History as a Mirror: What Does the Demise of Ryukyu Mean for the Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/ Dispute?1

Ching-Chang CHEN* Abstract

The on-going dispute over the ownership of move from calls for putting aside sovereignty the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between differences towards a more inclusive, post- and has often been ridiculed by observers Westphalian bordering practice in . as an unwise struggle for rocks. One must question, however, why so much significance has been attached to those “trivial specks” in Key Words the first place. This paper maintains that the seed of contemporary Sino-Japanese rivalry Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, international cannot be separated from the “expansion” society, non-Western international relations, of European international society, after Ryukyu, Sino-Japanese relations, territorial which China and Japan came to be obsessed dispute. with sovereign independence and territorial integrity. Following the demise of the , Qing Chinese officials realised that Introduction Japan was no longer within the borders of a once-shared civilisation, which prepared the A clutch of eight tiny, uninhabited ground for a series of violent conflicts between islets in the Western Pacific, named them, unusual in their millennium-old, largely the Senkaku Islands by Japan and the peaceful interactions. A sustainable resolution of the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue, then, should Diaoyu Islands by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), recently became one of * Ching-Chang Chen (Ph.D. Aberystwyth) the most headline-making flashpoints in is Associate Professor of International East Asia. Administrated by Japan but Politics at the College of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan. also claimed by China, the ownership He is currently working on a book manuscript dispute further involves competition for that analyses the relationship between threat perception and national identity construction fishery resources, potential oil deposits in post-Cold War . His research also and, indeed, a “reputation for resolve”.2 focuses on the theories and practices of “non- Western” international relations in Asia. Dr. In September 2010, a Chinese trawler Chen’s recent journal articles appeared in Issues collided with a patrol & Studies, Journal of Chinese Political Science, International Relations of the Asia-Pacificand boat in waters near the contested islands; Asian Perspective. to press for the release of the detained

87 PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2014, Volume XIX, Number 1, pp. 87-105. Ching-Chang Chen

captain, Beijing allegedly delayed the Sea.4 The Chinese foreign ministry in export of rare earth metals to Japan.3 April referred to the Diaoyus as a part of Tensions continued to build up during China’s “core interests”, a term normally 2012, which, ironically, marked the 40th associated with Xinjiang, and anniversary of the normalisation of the Taiwan, for the first time.5 diplomatic relationship between these The on-going standoff between two nations. Following ’s naming the world’s second and third largest of some islets early that year, Beijing economies has been a cause of great countered with its own naming amid concern for stakeholders of the region’s then-Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro’s peace and prosperity.6 The United States, statement indicating his intention in particular, is caught in an unwanted to purchase the three larger islets. To situation where it is obliged by treaty prevent the Senkakus from entering to defend territory under Japanese the hands of conservative nationalists administration (which includes the such as Ishihara, the Senkakus, despite Japanese government The on-going standoff between Washington’s proceeded to buy the the world’s second and third avoidance of taking islands from their a stand on their largest economies has been private landlord in sovereignty), while September. Thisa cause of great concern for needing China’s move, in turn, stakeholders of the region’s cooperation on a set in motion a peace and prosperity. wide range of issues series of large- from cyber security scale anti-Japanese to North ’s demonstrations in major Chinese cities, nuclear programmes. On the other hand, a slump in Japanese exports to China and many wonder why Beijing and Tokyo in Chinese tourists to Japan, and frequent have been so obsessed with those “trivial appearance of Chinese petrol vessels and specks”, which are of limited strategic and aircraft in the surrounding waters and economic values. After all, any occupied airspace. With the increasing number islet is easy to invade and virtually of aerial and maritime near-misses, and impossible to defend in war. Moreover, without hotline-like conflict-prevention possession of the Diaoyus/Senkakus mechanisms between them, in January does not represent a key to controlling 2013, Chinese warships were said to the sea; the strategic advantage is at have pointed their fire-control radar at best marginal and can be easily offset a Japanese helicopter and a destroyer by increasing military capabilities and/ in close proximity in the East China or building closer alliances. Likewise,

