The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force

reviewAIR U N I VE R S IT Y from the editor's aerie

It is a mark of a professional journal not only to inform in the factual sense but also to serve as a forum of emerging ideas that stretch understanding in new directions or challenge existing concepts. In our lead article, Francis Hoeber undertakes to puncture some of the myths associated with the defense budget. Regarding the competition within the federal budget for defense or social services, he points out that “There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.” In a symbolic representation of these ideas, our cover, by Art Editor William DePaola, depicts myths being assaulted by truth.

Donald Clark, a frequent contributor to our pages, introduces an argument counter to the conventional wisdom that nuclear proliferation must be held to a minimum. On the contrary, he indicates in his article “Could We Be Wrong?” that nuclear proliferation may actually improve international stability and the prospects for peace.

In a somewhat related vein. Colonel David Cade suggests that Russian military strategy places decreasing reliance on the use of strategic nuclear forces, which serve as an uncrossable threshold, while at the same time striving for clear superiority in general purpose forces.

"Men are not only determining the goals women should accept but they also determine how women will and should feel and how women will react in various situations” writes Major Patricia Murphy in "What’s a Nice Girl Like You Doing in a Place Like This?” Despite her assertion that women have not reached their full potential in a traditionally masculine Air Force, Major Murphy appears to compete quite successfully in this environment. Congratulations are due for her forthcoming promotion to lieutenant colonel—below the zone!

"The old order changeth,” and after three years as Editor of the Review, Colonel Glenn Wasson has been posted to the western ramparts as Fifth Air Force Director of Information, with offices at Yokota Air Base and Tokyo. We shall continue to draw on his expertise as one of our Advisers, just as we shall rely on the continuing support of old and new contributors to keep the Review both viable and vital. September-October 1978 Vol. XXIX No. 6 articles 2 Myths about the Defense Budget Francis P. Hoeber 18 Russian Military Strategy— Col. David J. Cade, USAF A Fresh Look 28 Could We Be Wrong? Donald L. Clark 38 Professionalism in Transition: Lt. Col. Thomas A. The Officer Corps in the Age Fabyanic, USAF of Deterrence

46 Family Policy in the Armed Dr. Hamilton I. McCubbin Forces: An Assessment Ms. Martha A. Marsden Dr. Kathleen P. Durning Dr. Edna J. Hunter departments

AIK FORCE KKV1KW

58 The Day of the E-3A Col. Dwayne P. Wright, USAF Tactical Test

IN MY OPINION

74 What's a Nice Girl Like Maj. Patricia M. Murphy, USAF You Doing in a Place Like This? 81 RMS 1977—Encouraging Maj. Barry D. Guyse, USAF Management Growth and Productivity

BOOKS AND IDEAS 86 A Response to Chaplain, Capt., Russell Human World Order L. Osmond, USAF 92 Potpourri 97 Books Received 103 THE CONTRIBUTORS ■\ 1 —z 11

These increased manpower costs are not, as co primarily a result of the post-Vietnam creatf~ volunteer army. Rather, they stem from conb. legislate in 1967 establishing “ comparability pay” (govern, with industry) and tying military raises to civilian civil

MYTHS ABOUT THE DEFENSE BU X r F rancis P.

i OR many years, and particularly Their explication is beyond the scope of since the late 1960s, the budget of the this article; we will content ourselves with U.S. Department of Defense has been a brief listing of some of the contributing Fa favorite whipping boy of many publicfactors. opinion leaders in this country—colum- Historically, this nation has been nists, academics, members of Congress, largely isolationist—and blessed with a liberal politicians, and so on. It is the belief physical remoteness that permitted it that of this writer that for little or none of this luxury. Its roots also gave Americans an time have the advocates of cutting the abhorrence of standing armies and of the defense budget represented a majority of strong central power they symbolize. the American public. It is not, however, the The aftermath of World War I—virtually purpose here to debate or attempt to prove a national hangover—and the suffering of the point. Rather, the intent is to examine the citizens’ army brought a resurgence of the premises behind the attacks on the isolationist sentiment and the Senate defense budget and some of the reasons for defeat of U.S. membership in the League of their popularity. Nations, albeit by a “ small band of willful It will be argued that the case for cutting men” who prevailed over an ailing the defense budget—and often for reduc- president. ing or eliminating specific items within The 1920s saw the birth of a genre of that budget—is based largely on myths antiwar literature (e.g., All Quiet on the about the budget or about the national Western Front, Good bye to All That, A defense which that budget underwrites. It Farewell to Arms, etc.) and a theory of the will be further argued that it is important “ Merchants of Death” —arms cartels to expose and analyze these myths “ selling” wars. The 1930s brought eco- because, as in so many areas of human nomic isolationism, ushered in by the activity, the myths tend to divert public Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and politicized and congressional debate from relevant by disillusion with the Versailles Treaty, issues of rational decision-making. tolerance of Hitler, grateful acceptance of Myths, of course, do not just happen. “ Peace in our time,” and finally America They are created by people. They start as Firsters and opposition to aid to a arguments, assertions, or simply as beleaguered Great Britain. stories, and it is through repetition that The shock of Pearl Harbor and the they become myths. The original state- political wizardry of FDR turned World ments may or may not have been true, but War II into a “ popular war,” and at its end the term ‘"myths” implies that they are not the United Nations was hosted and true now. (If they were once true, the facts enthusiastically joined, in atonement for may have changed during the period of the League debacle. repetition or justification of the evolving But there was also an initially un- myth.) Once statements have become full- popular president’s use of the atomic blown myths, their easy repetition and bomb, which spawned a generation of uncritical acceptance can become mis- guilt-ridden scientists, whose Bulletin of leading and dangerous. the Atomic Scientists and Federation of One may well ask, Why so many myths American Scientists have lent an aura of about defense? Why is the defense budget a intellectual prestige to the antinuclear scapegoat? The reasons are historical, arms movement. Two unpopular wars, psychological, political, and complex. McCarthyism, and the century-overdue

3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

civil rights progress have added to the a value j udgment, would it not be better to ranks of the post-World War II guilt- say that Martin Luther’s “wine, woman, ridden. The unprecedented necessity for and song,” 1 or today’s “whatever turns maintaining large standing U.S. forces you on,” are productive, and all the other since Korea has provided a target for the things that one does—necessary defense vocal but still minority anti-arms groups. against the obstacles that nature and man Inflation has fed their arguments and place in the way of one’s enjoyment of his their ranks. discretionary income—are either non- The synthesis of these and other factors productive or only indirectly productive? into an adequate theory of public opinion But the point is not whether one or on defense is a monumental task that the another latter-day interpreter of Isaiah or writer leaves to others. For present Martin Luther is semantically correct, but purposes, we only note that we can see rather that the belief that defense is many motivations for the myth-makers nonproductive prejudices choices both and at the same time that public opinion between defense and nondefense and polls have long and consistently shown among alternative defense expenditures or large majorities, however diffuse and alternative weapon systems. Indeed, if one unvocal, supporting national defense and believes that defense is nonproductive, the necessary spending to provide for it. then one cannot logically invoke cost- We examine, therefore, some of the major effectiveness comparisons in opposing a myths currently prominent in defense particular weapon system. The problem is budget debates. at most that of establishing priorities as to. which weapon system to oppose first. To Myth number one: cite a recent example, some of those who Defense is nonproductive. opposed the B-l bomber during the debate of the past two years, invoking the That defense is nonproductive is the oldest arguments that cruise missiles offered a and most basic myth with which we must cheaper, more effective alternative, are deal here. In Isaiah’s mountain of the now opposing the cruise missile on various Lord’s house, nations “shall beat their grounds, such as that it represents a new swords into plowshares, and their spears step in the arms race, that it raises into pruninghooks.” To many of his host of verification difficulties that jeopardize readers, Isaiah seems to imply that swords arms control negotiations, and even that it and spears are nonproductive, but plow- may be less cost-effective than earlier shares and pruninghooks are. But Isaiah claimed.2 specifically referred to days to come, when “ nation shall not lift up sword against To deny that arms are nonproductive is nation, nor shall they learn war anymore.” not to assert that all arms are productive. Those days have not come, however, and There should indeed be rational choices nation still does lift up sword against made on the merits of each case. Some nation. arms may not be productive at all in a It is a curious and arbitrary distinction given environment that includes the that says that defense against the swords weapons and doctrines of potential enemy of others is not productive, but defense forces as well as the other weapons and against the elements is. Were the rude doctrine of the United States. Other cabins of our forefathers productive, but weapons may be productive, but less so their stockades not? If we must make such than some alternatives. DEFENSE B UDGET M YTHS 5

Reciprocally, the theology that non- Myth number two: defense goods and activities, or some We must shift our priorities. subset thereof, are always productive is Closely related to the myth of the non- similarly indefensible, though not neces- productivity of defense is the slogan of the sarily absent in national debate. If one's 1960s: “ We must shift our priorities.” It theology holds that all dams are pro- has a much more moderate and reasonable ductive, one may be reluctant to make sound. It does not deny that defense may comparisons among them and may be have utility but simply asserts that we tempted to vote for every dam that is have been spending too much on defense proposed—and it has been suggested that as compared with some other activities. there is a dam constituency that does just The slogan gained popularity during the that. The examples are legion. It is a Vietnam War, with, it must be added, widespread belief that hospitals are good, considerable justification in the eyes of but the history of the Hill-Burton Act has most people today—though not so in the shown that the building of hospitals can early years of that war. But the slogan also continue to the point where some of the became the call to arms of those opposed to hospitals are nonproductive. Indeed, arms, not just the Vietnam War. It is still because competition among hospitals is heard today—although the priorities have highly imperfect, empty beds lead to long since been dramatically shifted. higher per-day charges, and excessive Table I shows that the implicit priority beds are counterproductive. In short, of defense has declined in less than two categorical judgments about productivity decades to about half that assigned to it in are not productive of good decision- the 1950s. This is true when defense is making. measured in terms of share of the GNP, of Myth number one was succinctly re- the total federal budget, of all government jected by a high British officer of World expenditures, or of the total labor force. War II in these words: Yet, the cry is still heard that “we must It is customary in democratic countries to shift our priorities.” deplore expenditure on armament as con- When the myth was still a statement flicting with the requirements of the social services. There is a tendency to forget that with elements of validity, the United the most important social service that a States had unquestioned strategic nuclear government can do for its people is to keep superiority that provided a deterrent to them alive and free. large-scale war and, in particular, to

Table I Department of Defense budget, as a share of selected national measures

1957 FY 1964 FY 1968 FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979 Department ot Defense budget as a share of: federal budget (outlays) 55.5% 41.8% 43.3% 23.8% 22.8% 23.0% gross national product 10.0 8.0 9.3 5.2 5.2 5.1 labor force NA 8.3 9.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 net public spending 38.3 27.9 29.5 15.6 15.2 15.2

Source: FY 1964 to 1979 from Department of Defense press release. 23 January 1978. 1957 calculated from Economic Report ot the President 1977 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW violent conflict between the superpowers. national security against external threats. Risks of defense budget cutting could The obvious fact that this statement may therefore be accepted. In contrast, today appear true to other nations quite natu- the U.S. strategic nuclear superiority is rally gives rise to the view that military gone, and by the 1980s superiority will preparations are a competition among have swung to the Soviet Union. The nations, or at least among the major author argues elsewhere that this new nations of the world, which today means reality carries grave risks for the security primarily the two superpowers. The of the United States against coercive popular metaphor for this competition is diplomacy by the Soviet Union as well as that of a race. “ Arms race” theory goes against actual war; he calls for a shifting back in a formal sense to Lewis Richard- of priorities back toward defense, where son.5 The arms race concept has been greater expenditures are needed to make popular in this country for almost three up for serious deficiencies accumulated decades because of several factors. over the last decade-and-a-half.4 It is After World Wars I and II, the United appropriate to add here that the shift in States essentially demobilized. In the first priorities has had much to do with case, the country did not remobilize until permitting the Soviets to pass the United after the outbreak of World War II and not States in strategic nuclear power. in a serious way until after the attack on In the early 1930s, Norman Thomas was Pearl Harbor. In contrast, the post-World fond of pointing out that “ the cost of one War II demobilization lasted less than five battleship would pay for five hospitals,” years. reflecting his own priorities. From 1931 to Demobilization was the most popular 1933 (if the author recalls the dates activity in our war-weary country in 1946, correctly), not one hospital was completed when the national theme was “bring the in the United States, not because battle- boys home,” and the GIs still overseas ships were built but because of a lack of spent this time counting the days they demand during the Depression. Battle- were short. But the Soviet troops were not ships and hospitals were entirely un- demobilized then and only gradually in related, except by rhetoric. Even today, the the late 1940s. A chaotic Soviet homeland, choices are seldom direct. With unemploy- needing time to reorganize in order to ment hovering between 6 and 7 percent rebuild and assure jobs, did not need the and plant utilization in the neighborhood potential further disruption of several of 85 percent, an increase in the defense million young men, tired and hungry, budget would not have to come out of one’s returning to who knew what mischief if favorite social service. An increment of they did not have jobs and food. Moreover, over $40 billion, if required, could be the continued presence of these armed men supported by a cut in unemployment of in Eastern Europe provided the highly less than two percentage points. visible power with which to gain and consolidate Soviet hegemony over the Soviet sphere of influence, the satellite buffer states. In Churchill’s vivid meta- Myth number three: phor, they rang down the Iron Curtain. In The arms race—usually meaning the strategic 1947, the extension of Soviet hegemony nuclear arms race—drives the defense budget. southward was only prevented by the U.S. It was noted earlier that national defense takeover of the support of Greece and is not nonproductive if it serves to provide Turkey from the exhausted British under DEFENSE Ii UDGET M YTHS 7 the Truman Doctrine, with the $400 large peacetime military forces. million emergency appropriation that For obvious reasons, public concern and preceded the Marshall Plan. In February debate over these large military forces and 1948, the fall of the democratic Benes- expenditures have been dominated by the Mazaryk regime in Czechoslovakia com- strategic-nuclear end of the spectrum of pleted the conquest of the Soviet satellites. potential conflict. The overriding danger Meanwhile, though we did not know it yet, in the second half of the twentieth century, the Soviets were carrying out their own in the minds of most people, is the risk of “ Manhattan Project” to develop the atom nuclear war. It is widely held that such a bomb. war would inevitably be a holocaust, or Still, in the spring of 1950 we were even the end of civilization. Indeed, debating a $13 billion defense budget. It nuclear weapons are generally believed to was not until after the June attack on make large-scale conventional war highly South Korea that Congress passed the unlikely (at least as long as the United $100 billion plus defense authorizations States maintains essential equivalence, or that initiated the partial remobilization of parity). The emphasis on Strategic Arms the Korean period. Limitation Talks (SALT) during the past It may be argued that remobilization decade has further focused American would have taken place to some degree in attention on strategic arms. any event, as a consequence of the Cold This strategic nuclear emphasis has War, the formation of NATO in 1949, and prevailed even though the strategic forces the Soviet acquisition of the atomic and have never represented more than 27 hydrogen bombs in 1949 and 1953, respec- percent of the total Department of Defense tively. However that may be, after the budget (1961) and currently are less than 8 Korean War the United States continued percent.6 (See Table II.) The defense to maintain, for the first time in its history, budget is actually dominated by so-called

Table II. Department o f Defense budget by major program. FY 1977-79

Total Obligational Authority constant FY 1979 dollars (in billions) Proposed Distribution Military Program FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979 FY 1979 strategic forces $ 10.6 $ 9.8 $ 9.8 7.8% general purpose forces 43.1 45.1 46.9 37.3 intelligence and communications 8.4 8.3 8.3 6.6 airlift and sealift 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.4 Guard and Reserve forces 6.7 7.0 6.7 5.3 research and development 11.2 10.9 11.0 8.7 central supply and maintenance 12.6 12.7 12.8 102 training, medical, other general personnel activity 25.7 25.5 26.0 20.6 administrative and associated activities 2.3 2.4 2.4 1.9 support of other nations (excludes MAP) .2 .3 .3 .2 Total $122.6 $123.7 $126.0 100.0% 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW general purpose forces (conventional and other side would take measures to offset. tactical nuclear forces), currently exceed- When he decided against deployment of ing 37 percent of the budget, or almost five the first American antiballistic missile times as much as the strategic forces. (ABM) system in 1961, McNamara an- Conventional forces are costlier than nounced publicly that the reason was that nuclear forces because they must be far the Soviets would simply build decoy more numerous; people tend to forget that ballistic reentry vehicles to overwhelm it. nuclear bombs were invented because they (He did not even ask a quid pro quo for the would be cheap! unilateral cancellation. An early oppor- Nevertheless, in the era of U.S. nuclear tunity for strategic arms limitation may force monopoly and then superiority, the have been missed.) When the start of the strategic nuclear weapons properly domi- Soviet deployment of an ABM system nated national security debates. The around Moscow was announced, McNa- United States could afford conventional mara said we would offset it by building a inferiority in Europe after World War II multiple independently targetable reentry because its atomic monopoly deterred the vehicle (MIRV) capability into our Po- Soviets (even when, as we now know, there seidon submarine-launched ballistic mis- were no atomic bombs in the stockpile—a siles (SLBMs) and Minuteman III inter- unique, successful U.S. bluff). The Soviets continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). regarded their conventional forces as at There were in fact multiple causes of the least partially redressing the correlation of development and deployment of U.S. forces while they developed and deployed MIRVs.7 their own nuclear forces. (It was more than Considerable experience and theory three decades before Brezhnev declared have shown that many factors, including that the correlation of forces had shifted to technological, bureaucratic, and political favor the Soviet Union.) imperatives, enter into both U.S. and This nuclear preoccupation was rein- Soviet defense spending decisions. Never- forced by the “ massive retaliation” theless, because some cases appear to be doctrine of John Foster Dulles, subsequent largely action-reaction phenomena, refer- concepts of nuclear deterrence, and the ence to the spiraling arms race seemed generalized fear of a nuclear World War III credible. (Note that the term “ spiraling” is (not as dissimilar from the 1930s fear of a always used to imply upward, not down- conventional World War II as the present ward, motion.) generation is wont to think). The nuclear The concept of the arms race or the emphasis and the concept of an arms race spiraling arms race has not provided a were further strengthened by the priority valid model for the postwar U.S./Soviet assigned by the Soviets to overtaking the competition. If there has been a race, it has United States in the acquisition of nuclear been more on Aesop’s model of the tortoise technology and weapons stockpiles. and the hare.* The trends of U.S. and Moreover, the arms race metaphor fitted Soviet military expenditures and deploy- the obvious fact of U.S.-Soviet competition ments have certainly not been parallel. in the postwar world. It derived added The Soviet Union did not demobilize after credibility from former Defense Secretary World War II, as the United States did, nor Robert McNamara’s “ action-reaction” did it match the U.S. Korean War build-up theory in the 1960s. This theory held, in (whether because it did not think it could essence, that whatever one side did, the afford to or because it did not think it DEFENSE BUDGET MYTHS 9

needed to, with North Korea and the Soviet trends discussed above, detailed People’s Republic of China acting as estimates are not available. Second, the Soviet proxies, or for both reasons). Nor rate of growth of the Soviet budget is did the Soviets parallel the U.S. rise in probably underestimated.9 But even at the military expenditures in the Vietnam War conservative estimate of about 3 percent a (perhaps for similar reasons) or cut back year, it will stay well ahead of the after the Vietnam denouement. Rather, announced U.S. goal (agreed with NATO) the level of Soviet military forces held of an annual 3 percent increase.10 remarkably steady in the first ten to fifteen years after World War II, and their military expenditures have been growing T he comparison of strategic by a fairly steady annual percentage in the force expenditures is even more unfavor- 1960s and 1970s, as shown in Figure 1. able to the United States. Soviet expendi- This chart reflects the latest official data tures for strategic forces rose from double available. Several qualifications need to those of the United States in 1967 to triple be made. First, it does not extend back to in 1977, reflecting the above-noted build- World War II because, while there is up toward Soviet strategic superiority.11 general agreement on the relatively steady The Soviet expenditures include more for strategic offensive forces (largely for ICBMs and SLBMs—but their lower expenditures on bombers do not include the Backfire bombers assigned to other missions but usable strategically against Figure 1. Comparison of U.S. defense outlays and the United States). The figures also estimated dollar cost of Soviet defense programs include the medium and intermediate- range strategic weapons for “peripheral attack” (vs. Western Europe and China)— the SS-4, SS-5, SS-20, and some Backfires. While outspending us on offensive forces, the Soviets also spend heavily on strategic defensive forces. They maintain and steadily modernize vast air defenses, including more than 10,000 surface-to-air missiles and 2600 interceptors, while U.S. expenditures are nominal—only for maintaining since 1974 some 150 old F-106 interceptors. The Soviets also maintain the Moscow ABM, while we dismantled our one treaty-permitted site at Grand Forks over two years ago. Not included in the comparison but bearing on the strategic balance is civil defense, on which the Soviets have been estimated to be spend- Notes: 1) To improve comparability. U S data include non-DOD ing over $1 billion a year in the 1970s as detense programs (eg . Department ot Energy. Coast Guard) compared with less than $100 million by 2) Retirement costs have been excluded Source: Department ot Defense Annual Report FY 1979 the United States. 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The CIA/DOD comparisons cited here today. Nevertheless, it continues to have often been criticized because they are obscure rational analysis of what the computed in dollars, at U.S. prices. There United States may need to do for its is some merit to the criticism; as every contemporary security in the face of student of index number theory knows, observed Soviet strategic and general comparison in rubles would make the U.S. purpose force build-ups and reflected in expenditures show up more favorably. Soviet budget trends.11 However, we are interested here in comparing expenditures for the observed Myth number four: forces, as seen by the United States. The $100-plu8 billion defense budget Moreover, we cannot compare ruble goes mostly for weapons. expenditures directly, because there is no Strategic systems get the headlines, but real or market-established exchange rate other weapons that come in large units, between the dollar and the ruble, and we such as ships, fighter aircraft, and tanks, cannot compare the costs of given forces in also get a great deal of attention. “ Arms” rubles because we do not have ruble prices has more frightening connotations than for Soviet weapon systems. But the trends “ forces.” The post-World War I image of of the Soviet defense expenditures in sinister arms merchants foisting their rubles are consistent with the trends wares on an unsuspecting people was shown here.12 reinforced by the famous passage in If one is interested in comparing the President Eisenhower’s farewell address: burdens imposed by defense expenditures In the councils of government we must guard in the respective countries, then one against the acquisition of unwarranted calculates the figures for each country in influence, whether sought or unsought by its own currency. We have already seen the military-industrial complex. The poten- that U.S. expenditures are only about five tial for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.15 percent of the GNP. CIA estimates for the Soviet Union are 11-13 percent, and many Eisenhower said many other things in students believe this to be on the low side. that speech, emphasizing the threats to For strategic forces, the Soviet figure is of the country and the importance of resolute the order of three percent of GNP, com- defense, but it is the phrase “ the military- pared to less than one-half of one percent industrial complex” that caughtthe public for U.S. strategic forces. eye, or rather ear, and stuck. It conjured up That there are neither parallel trends images of fat-cat lobbyists selling non- nor a spiral arms race in strategic weapon productive weapons. The public over- deployments in the 1960s and 1970s has looked the simple fact that one aspect of been authoritatively documented in terms the checks-and-balances principle on of numbers of weapons as well as expendi- which the American government is organ- tures by Albert Wohlstetter et al.13 ized is that of competing claims—by However, the myth persists. Whatever “claimant agencies” within the govern- validity it may have had in other par- ment and claimant industries pressing ticular cases—in earlier periods, e.g., the their own interests (“ lobbying” ) from the British-German naval competition before outside. Clearly, there are many other World War I, and in local regional areas, claimant “complexes”—a health-indus- eg., the Israeli-Egyptian/Arab competi- trial complex, an agriculture-farmer tion—it is not valid for the superpowers complex, a housing-urban-local-govem- DEFENSE B UDGET M YTIfS 11

ment-industrial complex, and so on. As we percent in FY 1964 to 52 percent in FY 1979 saw in discussing the shift in priorities (after peaking at 62 percent in FY 1973). over the past two decades, the military- This startling increase has occurred industrial complex has in this period been despite a 22 percent decline in the size of one of the less successful competitors. the armed forces, from 2.7 million men in Let’s look at the facts. Arms appear in 1964 to 2.1 million currently (with a peak of the defense budget under the heading, 3.5 million during the Vietnam War). “ Procurement,” which includes all sorts of Manpower costs include the pay and nonweapon supplies that the services buy. allowances of military personnel, the pay But even with these inclusions, this of civilian employees, and military retire- category is only 25 percent of the FY 1979 ment pay. budget. If we consider research and These increased manpower costs are development (RDT&E—research, develop- not, as commonly believed, primarily a ment, test and evaluation) as an important result of the post-Vietnam creation of an stage in the budgeting for arms, and, even all-volunteer army. Rather, they stem from more than procurement, dominated by congressional legislation in 1967 estab- weapons, we can add another 10 percent. lishing “ comparability pay” (government Thus, the hardware and new technology with industry) and tying military raises to that constitute the cutting edge of defense civilian civil service raises. account for at most 35 percent, or just over The problem was further compounded one-third of the total budget. (See Table by the rapid growth of retirement pay, III.) from one percent of the defense budget in In 1964, procurement and R&D 1962 to over 8 percent currently. This amounted to 44 percent, a 25 percent larger growth, which is expected to continue, share of the budget. Why has the share stems from the combined effects of two going to create military muscle declined? factors. First, the retired military popu- The first cause is an increase in the lation has been growing rapidly, as the allocation to manpower costs, up from 47 generation of young officers who stayed in

Table III Department o f Defense budget by appropriation category, FY 1977-79

Total Obligational Authority constant FY 1979 dollars (in billions) Proposed Distribution Appropriation Title FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979 FY 1979 military personnel $ 29.3 $ 28.9 $ 28.7 22.8% retired pay 9.5 9.8 10.2 8.1 operation and maintenance 36.4 37.1 38.1 30.2 procurement 30.8 32.0 32.0 25.4 RDT&E 12.0 12.1 12.5 9.9 military construction 2.7 2.0 2.7 2.1 family housing 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.3 civil defense .1 .1 .1 .1 revolving and management funds .2 .2 .1 .1 Total $122.6 $123.7 $126.0 100.0% Sourct: Department o! Defense FY 1979 budget press release. 23 January 1978 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW after World War II has reached retirement percent. The FY 1979 budget finally age. Second, the above-mentioned pay recognizes that, while military assistance raises and cost-of-living escalator clauses to other nations may involve national in the pension system compound the rising security considerations, it is not properly trend. part of the defense budget. The new federal Pensions should not, in fact, be included budget proposes that MAP funds be in the military budget at all. They transferred to the international affairs represent not a cost of maintaining the budget. armed forces but a social-policy decision Budgetary reforms may in time give a about the transfer payments that should clearer picture of the share of weapon be made to a given class of citizens. This procurement in the total budget. This was implied in the pioneering Moot Report share may also rise somewhat, after more in 1972"* and is beginning to be recognized than a decade of disinvestment in the in proposals by the Defense Department stock of arms. There is increasing recogni- and in Congress to lump military pensions tion of the need to redress the strategic with other government pensions, in a balance in the 1980s and the current separate budget category (which should conventional balance in NATO, as Presi- include Social Security pensions and dent Carter agreed with NATO allies in perhaps some other transfer payments, if July 1977 and Secretary Brown recognized the disastrous tax scheme for Social in the presentation of the FY 1979 budget. Security could be reformed—but that is Nevertheless, weapons are unlikely at any another story beyond the scope of this time in the foreseeable future to dominate article). A second step, generally men- the defense budget. We have already seen tioned in the same breath, is possible in Figure 1 that the magnitude of the reform of the escalatory provisions in the Soviet defense effort exceeds that of the retirement laws, early retirement policy, United States by a steadily widening and peculiar vesting arrangements that margin, currently estimated at about 45 give zero pension before twenty years, thus percent. The same CIA report17 estimates encouraging an inefficient service pat- that Soviet procurement is about 75 tern—get out early, after up to eight years percent above that of the United States, or so, or after twenty years and retire with and the dollar value of Soviet RDT&E is a pension. “ substantially larger” than that of the Moving retirement costs out of the United States and growing. defense budget would increase the clarity and accuracy with which the federal budget reflects both national defense Myth number five: policies and national transfer-payment Ten-foot Russians policies. are a perennial DOD budget-time trick. A less important but still significant Soviet military budgets are not a reason item that increases the defense budget for matching U.S. defense budgets. How- without enhancing national defense has ever, the very real Soviet threats that their been the inclusion of Military Assistance expenditures reflect must be taken into Program (MAP) funds. Currently running account in U.S. planning. Moreover, at $1 billion a year, MAP represents less because the development of modern than one percent of the budget, but as sophisticated weapons involves several recently as five years ago it was about two years of R&I) lead time, and their acquisi- DEFENSE R UDGET M YTHS 13

tion several years of production and statement would have been that there had deployment lead time, current defense been no ICBM gap. The Soviets, who budgets must be based on estimates of always put a strategic priority on Europe, threats 5 to 10 years in the future. had started their ballistic missile program It was noted in the discussions of the with the simpler and cheaper medium/in- arms race myth that, far from exagger- termediate-range missiles and deployed ating the size of the Soviet threat, them to hold Western Europe hostage throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s, before they started their ICBM deploy- the official predictions of the Soviet ment against the United States. strategic forces were below the numbers We must pause here to note an anomaly. that turned out to be actually deployed. It is precisely this revolution in the This was true in part because of bureau- technology of intelligence that is credited cratic reaction to a considerable hue and with having made feasible the SALT I cry about the politically generated allega- agreements of 1972. Those agreements tions of a “ bomber gap” in the 1950s and a included the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) “ missile gap’’ in 1960 (candidate Kennedy, Treaty and the Interim Agreement on not DOD, coined the “ missile gap” in his Strategic Offensive Arms. (The latter debates with Nixon).18 expired on 3 October 1977 but at time of It is important to remember that there writing is being kept in effect by mutual was a revolution in intelligence tech- agreement, pending further negotiations nology in the early 1960s. For observation on a SALT II treaty.) Both agreements of the Soviet deployments, and most specifically provided that verification especially of ICBMs, we had to rely in the would be based on “ national technical 1950s on overflight by the high-altitude U- means,” meaning primarily satellite- 2 aircraft. Aerial photography is in- borne cameras and other sensors. It herently a slow process, in the sense that further provided that neither side would coverage from an 11- or 12-mile altitude is interfere with these national technical limited, and it is not possible to photo- means of verification. Since 1972, it has graph in any realistic length of time an become increasingly apparent that these area so vast as that of the Soviet Union. satellites do not guarantee verification as fully as had been thought or alleged. This One must assign priorities to areas to be is true for three principal reasons: photographed, by educated guesses based on very few clues. With the advent of 1. Soviet development and initial de- satellites carrying cameras and other ployments of mobile missiles (the SS-16 sensors at altitudes of one to several ICBM, and the SS-20 IRBM that consists hundred miles, coverage could be vastly of the two first stages of the SS-16 and can multiplied. It was then that we could get be readily converted to an intercontinental accurate counts of Soviet silos as well as SS-16 by the addition of the third stage) many indicators of other Soviet military make the counting of missile launchers deployments. One such deployment, it highly uncertain. might be noted, was the several hundred 2. The Defense Department reports of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range some nine Soviet antisatellite tests in the ballistic missiles (M/IRBMs) in Western last two years and the decision to increase Russia, targeted on Western Europe. R&D programs to catch up with the Soviet Although the public was told there had technology in antisatellite capabilities been no missile gap, a more accurate indicate that the Soviets are acquiring a 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW capability to interfere with U.S. veri- pay attention to the statements about the fication as well as potential wartime threat, and indeed, the principal DOD reconnaissance and control on very short official statement, the Annual Report or notice in time of crisis or actual conflict. “ Posture Statement,” is deliberately and 3. SALT I and SALT II proposals to date properly a part of the budget-planning limit numbers of launchers but not cycle. numbers of missiles. It has been alleged by The Russians are not yet ten-feet tall, but retired Major General George Keegan, in their strategic forces they are as tall as former Chief of Air Force Intelligence, and we are and still growing, which we are not. others that the Soviets already have In general purpose forces, they have long several standby missiles for every launch- been known to have larger ground forces er (silo) permitted in SALT I Interim than we, and both President Carter and Agreement. Such missiles can be kept Secretary Brown have recognized in their concealed until time to use them. Much 1979 budget that the Soviets have been had been made of the Soviet capability for modernizing these forces to the point relatively rapid reload of silos because of where we must increase our R&D and the cold-launch techniques for the SS-17 procurement efforts in order to catch up. In and SS-18.10 But back-up missiles could be naval forces, they are generally believed to launched from “ soft” launchers, which be of about our size and, again, to be still could be mobile or concealed in various growing, while we are not. Indeed, the FY ways. It would even be possible to launch 1979 budget cuts back severely on naval missiles from inside warehouses or fac- programs to resume growth. The U.S. tories, with rapidly removable or opening Navy has fewer ships than the Soviet roofs. navy, although still greater tonnage. The All of these possibilities of avoiding or numbers of ships in both navies are evading our intelligence are reasons why declining, but the Soviet tonnage is the United States may underestimate, not growing and U.S. tonnage is declining. overestimate, Soviet strength, with or Many of the smaller Soviet ships are faster without SALT agreements. There are no and more heavily armed, and in particular further revolutionary developments in they have a several-year lead over the intelligence presently foreseeable to United States in the deployment of ship- overcome these possibilities. launched antiship-guided missiles with both conventional and nuclear warhead. Finally, the CIA stated in 1976 that they In tactical aircraft the United States has had underestimated the Soviet defense long been considered superior, but the expenditures in 1970-75 by 50 percent,20 Soviets have been rapidly modernizing and there is considerable evidence that their tactical aircraft and are producing they may be underestimating the rate of them at approximately double the U.S. growth since that time, so that further rate.23 Soviet budget estimates will be on the low side.21 The Russians are not ten-feet tall. But In short, the Defense Department has they may well be six-foot-six, and that is not been exaggerating the Soviet threat in enough stature to command the respect of order to justify appropriations.22 That they most of us average-sized mortals. But old are alleged to do so at budget time simply myths die hard. The author cannot resist reflects the fact that it is at budget time citing a curious and rather grudging that the Congress and, therefore, the press recognition of the slow but overdue demise DEFENSE BUDGET MYTHS 15

