UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM
Department of Sociology
August 2016
POLITICAL TRANSNATIO NALISM AND GREEK IMMIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN IMMIGRANTS WHO SETTLED IN THE NETHERLANDS BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 AND NEWCOMERS
Supervisors: Andrikopoulos Apostolos/Rozakou Katerina
Student: Sklia Evangelia
Student number: 11138009
Master Program: “Migration and Ethnic Studies”, 2015 – 2016
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ΠΊΝΑΚΑΣ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΈΝΩΝ
INTRODUCTION ...... 4 1) THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ...... 5 1.1Transnationalism as an Analytical Framewor…………………………………...5 1.2Political Transnationalism and the Nation-State ...... 7 1.3Political transnationalism: The Persistence of the Nation-State ...... 9 1.4Political Transnationalism and Citizenship ...... 13 1.5Political Transnationalism and the Persistence of Traditional Citizenship ...... 15 2) GREEK IMMIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS ...... 17 2.1 Introduction ...... 17 2.2 Greek Immigrants in the Netherlands ...... 18 2.3 The Dutch Context ...... 20 2.4 The Greek Context ...... 24 2.5 Research questions ...... 30 3) DATA, METHODS, LIMITATIONS ...... 33 3.1 Data and Methods...... 33 3.2 Strengths and limitations ...... 36 4) FINDINGS ...... 38 4.1 Home-town associations ...... 38 4.2 SENDING CONTEXT ...... 46 4.2a. Determinants, emotions and political behavior – Newcomers ...... 46 4.2b. Determinants, emotions and political behavior – Immigrants who settled in the Netherlands before the financial crisis of 2008...... 55 4.3 RECEIVING CONTEXT ...... 58 4.3a. Emotions about the host-society and political behavior – Newcomers ...... 58 4.3b. Emotions about the host-society and political behavior – Immigrants, who settled in the Netherlands before the financial crisis of 2008 ...... 65 4.4 POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM ...... 67 4.4a. Newcomers ...... 67 4.4b. Immigrants, who settled in the Netherlands before the financial crisis of 2008...... 70 5. DISCUSSION ...... 72 6. CONCLUSION ...... 75
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REFERENCES ...... 76
Abstract:
This thesis aims to examine the potential of Greek expatriates in the Netherlands to develop and maintain regular transnational political linkages with their country of origin. Two main sub-groups of immigrants were taken as a point of reference; those, who settled in the Netherlands before the financial crisis of 2008 and newcomers. We expect that differentiation between them –in terms of socio- economic status, determinants of emigration and position in the host-country- will affect their motivations to engage with transnational politics. The findings suggest that newcomers are more likely to sustain recurrent and ongoing political ties with their home-country. Yet, the majority of them are reluctant to engage with Greek political affairs mainly due to lack of resources and disappointment with the current political regime. On the other hand, “old” immigrants either do not participate in the transnational public sphere, or get involved only with occasional, intermittent political activities. According to Waldinger, “moving to a territory of a different state yields political detachment, diminishing awareness and suppressing interest.
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INTRODUCTION
The classical theory of transnationalism suggests that the core-periphery structure of the international system of the nation-states has resulted in the emergence of a specific category of migrants, i.e. the “trans-migrants”. Until recently, immigrants were either “sojourners”, or permanent residents of the host-country. Precarious working and living conditions in the modern economies lead to the development of transnational social spaces, where marginalized migrating populations resort, in order to buffer the effects of their exclusion in both sending and destination countries. According to the transnational approach, orthodox assimilation theories could no longer explain the phenomenon of migration, since they took a container model of society as a given. Yet, studies have shown that it is not the marginalized, excluded immigrants who engage with transnational political activities, but rather well- educated and longer residents of the host-society. Additionally, the transformational potential of transnationalism is rather limited, since in the post-industrial era the nation-state is more powerful than ever. Domestic politics in the sending country and “political opportunities” in the host country influence a great deal immigrants’ incentives to involve with transnationalism. Will the financial crisis of 2008 affect Greek immigrants’ motivations to engage with transnational politics? By taking as a frame of reference the Greek economic recession, we do not suggest that the creation of transnational political fields depend solely upon nation-states; we rather intend to illustrate the manner, in which the differentiation between “old” and “new” immigrants results in differentiated objectives, with regard to the development of transnational political ties.
In the first section, we report on the main theoretical approaches on political transnationalism. In the second section, we report on the history of the Greek migration in the Netherlands. Different determinants of emigration are more likely to result in differentiated perspectives, with respect to transnational engagement. We also explore social and political conditions in both sending and receiving contexts. Position in both home- and host-societies largely influences immigrants’ prospects. Next, following theory and contextual factors, we form our research questions. In the third section, we mention the methodology we used, in order to carry out this
4 research. In the fourth section, we present the findings. Discussion and conclusion are included in the fifth and sixth section accordingly.
1) THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
1.1 Transnationalism as an Analytical Framework
The concept of immigrant transnationalism entered the literature in 1992 by Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, who contended that the emergence of transnational social fields, transcending the nation-states’ boundaries, represented a break with the past. Until then, immigrants were supposed to belong either to the country of origin or to the country of settlement. Orthodox theoretical schemas of immigration, such as push-pull and assimilation theories, were based on the assumption that the world is divided into externally bounded and internally homogeneous sovereign national polities, wherein immigrants are eventually expected to assimilate or acculturate, severing ties with their country of origin. In other words, they were either to preserve their own cultural traits and political loyalties - but prepare their return to the country of origin - or settle for good, by adopting a new national identity. Integration thus into the dominant socio-cultural and economic systems of the receiving society, was considered to be incompatible with migrants’ transnational engagement.
Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton argued that conceptualizations, such as assimilation, were dominated by the notion of “methodological nationalism”, i.e. a nationalist framework that equates the study of society with the analysis of nation- states. Social science has taken for granted that “nation-states constitute the container of society and the boundary of sociology…,research has come to focus on ‘national communities’ as the natural unit of social analysis” (Fanning 2013:4). Analyses of migration phenomena were inevitably constrained by such static models, which is why mobility between nation-states - let alone immigrants’ attachments - was viewed as anomalous. There were certain forms of border-crossing movement that could not
5 be described by theoretically established terms, such as “permanent migrants” or “sojourners”. A new kind of migrating population was emerging, whose lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field. These immigrants “forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations than link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch et al 1992: 7). This phenomenon is called “transnationalism” and denotes the rise of an encompassing social space that extends beyond geographic, political and cultural borders. “Immigrants who develop and maintain multiple relationships – familial, economic, social, organizational, religious and political - that span borders we call “transmigrants” (Basch et al 1992:7).
Although several scholars in the past had attempted to posit a global social field or world society as a unit of analysis, they tended to ignore the remarkable resilience of nation-states and their unequal power in the global capitalist processes. Growing internationalization of capital and the advance of technology resulted in a global flow of ideas, goods and information, but also labor force. The lack of transnational lens prevented these scholars from depicting migrants, not merely as units of labor, but rather as people with experiences, concerns, aspirations, beliefs and identities. As a consequence, most theoretical frameworks failed to distinguish powerful non-state agents, such as transnational companies, from international immigrants. From the transnational perspective, global economic processes, as well as the continuing significance of the nation-state, need to be related to migrants’ social relationships, because the formation of transnational social spaces supplements the international space of sovereign nation-states, and border-crossing sustained ties can significantly impact political communities. By contrast powerful non-state actors remain attached to specific nation-states and focus on “nested processes” (Faist 2004: 339). They do not challenge the functions of the national states.
The internationalization of capital resulted in broad changes in employment pattern and a new international division of labor, in which less developed countries specialized in basic manufacturing activities and wealthy countries in high-skilled economic activities. It was this “deindustrialization” that led to the contraction of the manufacturing sector and a massive reallocation of labor to Third World countries. Widespread unemployment became a common feature of economic life, since the service sector could not absorb all of the displaced blue-collar workers. This core- periphery structure of the international economic system and the creation of a “new”
6 employment, which was characterized by precarious working and living conditions, conduced to increasing migration from developing to developed countries. Yet, once within their new settings, these immigrants usually ended up with low-skilled, poorly paid job positions at the margins of the host society and the labor market. Due to these predicaments, along with social segregation and discrimination, immigrants establish and maintain recurrent and intense exchange political, social, cultural and economic relations that give rise to a “deterritorialized nation-state”, that is a new transnational public sphere.
In both sending and receiving national states, transmigrants are subject to “hegemonic constructions”, socially constructed conceptions, categories and practices that dominant classes use in order to establish control over their populations. They attempt to manipulate migrants’ loyalty and sense of self, and to perpetuate the social order by fostering ideologies of bounded identity, such as ethnicity, nationality and race. These artificial categories, in turn, are internalized by the dominated and create legitimacy for the dominant. “The hegemonic context imposes a discipline on newcomers who develop self-identifications in accordance with categories and related behaviors that are not of their own making” (Schiller et al 1992:14) . Transmigrants however perceive the nature of ethnicity and nationalism not as bounded, but rather as fluid and manipulated. By living “both here and there”, they create transnational fields of action, within which hegemonic constructions dwindle and a new consciousness eventually prevails. The transformational potential of their transnational engagement clearly challenges the status quo of state politics, since they are no longer subjected to social control of the states’ apparatus.
