September 11Th: Has Anything Changed?

13 June 2002 review September 11th: has anything changed?

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

Published by the Refugee Studies Centre in association with the Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project Forced Migration Review from the FMR editors provides a forum for the regular exchange of practical experience, information and elcome to this special issue of FMR ideas between researchers, refugees and internally displaced people, and those who Wwhich has been produced in collabora- work with them. It is published three tion with the Migration Policy Institute, times a year in English, Spanish and Washington DC. We felt that the implica- Arabic by the Refugee Studies tions for refugees and IDPs of the terrorist Centre/University of Oxford in association with the Global IDP Project/Norwegian attacks of 11 September 2001 and the Refugee Council. The Spanish translation, events which followed were so significant Revista de Migraciones Forzadas, that they warranted changing our publishing Corinne Owen is produced by IDEI in Guatemala. schedule to accommodate this additional issue. Editors Many thanks to our MPI colleagues for their work on commissioning and reviewing Marion Couldrey & articles and liaison with authors. Their Introduction (pages 4-7) highlights the context Dr Tim Morris and theses of this issue and presents policy recommendations. Subscriptions Assistant Sharon Ellis Two additional commentaries, which FMR commissioned for its Arabic language edition, have been included, following the MPI special section. These look at the implications of Forced Migration Review Refugee Studies Centre, 11 September for the Middle East and are included for the purpose of further reflection. Queen Elizabeth House, 21 St Giles, Oxford, OX1 3LA, UK We are extremely grateful to the UK Department for International Development (DFID) Email: [email protected] for generously funding the bulk of the cost of producing and distributing the English and Tel: +44 (0)1865 280700 Fax: +44 (0)1865 270721 Arabic language edition of this issue.

Global IDP Project Are you receiving Forced Migration Review for the first time? To receive future Chemin Moïse-Duboule 59 issues, you will need to take out a paid subscription (see the form in the middle of this CH-1209 Geneva, Switzerland magazine). If you are a regular reader but have not renewed your subscription for Email: [email protected] 2002, please use the subscription form in the magazine to do so – or email us at Tel: +41 22 799 0700 Fax: +41 22 799 0701 [email protected]. This year we will be producing four issues of FMR: feature themes of the next two issues are listed opposite. Subscription rates Individuals £15/US$22/€24 with best wishes Institutions £25/US$36/€41 FREE for: residents of developing countries, refugees/IDPs Marion Couldrey & Tim Morris and students/unwaged. See subscription form in centre of magazine Letter from the Migration Policy Institute Special Issue Copyright and disclaimer Material from Forced Migration Review Guest Editors may be freely reproduced but please acknowledge the source. Photographs We are privileged to have had the opportunity to work with the FMR editors on the should only be reproduced in the context Special Section contained in this special issue. Working on migration and humanitarian of the articles in which they appear affairs, and based as we are in Washington DC, we have been concerned to collect our (and credited). Material and information contained in Forced Migration Review are thoughts on the impact of the events of 11 September on forced migration and protection the opinions of the authors and do not issues. necessarily reflect the views of the Editors, the Refugee Studies Centre or the We are particularly grateful to the Andrew W Mellon Foundation for their generous sup- Norwegian Refugee Council. port of MPI’s work on forced migration, including the establishment of a policy dialogue Forthcoming features in 2002 among researchers, practitioners and policy makers in this field. Older refugees/IDPs Children Our thanks go most of all to our contributors, many of whom are actively involved in Website dealing with the consequences of 11 September and the war in Afghanistan, for finding www.fmreview.org the time to commit their thoughts and observations to paper. We hope you find the result as stimulating to read as we found it to work on.

Designed by Colophon Media. Printed by LDI Ltd on environmentally Kathleen Newland, Joanne van Selm, Monette Zard and Erin Patrick friendly paper.

ISSN 1460-9819

Front cover photos: World Trade Centre: Panos/HH/Rene Clement • Northern Alliance soldiers on road to Taloqan frontline, October 2001: Panos/Martin Adler • Assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan: Panos/Clive Shirley. FMR 12 3 contents

September 11: Introduction 4 Has anything changed? by the Migration Policy Institute Guest Editors

Afghanistan: conflict and displacement 1978 to 2001 8 Special Section by Hiram A Ruiz

Hope on the brink 11 by Filippo Grandi

Civil-military relations in Afghanistan 14 compiled by Tim Morris

Foreign policy considerations in dealing with Afghanistan’s refugees: 16 when security and protection collide by Joanne van Selm

Receiving Afghanistan’s asylum seekers: Australia, 19 the Tampa ‘Crisis’ and refugee protection by William Maley

Afghan refugees in Europe 22 by A-R Faquiri

Afghanistan and the challenges of humanitarian action in time of war 23 by Roberta Cohen

Reinvigorating resettlement: changing realities demand 28 changed approaches by John Fredriksson (with case study by Marta Bivak and Ceri Oeppen)

Exclusion, terrorism and the Refugee Convention 32 by Monette Zard

Screening in mass influxes: the challenge of exclusion and separation 35 by Bonaventure Rutinwa

What does it take to rebuild a state? 38 by Paula R Newberg

Security and the ethics of asylum after 11 September 40 by Matthew J Gibney

Resources 43

Further reflections Palestinians in the aftermath of 11 September: wishing refugees 44 out of existence? by Abbas Shiblak

Post 11 September jitters for Iraqi Kurds 46 by Maggy Zanger

Endpiece Lessening tensions in a tumultuous world: The Royal Institute 47 for Inter-Faith Studies by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal 4 FMR 13 Introduction by Kathleen Newland, Erin Patrick, Joanne van Selm and Monette Zard Migration Policy Institute, Washington DC Certain events divide moments in time into ‘before’ and criminals who may seek to use the country of asylum as a platform from ‘after’. Hiroshima ushered in the age of the nuclear which to continue their fight. threat; the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of The imperative to screen adds impetus to the need to ensure that equitable the Cold War. and adequate systems are established for burden sharing in various ways t is perhaps too soon to define the Old issues: new dimensions with countries of asylum. It is essential broad historical significance of 11 when considering both burden sharing September 2001. It may eventually However realities have changed and I and screening that states ensure that be seen as the start of a new period of will continue to change, the debates civilian populations displaced within transition from the post-Cold War era about various features of protection their country of origin are adequately to a ‘Grey War’. However, for refugees will be set in the context of policy pro- assisted and protected. This must be and internally displaced persons, as grammes and legal discussions of the carried out in such a way that the prin- for those who work with them or who post-Cold War era. In the 1990s, many ciple of asylum is not compromised – study forced migration, it is already people were discussing the movement the so-called IDP/refugee tension. clear that the terrorists’ strikes on the of people in ‘security’ terms. We can United States on 11 September hit expect to see this framing of the Afghanistan: a crisis in hard at certain fundamentals. There is forced migration debate to be intensi- context a new sense of vulnerability in the fied, with two key features: West, and the ensuing ‘war on terror- A wide range of issues will need to be ism’ has caused new obstacles to be i. a focus on the potential arrival of drawn out in order to start to under- put in place for people seeking asylum individuals who abuse the asylum stand the implications of the post 11 outside their own countries, tempting system and may pose security September context for responses to governments into labelling any force- threats to the country in which they forced migration. We can start to ful opposition as ‘terrorism’. seek asylum understand those implications by assessing, for example, the plight of In the first instance, attention has ii. an increased preoccupation with the Afghans displaced by decades of fight- been focused on the initial phase of security dimensions of mass exo- ing and by Operation Enduring the international war against terror- duses and influxes, and the Freedom and the situation of people ism: the US-led attack on the al-Qa’ida international management of such detained or suspected of potential and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. No refugee flows involvement with terrorism when sim- matter how the war against ‘terrorists ply filing immigration documents or With an increased fear of ‘terrorists with global reach’ unfolds, individuals asylum claims. Such an assessment with global reach’ there will be in many countries will almost certainly should be made within the context of increased focus on the need for careful be displaced as a result of this 21st developments in refugee protection screening and perhaps the exclusion of century war. In some cases these will that were already underway prior to certain individual asylum seekers from be displacements from countries that September 2001, and most particularly refugee status due to suspected have produced hundreds and thou- by analysing whether the tools with involvement in terrorist activities. sands, even millions, of refugees and which states and international organi- Mass exoduses of refugees and influx- IDPs in the last decades, as has been sations are already equipped are es into neighbouring states become the case of Afghanistan. In other cases sufficient to allow them, albeit in some likely when the response to terrorist there might be brand new displace- cases with altered means of implemen- acts on a global scale involves (more ments from more unexpected places. tation, to deal with the seemingly new or less) conventional interstate war- For all of the newly displaced, how- situation. This special issue of Forced fare. Mass displacements bring with ever, the political environment Migration Review will therefore focus them significant security challenges surrounding their reception as seekers specifically on the responsibilities of a linked to screening. The individual and of refuge and the protection and assis- range of actors who respond to dis- group dimensions of this problem tance offered to them are likely to be placements, the existing tools available become linked: where recent crises at the very least tinged by the seem- to those actors and the usefulness of such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo ingly new political realities. Those these tools in an increasingly security- gave rise to prima facie-based tempo- realities make this a James Bond-like conscious world. world in which nationality alone is no rary protection systems, the longer a tool to define ‘enemies’ but in experience of the Great Lakes in partic- Where were we on which an array of factors could cause ular indicated that among the September 10? almost everyone to be a possible sus- displaced, alongside those victims of pect in the new ‘with us or against us’ conflict and unrest we would call It is important, in considering the world. refugees, are also fighters and impact of 11 September on issues of FMR 13 Introduction 5 forced migration, that we recall the left the country vulnerable to abuse tional level, it is important to assess international political climate with by both the Taliban regime and the al- the role of foreign policy and diplo- regard to refugees and asylum seek- Qa’ida fighters harboured by that macy in a crisis in which all states ers that was already in place. regime. The role of UNHCR in protect- have multiple interests. As well as UNHCR’s Global Consultations to ing returning refugees and IDPs is multiple interests, states have differ- mark the 50th anniversary of the thoroughly examined in a field report ent, and perhaps competing, 1951 Convention relating to the by the organisation’s representative in responsibilities within a single crisis, Status of Refugees were in full swing Afghanistan, Filippo Grandi. for example both to conduct meaning- and building up to the defining ful and appropriate foreign policy, moment when, on 12 December, the The two subsequent parts will shed and to live up to international protec- signatories would come together and light on issues of ‘responsibility shar- tion obligations. What is more, states reaffirm their commitment to the ing’ and on the existing tools of behave differently on the same issues Convention. These activities were tak- protection and the usefulness of these in different crises. Our second article ing place in a climate that, for more tools in scenarios that bring new in this section contrasts the closures than a decade, had been marked by security dimensions to displacement of the Pakistan border with that of increasing scepticism, most notably in situations. The articles variously the Kosovo-Macedonia border in 1999. Europe and Australia, about the inap- touch on a number of different layers propriateness of the Convention in of policy response, namely the field; Finally, we look beyond Afghanistan the current times. regional; linked regional-global and to the countries that have received global levels. This separation has the Afghan asylum seekers during the last The subjects of discussion in tracks goal of structuring the discussion decades, and their reactions to those two and three of the Global towards policy options available to asylum seekers in the changed situa- Consultations indicate those areas of states and humanitarian agencies. tion in Afghanistan. Two articles concern to governments and activists: Recurring themes will include the consider the means of arrival of cessation; exclusion clauses; supervi- relations between states, inter-agency Afghan refugees in destination coun- sion of application of the Convention; cooperation and the relations among tries, the reception these asylum non-refoulement; internal flight alter- UN agencies, NGOs and states. The seekers receive, their frequent rejec- natives; gender; family unity; thinking in commissioning these arti- tion, and the impetus towards their detention; responsibility and burden cles is as follows. return. The first of these papers looks sharing; registration; mass influxes; at Australia’s response to the Tampa access to procedures; safe third coun- Responsibility sharing incident in late August 2001 and tries and safe countries of origin; other such smuggling incidents after reception modalities; capacity build- In this context, responsibility sharing that date. It draws attention to the ing and complementary forms of is not linked directly to the discus- formal rejection of a high percentage protection. All of these issues have sions about burden sharing and of Afghan asylum claims in the last remained subjects of concern during solidarity in the sense of apportioning decades. This same situation pertains and since the US campaign in refugees, which have been a major in the EU, where attention is now Afghanistan. The papers written for feature of all massive displacement turning to the removal of Afghans to the meetings of the Global crises (Indo-China, the Balkans and a so-called safe new situation in their Consultations may have been able to others). Rather, we examine different country of origin. draw on another case study but the ways in which different actors partake issues they raised may not have been in a collective responsibility for the The issue of internal displacement is much altered by the ‘new world’ of a whole chain of management in forced one that cuts across our two themes superpower awakened to the challenge migration situations, and how those of responsibility sharing and the of terrorism. As such, the question actors (states, NGOs, international existing tools of protection. A number raised in the title of this special issue organisations, the military, etc) relate of institutions are attempting to pro- is pertinent: has anything changed? to one another. vide assistance to the world’s IDPs but clear means of coordination, of Organisation of this Special At the field level, agency coordination sharing the responsibility, have not Section and the sharing of tasks and yet been satisfactorily developed. responsibilities between NGOs and In Afghanistan in autumn 2001, IDPs This special section is split into three international organisations are the became the focus of intense interna- parts. This first part involves some subject of the first paper. Civil-mili- tional attention, not least because, as setting of the scene. Following this tary relations have been a major referred to in the context of foreign introduction, two articles will set out problem on the ground during this policy above, states did not envisage the history of war and conflict in crisis. Both NGOs and the military that these IDPs would become Afghanistan – which has led to the have responsibilities during such a refugees as they had in many high- uprooting of millions of victims in conflict situation; the content of those profile cases of large internal more than two decades of internation- responsibilities is distinct. One displacement in the past (even if al and civil fighting – and the responsibility of both could be said to UNHCR was preparing for them). situation on the ground in that coun- be to maintain clarity in the distinc- In addition, while legal tools for pro- try in early 2002. Hiram Ruiz, who tions between their operations, for tecting refugees had been developed, has followed developments in the their own sakes as well as for the no such strong instruments exist for Afghanistan region for many years, population’s sake. Taking the issue of the protection of IDPs. The question in examines the decades of conflict that responsibility sharing to an interna- the case of IDPs is thus whether the 6 Introduction FMR 13

lack of an (accepted) international to be present in any application of the agreement among the authors. Among mechanism for IDP protection is satis- exclusion clauses. Screening in important points are: factory for a changing world where the refugee camps, in an effort to apply nature of sovereignty is ever shifting. the exclusion clauses at the field level 1. The coalition of states engaged in in situations of mass influx, takes the a war on terrorism have taken Existing tools: challenges to another level. In a situa- upon themselves additional, new dimensions tion where combatants, declared and implicit and explicit responsibili- undeclared, may be mixed in with ties through this act. Primary The existing tools of protection for bona fide refugees, as well as those among these is that the interna- refugees and displaced persons are who may have committed serious tional community cannot again thought by many to be sufficient to international crimes, there are added leave any state isolated simply deal with any new refugee crises, and difficulties. Drawing on comparative because other states do not have indeed to deal already with many of experiences, an article on screening the political will to be involved. the circumstances (eg terrorists seek- reflects on the legal and practical Every state that produces massive ing asylum ‘under cover’) which might dilemmas, including the division of flows of refugees or displaced be thought of as somehow ‘new’. Most inter-agency responsibility in this persons, and every state that of the existing tools are indeed suffi- area, which would probably be faced shoulders a significant refugee cient; their application and use by in any such exercise in the Pakistan burden, is now understood to states, however, might not be suffi- context. represent a foreign policy interest cient – hence we suggest that new to any government with a lively dimensions may need to be brought While there is no single model for an sense of rational self-interest in a to those tools. ‘existing tool’ to use in reconstruction, highly integrated world. there are experiences and lessons to The US, Australia and Canada are be drawn upon. These may help in 2. In sharing responsibilities within a among those states that seek to man- trying to ensure not only that recon- displacement-inducing conflict age their refugee immigration through struction is successful in Afghanistan situation, participating states and resettlement programmes. The and the return of the displaced is non-state bodies need clearly European states have limited such truly a durable solution but also in defined mandates, areas of opera- organised resettlement in general ensuring that the country ends its tion, and understanding of where terms but employed a humanitarian cycles of civil war and ceases to be a their duties and obligations over- evacuation programme during the place where terrorists can train and lap. Coordination often seems an Kosovo crisis, effectively creating a plot at leisure. Precedents have been elusive goal – though an obvious precedent of short-term ‘resettle- set for international involvement in goal of all. The issue of coordina- ment’. Whilst such an approach was post-conflict reconstruction, most tion, which is most often problem- never a consideration during the recently in Kosovo and East Timor. atic within the humanitarian assis- Afghan crisis, the first article in this At the same time, concerns have tance community, is even more section explores the potential use of emerged from past experiences that complex when the military resettlement as a policy tool to allow international involvement can hamper becomes involved, both in conflict states to deal with mass exoduses in the development of local capacity for and in assistance operations. When an effective way. The reality remains, political, societal and economic devel- military involvement is essential, however, that in the aftermath of 11 opment beyond a conflict situation. governments need to distinguish September, traditional countries of The discussion surrounding the post- clearly between military operations resettlement such as the US suspend- conflict potential for Afghanistan and civilian operations (eg sup- ed and/or re-assessed their began even before the US and its allies ported through the UN or NGOs) resettlement programmes. The human began their military action. and realise the benefits coordina- cost of this policy decision is explored tion can bring to all involved. in an additional case study. Finally, our thoughts turn to the normative framework within which 3. In dealing with population exodus- An existing tool likely to take on asylum and security are related. es, states need to weigh many increased significance in the post 11 Again, there are no clearly definable concerns: the protection capacity September era is Article 1F of the ethical ‘tools’ as such but there is a in neighbouring states; the securi- 1951 Refugee Convention; these so- body of thought, literature, work and ty consequences of both an exodus called exclusion clauses are an experience on which we can draw to and an influx in the place to which important means by which to ensure analyse both how refugee protection the population moves; alliances that the system of refugee protection has arrived at its current state and with states neighbouring a conflict is not abused by terrorists and those what the future might hold, and situation. However, the primary who may have committed war crimes should hold. factor must be to balance those or crimes against humanity. concerns with humanitarian oblig- Nevertheless, as states turn their Policy directions ations, including guaranteeing that attention to these clauses it is impor- those who need protection can tant to ensure that they are applied in Many of the articles commissioned by achieve their right to seek that a fair and rights respecting manner. MPI point to policy conclusions. The protection outside their country of Guidance is needed as to the scope of conclusions that follow are stimulated origin, and that they are not crimes envisaged by Article 1F and by, but do not draw directly on, the returned to a situation of danger. the procedural safeguards that need articles and are not indicative of any FMR 13 Introduction 7

4. Short-term domestic political goals of origin, the refugees and the tools – such as resettlement pro- should not be the cause of govern- host country, attention must be grammes – that permit optimal, ments reneging on long-term paid to individual circumstances, durable protection need to be pos- international obligations and including the length of the period itively re-considered. responsibilities. In particular, in of refuge, and to allowing and entering the debate on the subject facilitating short-term visits with 8. In assessing protection needs, for of refugees and asylum, govern- an eye to ultimate return, without the security of genuine refugees as ments should be aware that their insisting that the latter take place. well as for the security of states, rhetoric is heard not only by the Giving people the personal securi- authorities should make appropri- voting public but also by refugees ty that comes with the right to ate use of the existing tools at and asylum seekers themselves. remain in or return to the country their disposal to exclude certain Derogatory public statements that of refuge can often be a factor in people from refugee status, and to discriminate against asylum seek- stimulating a willingness to return, screen camp dwelling populations ers and refugees can cause unrest at least on a trial basis. in situations of mass influx, where among refugee communities, as individual application of the exclu- well as appearing to condone dis- 6. The provision of assistance alone sion clauses may not be crimination. This is counter- is not sufficient to live up to inter- appropriate. productive for all concerned and is national obligations. For both at odds with the actions of those refugees and IDPs, alongside the 9. In learning from past mistakes, the governments that do live up to provision of aid, it is essential that international community needs to their international protection governments explore and develop ensure that the reconstruction of obligations. means to guarantee security and Afghanistan is a project for and by protection where such means are Afghans. However, recalling the 5. European governments, in particu- not yet established, and that they first conclusion listed here, that lar, should guard against seeing live up to their protective obliga- does not mean ignoring the every conflict successfully tions where such already exist. process of reconstruction or with- resolved as a situation to which drawing from it quickly. Rather it those who have been refugees can 7. In providing protection and securi- means a process of partnership, of return. The security of the country ty, states need to maximise their state and society building for a in which intervention has taken development of useful tools of state that needs to be strong and place cannot be maximised in the management in both the migration secure for itself and its people but short term by forcing or over-stim- and displacement scenarios. that also needs to be strong for ulating immediate return by exiles. Registration, for example, needs to and within the international com- Rather, for the sake of the country be improved on the ground. And munity of states.

The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) is an independent, non-partisan, non- profit think-tank in Washington, D.C. dedicated to the study of the movement of people worldwide. MPI provides analysis, development and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at the local, national, and international levels. It aims to meet the rising demand for pragmatic and thoughtful responses to the challenges and opportunities that large-scale migration, whether voluntary or forced, presents to communities and institutions in an increasingly integrated world. MPI’s work is organised around four research pillars: ■ Migration Management ■ North American Borders and Migration Agenda ■ Refugee Protection and International Humanitarian Response ■ Immigrant Settlement and Integration

Founded in 2001 by Kathleen Newland and Demetrios G Papademetriou, MPI grew out of the International Migration Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The think-tank’s policy analysts seek to bridge the worlds of migration research and policymaking, by translating research findings into policy recommendations for politicians, business leaders and journalists around the world.

A central focus of MPI’s refugee protection work in 2002 is the issue of internal displacement. MPI is collab- orating with the newly established IDP unit within the UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to explore some of the continued challenges of providing effective protection and assistance to the internally displaced. The results of this study will be published in September 2002. A second collaborative effort, with the Brookings Institution-CUNY Project on Internal Displacement, analyses the complex relationship between the international refugee protection system and evolving IDP protection mechanisms, with a view to progressing towards the development of a comprehensive protection regime for these two groups.

