POLITICAL CULTURE, MASS BELIEFS, and VALUE CHANGE 127 Introduction

Political Culture, Mass 19 Beliefs, and Value Change Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart

• Introduction 127 • The Role of Mass Beliefs in the Democratization Literature 128 • Mass Demands for Democracy 129 • Regime Legitimacy 131 • Economic Performance and Regime Legitimacy 133 • The Congruence Thesis 134 • Are Emancipative Values caused by Democracy? 136 • Explaining Democratic Change 138 • The Role of Religion 141 • Conclusion 143

Overview

This chapter examines the role of mass beliefs and determine whether a political system is accepted value change in democratization processes—a factor as legitimate or not, which has a major impact on that is generally underestimated. Building on one of a regime’s likelihood of surviving. As the motiva- the central assumptions of political culture theory— tional source of opposition or support for a regime, the congruence thesis—we argue that mass beliefs mass beliefs play a crucial role in deciding whether a are of critical importance for a country’s chances regime ﬂ ourishes or is overthrown. to become and remain democratic. For mass beliefs

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The idea that a society’s political order refl ects its peo- In this vein, Harold Lasswell (1951: 473, 484, 502) ple’s prevailing beliefs and values—that is, its politi- claimed that whether democratic regimes emerge cal culture—has a long tradition. Aristotle (1962 [350 and survive largely depends on mass beliefs. Simi- BC]) argued in Book IV of Politics that democracy larly, when Seymour Martin Lipset (1959: 85–9) emerges in middle-class communities in which the analysed why modernization is conducive to democ- citizens share an egalitarian participatory orienta- racy, he concluded that modernization changes mass tion. And many subsequent theorists have claimed orientations in ways that make people supportive that the question of which political system emerges of democratic principles, such as political pluralism and survives in a country depends on the orienta- and popular control over power. More recently, Sam- tions that prevail among its people. Thus, Charles- uel Huntington (1991: 69) argued that rising mass Louis de Montesquieu (1989 [1748]: 106) argued in desires for freedom provide the intervening mecha- De L’Esprit des Lois that the laws by which a society nism that explains why modernization has given rise is governed refl ect its people’s dominant mentality: to democratizing movements in scores of countries Whether a nation is constituted as a tyranny, mon- in recent decades. archy or democracy depends, respectively, on the Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963: 498) and prevalence of anxious, honest or civic orientations. Eckstein (1966: 1) introduced the term ‘congruence,’ Likewise, Alexis de Tocqueville (1994 [1835]: 29) claiming that political regimes become stable only postulated in De la Démocratie en Amérique that the in so far as their authority patterns meet people’s fl ourishing of democracy in the USA refl ects the lib- authority beliefs—’regardless of regime type’, as Eck- eral and participatory orientations of the American stein (1998: 3) notes. According to this congruence people. thesis, authoritarian regimes are stable when the In modern times the most dramatic illustration people believe in the legitimacy of dictatorial pow- of the fact that a political order requires compat- ers, just as democratic regimes are stable in so far as ible orientations among its people was the failure of people believe that political authority ought to be democracy in Weimar Germany. Although on paper, subject to popular controls. the democratic constitution adopted by in Germany Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005: 187) after World War I seemed an ideally designed set of have extended these propositions to suggest that in institutions, it never took root among a people who order to endure, political regimes must supply democ- were accustomed to the authoritarian system they racy at levels that satisfy the people’s demand for it. had previously experienced. When the new democ- In support of this claim, they provide empirical evi- racy failed to provide order and prosperity, Hitler dence demonstrating that, during the global wave of came to power through democratic elections. The democratization, those countries in which mass aspi- failure of democracy in Germany had such cata- rations for democracy exceeded the extent to which strophic consequences that it troubled social scien- democratic institutions actually existed around 1990, tists, psychologists, and public opinion researchers subsequently made the greatest progress in democra- for many decades. And the research inspired by this tization; while those countries in which the supply disaster seemed to indicate that democracy is fragile of democracy exceeded the level of mass aspirations when it is a ‘democracy without democrats’ (Bracher for democracy, actually tended to become less demo- 1971 [1955]). cratic during the subsequent decade.

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Most of the recent democratization literature has are signiﬁ cantly more likely than under others. For paid surprisingly little attention to the role of mass example, virtually all of the countries that democ- beliefs in democratization. This applies to both of the ratized in the global wave from 1986 to 1995 were two dominant types of approaches in the democra- middle-income countries; almost none of them were tization literature: structure-focused approaches and low-income countries. action-focused approaches. Structure-focused and action-focused approaches Structure-focused approaches emphasize struc- have a common blind spot: How to get ‘from structural aspects of society, such as modernization, ture to action’. Structure-focused approaches are income equality, group divisions, class coalitions, unable to tell us how the structures they emphasize religious composition, colonial heritage, or world translate into the actions that accomplish democra- system position (Doorenspleet 2005). Advocates of tization. Action-focused approaches, on the other these approaches perform sophisticated statistical hand, leave us uninformed about how the actions analyses to demonstrate how much given structur- accomplishing democratization grow out of struc- al factors increase or decrease the likelihood that a tural features. The problem is that neither structure- country will become and remain democratic. But focused approaches nor action-focused approaches these analyses specify no mechanism by which take mass beliefs into account—and it is these mass these structures translate into the political actions, beliefs that constitute the missing link between these identifying no actors—whether elites or mass- two types of approaches. Why is this so? es—by whom which democratization is initiated, Mass beliefs are needed to translate ‘structure into accomplished, consolidated, and further pursued. action’. All collective actions, including those that But structural factors, such as high levels of edu- bring about democratization, are inspired by shared cation or GNP, can not in themselves bring about goals (Tarrow 1998). Hence, if structural aspects of democratization—this requires action by human society play a role in making democratizing actions beings. more likely, these structures must give rise to orien- The second type of approach focuses on such tations that make people believe in democracy as actions. It describes democratization processes a desirable goal. Mass beliefs are thus the interven- through the elite actions and mass actions that ing variable between social structure and collective make democratization happen (Casper and Tay- action. Ignoring this, democratization processes can- lor 1996). But describing, reconstructing, classify- not be adequately understood. ing, and simulating these actions, does not explain them. An object, such as democratization, can only be explained by causes that are exogenous to it, Box 9.1 Key points or the explanation is tautological. Action-focused approaches enrich our understanding with telling • The democratization literature is dominated by narratives and thick descriptions. They clarify how structure-focused approaches and action-focused democratization was attained. But fail to explain why approaches. it came about, which requires identifying the condi- • Both approaches tend to neglect mass beliefs as a tions that gave rise to given actions and motivated potential source of democratizing pressures, even given people to carry them out. This failure is all the though these beliefs help translating structures into more glaring when it is clear that there are structural actions. conﬁ gurations under which democratizing actions