1.1 Political Transnationalism and the Nation-State
As already mentioned, transmigrants create and sustain multiple cultural, economic, social and political linkages that extend beyond national borders. They travel back and forth, they command important economic resources, such as financial remittances, they engage in transnational economic activities, they maintain regular social relations between families or villages, they found hometown civic associations, they organize demonstrations either in support of or in opposition to the current homeland political regime, they participate in political parties and they vote. Steven
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Vertovec suggests that current transnational practices involve modes of transformation in three basic domains: “1) perceptual transformation affecting what can be described as migrants’ orientational ‘bifocality’ in the socio-cultural domain, 2) conceptual transformation of meanings within a notional triad of ‘identities- borders-orders’ in the political domain and 3) institutional transformation affecting forms of financial transfer, public-private relationships and local development in the economic domain” (Vertovec 2004:971). Immigrant transnational politics is a particularly interesting phenomenon, insofar as it is related to simultaneous political behavior, which challenges a mono-territorial concept of political community and constitutes a direct intrusion on the congruence between the “nation” (state population) and the territorial boundaries of the state.
According to Brubaker, the idealized conceptual model of the nation state is characterized by a bundle of congruencies linking state territory, national territory, national culture and demos. In a hypothetical world of ideal nation-states, the territorial boundaries of the state should match the boundaries of the nation, as an “imagined community”. Culture should also be coterminous with the frontiers of the state. There should be cultural homogeneity throughout the territory of the states but heterogeneity between them. Third, state territory should be in alignment with state population/demos. “Ideally, all permanent residents of the state should be citizens, and all citizens should be residents” (Brubaker 2010:63). Last, legal citizenship and cultural nationality should converge. “All ethno-cultural nationals should be citizens, and all citizens should be nationals” (Brubaker 2010: 63).
The new forms of political action, which are related to the emergence of a new, transnational public sphere, challenge the traditional definition of the state, insofar as they transcend and do not depend on the political borders of the states. Within this traditional framework, states function as membership organizations, which is why migrants seem to disrupt the abovementioned congruencies. Dominant perceptions, that significant cultural differences persist between nation-states - and, subsequently, immigrants should have representation in only one national polity – find ongoing expression in political responses to immigration. As a consequence, cultural identity, national allegiance and political membership are viewed as well-bounded characteristics, while immigrants’ homeland ties are expected to decline.
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However, immigrants develop several strategies, by which imposed categories are countered and the hegemonic power of dominant modes of ethnic boundary making declines. “While powerful actors can make their vision of the social world publicly known and consequential for the lives of all, subordinates may develop counter- discourses and other modes of dividing the social world into groups than those propagated by the dominant actors” (Wimmer 2008:995). Transnational political participation constitutes one of these counter-strategies, precisely because it brings about a “disjuncture between one’s legal identity as citizen of a territorial state and one’s political identity as an actor in the public sphere” (Mandaville 1999: 657). To the extent that new boundaries of political action are created, territorial boundaries prove to be leaky and states’ power of coercion diminishes.
1.2 Political transnationalism: The Persistence of the Nation-State
Itzigsohn defines immigrants’ political transnational field as “a realm of recurrent and institutionalized interactions and exchanges between, on the one hand, immigrants and their social and political organizations and, on the other hand, the political institutions and the state apparatus of the country of origin” (Itzigsohn 2000: 1130). By focusing on the institutional structures of the political transnationalism, Itzigsohn seeks to highlight, not the declining significance of the nation –state, but rather the manner in which it extends to encompass the transnational political space.
There is no doubt that the emergence of a transnational public sphere engenders a disjuncture between the nation and the state. Immigrants seek to resist their marginalization in the host society - by demanding the extension of the boundaries of citizenship rights - while sending states seek to guarantee the continuing flow of remittances. This interaction institutionalizes the transnational sphere of politics and leads to a realignment of political power. However, migrants’ and states’ interests may not always coincide, which means that migrants are not entirely independent of states and their policies, and states still remain the main site for the exercise of citizenship rights. What is more, the trans-border political field creates opportunities for previously excluded groups of people, but it also creates “new elites of people”; those who have the time and resources to engage in transnational politics.
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Many scholars argue that the process of transnationalization of immigrant politics is still in its early stages. It is not the occasional, intermittent activities that we should account for, but rather regular trans-border political engagement that justifies the coining of a new term (Guarnizo et al 2003:1211-1213, emphasis in the original). Although the proliferation of transnational ties is of essence, we cannot overlook the fact that there are people who do not engage in transnational politics or get in on the act only occasionally. These segments do not constitute an alternative political force, neither do they subvert pre-existing political relations. In order to provide analytical leverage to the transnational approach, we need to study the determinants of participation. Context of exit and reception, density of social networks, as well as individual characteristics may influence immigrants’ motivations. Guarnizo suggests that the number of immigrants who regularly participate in transnational politics is relatively small. While there is a proportion that becomes active via electoral or non- electoral activities, most of the immigrants mobilize only at special junctures. Moreover, those who are most involved are better educated and longer residents of the host society, which means that it is not the marginalized that resort to trans-border activities, but rather immigrants, who have integrated and are endowed with several forms of capital. Transnational actions therefore are “socially bounded across national borders and occur in quite specific territorial jurisdictions” (Guarnizo et al 2003: 1239). Within this framework, it would be premature to celebrate the emergence of a “deterritorialized nation-state”.
