DOCSLIB.ORG

The Intended Interpretation of the Intuitionistic First-Order Logical Operators

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Intended Interpretation of the Intuitionistic First-Order Logical Operators THE INTENDED INTERPRETATION OF THE INTUITIONISTIC FIRST-ORDER LOGICAL OPERATORS PhD Dissertation by Enrique Gustavo FERNANDEZ-DIEZ-PICAZO The London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London) Year 1997 1 UMI Number: U613452 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U613452 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 British Uljiarv/ o! Political and Econon tc Science ABSTRACT The present thesis is an investigation on an open problem in mathematical logic: the problem of devising an explanation of the meaning of the intuitionistic first-order logical operators, which is both mathematically rigorous and faithful to the interpretation intended by the intuitionistic mathematicians who invented and have been using them. This problem has been outstanding since the early thirties, when it was formulated and addressed for the first time. The thesis includes a historical, expository part, which focuses on the contributions of Kolmogorov, Heyting, Gentzen and Kreisel, and a long and detailed discussion of the various interpretations which have been proposed by these and other authors. Special attention is paid to the decidability of the proof relation and the introduction of Kreisel’s extra-clauses, to the various notions of ‘canonical proof' and to the attempt to reformulate the semantic definition in terms of proofs from premises. In this thesis I include a conclusive argument to the effect that if one wants to withdraw the extra-clauses then one cannot maintain the concept of ‘proof' as the basic concept of the definition; instead, I describe an alternative interpret­ ation based on the concept of a construction ‘performing' the operations indicated by a given sentence, and I show that it is not equivalent to the verificationist interpretation. I point out a redundancy in the internal -pseudo-inductive- structure of Kreisel's interpretation and I propose a way to resolve it. Finally, I develop the interpretation in terms of proofs from premises and show that a precise formulation of it must also make use of non-inductive clauses, not for the definition of the conditional but -surprisingly enough- for the definitions of disjunction and of the existential quantifier. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During the production of this thesis I have received help from various people and institutions, to whom it is only fair that I express here my gratitude. Professor Luis Valdes firmly encouraged me to undertake postgraduate studies in Britain after graduating at the University of Murcia (Spain). His friendly unconditional support since then has been of inestimable value to me these last few years. Dr Colin Howson has been my supervisor since I came to the LSE Philosophy Department. He dealt with me patiently when my English was very far from fluent, and helped me in both academic and bureaucratic matters, always in a friendly and considerate way. Later I had the opportunity of being his teaching assistant for two years, and I learnt a great deal from the experience -both about logic and about teaching itself. He carefully read the final draft of the thesis, and made countless comments, concerning many clarification points as well as substantive issues. 4 Professor Moshe Machover taught me mathematical logic during the academic year 1992/93, and has closely followed my doctoral research since it started. To him I owe numerous suggestions and comments, some of which have played a crucial role in the development of the thesis. He has always being kind and patient to me, and I have learnt from him more than I can possibly express. Something for which I am grateful to these three scholars as well as to Dr Peter Urbach, is the enormous confidence that they have consistently shown in me and my prospects. To me, this has been of the greatest value. In May 1995 I gave a talk on the topic of this thesis at the Staff/Graduate Seminar of the Philosophy Departments of LSE and King’s College London, where I benefited from the questions and comments of several people in the audience. Finally, Dr Andrew Powell generously offered me full assistance while he was still a graduate student -albeit one senior to me, and infinitely much wiser. He read a good deal of my written work, and patiently discussed with me many of the topics of the thesis; when I finished the final draft, he reviewed it carefully and made comments on almost every 5 page. His observations, his criticisms and his illuminating expositions have no doubt made this thesis much better than it would