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There is a tendency in the political culture litera- than by the belief that it provides prosperity or other ture to equate popular preferences for democracy instrumental motivations. The beliefs that motivate with actual mass demands for democracy (Seligson people’s preference for democracy are as important 2007). But popular preferences for democracy do as the fact that they say they prefer it (Bratton and not automatically translate into mass pressures to Gymiah-Boadi 2005). democratize. Mass pressures for democracy do not necessarily Preferences for democracy are often superfi cial or emerge simply because a large share of the public purely instrumental (Schedler and Sarsfi eld 2006). says they prefer democracy to its alternatives. Peo- At this point in history, most people in most coun- ple may give lip service to democracy for shallow tries say favourable things about democracy simply or instrumental reasons. But if people’s preference because it has become socially desirable and has for democracy refl ects the fact that they place a positive connotations. Preferring democracy for high value on freedom and self-expression, they are these reasons is a superfi cial preference for democ- relatively likely to pursue democratization active- racy (Inglehart 2003). Because Western democracies ly. Hence, in order to know whether people prefer are obviously prosperous, some people believe that democracy intrinsically—that is, for its defi ning if their country becomes democratic, it will become freedoms—one needs to fi nd out how strongly they rich. This is an instrumental preference for democracy emphasize emancipative values. People’s responses (Bratton and Mattes 2001): people seek democracy to the questions shown in Table 9.1 enable us to for other reasons than the political freedoms that are measure the extent to which they emphasize eman- its defi ning qualities. cipative values. Mass preferences for democracy are widespread Emancipative values give priority to gender almost everywhere, but if these preferences are equality over patriarchy, tolerance over conform- superfi cial or instrumental, they will not motivate ity, autonomy over authority, and participation people to struggle or risk their lives to obtain democ- over security, as shown in Table 9.1. Emancipative racy. People are most likely to do so if they give high values are closely related to self-expression values priority to the freedoms that democracy provides. as described by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who Only when democracy is valued as a good in itself, demonstrate that their measure of self-expression are strong mass pressures likely to be brought to bear values has an inherently emancipative impetus and on elites—whether to attain democratic rights and use the terms self-expression values and emancipa- freedoms when they are absent, or to defend these tive values interchangeably. Since these values cover freedoms when they are endangered. a broad syndrome of interrelated beliefs, represent- But how do we know that people support democra- ing a coherent worldview, they can be measured in a cy for its defi ning freedoms? Democracy is an emanci- number of different ways, all of which tap the same pative achievement that frees people from oppression underlying dimension. The measure of emancipative and discrimination and empowering them ‘to live the values used here is conceptually more coherent and lives they have reason to value’ (Sen 1999). Thus, the focuses more explicitly on the theme of participation values motivating democracy emphasize equality, than does self-expression values. Although they use liberty, tolerance and empowering people to choose different indicators and are operationalized in differ- their leaders and to participate in decision-making. ent ways, the two measures correlate very strongly People who value these goals over others, emphasize (at r=.90), an indication of how robust the underly- emancipative values. If they support democracy (as ing dimension is. The theoretical explanation of the most people do), they are more likely to be moti- factors that give rise to self-expression values applies vated by the fact that democracy provides freedoms, equally to emancipative values.

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Obed- chosen ience not .63 .54 Imagi- nation chosen omy Auton- chosen justifi ed justifi divorce is divorce Agree that Emancipative VALUES .72 that ity is Agree homo- sexual- justifi ed justifi (correlation with self-expression values: r = .90) ed fi fi that abor- Agree be justi- be justi- tion can Dis- have a job more agree right to that men boys more tion is impor- educa- tant for Disagree .76 better leaders political Disagree that men can that live by herself woman An Index of Emancipative Values lying ble 9.1 Items Agree Factor Under- Belief in Gender equality over Patriarchy over Conformity Tolerance Autonomy over Authority Participation over Security loadings* dimension Ta * Factor analyses of over 340,000 respondents from 90 countries in the 5 waves of the World Values Surveys 1981–2007. Subindices are the arithmetic means of their respective Values * Factor analyses of over 340,000 respondents from 90 countries in the 5 waves World component variables, each normalized to a scale with minimum 0 and maximum 1.0. The Emancipative values Index is the arithmetic missing, the Emancipative values Index is arithmetic mean of remaining three components.

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Countries of different cultural zones around the extent to which their people prefer democracy intrin- world differ surprisingly little in the extent to which sically—and the difference is important: if intrinsic the public says they prefer democracy. At this point preferences for democracy are weak, the actual level in history, democracy has become the most widely of democracy is low; but if intrinsic preferences for preferred system around the world, even in coun- democracy are strong, the actual level of democracy tries governed by authoritarian institutions (Klinge- is generally high (Welzel and Inglehart 2006). mann 1999). But countries differ considerably in the