In late Spring 2002, MPI is launching the Migration Information Source (www.migrationinformation.org), a new website that offers current and authoritative data on international migration, as well as analysis from migration experts and dispatches from foreign correspondents around the world.

For more information on the Migration Policy Institute, visit our website at www.migrationpolicy.org. 8 FMR 13

Afghanistan: conflict and

displacement 1978 to 2001 UNHCR/C Shirley by Hiram A Ruiz

Jalozai refugee camp, The tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the dead, prompted the exodus of thou- near Peshawar, sands of refugees and gave rise to an Pakistan, 2001 subsequent US-led military action against armed resistance movement.

Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and al-Qa’ida thrust Concerned that the communist government in Kabul was losing ground, Afghanistan into the international spotlight and in December 1979 the Soviet Union finally placed it on the agenda of senior policy mak- invaded Afghanistan. The civilian population once again faced violence ers worldwide. What the media and policy makers and intimidation and hundreds of thousands more refugees fled discovered was a country ravaged by conflict and Afghanistan.

already in the grip of one of the worst humanitarian During the 1980s, new Afghan opposi- crises in the world. tion forces – the mujahideen or holy warriors – grew rapidly, increasing the n fact, Afghanistan has experi- all taken a grave toll on the Afghan intensity of the conflict. In 1981, enced one of the world’s largest people. some 1.5 million Afghans were 3 I refugee crises for more than two refugees; by 1986, this number had decades. Between the Soviet invasion The conflict’s early days increased to nearly five million, most- 4 of Afghanistan in 1979 and the pre- ly in Pakistan and Iran. Most of the sent day, one in four Afghans has The coup that brought a communist Afghan refugees in Pakistan were been a refugee. At the peak of the cri- government to power in Afghanistan ethnic Pashtuns, housed in refugee sis in the late 1980s, there were more in April 1978 ignited the first of a camps established by UNHCR than six million Afghan refugees. series of conflicts that have crippled throughout Pakistan’s two western- When American bombardment began Afghanistan and left an estimated 1.5 most provinces, the North-West 2 in October 2001, 3.6 million Afghans million Afghans dead. Afghanistan's Frontier Province and Baluchistan. remained refugees, mostly in Pakistan largely uneducated, traditional, rural and Iran, while at least 700,000 more population deeply resented and resist- Over the years, the camps evolved were internally displaced.1 Decades of ed the new communist regime. Faced into villages that began to appear ongoing conflict, human rights abuses with widespread opposition, the much like other villages in Pakistan. by both the Taliban and the opposi- regime turned to force. Its violent tac- Many of the refugees carved out rea- tion forces and severe drought have tics left tens of thousands of Afghans sonable and predictable lives, at least FMR 13 Afghanistan: conflict and displacement 1978 to 2001 9

compared to what they could expect Since the Soviet pull-out from Taliban had grown to more than in Afghanistan. Most found at least Afghanistan, however, the West’s 25,000 fighters and controlled most subsistence work in the local econo- interest in the country had faded. of southern and western Afghanistan. my or rented land to cultivate. Some Funding for reconstruction and repa- However, the movement’s strict read- maintained a foothold in both coun- triation, as well as for assistance to ing of an ancient tribal social code tries by living in Pakistan while hiring the large number of refugees who called Pushtunwali was resented by tenant farmers to work their land in remained in Pakistan and Iran, dried the vast majority of Afghans who had Afghanistan. up. Operation Salam soon collapsed. never before been subject to such Although repatriation continued at a restrictions. As the movement headed Afghan refugees in Iran did not bene- brisk pace in 1993, it subsequently north, it was met with increasing fit from similar assistance, however. levelled off. resistance from many of the former In 1979, a revolution put an Islamic mujahideen groups which eventually fundamentalist regime in power in Two factors contributed to the slow- banded together to form the anti- Iran and radical students seized the down in repatriation: inadequate Taliban Northern Alliance. The US embassy, taking dozens of US citi- repatriation assistance and the in- Taliban captured Jalalabad and Kabul zens hostage.5 The US and its allies fighting that erupted between the in late 1996 and Mazar-e-Sharif – the were reluctant to fund programmes in various mujahideen factions that had Northern Alliance’s de facto capital – Iran, even for refugees, and Teheran worked together to oust the Soviets in 1998. did not want Western agencies – includ- and Najibullah. Unable to agree on a ing UNHCR – in Iran. Left largely to political power-sharing arrangement, a writhing nest of petty warlords fend for themselves, most Afghan the mujahideen turned against each refugees in Iran settled in urban cen- other "as each sought to achieve its The fighting for control of northern 7 tres, with little protection, forced to objectives by military means". Afghanistan triggered a new refugee compete with local people for limited Afghanistan became what Afghan exodus. Many of Kabul’s educated employment opportunities. expert Robert Kaplan described as "a élite, including government workers, writhing nest of petty warlords who medical professionals and teachers, The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan fought and negotiated with one anoth- fled to Pakistan. They opposed the 8 proved costly in both lives and expen- er for small chunks of territory". Taliban’s anti-western, fundamentalist diture and sparked political Fighting for control of Kabul left an Islamic stance and the many restric- opposition within the flagging Soviet estimated 50,000 people dead and tions that the Taliban imposed on the Union. In February 1989, Moscow much of the city in ruins. In Kandahar, population. Many members of ethnic withdrew its troops from Afghanistan the largest city in southern Afghanistan, minorities such as the Hazara, fearing and left in power a puppet regime civilians "had little security from discrimination by the Pashtun-led 9 headed by Mohammed Najibullah. murder, rape, looting, or extortion". Taliban, also fled. Additionally, hun- The UN tried to broker a peace agree- dreds of thousands of civilians within ment between Najibullah and the The emergence of the Taliban the region were displaced internally. mujahideen but failed to achieve any During the 1980s and early 1990s, result. In April 1992, the mujahideen The post-Cold War period religious schools called madrassas captured Kabul and killed Najibullah. became popular with Afghan refugee In Pakistan, UNHCR and WFP, faced populations, as they were in many with huge funding shortfalls for their Civil war cases the only form of education and relief activities for Afghan refugees as The mujahideen’s victory triggered an discipline for refugee boys. The well as robbery and threats from local immediate and massive repatriation. schools were funded largely by ultra- warlords, ended food aid to most Between April and December 1992, an conservative groups in Saudi Arabia refugees living in camps in late 1995. estimated 900,000 Afghans returned and conservative Pashtun religious They based their decision – which was home.6 UNHCR said it was the leaders in Pakistan and southern to have a significant long-term impact "largest and fastest repatriation pro- Afghanistan. They taught Koranic both on refugees in Pakistan and the gramme [ever] assisted by UNHCR." study and sacrifice rather than, for government of Pakistan’s attitude The UN established two programmes example, mathematics or literature. towards their presence – on the to assist returning refugees. In The madrassas proved to be ripe results of a survey that indicated that Pakistan, UNHCR offered refugees who breeding grounds for the Taliban a majority of the refugees were self- turned in their refugee ration cards a movement. Students were taught that sufficient or could become set sum of money to use for their the cure for the factional fighting and self-sufficient if necessary. A year transportation home and for initial lawlessness that had taken over the after the cut-off, however, a subse- survival needs in Afghanistan. In country lay in the creation of a strict quent study found that, far from Afghanistan, the UN created Operation Islamic state. The Taliban began what being self-sufficient, many camp Salam to assist returnees through mine was to be a quick takeover of most of refugees "were living at a marginal clearance, health programmes, rehabili- the region of Kandahar in 1994. level of existence, dependent on inter- 10 tation of the water supply, and basic mittent daily labouring work." education. UNHCR also assisted Most Afghans were at first receptive Afghan refugees repatriating from Iran to the Taliban, as they initially The termination of food aid to camp but on a much smaller scale. brought relative peace and stability to residents prompted the exodus of the war-torn nation. By mid-1995, the tens (perhaps hundreds) of thousands 10 Afghanistan: conflict and displacement 1978 to 2001 FMR 13

of refugees from the camps to led to increased harassment of Conclusion Pakistani cities. The Pakistani authori- Afghan refugees. Police in Pakistan’s ties blamed the increased number of major cities stopped undocumented The crisis that existed before 11 refugees in the cities for Pakistan’s Afghans and deported many who did September was 24 years in the mak- growing social and economic ills. not pay bribes. In June 1999, police ing. The US intervention initially According to one senior government demolished the stalls of a number of compounded the situation, displacing official, the refugees caused "an Afghan traders at a market in hundreds of thousands more civilians increase in crime, drug addiction and Peshawar and assaulted the traders and disrupting relief efforts. However, drug trafficking, and illegal trade. and their Afghan customers. Later the ousting of the Taliban, the inaugu- Local people say that the Afghans that year, local authorities in ration of a new government and the take their jobs and drive up real Baluchistan pushed back across the promise of substantial, long-term estate prices."11 border 300 Afghan asylum seekers international aid have given the and forced thousands of Afghan Afghan people their first spark of UN agencies and international NGOs refugees who had been living in hope in many years. sought to help the displaced popula- Quetta to move to camps.13 tion within Afghanistan but their It is now up to the international com- efforts were often thwarted by wide- Another refugee influx, the largest in munity to ensure that it does not spread fighting and the Taliban’s four years, began in mid-2000. repeat past mistakes that led to the distrust of them. That distrust esca- It followed heavy fighting in northern suffering of Afghan civilians and con- lated when the UN imposed sanctions Afghanistan and the widening effects tributed to a political climate that on the regime in 1999. A year later, an of the worst drought to hit facilitated the work of terrorists. Afghanistan in 30 years. UNHCR the border closure … signalled estimated that more than 172,000 Hiram A Ruiz is Director of Afghans entered Pakistan in 2000. Communications for the US Pakistan’s hardening stance Committee for Refugees. He is In response to this influx and as a author of Pakistan: Afghan assessment of the sanctions’ impact result of frustration with the interna- Refugees Shunned and Scorned by the UN’s Office of the Coordinator tional community, Pakistan closed its (USCR, September 2001), Afghans for Humanitarian Affairs found that border with Afghanistan in November in Crisis (USCR, February 2001) the sanctions "had a tangible negative 2000. Though the border closure was and Left Out in the Cold: The effect ... on the ability of humanitari- largely ineffective in practical terms Perilous Homecoming of Afghan an agencies to render assistance to (the border is porous and border Refugees: (USCR, December 1992). people in the country." The report guards easily bribed), it signalled Email: [email protected] added that many individual Afghans Pakistan’s hardening stance. Pakistani felt victimised by the sanctions, authorities resented what they saw as For statistics on Afghan refugee believing that the UN had "set out to the international community’s aban- movements, see www.refugees.org. harm rather than help Afghans". donment of the region after the Soviet 1 Statistics compiled by UN UNOCHA, Internal withdrawal and its saddling of Displacement in Afghanistan, June 2001. Nevertheless, in December 2000, even Pakistan with more than two million 2 Human Rights Watch (HRW) ‘Crisis of Impunity: as the UN, donor governments and refugees with few prospects for a The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling NGOs struggled to provide humanitar- speedy return home. With hindsight, the Civil War’, New York, July 2001, p3. ian assistance to vulnerable Afghan many in the international community 3 World Refugee Survey 1981, US Committee for civilians, the UN Security Council, recognise that Pakistan’s increasingly Refugees (USCR), Washington. spurred on by the US and Russia, harsh treatment of Afghan refugees in 4 World Refugee Survey 1986. voted to impose additional sanctions recent years can be traced to that on the Taliban. NGOs and UN agencies abandonment. 5 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000, providing humanitarian relief in Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p117. Afghanistan said that additional sanc- Pakistan’s hardened stance toward 6 World Refugee Survey 1994. tions would further strain relations Afghan refugees continued through- 7 British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) between the Taliban and UN agencies out the displacement crisis that ‘Afghanistan Briefing Pack’, January 2001, p5. and NGOs, and could put the lives of followed the start of US military UN and NGO staff at risk or cause action in Afghanistan in October 8 Robert D Kaplan ‘The Taliban’, The Atlantic, September 2000. their withdrawal from Afghanistan, 2001. Like all of Afghanistan’s neigh- crippling relief efforts. UN agencies bours, Pakistan kept its border 9 HRW ‘Crisis of Impunity’, p15.

temporarily withdrew their staff from officially sealed, trapping tens of 10 World Refugee Survey 1997. Afghanistan when the Security thousands of Afghans in places of 12 11 USCR interview with Muhammad Haroon Council approved the sanctions. danger within Afghanistan. Although Shaukat, director general, Ministry of Foreign UNHCR and donor governments Affairs, Islamabad, June 2001. Pakistan: an end to the welcome promised to meet the cost of assisting 12 World Refugee Survey 2001. new refugees, Pakistan continued to In 1999, Pakistan’s growing frustra- fear that the international community 13 Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), UNOCHA, Islamabad, 16 August 2001. tion with the seemingly endless would again soon lose interest and conflict in Afghanistan and with its leave Pakistan struggling to cope with growing Afghan refugee population even more refugees. FMR 13 11 Hope on the brink by Filippo Grandi As a rainy spring – the first after years of drought – ■ harassment of minority Pashtun communities identified (or threat- brings out the blossoms in Afghanistan’s orchards, ened) as "Taliban" in the North and the West, often in the vicinity of many questions remain unanswered about the future camps hosting internally displaced people; and consequent fresh dis- of this battered country. placement of these communities, sometimes all the way to Pakistan; our months after the establish- Even the most cynical Afghanistan this situation has improved, espe- ment of the Interim observers – and there are many - must cially in the West, after central and 1 F Administration, the central admit that the country, in spite of all local authorities took decisive authority and regional power holders its daunting problems, is opening up action, but it needs continued vigi- are still finding a balance and a to the outside world. We should not lance and monitoring. modus vivendi. The most striking fea- forget that for the first time in ture of the situation is perhaps this decades, and despite the dangerous ■ tenuous Interim Administration’s contrast – between the warlords who flare-ups, Afghanistan is not at war control on many parts of the coun- have been fighting since the Soviet with itself. The absence of a gener- try, and an almost complete lack of occupation, bringing to the country alised civil war is perhaps the most resources on the part of the cen- first freedom, and later fragmenta- significant change of all. tral government (only 20% of the tion; and a newly emerging – but still national budget for recurrent costs fledgling – political leadership, keen Fragility and determination can be funded by national rev- to rush Afghanistan rapidly through enues – the rest, for this year, will Two contradictory impulses – politi- the difficult road from ‘failed state’ to depend on foreign aid) ‘normal’ country after 23 years of war. cal/ethnic rivalries and a palpable desire for peace – are both evident on ■ in spite of continued international the ground in Afghanistan. A series of Yet despite this apparent fragility, no attention and commitment to ‘fragility factors’ cloud the prospects one should discount the enormous peace, slow translation of pledges for stability and for the sustainable progress made since the Bonn made at the January reconstruction 2 return of refugees and displaced peo- Accord: the establishment of the conference in Tokyo into concrete ple, including: Interim Administration, the timely financial contribution; and very formation of the Loya Jirga limited recovery activities, espec- ■ tensions and frequent clashes in Commission, the return of the diplo- ially outside Kabul and the main several areas between the regional matic community to Kabul, the cities re-opening of crucial road axes, the political factions; these are confined outbreaks of fighting, which possibility for aid agencies to have The Interim Administration is however can bring a sense of pro- access to increasingly undoubtedly trying – under these dif- found insecurity in a given area: in wider areas of the ficult circumstances, and with very Nimroz province in South-Western country, the presence limited means – to assert its authority Afghanistan, for example, clashes of the International and to promote the principles of the erupted recently between different Security Assistance Bonn Accord: national unity and rec- local groups, which prevented Force (ISAF), albeit onciliation, peaceful solution of UNHCR from going ahead with its only in Kabul, and conflicts, and the rule of law. With or first repatriation convoys from the proliferation (at without the support of the UN, it has Iran in that remote area. least in urban areas) attempted mediation efforts in vari- of businesses and ous places. Chairman Karzai's trips to ■ unwillingness of the international shops. provincial centres have been very suc- community to expand the presence cessful. UNHCR staff in Herat, for of the multinational force (ISAF) example, witnessed a spontaneous beyond Kabul popular welcome when he visited that western city in February, that went far beyond any organised display. It spoke volumes about the Afghans’ Hamid Karzai at wish to recognise themselves in a ceremony to celebrate credible leadership, and about their reopening of Kabul distrust of old divisions. schools, 23 March 2002 Against this background, and within the emerging framework of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNHCR continues to Crown Copyright 12 Hope on the brink FMR 13

make preparations, in partnership to IDP camps, and become IDPs in multinational force be expanded, both with the Ministry of Repatriation of turn. In many parts of the country, geographically and in numbers. the Interim Administration, for what the Afghan authorities are promoting Sometimes – with some notable excep- may be a massive return of Afghans IDP returns, and it is crucial that its tions – even conflicting factions from abroad and from inside the international partners, and particular- request the deployment of interna- country. Since the Ministry of ly UNHCR – the main UN agency for tional forces. With this appeal being Repatriation and UNHCR started facil- Afghan displacement – take on the clearly articulated by Chairman itating voluntary repatriation from role of ‘facilitators’ of such return. Karzai, and echoed by the Special Pakistan on 1 March, some 353,000 Representative of the UN Secretary people have availed themselves of It has been UNHCR’s position in the General, it is becoming difficult for organised assistance. Refugee return last few months to look at displace- Afghans to understand why the ISAF is now facilitated also from Iran. ment in a holistic manner. The causes continues to be limited to Kabul. None Internally displaced people have of flight are similar, whatever the of the reasons invoked for its limited expressed their wish to return in nature of displacement. To shift assis- deployment appears convincing to many parts of Afghanistan. tance towards return requires breaking Afghans. a vicious cycle of which refugees, IDPs, The ‘fragility factors’ described above, trafficked people and illegal migrants The absence of a broader ISAF ham- however; the experience of previous have been one of the most visible and pers efforts to conduct relief and repatriation movements, which could dramatic manifestations. reconstruction activities outside not be sustained because fighting Kabul, especially by bilateral actors – erupted again; and the uncertainty Upholding human rights – especially thus strengthening the ‘pull factor’ regarding the real effect of winter in the context of displacement – is provided by the capital on the popula- snows and rains – on which precise also important for peace and security, tion, and especially on returnees, half data are still missing – have a deter- not only at national but also at region- of whom have so far chosen to return rent effect on many people who al level, given the cross-border ethnic to Kabul. In this context, it is crucial would otherwise return home this links. Earlier this year, UNHCR for that UNHCR and other actors encour- year. Although we at UNHCR are opti- example detected a clear connection age more systematic efforts (not just mistic that repatriation will continue – between the harassment of Pashtun by agencies but by governments with and repatriation is, after all, a vote of people in Northern Afghanistan and power and means) towards the disar- confidence in the future of Afghanistan of non-Pashtun refugees in some mament and reintegration of – many factors can still slow down or areas of Pakistan. The ensuing tension combatants – a Herculean task in interrupt the return flow. in both areas was a clear danger sig- Afghanistan but one which at some nal. Refugee and returnee protection point will be necessary, and towards A population still on the should be projected as a tool for sta- which very, very little has been done move bility as well as an end in itself. in reality so far.