Apart from creating opportunities, the transnational public sphere also constrains independence for immigrants. This argument is in line with Itzigsohn’s assertion, i.e. the sending state’s ability to renegotiate its relations with its migrants abroad. The erroneous assumption that states do not affect transnational political membership is related to the fact that literature emphasizes causality between the disruption of the nation-state and the creation of transnational political space. If we take as a frame of reference this disjuncture, we deduce that states no longer matter. However, if we do not account for their position in the global context, we will not be able to comprehend their vital role. Their insertion in the current international economic system entails fundamental changes in domestic politics and affects their stance towards their emigrants. If we ignore their motivations and interests in determining the potentials for transnational membership, we cannot realize their continuing significance.
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Waldinger argues that the bounded nature of the national political unit prevents migrants from engaging in regular and sustained transnational political linkages. “As polities are bounded, moving to the territory of a different state yields political detachment, diminishing awareness of home country political matters and weakening the ties to home state electoral institutions needed for voting” (Waldinger 2013: 1240). While most immigrants stay connected to kin and family on a regular basis, it is less likely that they will maintain enduring political ties. Sending state’s incompetence to mobilize its emigrants abroad, as well as receiving country’s policies, affects migrants’ motivations.
The fact that more and more states nowadays extend the franchise beyond territorial borders may result in increasing political engagement but does not guarantee a high voter turnout among expatriates. Sending states seek to establish formal linkages- so as to attract remittances and economic investment- and to secure expatriates’ political loyalty. Embassies, consular services and documentary regimes constitute institutional responses to transnational practices and enable migrants to claim membership in several polities. Nevertheless, bureaucratic obstacles and cumbersome registration procedures, alongside considerable costs for both voters and governments, impede homeland political involvement. Moreover, a series of individual characteristics, as well as country-level factors may influence their motivations. On the one hand, settlement in the host society makes them more susceptible to the latter’s political messages and enables more extensive political engagement, depressing thus their interest in keeping political ties with their country of origin. On the other hand, lack of political involvement prior to migration, and/or the fact that the extra-territorial nature of expatriate voting entails significant financial demands, reduce participation rate.
In the end, “international migrants do repeatedly engage in concerted action across state boundaries, but the use, form and mobilization of the connections linking ‘here’ and ‘there’ are contingent outcomes subject to multiple political constraints” (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004:1177). By ignoring the fact that states seek to control movement, as well as their indisputable power to police territorial boundaries, we fail to acknowledge that the world is still divided into mutually exclusive nation-states and that a container model of society is still the case. Due to this dominant pattern, population movement is inevitably considered to undermine states’ ability to bound
11 the societies they seek to enfold, while hybrid identities raise questions of belonging in both home and host contexts. Since states operate at both internal and external levels, by distinguishing between members and foreigners, the latter’s arrival and their attachments generate persistent state efforts to suppress autonomous action and to extend surveillance. Cross-border linkages, loyalties and identities cannot escape the uncontested, prevailing ideology that the nation-state constitutes the most fundamental category of social and political organization. As migrants come from nationalized societies, where identity is defined by contrast to alien peoples and lands, their home-country attachments and loyalties are inherently particularistic and “antithetical to those by-products of globalization denoted by the concept ‘transnational civil society” (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004: 1177,).
Eventually, the novelty lies, not in states’ declining ability to embrace and penetrate their populations, but rather in their ever-increasing power to control mobility. They are able to do so, because they have successfully expropriated the legitimate means of movement, i.e. elaborate bureaucracies and technologies, which only gradually came into existence. Once international passports and identity cards became available to anyone, they became a requirement for legitimate movement across territorial jurisdictions, while “the authority to regulate movement came to be primarily a property of the international system as a whole – that is, of nation-states acting in concert to enforce their interests in controlling who comes and goes” (Torpey 1998: 243). States were henceforth able to define who belongs and who does not and to institutionalize the exclusion of undesirable nonmembers. In order to do so, they had to erect boundaries, to enclose their societies, to define their “nationals”, to deprive people from the freedom of movement, to impose identities, to codify laws and develop techniques for verifying identities, and to situate individuals in a field of surveillance. By and large, they had to build their nation, they sought to embrace. It was the very realization of the nation-state system in the modern era that strengthened their capacity to regulate population movement on a systematic basis and to determine who is entitled to gain access to wealthy countries’ privileges and who is not.