Regime Legitimacy

Some scholars assume that autocracies are always sider authoritarian regimes to be democratic: their illegitimate, as far as the general public is concerned, underlying values emphasize good economic per- and that overwhelming majorities of ordinary people formance and order, rather than political rights and almost always prefer democracy to autocracy (Ace- civil liberties. moglu and Robinson 2006). In this view, autocracies It is not true that the publics of authoritarian lack legitimacy and are able to survive only because regimes always prefer democracy and that authoritar- they are able to repress opposing majorities. Histori- ian regimes survive simply because of their repressive cally, this is inaccurate: in the past, absolute mon- capacities. But intrinsic preferences for democracy archies and more recently, communist dictatorships can and do emerge in authoritarian regimes when sometimes had widespread mass support they experience a modernization process that Unfortunately, people do not always support changes ordinary people’s value priorities and action democracy, and when they do, they do not neces- repertoires. sarily support it intrinsically, for the freedoms that This theory of intergenerational value change defi ne it. Evidence from the World Values Sur- advanced by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) holds that veys and other cross-national surveys indicate that virtually everyone likes freedom, but they do not emancipative mass beliefs vary dramatically cross- necessarily give it top priority. People’s priorities nationally, and when these beliefs are weak, peo- refl ect their socioeconomic conditions, placing the ple give priority to authority and strong leadership highest subjective value on the most pressing needs. over freedom and mass participation. This does not Since material sustenance and physical security are prevent people from becoming dissatisfi ed with an the fi rst requirements for survival, under conditions incumbent authoritarian regime’s policies and repre- of scarcity, people give top priority to materialistic sentatives when they perform poorly. But disillusion- goals; while under conditions of prosperity, they ment about policies and authorities does not mean become more likely to emphasize self-expression and that people view dictatorial powers as inherently emancipative values. During the past 50 years, rising illegitimate. Even dissatisfi ed people can continue economic and physical security have led to a grad- to prefer strong leaders and authoritarian rule. They ual intergenerational shift in many countries plac- might wish to have one dictator replaced by another ing rising emphasis on emancipative values. At the without rejecting authoritarian rule. In fact, when same time, rising levels of education and changes in emancipative values are weak, people are more likely the occupational structure have made mass publics to accept limitations on democratic freedoms for increasingly articulate and increasingly accustomed the sake of national order or other goals. Another to thinking for themselves. Both processes encourage important factor is that the absence of emancipative the spread of emancipative values that give priority values biases people’s understanding of democracy to gender equality over patriarchy, tolerance over in an authoritarian direction. As evidence from the conformity, autonomy over authority, and participa- World Values Surveys demonstrates, when emanci- tion over security. As these beliefs spread, dictatorial pative values are weak or absent, people may con- regimes tend to lose their legitimacy.

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Implicitly, much of the literature assumes that of the army and secret police, it can survive despite whether people consider a given regime legitimate mass opposition. or not only matters for democracy but not for autoc- This is inaccurate. Recent cases of democratiza- racy (Easton 1965). It matters for democracy because tion demonstrate that when mass opposition grows when a majority rejects democracy, antidemocratic strong enough, even rigidly repressive authoritarian forces can become sufﬁ ciently widespread to gain regimes can be overthrown (Schock 2005). Repres- power and abandon democratic institutions. Autoc- sion does not necessarily cause mass opposition to racies, in this view, do not need legitimacy, since break down as soon as it faces repression—indeed, they can repress even widespread opposition. Hence, repression has sometimes increased and intensi- as long as an authoritarian regime stays in control ﬁ ed mass opposition (Francisco 2005). Moreover,

1.00 + Source: World Values Surveys V (2005–7).

0.90

0.80 450

0.70 1,242

0.60 2,634

0.50 4,750

0.40 7,255

10,400 0.30 Liberal Understanding of Democracy 12,138 10,245 0.20 5,306

1,057 0.10

0.00 192 3 4 5 6 7 8 10

Strength of Emancipative Values +

Fig 9.1 Emancipative beliefs and a liberal understanding of democracy Notes: Emancipative values are measured as shown in Table 9.1 but broken down into ten categories of increasing strength. Based on a scale from 0 to 1, category 1 measures emancipative beliefs of strength from 0 to .1, category 2 measures strength from .1 to .2 and so on, until category 10 measures strength .9 to 1. The liberal understanding of democracy measures how much people place their deﬁ nition of democracy on civil rights, free elections, free referenda votes and equal rights for both sexes. The scale has a minimum of 0 for the least liberal and 1 for the most liberal understanding.

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the characteristics of the mass opposition itself are standing of what democracy means. With low important too. Mass opposition has usually failed levels of emancipative values, people tend to view when it was driven by relatively small and clearly democracy as meaning that the economy prospers, identifi able groups, making it easy to isolate them. unemployed people receive state aid, criminals get But emancipative values tend to become widespread punished, and other instrumental views. With rising at high levels of economic development, as people emphasis on emancipative values, they increasingly gain higher levels of education, material resources, come to defi ne democracy as meaning that people intellectual skills, and networks of connections. At choose their leaders in free elections, civil rights pro- the same time, rising levels of security help make tect people’s liberties, women have equal rights, and mass emphasis on emancipative values become people can change the laws. With each additional increasingly widespread. When this happens, large step on the ladder of progressing emancipative val- segments of the public have both the resource and a ues, people’s understanding of democracy takes on a strong motivation to oppose authoritarianism (see more liberal character, focusing on the freedoms that Figure 9.2). Expanding action repertoires and eman- empower people. cipative values empower ordinary people to mount Neither people’s understanding of what democ- effective pressures on elites. racy means, nor the extent to which people give Human empowerment nurtures emancipative high priority to obtaining democratic institutions, mass movements in any regime. In autocracies, are constants as is assumed in the models proposed emancipative movements are likely to oppose the by such writers as Boix or Acemoglu and Robinson. regime, attempting to replace autocracy with democ- Both the meaning of democracy and the priority it racy. In democracies, emancipative attempt to make holds, refl ect mass values that vary according to a their governments more responsive. In both situa- society’s level of socioeconomic development. Mass tions, emancipative values tend to transform politi- beliefs matter, as the political culture school has long cal institutions. claimed: for mass beliefs help determine whether a Figure 9.1 shows how rising emphasis on eman- given regime is accepted as legitimate. cipative values tends to transform people’s under-

Economic Performance and Regime Legitimacy

Many scholars have argued that any regime, whether values is linked with a shift toward an increasingly autocracy or democracy, will have mass support as liberal understanding of democracy—and this takes long as it is economically successful (Haggard and place among both democratic and authoritarian Kaufman 1995). On the contrary, we argue that this countries. depends on people’s value priorities. The impact of Rising emphasis on emancipative values make economic success on regime legitimacy varies accord- people judge the legitimacy of a regime less and less ing to the society’s cultural setting, with its impact on the basis of whether it provides order and pros- being contingent on mass values. perity, and more and more on the basis of whether Rising emphasis on emancipative values make it provides freedom. Thus, as emancipative values people value civic freedoms increasingly highly. grow stronger with rising levels of development, This happens regardless of whether a country has legitimacy increasingly depends on whether a regime democratic or authoritarian institutions: emerging provides liberty and democracy; with strong emanci- emancipative values lead people to place increas- pative values, economic performance has little effect ing value on civic freedoms. Accordingly, as Figure on people’s acceptance of a regime (Hofferbert and 9.1 demonstrates, rising emphasis on emancipative Klingemann 1999).