Given the situation on the ground, it The security imperative Another challenge, one which is inti- is perhaps not so surprising to hear mately related to the security of of so many Afghans preparing for an Security and stability are the corner- returns, is that of demining. early return – some of them after stones of any return-and-reconstruction Afghanistan is one of the most mined years in exile. At this early stage, it is process – but, as High Commissioner countries in the world. Thousands of possible that some returnees come Lubbers said during his recent visit to Afghans working for the UN and for back to assess the viability of bringing Afghanistan, the successful reintegra- NGOs are patiently trying to free the their families home but have not yet tion of returnees is also, in turn, a country from this scourge. The committed themselves to repatriation. cornerstone of security and stability. Special Representative of the Secret- However, a large percentage of This is of course well understood by ary-General has termed them the true, returns from Pakistan – and, to a less- everybody, and none better than by untold heroes of Afghanistan. Their er extent, from Iran – are made up of the ordinary Afghans, who have great work needs to be supported. families, and can be presumed to be expectations in this area. intending to stay. Looking ahead The ISAF was created as a part of the The situation of the internally dis- Bonn Accord and entered into force in All this begs the question of how the placed is more fluid, with January 2002. It calls for a multina- UN, and UNHCR in particular, can conflict-related IDPs throughout the tional peacekeeping unit of up to help the process of stabilisation pick country (especially in the North, in the 4,500 soldiers to be deployed in up speed and become irreversible. Central Region, and perhaps soon in Kabul, currently led by the British. This is the pre-condition not only for the East and South) indicating howev- Although the United States is playing the return of refugees but also for the er that they want to return home an ‘observer’ role and has of course a return of wealth – of the skilled soon. Although some IDP situations separate military presence in the Afghans who have been in exile for will not be resolved in the immediate country – which continues the war on years, and of the financial and materi- future, IDP programmes must be re- the remnants of the Taliban and al- al resources that diaspora Afghans oriented towards return, wherever Qa’ida groups – it will not commit could be encouraged to invest in the possible. Lingering and sometimes troops to the multinational force. reconstruction of the country. obsolete IDP situations may become an obstacle to refugee return. Afghan public opinion continues to For the time being, UNHCR enjoys Returning refugees could be attracted demand, sometimes vocally, that the some relative advantages in the FMR 13 Hope on the brink 13

Afghan reconstruction process. It has systematic interventions for urban or Afghanistan, will need to be very cre- a well-organised presence in all major urbanised populations are still very ative and ‘think out of the box’ – for cities and is branching off to a num- limited. example, in terms of recruitment, sec- ber of field locations. This will give it ondments and training. access to better information about This may have another, unwanted areas of return, something that is cru- effect: thousands of returnees, both One thing should be clear, and should cial to help refugees and IDPs make refugees and IDPs, are already opting be made clear. The international com- decisions about their future. Regional for going back to urban centres even munity is in Afghanistan for the long presence will also give UNHCR more if they originate from the countryside; haul, even in terms of repatriation credibility in speaking about the clearly, especially in the case of and return. Obviously, in a country so needs of Afghans. Finally, so far at refugees, this is linked to the fact that rife with arms – in a country where least, UNHCR enjoys support from the they have spent many years working war, as an old Afghan told me, "has authorities, which have recognised the in the cities of Iran and Pakistan, and changed our way of talking to each importance and the urgency of its have become urbanised. But in many other" – improvements will take years task: the return and reintegration of other cases, it is simply the opportu- to be felt by ordinary people. But this refugees and IDPs are a clear priority nities provided by the Afghan cities – has to begin at some point. Now is the in the Interim Administration’s which are totally lacking in the rural time. National Development Plan. areas – that lure people to Kabul, Herat and other major centres. IDP Filippo Grandi is the UNHCR Chief These comparative advantages allow camps in the vicinity of cities risk of Mission for Afghanistan UNHCR to try and look beyond day-to- becoming urban slums. The links day operations to the key features of among displacement, return and The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the the environment to which it is taking urbanisation will have huge implica- United Nations. the heavy responsibility of helping tions for the repatriation programme; people return. UNHCR needs to examine them thor- 1. According to the Bonn Accord, the Afghanistan oughly, together with its partners and Interim Authority "shall consist of an Interim Administration presided over by a Chairman, a Despite whatever pragmatic deals and the Interim Administration. Special Independent Commission for the convening compromises the international agen- of an Emergency Loya Jirga, and a Supreme Court of Afghanistan as well as such other courts as may cies and other external actors may The reintegration process is a huge be established by the Interim Administration." have to continue to make with local task even for a relatively small actor power holders in order to deliver like UNHCR. But because UNHCR is – 2. The full title is the ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-estab- much-needed assistance, all must somehow – at the forefront of interna- lishment of permanent government institutions’ learn to think in terms of support to a tional efforts in Afghanistan; and and it is commonly known as the Bonn Accord. central authority, and to its suitably because its government counterpart, decentralised, but nevertheless struc- the Ministry of Repatriation, is some- tured, provincial branches. This is thing of an ‘emergency ministry’, they made psychologically difficult, partic- have a significant responsibility in ularly for aid agencies, by years of creating good precedents. This con- tension with the Taliban and of ad cerns the agencies’ way of doing hoc, war-time compromises with business in Afghanistan but also – Mujahedin forces. Yet, it is crucial and much more importantly – the that all follow the Interim need to help the Interim Administration’s firm invitation to Administration create a culture for its use aid to enhance the credibility of officials of working with Afghan com- the legitimate authorities, and not to munities, rather than simply for and promote the visibility of respective within their bureaucracy. countries or agencies. And finally, whichever way one looks It is particularly important that a at the situation, it is essential that mental shift takes place. everyone involved in Afghan efforts – Humanitarian assistance for example, including agencies like UNHCR – take especially food, is still necessary in more seriously the imperative that Afghanistan; but it needs to be thor- Afghans must become owners oughly re-examined, and better of the reconstruction targeted to areas of acute need, or to process, and ultimately of areas where it can constitute a pull Afghanistan itself. A factor towards return and stabilisa- huge amount of tion, rather than the opposite. There rhetoric is currently must be a decisive move towards real being piled upon recovery. Free distributions in or near Afghans on this sub- large cities and in IDP camps have ject but too little is become a factor of displacement in happening yet. themselves as desperate city-dwellers UNHCR, and other try to access assistance meant for the agencies as they displaced; in contrast, development establish their assistance provided in rural areas and operations in WFP/Alejandro Chicheri 14 FMR 13 Civil-military relations in Afghanistan compiled by Tim Morris There is a considerable degree of confusion both do not mistake humanitarian agency staff and assets for those of similarly among the humanitarian community and the Afghan dressed non-humanitarian personnel using similar vehicles. The US mili- population over the various military forces present tary, which sets great value on the hearts-and-minds benefits of being in Afghanistan, particularly with regard to their seen to deliver humanitarian assistance, appears unconcerned about respective mandates and humanitarian support/ possible threats to the security of liaison operations. NGO personnel.

The UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator is nlike recent peacekeeping The current situation in Afghanistan sympathetic to the NGOs’ concerns experiences in the Balkans, continues a trend towards growing and is attempting to maintain a clear the civil-military relationship military involvement in humanitarian U separation between the UN humanitar- in Afghanistan is complicated by the provision since the start of the 1990s. ian system and both ISAF and fact that there are two distinct foreign Military operations with humanitarian coalition forces. Unfortunately, UN military forces operating in the country. components have taken place in input to CJCMOTF (and ISAF) humani- Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor tarian planning appears to be weak. The British-led, multinational and elsewhere. This trend has been CJCMOTF’s only regular contact with International Security Assistance watched with concern by NGOs since the UN system is with the UN Joint Force (ISAF) works under UN mandate it raises fundamental questions about Logistics Centre which is staffed pri- in the Kabul area. Its troops operate differences in approach by humanitar- marily by logisticians and is not in uniform. ISAF has a large CIMIC – ian actors and military actors. actively engaged in humanitarian civil and military co-operation – com- assessment or programming activities. ponent and is undertaking relatively The NGO Coordination Meeting con- small-scale humanitarian support pro- vened by the Agency Coordinating It is far from certain that the current jects in and around Kabul. Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) in ‘honeymoon’ period for coalition and March 2002 expressed concern about ISAF forces will continue. The US mili- The US-led coalition force has a pres- the mixed military-humanitarian man- tary itself recognises that its mission ence in several regions of the country, date of coalition forces and the use of in Afghanistan is unlike any other. is conducting offensive military oper- civilian clothing and concealed The fact that coalition forces are ations in pursuit of various wanted weapons by both combatant and engaged in on-going offensive military individuals and is not operating under humanitarian support personnel. operations will undoubtedly compli- a UN mandate. It has a large civil-mili- NGOs operating in Afghanistan are cate its relationship with local tary element (the Combined Joint Civil alarmed about the potential confusion populations, irrespective of how the Military Operations Task Force – CJC- created in the minds of Afghans by ‘carrot’ component of its approach MOTF) that is currently implementing armed coalition soldiers taking part in fares. If the coalition’s relations with a $5m humanitarian support pro- civil affairs operations while dressing local communities take a turn for the gramme throughout the country. and operating similarly to NGO staff. worse, NGOs’ association with those Many coalition forces, including both Civilian-clad personnel not employed forces (whether real or perceived) may those engaged in military operations by the humanitarian community well have significant consequences for and those engaged in humanitarian include not only US and coalition spe- their ability to safely and effectively support activities, operate in civilian cial operations forces but also provide humanitarian and reconstruc- attire and carry weapons. The CJC- personnel from the FBI, CIA and the tion assistance in the months and MOTF has established Coalition US Drug Enforcement Administration. years ahead. Humanitarian Liaison Centres (CHLCs) There is a real fear that humanitarian in several major urban areas around action may be seen as a front for the country. CHLC staff do not wear intelligence gathering by coalition For the majority of NGOs in uniform and carry concealed and/or forces. The presence of non-uni- Afghanistan, the principles of humani- unconcealed weapons. CJCMOTF formed, non-humanitarian personnel ty, independence and impartiality are works closely with the Afghan Interim has led NGOs to review security pro- cornerstones of their programmes. Administration (IA) and USAID (whose cedures and undertake visibility Application of these principles staff occasionally use US military campaigns. Staff, vehicles and facili- ensures acceptance and access to pop- forces for logistical support). ties have had to be marked in an ulations most at risk in circumstances effort to ensure that local populations that would prevent assistance and FMR 13 Civil-military relations in Afghanistan 15

support by other actors. In the past, ■ The military should focus on those understand and acknowledge the NGOs have frequently been able to activities in which they have spe- potential risk to aid workers (aris- negotiate access to civilians on all cific competency: maintaining a ing from confusion between sides of the conflict in Afghanistan secure environment in which military and NGO actors) and com- and carry out vital humanitarian and humanitarian aid can be delivered; municate this understanding down lifesaving work. To support their inde- providing a reassuring security the chain of command. pendence and impartiality, NGOs presence for both the local popula- ■ endeavour not to act as instruments tion and nascent government; Transparency must be maintained of government foreign policy and training a new multi-ethnic and in any military involvement in civil believe that assistance should not be non-political national army; assist- affairs operations. Soldiers (and driven by the political interest of any ing and monitoring local forces in intelligence officers) should in no particular donor. It is important to their efforts to maintain security case claim to be in Afghanistan as reaffirm the principles of The Code of and assisting in the disposal of ‘humanitarian workers’. Conduct for the International Red unexploded ordnance, landmines Cross and Red Crescent Movement and and other armaments. The US military has partially accom- NGOs in Disaster Relief which seek to modated the concerns of the NGO ■ guard the standards of behaviour of If international military forces in community relating to uniforms. Civil NGOs, maintain independence and Afghanistan do go beyond their military troops in Kabul and Mazar maximise the effectiveness and security remit they should focus (but not elsewhere in Afghanistan) are impact to which NGOs aspire. on projects where military engi- now wearing uniforms. neering expertise could be usefully International and national relief and applied in repairing key infrastruc- Tim Morris is one of the Editors of development organisations have long ture. Forced Migration Review. experience and established networks ■ International military forces Material for this article was obtained from a state- in Afghanistan and are generally bet- should act at all times in such a ment released in March 2002 by the NGO ter placed to deliver effective Coordination Meeting convened by ACBAR: The way that a clear distinction is assistance. Usually it is less appropri- Need for a Clear Distinction between Humanitarian maintained between military and Programme and Military Activities in Afghanistan. ate for the military to directly civilian actors. Although the statement was endorsed by many implement humanitarian activities NGOs (members and non-members of ACBAR) it does not necessarily represent the views of all when humanitarian agencies are pre- ■ Military personnel involved in con- organisations working in Afghanistan. Email: sent and capable of delivering ducting civil affairs operations [email protected] services. should be in uniform and clearly Additional material was supplied by George identifiable as soldiers at all times. Devendorf (Director, Emergency Operations, The NGO Coordination Meeting rec- Mercy Corps. The British Army's Parachute Regiment ommended that: ■ Staff at the highest levels of politi- Email: [email protected].) on patrol in Kabul, cal and military authorities should 2002. Crown Copyright 16 FMR 13 Foreign policy considerations in dealing with Afghanistan’s refugees: when security and

protection collide by Joanne van Selm The values of democracy, justice and freedom are 2,000 refugees a day, according to NGO reports. Many slipped across stated goals of the foreign policies of Western states. remote, unmanned border crossings. After initial policy fluctuations, These are the same values that the terrorist attacks Pakistan remained resolute in officially closing border crossings, leading of 11 September challenged. They are also the val- refugees to resort to the use of smug- ues that should inform refugee protection policies. glers to find their way to relative safety in Pakistan. Refugees were n this article I will examine the Council Directive on temporary pro- reportedly paying $50 a head to ways in which foreign policy con- tection in case special protection smugglers – a significant amount of I siderations played a role for arrangements are required within the money for Afghans who have lost Western states and Pakistan in their European Union." The Temporary everything in years of conflict. Iran handling of the potential refugee cri- Protection directive is one of the few similarly acted to limit border cross- sis resulting from the US bombing of agreed since the entry into force of ings, going so far as to deport some Afghanistan and the simultaneous the Amsterdam Treaty and should be 2,000 Afghans during the last months spread of insecurity and unrest within triggered if the Member States consid- of 2001. an already war-ravaged country. er there to be a significant influx into Defence and security concerns will be the EU. Clearly, there was little likeli- The efforts of UNHCR and others to seen to have overridden the obligation hood of such a mass influx of persuade Afghanistan’s neighbours to of refugee protection and to have dri- Afghans even if more people started open their borders were unsuccessful. ven the foreign policies of all the to turn to smugglers. The statement President Musharraf claimed to fear states involved. that the EU was ready to receive the arrival of two million new Afghans was a symbolic foreign policy refugees. Pakistan refused to admit Background statement. Realities on the ground the reported 50,000 Afghans gathered ensured that the suggested use of on the Afghan side of the border in After decades of war, millions of Temporary Protection would not clash the eastern province of Paktia. In the Afghans were already refugees in Iran either with the general tendency to days immediately following 11 and Pakistan in September 2001. For reject Afghan asylum claims or with September the US requested that over a decade (except briefly at the domestic security fears attached to Pakistan keep the borders closed as a height of the Balkan conflicts) the arrival of new Afghan refugees. security measure. Not letting anyone Afghans have topped the list of asy- out confined not just refugees but lum applicants in Europe. In Pakistan Preparations also al-Qa’ida to Afghanistan. While and Iran, the world’s largest recipi- the stance had some military and ents of refugees each with some 2 As UNHCR made plans to house an security logic, it flew in the face of million Afghans, the majority of anticipated 300,000 new refugee human rights concerns. While the ter- refugees have remained in camps. arrivals in Pakistan, it became rorists used covert means to cross the Many of those who have fled have embroiled in difficult negotiations borders and regroup, Afghans were used smugglers in exhausting jour- with the Pakistani government. Camp refused the right to seek asylum neys to Europe or Australia. sites offered by the Pakistanis had abroad and refoulement was implicitly many disadvantages: proximity to the condoned. Many of the men attempt- On 20 September 2001, as part of its Afghan border, unsuitable terrain, ing to cross – while Pakistani guards initial institutional reaction to the ter- lack of fresh water and the strong shot wildly into the air above them – rorist attacks, the European Union’s anti-US sentiments of the local popu- were fleeing conscription by the Council of Ministers (Justice and lation. The actual number of people Taliban, yet were deported straight Home Affairs) requested the European crossing the border, even in the earli- back to Afghanistan. Commission to "examine the scope est weeks of US bombardment, was for provisional application of the much lower than expected: fewer than FMR 13 Foreign policy considerations: when security and protection collide 17

Myriad questions arise: Why did the mately took more than 90,000 the grounds contained in the 1951 security concerns seemingly trump Kosovans to safety abroad and the Convention, or that they were fleeing the protection obligations, even in a Humanitarian Transfer Programme a non-state actor (the Taliban). situation in which the US and its allies which took some 100,000 Kosovans Following 11 September, some wor- knew that al-Qa’ida members could from initial refuge in Macedonia to ried that terrorists might be among easily cross the frontiers without min- (slightly) longer-term refuge in the Afghan asylum seekers. In fact, gling in refugee flows? Why did Albania before their return to Kosovo. however, none of the 19 hijackers nor British Prime Minister Tony Blair Efforts to restore calm to Macedonia’s any of their suspected accomplices pledge to build "a humanitarian coali- political landscape were driven by the appear to have applied for asylum at tion" to match the "political and need to maintain good relations with any point in Europe or North America. military coalition" but did not a nation with NATO bases which respond to the needs of refugees would become key staging points for Was the UN prepared? attempting to flee to Pakistan and post-intervention peacekeeping mis- Iran? Why did the US and its allies sions in Kosovo. In the case of Kosovo, UNHCR was expect Pakistan to shoulder the stung by criticism that it had only refugee burden alone? Why did the In the case of Afghans trapped on the prepared for 100,000 displaced per- countries leading the military and Pakistan border, the few images that sons, whereas a million people political alliance that depended on were televised did not make the crossed the borders of Kosovo in just Pakistani membership and Iranian refugees ‘look just like us’ in the way a matter of weeks. In the case of acquiescence for its viability run the the Kosovan Albanians had. Rather Afghanistan after 11 September, risk of losing support from those than thinking about evacuation pro- UNHCR had established contingency states by not stepping in to accept grammes, those states already plans for 300-400,000 arrivals. refugees? operating regular resettlement pro- In fact, from 11 September to 29 grammes in fact cut their programmes October only some 80,000 people Images from the field significantly in the wake of 11 crossed the borders into Pakistan, September (in the US) and public con- very few of them registering at These questions become particularly cern at the rate of increased UNHCR’s 15 new staging camps to pertinent when contrasted with the spontaneous arrivals of Afghans (in receive international aid. Most blend- different reaction of the same actors Australia). For years European govern- ed into existing camps or simply when 10,000 Kosovan refugees were ments have portrayed Afghan asylum disappeared into the existing Afghan prevented from entering Macedonia in seekers as invalid claimants of society in Pakistan. Some reports sug- April 1999. As images of people refugee status. Of the 150,000 gested that UNHCR was confused trapped in no-man’s land and seeking Afghans who have sought asylum in about which refugees were where, safety on railway tracks were beamed Europe, only 36,000 have been recog- indicating that recommendations on around the world, governments leapt nised as refugees. Denials of refugee registration and management high- into action. Two programmes were status have largely been based on the lighted in the independent Kosovo established: the Humanitarian understanding that the Afghans were evaluation might not have been acted Evacuation Programme which ulti- not fleeing individual persecution on upon. Refugees from Kosovo, 1999. UNHCR/R LeMoyne 18 Foreign policy considerations: when security and protection collide FMR 13

By 6 November, 135,000 had crossed many had left earlier in order to foolish to lose the support of such the frontiers, still less than half return to Afghanistan. states because they were feeling over- UNHCR’s contingency figure. Many burdened by the presence of massive tens of thousands more had been dis- Who risks what? refugee populations and saw the West placed within Afghanistan, leaving the shirking its responsibility of refugee local workers of international agen- In 1999 NATO risked losing the sup- protection. The US and its allies were cies scrambling to use those supplies port of Macedonia for its military not concerned enough to protest at which were on hand and which sur- intervention in order to assist the border closures, nor to advertise vived US bombing. refugees. In the case of Pakistan, how- the consequences to the general pub- ever, the loss of a strategic military lic in the West. Where are the refugees? ally was a risk the West was not pre- In his address to a Joint Session of pared to take. Had the humanitarian In the absence of photogenic images, Congress on 20 September 2001 suffering been so great that Pakistan public pressure for moves to protect President Bush starkly stated: "Every asked for help, the allies might have refugees in Pakistan was lacking. nation, in every region, now has a had to respond. Islamabad, however, Seemingly UNHCR was prepared and decision to make. Either you are with seemed embarrassed at the prospect more or less coping. Whereas us, or you are with the terrorists." It of requesting help, fearing that Macedonia had been urged to open its seems that some states have under- acknowledgement of a crisis could borders in order to prevent human stood being with the US as implying add to domestic instability. General suffering, Pakistan was permitted to that they must avoid being even pas- Musharraf’s regime was caught in a keep its border closed. While the West sively involved in humanitarian crises dilemma. It could not handle a mas- maintained a diplomatic silence on which could be a source of political sive refugee flow nor the added the issue of the closed borders, there embarrassment at a sensitive opposition to its controversial alliance was probably private relief among moment. This misunderstanding can with the US that an enhanced refugee political leaders well aware that in the even lead states (such as Pakistan) to presence would bring. Neither did it eyes of their own public fear of terror- avoid making requests for assistance want to be blamed for a humanitarian ists far outweighed sympathy for in meeting their international obliga- disaster. The solution was to minimal- refugees. tions to protect refugees. We should ly release the tension on the border be wary of accepting the creation of a by allowing through a few people An unnamed UNHCR worker was cited world in which free, democratic and without ever advertising the fact and in a Dutch newspaper as saying: "Why humanitarian states turn their back thus opening the floodgates. The gov- are all these politicians visiting on their principles and reject like- ernment knew that it was not in its Pakistan now? It doesn’t help any- minded people from their societies. interests to let the Pakistani people thing. We are still the only ones who While strategy and defence might know just how many people UNHCR are screaming that the border require sacrifices, the principles of could not account for as they had dis- between Afghanistan and Pakistan access to asylum and non-refoulement appeared into existing camps or gone must be opened, and opened now." are surely too high a price to pay – to live with relatives. While visiting leaders such as Dutch and lead us away from the democrat- Prime Minister Wim Kok claimed that ic, free and just world the war on The US and its allies needed Pakistan, the refugees would cross the border terror claims to be protecting. regardless of its closure if they really Iran and other states bordering Joanne van Selm is Senior Policy needed to, the reality was that few Afghanistan in the initial stages of Analyst at the Migration Policy people were crossing. They clearly their fight against global terrorism. Institute, Researcher in feared the consequences of trying to Driven by geo-political and strategic International Relations at the do so: the uncertainty of their recep- concerns, they could not afford to see University of Amsterdam and tion and the bleak prospect of any friendly or willing ally turn co-editor of the Journal of Refugee returning to refugee camps which against them. It would have been Studies.

1 Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) Brussels, 20 September 2001, SN 3926/6/01 REV 6, paragraph 30

2 Human Rights Watch Closed Door Policy: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan and Iran, Vol 14 No 2 (G), February 2002, http://hrw.org/reports/2002/pakistan/index.htm p23.

3 Ewen MacAskill, Anne Perkins and Richard Norton-Taylor ‘Blair gives aid pledge’, The Guardian, 28 September, 2001.

4 Matthew J Gibney ‘Kosovo and beyond: popular and unpopular refugees’, Forced Migration Review, issue 5, pp28-30.

5 ‘The Kosovo refugee crisis: an independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response’, UNHCR, February 2000.

6 Frank Poorthuis ‘Wel even slikken, de mensen willen de grans over’ (Hard to swallow, the people want to cross the border), De Volkskrant, 29 October 2001 [author’s translation].