88 History as a Mirror the size of the Diaoyus/Senkakus means to illuminate why the present Senkaku/ that, even though the islands are used as Diaoyu issue has often been handled by legitimate baselines, they are deemed too hotter heads. small to have any significant impact on To make sense of China’s underactive the Sino-Japanese maritime delimitation response to Japan’s gradual incorporation under the existing international law.7 of Ryukyu in the 1870s, one cannot Since there will be few real interests overlook the absence of compellence to gain but a lot to lose in solving the in Chinese strategic behaviour. In dispute by force, calls for “cooler heads International Relations (IR) jargon, to prevail” in Asia so as not to go to war compellence refers to a specific type “over a rock” have abounded.8 of coercion that threatens to use force But why has so much significance been to make another actor do (or undo) attached to the supposedly negligible some action. The Qing did Diaoyus/Senkakus in the first place? not resort to any military threat to get Beijing’s apparent belligerence over the Meiji government to change course the islands is puzzling, because China at several junctures when the Ryukyu did not resort to coercive diplomacy Kingdom was first reduced to a clan in to prevent the Ryukyu Kingdom from 1872, then prohibited from sending falling under Japan’s full control during embassies to the Qing in 1875, the 1870s. In a retrospective thought and eventually abolished in 1879. Three experiment, a more proactive Chinese possible explanations stand out. First, intervention at that particular juncture from the perspective of the coercion might have altered the island kingdom’s literature,9 compellence was simply not a fate as well as prevented the Senkaku/ credible policy for the declining Qing to Diaoyu issue from becoming an issue adopt in its dealings with a modernising today. To be sure, Ryukyu had been Japan. This materialist view and the under the strict control of the Satsuma mainstream scholarly works on Chinese clan since 1609, but it maintained an strategic culture are complementary, for ambiguous status as a “double tributary both maintain that the pacifist rhetoric state” (ryozoku no kuni) to both Japan and the principle of minimal use of force and China in East Asian international was no more than a temporary measure society; it was not until the kingdom to compensate for China’s material being formally annexed and turned into inferiority.10 Third, in contemporary Prefecture in the late 1870s Chinese nationalist discourse, the “failure that the first border dispute between to act” is attributable to the corruption China and Japan broke out. Systematic and incompetence of late Qing leaders inquiries into this old dispute will help who were unable to comprehend the

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perils China was facing in the age of with Confucian norms, values and .11 While China’s lack of hard practices, not by their relative power power at that time did limit the Qing (including territorial possessions). As court’s ability to effectively respond to such, the legitimacy of this hierarchy the fait accompli in Okinawa, material entailed a credible commitment on the constraints (military capabilities) part of the dominant state not to exploit or strategic ignorance (having no the secondary states.12 Employing knowledge of “realism”) alone are not compellence against Japan over Ryukyu strong explanations and together do not or dividing up the islands with Japan, make the puzzle more intelligible to us. however, would violate this key aspect Careful inquiry into Sino-Japanese of status hierarchy and call into question diplomatic history suggests that top China’s position as the centre within Chinese officials such as Li Hongzhang Confucian cosmology and the assumed (1823-1901) were not unaware of the moral superiority of its leadership. consequences of their passive approach China’s difficulty in establishing clearly to the dispute, which included not defined, exclusive borders enshrined in exploiting Japan’s weakness during the international legal treaties (instead of the Satsuma Rebellion (1877) and not Confucian influence of ritual protocol) acquiring the southern parts of Okinawa at the expense of the secondary states, as offered by Japanese negotiators then, illustrates more about the extent following the US mediation (1879- to which it had been socialised into East 80). Rather than following the logic Asian international society over centuries of consequences that attributes action than how “misguided” or “incompetent” to the anticipated costs and benefits, Qing leaders were in failing to turn various memorials to the by Qing China into a modern, sovereign state. officials reveal that opponents of the partition of Ryukyu (hence “losing” it to As a foundational institution of Japan altogether) were mostly informed East Asian international society, by a logic of appropriateness, concerning the tribute system emphasised whether their actions were considered legitimate in the tribute system. As a a formal hierarchy among its foundational institution of East Asian members. international society, the tribute system emphasised a formal hierarchy among The remainder of this paper is its members. Within this hierarchical divided into three sections. To advance order, China sat highest and subordinate an explanation that does not force states were ranked by their proficiency China and other regional actors into a

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Eurocentric straitjacket, the first section convincing that East Asian countries revisits the constitutional structures and managed to maintain their “long peace” institutions of East Asian international without resorting to any sophisticated society before the arrival of the Western institutions but chance, or that the powers, examining how they informed impressive stability simply reflected the the members’ identities and interests. power asymmetry between China and its Using primary Chinese sources, the neighbours.14 second section retraces how Qing As Suzuki Shogo has indicated, the officials had debated various options constitutional structures of East Asian and how Li Hongzhang’s argument that international society involved three China’s reaction should not “start with normative dimensions: the “moral a just cause but end up with satisfying purpose of the state” (the reasons for self-interest” (yishi lizhong) prevailed. establishing a political entity to serve the The concluding section discusses the common good), the “organising principle implications of this study for the of sovereignty” (which legitimises the notion of international society and for entity’s possession of sovereignty) and understanding contemporary territorial disputes in East Asia. the “norm of procedural justice” (the implementation of the above principles must also follow certain procedures).15 In International Society Outside the case of European international society, Europe: The Case of East a legitimate state was expected to enable Asia its citizens to pursue their individual happiness and achieve their potential. As Unlike Martin Wight’s famous a result, the state’s internal affairs were to categorisation of the Sinocentric world be free from foreign intervention so long order as the product of a “suzerain system” as it commanded popular support. The rather than of an international societ,13 principle of sovereign equality, in turn, the term “East Asian international was safeguarded through legislation society” has been consciously employed (i.e. legislative justice) and embodied in throughout this research to avoid the institutions such as positive international implication that only Europeans were law and diplomacy. By contrast, the capable of addressing the anarchy “moral purpose of the state” in East Asian problem but East Asians were not. international society was to promote Given that there were only two major social and cosmic harmony. Such wars in this part of the world from the harmony was maintained when member founding of the (1368) states could conform to their “rightful” to the Opium War (1839-42), it is not positions within this hierarchical society.