of this myth in a review of the book on the Despite all of these statistics, many FY 1978 defense budget that he coedited: people assert that the myth is validated by This second annual U.S. defense budget the bottom line: that defense has caused survey by the National Strategy Infor- inflation. But here, too, the alleged mation Center is a straight-forward hard- correlations are inverse. The inflation line approach to the military balance. Its argument was refuted in 1972 (before conclusion—the U.S. needs to increase its inflation became really severe!) in the dangerously inadequate investment in defense—is not new, but acquires more Moot Report, as follows: plausibility with each year of the Soviet Inflation in the U.S. has been most severe military buildup.-* since 1968, a period when Defense programs were being massively cut back. [President Johnson’s failure to propose timely tax Myth number six: We cannot afford more for defense. increase for the requirements of the Vietnam War may properly be assigned some of the Ever since the first large U.S. peacetime blame for accelerated inflation in this defense budget following the Korean War, period, but this is not the same thing as there have been allegations that the limits ascribing the inflation directly to the defense budget.] on the defense budget are economic, rather The aircraft industry —20 times more than being dictated by the requirements of dependent on Defense than U.S. industry in providing for the common defense. Presi- general—shows productivity increases dent Eisenhower even suggested at one nearly double the average and has the best point that a billion-dollar increase in the balance of trade record in the U.S. economy. defense budget would be tantamount to Inflation has been the most severe in those industry sectors where the Defense input is letting the Soviets tempt us to “ spend the smallest, and conversely. For example, ourselves into bankruptcy.” As former the greatest inflation by far (76.4%, 1964-71) Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger is in construction, where defense accounts has said, “ Each of us is entitled to his own for less than 1% of the business. Five sectors opinion, but not to his own facts.”25 One have had above-average inflation, and defense accounts for less than 1% of the may feel that the priorities should be business in four of them, and 2.7% in the different or that the defense budget is fifth. According to Department of Commerce adequate at some given level, but nothing figures, inflation on state and local govern- in the history of the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s ment purchases has been much greater than validates the judgment that we are on defense purchases.2* pressing economic limits. As we saw in Inflation has, of course, accelerated Table I, the defense budget has been since those words were written—while the declining ever since the 1950s, by all defense budget has continued to decline in relevant relative measures, i.e., in pro- real, constant-dollar terms as well as portion to GNP, the federal and total relatively. The major causes are well governmental budgets, and in share of the known, although not all of them are yet national labor force. Even the temporary well understood: the monopoly (more peak for Vietnam did not return us to the properly, oligopoly) prices of the OPEC oil relative shares of the Eisenhower years. suppliers’ cartel following the 1973 oil Meanwhile, the rate of unemployment embargo; the worldwide increase in food (averaging out the peaks and valleys of the prices, triggered, though only partially short-term business cycle) has been caused, by low world grain crops in the steadily upward since the Eisenhower early 1970s and the Soviet wheat pur- years. chases; raw material scarcities; “ in- 16 AIR UNIVERSIT Y RE VIE W dexing” or contractual tying of wage rates lifetime—for some systems, such as ships to cost of living indexes in union contracts and aircraft, for as long as 30 years. If this and federal pay scales; economic events in is combined with projecting inflation, other countries; the overvaluation of the adding maintenance, modernization and dollar, in the late 1950s and the 1960s, operating costs, and sometimes even under the fixed exchange rates of the only “ loading” on other costs for items that partially implemented Bretton Woods would be bought anyway (new ammuni- Agreement of 1944; and so on. tion, replacement tankers for aircraft, Several techniques are used to reinforce etc.), the costs can be made to sound the myth that we are spending all we can horrendous, as was done in the organized and to support the c f'ument by maxi- campaign against the “ 24-billion-dollar” mizing the apparent costs of defense. High B-l bomber. What really matters, of on the list of these techniques is one that course, is what we must spend each year in was mandated by Congress in 1972: the relation to what we earn. If a $6000 requirement that future costs (e.g., for a automobile were advertised as costing weapon procurement program that will $35,000 over the next ten years, including take several years) be presented to Con- repairs, tire replacement, gas, insurance, gress in “ then-year” (current) dollars three new CBs, etc., all at projected instead of constant or real dollars at inflation rates, how many of us would buy today’s prices. This practice is supposed to it? If we were told it would cost$1200-$1500 help Congress “ know what it is commiting a year in today’s prices, or X percent of our itself to,” but in fact it is highly deceptive, current salary, we could decide rationally even pernicious. Inflation rates cannot be whether we could afford to trade in the old accurately predicted and should not be jalopy, which is currently costing us, say, projected for this purpose. We can only $600 a year and “ won’t last forever.”28 understand costs in terms of today’s dollars. If prices go up, so will government revenues, as will personal incomes. Future But if by what we can afford is meant costs should be discounted, that is, less what we can expect the Executive to highly valued than costs that must be paid propose and the Congress to approve and today, both because the future is uncertain fund, then what we are talking aboutis not and because we can earn interest on economic limits but the limits of political money that does not have to be spent until leadership and political will. In view of later. In short, future costs are less onerous what has been said and cited here about than present costs. “Then-year” costing is the growing Soviet military threats, the equivalent to using a negative discount declining U.S. preparedness, and the rate that makes such costs look more potential use of the Soviet forces for onerous.-7 political purposes,-'5' I would strongly urge Opponents of a particular weapon that how much national defense the program are also fond of putting it in the United States can afford is how much it worst light by cumulating costs over its needs and has the political will to provide. Arlington. Virginia

Notes l . No oftenst* to my feminine readers intended < )ne is constrained to •>. The cost-effectiveness limitations of a "stand-off cruise missile quote accurately; perhaps today Luther would have referred to "wine, force and the importance of a mtxrd force of penetrating bombers and person, and snnj»." cruise missiles are discussed at length in Stun T<> Tahr Offense: DEFENSE BUDGET M YTHS 17

Bombers. Cruise Missiles, and Prudent Deterrence by Francis P. American and Souiet Armed Serenes. Strengths Compared. 1970-76. Hoeber l Washington. D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Strategic Congressional Research Service, in Congressional Record. 5 August and International Studies. 1977). 1977, pp. S 14064 14104 , and in Hoeber, Kassing. and Schneider, op. cit. 3 Attributed to Air Chief Marshal Slessor in The Economics of 15. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Public Papers of the President. 1960-61 p Defense Spending: A Look at the Realities. Department of Defense 1037. (Comptroller!. July 1972. p. 189. (This was the so-called "M oot Report" 16. See "M oot Report." and is hereafter so referenced.) 17. CIA. SR 78-10002. -i See Arms. Men. and Military Budgets Issues for Fiscal Year 18. See the chapter by William T. Lee, "Intelligence, Some Issues ol 1979. Francis P. Hoeber. David B. Kassing. and William Schneider. Jr. Performance.” in Arms. Men. and Military Budgets: Issues for Fisca, iNew York: Crane. Russak and Co.. 1978). Year 1978. Francis P. Hoeber and William Schneider, Jr., editors (New 5. Lewis F Richardson General Theory of Arms Races (London: York: Crane. Russak and Co.. 1977). British Psychological Society. 1939). A more complete and more readily 19. "Cold-launch” refers to "popping up" the missile from the silo by available work was published posthumously: Arms and Insecurity: A use of a gas generator before igniting the rocket motors, thus doing less Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War (Chicago: damage to the silo (as well as permitting a larger missile and a larger Quadrangle Books and Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press. I960). throw-weight from a given silo). 6. It is often argued that a figure of about 13-14 percent is more 20. Estimated Sooiet Defense Spending in Rubles. 1970-1975. S.R. accurate than 8 percent, when one allows for proper allocation of the 1976-1U121U, May 1976. costs of other programs, including research and development, 21. See William T. Lee in Schneider and Hoeber. op. cit. surveillance, and support. This dubious accounting change would not 22. As recently as 8 February 1978, Secretary o f Defense Harold alter the argument in the text Brown told the House Armed Services Committee: "The key to this 7. See Herbert F. York. “ Multiple-Warhead Missiles," Scientific matter (is that) Soviet build-up has been faster than anticipated.” American. November 1973. George C. Wilson, Washington Post. February 9, 1978, p. 2. 8. As belatedly recognized in the Department of Defense Annual 23. See Robert P. Berman. Sooiet Airpower in Transition Report. FY 1979. p. 11. (Washington. D.C.: Brookings Institution, January 1978); and Hoeber 9 See William T. Lee in Arms. Men. and Military Budgets: Issues for and Schneider. Fiscal Year 1977. William Schneider. Jr., and Francis P Hoeber. editors 24. Review of Hoeber and Schneider's Anns. Men. and Military tNew York: Crane. Russak and Co., 1976). Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1978 in Foreign Affairs. January 1978, 10. The FY 1979 budget turned out to involve a constant-dollar p. 445. Emphasis added. increase of less than two percent. The Office of Budget and 25. Pacem in Terris, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Management rationalized—inconsistently with earlier official December 1975. statements—that the three-percent figure referred only to the budget for 26. Moot Report, inside of back cover. NATO expenditures (which cannot be separately identified). General 27. Secretary of Defense Brown has projected a defense budget of purpose forces were favored, at the expense of strategic forces and $172.7 billion for FY 1983. But thatis in 1983 dollars. In 1979 dollars, it naval forces (Clearly, losing strategic equivalence will require stronger would be only $140.3 billion. That is much less startling in relation to general purpose forces.) Overall, there is zero increase in procurement the coming year’s$ 126 billion; it represents only 2.7 percent real annual over FY 1978 and only three percent in RDT&E (or R&D, as it is more growth. generally known i. The two percent total budget increase has also been 28. For a more extended discussion of then-year costing and related defended on the grounds that expenditures will rise over three percent, techniques of exaggerating weapon program costs, see Francis P. but this reflects previous years' budgets, not the FY 1979 one. Hoeber. Slow To Take Offense, pp. 64-69. 11. CIA. “ A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense 29. See the findings of the "Team B" reviews of the CIA-led Activities, 1967-77." SR 78-10002, January 1978 Hereafter referred to as interdepartmental National Intelligence Estimates Team in the Fall of CIA. SR 78-10002. 1976 (David B'nder, New York Times. December 1976), and article by 12. See Lee. op. cit. Richard Pipes, head of Team B. in Commentary. July 1977. “Why the 13. See "Legends of the Strategic Arms Race. ' United States Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War." Strategic Institute. U.S.S.I. Report 75-1 by Albert Wohlstetter, Fred Hoffman, David McGarvey. and Amoretta Hoeber. A number of national intelligence estimates (NlEs) on Soviet strategic offensive forces—the 11-8 N1E aeries—were declassified for this study. This article is adapted from a forthcoming book, U.S. Defense Policy- 14 The Soviet build-up is well documented in John M Collins, Issues and Alternatioes, James E. Roman, editor. RUSSIAN MILITARY STRATEGY a fresh look

C olonel David J. C ade HERE is a lively debate both inside These and other questions must be and outside the federal government addressed with an eye toward objectivity today as to the nature and extent of in attempting to calibrate the Russian T what is commonly referred to as themilitary posture, encompassing both “ Soviet threat.” Some would have us capabilities and intentions. believe that the “ Russians are coming,” and to support this contention cite impressive evidence of a massive military Threads from the Past buildup aimed primarily at the United A brief look at the Imperial Russian States and its Western European allies. politico-military heritage and some of the Others—just as scholarly and experi- pre-1945 lessons learned by the modern enced—take the opposite approach, claim- Soviet regime will provide a useful ing flatly that there is no Soviet military background for understanding present- threat to the West. This school generally day Soviet military posture.1 contends that the new military hardware Three major invasions of Russia (the and occasional saber rattling are merely Mongols in the thirteenth century, Na- normal characteristics of the Russian poleon in 1812, and Hitler in 1941) have mind-set. A popular corollary is that the had a far-reaching effect on the Russian Soviet Union is so weak economically that mind and military thinking. The invasion it could not mount an effective sustained by the Mongol Golden Hordes, who held threat against the West, which will be able European Russia in virtual bondage for to hamstring it in a technological and nearly 200 years, was particularly catastrophic. Because of the occupation, ...military power has always Russia was virtually cut off from Western been regarded as the main Europe for those two centuries, a time lag guarantor of Russian (and from which the Russians never recovered. The brutality and terror of the Mongols Soviet) security. stunned the Russians, who nevertheless successfully learned from their conquerors economic sense for the foreseeable future. how to employ the weapon of fear. More What are we to believe when we read and important, however, the Russian psyche hear such disparate arguments from was forever ingrained with an invasion legitimate experts? As is usually the case, complex and a sense of insecurity and the answer is probably somewhere in inferiority, which was reinforced by the between the two extreme points of view two subsequent invasions with resultant just described. ramifications to the present time. In this article, it is hoped that a careful This invasion complex has given rise to review of Russian military strategy will what is described as a “garrison-state” sharpen perceptions and help each reader mentality, characterized by a need to make up his own mind as to the nature and create buffer zones on the Russian pe- extent of the Soviet threat. “ What are the riphery to reduce the vulnerability of the Soviet motives and the underlying his- homeland to attack and keep foreign torical legacies behind them? Are there influence and power as far away as explanations for the recent military possible from its borders. Closely tied to buildup other than preparation for an this notion is the internal use of coercive attack on the U.S. or its NATO allies?” force in the form of secret police to keep the

19 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Russian populace under control and stifle inferiority complex, as did those absorbed perceived subversive threats to the co- by Soviet armies in the 1918-20 civil war hesion of the empire. and the 1940 invasion of Finland. Such Another significant czarist trait was an setbacks often forced Russia to accept inclination toward opportunistic territor- coexistence as a substitute for further ial expansionism for a variety of reasons over the centuries: trade, pan-slavism, a Ultimate domination of all of missionary style, religious and ideological thrust, and simply the desire to accumu- Europe is a clear Soviet goal. late power for power’s sake. This drive traditionally relied on the use of the expansion or aggression, but also served to military instrument in an offensive mode, make Russian collective will more deter- an interesting dichotomy when compared mined. In a related vein, the deep-rooted with the defensive orientation of the invasion fear—particularly the World War “ fortress mentality” described earlier. II or Great Patriotic War experience—has These seemingly contradictory facets of taught the Soviets to maintain an effec- the Russian politico-military heritage tive, well-prepared military instrument have been the twin driving forces behind that will never again be caught off guard Russian (and Soviet) military strategy by a surprise attack or allow the homeland down to the present day.- to be invaded. Two other important military legacies to Even today, the day-to-day impact of modern Russia were a strategy of aggres- World War II on the Soviet way of life must siveness and a continental outlook. In be seen to be fully comprehended by a order to protect the homeland and extend Westerner. The horrors of the war and its borders, it was necessary to wage war Russia’s 20 million dead are kept vividly on the enemy’s territory and destroy his alive by the regime; new monuments to forces.1 As a land-locked country for most war heroes and hero cities are still being of its history (lack of warm water ports), dedicated, and the militarization of society Russia has had a military outlook that has glamorized paramilitary training for was basically continental in scope, with young people—all of which bears witness military interests largely restricted to the to a paranoia over defense of the mother- empire’s periphery. In this regard, Rus- land. To the Russians, the 22 June sian military power was never success- syndrome (the date Hitler invaded Russia) fully projected beyond the Eurasian has a far greater significance as a never-to- continent until relatively recently. be-forgotten watchword than does 7 Military setbacks have also had a December for Americans. In this regard, lasting impact on the Russian (and Soviet) the watchful eye of “ Father” Lenin military mentality. During the reign of exhorting his countrymen to “ be prepared Peter the Great, the limits of Russian and be vigilant” can be seen on banners expansionism became apparent for the and billboards everywhere. first time, resulting in direct confronta- From a broad historical perspective, tions with the great powers and losses on military power has always been regarded the battlefield. These and subsequent as the main guarantor of Russian (and military defeats suffered by the Imperial Soviet) security. This has bred a tendency Army—particularly the 1905 debacle to depend on numerical and physical against Japan—added to the Russian preponderance—both in terms of troops RUSSIAN MILITARY STRATEG Y 21

and weapon system—to solve any military territory would be the decisive factor. The problem.4 As in other elements of Soviet new strategy placed heavy reliance on society, the penchant for bigger and better strategic forces and intimated that con- comes through loud and clear. ventional or general purpose forces were largely outmoded or downgraded since future wars would no longer be fought on The Revolution in the frontiers. This posture was institu- Military Affairs tionalized by creation of the Strategic The explosion of a hydrogen bomb by Rocket Forces, which soon had eclipsed the Soviets in the summer of 1953 was the Soviet army as the most essential destined to have far-reaching effects on element of the Russian armed forces. Soviet military strategy and thinking. Concurrently, combat-ready conventional Perhaps most important, the possesion of forces—notably naval aviation, tactical thermonuclear weapons released the air forces, and army divisions—were Soviet leadership from an unadmitted but reduced in considerable numbers. Strong long-standing inferiority vis-a-vis the opposition to Khrushchev’s policies, West, particularly the United States. Thus particularly the de-emphasis and reduc- the Soviet armed forces had a new tion of conventional forces, rapidly orientation, a new arm to strengthen the developed in both party and military military instrument in the pursuit of circles. By 1961, Defense Minister Mali- national objectives.'1 novsky had become perhaps the most articulate critic of the new strategy In the immediate postwar period, despite theories—although probably with Khrush- a large, well-equipped, and widely de- chev’s tacit approval since the premier ployed army, the Soviets were incapable of was already beginning to lose support on a offering any real match to the United broad front in the Soviet power structure. States as a world power. By the mid-1950s, Malinovsky acknowledged the primacy of although the Soviets realized their po- nuclear missiles, but advocated their litico-military vulnerability to the U.S. distribution to all branches of the armed strategic nuclear bomber force, the availability of the hydrogen bomb, coupled with forces based on range and usage, and asserted that conventional forces were still a modest delivery system in the form of a needed to complement and supplement growing intercontinental bomber fleet of strategic forces. As a result of the internal their own, gave the Soviet leaders a fresh pressure, Khrushchev was forced to outlook, which became known in the Soviet military lexicon as the “ Revolution in Military Affairs.” This outlook was ...for the Soviets, strategic strengthened by the development and parity with the U.S. is essen- testing of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) delivery systems in the late 1950s. tial, and, indeed, there is a By 1960, the strategic military impli- perception in some quarters cations of the growing arsenal of Soviet that they may be striving to nuclear-tipped ICBMs led Khrushchev to adopt a new total war defense policy, achieve strategic superiority which postulated that in any future armed (or what they would term a conflict with the West, an initial exchange “useful margin of strength”). of nuclear strikes deep into the adversary’s 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

modify his new defense policy and sus- military, political, and economic power pend the reduction of conventional forces. centers throughout his entire territory. (In Malinovsky’s views subsequently were a tactical sense, however, the Soviets reflected in an important collective work remained committed to annihilation of entitled Military Strategy, first published enemy forces on the battlefield.) From 1963 in 1962 under the leadership o f Marshal V. to the present, Soviet strategic military D. Sokolovsky. The book, updated in 1963 thinking has remained essentially as and 1968, recognizes three categories of presented in the Sokolovsky book. More- war: wars of national liberation, limited over, there is every reason to believe that war, and general war. According to the this thinking enjoys a general consensus authors, the Soviets are committed to not only with the military but within the support wars of national liberation, party hierarchy as well. Brezhnev, who ostensibly by application of conventional succeeded Khrushchev in power in 1964, military forces; while limited wars are proved to be a proponent of the combined admitted to exist on a hypothetical basis, arms concept and continued to push foran such wars between superpowers are upgrading of conventional as well as regarded as impossible since any conflict strategic forces. In fact, his apparent belief between them would inevitably escalate to that an armed conflict between the total nuclear war.7 The essence of the work superpowers would not necessarily esca- relates to general war, which is regarded late to total war provided a measure of as the culmination of the historical doctrinal justification for the combined struggle between opposing socioeconomic arms policy. systems, each pursuing decisive political As early as the mid-1960s and on to the goals. The main thrust is that general war present, Soviet military writings stressed will begin with a surprise attack on the that the study of history shows that Soviet Union, and, although nuclear- victory in war can only be achieved tipped missiles will be the decisive factor, through offensive actions—assuring com- victory can only be assured by the plete defeat of the enemy.8 In the nuclear combined use of all types of forces. age, this rationale has been expanded to The book also documented for the first incorporate the thought that decisiveness time a broad shift in Soviet strategic is the most important characteristic of outlook from primary preoccupation with offense in a thermonuclear war, advo- continental land warfare and peripheral cating surprise nuclear strikes to defeat military interests to a focus on strategic the enemy. While the official Soviet warfare on a global scale. This, of course, position is that the Soviet armed forces meant that Soviet military strategy must only fight wars imposed by the enemy, give more attention to combating a non- Russian military authors clearly empha- European adversary. size the necessity of being able to thwart Before the nuclear missile era, Soviet an anticipated enemy attack by having a military strategy regarded an enemy’s capability to fight, win, and survive a armed forces as the principal strategic nuclear war.9 According to this line of objective of general war. With the advent reasoning, only by having a war-winning of intercontinental delivery systems, the capability can Soviet strategic forces serve principal strategic objective of total war as a viable deterrent to the West. Based on became destruction of all aspects of an their World War II experience, total war, adversary’s national strength—including although catastrophic, is indeed thinkable RUSSIAN MILITAR Y STRATEGY 23

to the Soviets in the context of Western Eurasian landmass to provide for develop- miscalculations, misunderstandings, or ment of a viable infrastructure for pro- irrationality.10 Even Marxist-Leninist Soviet or socialist forces." ideology now embraces the notion that the In political and military terms the West, in the death-throes of capitalism, Soviets regard Europe as a single geo- may launch a last-gasp thermonuclear graphic entity over which they feel a attack. historical mission to exercise hegemony if not suzerainty. Ultimate domination of all of Europe is a clear Soviet goal. For Soviet Grand Strategy Western Europe, this would mean the Since the end of World War II, Soviet harnessing of economic and technological long-range national objectives have strength for support ofSovietprogress.no/ remained remarkably constant despite an occupation—which is the last thing the periodic changes in tone and style and Soviets would want (their Eastern Europe evolving strategic nuances. Key objectives satellites already give them enough include a constant strengthening of the headaches). This grand design for Western Russian defense perimeter, domination Europe probably entails a series of over all of Europe, and increased Soviet bilateral agreements to facilitate Soviet influence and prestige worldwide—par- influence on foreign and domestic policy ticularly in regions which are important to formulation, leading to a reduction of the economies of Western industrial defense expenditures and force levels and countries. elimination of the defense link with the United States.1 - ... there is increasing evidence In this regard, a good case can be made that Soviet decisions concerning force of a trend toward dual purpose levels in Europe are influenced by a belief forces and weapons that can that Western European perception of operate effectively in a nu- Soviet superiority will eventually lead to policies favorable to the Russians con- clear or conventional environ- cerning technology transfer and trade if ment. not outright political sympathy.11 Finally, the Soviets hope to limit Bolstering the defense perimeter entails Western options in important areas such several aspects: an Eastern Europe that as the Middle East and Africa and to take remains under tight Soviet political, advantage of weak points or vacuums in economic, and military control—a vital Western or third world areas of influence.11 geographical and ideological buffer whose This aspect of Soviet grand strategy frontiers and political systems are un- includes many-sided efforts to gain some challenged by the West despite a Soviet measure of control over the sources and willingness to tolerate a certain level of supply lines of the West's strategic raw expanded East-West cultural and eco- materials. By undermining the influence, nomic ties; continuing military and prestige, and power of the U.S. and its political containment or even isolation of allies, the Soviets hope to substitute their China and a series of bilateral treaties or own—thereby ‘‘proving’’ the continuing other sponsorship relationships with third viability and relevance of Marxist-Lenin- world countries on the periphery of the ist ideology. 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Present Soviet other qualitative missile performance Military Strategy factors. Under Brezhnev, Soviet military stra- In Soviet eyes this strategic force modernization effort must be just subtle tegy has become more and more refined. In his fourteen-year tenure, Brezhnev has and low-keyed enough to preclude full shown a clear appreciation for the risks of mobilization or unleashing of the U.S. nuclear war as well as for the application technological and industrial base in a and use of force short of war—including strategic trumping effort, which the Soviets deeply fear. Moreover, it must be extensive military and naval exercises, large-scale provision of arms and other remembered that even strategic parity cancels the overwhelming strategic pre- military assistance to selected countries, dominance the U.S. has enjoyed since various forms of intimidation, and publi- World War II. cizing scientific and technical achieve- ments with military overtones. Of course, Perhaps even more important, however, land-based and submarine-launched stra- since the nuclear deterrent has reached a tegic nuclear missiles have become the rough equivalence on each side, the protective umbrella under which all Soviet Soviets in the 1970s have given every indication that they are seeking clear superiority in the area of conventional ...although the Soviets may forces. A tremendous buildup in the level and quality of conventional weapon be satisfied with strategic systems has been coupled with an effective parity, they probably will projection of military and naval forces maintain their drive toward beyond the Eurasian continent for the first time in Russian history. Soviet blue water clear superiority in the area of naval operations have increased world- general purpose forces to over- wide, particularly in the Mediterranean ride perceived U.S. advan- Sea and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the level of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe tages in other areas, primarily provides an offensive capability ap- economic and technological. parently well beyond that required to keep the satellites in check. While there are many who see this as a prelude to a politico-military actions are taken.15 In Warsaw Pact attack against NATO, a this respect, for the Soviets, strategic strong argument can be made that this parity with the U.S. is essential, and, overkill of forces stems from the deep- indeed, there is a perception in some rooted insecurity and weakness that the quarters that they may be striving to Soviets have always tried to mask from the achieve strategic superiority (or what they outside world. Given the 22 June syn- would term a “ useful margin of strength” ). drome, the massive Soviet military build- By the mid-seventies the Soviets had up opposite NATO can at least be partially developed and deployed an entire new explained as a knee-jerk reaction to a generation of ICBMs and SLBMs. More- perceived invasion threat across the over, they are continuing to put emphasis Central European plain—the route used by on high-yield warheads while mounting a both Napoleon and Hitler. Moreover, the concerted effort to improve accuracy and Soviets perceive that the principal U.S. RUSSIAN MIL1TAR Y STRATEG Y 25 military strategy since World War II has operate effectively in a nuclear or con- been to encircle the U.S.S.R. with bases, ventional environment. It must be noted, maintain a capability to project force however, that the Soviets traditionally anywhere in the world, and follow a have experienced a long lag time in propensity to engage in military actions fielding a military capability to match the on foreign soil—a posture which the particular international politico-military Russians regard as a serious threatto their situation for which it was developed. This national security. has often led to weapon systems and force Within the past several years, numerous employment concepts that are out of tune developments involving conventional with the existing environment. forces have indeed resulted in a strength- Pervasive in modern Soviet military ening of the Russian defense perimeter to literature is a clear concept of victory at all counter both U.S. and Chinese presence, levels of conflict. Over the past decade, political influence, and military power. there have been increasing indications of a shift in the Soviet view toward the Specifically, these developments include possibility of a limited war between the an increase in Soviet naval efforts to superpowers—particularly in the context confront U.S. nuclear deployments on the of a European conflict. Present force Russian periphery; the extensive buildup preparation developments and military of Soviet military capability opposite writings reflect a growing interest in other NATO and along the Chinese border; and force options short of an all-out nuclear the expansion of worldwide force pro- exchange, i.e., tactical nuclear options and jection capabilities such as airlift, sealift, conventional options.17 and sea control. The use of Russian The Brezhnev leadership clearly recog- military cadre and Cuban surrogates in nizes both the limits and potentialities of peripheral areas such as Africa—while military power and is prepared to manipu- widely regarded as an opportunistic ploy late or bargain to improve the Soviet to gain power and influence at the expense position. In this light, the Soviets are not of the West—can also be thought of in averse to negotiating for strategic arms terms of an extension of the Russian control or disarmament measures that defense perimeter. It is interesting to note would reduce the danger of a nuclear that despite the expanded Soviet view of holocaust while preserving Soviet stra- the world and their role in it, the heritage tegic parity with the West at the very of a continental military tradition—with minimum. Indeed, peace is precisely the emphasis on peripheral matters—con- modern form of warfare the Soviets have tinues to run strongly through Soviet chosen.16 At this juncture, probably only strategic thinking. two sets of circumstances could alter this As we have already seen, modem Soviet decision in a strategic nuclear context a military strategy holds that coordinated direct threat to their national survival or a use of all types of military power is severe infringement of their superpower necessary to achieve Soviet politico- status, which is extremely important to the military objectives.16 This goal requires a Soviet psyche as “ideological proof’ that flexible military establishment affording they finally have become a dominantactor selective reliance on a whole range of on the world scene. weapon systems. In this vein, there is This brings up the subject of detente in increasing evidence of a trend toward dual the context of Soviet military strategy. purpose forces and weapons that can First of all, it must be remembered that 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW detente is not a new concept. Lenin, Stalin, trying to achieve strategic superiority. and Khrushchev each used the political In this light, while the upgrading of expedient of peaceful coexistence with the strategic forces will continue to receive top West when such a policy was in the best priority by the Soviets, nuclear weapons interest of the Soviet Union, specifically to probably will become less and less of a gain time or advantage for a particular usable instrument in superpower “power purpose. In the most modern sense, detente politics.” Henry Kissinger goes one step to the Soviets embraces the need to avoid further by asserting that nuclear weapons or reduce the likelihood of strategic are becoming a less plausible factor in nuclear war. What the Soviets hope to get out of detente is to neutralize threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons by the West ...while the upgrading of and cancel U.S. strategic options while upgrading Russian nuclear capabilities strategic forces will continue and conventional military strength. to receive top priority by the Despite widespread notions to the con- Soviets, nuclear weapons trary in the West, detente to the Soviets does not mean suspension or abandon- probably will become less and ment of the ideological struggle against less of a usable instrument in the capitalist system. Hence, Russian superpower “power politics.” support of wars of national liberation, use of surrogates, as well as threatened or actual use of conventional military forces regional politico-military affairs as well.19 are all fair game to the Soviets under the Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the framework of detente. From a political Soviets will continue their buildup of standpoint, detente in the Soviet view has conventional forces to more effectively moved them closer to their key national project Russian power and influence on a strategic objectives. In Soviet eyes, then, global basis. Thus, although the Soviets detente is a tactical expedient that serves may be satisfied with strategic parity, they to accelerate the continuing shift of world probably will maintain their drive toward correlation of forces in their favor. clear superiority in the area of general purpose forces to override perceived U.S. advantages in other areas, primarily The Near-Term Future economic and technological. The Soviet A good case can be made that the navy is likely to be employed more military instrument is now the only assertively as an instrument of inter- instrument of Soviet national power that national political influence and to protect is generally effective on the world scene. expanding Soviet overseas interests.20 Although the Soviets will take advantage This intensified conventional force projec- of any perceived opportunity or weakness tion probably will be coupled with more to achieve strategic superiority, at least support of client states and use of sur- rough strategic nuclear parity between the rogate military forces to test the relevance two superpowers can be expected to prevail of deterrence in lesser conflicts around the for the foreseeable future. As indicated world. previously, the Soviets probably will As Henry Kissinger so aptly put it, the studiously avoid giving the impression of Soviets have no preconceived master plan RUSSIAN MI LITAH Y STRA TEG Y 27

for military strategy and the use of the American continent—will be the key to military instrument of power; rather they which side will prevail. seem to be accumulating as much power as As they pursue their self-perceived they can to avoid a repeat of the circum- manifest destiny, the Soviets are con- stances surrounding the Great Patriotic vinced that time is on their side, so they War and will employ such power and feel no immediate compulsion to supplant influence whenever and wherever the the United States as the world’s foremost opportunity presents itself.21 Ultimately, political, economic, and military power. peripheral areas of the world—peripheral When it is in their best interest, the to the Eurasian landmass and the North Russians can indeed be patient. Irdklion, Crete