By heralding the emergence of a “deterritorialized nation-state” and “post-national citizenship”, scholars of transnationalism tend to ignore the continuing, central role of states and the ways in which regulation of movement “contributes to constituting the very ‘state-ness’ of states” (Torpey, 1998: 240). The presence of millions of “illegal”
12 migrants, refugees and stateless people, the proliferation of border fences, as well as the rise of right-wing parties, prove what is largely taken for granted; that this world is still comprised of mutually exclusive nation states, more powerful than ever before.
1.3 Political Transnationalism and Citizenship
In 1994 Yasemin Soysal argued that an era of post-national citizenship had arrived. This new perspective emphasized international discourses of universal human rights and their influence on the traditional notions of citizenship. In the framework of a newly emerging global civil society, political rights, as well as membership and national identities, no longer depend on physical, geopolitical boundaries, but rather on international political structures, within which nation-states are embedded.
The dominant trend has seen citizenship restricted to the territorialized state. In its ideal terms, national citizenship provides equality and protection under the law, through the establishment of enforceable rights for all citizens residing within a national territory. The formal requirement of citizenship is the fulfillment of certain obligations and exclusive allegiance to the political community of the nation-state. This liberal democratic conception assumes membership in a single national polity and locates the citizen within the territory, which is relevant to their citizenship or exclusion from citizenship. By definition, thus, it distinguishes citizens from non- citizens, by excluding particular groups of people.
Migrant populations constitute the most common group of these excluded people. As already mentioned (see Brubaker, pg 4), migration engenders a set of incongruencies, one of which is related to formal citizenship. When part of the resident population of a country has no formal political rights terrain, there is a certain degree of discrepancy between demos and state authority. As Painter and Philo argue, “the linkage between citizenship and space may be seen in the opposition between ‘us, here’ who define themselves against a physically separate ‘us, there’. International migration inevitably produces individuals who are present in the spaces of citizenship, but who remain ‘spatially invisible non-citizens’; ‘them, here” (Collyer 2014: 58). Since all immigrants are also emigrants and home states retain their obligations towards them,
13 international migration also produces non-resident citizens – the “us, there” category – who, due to their membership status, challenge the ideas of bounded citizenship. Non-resident citizens alongside non-citizen residents generate the “politics of belonging”, the external and internal dimensions of which, can be “reciprocally connected between states”. That is, “a population subject to an internal politics of membership in one state may be subject to an external politics of membership in another state” (Brubaker 2010: 66).
By undermining the traditional conception of citizenship, migrant populations, as well as transnationalization of their ties, lead to a progressive decoupling of rights from membership in the national polity, i.e. formal citizenship. The emergence of new forms of citizenship – the post-national citizenship – needs to be attributed to the rise of global human rights and their institutionalization. Soysal argues that, under the auspices of international legal and moral norms, social and civil rights are increasingly conferred on individuals, rather than through membership in a nation- state. The recasting of citizenship rights as universal human rights enforces states to extend the denizenship status1 to non-citizen immigrants residing within their territory, and allows immigrants to enjoy the advantages of citizenship in more than one nation-state. From this point of view, multiple membership statuses, such as dual citizenship, derive legitimacy by membership in the international community, while individuals are able to make claims as actors themselves, rather than as merely representatives of a state.
From the “strict” post-national perspective, immigrants are aware of the fact that, their rights – those related to the person – are guaranteed and that membership no longer depends on bounded polities. Since rights, traditionally associated with legal citizenship, are vested in all immigrants, they face no need to naturalize and they are less likely to claim dual citizenship for socio-economic benefits. Moreover, receiving societies influence their motivations. Ties to international or supranational organizations are an indication of states’ likelihood to conform to the dictates of human rights discourses. As a consequence, immigrants, from established liberal democracies in particular, become more post-national, i.e. reluctant to naturalize.
1 A discrepancy between long-term residence and citizenship; integrated resident non-members, who enjoy civil and social rights, but no full political rights.
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By contrary, the “weak” version of post-nationalism assumes that, since states continue to be the grantors of citizenship, immigrants are more likely to claim dual nationality, despite the global spread of the human rights. Advocates of this approach argue that, instead of challenging exclusive loyalties and belonging, dual citizenship enhances the centrality of the nation-states. The fact that there is a significant portion of immigrants, even in the liberal democratic regimes of the European Union, who are persistently denied access to basic rights denotes that dual citizenship in contemporary politics is not as institutionalized as other facets of the modern state. At this juncture, human rights regimes have yet to take root and globalization is still at its early stages. Therefore, immigrants are more likely to embrace a membership status of a dualistic type, rather than rely upon contested discourses. 2
Likewise, advocates of transnationalism assume that, immigrants’ transnational experiences reflect their tendency to identify with multiple political communities, increasing thus their propensity to adopt dual citizenship. From this standpoint, their interest in holding multiple statuses across borders suggests their desire to maintain multiple affiliations and to keep political options flexible. Since transmigrants inhabit “deterritorialized” social and political fields, bounded citizenship becomes less salient over time, while the power of national governments diminishes. The loosening of rules and the global rise in tolerance towards dual citizenship indicates the major role migrant transnationalism plays at this growth. Although cross-border political engagement is not always welcome, the upward trend towards policy shifts suggests otherwise.