Border crossing near Quetta, 2002. Andes Press Agency/Carlos Reyes FMR 13 19 Receiving Afghanistan’s asylum seekers: Australia, the Tampa ‘Crisis’ and refugee protection by William Maley

n 22 January 2002, the announced that the government of the National Party, which made up the Chairman of the government- tiny Pacific nation of Nauru, a state country’s ruling coalition, and the O appointed Council for not party to the 1951 Convention, had opposition Australian Labor Party – Multicultural Australia, Neville Roach, agreed to the processing of asylum and it was left to minor parties, such resigned his position. In a newspaper claims on its soil. Nauru’s agreement as the Australian Democrats and the article three days later, this prominent was secured with a large aid package, Greens, to proffer a more nuanced and highly-respected businessman including payment of the unpaid account of the factors underpinning explained why he had taken such a Australian hospital bills of certain forced migration to Australia. dramatic step, which made headlines Nauruan citizens. Nonetheless, there are a number of right around the country. "If an advis- implications of these events which er", he wrote, "is faced with a Buoyed by the outcome of the Tampa government that has locked itself into Affair and trumpeting the merits of Logo of refugee infor- a position that is completely inflexi- its ‘Pacific solution’ to the problem of mation organisation ble, the opportunity to add value uninvited asylum seekers, the Howard reminding all non- disappears". The asylum seeker con- government was returned to office in indigenous troversy, he went on, "has a general election in November 2001. Australians that they unquestionably done serious damage The government’s nationalistic too are boat people. to Australia’s multicultural fabric". election campaign was dominated by He appeared particularly distressed at denunciations of ‘people smuggling’, the perverse operation of Australia’s assertions that it alone would deter- new ‘Temporary Protection Visa’ mine who could enter Australia, regime for refugees who had arrived uncorroborated insinuations that ‘ter- without documentation, and argued rorists’ might be seeking to enter that "compassion seems to have been Australia by boat in the guise of thrown out the door". refugees, and ministerial allegations (grudgingly retracted after the elec- The context of this blast was the tion) that certain ‘boat people’ had furore which resulted from the so- sought to throw their children into called ‘Tampa Affair’, an episode the sea as a way of engaging deserve to be highlighted as part of which exposed a range of important Australia’s protection obligations the ongoing debates over refugee pro- tensions in the international refugee under international law. Seeking to tection, durable solutions to refugee protection regime. In August 2001 the link itself to the US ‘War on problems and the nature and content Norwegian freighter MV Tampa res- Terrorism’ in the wake of the 11 of state sovereignty. cued a large group of refugees, the September attacks, the government bulk of them of Afghan Hazara origin, even committed Australian ground Domestic politics from a sinking vessel in the waters troops to support the campaign in between Indonesia and Australia. With Afghanistan against Osama Bin One danger is that developed coun- an eye to the opinion polls, the Laden’s al-Qa’ida and the Taliban. tries may seek to use refugee Australian government under Prime The irony of its joining an attack on resettlement as a means of evading Minister John Howard had sought to the Taliban while anathematising their specific refugee protection deny the Tampa permission to enter refugees fleeing from Taliban-domi- responsibilities. Australia ratified the Australian territorial waters, a move nated territories was largely lost on 1951 Convention in 1954 and its 1967 hauntingly reminiscent of the June the Australian public, although not Protocol in 1973. The key obligations 1939 rejection by Cuba of Jewish on all observers. under these instruments relate to refugees on the St Louis, a vessel sub- refugees who arrive in the territory of sequently forced to return to Europe – The difficulties of the situation in a party to the Convention, irrespective the so-called ‘Voyage of the Damned’. Afghanistan and the dire circum- of their means of arrival. The resettle- Fearing for the well-being of the 434 stances which may have prompted ment of refugees from other rescued persons aboard, the Tampa’s asylum seekers to have recourse to territories is a voluntary measure captain sailed into Australian waters the services offered by people smug- which states may undertake but is around Christmas Island only to have glers received scant attention from not an obligation of parties to the his vessel boarded by Australian com- Australia’s mainstream political Convention itself. Yet the Australian mandos. After a standoff, it was parties – the Liberal Party and the government repeatedly sought to 20 Receiving Afghanistan’s asylum seekers: Australia, the Tampa crisis and refugee protection FMR 13

justify its actions by describing those Domestic political considerations can The second observation is that the who arrived with the help of smug- all too easily overwhelm international claim that the ability to control popu- glers as ‘queue jumpers’ who by their obligations when the two appear to lation movements is an essential, actions had compromised Australia’s conflict sharply, and the prospects of sovereign state capacity is ahistorical, ability to help the ‘neediest’ refugees. short-term gains are likely to prove especially if one traces the origins of The claim was spurious on three alluring, even when long-term costs the modern state system to the Peace grounds. may be considerable. The UN High of Westphalia of 1648. Passports and Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud visas are markedly more recent in First, the government was able to Lubbers, warned against this: "Asylum provenance and cannot claim the commit itself to making available the seekers have become a campaign sanctification of use since time same number of notional places to issue in various recent and upcoming immemorial. Just as visa controls UNHCR for refugee resettlement, election battles, with governments were used in the 1930s in an attempt namely 4,000, as in previous years; and opposition parties vying to to block movements of European Jews cuts in the numbers of humanitarian appear toughest on the ‘bogus’ asy- from Germany and other states resettlement visas – cuts driven by lum seekers ‘flooding’ into their threatened by Nazism, so visa con- budgetary priorities but ultimately of countries ... Genuine refugees should trols in more recent years have been a discretionary character – were not not become victims yet again. Surely, used to block Afghans from making made in refugee places. This was there are other ways to win elections." asylum applications in Western coun- scant comfort to Afghans, since an Discussing Australia’s attempts to tries, forcing them to use the services ordinary Afghan’s chance of even exclude ‘boat people’, he pointedly of people smugglers. securing an interview with one of observed that we need to "go for the UNHCR’s overworked protection offi- law and not the law of the jungle". Furthermore, paranoia over ‘people cers in Pakistan was extremely slim, smuggling’, whether at mass or élite but it showed that the claim that ‘boat Sovereignty and paranoia level, can prompt countermeasures people’ were hurting ‘needier’ people which are arguably more degrading was hollow. Cuts came in the so-called Claims of sovereignty can all too easi- for a liberal democracy than any steps Special Humanitarian Programme, for ly be used as a rhetorical device to which smugglers might take. They which applicants require sponsors in minimise the force of international also involve a high degree of Australia but need not be Convention obligations. Here, there are two broad hypocrisy for, as Sir Michael Dummett refugees. observations which are of some has recently argued, the "combination pertinence. of harsh laws to restrict immigration Second, because the Hazaras (a Shiite and the drastic measures to prevent minority which had long experienced Committing one’s state to observe refugees from arriving frequently discrimination and was viciously per- certain norms of international law is means that people fleeing terrifying secuted by the Taliban) were itself a manifestation of sovereign or intolerable conditions have no under-represented in Australia’s capacity. For this reason, Australia’s other way of escaping: the blame for Afghan community, they were particu- responsibilities under the 1951 the existence of these reviled traffick- larly poorly placed to secure Convention (and indeed those of any ers in human beings lies largely with sponsorships and were thus effective- state under any treaty or convention the governments that have erected the ly denied access to the Special which it voluntarily accepts) are not a barriers the traffickers are helping Humanitarian Programme. It is no limitation of its sovereign capacities frightened people to circumvent." wonder that they made up the majori- but rather a reflection of sovereign Australia’s policy of mandatory deten- ty of Afghan boat arrivals and that capacity in action. Nor is it a valid tion for undocumented arrivals has the vast majority were found to be claim that the Convention is not seen refugees from Afghanistan held ‘Convention’ refugees. working in stressful conditions in remote camps (such as the notorious the resettlement programme offered not "a place as it was intended Woomera detention centre, in which in a queue but a ticket in a lottery" in 1951; most Afghans are held) where the the claim temperatures of the surrounding which this desert match the explosive power of argument masks is actually that more the mood of despair which dehumani- Finally, Australia’s ‘offshore’ resettle- people now fall within the definition sation and uncertainty can produce. ment programme was skewed to of refugee in the 1951 Convention match Australia’s interests rather than expected by those states which To deter other refugees from than those of needy refugees (even drafted it. But if this is a problem, it approaching Australia, the govern- using medical screening to exclude is not the fault of the Convention and ment has been prepared to add to the disabled refugees whose conditions still less of refugees: it reflects rather pre-existing traumas of those who do. would be expensive to manage). A the limitations which states, for politi- It is not the least surprising that the Refugee Council of Australia study cal reasons, would like to be able to result has been suicide attempts, concluded that the resettlement pro- set on the ambit of their compassion. hunger strikes, and rampaging by gramme offered not "a place in a "Four or five thousand people a year, those who feel that they are deliber- queue but a ticket in a lottery". It is many of them women and children, ately being treated as the scum of the hardly surprising that people smug- offer no threat to the sovereignty of earth. "What is happening in Woomera gling flourished and actually drove Australia", wrote former Liberal Prime today", argued UNHCR spokesman the proportion of ‘Convention’ Minister Malcolm Fraser in February Kris Janowski in January 2002 as refugees within Australia’s overall 2002. another spate of disturbances made ‘Humanitarian’ Programme to an all- world headlines, "is a very graphic time high. FMR 13 Receiving Afghanistan’s asylum seekers: Australia, the Tampa crisis and refugee protection 21

illustration of how detention can go process which takes years rather than day destroy it." His successors have wrong." months. The assurances given by the forgotten these wise words, if indeed Interim Authority as to the safety of they ever bothered to read them. Delusions returnees are little more than statements of goodwill: the Authority is in William Maley teaches in the Governments may be ludicrously – and no position to guarantee their security. School of Politics, University of in some cases almost criminally – san- And at the moment there is no interna- New South Wales at the Australian guine about the prospect that refugees tional security force in the Hazarajat Defence Force Academy. He is the will be able to return safely to their region from which the bulk of Hazara editor of Fundamentalism Reborn? homelands after only a brief period of refugees originate, and little likelihood Afghanistan and the Taliban temporary protection. In certain strict- that one will be deployed there soon. (Hurst & Co, 2001) and author of ly circumscribed cases, where a The Afghanistan Wars (Palgrave short-term threat to refugees’ well- What all these problems reflect is a Macmillan, 2002). being can be rapidly crushed, rigid way of viewing the world and an Email: [email protected]

temporary protection may be appropri- inability to recognise that human 1 Neville Roach ‘Leadership minus compassion is ate. Can Afghan Hazaras safely return affairs are irreducibly complex. And it tearing us apart’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 to Afghanistan? The Australian govern- stands in stark contrast to the perspec- January 2002. ment suggested just that in January tive of Sir Robert Menzies, founder of 2 Refugee Council of Australia The Size and 2002 but to informed observers the the Liberal Party and Australia’s Composition of the 2000-2001 Humanitarian Program: Views from the Community Sector, Refugee claim was as insensitive as would have longest serving Prime Minister. In 1949, Council of Australia, 2000, p53.

been a suggestion in May 1945 that the Menzies led the opposition in 3 See Ruud Lubbers ‘Don’t kick refugees just to time was ripe for German Jews to be Parliament to the removal of a wartime score points: Politicians who demonise asylum seek- returned to Germany. There is no refugee. Policy in this area, Menzies ers are playing with people’s lives’, The Australian, 20 June 2001; Refugees, vol 4, no 125, p31. doubt that, with the fall of the Taliban argued, "must be applied by a sensible and the installation on 22 December of administration, neither rigid nor 4 Malcolm Fraser ‘Inhumane mood betrays the gold- en rule’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 February Afghanistan’s new Interim Authority, peremptory but wise, exercising judg- 2002.

the country has turned an important ment on individual cases, always 5 Michael Dummett On Immigration and Refugees, corner. Its prospects are brighter now remembering the basic principle but Routlege, 2001, p44.

than for almost two decades. There is, always understanding that harsh 6 BBC World Television News, 29 January 2002. however, a world of difference between administration never yet improved any 7 Commonwealth of Australia House of the commencement of a transition law but only impaired it, and that noto- Representatives Hansard, 9 February 1949, p68. process and the final institutionalisa- riously harsh administration raises up tion of new political structures, a to any law hostilities that may some UNHCR/C Shirley 22 FMR 13 Afghan refugees in Europe by A-R Faquiri The tragedy of 11 September became a turning point be considered eligible for deportation. In late December, when the Taliban in the history of a country thousands of kilometres regime had lost power, the immigration authorities asked the Dutch away from New York, a nation with no direct involve- cabinet and parliament to approve the ment in what had happened to the Twin Towers. cessation of normal adjudication procedures relating to Afghan asylum fghanistan deserved recogni- this Islamic state would offer the claims. It was agreed to freeze deci- tion for its role in the fall of Afghan people only anarchy, corrup- sions on new and existing claims and A the repressive Soviet empire. tion and repression. Unfortunately allow the Immigration Service a period Instead, it became the biggest produc- Jehadi groups surround the Interim of up to a year to make decisions. er of drugs in the world and the Authority installed by the UN in centre of command and training for Kabul. Their presence leaves little According to the new Dutch Law on Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. The space for independent technocrats to Foreigners, an asylum seeker’s claim Taliban acted more as the Afghan do their jobs properly. Even in the should be assessed within six months branch of al-Qa’ida than the govern- capital, Kabul, there is only peace in of the application being lodged. If, ment of Afghanistan. The reluctance daylight. At night, when the foreign after acceptance, they have been legal- of the Taliban leadership to hand over peacekeeping troops go back to their ly in the Netherlands for three years, Bin Laden and his lieutenants to the bases, misuse of power, repression and if their country of origin is not US government reflected the subordi- and criminality rule in the city. safe for their return at the end of that nate position of the Taliban to three-year period, they should be al-Qa’ida. The first victim of this state Such fundamentalist parties as granted permanent residence. of affairs was the population of Jamiat-I-Islami of ex-president Rabani Afghans who would have become Afghanistan. and the Etehad-I-Islami of Professor eligible for this kind of permanent resi- Saiaf are preparing themselves for a dence if their claims had been handled there is only peace in daylight gradual cleansing of the liberal mem- and accepted during the period since bers of the Karzai administration. October 2001 are now being asked to The defeat of the Taliban and the dis- This cleansing has already started wait an unspecified period of time for mantling of al-Qa’ida have been with the killing of Abdul Rahman, the granting of their legal rights. achieved, more or less, in Minister for Aviation, at Kabul airport Afghanistan. However, another kind in February 2002. The Dutch Ministry of Justice seems of Islamic fundamentalism has to hope that at the end of this period Many Afghans who have travelled to returned to power. The so-called the situation in Afghanistan will be Afghanistan since the fall of the Mujahed groups, driven from power sufficiently safe to enable Afghans’ Taliban have already returned once by the Taliban, have come back to try asylum applications to be rejected. more to Europe, demotivated after to re-establish their ideal Islamic It is hard to believe, however, that the searching for an opportunity to take state. The experience of the period security problems of Afghanistan will part in their country’s reconstruction. between 1992 and 1996 shows that be solved so speedily. The lives of Some returnees have been killed or thousands of Afghan refugees might abducted. Despite the still uncertain be at risk if they were sent back. The situation, immigration authorities in Secretary of State for Justice, Ella various European countries have start- Kalsbeek, has said that she is developed to talk about voluntary and even ing policy on the return of Afghans forced return of Afghan refugees to and hinted that later forced returns Afghanistan. The British Home might take place. Mrs Kalsbeek’s Secretary has called on Afghan words have greatly alarmed Afghan refugees in the UK to return to take refugees. part in reconstruction. Other countries have already taken measures to In the Netherlands, as elsewhere in contain the growth of the number of Europe, Afghan refugees and asylum Afghan refugees. seekers fear for their prospects. It is hard to say whether there will be a The Dutch authorities appear keen to future for those returning from exile. remove the 30,000 Afghan refugees Let us hope that European leaders will and asylum seekers in the carefully study the situation on the Netherlands. In October 2001 the ground in Afghanistan before judging Dutch Immigration Service stopped whether it is safe for Afghan asylum making decisions on Afghan asylum seekers to return. applications in order to prevent the issuance of residence documents to A-R Faquiri is Vice-Chairman of Afghans who, some weeks later, might the Federation of Afghan Refugees in Europe (FAROE). US Committee for Refugees FMR 13 23 Afghanistan and the challenges of humanitarian action in time of war by Roberta Cohen ICRC/Franco Pagetti

In Afghanistan, unlike in most other humanitarian Tensions between refugee ICRC depot near and IDP protection Kabul airport. emergencies, the international community’s focus, in When the US military campaign the wake of the events of 11 September, was on began, UN agencies predicted that between one to two million Afghans those at risk inside the country. would flee the country and become refugees. It did not happen. his was a welcome change, departure, no more than 200,000 peo- Neighbouring countries closed their sharply contrasting with the ple were able to flee the country from borders and the Taliban blocked mass international response in 7 October until the end of the year. T movements, especially of young men. Kosovo or Rwanda where the lion’s This closing of the refugee steam Only people with the physical share of international aid and atten- valve had the effect of shifting atten- strength and resources to hire trucks tion went to those fleeing the country, tion to the people inside. Third and or donkeys, cross difficult mountain while those left inside basically most decisive, the US and its Western passes and bribe border guards man- remained unaided and unprotected allies made humanitarian aid to those aged to get out – a total of 200,000, until the war was over. inside the country a substantial com- mostly to Pakistan. The result was ponent of their military-political that the number of IDPs within Three major reasons accounted for strategy, in an effort to demonstrate Afghanistan soared from 1.15 million this shift. To begin with, there was an that the war on terrorism was not a prior to 11 September to up to 2 mil- enormous humanitarian crisis loom- war against Islam or against the peo- lion. Large numbers of these IDPs ing inside the country that could not ple of Afghanistan. be overlooked – up to 6 million peo- risked starvation in camps and settle- ple were at risk of starvation. ments where there was little or no Although the threat of famine predat- But protecting and assisting people food or medicine, where conditions ed 11 September, the departure of inside Afghanistan was to be no easy were unsanitary, and where people international humanitarian staff prior task. The political will was not always had to dig holes in the ground for to the US bombing made the situation there, international mechanisms were shelter. Armed elements, too, entered more urgent. Second, the massive not in place, and there were clashes IDP camps, where young men were refugee flows that had been predicted among the actors, which resulted in forcibly conscripted and violence was in response to the US bombing cam- uneasy compromises that at times reported, especially against women. paign did not materialise. With the undermined the overall result. A brief As one international aid official sealing of the Pakistani and Iranian look at some of the challenges should observed: "People who can’t leave the borders, and Taliban restrictions on prove instructive. country are … much worse off than 24 Afghanistan: the challenges of humanitarian action in times of war FMR 13

those at refugee camps outside considered until after the war was Either the Srebrenica trauma was Afghanistan … The number of inter- over, UNHCR being encouraged raised to discourage this idea or it nally displaced persons, or IDPs, who instead to ‘go back to basics’ and was pointed out that malnourished are facing death must have already focus primarily on refugee protection. people would be in danger if they reached 1.1 million." 1 moved into unsanitary camps and Accordingly, throughout the entire contracted disease. But hundreds of While UNHCR attended to the needs period of the war, UNHCR stuck close thousands did just that, moving into of refugees, there was no operational to its mandate and provided protec- camps in different parts of the coun- locus of activity for the IDPs. A range tion and assistance mainly to try even though they were largely of international organisations, the refugees. To its credit, UNHCR did unaided and unprotected there. What, World Food Programme (WFP), the authorise the trucking of some need- after all, did anyone expect Afghans International Committee of the Red ed supplies into the overcrowded and to do when food supplies ran out at Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, the desperate IDP camps near the home, bombs began falling and fight- International Organisation for Pakistan and Iranian borders but it ing intensified? According to one Migration (IOM) and a number of declined to work directly in these military specialist, each safe area NGOs, did their utmost from outside camps or set up new ones. It cited would have required 1,000 to 3,000 the country to bring food and medi- both security concerns and the fear troops to assure adequate protection, cines to those inside Afghanistan that such involvement could impede and a number of countries might have despite the bombing campaign and refugee flows. Nor did it assume a helped.2 But neither safe areas nor the war on the ground. Local staff and strong advocacy role for these or other comparable ideas were given NGOs valiantly worked with them, dis- other IDPs despite the protection serious consideration. Had the war tributing relief supplies when they problems reported in the camps. not ended so quickly, this peremptory could to those at risk of starvation Stung by criticism of too much overall dismissal of safe havens could well and disease. But overall, as in so involvement with IDPs, faulted for have condemned many Afghans to being ill-prepared death. the internally displaced had no champion during the Kosovo emergency (when Now more than ever, comprehensive on the ground. refugees needed strategies are needed to protect and attention), and influ- assist both the refugees and IDPs who many other humanitarian crises, there enced by those at headquarters who are beginning to return home. Given was no centralised or comprehensive supported a more narrow focus, the inter-ethnic conflicts in the coun- monitoring of IDP conditions, assess- UNHCR staff insisted that the best try, possible reprisal acts and overall ment of their needs, or development protection for those at risk inside insecurity, UNHCR because of its pro- of strategies for protecting and assist- Afghanistan was ‘open borders’. tection mandate should be ing them. In short, the internally encouraged to play the central role in displaced had no champion on the But ‘open borders’ was hardly a prac- the return process both for refugees ground, especially in the area of pro- tical solution at a time when all six and IDPs. In neighbouring Tajikistan, tection. neighbouring governments were from 1993 to 1995, UNHCR played adamantly keeping their borders the lead role in accompanying return- The explanation lies at UN headquar- closed on security grounds and the US ing IDPs and refugees to their home ters. Following debilitating turf battles largely supported the closure. To be areas, monitoring conditions in these among humanitarian agencies in sure, Pakistan at times acceded to areas, advocating with local authori- 2001, the UN Secretary-General reaf- pressure and allowed in ‘vulnerable’ ties and groups on their behalf where firmed, at the behest of donor cases but basically it made quite clear there was harassment or other human governments and many agencies, that that it could not absorb more Afghan rights abuse, even helping them go to no one agency would be in charge of refugees. Both it and Iran already court in property dispute cases. Such IDPs. Although UNHCR had been pro- housed nearly four million Afghans engagement should take place in posed as a suitable candidate to from earlier times and feared the Afghanistan as well. Unfortunately (as assume this global responsibility, it international community would pack of time of writing – mid March), the was decided instead that the Office up, as it did when the Soviets with- UN has not yet decided to assign for the Coordination of Humanitarian drew, and once again leave them with UNHCR overall responsibility for the Affairs (OCHA), the UN’s officially enormous refugee populations to care return of refugees and IDPs. The designated coordinator of relief, for on their own. returnees, moreover, are being would remain the UN’s focal point on provided with food, clothing and build- IDPs. To help it perform more effec- Pressing for open borders against all ing materials but the protection of their tively, the Secretary-General approved odds, as most refugee and human physical safety and human rights is not the creation of a special IDP Unit. But rights advocates did, also had the being given the attention it warrants. this new Unit was not to come into effect of diminishing the energy that being until January 2002, well after should have been directed toward What is needed is the deployment of the Afghan emergency began. Given developing strategies to try to protect UNHCR protection staff in areas of the vacuum of responsibility and the the physical safety of the millions return supported by field staff of the fact that neither OCHA nor its Unit trapped inside. Remarkably little Office of the UN High Commissioner was operational, UNHCR requested attention, for example, was paid to for Human Rights, and the formation authorisation to assume a ‘lead’ oper- the possibility of creating safe areas of ‘protection working groups’ so that ational role in Afghanistan for in different parts of the country to different international organisations, refugees, IDPs and other war-affected protect IDPs and other affected popu- NGOs, civil society, and the new gov- populations. But the request was not lations, as the Taliban withdrew. ernment can be brought together on a FMR 13 Afghanistan: the challenges of humanitarian action in times of war 25

regular basis to examine protection remote areas of the country over a workers had to leave Afghanistan, problems and design strategies to try two-month period. when local staff were being harassed, to address them. and most overland convoys could not For much of the humanitarian com- get through, the airdrop constituted The uneasy military/human- munity, however, this ‘dropping of one of the few alternatives available itarian relationship food and dropping of bombs at the to reach isolated areas. To a hungry same time’ constituted heresy. Major person in Afghanistan, moreover, it Many in the humanitarian world argue aid agencies countered that humani- could have hardly mattered whether that a clear separation of roles should tarian action must be neutral, the meal came from a civilian or mili- be maintained in emergencies impartial and non-political, and ‘led tary source. The humanitarian between humanitarian actors and mil- by civilians for civilians’. Unless community’s orthodox insistence itary forces, especially when the sharply delineated from military oper- upon the civilian character of aid had forces are belligerents in the conflict. ations, the independence and the effect of putting it into the But for the United States, in its war in credibility of the aid would be com- unseemly position of begrudging food Afghanistan, military and humanitari- promised. Of course, the dropping of to people in areas of widespread mal- an goals basically converged. To make food packets from 20,000 feet with- nutrition. more palatable its military campaign out monitoring their distribution to against al-Qa’ida and its Taliban sup- the needy was hardly a strategy that Humanitarian and security interests… porters, the US sought to win the humanitarians could be expected to ‘hearts and minds’ of the people of sign onto. It was risky – it could in many instances converge. Afghanistan and of the Islamic world attract people to a site where they initially by airlifting food packets into would be unprotected or where the The same reservations about the mili- the country to stave off impending food could be diverted. And it only tary’s role surfaced in the Kosovo starvation. It was a public relations provided one meal, or less than 1% of crisis. By its own admission, the ploy but it resulted in 2.5 million the estimated overall food needs. But humanitarian community was unpre- readymade meals being dropped into at a time when all international relief pared to provide adequate shelter for the hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into Macedonia and Albania. Yet it experienced great discomfort when NATO stepped in to build the refugee camps, set up the needed tents and provide camp security. The relief community argued that NATO’s action would undermine UNHCR’s claim to impartiality and neutrality, make the camps into military targets and jeopardise relationships with the Belgrade authorities.