Notes 1. For a good oyerviewof modern Russia's politico-military legacy technological development, and thearmed forces'combat materiel, from the past, see Adam B. Ulam's Expansion and Coexistence with due regard to the conclusions of military science and the views (Washington: Praeger. I974>, pp. 3-12. of the probable enemy 1. Throughout this article, use of the term "military strategy" Moreover, there is no comparable Western usage of the term "military specifically refers to the definition contained in JCS Pub. 1. Dictionary doctrine.” Note that the above definition is not compatible with the of Military and Associated Terms; "Th art and science of employing usual Western definition of military strategy or "grand" (“ national") the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy strategy. For a more detailed discussion on the nature of Soviet by the application of force, or the threat of force.” This definition is military doctrine, see Sokolovsky, pp. 42-43 and Grechko, pp. 10-16. narrower than the usual Western definition o f "national strategy" or 3. Michel Garder. A History of the Soviet Army (New York: Praeger. "grand strategy," which involves the use of all resources of a nation in 1966), p. 17. achieving national objectives. (JCS Pub 1 defines "national strategy" 4. Malcolm Macintosh, "Soviet Military Policy," Soviet Naval as: me art and science ot developing and using the political, economic, Developments: Capability and Context (New York Praeger, 1973). p. and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, 58. during peace and war. to secure national objectives.") Note that the 5. War and Army. 1972, Soviet Military Thought Series (vol. 2) above definition of military strategy is quite different from (and hence published under auspices of USAF. pp. 250-60; see also Garder. p. 140. is not interchangeable withi the Soviet version of "military strategy." 6. The current Soviet view of "deterrence" is somewhat different as contained in Dictionary o f Basic Military Terms. 1965. Soviet from that held in the West: to the Soviets, deterrence is meaningless Military Thought Series (vol. 9) published under auspices o f USAF: without a viable capability to defend the homeland should war The highest level in the field o f military art. constituting a system avoidance fail. See John Erickson, “ The Soviet Military, Soviet Policy of scientific knowledge concerning the phenomena and laws of apd Soviet Politics,” Strategic Review, Fall 1973, pp 24-25. armed conflict. 7. Sokolovsky, p. 200. On the basis of the tenets of military doctrine, the experience of 8. Ibid., pp. 292, 297-98. past wars, and analysis of the political, economic and military 9. Macintosh, p. 61; see also Leon Court, Foy 1). Kohler, Muse L. conditions of the current situation, military strategy investigates Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forcesin Current Soviet Strategy {Miami: and elaborates on problems pertaining to the trainingof the armed Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975), pp. 8-9. forces as a whole and the individual Services, and their strategic- 10. Sokolovsky, p. 288. use in war. theformsand methodsofconductinganddirecting war; 11. Avidgor Haselkorn. "The Soviet Collective Security System," and also problems pertaining to comprehensive strategic support Orbis, Spring 1975. of the combat operations of the armed forces. 12. John Erickson. “ European Security: Soviet Preferences and At the same time, military strategy is a field of practical activity Priorities." Strategic Review, Winter 1976, pp. 40-41. for the higher military command in training the armed forces for 13. John Erickson, “ Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe." Journal war and providing leadership in armed conflict. Military strategy of the Royal United Services Institute fur Defence Studies, March 1975. exerts an influence on the preparation of a country for war in such a- 14. Macintosh, p. 67. way as to ensure victory. 15. Ibid., p. 65. For additional discussion on the Soviet concept of military strategy, see 16. Sokolovsky, p. 16. Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko. State of the Forces of the 17. General Lt. Z. G. Zavyalov, " The New Weapon and Military Art," Soviet Union (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1975). pp. 16-17; and V. D. Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970-75, Soviet Military Thought Sokolovsky, Military Strategy iNew York: Praeger. 1968), pp. 15-17. In Senes (vol. 11), published under auspices of USAF, pp. 210-11; see also Soviet military writings, the concept of "military doctrine" is closely Grechko, p. 6; see also The Revolution in Military Affairs vol. 3 related to land in fact encompassesi military strategy. The Dictionary (Moscow: Soviet Military Thought Series. 1973), p. 137. of Basic Military Terms provides the following definition: 18. Garder. p. 209. A nation's officially accepted system of scientifically founded 19. Henry Kissinger, lecture to students and faculty of National views on the na ture of modern wars and the use of armed forces in Defense University, 26 May 1977 (Permission to use granted by l)r. them, and also on the requirements arising from these views Kissinger on 14 October 1977). regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for 20. Robert G. Weinland et al„ "Admiral Gorshkov's 'Navies in War war. and Peace,'"Survival. March- April 1975,pp.54-65;seealsoGrechko.p. Military doctrine has two aspects political and military- 3; see also Admiral of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov, “The Experience of technical The basic tenets of a military doctrine are determined by History and the Situation Today,” Soviet 1‘ress Selected Translations a nation s political and military leadership according to the socio- no. 765, May 1976, p. 21. political order, the country's level of economic, scientific and 21. Kissinger, op. cit. COULD WE BE WRONG?

Donald L. Clark

no nation that possesses nuclear weapons has ever had its borders seriously *4^ attacked by another nation"

4m * «- \ i ^ r f Hv * ? / 1 Vi * £ Xtv * ,^ 7 1 * I J f w / .* The spread of nuclear capability threatens U.S. security and increases the chance of nuclear holocaust. The NPT and the IAEA are the major international instruments for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, August 1977 From the moment the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the main question before the world has been whether the human race is intelligent enough to survive.... At least seven nations are manufacturing nuclear bombs and a dozen more know how to make them. “Arms and Madness,” [Norman Cousins] Saturday Review, July 26, 1975 Although I don't exactly love the H-bomb, it comes close to my idea of what a bomb should be.... In the more than 25 years since it became popular, it has never been used against anybody. A person could get fond of a bomb like that. Russell Baker, New York Times Magazine, July 31. 1977

ANY now argue that the most tioning that near unanimous opinion.3 dangerous issue facing the The purpose of this article is not to world is that of nuclear prolifer- advocate proliferation but to expose the M ation, and that contention is readerwidely to the logic and thought on that reflected in the great amount of recent other side of the question. Nonprolifer- press and international discussion.1 ation seems so logical on the face of it, so President Carter apparently shares this moral and proper, that perhaps most of us belief and is even willing to sacrifice more have tended to approve of it with little or potential efficiency in the battle for energy only cursory consideration. Reading this in an effort to stop, dampen, or slow article may make the decision tougher— proliferation.2 Additionally, this is the one indeed, it might even raise the issue to the subject on which both U.S. political level of some other international dilemmas parties, the most renowned scientists, the where the right or best answer is not quite military, the public, our allies, and so clear. Above all, it is designed to force enemies all seem to agree. Though the the reader to go beyond gut reaction and means to ensure nonproliferation may not think the issue through. Readers may—I be agreed on, nearly unanimously, the am tempted to say probably will—con- leaders proclaim proliferation to be bad, tinue to support NPT initiatives, but I and nonproliferation, indeed an extension suspect they will do so with slightly less of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty assurance, while feeling more confident (NPT), to be good. that they have considered the issue in However, a growing number of reason- depth. They may also conclude that able and responsible people are ques- nonproliferation could be counterproduc-

29 30 AIR UNIVERSIT Y RE VIE W

tive to the very conditions it seeks to the answer promote. Nuclear weapon possession is, after all, most valuable. Why else would the U.S. the question and U.S.S.R. possess thousands of war- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was heads when the weapon has only been signed in 1968 amid great fanfare pro- used twice more than thirty years ago? claiming that the world now had a means Why else would the United Kingdom, to avoid nuclear holocaust. It has since France, the People’s Republic of China, been signed or ratified by more than one and India, at increasing degrees of hundred nations. These ratifications seem sacrifice, devote the enormous amounts of to be a giant step forward, yet nuclear investment (manpower, money, and re- weapons have proliferated in both total sources) necessary to enter the nuclear numbers and number of possessors and club, even while the latter three were being may be on the verge of even more rapid pressured, sniped at, and criticized by the growth and expansion. In fact, the NPT, to superpowers for so doing? Could it be just date, simply has not achieved its avowed for the right of membership in the goal. Tonga, Zambia, and similar third exclusive nuclear club? Could it be just for world nations have rushed to the signing a seat of power on the Security Council of table, but most of the nations that have the the United Nations? No. (Note that the technology or technological potential and People’s Republic of China was denied her the financial ability to produce nuclear seat until she acquired nuclear weapons.) weapons have not been so eager to sign; As important as it may be to join the and two possessors, France and the nuclear club and enter the ever less People’s Republic of China, have not effective and weakened Security Council, signed. The list of nonsigners is impres- those reasons alone would not appear to sive. The Federal Republic of Germany justify the expenditure of the six “haves.” and Japan are the only nonpossessor Nuclear weapon possession must be nations with true nuclear potential that perceived to offer something more. I have signed and ratified, and they ratified suggest that that something more is quite only some six years later after pressures evident and that it becomes more evident were applied by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.4 as proliferation increases. It is, in a word, Significant nonsigners or ratifiers include “ security.” There is one self-evident and Brazil, Israel,* South Africa,** India, undisputed fact associated with nuclear Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Egypt among power possession: no nation that pos- the nonpossessors;5 France, the People’s sesses nuclear weapons has ever had its Republic of China (PRC), and India are borders seriously attacked by another among nuclear weapon possessors. The nation. True, nuclear possession may not question we have to ask is Why? If be the sole reason for this, but, if we nonproliferation is so clearly in the best consider the evidence of history, it appears interests of the world, why are such key to be significant. countries not responding to this call for In the early days of the nuclear era, soon what we see as sanity? after World War II, many proffered the conclusion that atomic weapons made war 'Some now are convinced that Israel has added nuclear weapons to her war stocks. unthinkable. That early premise failed to **The U.S. and U.S.S.R. recently joined forces in an attempt to come true. Since 1945, wars have occurred pressure South Africa to turn away from nuclear development. The verdict is not yet in. around the world—in the Middle East, COULD WE HE WRONG? 31

Korea, Southeast Asia, Latin America, theoretical last ditch effort to ensure and elsewhere. These wars have involved survival. possessors of nuclear power, either directly, by proxy, or in the weapon supplier role, but they have never involved the discussion sovereign territory of a nuclear nation.6 If this is true, nuclear weapon holders, in Thus, although all wars have not been the current state of weapon technology, prevented, one could posit that nuclear have both the ultimate defense and, at the war has been prevented and, further, that same time because of nuclear prolifer- superpower or nuclear possessor wars ation, an almost useless offensive weap- have been prevented. This leads to the on.8 On the surface, this combination consideration that nuclear weapons may could tend to achieve what the early provide what nations have long sought: prophets of nuclear weapons foretold, a perfect territorial security. If even the nuclear guarantee against war. Further, if possibility of that utopia comes from the foregoing is true, it follows that the nuclear possession, it could readily ex- proliferation of nuclear weapons, instead plain why nations want them, in spite of of threatening war, actually increases the the expense and why nations decline to probability of preventing war. This sign a solemn treaty of self-denial. Surely, a conclusion suggests the following hy- nation that is able to attain a weapon pothesis: If no nuclear possessor need fear system which has even some possibility of attack, then the only place there can be guaranteeing security should not forego wars is where nuclear weapons are not that option, for is that not the first and possessed, and if such places are dimin- primary goal of every government? Would ished through nuclear proliferation, then the U.S. sign the Nuclear Non-Prolifer- war potential is also diminished. Thus, ation Treaty if we were a nonpossessor? nonproliferation, our sacred cow, may be Considering the history of the nuclear counterproductive to the very purpose for era, I would additionally suggest another which we have established it, or, in other possible conclusion: that the proliferation words, proliferation may be more likely to of nuclear weapons has actually made eliminate war than nonproliferation. A them a more effective deterrent while key point is that “ proliferation” has simultaneously diminishing the likeli- changed this powerful offensive weapon hood of their use, a most incongruous and into one that can be used only in a last- unique occurrence. Remember that when ditch defensive role. only one nation had nuclear weapons, it Let us turn for a moment from the realm used them in spite of what, at least in of pure speculation to the facts of recent retrospect, seems to have been ques- history. The U.S. and U.S.S.R., in spite of tionable cause.7 But since that near-single numerous crises, have avoided war with use and the acquisition of similar weapons one another, and at least one significant by other states, all have foregone their use reason for that could be because they both in spite of provocation and opportunity. recognize the exponentially increased Thus, it can be argued that weapon risks to them as a result of nuclear possession by a single state is most weapons. In fact, a study of their relations unstabilizing, at least for all the others, can detect that as their nuclear arsenals but as more acquire the weapon the less have become more equal, they have likely it will be used, except in the become more and more prudent and 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW cautious in their relations with one their worst-case analysis would have to another; while when one side had a clear indicate that an invasion of Czecho- advantage, they were even more at odds. slovakia could mean the loss of several But specific wars have occurred, even million at-home Russian civilians in an involving the superpowers—the U.S. in overnight holocaust. The “ pucker” factor Korea and Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. in its goes way up, and the conservative deci- invasions of Hungary and Czechoslo- sion-maker is forced to re-evaluate the vakia. Additionally, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., gains versus losses of his decision to strike by proxy and supply line, have been or not. involved in three Middle Eastern wars and The same applies to the Israel/Egypt/ other even smaller ones in Angola, Yemen, Syria triangle and similar African, Latin Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Zaire, etc. American, and other rivalries. Thus, is it In fact, it is the contention of many not reasonable to ask if proliferation concerned voices in the world that these might not mean less chance of war— indirect superpower confrontations in rather than an increased likelihood? nonsuperpower wars present the greatest danger of leading to superpower nuclear the fanatics war as the result of escalation, miscal- By now you are surely saying, but what culations, etc. On the evidence available, about all those wild-eyed fanatics around one has to conclude, then, that nuclear the world? Surely nonproliferation is valid weapons, if they are preventing wars if it means preventing Idi Amins, Black between the possessors, clearly are not Septembers, el-Qaddafis, and the like from also preventing wars among nonpos- acquiring nuclear weapons. This is a sessors and further conclude that this is strong argument and on the surface makes dangerous. However, we seldom ask, could sense to most of us (if we are not Ugan- those small wars also have been prevented dans, Palestinians, and Libyans). But, like had the lesser powers possessed nuclear so many of the apparent truisms of weapons? nonproliferation, examination of the issue The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czecho- reduces the definiteness of the initial slovakia presents an interesting example. conclusion. Wild-eyed fanatics have, in The Soviets are noted for a strong fact, had nuclear weapons and for some conservative bent in international affairs, reason (possibly the fact of proliferation) especially as to involving Soviet forces chosen not to use them. The world may be outside the U.S.S.R.1’ In 1968, Soviet shocked by the actions of Amin and el- generals were able to assure the party Qaddafi, and even of the Black Septem- leadership that (1)organized Czech mili- bers and other Palestinian terrorists, but tary resistance was unlikely and, (2)even their actions pale when compared with the if it occurred, it would be squashed murders, death camps, and unbelievable reasonably rapidly and with, say, at worst, horrors of Joseph Stalin. Still, even Stalin 10,000 to 40,000 Soviet military casualties, resisted the temptation to use nuclear a relatively undramatic loss possibility of weapons once acquired. Mao Tse-tung’s professional soldiers in a country with record cannot match Stalin’s—at least is millions. But what if those Soviet generals less well documented—but many have faced a proliferated world and knew that thought him mad, unrestrained, and Czechoslovakia possessed, say, just 10 to callous toward life; yet he, too, proved quite 20 Minuteman missiles or their like? Now, modest in the nuclear arena. Both these COULD WE BE WRONG? 33

men saw the value of nuclear weapons, determine it unnecessary to strike out killed or caused the death of innumerable against his “imagined” threateners. My lives just by diverting resources to acquire point is that, bad as it might be even if an the weapons,10 yet both showed restraint Amin were a nuclear possessor, the only after nuclear weapon acquisition. likely change is that there would then be The point is that no matter how badly a less chance that any other nation would nation might want to use its nuclear decide to remove Amin—“nukes” protect weapons for evil gains, since proliferation the good and the bad equally, but due to all they can realistically do with them is proliferation they offer only an unusable point to them with pride and say, “ don’t offensive threat. Amin types are dis- tread on me.” They cannot (at least have gusting aberrations, but no more so than not) use them because once a nation the world has faced before; and the acquires such weapons no other nation previous aberrations, once they acquired can afford to push so drastically that he nuclear weapons and faced the fact of might have to use his nukes. But, simul- proliferation, actually demonstrated re- taneously, without being attacked and in straint about their use and protection. It is ultimate danger of survival, the nation is a hard fact to accept, but to much of the inhibited in the use of its weapons against world it was the U.S. alone that used such even a nonpossessor because it fears weapons, and U.S. irrationality alone, as retaliation from some other of the ever recently demonstrated by “ Nixsonian- growing number of possessors. Idi Amin like” paranoia over national security, they and such types may appear mad, but it is a most fear. The wild-eyed, fanatic fear may controlled madness. These powerful men be exaggerated—I hope. are willing to murder, harass, and torture those under their control and too weak to inevitability defend. They are even ready to tweak the I say “ I hope” because there is another nose of superior powers up to the point that argument against support of the NPT it is not really serious enough to invite a concept. Many of the world’s most re- strong response. However, they do not nowned experts in weapons, international foolishly attack or push too far those affairs, politics, and nuclear science are capable of squashing them. Few, if any, now concluding that the battle is lost; who have risen to such absolute power proliferation is inevitable if only because have ever attacked a foe when it was clear science cannot be withheld, and the that the foe or his allies would easily be science of nuclear weaponry is available.11 able to annihilate them. An Amin with ten I might add that it is inevitable also nuclear missiles under his control would because many see these weapons as useful. not be a very attractive alternative to the But the point they make is, why fight the world, but realistically, neither does he inevitable? It is worth fighting even for a add much to the threat of nuclear war. The lost cause if the cause is noble and correct, world feels helpless now to stop his but it is not worth the candle if the cause is internal machinations (partly due to not clearly in the best interests of man nuclear proliferation), and if he had kind; and the points related thus far at nuclear weapons, the rest would be even least raise the question that proliferation more deterred from interference. But, might well be better for mankind than conversely, Amin might then perceive nonproliferation so the candle’s value is himself as less threatened and, therefore, questionable. However, unmanaged pro- 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

liferation is more dangerous than other the other hand, will keep ours, even alternatives—one of which I will describe constantly increasing the numbers and/or later. the capability of them to destroy effi- ciently. Now if that is the way many of the U.S. image nuclear have-nots j udge our nuclear stance (this ignores the specialized economic Another concept of the nonproliferation gripes the Germans, Japanese, and Bra- policy that may in fact not be what we think it is, is the image its support by the zilians have made in recent months),12 itis U.S. creates. In the U.S., we instinctively rather easy to see why they not only do not consider nonproliferation to be good and sign on but, in fact, might harbor rather support of the NPT to be respected and strong resentment over the policy. proper. The failure of the NPT should have I would posit that our NPT policy—plus warned us that they may not be univer- SALT, detente, and related activities that sally true, but it did not. The truth may be, have brought the U.S. and U.S.S.R. into however, that other nations, especially close and frequent contact—could cloud those verging on nuclear capability and the view of much of the world concerning properly desirous of its advantages, the basic differences between the U.S. and consider the U.S. NPT policy to be U.S.S.R. Partly because of this NPT hypocritical and arrogant. They may well attitude, they might judge us as two interpret our platitudes about the evils of superpowers striving to achieve even nuclear weapons as merely propagan- greater power and wealth while telling dists cover for our participation and others that it is bad for them to follow our perpetuation in superpower world domina- path. tion rather than a sincere desire to avoid a However, I do not mean even remotely to nuclear Armageddon. suggest that detente is the wrong ap- Think of it for a moment from their proach, for I feel quite strongly the other viewpoint. What the U.S. may be perceived way. Yet as other nations observe summit as saying, in concert with the U.S.S.R. and meetings with our President and the the world’s former pre-eminent colonialist, Soviet General Secretary arm-in-arm, the United Kingdom, is: We and our toasting in champagne and concurring in powerful friends have accumulated these joint policies like the NPT, it could cause super destructive weapons in numbers the third world and even some of our that can threaten the world. We need them, developed allies to wonder if the super- but of course you do not. In fact, in your powers are not becoming more and more hands they could be most dangerous. For alike and conspiring to hold onto special us they guarantee freedom from attack by wealth, might, and status at everyone any and all and near ultimate security, but else’s expense. for you such a guarantee is not necessary. I suggest that instead the U.S. should Sign the NPT and if anything goes wrong, highlight the differences between our we might decide to protect or punish you, system and the Soviet’s whenever pos- depending on how we interpret the sible. Agreements to reduce or limit circumstances. You should forswear such nuclear weapons and to exchange cultural 4 9 weapons and even some of the energy programs, etc., can easily be judged by the related benefits some aspects of nuclear world as progressive steps for all if they production capability might afford you, diminish ever so slightly the superpower since they can lead to weaponry. We, on threat of war, and they should continue. COULD WE BE WRONG? 35

But the NPT policy may be viewed through history of stability and friendly relations others’ eyes as discriminating—an act of with the U.S. (Canada, Switzerland, The inequality and even immorality favoring Netherlands, as examples). the greats while depriving the weak. This • Where possession of nuclear weap- image is not consistent with the founding ons or energy by the state in question of the U.S.; our founders called for no would make the region more stable by entangling alliances, all people and lessening the likelihood of war (Taiwan, nations equal, and no plan for the U.S. to Israel, Egypt, Greece, Turkey). try to dominate others. Thus, in spite of our • Where human rights are at an belief of its goodness, the NPT policy acceptable level or have drastically might in the eyes of many be viewed as a improved and are still improving (Canada, new kind of imperialism, one sponsored by Switzerland, Norway, Sweden). Communist and democrat alike. Is there • Where the recipient will sign a then an alternative, a middle ground that treaty not to use such weapons except in turns us away from the lost cause while defense of his sovereign national territory simultaneously taking advantage of some that has been invaded or attacked. of the pros for proliferation? I suggest • Where the recipient will agree not there may be. It is an approach I call to add to the number of weapons supplied “ controlled proliferation,” which is de- by the U.S. or to transfer them. signed to lessen the risks of war, reduce the In essence, the U.S. would consider costs of acquiring nuclear weapons and supplying a small number—10 to 50 nuclear energy, improve the U.S. image as nuclear weapons—to those nations in a leader and seeker of an equitable as well which we determine it to be in our interest as peaceful world, while simultaneously and the world’s to do so, yet limit the avoiding for as long as possible—perhaps number given or developed and their range indefinitely—proliferation to those most so the recipients and the world can unstable, undesirable states. recognize that they basically have only a defensive force; a force that would make an controlled proliferation attack against them too great a risk to Under controlled proliferation (CP), the consider, yet a force too small to enable U.S. would publicly withdraw from the them to initiate an attack capable of NPT for reasons of its failure, the clear totally destroying another. (Expert inevitability of proliferation, and the opinion considers 200 to 300 warheads possibility that proliferation may better sufficient to destroy any modern state.)11 achieve the goal of lessening the danger of Think how this might be used to assist war. We would then make it clear to the U.S. foreign policy. What influence might world that, under certain circumstances, we gain over an Israel or Egypt to settle we would be willing either to assist or even their problems, if, instead of promissory grant nuclear weapon acquisition or guarantees over which they have no energy capability to certain have-nots. control, we could trade 10 Minuteman The circumstances are, of course, the key, missiles for a reasonable compromise and they would have to be carefully allowing a Palestinian state on the West determined,11 but as a starting basis I Bank. Israel and Egypt would remain suggest the U.S. might grant limited independent and now have control them- nuclear weaponry:• selves over assuring the settlement. Yet, • Where a government has a long the agreement would likely stand because :iti AIR U 11VERSIT Y RE VIE W

the risk factor potential would then exceed is a risk, but it might not outweigh the the desire for change. We could also make a gain. U.S. force withdrawal from South Korea The second concern is related to the first. result in increased South Korean security It deals with guarantees and their flim- rather than lessened. siness. How can the U.S. be sure a nation What would the reaction to controlled that passes some carefully developed proliferation be? Obviously, the U.S.S.R. criteria of friendship, stability, etc., will would protest. Not because the U.S. policy remain that way? The answer is simple: would be wrong but because without U.S. We cannot, but, frankly, that is also true participation in the NPT fheir chance to today. We have no such guarantees that dominate the world is lessened. Unfor- the current possessors, the U.S.S.R., the tunately for the U.S.S.R., they trust no one People’s Republic of China, India, or not under their control sufficiently to give France, will not decide to attack tomorrow. them nuclear weapons, and their natural They are all more atomically powerful and fear and insecurity plus their imposed in some cases more likely opponents than alliances are too fragile for them to follow any logical recipients of CP would be—and our lead within their bloc. Proliferation in perhaps in the case of France, the U.S.S.R., Soviet eyes is a far greater threat than it is and the People’s Republic of China, they to the U.S. are even less stable—e.g., How many Those who sought such weapons but governments in France since World War could not or would not meet the U.S. II? What succession lines exist in the standards might also be unhappy. But, so U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of what? They are not very likely to be China? In other words, in the danger area, cooperative with us now, and they just nothing new is added, but in the stability might decide that meeting U.S. standards area, perhaps there could be an improve- of human rights and foreign affairs ment. Under CP the U.S. would probably conduct would be worth the effort if it not give missiles to a Uganda under an gained them genuine security—something Amin or a Libya under el-Qaddafi, but we the offer of our friendship or money alone might to Belgium and The Netherlands; does not assure thus provides little Egypt and Israel; Hungary, Czechoslo- leverage to the U.S. vakia, and even Romania; Canada and Iceland. Would the world be more explo- sive or less so? I contend there is a legitimate possibility it might prove more H owever, two serious con- stable, and in such a proliferated world the cerns remain. One, I have not refuted the U.S. would have to lead by example rather idea that proliferation, via the numbers than power alone—a worthy challenge in game alone, increases the chance of a more equal world. It would be a danger- nuclear weapons use. I accept that possi- ous gamble, but one that could enhance bility, but with this qualification—How peace and nudge the United States back much danger is added? There are already into the more traditional leadership role of at least six nuclear nations and 40,000- its past—leading by leadership rather plus warheads in the world. Would 10 or20 than power quotient. nations and another small fractional increase in the total number of weapons change that likelihood significantly (say, H ave we been wrong? Has nuclear at the peak, another 2000 weapons)? There weapons’ greatest use to the world been COULD WE BE WRONG? 37

frittered away by a shortsighted policy evidence shows it to be failing. Prolifer- decision designed not to save the world but ation is occurring. The controlled prolifer- to ensure a dominant position in it for the ation alternative proffers a chance to current possessors for as long as possi- achieve the long sought grail—a world of ble—an inequitable policy hidden, as so peace. Should we not consider it on its often in the past, by the cover of security? merits without blind allegiance to non- If so, it will fail, and unfortunately the proliferation on instincts alone? Bozeman. Montana

Notes J. In recent months The Atlantic. Atlas. Saturday Review. have surrendered withuut invasion or the use of atomic weapons. Washington Pust. Foreign Affairs. Foreign Policy, and The Illustrated 8. Drew Middleton in "Thinking about the Unthinkable. Politics London News, to mention a few. have featured articles on the question and the Arms Race,” The Atlantic. August 1976, pp. 54-57, is only one of of nuclear proliferation. Additionally, the U.S. State Department and many international observers who argues that nuclear parity rules out U.S. officials have spoken out publicly and in print citing the need for the use of nuclear weapons except in extreme emergencies. nonproliferation and the connection between proliferation of nuclear 9. Note that even now. when some experts claim the Soviets have weapons and nuclear energy development. acquired nuclear and overall superiority, the Soviets choose to use 2. President Carter has delayed development of the fast breeder "proxies” (the Cubans) for their African ad ventures. In a 1970 article in reactor in the U.S. and tried to persuade the United Kingdom, the the Air University Review! January-February), 1 predicted direct Soviet Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada to stop nuclear energy intervention in Africa by the mid-7Us. agreements with other nations for fea r they encourage the possibility of 10. The best chroniclers of Stalin’s madness and his obsession with proliferation. Mike McCormack. "How Not to End Nuclear Prolifer- acquiring nukes are Aieksander I. Solzhenitsyn in several of his books, ation." Washington Post. April 24, 1977, p. 5. including The First Circle and The Gulag Archipelago. /.9/8-7956: An 3. R. Robert Sandoval in "Consider the Porcupine. Another View of Experiment in Literary Investigation. Parts 1 and II: and Robert Nuclear Proliferation." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. May 1976. p. Conquest in The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties 17, suggests nuclear weapon proliferation might have some 11. Nuclear Energy, Report of the Fiftieth American Assembly. April advantages. Another article raising the question is: "Undue Alarm 22-25,1976, Arden House. This distinguished group joined many others over Nuclear Spread'.’" Wall Street Journal. O ctober 15, 1976 by Ernest that believe, try as the world might, nuclear weapons will proliferate, W. Lefever. p. 12. and that the knowledge to build is common knowledge and the cost ever 4. The West Germans were very slow to ratify the NPT and finally decreasing. did so by a slim margin only when the U.S. and Russia insisted that 12. Daniel Yergin, "The Terrifying Prospect Atomic BombB German ratification was needed before the Berlin agreement would be Everywhere," The Atlantic, April 1977, p. 60 signed. Japan was equally slow only ratifying in 1976. The issue is 13. Daniel Yergin in his excellent article, “ The Terrifying Prospect: frequently debated in Japan with an increasing number of supporters Atomic Bombs Everywhere," The Atlantic. April 1977. suggests opposing Japan’s allegiance to the NPT. pulicies whereby the U.S. would use incentives to accomplish 5. For a more thoruugh study of the possibilities and needs of nonproliferation. The similarity between the other goals (nonnuclear) nuclear power development potentials, see Major Wayne Morawitz, we list is interesting. The Committee for Economic Development in an "Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. Security." Air University Review. 88-page report issued in 1976 also urged a close connection between January-February 1977, pp 19-26. other U.S. foreign policy goals and nuclear nonproliferation. 6. There have, of course, been the Sino-Soviet clashes over disputed 14. In a stu dy, IU7U without Arms Control, the National Planning territories on their 5000-mile border. Association indicated no more than 200 warheads are needed to destroy 7. In retrospect, we have learned that the Japanese would probably a large nation/state. PROFESSIONALISM IN TRANSITION the officer corps in the age of deterrence