have been otherwise. Moreover, from an early stage he also honoured me with a sincere friendship which I have enjoyed ever since. As for material help, the British Council and Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (Spain) provided full financial support for both the college fees and my living expenses from October 1992 to September 1994 ( Becas CAM-British Council, Convocatoria de 1991). Later, the British Academy awarded me a postgraduate studentship which covered the college fees for the academic years 1994/95 and 1995/96 (Ref. BA94/3021/ LSE); and finally, the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (presently ‘of Education and Culture’) awarded me a research grant which has being covering my living expenses since January 1995 (Ref. FP94 27484804). 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS A b s t r a c t ................................................................................................... 2 A cknowledgements ................... ............................................... 4 C h a p t e r 0. Introduction §0.1. The topic of this thesis and its significance 14 §0.2. Summary of contents 0.2.1. Chapter 1..................................................................... 17 0.2.2. Chapter 2..................................................................... 18 0.2.3. Chapter 3.................................................... 19 0.2.4. The ‘Conclusion' ......................................................... 20 §0.3. Original content of the th esis...................................... 21 §0.4. The intuitionistic ‘ideology' and the study of in- tuitionism today ........................................................................ 25 §0.5. The other main schools of constructive mathe­ matics 0.5.1. The logic of constructive mathematics ................. 27 0.5.2. The status of Markov's principle ................. 27 0.5.3. More on Markov's principle .................................... 29 0.5.4. Conclusion ................................................................... 30 §0.6. Notational conventions and preliminary notions 0.6.1. First-order languages ............................................... 31 0.6.2. Constructive sets ....................................................... 31 0.6.3. Constructive interpretations .................................. 33 0.6.4. More on constructive interpretations .................. 34 7 0.6.5. Constructive interpretations with a non-decid- able domain ............................................................................ 37 0.6.6. Conventions regarding quotations ........................ 38 C h a p t e r l . Th e S e a r c h fo r th e In t e n d e d In t e r ­ p r e t a t io n : E x po sit io n §1.1. Brouwer's use of the logical constants 1.1.1. Introduction ................................................................ 40 1.1.2. Verificationist interpretations: meaning as provability ............................................................................... 41 1.1.3. Verificationist interpretations: meaning as problem-solving ..................................................................... 43 1.1.4. The operational interpretation .............................. 45 1.1.5. The verificationist versus the operational inter­ pretation ................................................................................. 47 1.1.6. The meaning of negation ......................................... 48 1.1.7. Negation and hypothetical constructions ............ 52 1.1.8. The meaning of the conditional ............................. 55 1.1.9. Disjunction, conjunction and ............................. 56 1.1.10. The quantifiers........................................................ 58 §1.2. Kolmogorov's interpretation 1.2.1. An interpretation in terms of mathematical pro­ blems........................................................................................ 61 1.2.2. Kolmogorov and Heyting ......................................... 62 1.2.3. The interpretation of the connectives.................. 63 1.2.4. The interpretation of the quantifiers ................... 65 8 §1.3. Heyting’s interpretation 1.3.1. Introduction ................................................................ 67 1.3.2. The verificationist point of view ............................ 67 1.3.3. Heyting and Kolmogorov ......................................... 70 1.3.4. The interpretation of the connectives .................. 71 1.3.5. The conditional and negation ................................. 73 1.3.6. The
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Arxiv:1803.01386V4 [Math.HO] 25 Jun 2021