1.4 Political Transnationalism and the Persistence of Traditional Citizenship
The fact that a growing number of states extend citizenship rights beyond borders may not only suggest responses to migrants’ political transnationalism, but also the resilience of the nation-state and the flexibility of its sovereignty. Scholars of this viewpoint argue, that it is not transnational politics per se that determines states’ motivations towards acceptance or rejection of dual nationality, but rather non- migrant political actors and their interests.
2 Bloemraad 2004: 394-397
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On the one hand, political conditions or regime change in the countries of origin affect to a large extent the latter’s stance towards expatriates abroad, as well as their homeland political engagement. Sending states may seek to channel this engagement to their own advantage – in order to secure economic or political support – or attempt to curtail cross-border political activities, when their emigrants maintain multiple loyalties that seem mutually exclusive. When their goals overlap with those of their citizens abroad, they may grant extended political rights, even when they do not allow dual citizenship for their immigrants, or attempt to reinforce national loyalty, by providing funding for rallies or campaigns. Since more and more migrant-sending states have now accepted that their expatriates abroad have settled and they will not return, they seek to strengthen economic and political links with these groups, by encouraging them to actively participate. However, when emigrants’ dual orientations raise concerns and are more likely to undermine the homeland political regime, sending states’ attitude towards them may become neutral or even negative. They might constrain their accessibility or become less eager to enfranchise them. The most popular argument against the granting of voting rights beyond borders is “the principle of territorial inclusion, i.e. because they are not subject to the laws and binding decisions of the state, permanent non-residents can rightfully be excluded from the citizen body of a democratic polity ” (Baubock: 2418).
On the other hand, contextual factors in the receiving country matter as well. “Political opportunity” structures may influence transnational political orientations and practices. A political environment supportive of immigrant cross-border politics may tolerate multiple loyalties and boost transnational engagement. Moreover, host- states may view dual citizenship as means to achieve the congruence between the citizens and the resident populations and to guarantee equal access to rights for all residents. However, if nations are defined as imagined communities of common descent, language, culture and history, states implement more assimilationist policies, discouraging their immigrants from holding multiple identities and emphasizing their responsibility to integrate. As to formal membership, lacking tolerance may decrease immigrants’ propensity to apply for the nationality of their country of settlement.
To sum up, although we have witnessed a growing tolerance towards multiple loyalties and dual citizenship, immigrants’ willingness and desire to adopt dual membership statuses largely depend on sending and receiving contexts. In other
16 words, it is states that decide whether migrants will be included in the citizenry, not the rise of transnational public fields. The fact that transmigrants’ activities and identities are multiple and extend beyond territorial boundaries does not imply that identification with territorially defined national polities and locales are disappearing. Since cross-border political activism is inherently particularistic (see Waldinger and Fitzgerald, pg 8), the relative identities and practices do not by-pass the nation-state but rather represent an extension and adaptation of the nation-state model. Moreover, dual citizenship appears to be a formal recognition of migrants’ simultaneous belonging to two different political communities. However, the political engagement that it entails is inevitably passive. While most civil and social rights have been gradually extended to all residents, voting rights have generally remained attached to the traditional notion of citizenship; bounded to a single territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the nation state remains fundamentally a territorial organization, one that “extends the reach of the polity to embrace trans-border members who do not reside within the territory of the state”. In this perspective, arguments about the post-national or transnational nature of citizenship are overstated; extra-territorial citizenship is simply “citizenship in a territorially bounded political community without residence in the community” (Collyer 2014: 61).
2) GREEK IMMIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to examine if and how Greek immigrants in the Netherlands develop and sustain transnational political linkages with their country of origin, we need to account for both sending and receiving contexts, as well as their individual characteristics that might determine the potentials for transnational political engagement. We might then be able to look into the specifics of the Greek immigration stream and to explore the manners, in which their motivations are affected. Our interest lies in two distinct categories of the Greek immigration flow, i.e. “old” immigrants who settled in the Netherlands before the financial crisis of 2008, and newcomers who were largely affected by the political and economic conditions in Greece. In taking as a point of reference the Greek economic crisis, we
17 do not imply that the options for engagement in transnational politics are shaped one- sidedly. We rather hope to reveal the different characteristics of the two sub-groups and examine whether and how these influence their potentials. First, we will report a brief history of the Greek immigration in the Netherlands. Since we are interested in immigrants’ particular traits, we need to explore the determinants of their choices and the ways in which those reflect differences in interests and motivations. Second, we need to look into the particularities of the sending country. As theory suggests, the governments’ stance towards their emigrants matters a great deal to shaping their incentives. Third, we are going to analyze contextual factors in the receiving country. Accounting for immigrants’ position in the host-society will provide insight into the latter’s environment and its influential potential. Last, having in mind the joint impact of receiving and sending countries, as well as the particular characteristics of the individuals involved, we will form the research questions that will guide this thesis.