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The principle of sovereign hierarchy own alternative, non-Sinocentric tribute meant that states (both suzerains and system.17 vassals) had to perform appropriate Confucian rituals to acknowledge their The extinguishment of the relative positions (i.e. ritual justice) if Ryukyu Kingdom can be seen as their legitimacy was to be respected, which led to the creation of the tribute a first step of such internal change system as the fundamental institution. that prepared the ground for the Paying tribute to the suzerain, then, was region-wide adoption of norms more than a bribe to “buy” security; the and institutions originated in participating states’ identities (and hence European international society. their interests) were inevitably shaped by their entering into tributary relations.16 What was the underlying logic that Three interrelated points follow the informed the functioning of East Asian above discussion. First, in principle, international society? “Civilisation” it was possible for a foreign people (yi seems to be a useful keyword here.18 or “barbarians”) to become a member According to D.R. Howland, Chinese of East Asian international society or conceptions of civilisation consisted of even part of the “middle kingdom” or three elements.19 First, wenming literally virtuous state (hwa), provided that they meant a desired state of human society participated in the totality of Confucian made luminous (ming) through writing civilisation- food, dress, language, or “patterning” (wen); when all was in rituals and so on- beyond their symbolic harmony in the world, there was no need participation in tributary protocol. to resort to military subjugation (wugong) Second, while member states competed and the world was wenming. This ideal for the highest possible positions in the stage was possible because of the highest society, a state would run the risk of virtue exhibited by the emperor (“Son being “downgraded” or even losing its of Heaven”, who was supposed to have membership should it fail to perform the direct access to the will of the heavenly necessary rituals pertinent to its place in bodies) following the examples provided the hierarchical order. Third, although by history and the classics. Second, to China normally took on the role of the the extent that a man could pattern “middle kingdom” at the apex of that his behaviour in accordance with the order, it was also possible for other states expectations of the Confucian texts, to assert their “superior” moral status submitting to his rightful lord (jun) in and demonstrate their ability to promote particular (e.g. ruler-servant, father-son, social harmony by constructing their etc.) he too was wenming or “civilising”.

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Civilisation, then, ultimately signified was founded upon the principle of a a “spatially expansive and ideologically tributary relationship sustainable for over a thousand years, it is difficult to infinite” process of Chinese imperial assume that its demise could be brought lordship.20 Third, based on the idea of about by a single event, such as the proximity (jin) that connects space to Opium War… Rather, it is conceivably more acceptable to view it as a demise morality, humankind would approximate that was caused by internal change moral behaviour in proportion to within the tribute system itself. their proximity to the emperor, whose In this regard, the extinguishment of benevolent rule could bring the people the Ryukyu Kingdom can be seen as a close and cherish them. Accordingly, a first step of such internal change that concentric and hierarchical world order prepared the ground for the region- emerged with the emperor at the centre; wide adoption of norms and institutions the civilisational realm was instantiated originated in European international by various regional bureaucratic offices, society. The next section will illustrate by the voyages of imperial envoys to and this change, a change which led to rising from the capital, and by those outside Sino-Japanese rivalry in the following peoples who responded to the imperial decades. virtue by sending tribute missions to the court. Tributary relations thus represented an act of reciprocity through Extinguishment of the which outsiders accepted the nominal Ryukyu Kingdom and lordship of the Son of Heaven and his China’s Response calendar; on the other hand, the foreign lord received Chinese investiture as With the expansion of European legitimate ruler of his domain. international society in the 19th century China’s response to Japan’s and Japan’s decision to be recognised as incorporation of Ryukyu during a qualified member of that society for the 1870s cannot be adequately the sake of its survival, the existence of analysed without understanding the tributary states in East Asia following aforementioned norms and institutions. ritualistic, hierarchical Confucian As Hamashita Takeshi has noted, it norms also became increasingly hard to would be remiss if one too readily tolerate in the eyes of the Meiji leaders assumes that East Asian international and intellectuals alike. Now ritualistic society collapsed completely soon after procedural norms of the East were to be the intrusion of the Western powers:21 replaced by legal procedural norms of Considering the fact that the history the West. As a result, tributary states had of East Asian international relations to either turn themselves into sovereign