Lie u t e n an t Colonel T homas A. Fabyanic bservation and analysis of existing international and domestic continuity and change provide environment. Moreover, because of emerg- an excellent means to assess the ing fundamental alterations in the O international system and some modifica- strength and resilience of any institution, and the Armed Forces of the United States tions in the domestic environment as well, are no exception. The past several years the officer corps may find it essential to seem to indicate that the dominant trend is reassess the variables that constitute its change, and little evidence exists to professionalism. More significant, the suggest that this trend will be altered nature of the changed international significantly in the future. system may require the professional officer corps to conceptualize alternative The amount and degree of change military strategies that could differ notwithstanding, much continuity exists considerably from the more traditional in the U.S. Armed Forces. In part this strategic constructs of the past. reflects the bureaucratic nature of the U.S. military and the role it plays in the political, social, and economic interactions of the nation, but it can also be argued that Professionalism Defined the continuity of the armed forces is Perhaps the most obvious variable that primarily the product of the leadership identifies the officer corps as a profession provided by the professional officer corps. is its cohesiveness or corporateness. Like Obviously the officer corps is undergoing the more traditional professions of law change, but one could question whether and medicine, the officer corps reflects a the rate and thrust of its new orientation is corporate character due to its requirement clearly focused outward toward a re- for prolonged and specialized training and conceptualization of the role and problems education, reliance on an ethical code of of military force employment in a sophisti- behavior, and an extremely strong sense of cated and complex international environ- group solidarity.1 ment or whether its predominant view is Certainly a more important variable is introspective, based on the assumption the professional theory that exists within that straight-line extrapolations of exist- the officer corps. The theory consists of ing strategies and force structures are fundamental assumptions and principles adequate for the decade of the 1980s. pertaining to the organization of military But before attempting to determine the forces and how they are employed in peace extent and direction of change within the or war. In an ideal sense, the theory results professional officer corps, one must first from an analysis of past operational examine the salient variables that identify experience and measured judgments about the officer corps as a profession, such as its technological influences. This profes- corporate nature, its fundamental beliefs sional theory serves as a wellspring for the as expressed in its professional theory, military doctrine, strategy, and tactics and its professional ethic, which regulates that form the basis for all military activity. the behavior of the corps. After defining It is in this area that the military finds the profession in terms of its variables, one itself challenged during the nuclearage by can then suggest the thesis that the officer those nonmilitary intellectuals who argue corps is faced with a serious professional that the exponential increase in the dilemma when tasked to pursue a strategy destructiveness of nuclear weapons and of deterrence or war-fighting, given the the basic lack of empirical evidence

39 40 AIR UNI VERS IT Y RE VIE W pertaining to their use relegate military the context of an emergent military judgment to mere speculation. Indeed, the strategy that may go beyond deterrence. doctrinal and strategic literature of the The degree to which the professional nuclear age is almost exclusively the officer corps will alter its perceptions of product of civilian theorists, with military these variables is a matter of conjecture. thought originating in the officer corps That they must consider modification is conspicuously absent.- But perhaps more obvious, for certain emerging trends leave significant is the fact that the officer corps the officer corps little choice. has yet to realize that the implications of the existing strategy of deterrence, which stems primarily from the civilian intel- Professionalism and Deterrence lectual community, pose enormous chal- Perhaps the most complex strategy ever lenges to military professionalism—a followed by the U.S. military is the proposition that forms the basis for this strategy of deterrence. It remains, since article. World War II, as the dominant concept of The third and final variable, the pro- military force utility and continues to fessional ethic, appears to be of crucial serve as the foundation of U.S. national importance, for it reflects the values and security policy. That notwithstanding, its norms that regulate the internal relation- implementation creates a conceptual ships of the officer corps as a group and challenge for the professional officer corps govern the relationship of the professional and requires it to consider some funda- officer corps toward its clients, the mental adjustment in its thinking. For institutionalized state and the society example, military planners traditionally within the state. As a group, the officer assess a potential adversary on the basis corps stresses the pessimistic nature of of his capabilities, not his intentions. Yet, man and accepts a cyclical view of history. “ ...deterrence is about intentions—not Military force employment is justified by just estimating enemy intentions but serving the political aims of the state, influencing them.” ' Despite its tradition, which is in continuous competition with the professional officer corps accepts this other states. This condition requires the salient fact that is stated clearly in the officer corps to be eternally vigilant and official doctrine of the United States Air well prepared for war. Threat perceptions, Force. therefore, are vital to the profession, for they strongly influence strategy, tactics, Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of and weapon system preferences. More unacceptable counteraction to an enemy’s important, threat perceptions are a crucial hostile actions. The intent is to deter an element of the communication process adversary—to prevent an act by fear of the between the profession and its clients. consequences—or to impel him to take some These values and norms are institu- action acceptable to the United States.4 tionalized through training, professional But in an analytic sense, this theoretical military education, and socialization, construct poses some difficulty for the which is a continuous function in a professional officer because it raises professional officer’s career. And like fundamental questions about his status as professional theory, the professional ethic a professional. The problem stems not presents the officer corps with a challenge from the theory, which professional of major proportions when examined in officers accept as valid and promulgate as PROFESSIONALISM 41

doctrine, but from the operational uncertainty of the deterrence doctrine, this tainty of the doctrine. By definition, the dimension of deterrence effectively pre- professional is required to combine his vents the professional officer from com- theoretical beliefs with practical appli- bining theoretical knowledge with prac- cations in order to assess the true value of tical application and thus further ques- his professional expertise.5 But an empir- tions his professionalism. ically precise assessment about the By contrast, and at a lower level of efficacy of deterrence is made with great significance, it appears that the strategy difficulty, if at all, and the void that results of deterrence serves to reinforce the effectively denies the officer corps an attitude of the professional officer corps element of assurance so vital to its well- toward war. As noted by Samuel P. being. Huntington, the professional officer “...is The deterrence strategy further com- afraid of war. He wants to prepare for war. plicates the issue of professionalism since But he is never ready to fight a war.” 7 deterrence is based on perceptions that are Nevertheless, the deterrence strategy does inherently vague and implicit. One deters force the officer corps to modify the by having the intention to deter and by perceptions of victory that continue to persuading one’s adversary that credible command great influence and respect in military force exists and will be used the training and education of the pro- effectively if deterrence fails.'’ This fessional officer. The traditionalist notion presents some difficulty to the profes- is that sional officer corps because the deterrence ...winning requires not only the means but theory suggests that perceptions of force also the ardent will to win, and the combat capability can become more important officer has been instilled with this will. The than actual force capability. Thus, it is kind of military history he has read has possible that force structure and readiness stressed those heroic episodes, especially standards necessary to maintain the among historic captains of his own nation, where the will to win has conquered over proper level of perceptions could be less considerable odds.8 than that required for actual war-fighting. Under such circumstances, the profes- One committed to a strategy of deterrence, sional officer can be expected to respond in by contrast, merely would define victory as a traditional manner, that is, he will seek the absence of war. to apply those preparedness standards that provide him a perceived degree of Professionalism and War-fighting certainty at the prudent risk level. Unfor- It should be recognized, however, that tunately, when a presumed state of mutual the demands for change placed on the deterrence exists, the clients of the professional officer corps would not professional officer corps could oppose disappear if the U.S. adopted a more such action, since it could be misperceived traditional strategy of war-fighting in lieu by the adversary as a move to gain a of deterrence, largely because there military advantage. Thus, what the currently exist powerful domestic con- officer corps sees as necessary to assure straints on the levels of military force and force credibility can be viewed by his their use. Moreover, the prevailing and clients as undesirable because of its anticipated lowered perceptions of inter- potential destabilizing influence. Like the national threat add another dimension to previously discussed operational uncer- the changing attitudes of the clients 42 AIR UNIVERSITY RE VIEW toward the need for military force. Col- ciated with decisions made by the clients. lectively, the constraints impede the But one must question the extent to fulfillment of the professional ethic. which the professional officer corps can By definition, the professional ethic adhere to its ethical values necessary for a includes the values, norms, and respon- war-fighting strategy, given the trend of sibilities with which the officer corps the views expressed by the elite and governs its interaction with the civil attentive public within American society. government, the society, and the internal One analyst suggests that “ ...Americans relationships among the officer corps.9 in general, and elites in particular, see The values that constitute part of the ethic international affairs as less threatening are of crucial importance, since they form than they once did,... [and that] the cold the basis for self-image and, moreover, war view of threat no longer is a part of enable both the state and society to most Americans’ political consciousness.” evaluate the viability of the profession. It Moreover, the evidence seems to suggest appears obvious that such a value system that the shift is a major one and likely to would include, at a minimum, patriotism, remain for some years.11 ideology, and nationalism. The existence In similar fashion, civil-military rela- of these values permits the officer corps to tions appear to be undergoing change. establish an appropriate normative struc- Indeed, Huntington currently suggests ture within the armed forces. The norma- that the immediate future will be charac- tive structure, its hierarchy of values, and terized by “ ... less congruence and possibly the corporateness of the officer corps tend less interaction between the military to provide group cohesion and enable the establishment and other social insti- officer corps to perpetuate the professional tutions.” 12 ethic. Yet, more important, they allow the Under such circumstances it appears officer corps to gain almost universal unlikely that the professional officer corps acceptance of a war-fighting strategy would convey high-level threat percep- within the armed forces. But the effect is tions to its clients on a sustained basis, limited to internalization, because exter- and, therefore, one must question the nally the normative structure of the extent to which professional officers could professional officer corps has little impact. rely on threat perceptions as a value in its Indeed, the value system of the clients ethic. It is this condition that leads might differ appreciably, particularly Professor Huntington to conclude that when the interaction between the military “ the tension between the demands of and its clients is low, which it traditionally military security and the values of is in the United States.10 Under such American liberalism can, in the long run, circumstances, and particularly in the be relieved only by the weakening of the absence of actual military employment security threat or the weakening of over a sustained period, the professional liberalism.” 11 officer corps might find it necessary to Thus, it appears that both a deterrent emphasize threat assessments in order to strategy and a war-fighting strategy convey professional judgments to its present serious dilemmas to the profes- clients. Threat perceptions are vital in sional officer corps; the former by prevent- such a situation, for they provide the ing the professional officer from com- armed forces with a method of high- bining his theoretical knowledge with lighting the risk and uncertainty asso- practical application and the latter by the PROFESSIONALISM 43

apparent divergence between client threat profession wishes to define the variables perceptions and those that the profes- that constitute its professionalism. Ob- sional officer must institutionalize to viously such efforts might lead to con- satisfy his professional ethic. Independ- siderable change but not to the exclusion ently. both strategies place a strain on of tradition and continuity. professionalism. But when it is realized The first task for the professional officer that existing American strategy is based corps might be to re-evaluate its de- on the notion of deterrence and war- pendence on both professional theory and fighting if deterrence fails, then the full practical application. In the existing impact of the professional dilemma technological era, the latter chiefly becomes abundantly clear. Put differently, functions as means of providing a measure the clients of the American military of certainty and offers a sense of accom- require its professionals to maintain a plishment. Practical application does not strategy which demands that the pro- appear essential for mature professionals fessionals’ expertise remain unproved; and, moreover, may not have validity due simultaneously, the clients ask the pro- to rapidly changing technology and the fessionals to remain prepared to imple- constant flux of politico-military situ- ment a strategy that requires the insti- ations. This is to suggest, of course, that tutionalization of an ethic fundamentally theory and doctrine—and the resulting at odds with that of the clients. strategy as well—can be accepted as valid Perhaps the basic question is one of without empirical data to substantiate strategic direction. Does there exist a their validity.14 The professional officer strategy that would provide for the corps can base its theory, doctrine, and security of the state while simultaneously strategy on a continuing analysis of its permitting the professional officer corps, own capabilities and its professional with its attendant theory, ethics, and assessment of the threat. corporateness, to maintain a positive and With regard to its ethic, the professional intellectually respected interaction with officer corps can give thoughtful exam- its clients? Or, alternatively, is it neces- ination to its values and norms and ask if sary for the professional officer corps to they maintain relevance for the existing reconceptualize its theory and ethic, with environment. It appears that the diver- proper emphasis on both continuity and gence between the professional officers’ change, in order to ensure a continuation perceptions of their fundamental values— of the profession of arms? nationalism and threat assessment—and Professionalism and those of the state and society may unduly and unnecessarily strain the linkages the Diffusion of Power between the two. Perhaps the professional Perhaps the greatest challenge for the officer corps should recognize that its professional officer corps in the last normative influence, external as well as decades of the twentieth century is to internal, has less impact in today’s conceptualize alternative military stra- relatively sophisticated and pluralistic tegies that reflect existing concerns about environment. Clearly, internal sociali- the utility and the role of military force in zation has its limits, and the professional international politics. A prerequisite to officer corps should be aware that exces- that effort is serious introspection leading sive commitment to the war-fighting to an objective analysis of how the values of the military institution is a 44 AIR UNI VERSITY RE VIE W

dangerous movement toward a distinct to international order and security ap- military ethos. pears ominous.18 The strategic implications of a recon- For the professional officer corps, the ceptualization of professionalism could be changing international system requires a major significance. Deterrence can be an assessment of the role of force in such accepted in a total intellectual sense, since an environment and an adequate strategic the demands of the profession will not concept. In a professional sense, appli- require practical applications of theoreti- cation of the deterrence strategy at levels cal constructs to ascertain their validity. below strategic nuclear exchange and Likewise, a war-fighting strategy takes classical conventional warfare in a on new dimensions since it would not rest NATO-type scenario might have serious on a professional ethic that places primary limitations because of the enormous emphasis on nationalism and threat difficulty in determining adequate force assessment. Instead the ethic could stress structure requirements for a multitude of the return to the notion of territorial potential adversaries. Likewise, a tradi- defense and coercive diplomacy, concepts tional war-fighting strategy may offer which should be more congruent with the little promise in such an international clients of the professional officer corps. system simply because the magnitude of This modification of the ethic makes it the threat conceivably could exceed the possible to alter the war-fighting strategy resources that realistically could be made so that its orientation is directed more at available for a continuous war-fighting escalation control of conflict. The pro- strategy. Indeed, the challenges are fession of arms then takes on the image of formidable. what is referred to as a constabulary force, A review of the implications of this changing international environment ...continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force and seeks viable leads one American scholar to conclude international relations rather than victory, that because it has incorporated a protective military posture.1' the paradox of the emerging international system is that the need for more effective Although not in the tradition of classic structures and mechanisms to reduce the military force employment, the profes- likelihood of conflict will be greater than in sional officer corps may have no choice but any previous era. But at the same time the potential for exploitation of a variety of to accept this changed orientation, if for no conflicts for unilateral advantage will be other reason than the continuing and greater than ever. The broad interest of the fundamental alteration of the interna- United States lies, of course, in helping to tional system. The emergence of a large shape a global system in which the prospects number of new states, with their attendant for conflict will be diminished. For this purpose American military power will nationalism, and the surfacing of deter- remain an indispensable ingredient.17 mined sociopolitical aspirations are accompanied by a diffusion of military and politico-economic power. Given the It appe ar s, therefore, that the response of magnitude of the diffusion—particularly the professional officer corps must be a the military dispersion that includes the strategy that offers military force struc- availability of conventional weapons of tures of sufficient capability and flexi- unprecedented accuracy and the likeli- bility to apply coercive diplomacy in the hood of nuclear proliferation—the threat international system, while the political PROFESSIONALISM 45

processes work toward the establishment The manner in which the professional of a new world order in which “ ...the officer corps responds is crucial; that it prospects of conflict will be diminished.” 18 must respond is an ethical imperative. Hq Air University (ATC)

Notes 1. The definitions offered ore drawn from the following sources; delations (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Bengt Abrahamsson, Military ProfessionatUatinn and Political Power Policy Research. 1977), pp. 22-26. I Beverly Hills: Sage. 1972); Samuel P Huntington. The Soldier and the 11. Bruce Russett, The Americans' Retreat from World Power." Stale (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Belknap Press. 1957); Political Science Quarterly. Spring 1975, pp. K, 17. and Morris Janowitz. The Professional Soldier [New York: Free Press, 12. Goodpaster and Huntington, p. 26. 19611; reprinted with a new Prologue in 197! I 13. H un tin gton , p 4.56. 2. A notable exception is Maxwell 1). Taylor's The Uncertain 14. A precedent for such acceptance exists in the history of the U.S. Trumpet i New York. Harper, 196(1). By con trast, there is a plethora o f Army Air Corps during the 1930s. During that lime, and on thebasisof scholarly Soviet materials written un doctrine, strategy, and tactics by meager evidence, it developed and taught the doctrine and strategy of military officers of the U.S.S R Much of the writing isavailable in the daylight, high-altitude precision bombardment. ‘ Soviet Military Thought" senes, translated and published under the 15. Janow itz. p. 418. auspices of the USAP 16. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Jr.. "Emerging Major Power Relation- ;t, Thomas C. Schelling. Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale ships: Implications for the American Military in the Late Twentieth University Press. 1966), p. .15. Century," Air Uniuersity Renew. March-April 1977. pp. 7-11. 4. AKM 1-1. Aerospace Doctrine United Slates Air Force Basic 17. Ibid., pp. 14-15. Doctrine Department of the Air Force. 15 January 1975. p. 1-1 18. Ibid. 5. Abrahamsson. p. 61. 6. Schelling. p. (6. 7 Huntington, p. 69. Acknowledgment « Bernard Brodie. War and Politics (New York: Macmillan. 1973), p. 491). The editors wish to thank Lucian Mandeville. Director, Armed Forces 9. Abrahamsson, pp 6.1-66; Huntington, pp. 9-10. 76-79. Research and Study Center (C.E.R.S.A.). Institute of Political Studies. It). Andrew J. Ooodpaster and Samuel P Huntington,Civil-Military University of Toulouse (France), for permission to publish this article. FAMILY POLICY IN THE ARMED FORCES an a ssessm en t

D r . H amilton I. M c C ubbin

Ms. M artha A. Marsden

D r . K athl een P. Durning

Dr . E dna J. H unter

R. CHARLES C. MOSKOS, JR., in his application of developmentalD analysis to the military establishment in the United States today, concluded that “ the overriding and clearly dominant trend in contemporary military organization is the decline of the institutional format and the corresponding ascen- dancy of the occupational model.”1 Such a conceptual shift implies not only organizational consequences such as trade unionism and increased use of civilian technicians but also a gradual yet distinct change in the role of the military family from that of a underscoring a “ calling," which overrides passive appendage to that of an active individual and family interest in favor of component of the military profession. the higher goal of national defense. Essentially, this shift departs from Historically, members of the military and traditional military values and norms their families have been guided by prin-

46 ARMED FORCES FAMIL Y POLICY 47

ciples of sacrifice and dedication to the ily, (2) understand the dynamics of both organization; their efforts, in turn, have the changing roles of women and the been partially repaid by an array of social family within the military, (3)evaluate the and financial supports signifying the impact of existing military policies on the military’s intent to “ take care of its own.” - health and stability of the family unit, and The emerging occupational model of (4) assess the impact of projected policies military service, by contrast, is derived on the family. from a marketplace that provides mone- tary rewards for equivalent skills/1 Within Assumptions Underlying this model, military personnel exert Family Policy in the Military influence in the determination of salaries, working conditions, and benefits; first Not since Reuben Hill’s classic study of priority is clearly given to self and family military fam ilies’ experiencing war- interest rather than to that of the employ- induced separations and reunions, in ing organization. The occupational model which he appealed for a “ national policy gives legitimacy and weight to the service which deals with American families as a members’ individual and family needs, precious national resource,” has any which are commonly suppressed within serious examination of social policy and the institutional model. Implicitly, the the military family been attempted.4 No occupational model stimulates the crea- systematic, comprehensive effort has been tion of programs and benefits more made to study the host of assumptions, responsive to family needs and more issues, and policies of the military system equitable in view of the unique demands that impinges on the lives of families of placed on the family by the employing career-motivated service members, in- military organization. Within this model, cluding both officer and enlisted personnel such presently unquestioned realities of from all branches of the armed forces, military service as forced family relo- collectively referred to in this article as cations, separations, financial hardships, “ the military family.” It appears now that and fluctuating benefits may well become such an effort should be made in view of negotiable contractual issues between increasing evidence that the family does employee service members and the em- influence the well-being, performance, and ployer organization. retention of the service member and thus By viewing the changing military affects the overall functioning of the system in terms of this emerging occupa- military system. The following assump- tional model, we can better understand tions appear to be rooted in the historical and respond to the increasingly activist development of the military system. These role of the military family and appreciate assumptions, although slightly modified even more the family’s role in the military over time, remain basically unchanged, mission. Within this context, military and influential in determining policy, and national leaders face an important and perhaps not totally appropriate in the difficult challenge: to make the family a emerging occupational model of the primary and integral component of mili- military organization. tary policy. To meet this challenge • The primary mission of the military effectively, policy-makers need to; (1) is the defense of the United States; family examine carefully and modify traditional concerns and needs are subordinate to this assumptions regarding the military fam- mission. to a comfortable standard of living for the family. The unique financial demands of military life, such as losses due to forced relocations, do not need to be calculated in the salary and benefits formula for service members. • Except in extreme cases, family influences are not significant factors in the recruitment, health, performance, and retention of military career personnel. • Because of immense logistical problems, family concerns cannot be considered in job assignments, career planning, relocations, and separations— except in rare hardship cases. • Family problems are outside the domain of military policy. If they occur, they can and should be handled within the family unit, using limited help from existing military and community resources when necessary. Difficulties within a family, particularly deviant behavior of the spouse or children, reflect negatively on the service member. • It is improper for the family to • The military profession is far more challenge the military system on policy than a job; it is a way of life in which both issues. service members and their families are • Any data needed to formulate and expected to accept willingly such inherent evaluate policies affecting the service stresses as extended family separations member or the military family are readily and frequent relocations. available to policy-makers and are taken • The traditional, supportive but into account when making or changing subordinate role of the military wife, policy. which has been strictly and comprehen- sively defined by the system, must be maintained. review of relevant research • The tradition of the military to “ care casts considerable doubt on the soundness for its own” means that programs and of the preceding assumptions and sug- benefits for family members are a reflec- gests that policies based on them may be tion of the military’s interest in them, but undesirably costly to the system.’ Al- these benefits should not be considered though costs such as the impaired func- guaranteed rights. tioning of military wives, children, and • Relative to civilian standards, families may defy exact computation, they military pay scales, allowances, and are nonetheless real and are documented benefits are fair, generous, and conducive in the research literature.1’ Additional

48 ARMED FORCES FAMIL Y POLICY 49 evidence for the need to re-examine family hypothesized that as women do become related policies in the military may be incorporated more fully into the military gained from a consideration of (1) the system, sex role stereotypes will tend to changing and increasingly important role erode as men and women relate to one of women in society, the military, and the another in a variety of superior/equal/ family; (2) the changing role of the subordinate job relationships. It may also military family itself; and (3) the impact of be hypothesized that service members will certain military policies on family life. begin to relate to their spouses and children in a less sex-stereotyped manner. Double standards of sexual behavior will changing role of women in society and the military fade, and the military system itself will gradually cease to be a “cult of mascu- Within the past few years, the women’s linity.” liberation movement has provided the The changing roles of women in society, impetus for a re-evaluation of sex role in the military, and in the family will definitions, policies, and attitudes that probably soon have profound effects on had previously limited the options avail- the quality of military life. For policy- able to women in our society.7 With makers, a host of family-related issues varying degrees of speed and success, come to mind and need to be addressed. many of the economic, legal, educational, What is the expected role of the “ de- and occupational barriers commonly pendent” husband whose wife is a service encountered by women are beginning to member? Or that of the “dependent” crumble. The institutions of marriage and military wife who has a career of her own? the family, based on their traditional, How will these changing situations affect strictly defined sex roles, are being military job assignments, family moves, critically examined by growing numbers and extended separations? Will members of women and men alike. The women’s of military families become less dependent movement may be viewed as a strong on the system, more assertive of their social force that legitimizes women’s personal and family needs, and less interests outside the home and, by exten- willing to subordinate their lives to the sion, legitimizes men’s interests inside the orders of the military establishment? Are home.8 Stereotyped, traditional, and family problems and divorces in the inflexible sex roles are gradually becom- military community likely to increase? ing modified, and the effects of these How difficult will it be to recruit, socialize, changes within both the family unit and and retain high-quality military personnel the entire society are quite likely to be in light of these current and projected substantial. In an effort to keep pace with the move social changes? toward equal opportunity for both sexes, the military establishment has recently changing role of the military family begun to recruit more women and develop Slowly and often painfully, many of more diverse career options for them today’s military family members, espe- within the military services.9 However, the cially wives, are breaking away from the integration and full utilization of women bonds of military traditions and stereo- in the armed forces continue to be limited typed sex roles to develop themselves more by both legal restriction and societal according to their own wishes and abili- r e s i s t a n c e . 10 N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t m a y b e ties. As they re-evaluate their educational. 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW occupational, and other life goals, a relatives of American servicemen declared growing number of military wives are prisoners of war or missing in action, this beginning to question the complete sub- highly visible and vocal group demanded ordination of themselves to the needs of that the government (1) provide families their husbands’ military careers. with a full accounting of their missing The contemporary egalitarian family husbands and sons, (2) end the war as pattern contrasts dramatically with the quickly as possible, and (3) pressure enemy traditional companionate pattern in governments to do the same and provide which the military community molded humane treatment to prisoners of war, as family life to the requirements of the guaranteed under the Geneva Conven- profession.11 Until fairly recently, the tions. Backed by extensive publicity from young serviceman often postponed mar- the media, members of the National riage because of his low salary. When he League of Families voiced their concerns did marry, the ceremony was often and demands to the Secretary of Defense, conducted with full military ritual, and the members of Congress, and the President new bride was dramatically introduced himself—as well as to representatives of into the closed community that was to be the governments of North Vietnam, her entire life. Apparently, the strains of Cambodia, and Laos. It is obvious that the military life were less disruptive in earlier efforts of the National League of Families times because the family was enveloped in had a significant impact on the military a strictly defined, internally consistent establishment and the federal govern- lifestyle. ment. Family services and benefits were The contemporary military family does developed; legal support and tax benefits not really fit into this traditional frame- were provided; and, perhaps most impor- work. Today, a service member often tant, military families were represented, marries and begins his career simul- heard, and respected.13 taneously, and his spouse is far less likely Within the context of an emerging to be actively socialized into the military occupational model of military service, community. The contemporary military increasingly composed of married service family may also be a single-parent family, members, several current and projected with either a serviceman or a service- policies appear to have especially unde- woman at its head. Pregnancy is now sirable consequences for family life and, legally classified as a temporary disa- thus, for the morale, recruitment, and bility, and the servicewoman may choose retention of high-quality personnel. For to remain on active duty. In other military example, cutbacks in programs providing families, both spouses are service mem- subsidized commissaries, low-cost hous- bers, or perhaps the wife is the service ing, family health care at military facili- member and the husband the military ties, and supplementary services through dependent. the Civilian Health and Medical Program During the Vietnam War, the strength of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) and changing role of the military family are certain to affect negatively those were dramatically underscored by the family-oriented persons considering mili- emergence of the National League of tary service as a career. Families of American Prisoners of War Clearly, the conflict between the two and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia.12 institutions—the military and the fam- Composed of parents, wives, and other ily-over the same resource, the service ARMED FORCES FA MIL Y FOLIC Y 51

member, produces strains and dilemmas work on a second job to supplement their for all parties.14 The considerable power of family income. the family in this conflict has been Besides the high financial costs of underscored in the retention studies of frequent relocations, military families enlisted personnel and military academy must also pay the psychosocial costs graduates, which reveal that family associated with a nomadic lifestyle.17 influences, especially wives’ attitudes Isolated from the traditional supports of toward the military, are crucial factors in extended family, close friends, and a determining whether service members stable community, members of military remain in the military.15 families, especially the wives and children, often experience emotional and impact of existing policies on family life interpersonal difficulties that seem to be The military community of the future will related to their rootlessness. For military probably be characterized by all volunteer children, problems in school, with friends, personnel, increasing options for women and at home have been noted.18 For the (both as service members and military military wives, frequent relocations make wives), diversity of family forms and serious educational or career ambitions lifestyles, less commitment to the tradi- practically impossible.19 Although mili- tional military way of life, and increased tary families may certainly enjoy such assertiveness of families regarding their benefits as travel, exposure to diverse needs and concerns. Since these trends are lifestyles, and close camaraderie with already observable, policy-makers would other military families, the financial and be wise to examine carefully the impact of sociopsychological difficulties involved in certain existing policies on the lives of frequent, forced family relocations are today’s military families. surely serious enough to warrant closer Service members and their families are policy analysis.20 routinely ordered to make a major change Family isolation. Because of national of residence approximately every two and international defense commitments, years. For all but the lowest grades of military families are sometimes relocated enlisted personnel, an allowance is pro- in foreign countries or in relatively remote vided for moving family members and areas within the United States. In such household furnishings to the new location. situations, families frequently live close Usually, however, this allowance is quite together in enclaves of military quarters inadequate, and the family is forced to and may become isolated from the larger, absorb the extra costs—along with totally nonmilitary society. Such “ ghetto-iza- nonreimbursable expenses such as losses tion,” in turn, may foster a lack of family incurred through buying and selling a privacy, an extreme dependence on the home on short notice, temporary family military system, a parochial view of the lodging costs, extraordinary transporta- world, and a distorted environment for tion outlays (e.g., automobile repairs), and children.21 Although some families may replacement purchases of household actually prefer these living arrangements furnishings at the new location.16 The because of safety, convenience, and financial stresses associated with forced economy, policy-makers would benefit relocation are serious and continual, from a thorough review of family adjust- especially for families of enlisted per- ments and problems associated with this sonnel; service members frequently try to social-cultural isolation.22 52 AIR UNIVERSITY RE VIEW