2.2 GREEK IMMIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS
Once known for its large-scale emigration, the Netherlands experienced successive waves of immigration since 1945 and transitioned thus to a country of destination for immigrants from the former Dutch East Indies, Surinam and the Antilles. In the 1960’s and early 1970’s “guest workers” were recruited in Southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco. During the long post-war growth, the demand for workers for unskilled jobs increased, while the supply of unskilled Dutch workers was decreasing. The shortage of unskilled labor was compensated by the inflow of Mediterranean workers. The Dutch government regulated the recruitment practices by bilateral agreements with several countries during the 1960’s. Workers were actively recruited or came spontaneously from countries like Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia (Rath 2009: 675 -678).
Following World War II, Greece became one of the main contributors of migrants to the industrialized nations of Northern Europe. The primary determinants behind the emigration flows were economic and political factors – such as extensive unemployment and political persecution – both connected with the impact of the 1946 -1949 civil war and the 1967 -1974 period of military dictatorship rule. The majority
18 of emigrants came from rural areas of Greece and they supplied both national and international labor markets. Of the estimated 638.000 emigrants to European countries, the largest number – 83% - went to West Germany and the rest to Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Kasimis et al.2012: 6-9).
The bilateral labor recruitment agreement between the Dutch and the Greek governments was signed in 1966 and a massive immigration flow of Greek workers settled in the Netherlands. Apart from the official labor recruitment, many Greek immigrants, who had already settled in Belgium, decided to reach the Netherlands in search of better living and working conditions. According to official Dutch Statistics, 1556 Greeks were located in the Netherlands in 1963, 525 of whom came from Belgium. By and large, the majority of Greek immigrant workers arrived between 1962 and 1965. In 1966, when the bilateral agreement was put into effect, most recruitment agencies had already closed, and organized inflows ceased.
The average age group of emigrants who left Greece in the period 1955-1977 was 25- 32 years. However, the number of children of 0-14 years who migrated rose over time in the context of family reunification. The majority of Greek emigrants worked in the primary sector, as small-scale farmers and farm-laborers. Some 20-25% came from secondary production, mainly construction or small-scale manufacturing, while only 10% worked in the tertiary sector (Kasimis et al. 2012: 9-10).
The first oil crises of 1973 caused economic uncertainty and a sharp decrease in the demand of labor. The Netherlands stopped the labor migrant recruiting and introduced more restrictive immigration policies. However, immigration from the recruitment countries, including Greece, continued as a chain migration, at first in the form of family reunification throughout the 1970’s and later on in the form of family formation in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Between 1982 and1983 the immigration flow stagnated, due to the deep recession of the Dutch economy after the second oil crisis in 1979. While the chain migration from Turkey and Morocco continued, the number of Greek immigrants did not grow much after the end of official recruitment.
The second wave of Greek emigration in the Netherlands was prompted by the financial crisis of 2008. According to official data, over 350.000 Greeks - or 3% of the population - emigrated between 2010 and 2013 (Source: ELSTAT). Almost
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270.000 of them were young people aged between 20 and 39. In the Netherlands, the numbers increased significantly during this period, from 7.343 first generation Greek emigrants in 2005 to 12.917 in 2014.3
In Greece, the intense economic recession and insecurity, which began in 2008, resulted in severe youth unemployment. In 2010 Greece had the highest unemployment rate among graduates between 25 – 29 years old (15,6%) compared to all other OECD countries whose average was 6,3 %. 4In 2012 youth unemployment increased dramatically to 57%, while it slightly decreased to 48,3% in 2015. The most striking point was that, in the long run, having higher academic qualifications did not protect young Greeks against unemployment. In 2010, for example, 19,2% of graduates were unemployed compared to 11,3% of those who had an upper secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary education and 7% of those below upper secondary education.5
In order to pursue a better standard of living, higher wages and more security, leaving their homeland became their only option. Most of those who emigrate are well- educated, highly-skilled, talented people with the potential of offering their homeland a great deal during a crucial time of unsteadiness. In 2015, the Guardian wrote: “Call them Generation G: young, talented Greek – and part of the biggest brain drain in an advanced Western economy in modern times”. 6
2.3 THE DUTCH CONTEXT
As already mentioned, the post-war economic growth in the Netherlands caused a labor shortage that forced the Dutch government to sign bilateral recruitment agreements with several countries. The labor demand spurred thus massive inflows of low-skilled workers and – since the late 1980’s- refugees and asylum seekers. As a
3 http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLEN&PA=37325eng&D1=a&D2=0&D3=0&D4 =0&D5=88&D6=0,4,9,14,17-18&HDR=G2,G1,G3,T&STB=G4,G5&VW=T 4 http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=374111 5 http://www.tovima.gr/finance/article/?aid=442692 6 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/19/young-talented-greek-generation-g- worlds-biggest-brain-drain
20 result of these complex and protracted inflows, the Netherlands transited from a quite high level of ethnic homogeneity to a remarkable degree of diversity.