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independent states or be absorbed by was abolished, and the islands such sovereign entities. came under the administration of Japan’s The Ryukyu Kingdom’s ambiguous home ministry. status as a part of Japan and China’s The crisis escalated into a Sino- , then, looked rather Japanese diplomatic dispute after embarrassing and even dangerous for the Chinese officials received petitions from Meiji government. As Suzuki puts it:22 Ryukyuan secret envoys in 1877. Seen The Ryukyu Kingdom’s participation from their memorials to the court, it in the Tribute System could potentially is hard to sustain the charge that these highlight Japan’s inability to conform officials were completely ignorant of the [to] international law, and consequently its lack of commitment to fully join geopolitical/geostrategic implications the international order as defined by of the demise of this tributary state or European International Society. This incapable of formulating feasible policy would, in turn, jeopardize Japan’s quest to attain the status of a “civilized” power options. Viceroy of - and as defined by the members of European Fuzhou general He Jing, for instance, International Society. did not consider Ryukyu in itself crucial Japan’s move to abolish the kingdom to the defence of China’s periphery, but was therefore as much a realist act of he was aware of the consequences of securing its southern periphery as a failing to protect the islands from foreign political demonstration of underscoring intrusions. He thus suggested that the its commitment to attaining international Qing court should take advantage of the recognition as a qualified member of the Satsuma Rebellion and apply diplomatic European society of states.23 The move pressure on the Meiji government to was an incremental one. In 1872, the deal with the dispute in accordance with Ryukyu king Sho Tai received investiture international law.25 Diplomat Huang as “lord of the Ryukyu fief”, and the Zunxian warned in “On the kingdom’s treaty and diplomatic matters [Ryukyu] Affairs” (“Lun liu shi shu”) that were henceforth taken over by Japan’s tolerating Japan at that time amounted foreign ministry. This was followed by to “feeding a tiger which China can Japan’s success in getting China to admit no longer rein in”: “given Liuqiu’s that the former’s 1874 expedition to proximity to Taiwan, it would not be punish “Taiwanese savages” was a “just possible to maintain even one peaceful act” to redress the murdering of Japanese night in Taiwan and should citizens.24 Then, in 1875, the kingdom Japan establish exclusive control over was prohibited from sending tributary Liuqiu, turn it into a prefecture, train its envoys to, and receiving investiture soldiers and arm them to harass China’s from, China, its trading mission in periphery”.26

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The Chinese minister to Japan He Meiji government 100,000 rifle bullets Ruzhang predicted that the Japanese made by the Tianjin Arsenal had his would not only prevent Ryukyu from purpose been simply to appease Tokyo sending tribute but also seek to eliminate or to prevent Japan from leaning towards the kingdom, and after that they would Russia. Despite the Qing officials’ turn to Korea. To pre-empt Japan’s increasing realisation that Meiji leaders expansion, He presented three options would only yield to international law to the court: his first and best solution (a hallmark of European international was to dispatch warships to demand society) or superior military might (a Ryukyu’s resumption of tribute missions necessary instrument for any “civilised” while negotiating with Japan. The state in the age of imperialism), Li second was that, when persuasion failed, apparently believed that the offer was China could support Ryukyu’s armed what “ought to be done” for China’s resistance with auxiliary troops should harmonious intercourse with Japan Japan use force against the Ryukyuans. (jiaoji zhong yinyozhiyi).29 The third resorted to international law, inviting Western diplomats to condemn the Japanese government.27 He Ruzhang The article that gave Japan admitted that China was not in good shape preferential treatment was not to use force, but he still recommended the same as that which had the first two options as “Japan’s recent allowed China’s unequal treaties situation [the Satsuma Rebellion] was with the Western powers in 28 even worse than ours”. Although the the 19th century- it required Zongli yamen ’s (International Office) Japan to give China equivalent subsequent decision not to engage in treatment as well. coercive diplomacy against Japan could not be separated from China’s concurrent dispute with Russia in Xinjiang, concerns That Chinese leaders started using the over the northwestern border were not language of Western international law yet the only reason for the Qing’s forgoing continued to embrace the constitutional of this rare “window of opportunity”; structures of East Asian international indeed, they might not even have been society cannot be overlooked in a letter the strongest one. Viceroy of Zhili and of understanding to Shishido Tamaki, minister of Beiyang Li Hongzhang, then Japanese minister to China, by one of the most influential officials in Prince Gong (who headed the Zongli charge of Qing diplomacy, would not yamen) in 1879, which emphasised the have felt the need to offer the embattled significance of Sino-Ryukyuan tributary

