M. A. I Political Science
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Chapter 1 Chapter 2
Notes Chapter 1 1. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 3–18. 2. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology and Other Essays (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960). See also Edward Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956); Nathan C. Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1951); and Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1952). 3. E.g., and perhaps most notoriously, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Chapter 2 1. Smith’s phrasing of the questions he wished to study may be found on p. 26. 2. The literature of the pluralist approach to American politics is immense and con- tinues to proliferate. The best recent work in the genre is Arnold Rose, The Power Structure: The Political Process in American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). Other well-known examples of this approach are Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) and Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Nelson W. Polsby, Com- munity Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Daniel Bell, “Is There a Ruling Class in America? The Power Elite Reconsidered,” in his The End of Ideology, rev. edn. (New York, 1965); David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), Part II; Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. -
In Defense of the State (II)
In Defense of the State (II) PHILIP GREEN n the first part of this essay, I argued ~at the "fre~ market". and th~ "mini I mal state," as understood by such anttstate theonsts as Milton Fnedman and Robert Nozick, as well as their intellectual progeny who now contend for cdntrol over the U.S. government, are in fact primarily instruments for the main tenance of inequality and privilege. The obvious line of defense of those instrumentalities against such an argu ment is familiar. First, it is claimed that the rights of property protected by the free market and the niinimal state are fundamental. Second, it is claimed that the free market and the niinimal state are in any event primarily democratic in stitutions-institutions, that is, such as would be created or have been created by ''the people/' as opposed to welfarist institutions that are created by "govern ment bureaucrats." In the second part of this essay I shall address both aspects of that defense. We shall see that the free market and the minimal state protect only a very special class of property rights, rather than any kind of right we can rea sonably think of as belonging by nature to all people; and that the activities of the minimal ot any other (capitalist) state consist to a great degree of coercion exercised by that state on behalf of the rights of a minority and against those of the majority. Democrats should be especially grateful to Robert Nozick. In his develop ment of what he calls the "entitlement theory of justice"-i.e., the theory of the rights of private property-he has shown more clearly than anyone before him (more clearly even than John Locke, who maintained a careful ambiguity on the origins and rights of entitlement) just how historically empty, though ideolog ically replete, that theory is. -
Issues of Policy Can Be Discussed Reasonably, by Looking at the Data
Philip Green Neo-Cons and the Counter-Enlightenment by Philip Green y remarks are going to be a variation on Louis Hartz’s Liberal Tradition M in America, still to my mind the basic text on political culture in the United States, though it needs a lot of amendment, some of which I will offer here. If the pre-modern culture of Europe was the Ancien Regime, then modern culture, starting with the Enlightenment, or the 17th Century Revolution in England, comes as a rebellion against it. So in Germany after World War I, for example, both the socialist Liebknecht and the liberal Max Weber, running for the presidency as a Liberal, had roughly the same attitude toward conservative Catholicism in Germany: it was an accomplice of the class enemy, or it was the cultural enemy, depending on which of them you asked. If Hartz is right about the United States, though, and an egalitarian liberal individualism is its foundation (as Tocqueville, of course, said long before Hartz), then in one of its forms at least rebellion quite logically comes as a version of anti-modern conservatism. (I’m talking about mass rebellion here, not the arcane rebellion of post-structuralist academics). And since the political institutions of liberalism are virtually unchallengeable—and have not really been challenged by the new conservatism—this comes mostly as a rebellion in the realm of culture. This is the real counter-culture; it renders comprehensible such factoids as that in the U.S. roughly eighty percent or more of respondents call themselves regular church-goers, whereas in Britain the comparable figure is below ten percent. -
Where Did Mill Go Wrong?: Why the Capital- Managed Firm Rather Than the Labor-Managed Enterprise Is the Predominant Organizational Form in Market Economies
Where Did Mill Go Wrong?: Why the Capital- Managed Firm Rather than the Labor-Managed Enterprise Is the Predominant Organizational Form in Market Economies JUSTIN SCHWARTZ* In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms organized as capital-managed and -owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor-managedand -owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalistfirms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is more efficient. Empirical research, however, overwhelmingly contradicts this. But employees almost never even attempt to organize worker cooperatives. I critique the explanations of the three leading analysts of the subject (N. Scott Arnold, Henry Hansmann, and Gregory Dow), all of whom offer different transactions cost accounts as logically defective and empirically inadequate. I then propose an explanation that has been oddly neglected in the literature,that the rarity of cooperatives is explained by the collective action problem identified by writers such as Mancur Olson. Labor management is a public good that generates the n- person prisoner's dilemma that gives rationalactors the incentive to create it in suboptimal (or no) amounts. I support this by reference to the empirical facts about the origin of existing cooperatives and show that this explanation requires no strong version of a questionable rational choice theory. My account points advocates of labor management towards solutions such as institutional changes in incentives, which, however, themselves involve public goods issues. -
Liberal Democracy, Classic Pluralism, Catallaxy, 3 Participatory Democracy, Deliberative Democracy, and Radical Pluralism
1111 2 3 4 5111 6111 Theories of Democracy 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 Theories of Democracy: a critical introduction is a comprehensive and access- 4 ible introduction to the main theories of democracy, covering the historical 5 development of the many different forms and the problems faced by each. 6 Frank Cunningham begins with the development of democracy from 7 ancient Greece to the present day, examining the views of prominent figures 8 such as Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, Rousseau, Alexis de Tocqueville, and 9 Schumpeter. He explains the main objections to democracy, including the 20111 challenges of majority tyranny, irrational decision-making procedures and 1 ineffectual government. Cunningham distinguishes between several compet- 2 ing theories of democracy: liberal democracy, classic pluralism, catallaxy, 3 participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and radical pluralism. A 4 detailed case study uses the example of globalization to show how the various 5 democratic theories are concretely applied, and notes the strengths and 6 weaknesses of the different theories in coping with the problem that global- 7 ization poses for democratic structures. Theories of Democracy contains three 8 helpful discussion sections that concentrate on the recurrent themes of 9 liberal democracy and capitalism, democracy and representation, and the 30111 value of democracy. 1 Clearly written and focusing on contemporary debate, Theories of 2 Democracy provides an accessible introduction for the student or general 3 reader and also makes an original contribution to contemporary political 4 philosophy. 5 6 Frank Cunningham is a lecturer in the philosophy department at the 7 University of Toronto.