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In the long run, this poses a dilemma for autoc- obvious, as people increasingly recognize that they racies. If they perform economically well over long need freedom in order to make use of a wider action periods of time, they move toward higher levels repertoire. Sustained economic development thus of socioeconomic modernization. By increasing transforms the criteria by which people evaluate people’s material means, intellectual skills, and regimes, and leads to increasingly skilled and artic- networking skills, modernization widens people’s ulate publics that become increasingly effective at actions repertoires. At the same time, rising levels challenging authoritarian elites. While economic of existential security bring increasing emphasis on success legitimizes authoritarian regimes in the early self-expression and emancipative values, making stages of development, it no longer does so at higher free choice more highly prized, and it value more levels of economic development.

The Congruence Thesis

Congruence theory argues that, in order to be sta- is widespread resistance to cultural explanations of ble, the authority patterns characterizing a country’s political institutions, including the idea that mass political system must be consistent with the people’s beliefs determine what level of democracy is likely to prevailing authority beliefs (Eckstein 1966). Thus, be found in a country (Hadenius and Teorell 2005). authoritarian systems tend to prevail where most The fact that mainstream political science has a deep- people believe in the legitimacy of absolute political rooted tendency to reject the idea that culture mat- power, while democracies should prevail where most ters, does not prove that it doesn’t. This question can people endorse popular control of political power. only be answered by empirical tests. This claim could not be demonstrated empirically Doubts that mass beliefs infl uence a country’s level when it fi rst was formulated, since representative of democracy have taken two main forms. First, it survey data measuring people’s authority beliefs was has been questioned that there is any systematic rela- only available then for a small number of countries, tionship between mass beliefs and levels of democ- most of which were rich Western democracies. Con- racy. For example, Seligson (2002) argued that the gruence theory remained a plausible but unproven relationship Ronald Inglehart (1997) found between theory for many years. Accordingly, there doubts mass beliefs and democracy is an ‘ecological fallacy’. were expressed about the empirical validity of the Seligson based this claim on his fi nding that civic congruence thesis and its claim that people’s legiti- attitudes, such as interpersonal trust, have no signifi - macy beliefs are an important determinant of the cant effect on the extent to which people say they type of regime that governs them. prefer democracy. But as Ronald Inglehart and Chris- One reason for these doubts is the fact that politi- tian Welzel (2003) demonstrate, Seligson’s fi nding cal science has an inherent tendency to emphasise simply confi rms that mass preferences for democ- institutional engineering. This viewpoint has many racy are not necessarily inspired by deep-rooted civic adherents because it implies that one can shape a orientations: they may say they prefer it for shallow society by shaping its institutions—which means or instrumental reasons or because of social desir- that political scientists can provide a quick fi x for ability effects. Only when preferences for democracy most problems. This encourages a tendency to treat are motivated by emancipative self-expression val- institutions as the explanatory variable par excel- ues do they lead to the emergence of democracy in lence and a tendency to reject the idea that culture a country. matters—or that institutions are shaped by cultural Since this debate, the World Values Survey has factors, since culture refl ects deep-seated orienta- gathered suffi cient data to demonstrate that there tions that are relatively diffi cult (though not impos- is a strong and systematic relationship between sible) to reshape (Eckstein 1998). Accordingly, there mass beliefs and levels of democracy. Over a global

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1.00 Norway Denmark 0.95 Netherlands Sweden Finland Belgium Iceland 0.90 Czech R. Australia Ireland UK Germany (W.) 0.85 U.S.A. Portugal Canada Slovenia Austria France 0.80 Hungary Slovakia Japan Estonia 0.75 Taiwan Greece Latvia Poland 0.70 Chile S. Korea Croatia S. Africa 0.65 Bulgaria Israel Dominican R. 0.60 Romania El Salvador Brazil Argentina 0.55 Albania Philippines Mexico Ukraine 0.50 Ghana India Peru Moldova 0.45 Turkey Venezuela Bangladesh 0.40 Georgia Russia 0.35 Indonesia Armenia Level of Democracy 2000–2004 0.30 Tanzania Nigeria 0.25 Algeria 0.20 Iran Jordan Azerbaijan 0.15 Uganda Belarus Zimbabwe 0.10 Egypt y = 0.8005Ln(x) + 1.3396 0.05 Pakistan Vietnam China R2 = 0.7295 0.00 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 Strength of Emancipative Values 1995–2000

Fig 9.2 The relationship between emancipative values and levels of democracy Notes: The horizontal axis measures emancipative beliefs as shown in Table 9.1. The vertical axis measures democracy levels as an average over four different indices of democracy, including the Freedom House index, the Polity IV autocracy-democracy scores, Vanhanen’s index of democratization, and the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) ratings for integrity and empowerment rights. The scale is standardized to a minimum of 0 (democracy completely absent) to 1 (democracy fully present).

sample of more than 70 societies, the extent to Correlation is not causation, so the correlation which a public holds emancipative values correlates shown in Figure 9.2 does not demonstrate what at r=.85 with a country’s subsequent level of democ- is causing what. Emancipative mass beliefs might racy, using the broad measure of democracy shown cause high levels of democracy to emerge and per- in Figure 9.2. The measure of democracy used here is sist, or it might work the other way around. It is even the average of four of the most widely-used ways of possible that there is no causal relationship between measuring democracy: regardless of which approach the two, with the relationship being due to some one uses, one ﬁ nds a strong relationship. As the third factor such as economic modernization, which strength of emancipative values in a society rises, causes both emancipative values and democracy to the level of democracy also rises—and the relation- reach high levels (Hadenius and Teorell 2005). We ship is remarkably strong and statistically highly will investigate these possibilities further in the next signiﬁ cant. section.