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relations and Chinese investiture while “systemic norm of procedural justice” in acknowledging the Ryukyu Kingdom’s favour of legislative justice grounded in status as a “double tributary state”.30 The positive international law. letter repeatedly stressed that Ryukyu The turning point for this dialogue was a part of China and recognised as of the deaf came when former US an independent state by all countries President Ulysses Simpson Grant was (Liuqiu jiwei Zhongguo bin geguo renqi visiting China and Japan in mid-1879. ziwei yiguo); the abolishment of the Grant agreed to mediate the dispute at kingdom might have thus breached the request of Li Hongzhang and Prince Article 1 of the Sino-Japanese friendship Gong, and offered a proposal with treaty (which stipulated that their American diplomats in Japan as a basis respective territories should be “treated for negotiation. The proposal suggested 31 with propriety”) and international law. dividing the into three Moreover, as a “weak and small” double parts:32 the central tributary state, Price part would belong to Gong lamented, the This shocking experience does the residual Ryukyu Ryukyu Kingdom not mean that Chinese strategic Kingdom protected should have been behaviour would remain largely by Chinese and protected rather shaped by the rules and norms of Japanese consuls, than swallowed up East Asian international society the southern part by Japan (which when facing further challenges would belong to went against the from Japan. China, being close “moral purpose to Taiwan, and the of the state”, i.e. northern part would promoting cosmic harmony, in East belong to Japan, being close to Satsuma Asian international society). Shishido (). The Japanese government countered that it was not possible for agreed to come to the negotiating table, the islanders to be subjects of Japan and but demanded that China recognise China at the same time. Furthermore, that the Okinawa main island and the islands could only be an independent the above belonged to Japan (Miyako state or part of such a state; the two and would belong to possibilities were mutually exclusive. China, as proposed by Grant) and that By rebuffing the relevance of Chinese the 1871 Treaty of Trade and Friendship investiture and declaring the abolition of be revised to allow Japan to enjoy the the “fief” as a domestic issue based on privileges granted to the Western powers, Japan’s effective control over the islands, especially inland trade. Considering that Shishido thus rejected ritual justice as the this compromise could help preserve

96 History as a Mirror the kingdom and avoid pushing Japan main points to support his claim that to the Russian side (with which Beijing the conclusion of the Ryukyu question was also trying to conclude a border should be “postponed” (yandang):35 dispute in Xinjiang), the Zongli yamen First, the Ryukyuan elite would not signed an agreement with Shishido be willing to re-establish the kingdom Tamaki in October 1880. However, due in Miyako and Yaeyama, which were to Li Hongzhang’s objection at the last relatively impoverished (and historically minute, the agreement was never ratified peripheral). If so, it would be too and was forfeited in January 1881. expensive for China to administer and Whether the legal status of Ryukyu was station troops on these remote islands. settled or not remains a contentious In addition to this, he argued, granting issue between China and Japan today, Japan rights to inland trade would not be but one thing is certain: the familiar in China’s interest. dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands On the surface, Li seemed to have that has plagued Sino-Japanese relations based his case on the costs and benefits for decades would not have become an of not ratifying the agreement. Under issue as it is now had the 1880 agreement scrutiny, however, his calculation was not been ratified. driven by pure material interests. In fact, Why did Li oppose (and effectively the article that gave Japan preferential block) the deal? Contemporary Chinese treatment was not the same as that historians have indicated that the progress which had allowed China’s unequal in the concurrent negotiation with treaties with the Western powers in the Russia led him to conclude that China 19th century- it required Japan to give should not make such a big concession China equivalent treatment as well.36 to Japan over the Ryukyu question.33 Like He Jing and Huang Zunxian, Li Some suspect that “inter-agency rivalry” was also keenly aware that abandoning had also played a part, for Li was in those “impoverished” islands to the charge of the signing of the 1871 treaty Japanese or Westerners would lead them but was not involved in the Zongli to control China’s Pacific choke points yamen’s negotiation with the Japanese (e wo taipingyang yanhou, yifei Zhongguo delegation over revision of the treaty.34 zhili); the consequences of doing This personal issue aside, Li still needed nothing clearly outweighed the costs of to make his case compelling enough administering the islands. Furthermore, for the Qing court. The question, then, Li must have recognised that time was is what kind of concession was too big running out for China as the Japanese to make for the Chinese leaders? In his fait accompli had continued to take root memorial to the emperor, Li made two in Okinawa ever since He Ruzhang’s call