    2009 SEKI http://wirth.bplaced.net/seki.html ISSN 1860-5931 arXiv:1803.01386v4 [math.HO] 25 Jun 2021 A Most Interesting Draft for Hilbert and Bernays’ “Grundlagen der Mathematik” that never found its way into any publi- Working-Paper cation, and 2 CVof Gisbert Hasenjaeger Claus-Peter Wirth Dept. of Computer Sci., Saarland Univ., 66123 Saarbrücken, Germany [email protected] SEKI Working-Paper SWP–2017–01 SEKI SEKI is published by the following institutions: German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI GmbH), Germany • Robert Hooke Str.5, D–28359 Bremen • Trippstadter Str. 122, D–67663 Kaiserslautern • Campus D 3 2, D–66123 Saarbrücken Jacobs University Bremen, School of Engineering & Science, Campus Ring 1, D–28759 Bremen, Germany Universität des Saarlandes, FR 6.2 Informatik, Campus, D–66123 Saarbrücken, Germany SEKI Editor: Claus-Peter Wirth E-mail: [email protected] WWW: http://wirth.bplaced.net Please send surface mail exclusively to: DFKI Bremen GmbH Safe and Secure Cognitive Systems Cartesium Enrique Schmidt Str. 5 D–28359 Bremen Germany This SEKI Working-Paper was internally reviewed by: Wilfried Sieg, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Dept. of Philosophy Baker Hall 161, 5000 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15213 E-mail: [email protected] WWW: https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/philosophy/people/faculty/sieg.html A Most Interesting Draft for Hilbert and Bernays’ “Grundlagen der Mathematik” that never found its way into any publication, and two CV of Gisbert Hasenjaeger Claus-Peter Wirth Dept. of Computer Sci., Saarland Univ., 66123 Saarbrücken, Germany [email protected] First Published: March 4, 2018 Thoroughly rev. & largely extd. (title, §§ 2, 3, and 4, CV, Bibliography, &c.): Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • The Proper Explanation of Intuitionistic Logic: on Brouwer's Demonstration
    The proper explanation of intuitionistic logic: on Brouwer’s demonstration of the Bar Theorem Göran Sundholm, Mark van Atten To cite this version: Göran Sundholm, Mark van Atten. The proper explanation of intuitionistic logic: on Brouwer’s demonstration of the Bar Theorem. van Atten, Mark Heinzmann, Gerhard Boldini, Pascal Bourdeau, Michel. One Hundred Years of Intuitionism (1907-2007). The Cerisy Conference, Birkhäuser, pp.60- 77, 2008, 978-3-7643-8652-8. halshs-00791550 HAL Id: halshs-00791550 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00791550 Submitted on 24 Jan 2017 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial| 4.0 International License The proper explanation of intuitionistic logic: on Brouwer’s demonstration of the Bar Theorem Göran Sundholm Philosophical Institute, Leiden University, P.O. Box 2315, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands. [email protected] Mark van Atten SND (CNRS / Paris IV), 1 rue Victor Cousin, 75005 Paris, France. [email protected] Der … geführte Beweis scheint mir aber trotzdem . Basel: Birkhäuser, 2008, 60–77. wegen der in seinem Gedankengange enthaltenen Aussagen Interesse zu besitzen. (Brouwer 1927B, n. 7)1 Brouwer’s demonstration of his Bar Theorem gives rise to provocative ques- tions regarding the proper explanation of the logical connectives within intu- itionistic and constructivist frameworks, respectively, and, more generally, re- garding the role of logic within intuitionism.
    [Show full text]
  • E.W. Beth Als Logicus
    E.W. Beth als logicus ILLC Dissertation Series 2000-04 For further information about ILLC-publications, please contact Institute for Logic, Language and Computation Universiteit van Amsterdam Plantage Muidergracht 24 1018 TV Amsterdam phone: +31-20-525 6051 fax: +31-20-525 5206 e-mail: [email protected] homepage: http://www.illc.uva.nl/ E.W. Beth als logicus Verbeterde electronische versie (2001) van: Academisch Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magni¯cus prof.dr. J.J.M. Franse ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Aula der Universiteit op dinsdag 26 september 2000, te 10.00 uur door Paul van Ulsen geboren te Diemen Promotores: prof.dr. A.S. Troelstra prof.dr. J.F.A.K. van Benthem Faculteit Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Informatica Universiteit van Amsterdam Plantage Muidergracht 24 1018 TV Amsterdam Copyright c 2000 by P. van Ulsen Printed and bound by Print Partners Ipskamp. ISBN: 90{5776{052{5 Ter nagedachtenis aan mijn vader v Inhoudsopgave Dankwoord xi 1 Inleiding 1 2 Levensloop 11 2.1 Beginperiode . 12 2.1.1 Leerjaren . 12 2.1.2 Rijpingsproces . 14 2.2 Universitaire carriere . 21 2.2.1 Benoeming . 21 2.2.2 Geleerde genootschappen . 23 2.2.3 Redacteurschappen . 31 2.2.4 Beth naar Berkeley . 32 2.3 Beth op het hoogtepunt van zijn werk . 33 2.3.1 Instituut voor Grondslagenonderzoek . 33 2.3.2 Oprichting van de Centrale Interfaculteit . 37 2.3.3 Logici en historici aan Beths leiband .