These are legitimate concerns but maintaining the complete independence of humanitarian action in all circumstances is probably not possible and in some cases could prove perilous to the populations the international community is trying to protect. A more realistic approach would be to create at the outset of each emergency a framework to foster better communication between humanitarian and military actors. A post-conflict evaluation commissioned by UNHCR acknowledges that the agency might have been better prepared had it engaged in joint contingency planning with NATO.3 Humanitarian and security interests, after all, in many instances converge. Joint planning and strategising could go a long way toward ensuring that the humanitarian consequences of military strategy are more easily anticipated and better dealt with by both parties; and in particular, that there is coordination between air strikes and food deliveries so that Panos/Martin Adler 26 Afghanistan: the challenges of humanitarian action in times of war FMR 13

supply convoys and routes can be protected and the military alerted to famine areas where food must get through.

In Afghanistan, such collaboration did take place, especially when the Taliban began to be routed. Joint air- lifts of food were planned, although in the end they were not needed. Relief agencies, led by WFP, with Western military and political support, aggressively managed to position millions of metric tons of food in the countries surrounding Afghanistan and then to truck it into the country and thereby largely avert the widespread famine predicted.

But the Afghanistan crisis also revealed the dangers of too much cooperation between humanitarian and military actors. The joint pro- nouncement in January by WFP and the US government that they had averted famine in the country seemed largely designed to prove that the US bombing campaign had not brought on starvation; rather the US and its partner, WFP, had saved the Afghan people.4 To be sure, WFP’s work deserves commendation but the assessment was overly optimistic and pointed up the danger when governments conducting military operations are the main funders of the relief operation. At the time of the announcement, serious food security

and protection problems still plagued Andes Press Agency/Carlos Reyes the country: about 100 internally dis- governmental groups and UN officials itary’s dropping of cluster bombs, placed children and elderly people Camp for IDPs expressed opposition to the daily many of which reportedly remain were reported to be dying each day near Mazar-e- bombing and called for a ‘pause’ to unexploded and pose a threat to the Sharif, 2002. from starvation and exposure outside enable food to be delivered. Others civilian Afghan population, is another Herat;5 little or no food was reaching drew attention to the number of civil- sore point being examined by human the people in and around Kandahar; ian casualties. The US of course had a rights organisations, which consider in Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif, local serious interest in avoiding civilian such weapons to be an illegitimate warlords were stealing the food des- casualties and tried hard to confine use of force. tined for the hungry; and in other its attacks to military targets. But the areas pockets of the country remained casualties nonetheless mounted. inaccessible to aid agencies and mal- Debate over an International Whereas some put the total in the nutrition was reported on the rise. For Security Force hundreds, others claimed it to be in the US Committee for Refugees, Save the thousands. Public and private the Children and other aid agencies, The need for a multinational security protests, however, diminished sub- the humanitarian crisis remained force to protect relief supplies, relief stantially when victory was rapid and quite ‘acute’. If famine had been avert- workers and civilians became appar- it became clear that so many Afghans ed, they countered, it was for "two ent when Taliban rule collapsed and welcomed the overthrow of the months – no more".6 large parts of Afghanistan succumbed Taliban regime. Nonetheless, subse- to banditry and lawlessness. In the quent erroneous bombing and land absence of a government, army, police Another area of controversy between attacks by US forces against innocent force or judicial system, armed the humanitarian community and the civilians pointed up the need for con- groups, sometimes aligned with military was the bombing campaign tinued monitoring by human rights Northern Alliance warlords or retreat- itself. Although most accepted the and humanitarian groups of military ing Taliban, took over critical supply fact that the US had to respond with actions with a view to pressing the routes, attacked aid convoys, sacked force to the attack on the World Trade military to investigate the incidents and occupied aid offices and ware- Centre and the Pentagon, some non- and take greater precautions. The mil- houses, harassed and beat up relief FMR 13 Afghanistan: the challenges of humanitarian action in times of war 27

workers and engaged in inter-faction- expansion into other areas was post- courage in their efforts to ensure that al fighting. Indeed, in mid-December, poned and no more than 4,500 troops starvation and disease did not over- international relief agencies could not could be deployed. The result was come large numbers of people inside safely distribute much of the food continued lack of security throughout the country. The US military joined in they had positioned in Afghanistan large parts of the country, including this effort, having a distinct interest and neighbouring countries to feed the roads leading into Kabul. Food in showing that its campaign was not millions of hungry people. and supplies could not reach many against the Afghan people. But the international focus on providing food, medicine and shelter was not Security and protection of civilians remain the most matched by any comparable initiative to provide security and safety to critical problems confronting post-war Afghanistan. those trapped inside. Even as the war came to an end, the long delay in set- If the military and humanitarian goals areas, refugees and internally dis- ting up an international security force of the US converged at different times placed persons were hesitating to and the limited mandate given to it during the Afghan campaign, when it return home, and large-scale recon- demonstrated once again that the came to creating an international struction and development could be now accepted international responsi- security force to facilitate food deliv- planned but not carried out. bility to avert starvation still does not eries and protect Afghan civilians this extend to protecting the physical safe- convergence came to an end. The The deployment of a more effective ty and human rights of people inside Pentagon actively blocked the creation international force would lend author- their national borders. Yet the future of an effective international force on ity to the new central government by direction of Afghanistan will be deter- the grounds that it would distract enabling it to rule the entire country mined largely by how the inter- from its overall military purpose of while a national army and police are national community deals with this defeating Osama bin Laden and al- created, deter criminal elements now protection gap. It remains one of the Qa’ida. Paralysed by the trauma of emboldened by the absence of mili- most serious shortfalls in internation- Somalia, the US also argued that inter- tary presence, and show the al efforts to address humanitarian national troops would become targets seriousness of the international com- crises. of attack with US forces compelled to munity in bringing stability to come to their rescue, resulting in Afghanistan. Such a force clearly is Roberta Cohen is Co-Director of casualties. needed to guard key roads, bridges the Brookings Institution-CUNY and warehouses throughout the coun- Project on Internal Displacement This fear of becoming bogged down try; accompany and protect relief and co-author of Masses in Flight: in ‘nation building’ led Defence convoys and humanitarian workers; The Global Crisis of Internal Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to down- defend civilians in major cities from Displacement (Brookings, 1998). play the deteriorating humanitarian indiscriminate and unwarranted She wishes to acknowledge with and security situation in the country, attacks; deter inter-factional fighting; appreciation the research assis- likening the "fighting and lawless- and create the environment necessary tance provided by Marianne ness" in Afghanistan to the situation for the return of millions of internally Makar. "in some American cities as well".7 displaced persons and refugees. Email: [email protected] Because the US relied heavily on the Northern Alliance to do most of the At the end of January, Afghanistan’s 1 ‘Hunger, winter biggest threats to Afghans’, The Daily Yomiuri, Tokyo, 11 October 2001. fighting, it further minimised the fact new President publicly appealed to that much of the looting and threats the UN for an expanded international 2 Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution Press to aid workers took place in areas security force and indicated that the Briefing, 12 October 2001. controlled by Alliance forces. For government and a lot of Afghan peo- 3 The Kosovo Refugee Crisis, UNHCR Evaluation their part, members of the Northern ple supported the expansion. UN and Policy Analysis Unit, February 2002, para. 554.

Alliance opposed the stationing of officials and aid agencies expressed 4 ‘Massive Food Delivery Averts Afghan Famine’, large numbers of foreign troops in similar sentiments. So far, however, Washington Post, 31 December 2001. Afghanistan, fearing their authority the political will does not appear to 5 ‘Refugees Left in the Cold’, The Guardian, 3 would be undercut. They proposed exist to meet this call, largely because January 2002. instead an all-Afghan security force of opposition by senior US Defence but clearly it could not be assembled Department officials. 6 US Committee for Refugees, Press Release, 7 January 2002. in time; nor could the inter-factional rivalries obstructing its formation be Conclusion 7 ‘Managing a War of Pressure and Patience’, Washington Post, 16 December 2001. overcome quickly enough. Security and protection of civilians The UN-authorised international force remain the most critical problems that did come into being in January confronting post-war Afghanistan. No (the International Security Assistance amount of food or supplies can sub- Force) was neither large enough nor stitute for addressing this basic need. with a broad enough mandate to be To be sure, during the emergency, effective. Confined to Kabul, the capi- international agencies, non-govern- tal, to protect the newly formed mental groups and local staff government, consideration of any displayed remarkable energy and 28 FMR 13 Reinvigorating resettlement: changing realities demand changed approaches by John Fredriksson The events of 11 September 2001 had unexpected grammes: case identification, needs assessment, identity validation, eligi- repercussions for refugees in far away places. Most bility determination and processing, transportation and passage, and even- dramatic of all was the refocusing of international tual integration in the country of reception. attention on the plight of the Afghan people. The policy of resettlement, however, ith a new interim govern- What is resettlement? has three core functions, all linked to ment in place, over 3.5 UNHCR’s protection mandate and the W million Afghan refugees in Resettlement means many different obligations of states in this area: Iran and Pakistan now have hope that things to different people. To some, it ■ they may be able to return and is a narrow and limited activity to provide international protection rebuild their homes and communities. reserved for the most dramatic cases and meet the needs of refugees of human rights violations and whose life, liberty, health, safety or Other refugees, however, have once severely traumatised persons. To oth- other fundamental human rights again had their lives put on hold. The ers, resettlement is an inherent right are at risk ■ lucky few who had secured a place on of individuals who seek protection (ie to be a durable solution to the the limited resettlement programmes you are a refugee, ergo you should be plight of refugees ■ of Western states saw their futures resettled). to be an instrument of internation- endangered as airline flights on and al responsibility sharing after 11 September were cancelled Resettlement is part of the protection and diverted. The US shut down its mandate of UNHCR. UNHCR is man- Thus, while resettlement is part of the programme (by far the world’s dated to provide international global migration phenomena, its dis- largest) soon after 11 September, protection to refugees when govern- tinct features and characteristics are stranding over 22,000 refugees who ments fail and individuals and anchored in the international refugee had already been approved for entry. families are at risk. UNHCR is charged regime and human rights law, setting The US resettlement programme has to seek durable solutions to the plight it apart from all other facets of inter- come under intense scrutiny, just as of refugees, either through voluntary national migration. increased security measures and bor- return when conditions permit, local der enforcement efforts have also integration in the host country, or In terms of the refugee regime broad- further restricted access to asylum. resettlement in a third country. But ly viewed, the dichotomy between the This was in fact the only US migration unlike the prohibition against refoule- refugee as an individual – with spe- programme completely shut down for ment in the 1951 Refugee Convention, cific personal and legal issues that months as visas for business trav- or the right to seek and enjoy asylum need to be adjudicated by competent ellers, tourists, students and other enumerated in the 1948 Universal national authorities – and groups of legal immigrants continued to be Declaration of Human Rights, resettle- refugees – who may collectively issued. By the end of December 2001, ment is a discretionary and voluntary exhibit characteristics requiring action fewer than 800 refugees had arrived activity on the part of states, despite by the international community to in the US, out of a projected 14,000 being a core protection activity for ensure their protection and long-term for the quarter of the ‘resettlement UNHCR. Herein lies the central conun- survival – is central to the debate over year’ starting in October. In 2002 drum. How do you harmonise the the role of resettlement as a response resettlement to the US will probably desirability of protecting refugees to refugee crises and its usefulness as fall below 45,000 admissions, the low- through resettlement with the desire a durable solution tool. est in more than 23 years. of states to manage migration through programmes to admit certain Background to resettlement Resettlement had fallen during the categories of migrants such as skilled 1990s out of favour in many states. In labourers and family immigrants? Resettlement cannot be understood the aftermath of the tragic events of today without reference to UNHCR’s 11 September, it may prove to be one Operationally, resettlement is defined role in relocating close to two million of the most useful tools in the protec- by several sequential stages which refugees from Vietnam, Laos and tion kit. mirror other state-run migration pro- Cambodia to the US, Canada, FMR 13 Reinvigorating resettlement: changing realities demand changed approaches 29

asylum systems in the developed world are perceived to be under attack by smuggling and trafficking networks, and abused by economic migrants posing as refugees. Since many refugees have few options but to join in the irregular and often dangerous underside of international migration streams, they are often doubly victimised and tarred as ‘illegal immigrants’. Ruud Lubbers has reinvigorated the international debate about protection and durable solutions in this wider context of international migration.

The inherent order in the resettlement process could be attractive to states concerned about the often unpre- dictable character of refugee movements. Resettlement is by definition an orderly mechanism of processing and moving refugees from a chaotic and hazardous situation to a place of safety and security in the country of resettlement. With increased emphasis on security, identity checks

UNHCR/A Hollmann and screening for fraud since the Repatriation to events of 11 September, resettlement Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Resettlement was articulated by the Burma in the late could become an effective tool for France and other European countries. organisation as a tool in international 1990s. states who want to participate in an In 1979, at the peak of refugee out- protection, particularly for specific international protection response and flows in the region, resettlement was cases such as those involving security help refugees attain a solution. the only viable option for 1 in 20 of concerns, special health needs, vic- the world’s five million refugees. By tims of torture and severe forms of However, there is a danger that reset- 1992, the end of large-scale resettle- trauma, and at-risk-women. tlement could be used as a quid pro ment from South East Asia offered an quo to condone states’ efforts to fur- opportunity for the international com- This narrow focus resulted in fewer ther restrict access to asylum. In other munity to redefine resettlement policy refugees being identified as in need words, the international refugee pro- and practice. for resettlement, with resettlement tection regime could become totally countries conversely dependent on states’ discretion to focusing their efforts the ‘solution’ pendulum swung from decide who should be resettled, and on other groups inde- the right to seek and enjoy asylum pendent of UNHCR. resettlement to repatriation. could be eviscerated. Asylum and At the same time, the resettlement need to be seen as fun- From the perspective of resettlement ‘solution’ pendulum swung from damentally part and parcel of the countries, two parallel trends resettlement to repatriation, to the same international refugee protection emerged. Some countries substantially extent that policy documents began to regime administered and overseen by decreased their resettlement quotas, refer to repatriation as the "happiest" the UNHCR. While resettlement is a citing ‘compassion fatigue’ and bud- of durable solutions while resettle- discretionary response on the part of getary constraints. Others returned to ment was the "least desirable". The states, asylum, as a corollary to the the previous practice of focusing on question remains: in whose eyes was principle of non-refoulement, is a right specific ethnic groups, religious it the "happiest" solution – refugees, under human rights law. Asylum, like minorities and other categories of per- individual states or the international- resettlement, addresses the individual sons of specific concern to special community, including UNHCR?1 need of the refugee for protection. interest groups within the country of Unlike resettlement, however, asylum resettlement. Resettlement in the wider is not discretionary and should not be migration context subject to the vagaries of each state For UNHCR, the post-South East Asia and their selection criteria beyond refocusing has had both positive and In the absence of durable solutions those enumerated in the Convention negative effects. While resettlement such as widespread managed resettle- (ie exclusion clauses). policy became closely linked to the ment programmes, refugees, facing refugee protection mandate, the pro- ever more secure borders and restrict- Does resettlement have something to gramme shrank considerably and ed access to asylum, often resort to offer in a brave new world of man- narrowed its global reach. smugglers and traffickers. As a result, aged migration? The answer is a 30 Reinvigorating resettlement: changing realities demand changed approaches FMR 13

qualified yes, as long as there is and criteria for this type of resettle- sations and bureaucracies. This lack agreement about what managed ment activity, which are now virtually of attention has had unfortunate out- migration means.2 Managed migration absent from the UNHCR Resettlement comes. UNHCR itself has been rocked is not reduced migration but rather a Handbook. A reinvigorated debate by a scandal of fraud and corruption process by which a state may seek to about the role of resettlement for in the Nairobi branch office, involving control as well as regulate the orderly durable solution purposes is also UNHCR staff extorting bribes from admission of immigrants. There is timely in many states. The challenge refugees seeking to be put on the nothing inherently wrong with states laid out in early 2001 by then British resettlement list. UNHCR has proac- viewing resettlement within this larger Home Minister Jack Straw to substan- tively addressed the deficiencies in context, as long as resettlement is tially increase resettlement capacity in the resettlement operation in Kenya, equally framed within the internation- Europe needs to be taken up by policy beginning long before the release of a al system of refugee protection. makers. UN investigative report. Measures Resettlement can also serve to allevi- undertaken include strengthening ate refugee suffering by functioning Two models staff resources, designing new over- as an instrument of international sight mechanisms and instituting case responsibility sharing, through In answering the policy question of management and quality assurance UNHCR’s commonly agreed policies, when resettlement becomes appropri- procedures. Could similar measures criteria and procedures. ate as a durable solution (as distinct be taken on a global basis, to ensure from a short-term need to rescue that resettlement processing in other New dimensions to existing refugees for emergency protection rea- sites is not vulnerable to this type of tools sons), there are two potential models. corruption? Particularly in light of new and heightened security con- Just as the end of the South East One model could be based on the cerns, resettlement processing must Asian refugee programme gave length of time a refugee spends in be done to the highest standards and UNHCR an opportunity to anchor limbo awaiting a more definite future, professionalism in order to ensure resettlement in the protection man- though care should be taken not to integrity in the process and not date so today, in the aftermath of 11 arbitrarily set pre-determined time undermine the will to use resettle- September, there is a window of frames, as each refugee situation is ment as a protection measure. opportunity to redefine resettlement unique. However, a formula-based It is often said that resettlement is as a mechanism to achieve durable approach can be designed, factoring very staff intensive. It is true that any solutions for many more refugees. in both the length of time and the process that entails assessment of likelihood and feasibility need, case identification, validation of The time is ripe to discard the notion that of a repatriation agree- identity and adjudication of status ment. This formula could, requires an adequate level of staff and there is a hierarchy of durable solutions. for example, be weighted operational resources. At the same so that if a refugee has time, many of the activities commonly The task ahead is threefold. First, a been in a situation of linked to resettlement, such as needs policy should be developed on the uncertainty for only a short time, the assessment, refugee registration, case role of resettlement as a vehicle to decision on turning to resettlement management and individual coun- help refugees attain a durable solu- can be deferred even if a repatriation selling, are necessary and helpful for tion. Second, international programme seems relatively unlikely all other facets of refugee assistance resettlement procedures need to be at that point. Conversely, the longer a and protection activities at the field revised, enhanced and resourced. refugee has been in limbo, the more level. Most importantly, they are Finally, a strong political initiative resettlement should be the presumed essential elements in the design of should be launched to increase sub- solution unless a repatriation pro- strategies for repatriation and local stantially the number of resettlement gramme is imminent. integration, helping refugees make quotas offered by states, particularly informed decisions When refugee reg- members of the European Union and Another policy model could articulate istration and assessments are done in other developed nations. the process by which, while respecting the exclusive context of resettlement, the principle of an individualised they become onerous, difficult to UNHCR and its key partners in reset- refugee status determination, the implement and, in some cases, subject tlement should define clearly what it resettlement need would be defined to fraud and corruption. means to do resettlement, not only on a group basis. Identifying a prede- for the relatively few in need of legal termined refugee group, based on For UNHCR, the role and function of protection but also for the refugees political, protection, ethnic make-up resettlement within the organisation who have languished for years in or other demographic characteristics, needs to be examined and strength- refugee camps or lived in limbo in would in turn facilitate the identifica- ened. If resettlement is to become many of the world’s urban centres. tion of needs as well as the more important and involve many The time is ripe to discard the notion operational requirements at field more states as partners, more staff that there is a hierarchy of durable level. and resources will be required. solutions, ie dubbing some as ‘pre- Furthermore, the way resettlement is ferred’ and others as ‘undesirable’. A renewed architecture managed should be reviewed, in order Developing a clear policy on the to strengthen management account- intrinsic link between resettlement Since the days of the South East Asian ability, focusing on outcomes and and the need for durable solutions programme, resettlement has been a results. A review and reform of man- will result in operational guidelines low priority activity for many organi- agement practices (including FMR 13 Reinvigorating resettlement: changing realities 31 recruitment of specialised staff, train- suggesting a ratio of 1 refugee per years in miserable camps and unten- ing and career development, and 1,000 inhabitants. So far, the response able situations breeds discontent, centralisation of oversight on policy by many governments has been victimises the vulnerable and opens and practice) is necessary, both for muted or silent. Using this formula, the door for criminal elements to UNHCR and concerned states. the US would have a target of about abuse and take advantage of refugees, Harmonising policies and practices 271,000 refugees per year: a 387% further eroding public support. between UNHCR and states is needed increase on their 2002 target. For Investments in self-reliance projects, to create a coherent global system Germany, it would mean a resettle- micro-enterprise, refugee education and, most importantly, set in motion ment programme of 83,000. and vocational training all rely on a transparent programme that would good registration and case manage- facilitate resettlement operations at Realistically, the European Union ment systems. Resettlement then truly the field level. When resettlement is states could commit themselves to becomes a do-able option, an impor- global and applied consistently, and increase resettlement quotas over tant but not exclusive item in the criteria for eligibility are transparent, time to 100,000 per year. Canada and menu of solutions that refugees need the ‘magnet’ effect of resettlement Australia could each return to their in order to regain hope for the future. that many fear would be lessened. In annual levels of 20,000 of the early John Frederiksson is the Co- other words, for refugees, if your 1990s, and the US to similar historic ordinator for External Relations at chances to be resettled are the same – levels of 130,000 per year. Though the Washington regional office of assuming the same level of need – much smaller in absolute numbers, UNHCR. whether you are in Bangkok, Dadaab there has already been good progress Email: [email protected] or Moscow, there would be no reason in increasing the number of countries to shop around for the best process- interested in offering resettlement, The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ing site. including Chile, Brazil, Benin, Burkina United Nations. Faso and Iceland.3 1 See for example General Conclusion on A renewed commitment International Protection (No. 79 (XLVII)-1996), More important than numbers and The Executive Committee, UNHCR Geneva, and the If resettlement is to become a realistic quotas, however, is the need for states Resettlement Handbook; April 1998, Division of International Protection, UNHCR, Geneva. solution for refugees, the number of to support the resettlement option as 2 Rt Hon Jack Straw MP ‘An Effective Protection participating countries and the quotas part of a broader commitment to Regime for the Twenty-first Century’, speech offered have to increase significantly. achieve durable solutions for before the Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 6 February 2001. Available from The Developed states will need to con- refugees. The infrastructure of reset- Guardian Newspaper Limited, 2001 website. tribute more financial resources to tlement does not stand alone. 3 Progress was made in this regard at the 25-27 enable UNHCR to fulfill its mission. Renewed attention is needed on April 2001 International Conference on the Reception and Integration of Resettled Refugees: High Commissioner Lubbers has also refugee registration, caseload identifi- Norrköping, Sweden. See ICRIRR: Principles, challenged developed nations to cation and durable solutions for www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home? page=search. increase efforts at burden sharing refugees in protracted situations. through larger resettlement quotas, Warehousing refugees for years and