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for coercive diplomacy. A wise statesman surface, however, Ryukyu had been would have reaped what was left on the forced by Japan, an “outlier” of the negotiating table. To make sense of Li’s family who had not come back to puzzling (in)action, one must understand see China for a long time, to pay that his inclination against yishi lizhong a “protection fee”. With his newly (i.e. China’s response to the annexation developed muscles trained in Europe, of Ryukyu should not “start with a just one day Japan broke into Ryukyu’s cause but end up with satisfying self- house and threatened to take Ryukyu’s interest”) was more a result of China’s property and life. Astonished, China century-old socialisation into East Asian tried to stop Japan but found that there international society than a Confucian was little he could do, not necessarily pretence. Likewise, his reluctance to allow because he was not able to fight Japan Japan to enjoy the same benefits granted but more because the use of force would to the Western powers (liyi junzhan) expose his failure to keep the family in was not so much that he was worried harmony. China had almost agreed with about Japanese economic penetration his American neighbour’s suggestion to into China’s inland (after all, it would divide Ryukyu’s property with Japan have been hard, in 1880, to foresee in order to keep Ryukyu alive; in the Japan’s emergence as a world economic end, China chose to accept Ryukyu’s powerhouse) but rather that treating death, for the proposed solution would Japan like a Western country would not inevitably undermine his moral authority reflect its supposed place in East Asian as the father at home. This shocking international society (hence disrupting experience does not mean that Chinese the society’s organising principle). strategic behaviour would remain largely Indeed, as Howland has noted, the Treaty shaped by the rules and norms of East of Trade and Friendship itself revealed Asian international society when facing how Japan was placed in an ambivalent further challenges from Japan. Rather, position in the eyes of Chinese leaders Qing officials learned from the Ryukyu during the 1870s, which was “neither as fiasco that the normative restraints that distant and different as the Westerners, had sustained the order of East Asian nor as close and commensurate as international society for centuries should 37 China’s dependencies”. no longer be applied to “treacherous” Imagine China assuming the role of Japan, now an outsider. This was father in the East Asian family. Ryukyu, evident in diplomat Yao Wendong’s like Korea, was highly regarded within assignment to compile a study of the the family for his filial behaviour and upon the arrival of resemblance to the father. Under the the second Chinese minister to Japan

98 History as a Mirror in 1882. Despite his popularity among that was not supposed to abuse those the major poetry societies in Tokyo and in the lower ranks. On the other hand, his ability to communicate with his criticising Qing leaders for failing to hosts outside of “brushtalking” (writing defend China’s “national interest” as or Kanbun, which was seen through a modern, nationalist lens understandable to educated Japanese), is both anachronistic and complicit in Yao never referred to Japan as a country justifying the “expansion” of European sharing a common civilisation (tong wen international society that subjected zhi guo) and completed The Military millions of colonial peoples in Asia and Essentials of Japanese Geography (Riben elsewhere to misery.39 dili bingyao) with the express purpose to Second, against an old myth in IR that enable China’s military preparations “in treats the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as case of some unexpected emergency”.38 the emergence of an international society In this sense, the path leading to the that removed the problem of religious Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) over Korea conflict and affirmed a commitment to had already been paved at the time when peaceful coexistence among sovereign China “lost” Ryukyu as a member of states, this study adds to recent challenges East Asian international society. to the “Westphalian narrative” which naturalises the Eurocentric conception Theoretical and Policy of international society while equating Implications other forms of arrangement outside of Europe with political disorder and The theoretical and policy implications religious intolerance.40 Considering that of this analysis are four-fold. First of all, East Asian states had maintained largely it shows that the failure to “get China peaceful relations among themselves for right” often has to do with the taken- centuries until they were forced to enter for-granted assumptions that concepts into European international society, and theories derived from the European intellectual production in IR needs to states-system and Western experiences re-imagine the notion of international are valid across time and space and can society that has thus far been too narrowly be readily applied to East Asia. However, defined by mainstream theories, in order inquiry into the “loss” of Ryukyu to accommodate diverse needs and voices indicates that China’s strategic behaviour in a globalising world.41 This should not was constrained as much by its limited lead us to a nativist intervention boasting military capabilities as by its normative that East Asian international society was self-expectation as the paternal figure superior than the European one (power of the concentric East Asian “family” relations still existed between China and