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Box 9.2 Key points

• One can differentiate superﬁ cial, instrumental, and intrinsic mass preferences for democracy.

• Intrinsic mass preferences for democracy are inspired by emancipative beliefs and these preferences are the most likely to translate into powerful popular pressures to attain, sustain or deepen democratic freedoms.

• Sustained economic development tends to give rise to emancipative beliefs, but when these beliefs have grown strong in a population, a regime’s momentary economic performance becomes less important for people to consider it legitimate.

Are Emancipative Values Caused by Democracy?

Advocates of institutional learning theory argue emphasis on emancipatory values. At the same time, that people learn to value democracy by living under rising education, information levels, opportunities democratic institutions for many years (Rustow to connect with people and other resources, broad- 1970). If this theory is correct, these beliefs can only ens people’s action repertoires, further increasing the emerge in countries that have been democratic for utility of freedom. In this view, self-expression values many years. And this implies that emancipative val- emerge and diffuse as a function of modernization, ues cannot cause democracy to emerge—since they rather than as a function of long-term experience would only appear long after democracy has been under democratic institutions. established. It also implies that if mass preferences Whether emancipative values emerge from grow- for democracy arise in authoritarian regimes, they ing resources or from experience with democracy must be instrumentally motivated, by goals other can be tested by a statistical technique called mul- than democracy itself such as prosperity. Intrinsic tivariate regression analysis. Using an indicator of mass preferences for democracy would only emerge a society’s accumulated experience with democracy through long experience under democratic institu- and an indicator of the utility of freedom, we can tions. Proponents of this view claim that eman- examine which of the two has a stronger effect on cipative values are ‘endogenous’ to democratic emancipative mass beliefs measured subsequently. institutions (Hadenius and Teorell 2005). The ﬁ rst indicator, called ‘democracy stock’, has been But, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) demonstrate, developed by John Gerring et al. (2005) and measures high levels of intrinsic support for democracy had a country’s accumulated experience with democra- emerged in many authoritarian societies before they cy.1 The indicator of resources is Tatu Vanhanen’s made the transition to democracy. High levels of exis- (2003) ‘index of power resources’, which we prefer tential security and the emergence of post-industrial to call action resources.2 The result of this regres- economies had contributed to making self-expression analysis is graphically depicted in Figure 9.3 sion values widespread in such countries as Czech- below. It shows that, controlling for each country’s oslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, South Korea, length of democratic experience, action resources and Taiwan before they democratized. An intrinsic explain 28 per cent of the cross-national variation valuation of freedom can emerge even in the absence in emancipative values. By contrast, controlling for of democracy, provided modernization takes place. each country’s level of action resources, the demo- By providing rising incomes and other resources, cratic experience explains virtually none of the vari- modernization raises ordinary people’s sense of ation in emancipative values. Another 36 per cent of existential security, modernization leads to growing variation in emancipative values is explained by the

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overlap of action resources and the democratic expe- It is possible for democracy to survive even in rience, reﬂ ecting the fact that people in countries low-income countries—as India demonstrates. India with a longer democratic history tend to have more has a long experience with democracy but the aver- action resources. Thus, while democratic experience age Indian’s level of resources is still limited—and strengthens emancipative mass beliefs only in so mass emphasis on emancipative values is also rela- far as it goes with action resources, action resources tively weak in India. Moreover, India’s overall level strengthen emancipative mass beliefs on their own, of democracy is lower than some indicators suggest. independent of the democratic experience. Clearly, Figure 9.2 demonstrates this point, using a broad emancipative mass beliefs are not endogenous to measure of democracy, averaging four different indi- democratic institutions. The idea that the rise of cators: the Freedom House political and civil liberties emancipative values is driven by growing resources ratings, the Polity autocracy-democracy scores, the ﬁ nds far more empirical support than the idea that it CIRI (Cingranelli and Richards) ratings of empower- is driven by experience under democracy. ment and integrity rights,3 and Vanhanen’s electoral

0.23 0.23 = − 0.21 y 0.0045x 0.0198 0.21 R 2 = 0.2845 0.19 Slovenia 0.19 0.17 0.17 Czech R. Croatia 0.15 0.15 Sweden Slovenia 0.13 0.13 Sweden

Higher than Suggested Czech R. Lithuania Croatia Ethiopia 0.11 Higher than Suggested 0.11 Ethiopia Spain 0.09 Latvia Denmark 0.09 Lithuania Latvia Argentina Estonia 0.07 Russia Mexico 0.07 Slovakia Denmark China Belarus Switzerland Netherlands Russia Brazil 0.05 Switzerland 0.05 China France Kyrgyztan Japan S. Korea Uruguay 0.03 0.03 Mexico Japan Luxemb. Hungary S. Africa Armenia Peru 0.01 Brazil Saudi Arabia 0.01 UK Guatemala Israel Georgia Colombia − Taiwan −0.01 0.01 Zambia Chile Italy Bangladesh India Iran Belgium Spain Argentina Israel Cyprus − Vietnam Peru Algeria −0.03 Chile Ireland 0.03 Poland Belgium Malaysia Cyprus U.S.A. Saudi Arabia − Morocco −0.05 U.S.A. Trinidad-T. Emancipative Values 0.05 Mali Tanzania Iran Venezuela Emancipative Values Algeria Thailand Venezuela Zimbabwe Rwanda − Egypt −0.07 Colombia Singapore 0.07 Morocco Turkey Uganda Egypt Nigeria Trinidad-T. Singapore − Bangladesh −0.09 0.09 Iraq S. Korea Ghana Philippines Turkey Iraq − − Taiwan Indonesia Pakistan 0.11 S. Africa Malaysia Indonesia 0.11 Ghana Jordan −0.13 Nigeria Malta −0.13 India Zimbabwe −0.15 −0.15 Malta −0.17 −0.17 − = − −0.19 0.19 Jordan y 2E-05x 0.0007 Pakistan − R2 = 0.0047 −0.21 Lower than Suggested 0.21 Lower than Suggested −0.23 −0.23 −30 −25 −20 −15 −10 −50 51015202530 −600 −500 −400 −300 −200 −100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Action Resources Democracy Stock Lower than Suggested Higher than Suggested Lower than Suggested Higher than Suggested