With American military personnel The impact of father absence on chil- assigned to duty in many parts of the dren’s adjustment is highly complex and world, it is not surprising that a number of related to a host of intervening variables, their spouses are foreign-born. In most such as nature of Separation (wartime or military communities, a notable propor- peacetime, short or long), age and sex of tion of servicemen's wives are European, child, attitude of mother toward the Japanese, Korean, or Vietnamese. More- separation, quality of mother-father-child over, because Filipinos serve in the United relationships, family’s prior separations, States Navy, entire families may find and availability of father surrogates themselves placed in a culture quite d u r i n g t h e s e p a r a t i o n . 25 D e s p i t e d i f - different from the one in which they were ferences in circumstances and coping born. For these foreign-born spouses and responses, however, it appears that the families, the “double culture shock” of stresses brought about by forced family adjusting to military life as well as to separations are considerable for military American life is indeed difficult.23 children. Although very little is actually known Although today’s military families may about these mixed-cultural families, it appears that they are often socially isolated from other military families, unsure of their English and reluctant to seek help for problems. Furthermore, it seems likely that their children may experience special difficulties because of their dual heritage and differing treatment by parents, teachers, and peers. If these somewhat isolated and vulnerable mixed- cultural families are to become fully integrated into the military community, policy-makers must initiate research documenting their specific needs so that appropriate services can be developed. family Reparation and reunion Another major stress experienced by military families is the periodic family separation required by the system’s need for a number of its service members to serve aboard ships at sea, in hardship duty abroad, on special assignments, or in actual combat. Although the nature, frequency, and length are variable, family separations share many similarities in the dramatic role shifts and conflicts found in the husband-wife and parent-child relationships during the actual separation and the subsequent reunion.24 ARMED FORCES FAMIL Y POLICY 53

display remarkable resourcefulness and Legitimacy of Family resilience in adapting to the strains of Policy in the Military separation and reunion, the longitudinal effects of family functioning under these Although the nature and intensity of stresses have only recently begun to be these family stresses may vary, the studied.26 How do family separations and authors contend that they are substantial, associated problems affect the health and that they detract from the performance of performance of service members? How service members, and that they should be might family members be better prepared examined much more carefully by military for required separations? What is the policy-makers. This review of research feasibility of making changes in the findings lends legitimacy to the next nature of separations—e.g., shorter dura- logical and more complex issue: should tion, more opportunity for rest and family considerations receive higher recuperation leave with families, im- priority than they now receive, and should proved planning of separations in careers, they become an integral part of the and more meaningful family support military’s policy-making process? services during separation? Should the The traditional viewpoint has been that military system actively encourage wives increased efforts by the military system to to develop their own interests, skills, and help meet its families’ psychosocial and independence so that they may become financial needs are inappropriate, im- more confident and effective co-leaders of practical, and unnecessary considering their families? If so, how would this affect the existence of federal, state, and local family stability? assistance programs. Only in cases of War and family life. Coupled with the extreme family hardship, it has been stresses of family separation, the fear and argued, should the military system inter- reality of wartime injury, captivity, and vene; even then, its programs and services death produce a number of marital and should be strictly limited. family difficulties, which have been In contrast, the authors maintain that documented in studies of families during military families, while certainly sharing World War II and the Vietnam War.27 The some problems with their civilian counter- impact of war and family separation on parts, are subjected to unique stresses and children’s emotional and social develop- problems that are not always amenable to ment has also been examined during help from existing federal, state, and local World War II, the Vietnam War, and the programs and that responsibility for recent Israeli-Arab conflicts.28 While the developing sound policies to minimize and substantial stresses of war, separation, alleviate these stresses lies clearly within and reunion may disturb even the most the military system itself. If the goal of a stable of families, military families have high-quality all-volunteer force is to be generally been discouraged from admit- realized, the system cannot ignore the ting the existence of problems and seeking potent influence of the family on the help. The experiences of the families of recruitment, performance, and retention of returned prisoners of war and men military personnel. declared missing in action underscore the Within both the larger American society need to research key issues related to and the military system within it, there is wartime stresses and to formulate appro- ample evidence documenting the need to priate policy responses. incorporate the significant role of the 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

family into public policy review and goals are greatly facilitated if family needs development. Major efforts have recently and the projected impact of specific been directed in Congress, toward the policies on families become integral parts improvement of family health and stabil- of the decision-making process. ity.29 Family policy specialists are being • To attain and maintain a high level trained to analyze the impact of projected of personnel effectiveness, military poli- public and private policies on families and cies regarding the recruitment, health, to assist in developing innovative and performance, and retention of service sound family-related policies.30 Within the members must reflect a positive emphasis military, the limited butincreasing body of on the supportive role of the family. research about the military family and • Policies regarding pay scales, allow- women service members heralds a positive ances, and benefits must take into account trend toward clarifying the close relation- the financial and psychosocial hardships ships among legislation, military policy, of military life and their impact on family and the family.31 members. • Military-sponsored medical, financial, and social service programs and Re-evaluation of Assumptions benefits must be considered guaranteed rights of the service member’s family in Given the needs of the present military partial compensation for the stresses system and those of its families, how much inherent in military life. weight can be given realistically to family • To the greatest possible extent, considerations in the policy-making family considerations should be incor- process? Because the family is playing an porated into personnel policies regarding increasingly important role in the emerg- duty assignment, relocation, separation, ing occupational model of the armed and career planning. services, the authors contend that family • Family problems are not outside the issues must be given high priority in the domain of military policy; coordinated development of both short- and long-term services within the military system and military policies. effective linkages to civilian resources Clearly the traditional assumptions of must be mobilized to offer appropriate military policy-makers, and the policies preventive and treatment programs for resulting from these assumptions, have family problems. not reflected fully the important roles and • F a m i l y m e m b e r s h a v e t h e r i g h t a n d needs of the contemporary military responsibility to challenge, seek clari- family. In contrast to those traditional but fication of, and attempt to change policies no longer appropriate assumptions, the that they feel undermine family stability. authors offer the following assumptions for consideration by policy-makers:• • Systematic investigations of the functioning, problems, and needs of the • The health and stability of service military family are the responsibility of members and their families are vital to the policy-makers; knowledge derived from accomplishment of the primary military such studies is an essential component of mission of national defense. policy-making and policy-review pro- • The implementation of military cesses. policies and the realization of desired These revised assumptions are based on ARMED FORCES FAMIL Y POLIC Y 55

the premise that it is time for the military and the formulation of family impact system to recognize the family as a key statements comparable to the existing factor in the formulation and assessment environmental impact statements man- of military policy. Because precise or dated in the U.S. 1971 Environmental coherent policy is far better than ambig- Policy Act.34 Simply stated, the ultimate uous or fragmented policy, the authors goal of the commission would be the propose the establishment of a family improvement of military family life impact commission or task force within through policy-making and review. Fol- the military’s policy-making organiza- lowing Sheila Kamerman’s guidelines for tion.32 This concept of a commission is an the development of a family impact adaptation of existing national and statement, the commission would adopt international programs, which review these immediate goals: (1) analysis and policy and develop impact statements clarification of the consequences of reflecting the present and projected military policies for families, (2) direct consequences to the family of existing and communication of knowledge and re- proposed public policies. Nations such as search findings to policy-makers, and (3) Austria and Sweden, for example, have assistance in modifying existing policies explicit family commissions that empha- and developing new ones that would size the analysis and improvement of contribute to family health and stability.35 governmental actions related to family life.33 Traditional military assumptions and The proposed military-sponsored com- policies concerning the families of service mission would focus on policy analysis members must be revised in light of evidence which underscores: (1) the significant influence of families on per- 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

sonnel performance, job satisfaction, and ment and retention incentives, promote retention; (2) the considerable stresses necessary family stability, and facilitate inherent in military family life; and (3) the the overall mission accomplishment of the changing and increasingly assertive roles military system. Through the develop- of women and families within the military ment of such policies, the family and the system. military system might reach a more Through the creation of a family impact mutually satisfying future, as envisioned commission within the military, sys- by Reuben Hill: “ ...Two institutions tematic policy analyses and recommenda- [which] co-exist to achieve a level of tions could be carried out most effec- collaboration that is more rewarding than tively. The authors contend that sound what is seen by some as the present state of policies concerning the military family antagonistic cooperation.”36 would improve the service member’s Minneapolis, Minnesota performance, provide effective recruit- and San Diego, California

Notes 1. Charles C. Moskos. Jr.. ‘Armed Forces in American Society: Family Services," pp. 110, in H. McCubbin, B. Dahl, P. Metres, Jr., E. From Institution to Occupation.” Symposium Proceedings: Pro- Hunter, and J. Plag, editors. Family Separation and Reunion ceedings of the oth Symposium on Psychology in the Air Force. U.S. Air (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974). Force Academy. April 1976, pp. 1-5. 13. E. Hunter and J. Plag, An Assessmentof the NeedsofPOW MIA 2. Ibid., p. 1. Wives Residing in the San Diego Metropolitan Area: A Proposal for the 3. Ibid., pp. 3-5. Establishment of Family Services. Report No. 73-39 (San Diego. 1. R e u b e n H i l l . Families under Stress: Adjustment to the Crises of California: Naval Health Research Center, 1973), H. McCubbin and B. War. Separation and Reunion (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1949), Dahl. "Social and Mental Health Services to Families of Servicemen p. 361 Missing in Action or Returned Prisoners o f War," pp. 191-98, in 5. H. McCubbin, B. Dahl, and K. Hunter. "Research on the Military McCubbin et al. Family Separation and Reunion (1974). R. Nelson, Family: A Review.” pp. 291-319 in H. McCubbin. B. Dahl, and E. "The Legal Plight o f the POW/M1A Family," pp. 49-64, in McCubbin et Hunter, editors. Families m the Military System (Beverly Hills: Sage, al.. Family Separation and Reunion (1974). Powers, pp. 1-10. 1976). 14. R Hill, "Consultants Comments" (Paper presented at the 6. See W. Dickerson »nd R Arthur. "N avy Families in Distress," Prisoner of War Research Conference, Naval Health Research Center, Military Medicine. 13(H 1965>:pp. 894-98; V. Gonzalez. Psychiatry and San Diego, California, April 1974). the Army Brut (Springfield. Illinois: C. C. Thomas, 1970); E. 15. J. Malone. A Study of Enlisted Personnel Retention in the Navy. Hillenbrand. ‘Father Absence in Military Families" Unpublished Research Report SRR 68-6(San Diego, California: U.S. Navy Personnel doctoral dissertation. George Washington University, 1970, and R. Research Activity. September 1967). G. Davidson."Reporton Graduate Isay, "The Submariners' Wives Syndrome." Psychiatric Quarterly. Questionnaire" (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1958). 42(1968): pp. 647-52. 16. R. Marsh, "Mobility in the Military: Its Effect on the Family 7. C. Safilios Rothschild, Women and Social Policy (Englewood System." pp. 91-111. in McCubbin et al.. Families in the Military Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-HaII. 1974). System (1976). 8. S Mem. "St»x Role Adaptability: One Consequence of Psycho- 17. D. Saunders, “ Poverty in the Army." Social Service Review. logical Androgyny." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43(1969):pp. 396-405. J. McKain, "Alienation: A Function of 31(1975):pp. 634-43. See also J. Burgess. “ An Explorative Analysis of Geographical Mobility among Families," pp. 69-91. in McCubbin et al., Role Alternatives for Men in American Society"; J. Defrain, (editors) Families in the Military System. (1976). “ Socioeconomic and Personal Factors Influencing Androgynous and 18. F. Montalvo. "Fam ily Separation in the Army: A Study of the Conventional Parenting M»xles”; and E. Gronseth, "Work-sharing Problems Encountered and the Caretaking Resources Used by Career Families: Adaptations o f Pioneering Families with Husband-Wife in Army Families Undergoing Military Separation," pp. 147-173, in Part-time Employment" (Papers presented at the Biennial Conference, McCubbin, Dahl, and Hunter Families in the Military System. (1976). International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development. B. Dahl and H. McCubbin,"Children of Returned Prisoners ofW ar The University of Surrey. Guildford. England. July 1975). Effects of Long-term Father Absence" (Paper presented at the Annual 9. P. Thomas, Utilization o f Enlisted Women in the Military. Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Chicago, Illinois. Technical Note 76-7 (San Diego, California: Navy Personnel Research August 1975). Dickerson and Arthur, op. cit. T. Trunnell,"A Review of and Development Center. May 1976); and P. Thomas and K. Durning, Studies of the Psychosocial Significance of Father Absence" (Paper “Military Woman and the Navy Wife" (Paper presented at the 84th presented at the Western American Psychiatric Association Meeting, Annual American Psychological Association Convention, Washing- Seattle. Washington, August 1968). ton. D.C., September 1976). 19. E. Finlayson, "A Study of the Wife of the Army Officer: Her 10. E Hunter and C. Mdlion, "Women in a Changing Military," U.S. Academic and Career Preparation. Her Current Employment and Naval Institute Proceedings. July 1977. pp. 50-58. Volunteer Services," pp. 19-41, in McCubbin. Dahl, and Hunter 11. M. Janowitz. The Professional Soldier A Social and Political Families in the Military System. (1976). Portrait (New York; The Free Press. I960), p. 89. 20. P. Darnauer, "The Adolescent Experience in Career Army 12. I. Powers. “ National league of Families and the Development of Families" pp. 42-66, in McCubbin, Dahl, and Hunter Families in the ARMED FORCES FA MIL Y POLICY 57

Military System (1976). Finlaysun. op. cit. R. LiUle "The Military and Ross. op. cit., II. McCubbin, E. Hunter and P. Metres, Jr., Family." pp. 247-70, in R Little editor Handbook o/ Military "Adaptation of the Family to the Prisonerof Warand Missing in Action Institutions (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971). Experience," pp. 21-48, in McCubbin et al.. Family Separatum and 21. Ibid E- Bower, “ American Children and Families in Overseas Reunion; P. Kedrin. R. Gelrnun, and L. Blum. “The Effects of the Yom Communities."American Journalof Orthopsychiatry37( 1967): pp 787- Kippur War on the Attitudes, Values, and Locus of Control of Young 96. Adolescents," L Bristol, "The Effects of u Wartime Environment upon 22. G. Wiley. "Is the Military Family in Trouble?" Family. 19-24 the Psychological Development of Children in Border Settlements," M October 1974. C. Blochberger. Jr., "Military Families: Differential Lifshitz, D. Berman, A. Galili, and D. Gilud. 'Bereuved Children: The Lifestyles,” Unpublished doctorul dissertation. University of Effectof Mother's Perception and Social System Organization on Their CaUfornia. Berkeley. 1970.S.Stumpf and W. Kieckhuefer.Drpu rtmenf Adjustment," and R Milgrainand N. Milgram, "The Effects of the Yom of Defense Family Housing Preference Survey; Altitudes and Kippur War on Anxiety Level and Israeli Children" (Papers presented Preferences of Military Personnel and Spouses Concerning Housing at the International Conference on Psychological Stress and and Basic Allowance for Quarters. Technical Report 76-20 (San Diego. Adjustment in Time of War and Peace,Tel Aviv. Israel. January 1975). California: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center. 1975). 29. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Children and Youth of D. Sattin and J. Miller, 'T h e Ecology of Child Abuse within a Military the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, American Families: Community." American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. AU196\): pp 675- Trends and Pressures. 1973 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 78. Bower, op. cit. 1974). S. Kamerman and A. Kahn, "Explorations in Family Policy," 23. R. Druss. "Foreign Marriages in the Military," Psychiatric Social Work. 21(1976):pp. 181-86. Quarterly 39<1965):pp. 220-26. Y. Kimura. "War Brides in Hawaii and 30. R. Hill, "A Program for Training Family Impact Analysts," Their In-laws." American Journal of Sociology. 63(1957):pp. 70-76. University of Minnesota, Institutional Grant, Department of Health, 24. See notes 4. 5, 18, 19: L. Stolz, Father Relations o f War-Born Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, 1976. Children: The Effectof Postwar Adjustment of Fatherson the Behavior 31. P. Thomas, op. cit.; L. Dobrofsky, "The Wife: From Military and Personality of First Children Born while Fathers Were at War (Palo Dependent to Feminist?" (Paper presented at the 84th Annual Alto: Stanford University Press, 1954): S. Baker, L. Cove, S. Fagen, E. American Psychological Association Convention. Washington, D.C., Fischer, and E. Janda, “ Impact of Father Absence: III. Problems of September 1976). Family Reintegration following Prolonged Father Absence. "American 32. M. Stanton, “ TheMililary Family: ItsFuturein the All-Volunteer Journal of Orthopsychiatry. 38<1968):p. 347 (abstract): H. McCubbin. B. Context," pp. 135-49, in N. Goldman and D. Segal editors, The Social Dahl.G. Lester, and B. Ross. "The Returned Prisoner of War: Factors in Psychology of Military Service ( Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976). Family Reintegration," Journal of Marriage and the Family 33. S. Kamerman, Developing a Family Impact Statement (New 37(1975):pp. 471-78: P. Metres, Jr., H. McCubbin. and E Hunter. York: Foundation for Child Development, 1976). "Families of Returned Prisoners of War Some Impressions on Their 34. R. Burchell and D. Listokin. The Environmental Impact Initial Reintegration," pp. 147-56, in McCubbin et al„ Family Handbook (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Separation and Reunion (1974). Research. 1975). 25. B. Dahl, H. McCubbin, and K. Ross. "Second Generational .'15. S. K a m e r m a n . op . ci t . Effects of War-induced Separations: Comparing the Adjustment of 36. R, Hill, “ Foreword," p. 15. in McCubbin, Dahl, and Hunter Children in Reunited and Non-reunited Families," Military Medicine, editors. Families in the Military System (1976). I41(1977):pp. 146-51. Damauer.op.cit. H. McCubbin, B. Dahl.G. Lester, D. Benson, and M. Robertson. "Coping Repertoires of Families Adapting to Prolonged War-induced Separations," Journal of Marriage and the Family. August 1976, pp. 461-71. Trunnell. op. cit. 26. McCubbin. Dahl, tester, and Ross, op. cit., H. McCubbin, B. Dahl, This article is an integration of two papers: “ The Military Family and G. Lester, and D. Benson. “Squadron without Wings: A Proposal for a Social Policy" (McCubbin, Marsden, Durning, and Hunter) presented One-year Study of Navy Families Undergoing Routine Separations" at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, New York, (San Diego. California: Family Studies Branch, Naval Health August 1976, and “ The Military Family and the Changing Military Research Center. September 1975). Profession" (McCubbin and Marsden) presented at the Regional 27. Hill, Families under Stress; Hunter and Plag, op. cit. McCubbin Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, et al.. Family Separation and Reunion, and H. McCubbin. E. Hunter, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. and B. Dahl. "Residuals of War Families of Prisoners of War and October 1976. The article was supported by the Department of the Servicemen Missing in Action." Journal of Social Issues 3(1975). Navy, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and by the Office of the 28. A. Freud and D. Burlingham. War and Children (New York: Surgeon General, Department of the Army. No endorsement by the International University Press. 1943); Stolz, op. cit.. Dahl. McCubbin, Navy or the Army has been given or should be inferred. THE DAY OF THE E-3A TACTICAL TEST

Colonel Dwayne P. Wright N 10 November 1976, Tactical Air exercises will be needed in the future to O Command participated in the larg- maximize headquarters staff and E-3A est, most complex and time-compressed mission crew training. Properly adapted to peacetime air operation ever conducted in readiness requirements, it also has the the United States. In just 90 minutes an potential to raise significantly the level armada of more than 400 aircraft from two and quality of readiness training and the services, six Air Force commands, twenty- combat capability of tactical forces. This one bases, and nine states, flying specific article, then, will identify major consider- routes with precision timing, flew through ations involved and problems encountered the Nellis and Edwards Air Force Base in conducting an operation of this magni- range areas in southern Nevada and tude and complexity, and it will discuss California. By comparison, the largest some key lessons useful to planners, Linebacker II raid over North Vietnam on operations staff, and commanders. Some 18 December 1972, consisted of only 266 background information will also be sorties—64 percent of the sorties in the provided to place events in proper per- later operation. This massive air oper- spective. ation, or “Tactical Test” as it was called, was designed to evaluate the E-3A Air- borne Warning and Control System, more T he E-3A Airborne Warning commonly known as AW ACS (recently and Control System represents a man- named Sentry). machine interface capable of conducting Tactical Test was one of three separate surveillance of unprecedented quality deep tests conducted by the Air Force Test and into enemy territory or of controlling Evaluation Center (AFTEC), during the forces in both defensive and offensive initial operational test and evaluation of roles. The aircraft is a modified Boeing 707 the E-3A aircraft. Tactical Test was airframe equipped with an aerodynamic specifically designed to measure the 30-foot rotodome housing a highly sophis- operational capabilities of two mutually ticated advanced radar. In addition to supporting E-3As in a dense, simulated detecting and tracking aircraft at high hostile environment (representative of a altitudes over both land and water, the mid-1980s projection) with extensive radar has the unique capability of being ground and airborne electronic counter- able to “ look down” and distinguish measures (ECM) employed against the E- airborne targets from the ground clutter, 3A radar. which confuses and saturates present-day The initial operational test and evalu- radar systems. Nine multipurpose con- ation was an AFTEC responsibility, but soles (MPC) provide the mission crew with AFTEC requested that TAC, as the single all control features and visual displays manager for the E-3A, provide the tactical required for surveillance, weapons direc- assets and manage force employment. tion, and battle management functions. TAC, in turn, identified Headquarters The on-board computer provides a data Twelfth Air Force as executive agent to bank on triendly and hostile forces and a plan, coordinate, and conduct this tactical fully automated console control capa- test. Nine months later the test was bility. In short, the AW ACS is an airborne successfully and safely completed, but it is surveillance platform capable of providing not likely to be the last operation of its service commanders and the National type. Follow-on operations and large-scale Command Authorities with a real-time

59 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

intelligence assessment of the air, land, and sea situation and an up-to-date data E-3A Tactical Test activities were base on which to make effective coordi- directed from the Tactical Air Control nated force employment decisions. Center (TACC) at Nellis AFB, The Honorable Thomas C. Reed, former Nevada (below). . .. The test director monitored these exercises on the TACC Secretary of the Air Force, commented on flow schedule data boards (bottom). the importance of this system to the Air Force in an appearance before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Repre- sentatives, in January 1976. Secretary Reed stated: The E-3A is our top priority general purpose forces program. It is designed to provide the improved surveillance and command, control and communications that are vital for credible deterrence in peacetime and for battle management in the event of conflict.1 Initially, congressional committee members were apprehensive of the AW ACS "

capability to meet design requirements and survive in a hostile environment. For that reason, Tactical Test was specifically planned to confirm AWACS efficiency and survivability for critics by placing the system in the most realistic simulated combat situation practicable in terms of “enemy” forces and scenario.

Planning the Test An A-7 Red Force aggressor aircraft (top) takes off from Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. Two guidewords—realism and vali- . .. A B-52 aggressor {above) dropped dity—pervaded the planning cycle. Test chaff and directed jamming against the decisions and plans were continually E-3A radar to mask the Red Force raid. evaluated and revised to ensure that test conditions were realistic and the planning factors valid. Only safety and peacetime operational constraints limited test real- ground-based command elements or the ism. A vital step in planning the test, AWACS, established fail-safe procedures because of its size and complexity, was the would immediately have defuzed the battle development of fail-safe procedures. and permitted the safe, orderly recovery of These procedures allowed rapid adjust- aircraft to predetermined locations. ments to compensate for various emergencies, including loss of command and concept of operations control communications. For example, Combat stress for the AWACS was had total communications been lost from achieved through a battle scenario pro-

61 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

viding a high-density wartime environ- Coordination for the airspace around ment. Test planners purposely matched a the range areas was complex and time numerically superior aggressor (Red consuming. Nellis and Edwards range Force) against a technologically superior complexes needed to be expanded to friendly (Blue) force representative of encompass an area approximately 300 by potential contingency situations. The Red 180 nautical miles (NM). (See Figure 1.) Force totaled approximately 300 hostile Since the air route traffic control centers aircraft to be identified and targeted by the (ARTCCs) operate autonomously, coor- AWACS. Most of these aircraft flew dination was required with six parti- mission profiles into blue airspace at low, cipating centers and two radar approach intermediate, and high altitudes to simu- controls (RAPCONs) to obtain agreement late realistic aggressor forces. In addition, to reroute general aviation traffic and a number of Red interceptors were targeted interface test traffic. Following tentative against the E-3A itself. agreement with the centers and western The Red Force attacked in three con- region of the Federal Aviation Admin- secutive, time-compressed waves. Eval- istration (FAA), the airspace proposal was uation of the E-3A radar capability in an published in the Federal Register. This intense electronic countermeasure en- procedure is used to notify interested vironment was provided by Red Force agencies and provide an opportunity for employment of chaff and standoff jam- them to submit comments or objections to ming against E-3A radars. proposed use of airspace. Subsequently, The concept of operations provided for a the Sierra Club, National Park Service, significantly smaller Blue Force (less than and the U.S. Forest Service each submitted one-half the size of the Red Force), includ- a strong protest to FAA. All three opposed ing interceptors, a small interdiction force, use of the airspace for Tactical Test RC-135 signal intelligence (SIGINT) air- because of its environmental impacts: craft, and ECM support. All were under the increased noise levels with adverse effect AWACS management. on certain endangered wildlife species and test airspace Airspace over a land area with moun- tainous terrain was needed to evaluate the unique low-altitude E-3A system capa- Figure 1. Test airspace bilities. A large geographic area was essential to accommodate realistic Red Force flight profiles and to maneuver Blue Force interceptors. The area also had to be large enough for E-3A maneuvering to evaluate its capability to survive in a hostile environment. The only area in the United States that met these basic criteria and provided necessary geographic and vertical airspace was in southern Nevada and California. It included the Nellis and Edwards range areas and additional surrounding airspace. Red Blue White CRC/CRP* 2 SR-71 1 CRC* 1UH-13 Angels Peak GCI’ 1 F-4 62 E-3A 2 HC-130 1 AFSC GCI* 1F-10512 EA-6B 2 HH-3 2 Ground-based jammers* 5F-520 KC-135 8 C-130 EA-6B 4A-758 RC-135 1 ABCCC 2 EB-57 3 F-100 4 F-15 24 WX B-52 2 RF-4 36 F-4 70 recce 2 KC-135 15 F-111 80 F-105 10 KC-97 3 A-7 16 aircraft total 300 133 10

'Ground-based support total aircraft 443

Figure 2. Summary of forces

disruption of the quietude of national threat for the AWACS. The force included parks and designated wilderness areas. 273 assigned target aircraft flying pene- The National Park Service and U.S. Forest tration missions into blue airspace. Red Service declined to negotiate objections at Force interdiction and reconnaissance the national level, indicating it was a aircraft were at low altitude, escort aircraft regional problem. Eventually, sensitive at intermediate altitudes, and interceptor issues were resolved and objections aircraft at intermediate and high alti- withdrawn after Twelfth Air Force per- tudes. sonnel briefed and discussed issues with The Red Force attacked from east to west regional officers. in three waves, compressed in space and Although late in the planning cycle, the time to within 90 minutes. (See Figure 3.) airspace proposal was finally approved by The first wave, a shallow penetration into FAA two months prior to the test. Had the Blue airspace, was targeted against environmental issues not been expedi- simulated friendly missile and gun sites to tiously resolved, the test could have been open corridors for subsequent attacks. The delayed or canceled. second and third waves were deeper penetrations against simulated Blue Force force employment command control facilities and air bases. Four hundred and forty-three aircraft were Each wave included a representative fragged to participate in the test. (See number of interdiction, reconnaissance, Figure 2.) The 300 aggressor aircraft (68 escort, and interceptor aircraft. percent of the total) and 133 friendly ECM was an essential element in the aircraft (plus ten neutral White Force test to evaluate E-3A radar capability in support aircraft) were considered suffi- an intense jamming environment. Red cient to place the E-3A under realistic Force aircraft employed jammers against combat stress. the E-3A from standoff orbits. This Red Force. Realism was a critical aspect included B-52s, EB-57s, and U.S. Navy of the test, and the Red Force was tailored EA-6Bs with coordinated jamming efforts. as closely as possible to present a realistic The B-52s and EB-57s also dropped chaff

63 FL 350 Blue RC-135 FL 340 Red Force FL 310 FL 300

E-3A FL 250

Blue Force ;>*, Red climb FL 200 K ^ j FL 190 Blue climb Red Force Blue interdiction

500 AGL ___ S3 Figure 3. Force management

in an attempt to mask the Red Force EA-6Bs to jam the Red Force GCI and attack. Ground-based units also directed interceptor radars, and eight KC-135 jamming efforts toward the E-3A. Fifteen tankers. A single heavy radar located at KC-135s and three KC-97s provided pre- Edwards AFB interfaced with FAA and and poststrike air refueling support for provided back-up radar surveillance for tactical aircraft operating from distant safety. bases. Two heavy radars and two ground- White Force. Additional support aircraft controlled intercept (GCI) radars partici- for the test were assigned to the White pated to monitor force employment and Force. This included two C-130 airborne provide radar control for Red Force battlefield command and control center interceptors targeted against the E-3A and (ABCCC) aircraft to assist ground-based Blue Force interdiction aircraft. radars in providing procedural control of Blue Force. The 133 Blue Force aircraft, test aircraft and to perform pretest totaling only 45 percent of the Red Force, weather reconnaissance/communications was considered a typical ratio of what checks, search and rescue (SAR) assets, might be-expected in real-world con- UH-1 helicopters for administrative use, tingencies. Two E-3As were employed, one and two fighters for pretest weather to conduct battle management operations checks. and one to control air-to-air refueling for Funding limitations required that most Blue Force interceptors. Eighty inter- forces operate from home base. Con- ceptors (F-15/F-4 teams) were employed sequently, aircraft launched from 21 under AW ACS control, and 26 F-105/A-7 operating bases, some as distant as Offutt interdiction aircraft also participated to AFB, Nebraska; Bergstrom AFB, Texas; evaluate AWACS low-altitude control and Boeing Field, Washington. (See capability while concurrently directing Figure 4.) In addition, F-15s, A-7s, EB-57s, the air-to-air battle. Support assets in- KC-135s, and EA-6Bs deployed to local cluded an RC-135 to provide signal operating bases to attain required force intelligence on the Red Force, U.S. Navy totals.