    [Show full text]
  • Intuitionistic Completeness of First-Order Logic with Respect to Uniform Evidence Semantics
    Intuitionistic Completeness of First-Order Logic Robert Constable and Mark Bickford October 15, 2018 Abstract We establish completeness for intuitionistic first-order logic, iFOL, showing that a formula is provable if and only if its embedding into minimal logic, mFOL, is uniformly valid under the Brouwer Heyting Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics, the intended semantics of iFOL and mFOL. Our proof is intuitionistic and provides an effective procedure Prf that converts uniform minimal evidence into a formal first-order proof. We have implemented Prf. Uniform validity is defined using the intersection operator as a universal quantifier over the domain of discourse and atomic predicates. Formulas of iFOL that are uniformly valid are also intuitionistically valid, but not conversely. Our strongest result requires the Fan Theorem; it can also be proved classically by showing that Prf terminates using K¨onig’s Theorem. The fundamental idea behind our completeness theorem is that a single evidence term evd wit- nesses the uniform validity of a minimal logic formula F. Finding even one uniform realizer guarantees validity because Prf(F,evd) builds a first-order proof of F, establishing its uniform validity and providing a purely logical normalized realizer. We establish completeness for iFOL as follows. Friedman showed that iFOL can be embedded in minimal logic (mFOL) by his A-transformation, mapping formula F to F A. If F is uniformly valid, then so is F A, and by our completeness theorem, we can find a proof of F A in minimal logic. Then we intuitionistically prove F from F F alse, i.e. by taking False for A and for ⊥ of mFOL.
    [Show full text]
  • Computability and Analysis: the Legacy of Alan Turing
    Computability and analysis: the legacy of Alan Turing Jeremy Avigad Departments of Philosophy and Mathematical Sciences Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA [email protected] Vasco Brattka Faculty of Computer Science Universit¨at der Bundeswehr M¨unchen, Germany and Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics University of Cape Town, South Africa and Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences Cambridge, United Kingdom [email protected] October 31, 2012 1 Introduction For most of its history, mathematics was algorithmic in nature. The geometric claims in Euclid’s Elements fall into two distinct categories: “problems,” which assert that a construction can be carried out to meet a given specification, and “theorems,” which assert that some property holds of a particular geometric configuration. For example, Proposition 10 of Book I reads “To bisect a given straight line.” Euclid’s “proof” gives the construction, and ends with the (Greek equivalent of) Q.E.F., for quod erat faciendum, or “that which was to be done.” arXiv:1206.3431v2 [math.LO] 30 Oct 2012 Proofs of theorems, in contrast, end with Q.E.D., for quod erat demonstran- dum, or “that which was to be shown”; but even these typically involve the construction of auxiliary geometric objects in order to verify the claim. Similarly, algebra was devoted to developing algorithms for solving equa- tions. This outlook characterized the subject from its origins in ancient Egypt and Babylon, through the ninth century work of al-Khwarizmi, to the solutions to the quadratic and cubic equations in Cardano’s Ars Magna of 1545, and to Lagrange’s study of the quintic in his R´eflexions sur la r´esolution alg´ebrique des ´equations of 1770.