Diagram 9.3a Diagram 9.3b

Vertical axis measures ëresidualsí in emancipative values, indicating the Vertical axis measures ëresidualsí in emancipative values, indicating the extent to which these values exceed (in case of positive numbers) or the extent to which these values exceed (in case of positive numbers) or the extent to which they fall short (in the case of negative numbers) of what a extent to which they fall short (in the case of negative numbers) of what a countryí s ëdemocracy stockí suggests. Horizontal axis measures ëresidualsí populationís action resources suggest. Horizontal axis measures ëresidualsí in action resources, indicating the extent to which these resources exceed in ëdemocracy stockí, indicating the extent to which this stock exceeds (in case of positive numbers) or the extent to which they fall short (in case of (in case of positive numbers) or the extent to which it falls short (in case of negative numbers) of what a countryís ëdemocracy stockísuggests. The negative numbers) of what a populationís action resources suggest. The residuals in both variables are significantly positively related. This means: residuals in both variables are not significantly related. This means: a populationís emancipative values exceed (fall short of) its ëdemocracy a populationís emancipative values do not exceed (fall short of) its action stockíto the extent its action resources exceed (fall short of) its ëdemocracy resources to the extent its ëdemocracy stockí exceeds (falls short of) its stockí. In other words, action resources have an effect on emancipative action resources. In other words, ëdemocracy stockí has no effect on values independent of ëdemocracy stockí. emancipative values independent of action resources.

Fig 9.3 The effects of action resources and level of democracy on emancipative values, controlling for the other variable (a) Impact of resources on values, controlling for each country’s level of democracy. (b) Impact of a society’s level of democracy on values, controlling for its level of action resources.

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democracy data. Across these four indicators, India’s less than half of the explained variation, taking into democratic performance is moderate, particularly account modernization’s own dependence on prior because of its low scoring on the Vanhanen index democracy. And when one controls for the effect of (refl ecting low voter turnout) and its high degree of emancipative mass beliefs, the impact of moderni- violations of citizens’ rights, as documented in the zation on subsequent democracy drops drastical- CIRI data. Taking these indicators of Indian democ- ly—explaining only 14 per cent of the variance in racy into account provides a more balanced picture of subsequent levels of democracy. On the other hand, its actual democratic performance than if one focuses emancipative values alone account for almost three- solely on the Polity and Freedom House data. quarters of the variation in subsequent levels of Analysing the direction in the relation between democracy, and still account for more than half of the emancipative values and levels of democracy depict- variance when one controls for the extent to which ed in Figure 9.2, Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 182–3) these beliefs are shaped by prior levels of democracy. fi nd that, after controlling for the action resources This effect drops further 24 per cent when one con- available to the average person in a society, prior trols for the effects of modernization. democracy has no signifi cant effect on subsequent What do these results indicate? The impact of mass beliefs; but, controlling for resource levels, mass both socioeconomic modernization and emancipa- beliefs prior to the Third Wave of democratization do tive mass beliefs drop considerably when one con- have a strong and statistically signifi cant effect on trols for the effect of the other variable. This is so subsequent levels of democracy. The causal arrow because these two phenomena overlap considerably, apparently runs from values to institutions, rather and the overlapping variance has a stronger effect than the other way round. on subsequent democracy than either of its parts. Using this broad measure of democracy, it is also Thus, socioeconomic modernization is conducive to clear that the relation between emancipative mass democracy mainly insofar as it is conducive to eman- beliefs and democracy is not a statistical artefact of cipative values among the public. Conversely, eman- a third factor, such as modernization, which might cipative values are conducive to democracy mainly cause both emancipative values and democracy to insofar as they are rooted in socioeconomic modern- reach high levels. Instead, Christian Welzel (2007) ization. Socioeconomic modernization gives people demonstrates that the effect of emancipative values the action resources that enable them to struggle for on democracy remains signifi cant when on con- democratic freedoms; and emancipative values give trols for modernization, even using the very broad them the motivation that makes them willing to do measure of modernization used by Hadenius and so. And both variables have their greatest impact Teorell (2005). Considered in isolation, moderniza- when they act together, making people both moti- tion explains about two-thirds of the variation in vated to seek democracy and able to exert effective subsequent levels of democracy. This effect drops to pressures to obtain it.

Explaining Democratic Change

The global wave of democratization, and its subse- both gains and losses in levels of democracy from quent reversal in some countries, brought changes to before the global wave of democratization in 1988– many countries’ level of democracy. These changes 1998, to the period afterward. constitute gains when a country climbs from a lower Moreover, if congruence theory is correct in to a higher level of democracy, and losses when a its assumption that incongruence between mass country falls from a higher to a lower level of democ- demands for democracy and given levels of democracy. If emancipative mass values have a causal effect racy is a major source of regime instability, chang- on democratization, they should be able to explain es towards and away from democracy should be a

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55 50

45 Czech Rep. Slovakia 40 Slovenia 35 Estonia Hungary 30 Latvia

Higher than predicted Chile 25 Taiwan Poland Bulgaria Croatia 20 Romania 15 S. Africa S. Korea Switzld. Norway 10 U.S.A. Neth. Sweden Ireland New Z. Denmark 5 Ghana Iceland Belgium Germany Portugal Italy Britain 0 Mexico Georgia Canada Philippines El Salv. -5 Russia Japan Bangladesh Armenia -10 Peru Brazil Indonesia Israel