64 AIR FORCE REVIEW 65

force deconfliction Forces. (See Figure 5.) Climb, descent, and Although realism was a primary consider- transit corridors were also developed to ation, the test had to be constrained in accommodate individual requirements. some cases to accommodate peacetime Internal deconfliction was achieved safety factors. Four hundred plus aircraft, within Red and Blue assigned airspace. operating in or transiting test airspace in a Red Force flights were separated in time or short space of time, demanded skillful and space by assigning altitudes, tracks, and detailed planning to provide for sepa- time-phased points. To confirm decon- ration of Red and Blue Forces and to fliction, each route was manually checked deconflict internal Red and Blue Force using time and altitude graphs. Subse- operations. The separation process com- quently, a computer model was developed menced by establishing the forward edge and deconfliction confirmed on AFTEC’s of the battle area (FEBA) from Tonopah to computer. Nellis AFB, with Red airspace on the east Separation of Blue Force interdiction and Blue on the west, as indicated in operations posed a unique problem. Since Figure 3. Blue interdiction aircraft had to conduct Vertical separation was achieved by strikes at low altitude in Red Force assigning altitude blocks to Red and Blue territory, an interdiction area located

Figure 4. Force beddown

Seattle Boeing Fairchild Salt Lake 2 E-3A 2 B-52 3 KC-97 Boise ANG 6 RF-4 Mountain Hill AFB Home AFB 28 F-4 12 F-105 46 F-111 Luke AFB Reno ANG 24 F-15 32 F-4 10 RF-4 Davis-Monthan AFB Beale 32 A-7 1 SR-71 16 A-7

T ravis 9 KC-135 • Offutt AFB 1 R C - 1 3 5 Nellis AFB 21 F-111 20 F-5 Kirtland AFB 14 F-4 14 A-7 12 A -7 3 EB-57 China Lake NAS Cannon AFB 4 EA-6B 13 F-111 2 EA-6B Bergstrom AFB March 20 RF-4 # 14 KC-135 George AFB Tucson IAP Holloman AFB 38 F-4 10 F-105G 4 F-100 20 F-4 66 AIR UNI VERSIT Y RE VIE W northwest of Nellis AFB (noted in Figure cific timing criteria were therefore estab- 3) was assigned to the Blue Force. Entry lished, and flights that deviated from and exit into the area were provided by schedule by more than one minute would special climb and descent corridors be required to return home without Ensuring separation between Blue entering test airspace. Force interceptor flights was more difficult since they were to operate under AW ACS management, and controllers could not Organizational Structure and provide positive separation without de- Command and Control Planning grading battle management capability. Planning for test employment was The safety problem was also solved by accomplished primarily by three major vertical separation—each flight was groups: the White or Joint Control Staff, assigned a separate hard altitude. the Red Force staff, and the Blue Force Flight timing was extremely critical for staff. This was necessary to enhance test internal deconfliction and to provide the validity by providing complete integrity of capability for ARTCCs to handle test force Red and Blue Force planning. This traffic in a saturated environment. Spe- separation ensured that the Blue Force

Figure 5. Altitude assignments alternate mission primary mission commander commander

Figure 6. Command and control

staff and the E-3A mission crew could not using three tactical air control centers employ Blue Forces based on prior knowl- (TACCs), three control and reporting edge of Red Force employment plans but centers/posts (CRC/CRP), two ground- only on intelligence reports provided by controlled interceptor sites, and the two E- the control staff. 3As. (See Figure 6.) The three TACCs The Joint Control Staff was the key test (White, Red, and Blue) were collocated in planning element and included repre- the same building at Nellis AFB, but each sentatives from all participating com- TACC was in a separate room. The Red mands and functional areas. The control and Blue TACCs were responsible to staff established test criteria, concept of manage their respective forces, and cross operations, force levels, wave structure, tell was not permitted. The White TACC airspace, targets, intelligence inputs, and supported the task force commander in control timing. Appropriate and separate directing the total operation. guidance was then provided Red and Blue Real-time activity displays were Force planners who developed detailed planned and used in the White and Blue force employment plans (flight profiles, TACCs to provide the means for positive timing, and tactics). The control staff command and control. In the White TACC closely monitored Red and Blue Force a “wide screen” displayed actual radar planning to ensure compatibility and returns using assigned mode III identi- provide for interface where necessary. fication friend or foe (IFF) codes from all Tactical Test command and control aircraft within surveillance of three communications structure was developed remote FAA radar stations. In addition,

67 The impartial KC-135 tanker (above) provided air-to-air refueling support for both the Red Force aggressors and Blue Force interceptors. . . . F-15 aircrew members (right) attended early- morning briefings at Luke AFB, Arizona.

the White and Blue TACC received “big Blue Force interdiction aircraft. A GCI site picture,” a real time, TV down link picture located at Angel Peak controlled these of radarscope aboard the second E-3A. interceptors. The second GCI, located in Three ground-based control radars were the Nellis AFB range area, provided radar employed. A CRC and CRP assigned to the control for Red Force ECM aircraft and Red Force were located at Mormon Mesa interceptors targeted against the E-3A. and Tonopah, Nevada (Figure 3). The The primary AWACS, under guidance CRC assigned to the Blue Force, located at from the Blue Force commander, was Edwards AFB, interfaced with the responsible for battle management of all AW ACS and was responsible to forward Blue Force aircraft. tell battle management information to the Many checks and procedures were Blue Force commander in the TACC at established to enhance safety, success, Nellis AFB. To permit timing control, and command and control. This included radar hand-offs from FAA to these Air preparation of time-phased sequence of Force radars were not required. However, events checklists, emergency action check- the radars, positioned to provide coverage lists for potential problems (tanker abort, of test airspace, monitored all test traffic lost communications, E-3A abort, FAA and relayed position reports to keep saturation), and decision criteria/aids. TACCs informed. Also they were prepared Weather minimums (35,000-foot ceiling to provide emergency assistance. and five-mile visibility) and aircrew The two GCIs were assigned to the Red qualifications (highest qualified basis) Force to control the interceptors. Although were established. Pretest flight profiles the majority of Red Force aircraft were were flown and command post exercises assigned specific time-controlled profiles, conducted to confirm completeness of some interceptors were targeted against planning actions. Finally, a miniature

68 .4 Blue Force F-105 (right) is readied for battle. . . . Two other F-105 Wild Weasel aircraft (above) depart from George AFB, California, to suppress the Red Force surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat.

scale test (33 percent of full scale) was decision was made and passed to all conducted on 8 November 1976, which participating units. Just before test confirmed that the overall employment aircraft were scheduled to begin launch, a plan was workable. final airborne area weather and com- With that planning background on the munications check was made, which employment plan, the Tactical Test and verified operational weather in the test results will be discussed. area. The test force began to launch at 0535 when the RC-135 departed Offutt AFB, Test and Test Results Nebraska. Within minutes the E-3A The test was completed on 10 November departed the Boeing plant at Seattle, 1976, essentially as scheduled. Activity Washington. It arrived on station at 0730 commenced just before midnight when a and began “ Deep Look” surveillance C-130 airborne battlefield command and operations into Red Territory. Initially, control center aircraft conducted an area there was no Red Force activity, but hostile weather and communications check. The aircraft were soon detected launching, check confirmed that existing weather met refueling, and marshaling for what test requirements of35,000-foot ceiling and appeared to be a large-scale incursion. The five-mile visibility. At 0230 (mountain initial Red F'orce penetration of Blue Force standard time/MST) a status report territory occurred at 0910. At that time the indicated all aircraft, radars, and com- AWACS was cleared to coordinate offen- munications were operational. Weather sive action against the intruders, and Blue forecast for launch bases was also above Force interdiction missions into Red test minimums. After confirmation that Territory were authorized. Hostilities the two E-3As were in commission, a “ go” continued until the last Red aircraft exited

69 70 AIR UNIVERSIT Y RE VIE W

Blue airspace—ninety minutes later. In dently. The system operated effectively in the meantime, approximately 400 aircraft the intense jamming environment, iden- had transited test airspace. During one tifying hostile targets and controlling Blue period some 230 aircraft were within Force interceptors. The friendly inter- confined test airspace. ceptors reported 97 (36 percent of the total) When all aircraft recovered, the tally Red Force aircraft intercepted and claimed boards indicated that 413 of 443 scheduled as destroyed. Further, the AW ACS dem- sorties had flown—significant consider- onstrated its capability to survive by ing that only one aborted because of an successfully evading 14 Red Force inter- aircraft problem. Other aborts were ceptors (specifically targeted against the charged to poor launch base weather or E-3A) in the confined airspace. Finally, administrative reasons. Of significant Tactical Test supported the position that note, there were no accidents or serious the AW ACS is capable of performing its incidents involved. Such success can be intended mission. attributed only to meticulous planning, lessons learned aircrew discipline, and outstanding maintenance and other ground support. Post- Large, complex operations similar to test reports indicated the operation was a Tactical Test are needed to fully develop complete success. General Robert J. Dixon, and maintain the total potential of the TAC Commander, called it “a magnificent AWACS. Future operations will take professional performance by all parti- advantage of lessons learned from Tac- cipants.”2 Major General Howard Leaf, tical Test. Some of the more significant AFTEC Commander, stated: lessons are presented below. ...the teamwork of participating aircrews Test validity. Congressional committees and ground support personnel directly were apprehensive of E-3A capability to contributed to the safety and success of the meet battle management requirements. test.3 Consequently, Tactical Test was planned In summary, test employment was and designed to validate E-3A capability. virtually flawless. The total system and Planning should ensure that criteria will component interface worked as adver- withstand close scrutiny. tised—everyone did his job, radars per- Airspace availability. Airspace to con- formed well, aircrew navigation and duct large-scale tests or other military air timing were precise (the first Red Force operations, already scarce, is becoming aircraft crossed the FEBA within 15 more difficult to locate. Existing areas are seconds of the scheduled time), FAA being restricted by general aviation and support was superb, and airspace manage- environmental groups. Direct routing ment was accomplished without incident. through and adjacent to military re- The test clearly demonstrated that a new stricted areas is desired and planned by and powerful dimension now exists in commercial and general aviation interests command and control. As designed, the to reduce flying time and attendant costs. AW ACS is a force multiplier and provides Also, environmental groups are attempt- a synergistic effect by combining inherent ing to limit operations in some areas. capabilities of separate weapon systems Currently, the Nellis/Edwards area and that produce an integrated combat team Eglin range (overwater) complexes and capable of operating far more effectively adjacent airspace are the only areas in than separate entities operating indepen- continental United States large enough to AIR FORCE RE VIE W 71

conduct an exercise or test on the scale of Coordination with environmental the E-3A Tactical Test. Only through groups. It is evident that environmental skillful negotiation was airspace obtained groups are taking an increasingly active for this test. To help ensure airspace interest in our operations. The Forest availability for future military use, we Service, National Park Service, and Sierra must state our case well. It is essential that Clubs all submitted formal objections to we maintain close liaison and understand our airspace proposal for Tactical Test. the concerns of FAA, property owners, and They objected on the basis that the test environmental groups. Finally, we must would cause greatly increased noise levels demonstrate our ability to use and manage and adversely impact on certain en- airspace properly and effectively when we dangered wildlife species as well as disrupt have it. the quietude of national parks and

Ground-support forces and equipment assembled from as far away as Alabama to set up command and control communication facilities in the Nevada test area. 72 AIR UNIVERSIT Y RE VIE W designated wilderness areas. Air Force the test and understanding of procedures. legal advisors indicate that existing For the most part, that was accomplished; documents relating to the Endangered however, in some instances face-to-face Species Act, Environmental Protection briefings were not practical, and problems Act, and the act that created the National did, in fact, occur. In addition, late in the Parks Service contain sufficient justifi- planning cycle, subordinate unit initia- cation to involve lengthy litigation should tives came to light that had to be sup- we be less than candid and expert in pressed. These problems again confirmed presenting our case. This could delay and the necessity for direct, face-to-face possibly prevent future operations. In this briefings. Ideally, these briefings would be instance, a positive, direct approach was presented by the key planner or force pursued and, fortunately, was successful. commander, who can answer all ques- Only after face-to-face briefings and tions, suppress all misdirected initiatives, discussions which provided assurances and ensure total continuity. that environmental impacts had been Reliable and redundant communica- minimized were the objections withdrawn. tions. A reliable and redundant communi- In the future, early consultation with cations system is necessary to provide interested groups is recommended to avoid command and control during large air or at least minimize objections on environ- operations. The key to reliability in this mental grounds. test was multiple pretest communication Automation for command and control. checks. Airborne checks of all equipment Two systems provided real-time command were conducted daily. This helped identify and control information in this test. The problems early enough to be corrected. White and Blue TACC received the “ big Early and late-night final checks of all picture,” down link (picture of the E-3A equipment and frequencies were accom- radarscope) from the E-3A. In addition, the plished the day prior to the test. These two “ wide screen” computerized display checks confirmed operational capability identifying mode III air traffic was also before the go-no-go decision. Compre- available in the White TACC. This radar hensive, multiple airborne communication information allowed commanders to see checks are an absolute necessity. the air battle in real time, to identify Fail-safe system. Development of a fail- current and developing aggressor actions safe management system is key to a safe that might not otherwise have been and smooth operation. This can be apparent, and thus take immediate, achieved by developing procedures that positive action to manage and control the will be carried out automatically in the force to best advantage. In such a large air event of emergencies or lost communi- operation, real-time information for com- cations. In the event of lost communi- mand and control is considered essential cations, aircrews knew precisely what and should be available in the TACC from course of action to take. Deconfliction, either the E-3A or from ground-based safety, and recovery of all aircraft were radars. thus assured and could have been accom- Face-to-face briefings. Direct coordina- plished without central control. Such tion and face-to-face briefings were procedures significantly enhance safety planned for all test participants (aircrews, and achievement of objectives in these TACC/GCI/radar/communications per- operations. sonnel), to ensure complete knowledge of Prepare for emergencies. Prior to flight AIR FORCE RE VIE W 73

operations, a comprehensive set of emer- of personal involvement and interface for gency action checklists was developed for commanders, staffs, and aircrews to be all possible contingencies and emer- prepared for real world contingencies. gencies. These checklists evolved from in- The E-3A Tactical Test proved that depth brainstorming sessions. The best large-scale, time-compressed air oper- course of action, level of responsibility for ations are feasible and can be safely the action, and pretest decisions were accomplished, even under peacetime identified for virtually every potential constraints. These operations have sig- event or emergency. This preparation nificant potential to enhance training for measurably accelerated problem solving commanders, planning staffs, and tactical and significantly decreased the impact of aircrews. With some changes, operations emergencies that occurred during Tactical such as Tactical Test can be organized to Test. include strike packages with weapon deliveries and supporting forces—a super Red Flag operation combined with the W it h the advent of the Blue Flag concepts. Success in future AWACS and an increased capability to combat operations will depend on com- conduct and manage large-scale air mand, staff, and force realistic training to operations, there evolves a requirement for carry out these operations. increased training in real time and under We can expect technology to advance at realistic conditions. Current simulator an accelerated rate. Full exploitation of technology can provide impressive train- this advancing technology demands ing results in both flight and control imagination and innovation to keep systems that closely approach the real training and combat capability at opti- thing. Current simulation, however, is not mum levels. We must commit ourselves to capable of providing the necessary degree that effort. Bergstrom AFB, Texas

Notes 2 Headquarters TAC Office of Information message. 242215 1. The Honorable Thomas C. Heed. Presentation to Committee on January 1977. Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives. 29 January 1976. 3. Ibid. WHAT’S A NICE GIRL LIKE YOU DOING IN A PLACE LIKE THIS?

74 “Look here, you, why didn't you tell me you were a girl?" The tower man stared at the woman who had just landed an airplane in the densest fog. The plane had broken out at about five hundred feet, made a smooth turn to the end of the runway and stopped in front of operations. It couldn't have been done better in English weather.1

OUND familiar? Many of us in today’s “There is no question but that women military would accept this scenario as could do a lot of things in the military San everyday occurrence. The event could services. So could men in wheelchairs. But take place today. Actually, the story was you couldn’t expect the services to want a reported in Flying magazine in January whole company of people in wheelchairs.”2 1944. It was written to illustrate the flying This article will attempt to illustrate abilities displayed by members of the that women are not being used success- Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASP). fully in the services and that sentiments The article also described the contri- such as General Hershey’s do in fact still butions and successes of that group of exist. I will challenge the inference that we women flyers. The group was disbanded in must explain why “ nice girls” would be in December 1944 without ever receiving a place like the military. There will be no official recognition as part of the regular attempt to quote pages of statistical data Army. These women, after petitioning to support the position that the military Congress for years to recognize their has yet to use the full potential of women World War II contributions, were finally as human resources. I hope to prove the granted veteran benefits (for some of the point by analysis of the make-up of the former WASPs who need the help) in the male environment of the military and the fall of 1977. complexities faced by women who choose Why, then, would anyone in today’s to enter this traditionally masculine military make comparisons with the above sphere. incident? Haven’t women today received Interest in the role of women in the equal pay, equal promotion, and equal military has been brought about by two status with their male counterparts? Who separate phenomena. The first, and are these women who choose to enter the probably most powerful influence affect- historically male province of the military? ing women, consists of the social and What more could these women possibly political forces impacting on the services. wish in terms of success and security? The women’s movement, heightened They have been accepted as an integral, interest in women’s rights, and political albeit small, portion of the armed forces. debate over the Equal Rights Amendment General Lewis Hershey, as director of have focused attention on the roles women the Selective Service from 1941 to 1970, have and may have within the military made this comment regarding the role of structure. There have been dramatic, women in the military environment: although slow, changes in the status of

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military women within the last ten years. mannerisms. Women were there to release Although the number of women in the men for more important and vital jobs. The armed forces today is approximately half view that became prominent was that of those serving in 1945, it must be noted women, in terms of military requirements, that the proportion has doubled.3 In 1970, were defective men. It was indeed nice to when the greatest changes began to take have women around, but they certainly did place in the military status of women, not have the right to take men’s jobs and statistical data indicate that over 43 men’s promotions. Standards will be set by percent of adult women were working men in the military structure, and if outside the home.4 It would appear then women wish to succeed, they must succeed that the military had recognized this within the male standards. I question the previously untapped resource and had validity of that logic. As Harriet Stuart begun actively to seek expanded roles for Mills said, “ We deny the right of any women. portion of the species to decide for another Unfortunately, all too often the armed portion, or any individual for another forces did not enthusiastically seek to individual, what is and is not their proper change its own restrictive policies or sphere. The proper sphere for all human petition Congress to repeal laws that beings is the largest and highest which adversely affected women. This may be they are able to attain.”6 attributed to the male view of the military Women have not yet found their proper as the last remaining bastion of strength sphere in the military, and I submit that and virility. As stated by two former there has been no cogent reason for military leaders in Militarism, USA, “The denying them this right. The long-term risks and dangers of military service are effectiveness of the armed forces is many and multiform. They tend to bind dependent on developing an adequate the veterans together with bonds of supply of individuals competent to per- experiences not shared by women and form anticipated duties required to fulfill civilians.”5 This, I believe, becomes the its mission.7 Inasmuch as women have crux of the problem women face in trying traditionally faced obstacles and diffi- to succeed in the military as well as their culties in pursuing military careers, the male counterparts. The military system is military must analyze and very often of men, by men, and for men. Behavior is enhance the organizational climate and measured and standards are set in terms of work to heighten perceptions of both that behavior. Sex role stereotypes, which women and men in the structure. It is are culturally determined, usually dictate incumbent on the military to develop what is acceptable behavior for men and women’s potential in order to successfully women. Stereotyping becomes more pro- exist and perform its mission in the future. nounced in the military environment since With or without the passage of the Equal work performed has been traditionally Rights Amendment, more women will be characterized as essentially masculine. seeking meaningful work in a variety of nontraditional professions. The services must come to grips with the new feminism W hen women entered the and the new masculinism that young military during World War II, to be people will bring to the military environ- military meant to be masculine, including ment. Caroline Bird, a prominent soci- short hair, masculine uniforms, traits, and ologist, observed, “ ...the new mascu- IN MY OPINION 77

linism—it is all right fora woman to do her Congresswoman Barbara Mikulski dis- thing as long as it does not impose upon cussed the Carter administration’s ap- the male and his role/status.”8 We must proach to women in government. She ensure that standards in the military described how “the good old boy” network challenge the individual’s ability to operates: “Pete Preppy looks through his perform, not his/her role as dictated by yearbook, calls up Mike Macho, and says, backgrounds. ‘Got anyone good for State?’ ‘Sure,’ Too often we equate success in terms of answers Mike, ‘Try Tom Terrifico.’” 11 I femininity and masculinity. The military submit the military has just begun to system expects male members to be strong, recognize that there are, in fact, networks aggressive, and dominant. Female mem- such as these which have, intentionally or bers are expected to exhibit these traits in not, restricted the complete acceptance of basic training, yet this type of behavior is women in the military. questioned in the work environment. I recall an instance in Vietnam that Women being aggressive and assertive are illustrates the view that many men hold of paradoxical or contrary to the stereotype women in uniform. I was advisor to a wing men have about women.9 The armed forces commander in matters concerning en- must encourage crosscultural discussion listed Air Force women. He called me to his at the beginning of the military training office to discuss women’s matters since it program in order that military members was evident we would be leaving Vietnam. will be able to recognize their own cultural He proposed that we move all women— biases and deal with them in the atmos- officers, enlisted, and civilians—to an old, phere of free expression and analysis. I unused open bay wing of the hospital. His believe it is important to note that women rationale was “the girls” would be more need this opportunity for analysis as well comfortable together, in spite of the fact as men. As discussed in the Harvard that the quarters would be uncommonly Business Review, it is not always the male crowded and disturbances would occur attitudes that impose barriers prohibiting because of the shift work of many of the women from taking responsible positions; military women. When objections were women have often been held back by their raised to applying a strange set of own preconceived ideas of what their roles standards to the women, the commander should be.10 Many women want to succeed, commented that it was his intention to but there seems to be a cultural attitude ensure that all enlisted women would be prevailing that says it is more feminine to sent from Vietnam on the first available fail. This attitude can be overcome only by aircraft as a “safety measure.” It took a free environment that allows every some time to convince this senior officer individual to succeed or fail in the pursuit that these women were performing duties of individual and organizational goals. that were essential and that their release There are other hindrances to the must be based on the completion of their acceptability of women in the armed jobs—the same as their male counterparts. forces. In Maureen Mylander’s book The I believe this is a prime example of Generals, she discusses at great length overprotection of women and the paternal- “the good old boy’’ syndrome and the fact istic view that is quite evident, especially that the military hierarchy perpetuates when dealing with young enlisted women. itself to the detriment of many men as well If women are not given responsibilities as women. In March 1977, Maryland commensurate with their grade, they will 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sense their less than complete acceptance headed by Dr. Herbert L. Stern.15 It is and act accordingly. In the article, absolutely implausible that the President “ Women’s Language: A New Bend in the could not find qualified women to advise Double Bind,” Lieutenant Katie Cutler him about women. Unfortunately, I stated: “ Communication is paired with believe this is the same problem that has behavior, one reinforcing the other.” 12 hindered the military in adequately The military services must make a addressing the extent to which women concentrated, deliberate effort to remove could be used in the armed forces. Men are the mystique of a woman in the military. not only determining the goals women The comments of Michael Korda, author of should accept but they also determine how Male Chauvinism: How It Works, are women will and should feel and how indeed appropriate: “ Men do not live in women will react in various situations. I fear of women on any conscious level, but submit that management of human they recognize that women are different, resources will decide the success of our that behind their personae as executives— military today and in the future. lurk other deeper, more mysterious Notwithstanding the question of wo- roles.” 11 If the government truly intends to men’s roles in the combat situation, support its stated policy of equal oppor- women still constitute less than 6 percent tunity, it must begin with a renewed effort of the armed forces. Yet, even by its own to ensure that talented women can find a study, the Department of Defense, service place within the military structure where by service, indicates the following per- they will be judged on individual merit, not centages of jobs can be classified as culturally stereotyped images. combat: Army, 30 percent; Navy, 38 The second most influential factor that percent; Marine Corps, 32 percent; and Air has brought attention to women in the Force, 12 percent.16 These figures would military has been the concept of the all- indicate that if restriction from combat volunteer force. In 1972, the Pike Sub- positions is the reason for fewer numbers committee stated: of women in the military then the Depart- We are concerned that the Department of ment of Defense is not actively working to Defense and each of the military services are guilty of “ tokenism” in the recruitment and solve shortfalls within the active and utilization of women in the Armed Forces. reserve forces. In 1976 the Defense We are convinced that in the atmosphere of a Manpower Commission reported that the zero draft environment or an all-volunteer participation of women in the military had military force, women could and should play increased, but the commission also de- a more important role. We strongly urged the Secretary of Defense and the Service tected a continuing lack of acceptance of Secretaries to develop a program which will them. A key point in their report was to permit women to take their rightful place in make certain that institutional discrimi- serving in our Armed Forces.14 nation does not continue in career patterns Six years later, the armed forces are still and assignments; the leadership from the planning and discussing the role of women Secretary of Defense downward must take in the military. a personal interest in equal opportunities I am reminded of President Nixon’s for women and members of racial minority recognition of the increasingly vital roles groups. In particular, more women and women play in our national economy. In minority officers must be attracted and 1974, he created the first Advisory Com- then encouraged to advance through the mittee on the Economic Role of Women, ranks.17 IN MY OPINION 79

I believe it would be agreed that many traditionally male role of the military women have been hampered in their should be de-emphasized in order to allow choice of occupation, not by the level but more successful assimilation of women the type of education they received. Many within the military environment. Through of our high schools still train young this approach, masculinity and femininity women for traditionally “ women’s jobs” will not be criteria forjudging how well an that concentrate on shorthand, typing, individual performs his or her duties. and home economics. Our society is still Women, then, will be a key factor in the geared to a woman’s working only tem- success of the all-volunteer force. If we porarily—until she gets married and has a continue to view as our only resource the family. In this vein, myths continue to 18- to 21-year-old male, we will be forced to perpetuate themselves: women work revert to a type of draft system in this because they want to, not because they country. Instead, I believe we should view have to; women are absent more than men; women as a much needed resource who women do not make good supervisors; and will bring new attitudes and cultural views the all-encompassing, all-knowing pro- that will enhance the make-up of the nouncement that women cannot do the military environment. It is also my firm types of work that men do because they do belief that unless greater numbers of not possess the needed aptitudes and qualified women are accepted in the abilities. military, there will be continued limited success of those presently serving. As Cynthia Epstein noted in Woman’s Place: S in c e 1922, the Human Engi- Options and Limits in Professional neering Laboratory of Johnson O’Connor Careers, “The more nearly a profession is Research Foundation has been engaged in made up entirely of members of one sex, aptitude assessment of men and women. the less likely it is that it will change its sex The laboratory is involved in the measure- composition in the future and the more ment of inherent aptitudes and the affected will be the performance of those measurement and teaching of acquired who are not of that sex.” 18 knowledge. Of the twenty-two aptitudes I recall as a second lieutenant meeting a and knowledge areas measured, there is no young male airman in a crosswalk on the sex difference in fourteen; men excel in two base. We were both in uniform, and as he areas and women excel in six areas. I passed me he stared but did not even believe the point is obvious—there is no attempt a salute. I stopped him and began field that is the exclusive domain of either a discussion of the salute as a military sex. Sex does not predetermine abilities or greeting and that we all must observe aptitudes. Training and education will military customs. As I was one of two assist individuals to succeed in a given women officers on the base with more than environment. 5000 military personnel, I could truly I am not suggesting that we ask our understand his incredulous look as I was society to train girls to grow up to be speaking. His discomfort became more military members any more than we train pronounced as he noticed traffic had boys for that role in life. I am suggesting stopped on both sides of us. Finally, his that the military services concentrate confusion was not masked by his words as more on training their personnel to do the he said, “ You want me to salute you here— needed jobs, regardless of sex. The right in the middle of the street?” I am 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW certain he thought it outrageous enough to context of a wartime phenomenon rather salute any second lieutenant—but a than a permanent component.” 19 woman second lieutenant! What had this man’s world come to? I do believe we have passed those times, F or the military services to succeed in but there is so much more to be achieved. the future, women will and must play a Women in the military need for the system vital role within the established structure. to recognize their abilities, need to be able Massive changes in the structure are not to perform and succeed, need to know they necessary, but massive changes in atti- are as good or as bad as their male tudes are. There is no one answer other counterparts (based on what they do on the than total dedication by everyone within job), and the need to be respected for their the military environment to recognize that job performance. I do not believe we can successful contributions are not limited by accomplish this only by professing our the sex of the contributors. It is essential faith in equal rights. Leadership in the that people and resources be properly used armed forces must, in fact, be truly by the military to keep it an active and committed to the right of all to succeed and responsible institution. Such professional fail. Women must feel totally committed to farsightedness is required to attract and their chosen profession through accep- retain bright women and men who will tance within the organizational climate. choose the military as a profession. The The observation made of the Navy applies message is clear—women must play a vital to all the services: “ The Navy has always role in ensuring that the armed forces been proud of its women, but at the same fulfill their role in national security and time, they have long been viewed in the the defense of our nation. Randolph AFB, Texas

Notes 1. John Stuart, “The WASP,” Flying, January 1944. p. 73. Business Review, September/October 1973, p. 135. 2. Patricia J. Thomas, Utilization of Enlisted Women in the 11. Attacking the Old Boy Network,” Time, March 28,1977, p. 17. Military (San Diego: Navy Personnel Research and Development 12. Cutler, p. 75. Center, May 1976), p. 6. 13. Michael Korda, Male Chauvinism: How It Works (New York: 3. Nancy Goldman, "Utilization of Women in the Military," The Random House. 1973), p. 4. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 14. Utilization of Military Women (A Report of Increased Utilization March 1972, p. 109. of Military Women, FY 19731977), Central All Volunteer Force Task 4. Diana Reische, editor. Women and Society (New York: Wilson, Force (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1972), p. 54. 1972), pp. 1-2. 5. Colonel James A. Donovan and General David M. Shoup, 15. N ancy Gayer, Wom en’s Rights Almanac (Bethesda, Maryland: Militarism, USA (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), p. 41. Elizabeth Cady Stanton Publishing Company, 1974), p. 543. 6. Reische, p. 5. 16. Bruce Bliven, Jr„ Volunteers, One and All (New York: Reader's 7. K. P. Durning and S. J. Mumford, Differential Perceptions of Digest Press, 1976), p. 84. Organizational Climate Held by Navy Enlisted Women and Men (San 17. Dr. Curtis W.Tarr, "M anaging the Human Resources of the Total Diego: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, August Force." Air Uniiiersity Review, January-February 1977, p. 6. 1976), p. 1. 18. Cynthia Epstein, Woman’s Place. Options and Limits in 8. Caroline Bird, Born Female, the High Cost of Keeping Women Professional Caree rs (Berkeley University of California Press, 1970),p. Down (New York: M cKay, 1968), p. 160. 86. 9. Lieutenant Katie Cutler, "Women's Language: A New Bend in 19. Lieutenant Commander Beth F. Coye, “ The Restricted the Double Bind," Air University Review, July-August 1976, p. 78. Unrestricted Line Officer The Status of the Navy's Woman Line 10. C. Fretz and J. Hayman, “Progress for Women,” Harvard Officer." Naval War College Review, March 1972, p. 57. RMS 1977—ENCOURAGING MANAGEMENT GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY

M ajor Barry D. G uyse

The goal oriented individual is most likely to reach his potential under management or supervision concerned basically with objectives, permitting him to make his own decisions about risks. The task oriented individual is more comfortable with an organization which practices management by controls, seeking to manipulate his behaviour including his personal motivation and judgment.x

IR FORCE publications repeatedly objectives. The fundamental principle of A proclaim a requirement for goal- any job enrichment program is the trust of oriented as opposed to task-oriented higher authority in the manager. This people. Recent articles encourage imple- trust tells the manager that he controls his mentation of management by objectives resource input and must make decisions (MBO), while Frederick Herzberg develops involving risks. orthodox-job-enrichment at Hill Air Force Since the implementation of Project Base, Utah, and commanders talk about PRIME (Priority Improvement Manage- increasing productivity through motiva- ment Effort), we have moved through the tion. In this frenzy to improve job satis- base accounting system for operations and faction and productivity through numer- entered into resource management at base ous behavioral science techniques, the level. But lower level managers are still basis for any enrichment program is being starving for authority to make decisions overlooked. On one hand the Air Force concerning resource allocation. Now this says that base level managers are respon- decision authority is limited to the control sible for resource consumption, but on the of resources for TDY, supplies, and other hand managers are denied the equipment, while really important deci- decision authority to distribute resources sions are centralized. Although we talk for obtaining the goods and services about resource management at the lowest necessary to do the job. level, resource allocation for specific The manager must control the alloca- requirements is slowly, but continually, tion of resources within his area of elevated to higher levels. We seem to be at responsibility before he can be motivated the crossroads of our resource manage- by job enrichment or management by ment travels. Should we continue to