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its neighbours, for instance); rather, the presenting “tribute”);44 in return, the point is that it is imperative for Asians Taiwanese were granted generous trade and other Third World peoples to privileges as gifts from Beijing (the “son recognise and reclaim their role as co- of heaven”). Since secondary political inventors of international society. entities historically enjoyed immense latitude within the tributary order regarding their economic, cultural and It is time to reconsider Asian even military affairs, this perspective territorial disputes such as this as helps to understand why Chinese leaders a structural problem of human formulated the “one country, two history wherein no victor can systems” proposal in dealing with Taiwan emerge without addressing the in the way they did (which precludes consequences of imposing one Beijing from exerting domestic control particular type of international over the island), and why they have been society on another. willing to entertain issues pertaining to Taiwan’s “international space” so long as Third, if the arrival of Western powers Taipei adheres to the “1992 consensus”. only added the Westphalian states- Finally, since the members of East system onto the tribute system rather Asian international society were than replacing the latter altogether informed by a worldview different as Hamashita has indicated,42 it is of from that of the West, as well as what academic interest and policy importance counts as valid representations of their to explore the conditions under which world, the diplomatic problems Asian contemporary East Asian states’ countries experienced in their dealings behaviour may be shaped by the residual with the Western powers and between rules and norms of the century-old themselves in the second half of the tribute system alongside the Westphalian 19th century were not simply outcomes states-system.43 For example, the of a “power transition” as described in conclusion of an FTA-like economic the realist literature; indeed, they were agreement between the PRC and Taiwan inherently problems of knowledge and in June 2010 can be understood as the representations. As Howland points out, island’s increasing incorporation into the earliest Chinese diplomats to Japan the Sinocentric cosmology. Hierarchical had hoped to mingle with like-minded relations were confirmed when Taiwan (a Confucian gentry upon their arrival; “vassal state”) submitted to the paternal far from being a tong wen zhi guo (a Chinese state (a “suzerain”) by upholding country sharing common civilisation), the so-called “1992 consensus” (i.e. by the 1880s their perception was that

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Japan had deeply inundated itself with desirable for China and Japan) that can Western ideas and things, hence turning help reconcile the two countries without itself into a rival more on the side of identifying a common enemy (e.g. pre- the Western powers than on the side 1945 pan-Asianism that treated the 45 of Confucian civilisation. While the West as an evil, and ultimately inferior, current IR literature on Sino-Japanese Other). Nevertheless, it seems fair to relations tends to focus on either “power” conclude that the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue or “interest”, this study has illustrated is not a uniquely Chinese or Japanese how the Ryukyu debacle paved the way problem. Rather, it is time to reconsider for transforming Chinese perceptions of Japan, or, to put it another way, the Asian territorial disputes such as this as borders of a once-shared civilisation. In a structural problem of human history the early 21st century, it is no easy task to wherein no victor can emerge without conceive an alternative, more inclusive addressing the consequences of imposing bordering practice (another “1992 one particular type of international consensus” may be neither feasible nor society on another.

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Endnotes

1 Surnames precede given names for all East Asian individuals in the main text. Portions of this research had appeared in a 2011 symposium proceedings edited by the Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University, Japan. Special thanks go to Pınar Bilgin and L.H.M. Ling for their warm invitation to the SAM conference in Ankara, and to Hitomi Koyama, L.H.M. Ling and Ming Wan for their valuable comments on an earlier draft. The author also would like to acknowledge generous financial support from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University Academic Research Subsidy. 2 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966, p. 124. 3 For an alternative interpretation of the incident as Japan’s strategic outmanoeuvring over China, see, Linus Hagström, “Power Shift’ in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Incident in 2010”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 2012), pp. 267-297. 4 The Sino-Japanese relationship was so tense that some media described the two countries as being on the brink of war. “Dangerous Shoal”, Economist, 19 January 2013. 5 Taiwan itself is a claimant of the Diaoyus, but it has refused to form a united front with the PRC against Japan and its approach to the island dispute has been much less confrontational. The Chinese foreign ministry later modified the record of its press conference, broadly defining China’s “core interests” as anything concerning state sovereignty, national security and territorial integrity, and that “the Diaoyu issue is related to the Chinese sovereignty”. Mainichi Shimbun, 26 April 2013. Beijing proceeded to include the islands into its self- declared East Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in November 2013. 6 At present China is Japan’s largest export destination, whereas Japan is China’s second largest trading partner and a major foreign investor. 7 Given the discrepancy in the length of the relevant parts of China’s mainland coasts and the much shorter coasts around the disputed islands, an equitable boundary between Chinese coasts and the islands would not be equidistant. That is to say, the boundary between the disputed zones around the Senkakus and China’s costal zones would have to be drawn much closer to the islands. In the Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Delimitation Agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin (2000), for instance, the Vietnamese-held Cat Long Vi Island is larger than the Senkakus and has several hundred inhabitants, but it only possesses an (EEZ) of 15 nautical miles (including 12 nautical miles of territorial sea). 8 The remarks come from Kurt Campbell, then-assistant secretary of state in the Obama administration, and an unnamed senior US military official, respectively. “Political Climates in Japan and China Ratchet Up Island Dispute”, Washington Post, 25 January 2013; “Protesting Too Much”, Economist, 22 September 2012.