Resettlement: the only chance for long-term security? by Marta Bivand and Ceri Oeppen

UNHCR supports a variety of durable solutions for the Afghan refugees in India. For all the Afghan families we met in New Delhi, however, resettlement was their preferred option. For many, the lack of legal and economic security in India combined with the continuing instability in Afghanistan leaves them no other viable solution. Farishta, for example, worries about her children’s future: "In Afghanistan there are no human rights and children cannot go to school. Life is dangerous in Afghanistan. But life is dangerous in India too, and my children cannot go to school here either because we haven’t got money for the fees. I would like my family to resettle in Canada." For others, their desire to resettle overseas is reinforced by the fact that they already have family members living in North America, Europe and Australia. Masood’s family told us that to their knowledge they have no remaining family in Afghanistan but that they are in contact with family members in the US and Canada.

Ibrahim’s family came to New Delhi from Kabul in 1990. Originally he thought they would only be in India for a couple of months until things calmed down in Afghanistan. It did not take long before they too started thinking of resettlement. On the 6 August 2001 the family received a letter from the US embassy in New Delhi granting them resettlement in Richmond in the US. After eleven years of uncertainty, they started planning for their future. Ibrahim’s four teenage daughters were particularly excited, and looked forward to pursuing their education and developing careers. But they also admitted they would be sad to leave India, and especially sad to leave friends they had made there. On the morning of 11 September Ibrahim and his family boarded their flight to Washington DC. While they were in the air, events in New York unfolded and their flight was re-routed to Canada.

Ibrahim and his family were among the last Afghans to be resettled in the US. Yet many Afghans in New Delhi still see resettlement as their only realistic opportunity for long-term security. Staying in India remains only a temporary solution, while many are unconvinced that they will be able to return to Afghanistan. What remains unclear is whether there will be any further opportunities for resettlement.

Marta Bivand and Ceri Oeppen are Third Year Undergraduates in the Department of Geography at University College London. They spent August 2001 in New Delhi conducting research with Afghan refugees for their undergraduate dissertations. Email: [email protected]; [email protected].

* All names have been changed. 32 FMR 13

Exclusion, terrorism and the Refugee Convention by Monette Zard CICR/Till Mayer CICR/Till

In the aftermath of 11 September, governments level (including, in countries such as the UK and the US, the prospect of around the world have turned their attention to indefinite detention of non nationals suspected of terrorist activity which combating the threat of global terrorism. potentially pose a number of problems for refugees and asylum he feeling of vulnerability taking measures which are necessary seekers). engendered by the attacks and to protect citizens and institutions. T the perception that the hijack- The Exclusion Clauses ers exploited open and liberal Recent months have seen an increas- societies to commit their heinous acts ing tendency to link refugees and Far from being a cloak behind which have intensified an already restrictive asylum seekers with acts of terrorism. the perpetrators of terror can hide, climate for refugees and asylum seek- UN Security Council Resolution 1373 international refugee law explicitly ers, justified in the name of security. (adopted on 28 September 2001), the excludes from protection those who Although no refugees or asylum seek- foundation of the international com- have violated the human rights of others were among the 19 hijackers, the munity’s response to the terrorism ers or committed other serious attacks have fuelled public percep- threat in the aftermath of 11 crimes. Nazi genocide and war crimes tions of refugees as criminals and September, twice makes explicit refer- were fresh in the minds of those gov- undesirable elements in society. The ence to the need to safeguard the ernments that drafted the new irony, as Ruud Lubbers has pointed system of international refugee pro- framework of human rights and out, is that it is the refugee who is tection from abuse by terrorists.1 refugee law in the immediate post-war often the first victim of persecution While its inclusion of the need to years, including the 1951 Convention and terror. A difficult challenge lies abide by international standards of Relating to the Status of Refugees, ahead for both governments and the human rights law is welcome, it never- and they felt that such ‘undeserving’ advocates who monitor them – pre- theless reinforces the perception that cases should be prevented from serving the rights and values that lie the institution of asylum is somehow claiming refugee status. The at the heart of democratic societies a terrorist’s refuge. It has in turn gen- Convention thus contains the so- (of which the principle of asylum is a erated a wave of new and restrictive called exclusion clauses – Article 1F – cornerstone) while at the same time laws and regulations at a national which placed anyone who had com- FMR 13 Exclusion, terrorism and the Refugee Convention 33 mitted such crimes outside the pro- to exclude is taken and the substan- are, similarly Tamils and the LTTE, tection of the international refugee tive grounds on which refugees may Kashmiris and the struggle against regime. The exclusion clauses note be excluded from international pro- Indian Occupation, etc."4 that the provisions of the 1951 tection need to be addressed in such a Refugee Convention "shall not apply way that the rights of refugees are In the US, the Uniting and to any person with respect to whom respected. Strengthening America By Providing there are serious reasons for Appropriate Tools Required to considering that: ‘one man’s terrorist is another Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (otherwise known at the USA-PATRIOT a) he has committed a man’s freedom fighter’. Act) (H.R. 3162) similarly expands the crime against peace, a scope of terrorism-related activity and war crime, or a crime against includes material support for humani- humanity, as defined in the Expanding the grounds for tarian projects of groups that are international instruments exclusion: the definition of listed on the Secretary of State’s list drawn up to make provision terrorism of designated terrorist organisations. in respect of such crimes; More troubling still, the USA-PATRIOT b) he has committed a serious As has often been stated, ‘one man’s Act also allows for the detention and non-political crime outside the terrorist is another man’s freedom deportation of non citizens who pro- country of refuge prior to his fighter’. While the international com- vide lawful assistance to groups that admission to that country as a munity was united in its are not officially designated as terror- refugee; condemnation of the events of 11 ist organisations. The onus is then c) he has been guilty of acts September as the worst form of ter- rather perversely placed on the immi- contrary to the purposes and rorism, its aftermath has seen the grant to prove that he did not know principles of the United re-ignition of the debate as to what and should not have known that his Nations." precisely constitutes terrorism. There assistance would further terrorist is no internationally accepted defini- activity. The latter is particularly 2 Ignored for many years, the exclusion tion of this term and it is, not problematic given the breadth of the clauses were catapulted to the fore- surprisingly, a central sticking point definition of terrorist activity that is front of the international agenda in negotiations on a Comprehensive employed by the Act. As advocates when the 1994 Great Lakes crisis Convention on International have cautioned, such activity can now illustrated the dire consequences of Terrorism. The UN currently has include the use of a weapon, or "other failing to pay due regard to the appli- twelve Conventions which address dangerous device", to cause "substan- 5 cation of the exclusion clauses. The such different forms of terrorist tial damage to property", thus perception that international protec- threat as airline and maritime safety, potentially including acts of civil dis- tion was being provided to the use of plastic explosives, the safe- obedience which are a hallmark of genocidaires and that humanitarian ty of diplomatic personnel and the activist organisations such as assistance was being manipulated to taking of hostages. This international Greenpeace and anti-globalisation sustain the war machine of the intera- lacuna means that legislation that has protestors. hamwe (Hutu militia) called into been adopted at the national level, question the integrity of the entire particularly in the aftermath of 11 Terrorism within the system of refugee protection. September, has tended to employ Refugee Convention broad and far-reaching definitions of Governments and UNHCR are legiti- terrorism. Such measures create the Terrorism as such is also not explicit- mately concerned to ensure that the potential for bona fide refugees to ly mentioned in the Refugee international refugee system is not find themselves unable to access Convention. Nevertheless, under arti- abused by terrorists, a concern which international refugee protection. cle 1F(a), terrorists could find is in the long-term interest of bona themselves excluded because there fide refugees and asylum seekers. It is The UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and are serious reasons to consider that a important, however, that the exclu- Security Act of 2001 for instance, "crime against humanity" has been sion clauses do not become another extends the definition of terrorist to committed (certainly the acts of 11 avenue by which states deny access to all those who have "links" with an September rise to that level). They international protection by widening international terrorist group (section may also fall foul of article 1F(c) the grounds on which refugees may 21(2)(c)). Links are defined as existing which excludes the granting of inter- be excluded and narrowing their pro- if such a person "supports or assists" national protection to those who may cedural rights. Exclusion is the most such a group (s 21(4)). The ambiguity have committed acts contrary to the extreme sanction of international of such terminology holds open the purposes and principles of the UN. refugee law and entails the removal of possibility that asylum seekers may Given the potential breadth of this protection against refoulement to a find themselves labelled as terrorist provision (which mentions "acts" and 3 country of persecution. It is thus on account of their political, ethnic or not "crimes"), UNHCR has consistently vital that the exclusion clauses are religious affiliations or ties. As one advised that it be restrictively inter- restrictively interpreted and resorted commentator has noted, "… the con- preted. The adoption in November to only where there is clear and com- temporary definition of terrorism or 2002 of Security Council Resolution pelling evidence of individual threat to national security can mean 1377, which notes that acts of inter- responsibility for a serious crime everything or nothing… it may mean national terrorism are contrary to the specified under the exclusion clauses. that a Kurd is sympathetic to the PKK purposes and principles of the UN Both the process by which a decision in Turkey: many if not most Kurds Charter, is likely to lead to a 34 Exclusion, terrorism and the Refugee Convention FMR 13

significant expansion in the use of all relevant factors which should be their security interests are reconciled this clause to exclude refugees integral to any exclusion decision". with the interests of those fleeing per- accused of terrorism. In the aftermath of 11 September, this secution and terror. Fifty years of trend (bypassing status determination refugee law and a proud tradition of The exclusion clause which has tradi- once exclusion is alleged) is likely to providing asylum to those in need tionally been of most relevance in the intensify. Recent legislation in the UK should not be bypassed or short cir- battle against terrorism is Article precludes substantive consideration cuited by responses to the events of 1F(b) which bars from the protection of asylum claims where the Secretary 11 September. of international refugee law those of State certifies that the removal of who have committed serious non- the appellant would be conducive to Monette Zard is a Policy Analyst political crimes outside the country of the ‘public good’ and that either at the Migration Policy Institute, asylum. This provision mirrors one in Article 1F or Article 33(2) (the expul- Washington. Article 14 (2) of the Universal sion provisions of the 1951 Email: mzard@migration Declaration of Human Rights and is Convention) are applicable. The policy.org intended to ensure that extraditable removal of someone without ever hav- criminals do not escape prosecution ing considered their asylum claim is 1 This follows a line of earlier resolutions, most notably a 1996 Resolution by the General by claiming refugee status. contrary to both the letter and the Assembly on Measures to Eliminate International Interpreting and applying this provi- spirit of the 1951 Convention. In the Terrorism and its annex, a Declaration to sion is one of the most complex US, there are similar concerns regard- Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism A/Res/51/210 of challenges facing decision makers ing the practice of utilising statutory 17 December 1996 found at www.un.org/docu- today. A central objective of the bars to prevent persons suspected of ments/ga/res/51/a51r210.htm.

Refugee Convention after all is to pro- membership in organisations desig- 2 UNHCR first issued public guidelines on the vide protection to those persecuted nated as terrorist organisations from application of the exclusion clauses in 1996 (The on account of their political activities even applying for protection as a Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on their Application, UNHCR, Geneva, December 1996). and terrorists frequently assert a refugee. The process of designating political motivation for their crimes. groups as terrorist organisations is 3 It is important to note, however, that the prohi- In determining whether an offence is more often driven by political and for- bition on refoulement contained in the Convention Against Torture applies without exception. ‘political’ and therefore exempt from eign policy considerations than by exclusion, or a crime which renders concern with the humanitarian issues 4 Memorandum Submitted by Nicholas Blake QC to the Select Committee on Home Affairs of the its author undeserving of protection that should underpin any asylum House of Commons, 15 November 2001 at para 13. as a refugee, decision makers are claim. www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/ pa/cm/200102/cmselect/cmh../351ap04.ht

Fifty years of refugee law and a proud tradition of providing 5 Of particular relevance in this discussion is Section 411 of USA-PATRIOT Act, amending section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality asylum to those in need should not be bypassed. Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3))

asked to walk a fine – but critical – Such measures come dangerously 6 See Summary Conclusions of Lisbon Expert Roundtable of 3-4 May 2001, 30 May 2001 line. Central to their ability to do so close to attributing guilt purely on the EC/GC/01/2track/1. fairly and effectively is that they con- basis of association and are clearly at sider all the elements of a case – odds with the necessarily individual 7 Report on Article 1F Exclusion Clauses, Standing Committee of the UNHCR Executive Committee, including the grounds for inclusion as character of the exclusion procedure. June 1998, Section C, para 15(i). well the grounds for exclusion. A A proper application of the exclusion comprehensive examination of all the clauses calls for an examination of an 8 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 14 December 2001 - Article 33(1) circumstances of an asylum claim asylum seeker’s activities within an www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/10024--e.htm. allows the decision maker to place organisation and his/her objective 9 T v SSDH, (1996) 2 All ER 865, (1996) 2 WLR any allegations of criminal conduct role in the commission of excludable 766, House of Lords, 22 May 1996. and accusations of terrorism in full acts. As the UK House of Lords stated, context. This approach was most a person may not be excluded from 10 Interpretations of the Article 1F by UNHCR, commentators and the practice of most States indi- recently reaffirmed by the Global the Convention merely because s/he cate that mere membership of a group or Consultations process, which asserted or his or her acts, have been labelled organisation will not be sufficient basis on which the need for a holistic approach to the "terrorist"; it is required that there be to exclude a person except in exceptional circumstances. However UNHCR does hold open the 6 application of the exclusion clauses. serious reasons for considering that possibility that in a small number of cases where he or she has committed an exclud- "the purposes, activities and methods of some groups or terrorist organisations are of a particu- Short-circuiting refugee law able crime under Article 1F. larly violent and notorious nature," membership – where it is voluntary – may be sufficient. UNHCR Nevertheless, even prior to 11 In conclusion, while it is important to Guidelines (December 1996), at para 47. September, UNHCR found itself hav- acknowledge that States have a legiti- ing to warn states looking for a fast mate security interest in ensuring that track to curtail the consideration of terrorists and other criminals do not asylum claims against the practice of take advantage of the system of inter- "employing exclusion as a test of national protection, it is vital that any admissibility". It noted that this was measures taken do not undermine the inconsistent with the exceptional very system itself. The 1951 nature of exclusion clauses and risked Convention provides States with the "prejudicing the careful weighing of tools through which to ensure that FMR 13 35 Screening in mass influxes: the challenge of exclusion and separation by Bonaventure Rutinwa

t is now beyond contention that, mandate or responsibility is it to look because refugee status could only be in situations of composite popula- after separated persons? lost under the five Convention I tion flows, persons not deserving grounds which do not include covert international protection should be Drawing on comparative experience return home. Thus refugees who excluded from refugee status and from Africa, this article highlights return to their country of origin and those likely to jeopardise protection how the above issues have previously then come back (even if they went as must be separated from ordinary been dealt with and proposes sugges- combatants) remain of concern to refugees.1 Some suggest that a con- tions on how to resolve dilemmas of UNHCR as refugees. sensus is emerging in refugee separation and exclusion in situations jurisprudence as to which persons of mass influx. Exclusion and separation should be liable to separation.2 procedures Legal and factual circum- Afghanistan, however, has highlighted stances for exclusion/ In situations of mass influx, the usual a host of legal and practical difficul- separation procedure for determination of ties. The number of Afghans who refugee status is group determination attempted to cross borders during The provisions of refugee instruments on a prima facie basis. Effectively, a Operation Enduring Freedom may not applicable in Africa are fairly clear as state recognises refugee status on the have reached the proportions which to which persons are excluded from basis of the readily apparent, objec- many expected. Nevertheless, the refugee status.3 Nevertheless, actual tive circumstances in the country of prospect of a mass influx once again cases of individuals who have been origin giving rise to exodus. Its pur- raised the question of how to separate excluded, particularly those who are pose is to ensure admission to safety ordinary civilians from persons who, alleged combatants, have aroused and to enable timely delivery of assis- under refugee law, do not deserve controversy and highlighted concep- tance to asylum seekers. international protection. In the con- tual difficulties. text of Afghanistan, these included However, group recognition of refugee members of al-Qa’ida who master- The arrest in November 2000 in status has a number of disadvantages. minded or executed the terrorist Tanzania of two Burundian refugees, It is difficult to exclude criminal and activities that triggered the war and found in possession of weapons and other elements who do not deserve their Taliban hosts and facilitators. allegedly engaged in military activities international protection. Drastic gov- Now that many Taliban and al-Qa’ida in Burundi, is a case in point. UNHCR ernment actions to avoid hosting combatants have fled Afghanistan, pondered the legal implications in criminal elements among refugees several countries may have to judge order to determine whether they were have had serious consequences for what kind of involvement in Taliban refugees or even persons of concern asylum seekers. An example is provid- administration or al-Qa’ida activities to the agency. One view was that com- ed by the decision in 1997 of the might warrant exclusion from refugee batants cannot be refugees, that an Central African Republic to bar entry status. individual who actively and willingly to all Rwandese asylum seekers in participates in armed conflict does order to prevent the entry of alleged While the need to separate has not been a prominent feature of reports weeding out the undeserving armed elements from civilian from the region, certain pertinent questions need to be raised, as rele- refugees has proved to be extremely risky vant to future discussion on this subject as to the current situation. not fall within the scope of the obliga- genocidaires. In-country UNHCR staff What conduct or attributes would tions under which refugees are members and Geneva colleagues warrant separation or exclusion? Is protected. When this individual is debated how to distinguish and membership, past or present, of al- found on the territory of a non-bel- separate bona fide refugees from Qa’ida sufficient to warrant exclusion ligerent, neutral state, s/he should not those meriting exclusion. The CAR or separation? How is separation or be treated according to refugee law authorities only relented after UNHCR exclusion to be carried out in situa- standards. The other view was that undertook to provide sufficient tions of mass influx? What is to be the mere fact that refugees returned human and material resources to done with those asylum seekers who to fight in their country of origin does screen genuine refugees from criminal have been excluded/separated? Whose not make them lose refugee status elements. 36 Screening in mass influxes: the challenge of exclusion and separation FMR 13

Mechanics of What follows after exclu- for which they were separated consti- separation/exclusion sion/separation? tute a threat to national security or public order. However, even when the The application of a prima facie Those excluded from refugee status activities of separated persons meet approach to admission of asylum and of no concern to UNHCR can in the threshold of threat to national secu- seekers has meant that where separa- theory be required to leave the territo- rity, they cannot, under human rights tion and exclusion are deemed ry of the host state. Often, however, law, be sent back to their countries of necessary they have had to take place this is impossible due to the risk of origin if they still face the possibility of after the targeted elements were persecution and torture which face persecution or torture. Unless a third already intermingled with genuine them in their home countries. The country is prepared to accept them – refugees in settlements. At this stage, fact of their exclusion denies them which is highly unlikely – then the host weeding out the undeserving armed any chance of being accepted for country has no choice but to allow elements from civilian refugees has resettlement by any third state. In them to remain on its territory. proved to be extremely risky. A case these circumstances, what can host in point was the attempt to exclude governments do? A second alternative for the separa- armed elements from the large tees is to intern them, a path chosen Rwandan refugee population in One option is to expel separated and by Tanzania in 1996 when it estab- Eastern Zaire in 1994. Although it was excluded refugees under article 32 of lished a detention facility at Mwisa, in noted that the presence of armed the 1951 Convention if the activities Kagera region. Mwisa was intended to militia represented the greatest threat for the refugees, it was also acknowl- edged that separating them from other refugees would be a complex task and require the use of force. Various military options proposed by the UN Secretary General were rejected by the Security Council and those countries who had been asked to provide troops. This compelled the Secretary General to request UNHCR to provide security. It was on this basis that the Zairean Camp Security Contingent was established in February 1995 to provide security to refugees without separating them from undeserving elements.