Change in Democracy -15 Dom. R. Argentina India -20 Nigeria Tanzania Turkey -25 Algeria Azerbaijan -30 Uganda Belarus Jordan Venezuela -35 -40 China -45 Zimbabwe r = .72 Lower than predicted -50 Pakistan -55 -0.20 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Emancipative Beliefs Lower than predicted Higher than predicted

Fig 9.4 The effect of emancipative values on changes in democracy, controlling for each country’s initial level of democracy Notes: The horizontal axis measures emancipative values in around 1990 controlling for the level of democracy in 1984–88 (i.e. before the climax of the global democratization wave). Positive numbers show how much emancipative values exceed what the prior level of democracy predicts. Negative numbers indicate how much they fall short of it. The vertical axis measures changes in the level of democracy from 1984-88 (i.e. before the global democratization wave) to 2000–04 (i.e. after the global democratization wave), scaled as the percent change in the initial level of democracy. Interpretation: The more a population’s emancipative values exceed the prior level of democracy, the more this level increases.

function of both the direction and the amount of level of democracy would predict, a country’s level incongruence. If mass demands for democracy of democracy should rise. And it should rise approxi- are lower than is usual at a given country’s level of mately to the extent to which mass demands exceed democracy, a country’s level of democracy should a given democracy level, making mass preferences fall subsequently. And it should fall roughly to the congruent with the country’s political institutions. extent to which mass demands fall short of the Figure 9.4 conﬁ rms these expectations. Compar- prevailing level, bringing the level of democracy ing the levels of democracy found in given countries in line with people’s demands. Conversely, if mass during the period 1984–88 (before the peak of the demands for democracy are higher than a country’s democratization wave) with the levels on which we

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fi nd them over the period 2000–04 (after the peak he argued that this is true because modernization of the global wave), incongruence between mass tends to generate beliefs and values that are favour- demands for democracy and the initial democracy able to democracy. Lipset thus understood that objec- level explains about half of the changes in levels of tive social conditions impact on political changes, democracy. Levels of democracy fell in most coun- such as democratization, through their tendency to tries where they exceeded mass demands, while they be conducive to subjective orientations that seek these increased in almost every country where they fell changes. When he proposed this view of moderniza- short of mass demands. Hence, the global wave of tion, the survey data that would be needed to test it democratization can be seen as a major shift towards did not exist so, Lipset was unable to explore it any greater congruence between mass demands for democ- further, but this was his basic causal argument. racy, as measured by emancipative values, and actual More than 30 years later Huntington (1991) fol- levels of democracy. China is the most prominent lowed a similar line of reasoning, arguing that the outlier in one direction, where the country actually rise of modern middle classes in developing coun- became somewhat less democratic after 1988, despite tries was conducive to beliefs that dictatorial powers mass demands for more democracy; and Taiwan is were illegitimate, and there was a growing valuation an outlier in the opposite direction, where the shift of freedom, concluding that these changes in mass toward higher levels of democracy was even greater orientations provided a major source of democratiz- than the amount predicted by mass demands. But on ing pressures. the whole, changes toward or away from democracy Despite its focus on mass beliefs, the political cul- tended to refl ect unmet mass demands rather closely ture approach has little to say about the role of mass ( r=.72), acting to reduce incongruence between mass beliefs in the process of democratization. While there demands and political institutions. is a widespread consensus that mass beliefs are important for the consolidation of existing democracies (Rose and Mishler 2001), the role of mass beliefs in Emancipative values and human transitions to or away from democracy is generally empowerment neglected. This refl ects the type of mass beliefs that most of the political culture literature assumed were These fi ndings suggest that democracy is based conducive to democracy. on empowering human conditions in a society. It Infl uenced by David Easton (1965), Gabriel Almond includes cultural conditions that motivate people to and Sidney Verba (1963), and Robert Putnam (1993), demand democracy, and economic conditions that most political culture studies focus on overt support make people capable of exerting effective demands. for democracy, confi dence in political institutions, As an institutional means to empower people, interpersonal trust, norms of cooperation and other democracy is inherently linked to empowering eco- communal orientations. Communal orientations nomic and cultural conditions. Democracy empow- may indeed be helpful in consolidating existing ers people in allowing them to practice civic freedoms. democracies. But when one wants to explore the role Human empowerment as a whole then is a syndrome of mass beliefs in transitions from authoritarian rule of empowering economic, cultural, and institutional to democracy, one must identify orientations that conditions. motivate people to oppose authoritarian rule and Emancipative values constitute the cultural com- struggle for democratic institutions. Emancipative ponent in the human empowerment process and self-expression values constitute precisely this type as such are the intervening variable between action of orientation. Emancipative values give priority to resources, and democratic institutions, as shown in tolerance over conformity, autonomy over authority, Figure 6.2 (see Ch. 6). Seeing mass beliefs in a medi- gender equality over patriarchy, and participation ating role between economic modernization and over security. If these beliefs arise in an authoritarian political democracy is consistent with Lipset’s (1959) regime, the very legitimacy of authoritarian rule is classic discussion of modernization. When Lipset undermined and mass regime opposition that top- asked why modernization is conducive to democracy ples these regimes becomes more likely.

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But emancipative values do not only help to undermine authoritarian regimes. They also help Box 9.3 Key points to consolidate and deepen existing democracies. For people who are inspired by emancipative values • Emancipative mass beliefs arise when growing are motivated to struggle for democratic institu- action repertoires among ordinary people increase tions, whether to attain them when they are absent, the perceived utility of democratic freedoms. These or to defend them when they are challenged, or to beliefs are not the product of enduring democracy. advance them when they stagnate. Accordingly, • Historically, countries moved the farther towards Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Welzel (2007) show democracy the more people’s emancipative beliefs that self-expression values motivate peaceful elite- were above the level suggested by the respective challenging mass actions and that they do so regard- country’s initial democracy level. Likewise, countries less of a country’s level of democracy. The absence moved the farther away from democracy, the more of democracy is thus no safeguard against the mass people’s emancipative beliefs were below the level mobilizing effects of emancipative values. Emanci- suggested by the country’s initial democracy level. pation-inspired mass actions, and only emancipa- • Emancipative beliefs are a central component in a tion-inspired mass actions, have a democratizing wider process of human empowerment, mediating effect, both in making democratic gains where the the economic component of human empowerment initial democracy level is low and in preventing (i.e. action resources) and its institutional compo- democratic losses where the initial democracy level nent (i.e. democratic freedoms). is high. The kind of communal, supportive, and allegiant orientations emphasized in most of the political cul- or deepen democratic institutions. Emancipative ture literature does tend to place elected democratic orientations, by contrast, do serve this purpose. elites in a stable cultural context where they face lit- These beliefs are an important mass orientation for tle resistance. But these orientations do not motivate democracy, operating in favour of its emergence, people to put pressure on elites to establish, retain, survival, and deepening.