81 82 AIR UNIVERSIT Y RE VIE W centralize or reverse the trend and de- purchase is distributed to each base for centralize resource allocation decisions in specific equipment. This procedure en- the spirit that popularized the resource ables the major commands to monitor all management system (RMS)? equipment purchases at each base and We can go either way, but much will be quickly redistribute funds if required. If sacrificed if the trend toward centrali- one base identifies a sudden important zation continues. First, people in the Air requirement, the major command can Force want freedom to do their jobs; they either provide money from reserve funds or do not want to be overly controlled. This withdraw funds from another base. freedom must start with the authority to Centralization appears to be efficient determine resource allocation for specific because immediate, far-reaching decisions purposes and could be the basis for job can be made and implemented in a very satisfaction. Second, Air Force efforts to short period of time. However, the prin- improve worker motivation and create an cipal limitation of centralization is the enriched job environment would be blunt- perception of base level managers. They ed. How can you establish MBO if the feel that everything is programmed, and manager does not control the resource higher level authorities do not trust them input to achieve his goals? The USAF to make decisions. As a result, the Leadership and Management Develop- manager loses interest, feels manipulated, ment Center teams are aggressively trying and resists superficial job enrichment to increase productivity by improving approaches. Decentralization tolerates a communication and worker satisfaction; slower decision and response process, but however, managers are not trusted with the manager is given maximum authority decisions concerning the basic input to to determine resource allocation for his performance, resource allocation. Finally, needs. It provides the manager with a an evaluation of a manager’s performance complete “ piece of the action.” He can based on effective use of resources will not program inputs, monitor progress, and be meaningful. Even now this basis for evaluate the outcome. This control factor evaluation is questionable because base encourages him to use feedback for level Air Force managers are limited to improving his work environment. TDY and supply management, while other In addition to centralization, resource decisions are centralized. Considering this managers’ responsibilities and authority limited scope of responsibility, we must are being transferred to a proliferation of stop the rhetoric about measuring a councils and committees at base level. manager’s worth based on his judicious These include the Utility Conservation use of scarce resources. Board, Work Order Review Panel, Facility Centralization is not all bad. When Review Board, Vehicle Utilization Coun- resource allocation is controlled at a high cil, Communications-Electronics-Mete- level, redistribution processing is easier orological Board, etc. Committee meetings and quicker. For example, most major consume valuable time and usually do not commands manage purchases of equip- effectively achieve the purpose. ment costing $1000 or more. Base level There is little relationship between managers submit justifications to pur- management of specific resources and chase equipment items, and major com- consumption of dollars by the manager. mands evaluate the relative importance of For example, the Utility Conservation the requests from all bases. Authority to Board meets monthly at most Air Force IN MY OPINION 83

bases. During the meetings, many issues Would government vehicle abuse be are discussed, and utility consumption for reduced if managers and squadron com- the previous month is thoroughly re- manders had to pay for repairs from their viewed, If meaningful conservation mea- resources? Would telephones be moved sures are recommended by the committee, each time there was a small organization very few are effective because there is change if the manager had to pay? Would nothing to bind individual managers. It managers evaluate their personnel re- seems that only mandatory decrees by the sources more closely if they were account- commander reduce utility consumption. able for the military pay costs of manning So the time wasted by 10 to 15 people at assistance? The conclusion is the same for Utility Conservation Board meetings does each question. If managers were required not change a thing. to pay for everything, waste would be These time wasters can be prevented by reduced. simply tying resources to dollar con- There seems to be a twofold problem. On sumption by each manager. Then there one hand managers feel that they are not would be only two principal meetings on trusted with important decisions. They do base, the Financial Management Board not have the authority to allocate re- and Budget Working Group. These com- sources required to perform their tasks mittees would determine the allocation because many decisions are made at a and distribution of scarce dollar resources. higher level or by committees. On the other Then each manager would be required to hand managers abuse free issues because prioritize his needs and purchase until his these resources are regarded as unlimited; funds are exhausted. By tying all con- the consumption is not considered in terms sumption to the dollar, managers would of dollars from their budgets. start making the decisions now imposed How can these problems be solved? Let’s by committee, and the dynamics of the start by giving base level managers more marketplace would regulate consumption. authority over resource consumption. In There is still another important factor in Frederick Herzberg terminology, the job the “ responsibility for resource allocation should be enriched to provide real satis- picture.” This factor could be called the faction. Relate the use of any resource in “ free issues” to bo.se level Air Force the work environment to consumption of managers. It is the base level manager’s limited dollars, and ask the manager to support in goods and services that is make the choices. This is the only environ- subsidized by the “big pot” of unlimited ment for real management because noth- resources at a higher level. The manager ing is free, and the manager must deter- may see this as a relief valve because he mine relative importance through the does not spend his resources to obtain the function of supply, demand, and the benefit. He can abuse priority systems, ability to pay. So now let’s look at some waste valuable assets, or overorder be- environmental changes necessary to cause he is not accountable for the costs. facilitate this process. This factor also complicates an evaluation Air Force managers receive “free” data system for a manager based on his use of automation support, so there is no reason resources. He may manage the resources to feel that this is a scarce resource. he buys, but those free issues are not Customers are careless and frequently ask translated in terms of dollars and are for support they do not need. Listings are rarely managed at the consumption level. prepared in too many copies, programs are 84 AIR UNIVERSIT Y RE VIE W

rerun because of overlooked input errors, planning ahead to avoid the expense of and unused products are prepared because using high priorities; however, the priority customers have not changed require- system would be available for those really ments. Managers must become aware of urgent jobs. this high-cost service and realize that it Managers already pay for TDY per diem should be conserved. This goal can be and travel costs. But what about the use of achieved by selling data automation government vehicles assigned to organ- support to the customers. izations? These are free issues, and vehicle Data processing installations could abuse is a major problem. Wouldn’t it be easily fit a buyer/seller relationship. much more sensible if the manager paid Remote terminal time and costs would be for vehicles as rental items and vehicle accumulated by the computer and provid- abuse resulted in additional costs? Besides ed to customers on a daily basis. Daily, placing resource consumption in the monthly, and quarterly processing costs proper management area, dollars would would be accumulated by standard rates become the input for management deci- based on the computer time required. At sions. The vehicle operations and mainte- the end of each month, customers receive nance areas of transportation also seem computerized bills for expenses incurred like naturals for industrial funding. The during the period. Ideally, the data equipment would be capitalized and the automation installation at base level services sold to base managers. This would become an industrial fund activity procedure adds to the manager’s respon- with invoices processed through the sibility and encourages him to conserve accounting and finance office. This because the dollar savings could be used in procedure places data automation on a other areas. self-supporting basis and encourages Resource managers also need to get managers to conserve because it costs more involved in the civil engineering (CE) money from the operations and mainte- support they receive. Now, the priority for nance budget. CE work orders seems to depend on a Administrative reproduction is another combination of panel actions and the free issue. Everyone gets administrative discretion of civil engineering plans and support at no cost, and little attention is programs. The manager who wants work devoted to preventing abuses. Managers orders completed has very little control are encouraged to get more copies than over the process. He can attend the Work required, and unnecessarily urgent pri- Order Review Panel meetings and advo- orities are established. This resource cate his requirements; however, he is not would also be conserved if managers had managing this resource. Someone else is to'pay for it. For example, rates should be doing it for him by establishing priorities established for each type of work order and distributing the civil engineering with an increasing sliding scale for higher minor construction effort through the in- priorities. Priority one may cost an service work plan. additional $10.00, while priority four If the principles of RMS are applied, would not have any added expense. This managers of significant resource centers procedure encourages managers to review should also be responsible for the con- their resources and requirements thor- sumption of the civil engineering re- oughly before ordering reproduction sources that support their organizations. services. They would also be interested in The manager judiciously reviews civil IN MY OPINION 85

engineering work orders and weighs them the manager could only obtain the service against other priorities. If he has the funds if he had the required funds. and believes that the work is needed more So let’s give the manager this authority than other things (opportunity costs), he by first reducing all input resources to the submits the work order and pays for the lowest common denominator, the dollar. services from his budget. The controlling Provide the money to the manager factor is scarcity of funds, notan arbitrary through the Financial Working Group and determination of the Work Order Review Financial Management Board process. Panel. Then ask him to make decisions concern- Besides giving the manager more ing allocations of scarce dollars on goods control over the factors that affect his and services required to do the job. In work center, the preceding examples of essence, make the manager buy every- environmental changes save personnel thing he needs. Resource consumption is costs associated with conducting com- then regulated in a natural way through mittees and panels to make the decisions supply demand and the ability to pay, and that should be part of the manager’s job. the manager will regain the authority to They could be implemented through the determine his productivity. Now, the basis RMS expense distribution to cost centers has been established for real job enrich- concept or by capitalizing the functions ment because the manager has a complete and establishing industrial funds. The “piece of the action.” industrial fund concept seems optimal Hq 40th Tactical Group (USAFE) because there would be a recognized buyer/seller relationship between cus- tomer and provider. As industrial funded activities, the seller would possess the Note 1. Everett C. Hughes. Social Psychology at the Crossroads (New capability to accomplish the work, while York. Harper and Brothers. 1951). p. 38. A RESPONSE TO HUMAN WORLD ORDER

Chaplain (Captain) R ussel l L. Osmond

We must all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.

HUS spoke Benjamin Franklin to Human World Order.f The most fascinat- John Hancock as they signed the ing impact of this rather interesting and DeclarationT of Independence on July 4, somewhat polemical piece is that it 1776. And so spoke Gerald and Patricia addresses the same issue that concerned Mische in 1977 in their book, Toward a Franklin and addresses it in much the

fGerald and Patricia Mische, Toward a Human World Order: Beyond the National Security Strait- jacket (New York: Paulist Press, 1977, $2.95, paper, $9.95, hardback), 399 pages.

86 BOOKS AND IDEAS 87

same way; the exception is that both the survive only when they stop struggling size of the community implied and the with each other to preserve their own implications of the hanging are much personal security and turn their efforts larger in the book. Franklin was concerned instead to international cooperation with about 13 fledgling colonies in a very the goal of preservation of the rights of the uncertain wild frontier; the Misches are individual. The protection and develop- concerned about the future of individuals ment of individual human potential will in over 150 established nation-states, occur only when states recognize their which are also facing a rather uncertain unique interdependencies and stop com- and wildly unknown frontier of shortages peting with one another. They take over and increasingly faulty assumptions. The 300 pages to agree with Henry Steele shared issue is survival and how to assure Commager that: it for individuals through, and in spite of, nation-states. What is called for is a revival of the wisdom Toward a Human World Order is and resourcefulness that presided over the birth of our Republic and gave us those unique in that it addresses international institutions which still serve us so well and survival from the point of view of the have been so widely copied throughout the preservation of basic human rights and rest of the civilized world. We must invoke does it from the perspective of Abraham that creativity to reconcile nationalism— Maslow’s well-known hierarchy of human with its assumption that nations can live by and to themselves—with the reality that, in needs. The authors assert that the right of almost everything that counts, the world is the individual to self-actualization is a interdependent. We must invoke it to higher right than the survival of the summon up an inventiveness in the realms nation-state. Unfortunately, they main- of politics and economics comparable to that which we display in science and tech- tain, the drive to preserve the nation-state nology.1 devours all the energy and resources of the state so that there is nothing left for the The Misches argue that the common benefit of individual self-actualization and denominator which states should share is personal development. This occurs be- the concern for maximizing human poten- cause the nation-state itself suffers from tial and not the concern for individual self- never having outgrown the security or preservation. Apart from the fact that this survival level of the Maslow needs hier- proposition flies in the face of both the archy; thus, nation-state leaders have traditional international relations theory never seen the vision of the self-actuali- of realism and any educated sense of zation potential of the state. Security and history, it is an inviting idea and idealism. individual state survival drive all the The development of maximum human decisions of the state leaders and all state potential for self-actualization, like behavior. The nation (as if it had a motherhood, is something that everyone personality) can thus never develop supports. Unfortunately, their justifi- beyond a very low level of security cations for that position and their alter- consciousness. native suggestions leave much to be The solution to this dilemma, say the desired. Their book, to a great extent, is Misches, is to focus on world order rather like cotton candy—inviting because it than on individual state survival. They suggests fulfillment, but disappointingly assume and attempt to argue, however hollow and without substance or lasting furtively, that the individual states will satisfaction. 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

| t is necessary to consider viduals. The authors maintain that this the argument structure of the book itself. It hopelessness exists because the prevailing opens with a plaintive description of the institution (the nation-state) devotes all its powerlessness of the individual and the energies to self-preservation at the ex- nation-state in the face of what Alvin pense of any human goals. Thus, power- Toffler has called “ future shock.” After lessness is the result of a national interest giving a relatively good collection of that focuses on the basic level of Maslow’s examples of why we are all powerless and need structure. It follows that because the perceive ourselves as such, the Misches nation never escapes the basic security make a case for the assertion that our level, the powerlessness perceived by the sense of powerlessness derives from the individual is never alleviated. The prob- fact that the state itself is powerless. They lem with this argument is that the state discuss national interest in some detail cannot be assumed to function like a and then use this for a springboard into a person. disguised defense of world federalism The second argument is that the ob- arguments. They conclude with an appeal session with security “ in the national to universal religious values as a solution interest” literally eats up all the energies of to all ills and as the invitation to proper the state and leaves no resources for the perspective for the human development development of human potential and thus movement. I will treat each of these main human rights. The authors introduce a arguments in turn from my perspective. rather novel, though simplistic, descrip- It is particularly difficult to argue tion of what they call the “ national against any assertion that individuals security motors” to demonstrate their and nations are powerless or at Jeast point. They argue that, unlike the de- perceive themselves as such. Emile Durk- mobilization in previous wars, since World heim called this perception “anomie” in War II the United States has been involved the nineteenth century, and few have since in constant mobilization for the preser- disagreed with him. The authors are vation of its national security: clearly and articulately, if a bit po- Military security became a motor that lemically, in touch with a very real sense of needed to be constantly turned on and the hopelessness that is abroad in the operative.... But military preparedness was land. The book review section of any major not the only national security motor that newspaper or the content of any clustering was to dominate life in the second half of the of Sunday sermons will give evidence of twentieth century. The postwar world witnessed a gradual but steady escalation of that. Their argument is that it is more economic and resource interdependencies intense and much nearer a crisis now than and a corresponding competition that would it has ever been. But whether such eventually pose even graver threats to perceived intensity is a function of more national security... Thus, there are now articulate communication capabilities or three national security motors: balance-of- weapons competition, balance-of-payments real despair remains a moot point. competition and competition over scarce There is clearly a sense of frustration resources, (pp. 46-47) among both individuals and groups around the world, but the unusual sug- This is perhaps the most interesting part gestion of this book is that the frustration of the book because it clearly articulates is due to the structural lag of institutional the economies of setting priorities for development behind the growth of indi- national security while, at the same time. BOOKS AND IDEAS 89 showing three intricate interdependencies of the book discussing a New World Order of both the national and international and outlining strategies for achieving itas economies. It maintains that these com- they have outlined it. They totally ignore plexities literally are driven by national the almost universal history of failure of security concerns at the expense of such attempts in the past to be anything concern for human individual needs. but a haven for intellectuals and never Unfortunately, this argument ignores the have any real impact on the common enormous budget for cabinet level depart- citizen. And they neglect to address the ments in the U.S. government such as the entire international relations field of the Department of Health, Education, and burgeoning growth of nongovernmental Welfare, Department of Housing and international organizations (NGOs) that Urban Development, and the Department exist apart from their propositions. These of Transportation. These departments NGOs already are meeting the Misches’ clearly demonstrate a high government prescribed solution to the national interest priority for response to human needs and problem: thereby counteract the authors’ argu- What is being asked, then, is not to abandon ments. present problem-solving efforts for some far Once the authors have demonstrated the distant future utopia. Recommended, rather, projection that governments are literally is a pragmatism which recognizes that such unable to respond to human needs because problem-solving efforts will not bear much fruit without commensurate effort put into of their complexity and national security structural adaptation at the global level, (p. motors, they turn to what they perceive as 329) a meaningful alternative to national The concluding argument of the book interest and national sovereignty. They appeals to what the authors imply is the call this a grassroots movement to gen- universal religious value of “wholeness.” erate world order while, at the same time, They see religious values as the only they refuse to call it a proposal for world shared core of perceptions that can bind federalism. Their argument is not only the individuals of the world together in a unrealistically idealistic and extremely grassroots movement to enhance and weak but also reveals their hidden agenda guarantee the rights of individuals and in writing the book. Although their emphasize the human growth toward self- argument is always couched in the famous actualization. They describe traditional Benjamin Franklin terms (and it is very religion as impotent because it responds hard to argue against the proposition that usually by drawing its “ moral skirts” we should work together for common around its few followers and claiming human goals, or we will all somehow fall immunity from the problems of the world. apart or be the less for the lack of effort), it is clear that they are calling for support of With a vision of themselves as members of their own “ World Order Models Project,” God’s faithful remnant who will enjoy which has already been under way for eternal bliss when this world passes away, they scrutinize their personal lives to make some time. It somewhat disturbs me that sure they are ready for the end. And thereby they never really admit this advocacy they contribute to the resulting destruction position outright; instead they veil their by failing to take any positive initiative on support of this organization in their behalf of the world and humankind, (pp. 231- introduction of all of its programs and 32) utilization of examples from the project’s Instead, the authors appeal to what they experience. They spend nearlv 100 pages call “ authentic religion”: 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

In both the Western and Eastern meanings tunity than its own. The book is neither of the word, authentic religion is concerned good political science nor necessarily good with a vision and celebration of the essential theology (or religion?), but it does invite relatedness and oneness of all existence. It points toward a potential and destiny that from us a response to good humanism. transcend the immediate evidence of And it does suggest some provocative brokenness and incompletion. Authentic dilemmas generated by the national religion is developed in the humble aware- motors that are driven by our growing ness of participation in reality and meaning interdependencies. Most of all, however, it greater than self and beyond measurable suggests that we examine our values lest physical, social, political or economic relationships, (p. 333) we find ourselves “hanging separately.” I feel that this volume suggests a very This definition of authentic religion leaves real challenge in terms of our responsi- ample room for emphasis on humanistic bility to respond to our interdependence values and the development of human with one another, our responsibility to rights and human goals. Consequently, “ hang together.” Its goal of generating a they argue that basically the only human system for international focus on human thing to do is to respond to our basic priorities is a good goal; its methodology is human religiosity that derives from our just a bit too unrealistic. Perhaps the best concern for our fellow man and eagerly invitation of the book is for us to examine lend our support to their proposed grass- how our own personal human potential by roots movements for “a more human world definition requires interdependence. Iran- order.” This movement toward a more aeus wrote that “The glory of God is man human world order is, therefore, basically come fully alive.” We cannot disagree with a human, religious movement. that goal nor would the Misches. But the emphasis suggested by them is that coming alive cannot be achieved without relationship that recognizes interdependence. Human development is, in the W hat then are we to do? If we context of the ideas presented here, do not leap on their bandwagon for human community development. By definition world order, are we to be considered then the human development movement is irreligious? I think not. But I do feel we a community development, the develop- should respond to the book for what it is— ment of a community that ministers to its an invitation to examine the balance own needs and the needs of its individual between human values and state values. members. Coming fully alive is a minis- The point of the book is that human rights tering within a community; ministering is have been given no attention because of community, literally “a way of living.” the national security motor. This is hardly As Air Force members we are thus true in a nation where an entire recent challenged to a more human order within decade saw the evolution of the civil rights our own community. We are constantly of one particular segment of its population reminded of this need and given checklists defined and clarified regardless of the and suggestions on how to make it happen. national security motors. Neither is it true But, do we succeed? Do we want to in a nation that recently fought its longest succeed? And, if we want to succeed, where war in defense of the human right of do we start? And how? freedom for a country that had experi- Rather than answer those questions enced less human development oppor- with a long prescription, let me share with BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

you a significant paragraph from C. S. all loves, all play, all politics. There are no Lewis that puts my own interdependencies ordinary people. You have never talked to a into proper perspective. mere mortal. Nations, cultures, arts, civili- zations—these are mortal, and their life to It is a serious thing to live in a society of ours as the life of a gnat. But it is immortals possible Gods or Goddesses, to remember whom we joke with, marry, snub and that the dullest and most uninteresting exploit—immortal horrors or everlasting person you talk to may one day be a creature splendor. which... you would be strongly tempted to worship, or else a horror and a corruption C. S. Lewis such as you meet now, if at all, only in a The Weight of Glory nightmare. All day long we are in some degree of helping each other to be one or The next move is yours! another of these destinations. It is in the Griffiss AFB, New York light of these overwhelming possibilities, it is with awe and circumspection proper to them, that we should conduct all our Note dealings with one another. All friendships, 1. Henry Steele Commager. "200 Plus l,“ Parade. July 3,1977, p. 6. than those of the Greeks; and the Persians who POTPOURRI were overwhelmed by the Greek rush of perhaps 100 to 150 meters were lightly armored archers who were relatively defenseless in close-in fighting. The remainder retreated two miles to their waiting ships and re-embarked. Miltiades, the Greek leader, did pursue after History of the Art of War within the having regrouped following the initial rush and Framework of Political History, Vol- engagement, but he was able to seize only seven ume I: A ntiquity, by Hans Delbruck. ships of a much larger force. A lack of reference Translated by Colonel Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., in early accounts of spoils of war indicated to Contributions in Military History, No. 9. Delbruck a fairly successful retreat and Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1975, extraction of the Persian advance guard from 604 pages, $25.00. the shore. In fact, the Athenians suffered about 1000 casualties, killed and wounded, from a force that numbered 4000 to 6000—a tribute to Military students, researchers, teachers, and the hard fighting on both sides and a measure historians in general will be indebted to Walter of the victory won despite what could have been J. Renfroe, Jr., for translating this first of four crippling losses. volumes on History of the Art of War by To Delbruck, Marathon was a significant German military historian Hans Delbruck. victory for the Greeks. It did not need the This is the first appearance in English of a panegyric language of Herodotus and others to work which has proved to be one of the finest make it so. In each of his chapters Delbruck teacher’s guides in the discipline. It is a must- strikes the same chord. Unadulterated facts read historiographic study of major military should speak for themselves; they need no subjects in the classical period—from the embellishment by overgenerous historians Persian wars through the campaigns and army prone to amplify and distort in subjective and of Julius Caesar. selective popularization of what never was but Delbruck, one of the early practitioners of the might have been. Words to Delbruck should be objective, scientific approach in historical as carefully chosen in exposition of the facts of research, has not given us the free-flow an event as the facts themselves. As he put it, character-centered studies prevalent since “ There is no true objective analysis without a Carlyle. Instead, he has produced a collection of philologically accurate base of source mate- profound studies of battles, campaigns, wars, rial.” This severe constraint may deaden the appropriate military topics, and certain style of his storytelling, but it does not destroy individuals whose acts transcended individual the central logic in each of his studies. engagements. What Sir Edward Creasy did so well in terms of battles, Delbruck has done in all A keen appreciation of objective truth explicit military categories. in Delbruck’s retelling of events promoted in His painstaking reconstruction of significant the author a hard taskmaster for all of us, military matters cuts through the welter of especially any who choose to retell history. exaggeration of period reporting, and he retells Most of his chapters are followed by an the victors’ tales with considerable effect, excursus, which is an exegesis of the salient eliminating the gross errors induced by controversial points in the foregoing chapter. national pride and inaccurate recording of Additional notes alluding to source materials events. Those who have stood on the mound at or other necessary explanations of pertinent Marathon may not wish to reject the fanciful material generally follow each excursus. story of Herodotus that depicts a small (Theodore Ropp of recent military historians Athenian army on the run for 1500 meters (8 comes closest to Delbruck’s satisfying tech- stadia), pushing the large Persian army into nique in his ambitious accompanying notes the sea. Delbruck notes that the charge and bibliography.) Thus, we learn as we described by the Greek historian was physi- proceed of the refutation of many long-held cally impossible, not only for trained troops but beliefs, which some of us have passed on to especially for the levies that constituted the countless unsuspecting students over the years. major portion of the Athenian army. Also, the One must swallow very hard to read that Greek, Persian forces were not significantly stronger Macedonian, and Roman armies were gen-

92 BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

erally larger than the armies they faced; that limited appeal is that it never progresses Spartan discipline was more pedagogical than beyond mere opinion into real substance. military and consequently severely limited the Although the authors’ proposals are digestible, ability of field commanders to prosecute their the superficial analyses they offer to support aims; and that Roman levies were never made them are not. There are gross generalizations according to classes of wealth. and several outright errors of fact. A. J. P. Taylor is not more provocative. Remaking Foreign Policy is a by-product of Delbruck has the redeeming feature of carefully the authors’ research for a congressional study sifting available evidence before concluding titled Commission on the Organization of the that the ancients may have overstated their Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. cases. For this alone he deserves a fair reading. This study represents better scholarship, and Only F. E. Adcock and Michael Grant of the the reader will benefit more by reading it than currently read military historians of the period the authors’ attempt to expand it. of antiquity come to mind as purveyors of Delbruck’s analytical technique; and, of the Major Richard E. Porter, USAF two, Adcock’s works are essentially sum- Eglin AFB, Florida mations wherein we are not privy to the research. One can only hope that this volume serves as a model for the remainder in the series. Colonel Wilmer F. Cline, USAF CENTO A Military History of Germany: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day by Martin Kitchen. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975, 384 pages, index + bibliography, $12.50. Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organi- zational Connection by Graham T. Martin Kitchen’s purpose in A Military Allison and Peter L. Szantow. New York: History of Germany is to explore the nature and Basic Books, Inc., 1976, 227 pages, $10.95. history of German militarism. The book is magnificently accomplished in this work. Remaking Foreign Policy is representative of Kitchen does not follow the operational and a growing concern about the adequacy of strategic campaigns; rather he presents the national decision-making machinery in a social, economic, and ideological nature of the world of increasing interdependency and Prussian and German government and its political complexity. The authors assert that intimate connection with the military estab- the problem not only reflects human incom- lishment. Kitchen illustrates the basic roots of petency but also organizational deficiency. the German’s military identification with the They pursue the questionable course of tracing ruling elite. The author convincingly demon- organizational sources of foreign policy failure, strates that at crucial points in German history a difficult task since one can never be sure the alliance between a ruling feudalistic elite where responsibility for failure shifts from and the military leadership negated real social individual to organization. and political progress in Germany. Kitchen Coming as it did near the beginning of a new skillfully explores examples such as the administration, this book was certainly timely. negation of the reforms of Scharnhorst and It differs from the usual quadrennial opinion of Gneisenau, the fear of a mass army officered by how to reform the National Security Council by “ unreliable leaders” before 1914, the corruption suggesting that this august body should be of the Weimar Republic through the prepon- abolished altogether. In its place the authors derance of General Seeckt and a ruling class propose an enhanced utilization of the Cabinet bent on preserving its power, and the willing- and a greater role for the Department of State. ness of the military to serve a nihilistic dictator. Their discussion embraces all the major Hence, Kitchen’s thesis is absolutely essential contributors to foreign policy formulation and to understanding the basic totalitarian forces recommends improvements for each. unleashed by the dictatorship of General What gives this book such temporary and Ludendorff in the First World War. 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Further, he squarely addresses the com- manner that appears to cover ail aspects of plicity of the German military in making modem terrorism. He defines it as coercive Hitler’s Third Reich possible. The shibboleth of propaganda and then examines several case the German officer corps, that they did not histories. Watson identifies the oracle of this support Hitler and indeed actively opposed violent art as Carlos Marighella and cites his him, is laid to rest. Kitchen tests this view by Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla as the exposing the stance of the military leadership bible. His prime examples are the Tupamaro in January 1933, Hitler’s advent to power, the movement and the Symbionese Liberation night of the “ Long Knives” in June 1934, the Army in the United States. The author explains killing of the S. A. leadership, the oath of that political terrorism is an unpredictable loyalty, the Blomberg-Fritsch affair, and the weapon, one that is likely to lead in unintended wholehearted support in planning, preparing, directions, but a phenomenon that can possibly and executing the major military campaigns— result in diminishing the liberties of the many all without question. Of course, Kitchen does and restricting democratic, liberal government. not forget the active and courageous opposition Watson proposes a logical counterstrategy: a to Hitler by various elements of the German multidirectional approach that deals with each military leadership. Yet he does point out that of the aspects of political terrorism. He explains this opposition was indeed self-serving; it was that the solution to terrorism involves an meant to preserve the German social order and accurate recognition of what it is. A response the privileged position of the military caste. In that deals only with the violent aspect of these chapters particularly, Kitchen’s work is terrorism misses the mark. The psychological skillful, well researched, and provocative. facets of terrorism must be addressed. Watson Perhaps the last chapter on rearmament in also says there is little hope of eliminating the Germany demonstrates the only weakness in terrorist unless effective programs are insti- Kitchen’s work. Here the author insists that the tuted to deal with problems that the terrorist same forces that brought the German military points to as justification for his violence. He into a position of prominence still exist and are also indicates the need to involve a large actively encouraged. This stance is unsup- spectrum of society in countering the terrorist. ported by the evidence. Thus his solution is not a quick fix but an This last chapter should not detract from the organized, many-faceted program for dealing overall value of Kitchen’s work, however. The with a complex problem. monograph will not only serve the student of Although events in the Middle East, Ireland, European military and German history but it is and the U.N. currently appear to be dealing also of high interest and value to the general with some aspects of political terrorism, reader. Francis Watson’s book is a welcome treatment of a phenomenon that gives every indication of Major Michael D. Krause, USA Fort Ord, California plaguing the world for some time to come. Lieutenant Colonel Rod Paschall, USA Fort Bragg, North Carolina Political Terrorism: The Threat and the Response by Francis M. Watson. Wash- ington: Robert B. Luce Co. Inc., 1976, 248 Ghana’s First Republic, 1960-1966: The pages + index, appendix, $10.00. Pursuit of the Political Kingdom by Trevor Jones. London: Methuen and Co., 1976, 360 pages, $18.50. Francis Watson’s book defines modern terrorism, describes its operation, its users, its supporters, and concludes with its results and a Ghana has played a role disproportionate to proposal for dealing with terrorism. The author its size, wealth, and population since becoming also includes a chronology of political terrorism independent in 1957. It traveled the road to from 1968 through 1975 and a list of 97 terrorist independence before all other constituents of organizations. modem colonial Africa. It found a savior in The strongest facet of the book is its Nkrumah and fashioned a one-party, Marxist straightforward approach and organization. political system widely copied elsewhere on the Watson proceeds in a systematic, investigative continent. The party in turn perverted many BOOKS AND IDEAS 95

institutions inherited from Britain and waxed Racism is a fact of life. It takes many forms, corrupt in doing so. In this line as well, much of of course, but Racism in American Education is Africa saw fit to emulate Ghana. concerned with those forms of racism that are Such notoriety as Ghana achieved under obviously central to education and educators. Nkrumah before his overthrow in 1966 con- The lesson here is that its evils must be tributed little to the outside world’s under- confronted. standing of the country, its people, and its Sedlacek and Brooks offer a pragmatic politics. Nkrumah hagiography seemed to program for community and school change supply the deficiency, and his departure left the with a model that should come close to Ghana bookshelf embarrassingly bare. Two eliminating racism in our educational process. specialized studies (William B. Harvey’s Law Their model of change is aimed primarily at and Social Change in Ghana and W. Scott whites or white institutions, since whites Thompson’s Ghana’s Foreign Policy) have control most of our schools. The authors feel served well, but more is needed. Trevor Jones’s that a systematic approach is needed in an area Ghana’s First Republic, 1960-1966: The Pursuit where well-intentioned but unsystematic of the Political Kingdom is, therefore, a efforts have often met with failure. welcome addition to the Studies of African History edited by A. H. M. Kirk-Greene of To work through the racist problems in our Oxford University. educational system, the authors provide a step The spare prose of this volume conveys a by step, six-stage program that is based on both great deal of information. Readers may find research and practical experience. The six most interesting the recurring evidence that stages—by their very grounding in the defini- Nkrumah’s authority was frequently circum- tion of learning as evolving, growing, chang- scribed by the party he created ostensibly to ing—are progressive. Stage one thoroughly implement his policies; his claims as dictator immerses the participants in cultural and were undermined by his disciples’ corruption, racial differences, how these differences should incompetence, and lassitude. Nkrumah vented be approached, and how they are expressed his frustrations by immersing himself in a both inside and outside of school. Stage two ridiculously ambitious foreign policy, a policy explains racism and prejudice in operational which in turn blinded him to the weakness of terms, defining individual and institutional his position at home. The 1966 coup was racism and giving examples of biased stan- peaceful, almost polite; Nkrumah was abroad dards in higher education in various kinds of busily mediating the Indo-Chinese conflict. colleges and universities. Stage three examines Nonetheless, Trevor Jones closes with a at an even deeper level the attitudes that are melancholy message: Ghana without Nkru- central to race and how these attitudes mah faces the same reality of impoverishment influence behavior. Stage four looks at the and despair that has so easily undermined sources of bias and the development of democracy elsewhere on the continent. stereotypes. Stage five provides directions for Ghana’s First Republic is based in large changing behavior, and then it establishes measure on the papers of the National goals and strategies that will firm up change Assembly and on reports in Ghana’s pre- and continuing understanding. Stage six cariously independent press. The author concentrates on techniques that will ultimately reserves his personal criticism of Nkrumah for achieve goals of mature behavior in personal the copious, sometimes unwieldy, footnotes. and community relationships. A number of major principles are incor- Edward P. Brynn, Foreign Service Officer porated in the authors’ approach to racism, one Department of History, USA F Academy of which is seen in the structure of the plan itself. It is outcome-oriented, that is, “ behavioral.” Their emphasis is on results of actions rather than on the actions themselves. They even define racism in terms of outcomes: what happens when certain behaviors take Racism in American Education: A Model place? for Change by William E. Sedlacek and Another principle articulated in the text is Glenwood C. Brooks, Jr. Chicago: Nelson- that shock may make change more difficult. Hall, Inc., 1976, xii + 227 pages, index, $12.50. Apparently, change nearly always incorpo- 96 AIR UNIVERSIT Y RE VIE W