The possibility of resistance to separation is likely to occur, even where the specific factors that obtained in eastern Zaire (collusion by local authorities and negation of protection principles) do not exist. This became evident in 1996 when the Tanzanian government attempted to transport alleged criminals to the Rwandan border. Special riot police and the army had to be brought in to quell refugee riots. When the government wanted to take to Dar es Salaam a refugee leader for whom resettlement in another country had been arranged, refugees suspected he was about to be impris- oned or sent to Rwanda. They threatened violence until the government allowed witnesses to accompany him to Dar es Salaam to see him onto a plane bound for the country of resettlement. These incidents show that separation of refugees, even where legitimate, is a sensitive exercise requiring careful handling.

Rwandan refugees, DRC, 1997 UNHCR/C Bowers FMR 13 Screening in mass influxes: the challenge of exclusion and separation 37

host those guilty of intimidation: which they accepted refugee status can be screened and, if they are found Rwandan refugees who were coercing and were transferred to a refugee not to be refugees, they can be or otherwise dissuading their fellow settlement. excluded. In exceptional cases, such refugees from returning to Rwanda. as previous indictment by an interna- After the mass repatriation of Whenever external agencies such as tional tribunal, exclusion could be December 1996, the facility was used ICRC and UNHCR wash their hands of considered immediately. to host those Rwandans who said that any category of asylum seekers, the burden naturally falls on the host The internment of separated persons the detention of separated persons country to take care of them. Such, must be consistent with principles of however, is the unfair burden facing refugee and human rights law. In par- raises a number of issues countries such as Pakistan should ticular, the restrictions imposed on they arrest and detain Taliban and al- the separatees, including those related they feared for their lives if they Qa’ida militants. to freedom of movement, must be returned to Rwanda. Since the pas- proportionate to the preservation of sage of the Refugees Act in 1998, Conclusion and recommen- the humanitarian character of asylum Mwisa has become the place for dations as a peaceful and friendly act, the pre- detention of combatants in addition vention of subversion and to asylum seekers and refugees. While exclusion and separation are demilitarisation of refugee camps, 5 appropriate tools for addressing prob- and the safe location of refugees. In Tanzania the detention of separat- lems of mixed flows of asylum ed persons raises a number of issues. seekers, there are added difficulties The international community should As separation effectively results in when states of asylum attempt to provide military and financial assis- restriction of movement and resi- screen in order to apply the exclusion tance to countries like Pakistan which dence, is it compatible with principles clauses. Despite the apparently clear- need to carry out separation exercis- of international law requiring that cut provisions of relevant inter- es. The burden of looking after such restrictions should be imposed national instruments, liability to separated persons should not be left only when necessary and that the con- exclusion in individual cases is not solely to host countries. If it is accept- ditions imposed should be always obvious. ed that it is necessary to separate proportionate to the problem being non-bona fide refugees, responsibility addressed? Should mere possession We need to address difficulties in a for looking after the separated should of arms be sufficient reason to war- way which recognises the concerns of be shared by all those with responsi- rant detention without trial? How long host countries and is compatible with bility for refugee protection. This is should the detention be? Section 27 of principles of asylum. Regarding not simply a question of mandate or the Refugees Act provides that the ex-Taliban and al-Qa’ida militants, even morality. It is one of functional detention period should be three I would argue that the mere fact of necessity. months but allows renewal of deten- former membership should not be a tion under the provisions of the sufficient reason for immediate exclu- Bonaventure Rutinwa is a Senior Preventive Detention Act of 1963. sion or even separation, provided that Lecturer, Faculty of Law, How many times can detention be the asylum seeker is prepared to University of Dar es Salaam, extended? renounce terrorism and war, lay down Tanzania. any arms and become a ‘normal’ Email: [email protected] Who is responsible for the refugee. We need to endorse recommendations which emerged from a 1 For various recommendations to this effect see separated? B Rutinwa ‘Refugee Protection and Security in East UNHCR-convened seminar in February Africa’, Refugee Participation Network, September Where separation has occurred, ques- 2001: 1996, pp11-14.

tions about mandate and respons- 2 See C Beyani ‘International Legal Criteria for the ibility arise. Authorities can disagree Persons who previously were Separation of Members of Armed Forces, Armed over the status of the persons sepa- members of military organisations Bands and Militia from Refugees in the Territories of Host States’, International Journal of Refugee rated. This happened in 1997 when a are not excluded from seeking Law, Vol 12, Special Supplementary Issue 2000, group of Mai Mai fighters from Zaire asylum and protection as refuges. pp251-271. arrived in Tanzania. Instead of asking [But] before considering the asy- 3 See the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status for asylum, the soldiers wanted to lum applications of such of Refugees, Article 1F and the 1969 OAU retain their combatant status. The persons/groups, a reasonable Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Article I(5). International Committee of the Red period of time should be allowed Cross concluded that they were not to elapse, the purpose of which 4 Overview of Key Conclusions/Recommendations combatants for the purposes of inter- would be to establish that the of the UNHCR Regional Symposium on Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of national humanitarian law of armed persons have completely Asylum, Refugee Status, Camps and other conflict and therefore they were not renounced military activities and Locations, 26-27 February 2001, Pretoria, South persons of concern to the Red Cross. have no intention of resuming the Africa, para 14(b). 4 UNHCR would not deal with them as war. 5 C Beyani Op. Cit., p265. long as they claimed combatant status and expressed a desire to go back and In situations of mass influx all per- fight. As a result, the government of sons who arrive at borders and seek Tanzania had to keep them in a foot- asylum should be admitted as prima ball stadium for almost a year after facie refugees. Thereafter individuals 38 FMR 13 What does it take to rebuild a state? by Paula R Newberg This question, raised countless times in the post- American-led campaign that is premised on cooperation with motley World War II, post-colonial and post-cold war military commanders and leftover politicians, people whose stake in periods, is taking new shape in Afghanistan today retaining power contrasts sharply with the vision of a democratic, repre- especially among donor states and international sentative government that drives the organisations concerned about Afghanistan. Bonn Accord. he US, among others, has Effective and enduring reconstruction The choices that confront the Afghan argued strenuously – both always strikes a balance between local Interim Authority, the transitional T before forming a global coali- initiatives to build political trust with- authority that is intended to replace it tion to fight terrorism and now, while in and among communities and in mid-2002, the UN and a host of maintaining a military presence in national ones to create public goods donor states are vast indeed. UN mod- Afghanistan but resisting a major role for the entire country. Afghans are els for reconstruction and develop- in what it derisorily calls nation-build- familiar with the former: in the ment elsewhere, however unevenly ing – that it is possible to distinguish absence of a state, the UN and its executed, offer some lessons for between establishing security and partners have worked with thousands Afghanistan. building political stability, and of villagers and townspeople to sal- between physical rehabilitation and vage resources for farming and Learning from the past the process of democratic reconstruc- irrigation, urban renewal and, critical- tion. But rebuilding the Afghan state ly, removing landmines from When the UN has stood in for a state must mean reviving political life in populated areas. in the absence of a functioning gov- the Afghan nation. If it does not, ernment, it has learned the critical Afghanistan’s recovery will be com- Critical as these efforts are, they can- importance of resolving social and promised and regional stability will be not rebuild and sustain an economy political conflicts before they balloon hard to assure. to keep Afghanistan intact. This is out of control. In Kosovo, some secu- where nation-building and state-build- rity and stability have been achieved In 1989, the last time war in ing intersect: by creating physical for some Kosovars and Serbs as reha- Afghanistan might have ended in infrastructure, social services and an bilitation proceeds to non-urban something resembling peace, the US environment that addresses Afghan areas. At the same time, however, the and its allies tried to manipulate local needs under the governance of indeterminate status of Kosovo – a loyalties to decide who would rule Afghan citizens. To complement the political grey area reflecting the inde- after the communist government fell. bottom-up strategies of community cision of UN member states and They failed, and the corrupt, ineffec- development, Afghanistan requires Belgrade rather than solely the diffi- tive governance that followed top-down strategies to help rebuild its culties of achieving harmony among prevented Afghan citizens from state. It also needs arbiters to keep Kosovo’s residents – has limited the rebuilding or running their country. competing interests at bay and to reach of recovery. The lesson: politics Their actions also led, in part, to the help Afghans reacquire political voice – international and domestic – and rise of the Taliban, whose puritanism after long years of deprivation. By reconstruction – short and long-term – proclaimed if not always practised – default, and occasionally by demand, – travel hand in glove. found support among those who felt this is the role that the international abandoned by those aid providers community today plays in war-torn In the West Bank and Gaza, the UN who used commanders as middlemen states like Afghanistan. has tried over many decades to in the provision of humanitarian respond to crisis while also staving assistance. The gravity of this error Establishing, or re-establishing, the off potentially dangerous regional cannot be underestimated. Although moral authority of a state is excep- instabilities – in part by simply sus- saving lives is always paramount in tionally difficult and Afghanistan taining its presence while others have times of crisis, the essence of a com- faces enormous challenges. The 2001 been more fickle. Its mixed bag of plex political emergency is the Bonn Accord orchestrated under the responsibilities has often been pur- intricate nexus between politics and auspices of the UN, which remains the sued without clear priorities. The economics: if the process of providing custodian of its implementation, sets lesson here is also one about the assistance does not take account of out a process for enfranchising a indelible imprint of politics on recov- the political consequences of aid, future government while establishing ery: if political goals cannot be recovery will not occur. an authority to manage the initial achieved – whether short or long-term process of reconstruction. But – then recovery is unlikely to succeed. Afghanistan is still seized with an FMR 13 What does it take to rebuild a state? 39

In Cambodia, Bosnia and East Timor, durable state and to forestall local habit of acting as if the state did not the international community has disappointments caused by misguided exist, and take specific steps to fostered recovery by creating an development policies which could strengthen Kabul’s hand in determin- authority to oversee political transi- readily fragment the country again. ing the pace and structure of refugee tion. State bodies and non- This is where the decisions taken by return and the broad contours of the governmental organisations have the international donor community humanitarian response. This is an moved from peace accords to rebuild- during the early transition phase of essential element of state-building ing states and, ultimately, holding reconstruction are extremely impor- and should define the political envi- elections. In each case, rights protec- tant, in two related ways. ronment in Afghanistan. tions have been put in place, along with significant investments in rights First, if donor states persist in old Conclusion education, in order to forestall practices by refusing to cooperate in renewed conflict. There is no doubt shared funding for basic recovery, A viable central state, supported that the international presence has then the capacity of the central state materially and politically by the inter- seemed very large – thousands of will be constrained to the point where national community, can help keep white relief vehicles indelibly mark it cannot fulfill its essential functions. outsiders at bay. Over the course of the landscape. But in each instance, When donors – whether bilateral, mul- the past 25 years, Afghanistan’s the duration was extensive, and the tilateral, governmental or non- domestic divisions have allowed its human cost and physical devastation governmental – insist on controlling neighbours (now frontline states in caused by conflict and indifference resource allocation by resisting coor- the global war against terrorism) and were enormous. These are additional dination and, even more, cooperation, occasional patrons to take advantage reasons why local governance over they compromise not only the physi- of its political vacuum to further their reconstruction, undertaken with care, cal tasks of reconstruction but also own ambitions. Whether on behalf of sensitivity, balance and judgement is the political and security prerequisites the Taliban movement, the old United extremely important: to ensure that, for recovery. Front, the newly empowered Northern once begun, recovery can be sus- Alliance or displaced political leaders, tained. Second, when donors cling to equally this accumulated interference has old habits by negotiating separately emboldened regional leaders to think Challenges in Afghanistan with individual power holders across of Afghanistan as their own. If civil the country – and in the case of strife is not ended judiciously under Each of these undertakings has Afghanistan this means warlords who neutral international auspices – and if encountered significant obstacles; have arms, militia and past records of recovery is not organised with similar each has succeeded only to the degree repression – the central state is again impartial support – then Afghanistan that it has created an intersection jeopardised. The fallacious equation, will be the puppet of foreign powers between recovery and political change. between localised or decentralised or a vulnerable, war-divided territory All have required big money. development, on the one hand, and, ripe for illicit pickings. Either conse- Afghanistan will require even more. It on the other, empowering local com- quence would be a recipe for has almost no fiscal reserves – except manders whose existence is inevitable regional conflict. for $4.5 billion in pledges (a fraction predicated on foreign backing rather of the per capita investment in than popular support is dangerous for After the Romans routed the Kosovo and Bosnia) – and its popula- all parties. Respecting the basic prin- Germanic tribes at the end of the first tion remains scattered in the wake of ciple of popular sovereignty is a century, the historian Tacitus internal displacement and long-term practical prerequisite for ensuring observed: "They made a desert and exile. respect for individuals and communi- called it peace." Modern Afghanistan ties. Without it, it will not be possible has long suffered the impositions of Building trust between the interna- for refugees to return and for all citi- outsiders but, this time, recovery is tional community and Afghanistan is zens to participate in the process of simply too important to be left to for- therefore a prerequisite for building recovery. eigners. If Afghanistan is to survive its trust among Afghans: to enable latest fate and if central, west and Afghans to build a credible and The international community will not south Asia are to survive with it, then sustain the early impetus of recovery the international community needs to planning unless it respects the state ensure that Afghans have the right institutions it has helped to create. and opportunity to make their deserts In the case of Afghanistan that means bloom. underscoring (and underwriting) the Afghan Interim Authority created Paula R Newberg is Special under the Bonn Agreeement so that Advisor to the United Nations the writ of the state can extend Foundation, Washington beyond the limited confines of the (www.unfoundation.org). capital city. Supporting the processes that empower a transitional authority will make it possible for government to work in, and with, the entire country. International organisations must therefore change their long-ingrained Afghan girls back in school in Kabul UNHCR/P Benatar 40 FMR 13 Security and the ethics of asylum after 11 September by Matthew J Gibney "Security", the philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote in tions of mutual interdependence. From the start, discussions welded 1861, "is the most vital of all interests." matters of asylum and immigration with more nefarious issues of organ- n it", he argued, "we depend rorist threat, while curtailing appeals ised crime, illegal migration and for all our immunity from evil, for some asylum seekers. In Canada, terrorism. Linkages between these “O and for the whole value of all the government’s new Anti-Terrorism concerns, moreover, became institu- and every good, beyond the passing Plan creates new detention places for tionalised in the Amsterdam Treaty. moment".1 On 11 September, the citi- foreigners suspected of terrorist activ- Fittingly, asylum was placed under the zens of Western countries had the ities, provides for a tightening of category of matters leading to a com- truth of Mill’s words brought spectac- screening systems to ensure that mon area of ‘Freedom, Security and ularly home to them. This lesson those involved with terrorist groups Justice’. unleashed some lamentable conse- do not enter asylum systems and allo- quences. The attacks of that fateful cates more money for deportation. The end of the Cold War also played a day led to war; war created refugees; key role in joining refugee and securi- refugees fled in search of asylum. The Legitimate asylum seekers, state offi- ty concerns. The defusing of the first two months of the war against cials have been quick to claim, have major security threat of the post-War the Taliban resulted in the movement little to fear from well-targeted securi- period – the threat of nuclear annihi- of some 130,000 refugees, most of ty measures. But the question is lation – provided academics, whom found a kind of rough asylum whether such measures are indeed government and military officials with in neighbouring Pakistan. Pakistan’s well-targeted. My aim in this article, a strong incentive to concentrate their borders had remained relatively open however, is not to analyse the adequa- energies on a range of new (and hith- to refugees in part because of pres- cy of individual pieces of legislation erto distinctly second-rate) security sure by UNHCR for the country to but to make some observations on the concerns. The ‘threats’ posed by asy- serve as a humanitarian refuge for the broader social context in which these lum seekers and refugees were simply course of the crisis. Yet while Pakistan laws and policies have flourished. one of a number of new non-state was expected to offer more asylum Asylum is increasingly viewed as a threats to be formulated in this period. during the course of the ‘war on ter- vehicle through which terrorists and ror’, all signs were that Western states other undesirables might enter A third important factor has been the would be offering less. Western states. In the aftermath of 11 Security Council’s increasing promi- September, these concerns are not nence since the early 1990s as a Operating almost in unison, these hard to understand. Yet the terrorist vehicle for sanctioning military inter- states implemented a number of poli- attacks also provide an opportunity to vention by states. Interventions in cy and legislative changes that are remind ourselves of the central value Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and the Former likely to have a profound effect on the and continuing importance of asylum Yugoslavia were, as Adam Roberts has provision of protection for refugees. for refugees. observed, in part legitimated by the In the US, the government temporarily desires of the dominant powers to suspended the resettlement of some Asylum as a threat to stem refugee movement.2 Under 20,000 refugees who had been told security Chapter 7 of the UN Charter these that they would be able to enter the interventions could be deemed legiti- US. Under the new USA-PATRIOT Act, The view that asylum policy might mate only if they were in response to aliens suspected of terrorism can be have implications for security was threats to "international peace and detained without charge for seven established long before the events of security". Thus actions by the Security days. In addition, members of terror- 11 September. The latest incarnation Council provided another link in the ist organisations prescribed by the of asylum as a security threat is root- chain of the refugee/security associa- Justice Department can now be ed in the mid-1980s and can be traced tion. deported or barred from entering the to four major developments. The first US without judicial review. In the UK, was the ratification of the Single Finally, the increased linking of the new Anti-Terrorism Crime and European Act in 1987, which began refugee issues with security reflects Security Act was quickly passed. The the move towards the abolition of the spread of democratisation since Act allows the Secretary of State to border controls between European 1989. The rise of multiparty demo- reject asylum claims for persons Community member states. cracy in Africa, in particular, has deemed a threat to national security. Negotiations about the implications of arguably diminished the autonomy of It also broadens the state’s authority a frontier-free Europe prompted new state élites in determining the security to detain individuals considered a ter- concerns about the security implica- agenda. Widespread social concerns FMR 13 Security and the ethics of asylum after 11 September 41 about the economic, cultural and from abroad" – is concerned, almost ensuring that this general feeling of social threats posed by refugees and anything goes. Expanded detention, discomfit is disentangled from more other immigrants have, accordingly, new deportation procedures for for- legitimate concerns over security that tended to make their way into the eigners and the Bush Administration’s states might have. This process of dis- defence considerations of states such suggestion that military trials may be entangling requires that states subject as South Africa and Tanzania. Even in used for some of the Taliban fighters their own security concerns to the the more established democracies, the held at Guantanamo are cases in end of Cold War hostility and uncer- point. What is in short supply in our relations tainties created by economic globalisation have created the space Widespread public indifference with foreigners is trust. and the appetite for a new range of to such discretionary treatment public fears. is closely linked to the view of the for- same kind of scrutiny that they cur- eigner as threat. How can we be sure rently apply to the claims of asylum These developments are significant in that those claiming asylum come in seekers. However, let me work their own right but the movement search of help rather than to harm towards this conclusion by saying a towards a new security perspective on us? Might they not be hostile to our little more about security. forced migration really picked up values and institutions? Do not their pace in the wake of actual terrorist true loyalties lie with the state they Security is, for the most part, an activity. The bombing of the World have left? What is in short supply in instrumental value. That is, we want it Trade Centre in 1993 in New York by our relations with foreigners is trust. because it enables us to realise other Islamic extremists, one of who had an This lack of trust is simply exacerbat- values, such as freedom, peace of asylum decision pending, and, of ed when a history of racist mind and justice. However, its instru- course, the attacks of 11 September assumptions has been left to fill the mental role suggests that the value of 2001 by foreigners on visitor and stu- void between what we do and do not any gain in security is not absolute; it dent visas demonstrated that security know about particular groups of peo- needs to be weighed against the costs talk actually corresponded to an ple. Moreover, at a time of widespread it might have to the other important empirically verifiable threat. These fear and insecurity, the grounds for values. This has important implica- attacks spawned a range of new worrying about the motives of for- tions. For example, we could ensure restrictive laws and policies across eigners are stronger than ever. that the type of terrorist attacks that Western states and particularly in the occurred on 11 September could not US. There is now an unprecedented Yet the refugee is no ordinary foreign- happen again, if we were prepared to consensus among states on the fol- er. There is something deeply ironic in ground all planes permanently. Few of lowing issues: that refugees generally seeing her as a threat. For the refugee us, however, would be willing to toler- constitute more of a threat than an is, by definition, a person who is a vic- ate the consequences of this move. asset; that the dangers posed by asy- tim of insecurity. Her very search for The cost in terms of our freedom to lum seekers are arguably more protection vindicates the importance move would alone far outweigh the diverse than ever before; and that of security. But this is only one side added security this measure would there is a need for international coop- of the coin of refugeehood. By virtue bring. eration to deal with these new of being escapees from violent con- security risks.3 flict and human rights violations, But the trade-offs associated with refugees are also (albeit unwilling) increased security are not only shared The refugee as a victim of representatives of these phenomena. out among citizens. Importantly, as insecurity They are human examples of how we have seen, the security of foreign- states can sink into violence, torture ers, like refugees in search of a secure The connection between refugees and and oppression. As representatives of place of residence, is sometimes trad- security runs deeper than just the last these undesirable features of social ed off against the interests of two decades, however. When the life, it is not surprising that refugees citizens. At times of high national English political philosopher, Thomas are often construed as carriers of the drama, the consequences for foreign- Hobbes, set out to justify obeying the instability and insecurity that led to ers of these trade-offs are rarely a modern state to a conflict-ridden and their initial departure. As in the case matter of great public debate. Yet, deeply divided seventeenth-century of those fleeing plague, reactions to from an ethical perspective, the inter- English audience, he placed the state’s them typically involve a mixture of ests of outsiders must count for role in delivering security at the cen- sympathy for their plight and concern something. In the aftermath of 11 tre of his argument. The sovereign, that they might be the carriers of the September, many officials and public according to Hobbes, shall do "what- disease that wracked their own soci- figures have called for new restric- soever he shall think necessary to be eties. There is, then, something tions on asylum with barely a passing done…for the preserving of Peace and discomfiting in the very idea of the mention of the effect of these mea- Security, by preventing discord at refugee. sures on the lives of refugees. Yet the home and Hostility from abroad."4 unspoken truth is that, as shocking as In the contemporary age, charac- An ethically defensible the recent terrorist attacks in New terised by judicially-specified limits response to 11 September York, Pennsylvania and Virginia were, on state authority, few would grant the number of people killed by them the state the prerogative to do "what- What, then, might be an ethically is dwarfed by the number of people soever [it] shall think necessary" to defensible response to security con- whose lives are saved from death and ensure peace at home. Yet, when the cerns for asylum raised by 11 torture annually as a result of the asy- treatment of foreigners – "Hostility September? We need to begin by lum policies of the US, Canada and 42 Security and the ethics of asylum after 11 September FMR 13