The Role of Religion

Besides the beliefs discussed so far, religiosity, reli- of the variation in levels of democracy. Protestant gious denomination, and a society’s religious demog- countries tend to be rich, have high educational lev- raphy have all been identifi ed as important cultural els and a high proportion of people employed in the factors infl uencing democracy (Inglehart and Norris knowledge sector. And a demographic dominance 2002). A demographic dominance of Protestants, in of Protestants is favourable to democracy largely particular, has been said to be favourable to democ- because it is linked with socioeconomic conditions racy, whereas a Muslim dominance has been claimed that strengthen emphasis on emancipative values. to be detrimental to democracy (Huntington 1996). This can be demonstrated by analysing the deter- Inglehart and Welzel (2005) fi nd that the percent- minants of the strength of people’s emancipative age difference between Protestants and Muslims in a values, using World Values Survey data. As the multi- society strongly affects its subsequent level of democ- level model in Table 9.2 shows, if someone has a racy: the more Protestants outnumber Muslims, the high level of education, this factor strengthens this higher the level of democracy. However, when one person’s emancipative values. The same is true for takes into account a population’s overall emphasis on people living in countries where the average person’s emancipative values, the effect of religious demogra- action resources are large. This contextual factor, too, phy becomes weak, accounting for only a minor part strengthens people’s emancipative values. Living in a

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Table 9.2 Multi-level Model Explaining Emancipative Values

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Emancipative Values

PREDICTORS: Coefﬁ cient T-Ratio

Intercept .423 71.659*** Individual Level Effects (IL): - Education level .127 25.945*** - Being Muslim – .053 – 6.2 96*** - Being Protestant .004 1.146 - Religiosity – .031 – 6.543*** Country Level Effects (CL): - Action resources .004 6.166*** - Democracy stock _____ n. s. - Muslims (%) – .000 – 1.742* - Protestants (%) _____ n. s. Cross Level Interaction Effects (IL*CL): - Education * Action resources .003 4.257*** - Education * Democracy stock _____ n. s. - Education * Muslim (%) – .001 – 2.556** - Being Muslim * Action resources – .002 – 2.696*** - Being Muslim * Democracy stock _____ n. s. - Being Muslim * Muslim (%) _____ n. s.

Explained variance (%): IL (% of total) 12% (8%) CL (% of total) 80% (24%)

Source: World Values Surveys 1995–2006. Notes: Number of individual level units (respondents) is 141,303. Number of country level units (nations) is 80. Signiﬁ cance levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, n. s. (not signiﬁ cant).

country with a rich democratic experience, however, interaction between being a Muslim and the action does by itself not strengthen people’s emancipative resources of the average person in a country shown values, as is evident from the insigniﬁ cant effect of under cross-level interaction effects. This interaction the ‘democracy stock’ variable shown under country level effects. Islam tends to depress people’s emancipative values in various ways. To begin with, living in a country Box 9.4 Key points dominated by Muslims tends to lower one’s emancipative values, whether one is a Muslim or not. But • Islam, independent of religiosity, and religiosity, independent of Islam, have modest but robust neg- being a Muslim depresses emancipative values even ative effects on emancipative beliefs. more than living in a Muslim society. Moreover, living in a Muslim society diminishes education’s • In depressing emancipative beliefs, religiosity in generally positive effect on emancipative values, as general and Islam speciﬁ cally weaken the cultural is indicated by the negative sign of the interaction foundation of democracy. between education and the percentage of Muslims • With action resources growing throughout a soci- shown under cross-level interaction effects. ety, Islam matters less and less for development of Nevertheless, the anti-emancipative effect of Islam emancipative beliefs. can be alleviated, as is evident from the negative

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means that the negative effect of being a Muslim on resources increase, being a Muslim becomes less and emancipative values shrinks as the action resources less of a hindrance to a shift toward emancipative of the average person grows. Hence, Muslims are not values. immune to the logic of modernization: as a country’s

Conclusion

In the process of democratization, mass beliefs play a give rise to these values. Emancipative values are part central role. Growing resources are conducive to the of the human empowerment process because they rise of emancipative values that emphasize self-expres- motivate people to give high priority to free choice, sion; and these values are conducive to the collective and make them more articulate and able to organize actions that lead to democratization. Emancipative effectively to demand democratic institutions. mass beliefs appear to be the single most important If emancipative values arise in authoritarian cultural factor in helping to attain, consolidate, and regimes, mass pressures to democratize become more deepen democracy. As a system designed to empower likely, increasing the chances of a transition from people, democracy is an emancipative achievement, authoritarian rule to democracy. If emancipative driven by emancipative forces in society. values arise in democratic regimes, mass pressures Emancipative values are not endogenous to democ- to deepen their democratic qualities and make them racy. These beliefs emerge in authoritarian societies more responsive become increasingly likely. Emanci- as well as democracies, provided they experience pative values constitute a major selective force in the socioeconomic modernization. And sheer experi- rise and fall of political regimes, conferring a selec- ence under democratic institutions by itself does not tive advantage on democracy.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the meaning of political culture?

2. What does congruence theory say?

3. In what regard do mass beliefs play a mediating role?

4. What are emancipative mass beliefs?

5. Why are emancipative values important for democratization?

6. Are emancipative values endogenous to democracy?

Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for additional questions to accompany each chapter, and a range of other resources: .