bir Bakis Ë , Istanbul: MUÈ SIAD, 1996. 21 See thekey report, PamukBirlig Æi , Istanbul: MUÈ SIAD, 1996. 22 See arecent, muchpublicised and controversial report by TUÈ SIAD, TuÈrkiye’deDemokratik Perspekti¯er , Istanbul: TUÈ SIAD, 1997. 23 Foran interpretation along these lines,see SaadEddin Ibrahim, `The other side of the moon: from Taliban toErbakan’ , CivilSociety ,5(59),1996, p 4. 24 Onthe relationship between Islam andpostmodernity, see AkbarS Ahmedand Hastings Donnan (eds), Islam,Globalization and Postmodernity ,London:Routledge, 1994. For a usefulexploration of thecomplex anduneasy relationship between Islam andpostmodernity with special reference tothe Turkish context, see AliYas Ëar Sarõ bay, Postmodernite,Sivil Toplum ve Islam ,Istanbul:IÇ letisËim Yayinlari,1995. 25 See RusËenC Ëakir, Ne SËeriatNe Demokrasi ,Istanbul:Metis Yayinlari, 1994; and Cakõ r, Ayet ve Slogan , Istanbul:Metis Yayinlari, 1990. 26 See OlivierRoy, TheFailure of Political Islam ,Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.

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