    [Show full text]
  • Abraham Robinson 1918–1974
    NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ABRAHAM ROBINSON 1918–1974 A Biographical Memoir by JOSEPH W. DAUBEN Any opinions expressed in this memoir are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Academy of Sciences. Biographical Memoirs, VOLUME 82 PUBLISHED 2003 BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS WASHINGTON, D.C. Courtesy of Yale University News Bureau ABRAHAM ROBINSON October 6, 1918–April 11, 1974 BY JOSEPH W. DAUBEN Playfulness is an important element in the makeup of a good mathematician. —Abraham Robinson BRAHAM ROBINSON WAS BORN on October 6, 1918, in the A Prussian mining town of Waldenburg (now Walbrzych), Poland.1 His father, Abraham Robinsohn (1878-1918), af- ter a traditional Jewish Talmudic education as a boy went on to study philosophy and literature in Switzerland, where he earned his Ph.D. from the University of Bern in 1909. Following an early career as a journalist and with growing Zionist sympathies, Robinsohn accepted a position in 1912 as secretary to David Wolfson, former president and a lead- ing figure of the World Zionist Organization. When Wolfson died in 1915, Robinsohn became responsible for both the Herzl and Wolfson archives. He also had become increas- ingly involved with the affairs of the Jewish National Fund. In 1916 he married Hedwig Charlotte (Lotte) Bähr (1888- 1949), daughter of a Jewish teacher and herself a teacher. 1Born Abraham Robinsohn, he later changed the spelling of his name to Robinson shortly after his arrival in London at the beginning of World War II. This spelling of his name is used throughout to distinguish Abby Robinson the mathematician from his father of the same name, the senior Robinsohn.
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography
    BIBLIOGRAPHY [1] Abelson, Raziel, 'A Refutation of Mind-Body Identity', Philosophical Studies XXI (1970),85-89. [2] Ackerman, Wilhelm, 'BegrUndung des "tertium non datur" mittels der Hilbert­ schen Theorie der Widerspruchsfreiheit', Mathematische Annalen XCIII (1924), 1-34. [3] Anderson, Alan Ross, ed., Minds and Machines. Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964. [4] Arbib, Michael A., 'Some Comments on Self-Reproducing Automata', in Systems and Computer Science. Edited by John F. Hart and Satoru Takasu. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967. [5] Baird, A. W. S., 'Pascal's Idea of Nature', Isis LXI (1970), 297-320. [6] Becker, Oskar, Beitriige zur phiinomenologischen Begrundung der Geometrie. 2, unveranderte Aufiage, Frieburg: Max Niemeyer, 1973. [7] Becker, Oskar, Mathematische Existenz: Untersuchungen zur Logik und Ontologie mathematischer Phiinomene. Freiburg: Max Niemeyer, Halle a. d. S., 1927. [8] Becker, Oskar, 'Das Symbolische in der Mathematik', in Bliitter fur Deutsche Philosophie. Bd. I, Heft. 4 (1928), 329-348. [9] Becker, Oskar, Die Grundlagen der Mathematik in Geschichtlicher Entwicklung. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1954. [10] Bell, E. T., The Development of Mathematics. New York: McGraw-Hili, 1945. [II] Bell, John, and Machover, Moshe, A Course in Mathematical Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1974. [12] Benacerraf, Paul, 'God, the Devil, and Godel', Monist LI (1967), 9-33. [13] Benacerraf, Paul and Putnam, Hilary, eds., Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Pren­ tice-Hail, 1964. [14] Benda, Miroslav, 'On Strong Axioms of Induction in Set Theory and Arithmetic', in Mathematical Logic in Latin America. Edited by A. Arruda, R.