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9 Schelling’s Arms and Influence remains a classic. See also, Thomas J. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011. 10 See, for example, Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995; Yuan-kang Wang, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 186-188. 11 Qifu Guo, Wuwang guochi: Zaichuang huihaung (Never Forget National Humiliation: Recreating the Glory), Wuhan, Wuhan University Press, 1996, p. 126. 12 David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute, New York, Columbia University Press, 2010. 13 Martin Wight, Power Politics, 2nd edition, Harmondsworth, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1979. 14 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 234. 15 Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society, London, Routledge, 2009, pp. 34-35. 16 Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, p. 234. 17 Takeshi Hamashita, Choko sisutemu to kindai Ajia (The Tribute System and Modern Asia), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1997; Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, pp. 43-49. 18 Recall Wight’s argument that all known states-systems emerged among peoples who considered themselves belonging to the same civilisation, which, in turn, differentiated them from other less “advanced” peoples. See, Martin Wight, Systems of States, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, chapter 1. 19 Douglas R. Howland, Borders of Chinese Civilization: Geography and History at Empire’s End, Durham, Duke University Press, 1996, pp. 13-15. 20 Ibid, p. 14. This seems to echo the Eliasian theme that civilisation is a process rather than a condition. See, Andrew Linklater, “Violence and Civilisation in the Western States- Systems”, paper presented at the symposium on, The English School Today: Order, Justice, and Multiculturalism, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan, 26 March 2012. 21 Hamashita, Choko sisutemu to kindai Ajia, pp. 8-9. 22 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, p. 155. 23 Ibid, p. 156.

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24 In 1871, 54 Ryukyuans were murdered by a native tribe (Mudanshe in Chinese or Botansha in Japanese) following their shipwreck on southern Taiwan. The survivors were rescued by local Chinese officials and escorted to the Ryukyuan trading mission in Fuzhou in 1872. From the perspective of international law, it was a misstep indeed for China to admit that the Ryukyuans were Japanese citizens; nevertheless, admitting Japan’s effective governance over Ryukyu did not necessarily imply that China henceforth had lost Ryukyu as a vassal as far as their tributary relations were concerned. Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, pp. 158-159. 25 Qing guangxuchao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao, Vol. 1, p. 21. 26 Li Wenzhong gong (Hongzhang) quan ji, yishu hangao, Vol. 8, pp. 3-4. 27 Chia-bin Liang, “Liuqiu wangguo zhongri zhengchi kaoshi (An Inquiry of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Extinguishment of the Ryukyu Kingdom)”, in Executive Committee for the Promotion of Chinese Culture Renaissance, Zhongguo jindai xiandaishi lunji, Vol. 15, Taipei, Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1986, pp. 115-117. 28 Ibid. 29 Li Wenzhong gong (Hongzhang) quan ji, yishu hangao, Vol. 7, pp. 3-4. 30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nippon gaiko bunsho, Vol. 12, pp. 178-179. 31 Ibid. 32 Qingji waijiao shiliao, Vol. 16, p. 21. 33 Yuanhua Shi, Jindai Zhongguo zhoubian waijiao shilun, Shanghai, Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2006, p. 272. 34 Liang, “Liuqiu wangguo zhongri zhengchi kaoshi,” pp. 143, 145-146. 35 Qing guangxuchao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao, Vol. 2, pp. 15-17. 36 Ibid, pp. 9-10. 37 Howland, Borders of Chinese Civilization, p. 35. 38 Ibid, p. 233. 39 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, The Expansion of International Society, Oxford, Clarendon, 1984. 40 For a penetrating critique, see, Turan Kayaoglu, “Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory”, International Studies Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 193-217. 41 Pınar Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 5-23; Anna M. Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling, Transforming World Politics: From Empire To Multiple Worlds, London, Routledge, 2009; Ching-Chang Chen, “The Absence of Non-Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.

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11, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 1-23; and L.H.M. Ling, The Dao of World Politics: Towards a Post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations, London, Routledge, 2013. 42 Hamashita, Choko sisutemu to kindai Ajia. 43 Regarding the consequences of institutional isomorphism and the internationalisation of norms, even conventional constructivists would agree that if states look alike it does not necessarily mean that they act alike. See, Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism”, in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 170. 44 The “1992 consensus” refers to a modus operandi under which Taipei neither openly challenges Beijing’s “One China Principle” (there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it) nor accepts the latter’s definition of China (PRC). As such, Chinese leaders would not have demanded the “1992 consensus” as the foundation of cross-Strait exchanges had their mind- set been fully and only under the influence of Westphalian norms. 45 Howland, Borders of Chinese Civilization, chapter 6.

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