other Western countries. Even if, as governments more prone to exclusion, residents generally. No one with a some ethical theories argue, there are we need to apply some rigorous crite- modicum of historical memory could good moral reasons for prioritising ria for determining the validity of be surprised that these measures have the needs of one’s compatriots, the security threats. flourished. At times of high anxiety, value of these lives saved cannot be political communities tend to become completely written off. There are three questions that we can less tolerant, more insular places. draw from current asylum practices One reason why we can be sure that that are helpful in this regard. First, Yet if this was the exclusionary the costs of making asylum more are we applying a clearly stated stan- moment spawned by 11 September, restrictive would be more death and dard for what constitutes a security another moment is still possible. The suffering is because the claims of threat (an analogue to Article 1F of insecurity and uncertainty generated refugees are subjected to rigorous the Refugee Convention)? Second, is by the terrorist attacks brought many scrutiny. Rather than taking their there a procedure for investigation as people in stable, rights-respecting claims at face value, Western states to whether claims to exclude on secu- countries closer to the insecurity that put refugees through an elaborate set rity grounds are ‘well-founded’ (an blights the lives of many of the of procedures to prove that their analogue to current refugee determi- world’s refugees. In so doing, they security would really be under threat nation systems)? Three, has a showed why the institution of asylum if they were returned. The aim is to personal link between the individual – with its promise to swap vulnerabili- sort out those who really need protec- seeking entry and the supposed secu- ty for protection – is so supremely tion from those who would use rity threat been established (an important and why it should not be asylum to serve other, less urgent or analogue to the reluctance of states to bartered away for a marginal increase less morally compelling ends. A give blanket protection to asylum in security. For most of us, this refugee must establish that their fear seekers from particular countries)? moment of connection lasted for only is ’well-founded’ and that this fear These questions may not provide a a few short minutes. But it is a applies to them as an individual. This blueprint for dealing with all the moment we would do well to replay in process of establishing the credibility thorny issues raised by security in our minds. If we let this feeling of and applicability of a claim to refugee entrance but they indicate clearly connection with refugees inform cur- status is both expensive and resource enough a general principle: that the rent measures to protect our societies, intensive. Yet, officials argue, it is nec- standards states use for evaluating the events of 11 September might well essary if the integrity of the provision security threats to their own societies cement, rather than erode, the values of protection is to be ensured. should be at least as stringent as that security promises to preserve. those demanded of individual asylum Here we have a powerful model for seekers wishing to be admitted. Matthew J Gibney is Elizabeth how states should deal with their own Colson Lecturer in Forced security concerns in the wake of 11 Conclusion Migration at the Refugee Studies September. Just as Western states do Centre, University of Oxford. His not take at face value an asylum seek- A shiver ran down the spine of many book, The Ethics and politics of er’s claim to be threatened, so they people in the West on 11 September. asylum: liberal democracy and the should not take the act of exclusion The world they response to refugees, will be pub- on security grounds as self-justifying. looked out lished by Cambridge University Especially at the current time, when upon now Press in late 2002. terrorist attacks have made our seemed a Email: matthew.gibney@qeh. much ox.ac.uk less secure 1 John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, edit- and much ed by H B Acton, J M Dent, London, 1992, p56. more uncertain place. This 2 Adam Roberts ‘More Refugees, Less Asylum: A Regime in Transformation’, Journal of Refugee changed world Studies, Vol 11, No 4, 1998. provided the ratio- 3 For detailed discussions of the implications of nale for new transforming migration into a security concern, see measures of Jef Huysmans ‘Migrants as a Security Problem: exclusion and Dangers of ‘Securitizing’ Societal Issues’ in Robert Miles & Dietrich Thranhardt, eds, Migration and control on European Security: The Dynamics of Inclusion and refugees, asylum Exclusion, Pinter, London, 1995; and Ole Waever et seekers and, in al Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, Pinter, London, 1993. some cases, foreign 4 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, edited by C B Macpherson, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, pp 232-233. CICR/Nick Danziger FMR 13 43 Resources

The links section of the Forced Migration Review website has an extensive guide to online information about Afghanistan which has proliferated since 11 September. Visit: www.fmreview.org/4DAfghanistan.html

Key internet resources with frequently updated information on Afghanistan include:

Human Rights Watch: www.hrw.org/asia/afghanistan.php Institute for War and Peace Reporting: www.iwpr.net/index.pl?afghan_index.html Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) www.rawa.org Relief Web www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/vCD/Afghanistan

Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism Reborn: Holy War: Inside The Secret World of Fundamentalism in Central Asia, by Afghanistan and the Taliban, edited Osama Bin Laden by Peter Bergen. Ahmed Rashid, Yale University Press, by William Maley, New York Touchstone Books, June 2002, ISBN: March 2001, ISBN: 0300089023, University Press, ISBN: 0814755860; 0743234952, 304pp, $11.20 via 294pp, $14.95. Contact March 1998, 256pp, $19.50 via www.amazon.com. www.yale.edu/yup www.amazon.com.

FMR Editorial Advisory Board Although the EAB members’ institutional affiliations are listed below, they serve in an individual capacity and do not necessarily represent their institutions.

Marit Sorheim Jon Bennett Michael Kingsley-Nyinah Norwegian Refugee Council Oxford Development Consultants UNHCR

Stephen Castles Marc Vincent Erin Mooney Refugee Studies Centre UNOCHA IDP Unit Brookings-CUNY Project on Internal Displacement B S Chimni Laurence Whitehead Jawaharlal Nehru University University of Oxford Bonaventure Rutinwa University of Dar es Salaam Maurice Herson Stacey White Oxfam International Global IDP Project Dan Seymour Fred Robarts UNICEF Consultant Richard Williams DFID Refugee Council, UK 44 Further reflections FMR 13 Palestinians in the aftermath of 11 September: wishing refugees out of existence? by Abbas Shiblak

host countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, While the international community expects that the Egypt and Iraq. This is the situation of population of Afghan refugees will eventually return those resident in the West Bank and Gaza. Today more than half of the home, the equally numerous Palestinian refugees see estimated total population of eight million Palestinians are refugees and no prospect of return. stateless.

srael, more than any other coun- UNRWA (the UN agency charged with Since Israel occupied the rest of try, has jumped on the American aiding Palestinian refugees), the Red Palestine in 1967, it has pursued a I bandwagon of ‘anti-terrorism’s Cross/Red Crescent and other human- policy of administrative ethnic cleans- global war’ in the aftermath of the itarian agencies have been severely tragic events of 11 September. As disrupted and blocked. Israel invades Palestinian self-govern- hopes of return to their homeland ing areas and dismantles and destroys For Palestinians in the diaspora com- have been shattered the institutions of the nascent munities hopes of return to their Palestinian political entity agreed homeland have been shattered. Like ing, especially in occupied East upon in the 1993 Oslo peace accords, other immigrant communities they Jerusalem.1 It is estimated that over Palestinian refugees find themselves, live in worry and fear in the midst of 250,000 of the population of the West once again, at the receiving end of a a less tolerant climate in the host Bank and Gaza who were outside the simplistic and dangerous discourse countries, brought about by measures territories at the time of the occupa- that sweeps away their aspirations for taken following 11 September. tion were not allowed back and so justice, freedom and peace. became refugees, some for the second Israel’s establishment in British-man- time. The rest of the population in the There is an international consensus dated Palestine in 1948 and the occupied territories were again con- that the cornerstone of a political set- annexation by Jordan of the West sidered by Israel as residents and not tlement and resolution of the Bank led to Palestinians not only los- citizens. Israeli laws applied to for- Palestinian refugee question is the ing their homeland but also, for the eign residents were applied to establishment of a viable Palestinian majority, any claim to citizenship. Palestinians in these territories. Yet state. Israel’s refusal to withdraw Three legal instruments enacted by more Palestinians, estimated to be from occupied territories and its con- Israel in the early 1950s (the Absentee around 150,000, lost their ID cards tinuing annexation of land and Property Law, the Law of Return and and their residency rights because of expansion of settlements have led to the Citizenship Law) classify dispos- further Israeli imposed measures. the current impasse in the peace sessed Palestinian refugees as process and a circle of violence that ‘absentees’ (thus nullifying rights to Since Oslo, more Palestinians have left has led to innocent people being property restitution, residence and because of oppressive measures and killed and needless suffering for both citizenship) while stipulating the right the hard economic conditions caused peoples. of any Jew anywhere in the world to by restriction on movement of people unrestricted immigration, settlement (and goods) other than those who Despite the Palestinians having agreed and automatic citizenship. have been permitted to return to to a historical compromise based on a reside in areas controlled by the two state solution, the peace process, Israel regarded those Palestinians who Palestinian Authority. Successive with its promise of statehood, is remained within its 1948 borders as Israeli governments have encouraged deadlocked. The national liberation residents but not citizens. Only in the massive immigration to strengthen its struggle of the Palestinians against early 1980s did they all gain citizen- grip on the occupied territories. In occupation is being portrayed by ship. When Jordan annexed the West contradiction of the spirit of Oslo, the Israel as a form of terrorism which Bank in the early 1950s it adopted annual growth rate in the settler pop- ought to be crushed. Refugee camps similar policies. As a result, the ulation in the last decade has been have become the main targets for the remainder of the Palestinian popula- over 8%.2 Israeli army, subjected to unprece- tion of former Palestine were doomed dented levels of brutality, demolition to live as stateless refugee holders of Palestinians are excluded from the and destruction while the services of Travel Documents issued by the Arab international protection regime for FMR 13 Palestinians in the aftermath of 11 September: wishing refugees out of existence? 45

refugees and stateless persons economic rights for Palestinians are allowed to return to homes of origin because their displacement predates denied in most host Arab states, in pre-1948 Palestine. the creation of UNHCR. Article 1D of most particularly for the 400,000 the 1951 Convention on the Status of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.3 Until this happens, Palestinian Refugees and Paragraph 7(c) of the refugees should no longer be exclud- statutes of UNHCR stipulate that per- Takkenberg has noted that it is state- ed from the general international sons already in receipt of assistance lessness, the absence of the option of legal regime created for the protec- from other UN agencies do not fall returning to their country, the denial tion of refugees and stateless under the mandate of UNHCR. Unlike of even the right to have rights, which persons. Recent events have shown UNHCR, UNRWA offers only relief and is at the heart of the Palestinian that the ‘passive protection’ intro- assistance, and not protection. Its refugee problem.4 Changing the status duced by a restricted number of mandate is restricted to Palestinian of Palestinians from refugees to citi- international observers is not the refugees in Jordan, Gaza, the West zens is key to the cessation of the answer. They cannot offer the level of Bank, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, not to Arab-Israeli conflict. The right of protection which is needed and, those who live in other Arab countries return and the right to compensation indeed, their presence obscures the or in communities outside the Arab and full citizenship in the countries in need to go beyond the limited nature world. which they reside are not only basic of UNRWA’s mandate. human rights but are also comple- statelessness is at the heart of the mentary rights which should not be Abbas Shiblak, a writer and seen to cancel out one another in any journalist, is one of the founders Palestinian refugee problem. way. of SHAML – the Palestinian Refugee and Diaspora Centre – Arab states have argued, and most The Palestinian refugee question www.shaml.org. continue to argue, that Palestinians could be resolved if and when a fully- Email: [email protected] should not be included within the fledged sovereign Palestinian state is international refugee regime lest this established within the framework of a 1 See ‘Population displacement in Jerusalem’, Forced Migration Review issue 5, p39. mute the voicing of their national comprehensive regional peace settle- rights. Although Arab states have ment. Any settlement has to widen 2 For settlement statistics visit the database of agreed in principle to grant full citi- rather than limit the options for the Foundation for Middle East Peace www.fmep.org/database and Americans for Peace zenship rights equivalent to those of refugees. A settlement package must Now www.peacenow.org. their citizens, they have stopped include either the right of repatriation 3 See ‘Grim prospects for Palestinian refugees in short of agreeing to naturalisation. in accordance with UN resolutions or Palestinians and Lebanon’, Forced Migration Review issue 11, p40. Israelis join together to Agreements and commitments made compensation and full citizenship take food to people in by Arab states have not been hon- rights in host countries for those who 4 Lex Takkenberg The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, Clarendon Press, Jenin refugee camp, oured. Full residency and social and choose not to return or who are not 1998. April 2002. Rapprochement Centre 46 Further reflections FMR 13 Post 11 September jitters for Iraqi Kurds by Maggy Zanger

ince the Gulf war, Iraq has been UN Habitat, 23% of the population of refuse are subjected to intimidation, effectively divided in two. Two the Kurdish area are victims of dis- arrest and, eventually, expulsion to S Kurdish administrations control placement as a result of genocide, one of the Kurdish enclaves. In recent an area the size of Switzerland. ethnic cleansing and conflict in recent months, as attention has focused on Despite constant interference from decades. Afghanistan, there are reports that the regime in Baghdad and from Iran the rate of ethnic cleansing in the city and Turkey (fearful that the example In the waning days of the Iran-Iraq and governorate of Kirkuk has speed- in Iraq will embolden their own large war in the late 1980s, the Anfal ed up. A ‘law’ decreed by the Baathist Kurdish populations), Iraqi Kurds (‘spoils’ in Arabic) campaign by the Revolutionary Council in September today enjoy unprecedented social and Iraqi government included mass 2001 allows for the nationality of all political freedom and a fairly stable killing, displacement and disappear- non-Arab Iraqis to be ‘corrected’. economy. UN Resolution 986, the oil- ance. As many as 4,500 Kurdish Confiscated residential and agricultur- for-food programme, has pumped villages were destroyed and 500,000 al land belonging to non-Arab citizens some $3 billion into the Kurdish people were forced to collective is given to officers of the military and enclaves, providing not only food but towns. Chemical weapons were used security forces. Arab settlers are given also funding for projects in agricul- in at least 40 separate attacks. Some land, cash and weapons as ‘personal ture, education, health, de-mining and 50,000 to 200,000 people were killed gifts’ from Saddam Hussein. housing. and another 182,000 disappeared and are presumed dead. The large num- In the Kurdish autonomous areas, As talk increases of making Iraq the bers of ‘anfal widows’ – many denied officials and UN and NGO workers target of ‘phase two’ of the ‘war on the solace of confirmation that their struggle to accommodate the steady terrorism’, Kurds, together with husbands are dead – give the collec- stream of expellees. The lucky ones members of other non-Arab minori- tive towns of northern Iraq today one can join families who had been forced ties resident in the Kurdish enclaves, of the most gender-unbalanced popu- from the Kirkuk area in earlier waves experience both hope and fear. While lations in the world. of expulsion. Other crowd into the they desperately hope that a US-led collective towns and makeshift camps attack may result in a regime change ‘Arabisation’ of the oil-rich region nearby. in Baghdad, they also fear Saddam around the main Kurdish city of Hussein’s reaction to any military Kirkuk (which remained in Iraqi gov- Uncertainty drives all inhabitants of action. Recent press reports indicate ernment hands at the end of the Gulf the Kurdish enclaves, whether resi- that Baghdad has installed infantry War) began in the early 1960s when dent or IDP, to seek opportunities to brigades, artillery units, tanks, anti- the Baath party first came to power. migrate. For many, voluntary depar- aircraft guns and missiles along the Ethnic cleansing and government-con- ture now is preferable to future ceasefire line which is only a few trolled in-movement of Arabs from expulsion by Saddam. Well-founded kilometres from the main population central and southern Iraq have dra- fears and traumatic memories impel centres in the enclaves. There is no matically altered the demographic Kurds to risk astronomical amounts guarantee that the US or any other composition of the region. of money (up to $10,000 per person) power can protect those in the to embark on perilous journeys Kurdish area, or, indeed, that they will Since 1991 the Arabisation campaign through Syria, Turkey and Iran and to choose to, if their attention is solely has been reinvigorated. While the US crowd onto derelict ships bound for focused on the ‘war on terror’. If there Committee for Refugees states that Italy or Australia. The threat of a US is another mass exodus of Iraqi Kurds 100,000 people have been expelled attack – and the Iraqi regime’s possi- it is likely that both Turkey and Iran since the Gulf War, Kurdish sources ble response to it – has made that will try to use the rhetoric of the speak of 200,000. Kurds, Turkmen uncertainty all the greater. global war on terror to refuse entry and Assyrians are pressured to sign a in order to ‘protect’ themselves from form ‘correcting’ their nationality. Any Maggy Zanger teaches journalism ‘terrorism’. It should be noted, howev- non-Arab who needs to have any offi- at the American University in er, that the Iraqi Kurds have a cial dealings with the Iraqi Cairo. She conducted research in remarkable history of not using ter- government – whether to do with Iraqi Kurdistan in summer 2001. rorist tactics. ration cards, property, vehicle owner- Email: [email protected] ship or school registration – has to fill Almost all Kurds (and for that matter in a form that says: "I wish to correct For further information on internal dis- Assyrians, Turkomans, Chaldeans, my ethnic origin into Arabic". Those placement in Iraq, see the Iraq country Armenians and Yezidis) over the age who comply may then be told that report of the Global IDP Project at: of ten have been refugees or IDPs at since they are ‘Arab’ they should www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/ idp Survey.nsf/wCountries/Iraq some point in their life. According to move to the south of Iraq. Those who FMR 13 Endpiece 47

Lessening Tensions in a Tumultuous World: The Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies

by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Patron, Refugee Studies Centre

(Judaism, Christianity strength and sustainability of the and Islam) in the region’s Christian communities? interests of deepening mutual understanding RIIFS has long been concerned with at a time when toler- the Arab image in the West. A 1998 ance often seems to meeting focused on the apparent be captive to newspa- European and American identification per headlines. The of the Middle East with such threats magazine is freely and to global peace and democratic order stablished in 1994, the Royal widely distributed to as terrorism, resurgent Islam, totali- Institute for Inter-Faith Studies leading political and religious figures tarian governments and weapons of E (RIIFS) emerged from a process in the region, both Christian and mass destruction. This negative per- of consultation with educational, cul- Muslim, as well as to others interested ception of the region and its peoples tural and interfaith institutions in the in the continuation of fruitful rela- has been repeatedly invoked in recent Middle East and the West started a tions among the adherents of memory, particularly by the United decade earlier. RIIFS was originally different faiths. States, to justify the severing of diplo- intended to serve as a centre for the matic relations, the application of study of Christian and Jewish tradi- Since 1999 the RIIFS has published economic sanctions and even the use tions in the Arab/Islamic world and the semi-annual Bulletin of the Royal of military force. for the enhancement of understand- Institute for Inter-Faith Studies ing of regional diversity with a view to (BRIIFS), a peer-reviewed academic Since the events of 11 September the lessening Middle Eastern tensions. journal that publishes research arti- Royal Institute has given renewed Initially focusing on religion, religious cles, essays and book reviews thought to how it may further con- diversity and the Middle East, the contributed by recognised scholars tribute to the lessening of tensions Institute has broadened its scope to working in all fields of the humanities between the Arab/Islamic and encompass the interdisciplinary study and social sciences. Western worlds by designing pro- of cultural interaction worldwide. grammes targetted at policy makers The Royal Institute works to promote and educators. Genuine progress will From the Institute’s inception, its dialogue between Muslim and take time. There is always the possi- work has involved research, publica- Christian Arabs and to assess their bility that a new outrage – real or tion of reference works and mutual relations, as Arabs, with the perceived – will harden prejudices and periodicals, and organisation of work- Western world. At meetings convened feed sterile conflict. No matter what shops, conferences and lectures. by RIIFS scholars, researchers, reli- the future holds, the Institute will In addition to publishing academic gious leaders and journalists have continue to work to foster under- works pertaining to Christianity and asked such questions as: What is the standing and deepen tolerance on Muslim/Christian relations in the role of Christian Arabs in Arab/ both sides of the divide. Arab World, RIIFS produces a quarter- Islamic society and how may it be ly magazine Al-Nashra which serves enhanced? What are the responsibili- For further information, contact: as a forum in which Muslims and ties of Christian Arabs to Arab/ Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, PO Box 830562, Christians may discuss contemporary Islamic society? Can Christian Arab Amman 11183, Jordan. interfaith issues, particularly as they identity be instrumental in cultivating Tel: +962 6 4618051/2. positive relations between Muslim relate to Arab and Islamic societies. Fax: +962 6 4618053. Arabs and the West? What is the Al-Nashra also strives to shed light Email: [email protected] upon the historical relationship impact of the migration of Arab Web: www.riifs.org between the three Abrahamic religions Christians to the West upon the When Godhadfinishedcreating theworld,there were bitsandpiecesleftover. In Afghanistanpeopleliveby, andexplaineventsby, proverbs: He decidedtoputthemalltogether…andtheresult isAfghanistan. If there are onlybread andonions,stillhaveahappy face. In aditchwhere waterhasflowed,itwill flowagain. Blood cannotbewashedoutwithblood. on hopeforthefuture: on ethnicdiversity: on makingpeace: on resilience:

CICR/Warren Clarke