    [Show full text]
  • PHIL 149 - Special Topics in Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Nonclassical Logic Professor Wesley Holliday Tuth 11-12:30 UC Berkeley, Fall 2018 Dwinelle 88
    PHIL 149 - Special Topics in Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Nonclassical Logic Professor Wesley Holliday TuTh 11-12:30 UC Berkeley, Fall 2018 Dwinelle 88 Syllabus Description A logical and philosophical exploration of alternatives to the classical logic students learn in PHIL 12A. The focus will be on intuitionistic logic, as a challenger to classical logic for reasoning in mathematics, and quantum logic, as a challenger to classical logic for reasoning about the physical world. Prerequisites PHIL 12A or equivalent. Readings All readings will be available on the bCourses site. Requirements { Weekly problem sets, due on Tuesdays in class (45% of grade) { Term paper of around 7-8 pages due December 7 on bCourses (35% of grade) { Final exam on December 12, 8-11am with location TBA (20% of grade) Class, section, and Piazza participation will be taken into account for borderline grades. For graduate students in philosophy, this course satisfies the formal philosophy course requirement. Graduate students should see Professor Holliday about assignments. Sections All enrolled students must attend a weekly discussion section with our GSI, Yifeng Ding, a PhD candidate in the Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science. Contact Prof. Holliday | [email protected] | OHs: TuTh 1-2, 246 Moses Yifeng Ding | [email protected] | OHs: Tu 2-4, 937 Evans Schedule Aug. 23 (Th) Course Overview Reading: none. 1/5 Part I: Review of Classical Logic Aug. 28 (Tu) Review of Classical Natural Deduction Videos: Prof. Holliday’s videos on natural deduction. Aug. 30 (Th) Nonconstructive Proofs Reading: Chapter 1, Section 2 of Constructivism in Mathematics by Anne Sjerp Troelstra and Dirk van Dalen.
    [Show full text]
  • Intuitionistic Logic Dirk Van Dalen
    The Blackwell Guide to Philosophica Logic. Ed. L. Gobble. Blackwell, Oxford. 2001, 224–257. Intuitionistic Logic Dirk van Dalen 1 Basic principles There are basically two ways to view intuitionistic logic: (i) as a philosoph ical–foundational issue in mathematics, (ii) as a technical discipline within mathematical logic. Let us deal with the philosophical aspects first, they will provide the motivation for the subject. In doing so, we will follow L.E.J. Brouwer, the founding father of intuitionism. Brouwer did contribute little to intuitionis- tic logic as we know it from text books and papers, but he pointed the way for his successors. Logic in Brouwer’s intuitionism takes a secondary place, the first place is reserved for mathematics. Mathematics has to be understood in the widest possible sense, it is the constructional mental activity of the individual (for a survey of the Brouwerian global philosophy of man and his mathematical enterprise, see [Dalen 1999]). The role of logic is to note and systematically study certain regularities in the mathematical constructional process. Con- trary to traditional views, logic thus is dependent on mathematics and not vice versa. Mathematical practice has taught us that relatively few logical connec- tives suffice for an efficient treatment of arguments. In the case of intu- itionism, the meaning of the connectives has to be explained in terms of the basic mathematical notion: construction. A fact A is established by means of a construction. An easy example is 3 + 2 = 5, this is established by the following construction: construct 3, construct 2 and compare the outcome with the result of the construction of 5.
    [Show full text]
  • Markov's Principle, Markov's Rule and the Notion Of
    MARKOV'S PRINCIPLE, MARKOV'S RULE AND THE NOTION OF CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF JOAN RAND MOSCHOVAKIS (6/19/2018 FINAL DRAFT, CORRECTED 8/2/2018) 1. Introduction In [34] Georg Kreisel reflected at length on Church's Thesis CT, the principle proposed in 1936 by Alonzo Church ([9]) as a definition: \We now define the notion . of an effectively calculable function of positive integers by identifying it with the notion of a recursive function of positive integers." An equivalent version with \recursive function" replaced by \function computable by a Turing machine" was proposed the same year by Alan Turing. Yiannis Moschovakis ([49]) observes that CT \refers essentially to the natural numbers, and so its truth or falsity depends on what they are." Of course its truth or falsity also depends on what it means for a calculation to be effective, and this question forces a distinction between the constructive and classical meanings of CT. This distinction in turn leads to Markov's Principle MP, which asserts (in its original version) that if a recursive algorithm cannot fail to converge then it converges. In its capacity as a principle of unbounded search, MP refers essentially to the natural numbers so its truth or falsity depends on what they are, and in particular on the fact that ! is the order type of the standard natural numbers. Markov's Principle is not generally accepted by constructive mathematicians. Beeson ([2], p. 47) notes that \. even [Markov and the Russian constructivists] keep careful track of which theorems depend on it and which are proved with- out it." Bishop constructivists accept neither CT nor MP, although their work is consistent with both.