rates discomfort and doubt, so most people Counterbalance Intelligence Test and the categorically resist change of almost any kind. Situational Attitude Scales offered in this One intermediate criterion, therefore, for text—all mark an extensive, probing guide to measuring the success of this model is whether better relationships among our people, par- people are thinking new thoughts and express- ticularly those in the academic setting. ing doubts about their present behavior. Most Above all, the model has unity. It hangs of us develop an elaborate and comfortable set together. The reason? Perhaps, because one of of rationalizations around denial of problems the authors is white and the other black. They or even the existence of a condition like racism. are able to present both majority and minority Discussing strategies for solving such a viewpoints to form a practical solution to a situation is useless, then, when people have no difficult problem. Their material provides the existential feeling of its reality. If the earlier soundest basis I have seen for moving stages of disseminating information on individuals, through group theory and goal humanistic growth are ignored, participants structure, toward a useful awareness of will always go back to a stage where they were situations resulting from feelings and actions more secure. that are the product of crippling prejudice. One trap which Sedlacek and Brooks point The challenge is clear. It relates integrally to out in the activation of change occurs when the national priority of maintaining a vital, people become overly concerned with method well-informed citizenry by ensuring the instead of with well-defined goals. Too often it greatest possible educational opportunity for seems we become involved with how to effect all. This priority and its impact on institutions change without knowing exactly what to is a continuing major issue in public, military, accomplish. Teachers, students, and educa- and higher education. tional leaders everywhere need this redemptive Racism in American Education is an action- and profound understanding of one of the oriented book which, if widely read, under- longest lasting problems in our society. stood, and applied, could help reduce conflicts Prejudice is learned, but it can be unlearned that have been counterproductive in the with positive, well-structured, sequential ongoing development of our principal encul- training programs that open up feelings of turating institution—the American school. concern, care, and community. The routines, dialogues, and role-playing Dr. Porter J. Crow Montgomery, Alabama experiences, plus such instruments as the Dove BOOKS RECEIVED Blaine, James Cyril Dickson. The End of an Era in Space Exploration: From Inter- The books listed herein are those received national Rivalry to International Cooper since the last list was published in our January- ation. San Diego, California: American February 1978 issue. Most of them have already Astronautical Society, 1976. $25.00. been sent to reviewers, and their reports will be Clark, Ronald W. The Role of the Bomber. New printed later. York: Crowell, 1978. $14.95. Emme, Eugene M., editor. Two Hundred Years of Flight in America: A Bicentennial Survey. San Diego, California: American Astronautical Society, 1977. $25.00. Fiest, U., N. E. Harms, and M. Dario. The Fighting 109. New York: Doubleday, 1978. I AIR POWER: DOCTRINE, STRATEGY, $10.50. AND TACTICS Godson, John. Clipper 806: The Anatomy of an Air Disaster. Chicago: Contemporary Berman, R. P. Soviet Air Power in Transition. Books, 1978. $7.95. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, Hacker, Barton C., and James M. Grimwood. 1977. $2.95. On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Birdsall, Steve. Flying Buccaneers: The Project Gemini. Washington: NASA, 1977. Illustrated Story of Kenney’s Fifth Air Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A History of Force. New York: Doubleday, 1977. $15.00. Project Ranger. Washington: NASA, 1977. Collier, Richard. Bridge across the Sky: The Mayer, S. L., and Masami Tokoi, editors. Der Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948-1949. Adler—The Official Nazi Luftwaffe Maga- New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. $12.95. zine. New York: Crowell, 1978. $12.95. Gray, Colin S. The Geopolitics of the Nuclear McClement, Fred. Jet Roulette: Flying Is a Era: Heartlands, Rimlands and the Tech- Game of Chance. New York: Doubleday, nological Revolution. New York: Crane, 1978. $7.95. Russak, 1977. $2.95. McCollough, John M. We Flew with One Wing. Higham, Robin, and Jacob W. Kipp. Soviet Ardmore, Pennsylvania: Dorrance, 1978. Aviation and Air Power: A Historical View. $4.00. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1978. $25.00. Mosley, Leonard. Battle of Britain: World War Mandelbaum, Michael, et al. Nuclear Weapons II. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, and World Politics. New York: McGraw- 1977. Hill, 1977. $9.94. Price, Alfred. Focke-Wulf 190 at War. New Weizmann, Ezer. On E agles' Wings: The York: Scribner’s, 1978. $12.50. Personal Story of the Leading Commander Rawlins, Lt. Col. Eugene W., USMC. Marines of the Israeli Air Force. New York: and Helicopters, 1946-1962. Washington: Macmillan, 1976. $8.95. USMC, 1976. Yanarella, Ernest J. The Missile Defense Raymond, Robert S. A Yank in Bomber Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Command. New York: Hippocrene Books, Politics, 1955-1972. Lexington: University 1977. $8.95. of Kentucky Press, 1977. $17.25. Rowe, Percy. The Great Atlantic Air Race. Zijlstra, Gerrit. Diary of an Air War. New York: Philadelphia: McClelland and Stewart, Vantage, 1977. $12.50. 1978. $10.00. Toliver, Col. Ray, USAF (Ret). Fighter Aces of II. AVIATION AND SPACE FLIGHT: the Luftwaffe. Fallbrook, California: Aero TALES, TECHNIQUES, AND Publishers, Inc., 1977. $17.95. TECHNOLOGY Van Ishoven, Andre. Messerschmitt 109 at War. New York: Scribner’s, 1978. $12.50. Abrams, Richard. F4U Corsair at War. New Vee, Roger (Vivian Voss). Flying Minnows: York: Scribner’s, 1978. $12.50. Memoirs of a World War One Fighter Pilot. Anderson, John D. Introduction to Flight: Its New York: Hippocrene Books, 1977. $12.50. Engineering and History. New York: Wills, Philip. On Being a Bird. North Pomfret, McGraw-Hill, 1978. $19.50. Vermont: David and Charles, 1977. $10.95.

97 98 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

III. MILITARY AFFAIRS Farrar, L. L., Jr., editor. War: A Historical, Political, and Social Study. Santa Barbara, Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Intelligence. New California: American Bibliographical York: Doubleday, 1978. $10.00. Center, Clio Press, 1978. $19.75. Blackstock, Paul W., and Col. Frank L. Schaf, Featherstone, Donald F. Wargaming: Pike and USA (Ret), editors. Intelligence, Espio- Shot. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1977. nage, Counterespionage, and Covert Oper- $10.00. ations: A Guide to Information Sources. F'oss, Christopher F. Armoured Fighting Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1978. $18.00. Vehicles of the World. New York: Scrib- Bond, Brian. Liddell Hart: A Study of His ner’s, 1977. $7.95. Military Thought. New Brunswick, New Freedman, Lawrence. U.S. Intelligence and the Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1977. Soviet Strategic Threat. Boulder, Colorado: $14.95. Westview, 1978. $22.50. Bradford, Ernie. Nelson: The Essential Hero. Gabriel, Richard A., and Paul L. Savage. Crisis New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, in Command: M ismanagement in the 1977. $12.95. Army. New York: Hill & Wang, 1978. Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier's Story. Chicago: $ 10.00. Rand McNally, 1951, 1978. $6.95. Golan, Aviezer. Translated by Peretz Kidron. Brown, Anthony Cave, editor. Dropshot: The Operation Susannah. New York: Harper & United States Plan for War with the Soviet Row, 1978. $15.00. Union in 1957. New York: Dial Press, 1977. Gropman, Alan L. The Air Force Integrates, $11.95. 1945-1964. Washington: U.S. Air Force, Brown, Weldon Amzy. The Last Chopper: The Office of Air Force History, 1978. $4.75. Denouement of the American Role in Haselkorn, A. The Evolution of Soviet Security Vietnam, 1963-1975. Port Washington, Strategy, 1965-1975. New York: Crane, New York: Kennikat, 1976. $15.00. Russak, 1978. $4.95. Brownlow, D. G. Checkmate at Ruweisat: Higham, Robin, and Jacob W. Kipp. ACTA No. Auchinleck’s Finest Hour. North Quincy, 2: The Washington Meeting, August 1975. Massachusetts: Christopher, 1977. $9.75. Manhattan, Kansas: U.S. Commission on Coffey, Kenneth J. Manpower for Military Military History, 1977. $15.00. Mobilization. Washington: AEI, 1978. Hoeber, Francis P., et al. Arms, Men, and $2.75. Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year Colby, William. Honorable Men: My Life in the 1979. New York: Crane, Russak, 1978. CIA. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978. $5.95. $10.95. Coletta, Paolo E. The American Naval Her- Holt, Pat M. The War Powers Resolution: The itage in Brief. Washington: University Role of Congress in US Armed Inter- Press of America, 1978. $14.00. vention. Washington: AEI, 1978. $2.25. Corson, William R. The Armies of Ignorance. Horrocks, Sir Brian. Corps Commander. New New York: Dial Press, 1977. $11.95. York: Scribner’s, 1978. $14.95. Coulam, Robert F. Illusions of Choice: The F- International Institute for Strategic Studies. 111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisi- The Military Balance, 1977-1978. Boulder, tion Reform. Princeton, New Jersey: Colorado: Westview, 1977. $7.50. Princeton University Press, 1977. $21.50. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Daly, John C. The US Navy: What Is Its Strategic Survey, 1976. Boulder, Colorado: Future? Washington: AEI, 1977. $2.00. Westview, 1977. $7.50. Dawson, Alan. 55 Days: The Fall of South Jablonski, E. A Pictorial History of the Worjd Vietnam. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: War II Years. New York: Doubleday, 1978. Prentice-Hall, 1977. $12.50. $12.50. Duffy, Christopher. Austerlitz 1805. Hamden, Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. American Espionage: Connecticut: Shoe String Press, 1977. From Secret Service to CIA. New York: $14.50. Macmillan, 1977. $10.00. Endicott, John E., and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., Jones, D. R., editor. Soviet Armed Forces editors. American Defense Policy. Balti- Review Annual (SAFRA). Gulf Breeze, more, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Uni- Florida: Academic International Press, versity Press, 1977. $22.50. 1977. $29.50. BOOKS AND IDEAS 99

Kahn, David. Hitler's Spies: German Military Osur, Alan M. Blacks in the Army Air Forces Intelligence in World War II. New York; during World War II: The Problem of Race Macmillan, 1978. $19.95. Relations. Washington: United States Air Keegan, John, et al., editors. The Rand Force, Office of Air Force History, 1977. McNally Encyclopedia of World War II. $2.40. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977. $19.95. Palmer, Bruce, editor. Grand Strategy for the Kinnard, Brig. Gen. Douglas, USA (Ret). 1960s. Washington: American Enterprise President Eisenhower and Strategy Man- Institute, 1978. $3.25. agement: A Study in Defense Politics. Palmer, Dave R. Summons of the Trumpet: Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, U.S. Vietnam in Perspective. San Rafael, 1977. $13.75. California: Presidio, 1978. $12.95. Kourvetaris, George A., and Betty A. Dobratz, Piekalkiewicz, Janusz. Arnhem 1944. New editors. World Perspectives in the So- York: Scribner’s, 1978. $12.95. ciology of the Military. New Brunswick, Radine, Lawrence B. The Taming of the New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1977. Troops: Social Control in the United States $14.95. Army. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood. Kozlov, General Major S. N., editor. The 1977. $14.95. Officer's Handbook: A Soviet View. Wash- Royal United Services Institute and Brassey’s ington: Government Printing Office, 1977. Defence Yearbook, 1977/78. Boulder, Kuhlman, James A., editor. Strategies, Alli- Colorado: Westview, 1977. $28.75. ances, and Military Power: Changing Rupp, Leila J. Mobilizing Women for War: Roles. Reading, Massachusetts: Sijthoff, German and American Propaganda, 1939- 1977. $31.50. 1945. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Lee, Gus C., and Geoffrey Y. Parker. Ending the University Press, 1978. Draft—The Story of the All Volunteer Schlesinger, James R., et al. Defending Force. Alexandria, Virginia: Human America. New York: Basic Books, 1977. Resources Research Organization, 1977. $13.95. Leonard, Thomas C. Above the Battle: War- Simpson, B. Mitchell, editor. War, Strategy, Making in America from Appomattox to and Maritime Power. New Brunswick, New Versailles. New York: Oxford University Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1977. Press, 1978. $12.95. $19.50. Mellenthin, Friedrich Wilhelm von. German Generals of World War II: As I Saw Them. Skirdo, Col. M. P. The People, the Army, the Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, Commander: A Soviet View. Washington: 1977. $8.95. Government Printing Office, 1970. Smoke, Richard. War: Controlling Escalation. Melosi, Martin V. The Shadow of Pearl Harbor: Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Uni- Political Controversy over the Surprise vrsity Press, 1978. $18.50. Attack, 1941-1946. College Station: Texas Stern, Ellen P. The Limits of Military Inter- A & M Press, 1977. $10.00. vention. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Moffat, Capt. Alexander W., USNR (Ret). A Publications, 1977. $8.95. Navy Maverick: Comes of Age, 1939-1945. Stockholm International Peace Research Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan Uni- Institute. Weapons of Mass Destruction versity Press, 1977. $8.95. and the Environment. New York: Crane, Montagu, Hon. Ewen. Beyond Top Secret Russak, 1977. $12.95. Ultra. New York: Coward, McCann & Taylor, A. J. P. The War Lords. New York: Geoghegan, 1977. $7.95. Atheneum, 1978. $10.00. Mrazkova, D., and V. Remes, editors. The Terraine, John. The Great War. New York: Russian War: 1941-45. New York: Dutton, Doubleday, 1965, 1978. $10.00. 1977. $12.95. Thompson, W. Scott. Power Projection: A Net O’Ballance, Edgar. The Secret War in the Assessment of US and Soviet Capabilities. Sudan. Hamden, Connecticut: Shoe String New York: National Strategy Information Press, 1977. $10.00. Center, 1978. $2.00. O’Kane, Richard H. Clear the Bridge: The War Trythall, Anthony J. ‘Boney' Fuller: Soldier. Patrols of the U.S.S. Tang. Chicago: Rand Strategist, and Writer, 1918-1966. New McNally, 1977. $10.00. Brunswick. New Jersey: Rutgers Uni- 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

versity Press, 1977. $13.95. Churba, Joseph. Politics of Defeat: America’s Van Creveld, Martin L.Supplying War: Logis- Decline in the Middle East. New York: tics from Wallenstein to Patton. New York: Cyrco, 1977. $10.00. Cambridge University Press, 1977. $14.95. Eden, Anthony. Another World, 1897-1917. Walters, V. A. Silent Missions. New York: New York: Doubleday, 1977. $7.95. Doubleday, 1978. $12.95. Gaddis, John L. Russia, the Soviet Union and Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A the United States: An Interpretive History. Moral Argument with Historical Illus- New York: Wiley & Sons, 1978. $6.95. trations. New York: Basic Books, 1977. Galloway, L. Thomas. Recognizing Foreign $15.00. Government: The Practice of the United Warner, Edward L. The Military in Contem- States. Washington: AEI, 1978. $4.75. porary Soviet Politics: An Institution Analysis. New York: Praeger, 1977. Garfmkle, Adam M. Finlandization: A Map to a Whetten, Lawrence, L., editor. The Political Metaphor. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Implications of Soviet Military Power. New Research Institute, 1978. $4.00. York: Crane, Russak, 1977. $14.50. Harkabi, Yehoshafat. Arab Strategies and Whitlow, Capt. Robert H., USMCR. US Israel’s Response. New York: Free Press, Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory & 1977. $10.00. Combat Assistance Era. Washington: Heller, Francis Howard, editor. The Korean Government Printing Office, 1977. War: A 25- Year Perspective. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977. $13.00. IV. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Herzstein, Robert Edwin. The War That Hitler Won: The Most Infamous Propaganda Atiyeh, George N., editor. Arab and American Campaign in History. New York: Putnam’s Cultures. Washington: AEI, 1977. $4.75. Sons, 1977. $15.00. Bailey, Thomas A. The Marshall Plan Summer: Hirst, David. The Gun and the Olive Branch: An Eyewitness Report on Europe and the The Roots of Violence in the Middle East. Russians in 1947. Stanford, California: New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Hoover Institution, 1978. $10.95. 1977. $12.95. Balzano, Michael P. The Peace Corps: Myths Hoffmann, Stanley. Primacy or World Order: and Prospects. Washington: AEI, 1978. American Foreign Policy since the Cold $2.00. War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. $12.50. Barnard, Dr. Christiaan. South Africa: Sharp Hoxie, R. Gordon. Command Decision and the Dissection. New York: Hippocrene, 1978. Presidency. New York: Reader’s Digest $7.95. Press, 1977. $15.00. Barnet, Richard J. The Giants: Russia and the Kitchel, Denison. The Truth about the Panama United States. New York: Simon & Schus- Canal. New York: Arlington, 1978. $8.95. ter, 1977. $8.95. Knight, F. W. The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Barnett, A. Doak. China Policy: Old Problems Fragmented Nationalism. New York: and New Challenges. Washington: Brook- Oxford University Press, 1977. $12.00. ings Institution, 1977. $2.95. Kohr, Leopold. The Overdeveloped Nations: Betts, Richard K. Soldiers, Statesmen, and the The Diseconomies of Scale. New York: Cold War Crises. Cambridge, Massachu- Schocken, 1977. $9.95. setts: Harvard University Press, 1977. Llerena, Mario. The Unsuspected Revolution: $15.00. The Birth and Rise of Castroism. Ithaca, Bissell, Richard E. Southern Africa in the New York: Cornell University Press, 1978. World: Autonomy or Interdependence? $12.50. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Lukacs, John. 1945: Year Zero. New York: Institute, 1978. $4.00. Doubleday, 1978. $8.95. Cahn, Anne Hessing, et al. Controlling Future Moore, John Norton, editor. The Arab-Israeli Arms Trade. New York: McGraw-Hill, Conflict: Readings and Documents. Prince- 1977. $5.95. ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Chung, Chin O. P’Yongyang between Peking Press, 1977. $22.50. and Moscow. University, Alabama: Uni- Mosley, Leonard. Dulles: A Biography of versity of Alabama Press, 1977. $15.00. Eleanor, Allen, a nd John Foster Dulles and BOOKS AND IDEAS 101

Their Family Network. New York: Dial lenges to Saudi Arabia. Washington: AEI, Press, 1978. $12.95. 1978. $2.25. Oksenberg, M., and R. B. Oxnam, editors. Weil, Martin. A Good Club: The Founding Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service. New Relations Past and Future. New York: York: Norton, 1978. $12.95. Basic Books, 1978. $12.50. Palmer, Alan. The Kaiser: Warlord of the V. GENERAL Second Reich. New York: Scribner’s, 1978. Bailey, Thomas A., editor. The American $14.95. Spirit. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Quandt, William B. Decade of Decisions: Heath & Co., 1978. 3 Vols., $8.95 each American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli volume. Conflict, 1967-76. Berkeley: University of Bailey, Thomas A. Voices of America: The California Press, 1977. $14.95. Nation’s Story in Slogans, Sayings, and Rangel, Guebara Carlos. The Latin Americans: Songs. New York: The Free Press, 1976. Their Love-Hate Relationship with the $12.95. United States. New York: Harcourt Brace Berger, Martin. Engels, Armies and Revo- Jovanovich, 1977. $12.95. lution: The Revolutionary Tactics of Ridgeway, Susan, compiler. NPT: Current Classical Marxism. Hamden, Connecticut: Issues in Nuclear Proliferation. Los Shoe String Press, 1977. $15.00. Angeles: California State University Bickel, Leonard. Mawson’s Will: The Greatest Press, 1977. $2.00. Survival Story Ever Written. New York: Roots, John McCook. Chou. New York: Double- Stein and Day, 1977 $10.00. day, 1978. $8.y5. Braestrup, Peter. Big Story. (Abridged). New Ryan, Paul B. The Panama Canal Controversy: York: Doubleday, 1978. $8.95. ' US Diplomacy and Defense Interests. Chatelain, Maurice. Our Ancestors Came from Stanford, California: Hoover, 1977. Outer Space. New York: Doubleday, 1978. Scherer, J. L., editor. USSR Facts and Figures $7.95. Annual (UFFA). Gulf Breeze, Florida: Geist, Christopher D., editor. Popular Culture Academic International Press, 1977. and the Mass Media: A Reader. Bowling $31.50. Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State Uni- Sigmund, Paul E. The Overthrow of Allende versity Press, 1977. $5.00. and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976. George, Frank, editor. Science Fact. New York: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Sterling, 1978. $8.95. Pittsburgh Press, 1977. $14.95. Giffin, Frederick C. Six Who Protested: Radical Siracusa, Joseph M., and Glen St. John Opposition to the First World War. Port Barclay, editors. The Impact of the Cold Washington, New York: Kennikat, 1977. War: Reconsiderations. New York: Ken- $9.95. nikat, 1977. $12.50. Godson, Roy. The Kremlin and Labor: A Study Sisco, Joseph J., et al. Prospects for Peace in the in National Security Policy. New York: Middle East. Washington: AEI, 1977. $2.00. Crane, Russak, 1977. $3.25. Solomon, Richard H. A Revolution Is Not a Goodavage, Joseph F. Our Threatened Planet. Dinner Party: A Feast of Images of the New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. Maoist Transformation of China. New $ 10.00. York: Doubleday, 1978. $6.95. Halperin, Morton, and Daniel Hoffman. Top Stern, Fritz. Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleich- Secret: National Security and the Right to roder, and the Building of the German Know. New York: Simon and Schuster, Empire. New York: Knopf, 1977. $17.95. 1977. $8.95. Stockholm International Peace Research Hoffman, Peter. The History of the German Institute. Strategic Disarmament, Veri- Resistance, 19113-1945. Cambridge, Massa- fication and National Security. New York: chusetts: MIT Press, 1977. $19.95. Crane, Russak, 1977. $16.50. Huxley, Elspeth. Scott of the Antarctic. New Szulc, Tad. The Illusion of Peace: Foreign York: Atheneum, 1978. $12.95. Policy of the Nixon-Kissinger Years. New Kevles, Daniel J. The Physicists: The History of York: Viking, 1978. $17.50. a Scientific Community in Modern Amer- Tahtinen, Dale R. National Security Chal- ica. New York: Knopf, 1977. $15.95. 102 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Knurr. Klaus, and Frank N. Trager, editors. Press, 1978. $34.50. Economic Issues and National Security. Sagan, Carl. The Dragons of Eden: Specula- Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977. tions on the Evolution of Human Intel- $7.50. ligence. New York: Random House, 1977. Kunetka, James W. City of Fire: Los Alamos $8.95. and the Birth o f the Atomic Age, 1943 1945. Seigel, Jerrold E. Marx’s Fate: The Shape of a Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- Life. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Hall, 1978. $10.95. University Press, 1978. $16.50. Mumford, S. D. Population Growth Control: Watney, J. The Churchills. New York: Cre- The Next Move Is America's. New York: monesi, 1977. $17.95. Philosophical Library, 1977. $7.50. Winkler, Allan M. The Politics of Propaganda: O'Neill, Gerard K. The High Frontier: Human The Office o f War Information, 1942-1945. Colonies in Space. New York: Morrow, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 1977. $8.95. Press, 1978. $11.95. Rostow, W. W. The World Economy: History Zuckerman, Solly. From Apes to Warlords. New and Prospect. Austin: University of Texas York: Harper & Row, 1978. $20.95.

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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “The Cen- tral Europe Battlefield: Doctrinal Implications for Counterair-lnter- diction” by Colonel Robert D. Rasmussen, USAF, as the outstanding article in the July-August 1978 issue of Air University Review. '7 the Si contributors

Union in May 1977, hosted oy the Soviet Chief, Military Studies Division. Air War Ministry of Defense. Colonel Cade spent College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His more than five years at the Pentagon, as flying experience includes tactical airlift executive assistant to the Assistant operations and combat missions in the F- Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, on 4 Phantom. He has been an assistant the Air Staff in the Directorate of Plans, professor of history at the United States and in the Directorate o f Intelligence Air Force Academy and a research Systems. He has also had tours with SAC associate at Columbia University. A and USAFSS and overseas assignments colonel selectee, Colonel Fabyanic is a in Germany, Panama, and Vietnam. 1976 graduate of Air War College. Colonel Cade is a graduate of Armed Forces Staff College and National War College.

Francis P. Hoeber is President of Hoeber Corporation, an Arlington, Vir- ginia. defense and economic studies firm. He also writes extensively on strategy and other military topics. He has a B A degree in economics from Antioch Col- lege. did graduate work in economics and statistics at American University, and has completed the Ph D. examinations in international relations at the University of Pennsylvania. Hoeber was a U.S. government economist from 1940 to 1952. and he has been a systems analyst and research manager with Stanford Re- search Institute and the Rand Corpo- Colonel Donald L. Clark, USAF(Ret ) ration. He is co-author with David B. (M.P-A.. George Washington University) Kassing and William Schneider. Jr., of is Assistant to the President and a Arms. Men. and Military Budgets: Issues lecturer in political science at Montana for Fiscal Year 1979 and author of Slow to State University, Bozeman. While in the Take Offense Bombers. Cruise Missiles, Air Force, he taughtinternational affairs and Prudent Deterrence, a monograph of at Air Command and Staff College, was the Georgetown University Center for the first USAF Fellow to Fletcher School Strategic and International Studies. of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, was Assistant Air Attache in Moscow, and served on the Joint Staff in the Office of International Negotiations. He has been a frequent lecturer at the various military staff and war colleges and is a previous contributor to the Review.

Hamilton I. McCubbin, Major, U.S. Army Reserve, (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin) is Chairman and Associate Professor, Department of Family Social Science, University of Minnesota, and an associate editor for the Journal of Marriage and the Family and Journal of Military and Political Sociology. Dr. McCubbin served as Head, Family Studies Branch, Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, and as director of the Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Pro- gram. San Francisco, and Research and Evaluation Division, United States Army Colonel David J. Cade (M.P.A., Syrs Corrections, Fort Riley, Kansas. He has cuse University) is Commander of tht co-edited Families in the Military System 6931st Secunty Group at Ir£klion Air and Family Separation and Reunion and Station. Crete. He was one of six National Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Faby- published articles on family stress, War College students to visit the Soviet anic (Ph.D., St. Louis University) is coping, and adaptation.

103 Chief, Personal Programs Branch, Air Force Military Personnel Center, Ran- dolph AFB, Texas. Except for a two-year tour as a protocol officer, her career has been as a personnel officer in the U.S., Europe, and Southeast Asia. Major Murphy held additional duties as commander’s advisor for enlisted women at bases in Vietnam and Thailand. She also served as Command Staff Director for Military Women, USAF Security Service. Major Murphy is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Armed Forces Staff Edna J. Hunter (Ph.D., United States College. International University) is Head of Family Studies and Assistant Director for Administration at the Center for Prisoner of War Studies, Naval Health Research Martha A. Maraden (M.S.W., San Diego Center, San Diego, California. Dr. Hunter State University) is a social worker and is a clinical research psychologist who instructor in the Residence Education has been affiliated with the Center since Centers Program of Chapman College. 1967. She has eo-edited two books on the Orange. California. Ms. Marsden is also military family and a number of journal Supervisor of Children's Homemaker articles in the areas of family research, Services with Visiting Nurse Associ- psychophysiology, learning disabilities, ation/ Homemaker Service of San Diego. and social isolation. In September she She was formerly a member of the Family becomes Director, Family Research Studies Branch. Center for Prisoner of Center and Associate Dean of the Grad- War Studies, in San Diego, and has been a uate School of Human Behavior, United medical social worker and consultant for States International University. several hospitals. She is a doctoral candidate. School of Social Work, Uni- M ajor B arry D. Guyse (M.S., Uni- versity of Maryland at Baltimore. versity of Southern California) is jhe comptroller at Aviano Air Base, Italy. Most of his Air Force service has been in the resource management field. Other assignments include accounting and finance officer at Clark AB. Philippines, and RAF Bentwaters, England. A lieutenant colonel selectee. Major Guyse is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Industrial College of the Armed Forces and a Distinguished Graduate of the Professional Military Comptroller School and Air Command and Staff College.

C olon el D w ayne P. Wright (M.S., George Washington University) is Chief, Exercise Plans Division. Twelfth Air Force, Bergstrom AFB, Texas, and was the project manager to plan and conduct force employment for the AWACS Tacti- cal Test. He served two tactical fighter! F: 100/F-l) tours in Europe. Other assignments include wing weapons/tactics officer at Phu Cat, Vietnam, staff officer on the Air Staff and CINCPAC Unified Staff (J-3), and Director, Force Programs Division in Hq PACAF during the SEA force drawdown. Colonel Wright is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.

Chaplain, Captain. Russell L. Os- m ond (M.S., Syracuse University) is on Kathleen P. Durning (Ph.D., Uni- the chapel team at Griffiss AFB, New versity of Arizona) is a personnel research York. His assignments include Keesle psychologist at the Navy Personnel AFB, Mississippi; Nakhon Phanom Research and Development Center. San Royal Thai AFB, Thailand; and the Diego. She is currently involved in the 3320th Retraining Group at Lowry AFB study of organizational climate per- Colorado. This review was written while ceptions of military women and of their he was Air Staff Training Officer for the experiences in nontraditional assign- Office of the Chief of Chaplains. He has ments and previously all-male environ- been a lecturer for ACSC and AWC base- ments (e g , the Naval Academy). Her level seminars and is currently com - past research focused on alcohol abuse pleting a Ph.D in political science. among Navy personnel and, prior to that, Major Patricia M. Murphy (MS., Chaplain Osmond is o Distinguished learning processes in children University of Southern California! is Graduate of Squadron Officer School. editorial staff advisers

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel David R. M ets, USAF Colonel Robert J. O’Brien, J r . Editor Hq Aerospace Defense Command J ack H. M ooney M ajor General John W. H uston, Chief Managing Editor Office of Air Force History J ohn A. W estcott D r . H arol d M. Helfman Art Director and Production Manager Hq Air Force Systems Command E nrique Gasto n C olonel Ric h a r d A. Ingram Associate Editor, Hq Air Training Command Spanish Language Edition C olonel Robert W. K line L ia Mid o si May Patterson Hq Air University (ATC) Associate Editor, C olonel G lenn E. W asso n Portuguese Language Edition Hq Fifth Air Force, -Japan W il l ia m J. De P ao l a Lie u t e n a n t Colonel Louis A. T orraca, J r . Art Editor and Illustrator Hq Military Airlift Command R udolph W. Morgan F rancis W. J ennings Financial and Administrative Manager USAF Office of Information C olonel David O. Schillerstrom Hq Strategic Air Command Ljeutenent Colonel Stephen B. H in d e r l it e r Hq Tactical Air Command C olonel John H. Price Hq United States Air Force Academy P rofessor I. B. H olley, J r ., Duke University Major General, Air Force Reserve attention

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