    [Show full text]
  • A Perspective on the Intuitionistic Conception of Truth* Goran Sundholm
    Existence, Proof and Truth-Making: A Perspective on the Intuitionistic Conception of Truth* GOran Sundholm ABSTRACT. Truth-maker analyses construe truth as existence of which can best be seen as an attempt at giving content proof, a well-known example being that offered by Wittgenstein in to the metaphors involved in the so called correspon- the Tractatus. The paper subsumes the intuitionistic view of truth as dence theory of truth, z existence of proof under the general truth-maker scheme. Two generic constraints on truth-maker analysis are noted and positioned with In general, a truth-maker analysis is given in terms respect to the writings of Michael Dummett and the Tractatus. of three items, namely, Examination of the writings of Brouwer, Heyting and Weyl indicates (1) the (category of) truth-bearers A, the specific notions of truth-maker and existence that are at issue in the intuitionistic truth-maker analysis, namely that of proof in the (2) for each object a of the category of truth-bearers, sense of proof-object (Brouwer, Heyting) and existence in the non- a category TM a of truth-makers for A, propositional sense of a judgement abstract (Weyl). Furthermore, possible anticipations in the writings of Schlick and Pf~tnder are and finally, noted. (3) the relevant notion of existence for the category TM A . Leibniz's Satz vom Grunde provides a case in point: A true proposition is one where the predicate is contained in its Michael Dummett writes: subject, or, more generally, whose consequent is contained in its antecedent, and it is therefore necessary that there should be some From an intuitionistic standpoint .
    [Show full text]
  • Kripke Completeness of First-Order Constructive Logics with Strong Negation
    Kripke Completeness of First-Order Constructive Logics with Strong Negation ICHIRO HASUO and RYO KASHIMA, Department of Mathematical and Computing Sciences, Tokyo Institute of Technology, O-okayama, Meguro, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan. E-mail: {hasuo2, kashima}@is.titech.ac.jp Abstract This paper considers Kripke completeness of Nelson’s constructive predicate logic N3 and its several variants. N3 is an extension of intuitionistic predicate logic Int by an contructive negation operator ∼ called strong negation. The variants of N3 in consideration are by omitting the axiom A → (∼A → B), by adding the axiom of constant domain ∀x(A(x) ∨ B) →∀xA(x) ∨ B, by adding (A → B) ∨ (B → A), and by adding ¬¬(A ∨∼A); the last one we would like to call the axiom of potential omniscience and can be interpreted that we can eventually verify or falsify a statement, with proper additional information. The proofs of completeness are by the widely-applicable tree- sequent method; however, for those logics with the axiom of potential omniscience we can hardly go through with a simple application of it. For them we present two different proofs: one is by an embedding of classical logic, and the other by the TSg method, which is an extension of the tree-sequent method. Keywords: Strong Negation, Quantified Constructive Logic, Kripke-type Semantics, Intermediate Logics 1 Introduction 1.1 Strong negation Strong (or constructive) negation, denoted by ∼ in this paper, is a negation operator in constructive logics introduced by Nelson [16], Markov [15], and von Kutschera [29].1 In intuitionistic logic, the negation operator ¬A, which we would like to call Heyt- ing’s negation to make it distinct from the strong one, is an abbreviation for A →⊥, i.e.
    [Show full text]