Dutch discourse on immigration and inclusion is historically characterized by three phases: 1) a pluralist phase or pillarization, in which immigrants’ integration was not at the top of the political agenda, 2) a period of “controlled integration”, during which policies applied to certain marginalized groups and 3) a “culturist” phase, in which structural inequalities were related to cultural factors.
Until the mid-1980’s, the main idea in political discourse was that the Netherlands was not and should not become an immigration country. Guest workers were considered to be sojourners, who were to return to their countries of origin, while long-term settlement was precluded. The Dutch authorities supported those who did not intend to stay, by showing tolerance towards different religious beliefs and by allowing them to create their own cultural institutions, as well as their own state- sponsored organizations for education and social welfare. The main objective was a smooth reintegration of labor migrants in their countries of origin. In this regard, “authorities stressed the importance for migrants ‘to sustain warm ties with the home country and keep their aspirations on their future possibilities in the country of origin alive” (Bouras:1224).
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the Dutch authorities realized that immigrants were going to stay and the permanent settlement of certain groups was acknowledged. The 1983 “Ethnic Minorities Policy” applied to certain segregated social groups and aimed at their integration. The relative report emphasized the equality of ethnic minorities to native Dutch in three domains. In the legal – political area, participation in the political realm was strengthened and voting rights for non-citizens at the local level were introduced, while naturalization procedures became easier. In the socio- economic domain, the measures were related to the labor market, education, housing and unemployment. Special training programs, voluntary agreements and laws were introduced to create more job positions for immigrants. Last, in the cultural domain, the report stressed that integration had to be a reciprocal process. Immigrants were allowed to create their own cultural, linguistic and religious institutions, but they had – as did the majority group -to acknowledge and respect the natives’ cultural and religious convictions.
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Despite the Dutch government’s efforts to promote immigrants’ successful integration, by funding their organizations and encouraging them to maintain their own cultural identity, unemployment rates remained way above those of the native Dutch, while levels of educational performance continued to be low among immigrant children. Policy-makers realized that they had to abandon ethnic minorities or multicultural policies and adopt more assimilationist measures. This ideological shift coincided with a shifted orientation towards self-sufficiency and responsibility, in regard to the welfare state. It was now individual’s duty, rather than state’s obligation, to successfully incorporate into the host society and reap its benefits. Immigrants’ transnational linkages with their country of origin, which had been tolerated and even promoted by the Dutch government, were now “problematized” and presented as a multi-dimensional threat that is, political, economic and cultural. Failed integration was attributed to immigrants’ choice and particularly their unwillingness to break off all ties with their home country. From this perspective, the Dutch government did not hold any responsibility and was thus legitimated to blame the “other”.
This change in the political domain, as well as in the public discourses, resulted in the implementation of the “Integration Policy”, which was introduced in 1994 and was based on the idea of “mainstreaming” – i.e. improving the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream services in order to move away from the ethno-specific provision popularly associated with a policy of multiculturalism” (Vasta 2002: 717). The rationale behind the new policy was that the Dutch government had been too generous in providing resources to facilitate integration, while immigrants had not taken the responsibility to discard their “old” cultural practices and identities and embrace thus the Dutch values and norms. Migrant organizations were now believed to hinder social mobility, since they came to be related to deprivation and low socio-economic progress in general. As a consequence, the Dutch state moved away from the institutionalization of immigrants’ ties with their countries of origin, by cutting down on any additional expenditure, and introduced compulsory language courses, sanctions and fines, in case newcomers failed to attend the programs.
From now on, immigrants’ integration was viewed as a one-sided procedure, since they were enforced to integrate into a national culture imagined as homogeneous and superior. According to Schinkel, the so-called “culturist” phase of the Dutch integration discourse constitutes a “functional equivalent of racism”, since it turns the
22 principle of culturalism - the idea that differences between people and groups are not biological or natural, but rather cultural – on its head that is, different cultures are incompatible and should decline in favor of the dominant ones. This argument implies that the causes of discrimination and marginalization are rooted, not in crucial contextual factors, but rather in distinct cultural markers7. However, institutional responses and dominant discourses are essential. As long as integration policies do not take into account the differing needs of immigrants ranging from people with limited formal education to professionals, labor market participation and educational attainment remain low, pay differentials are still the case and sanctions deteriorate their situation, rather than improving it. This is where institutional racism lies; the discrepancy between assimilationist policies and their outcomes are ascribed, not to their insufficiency, but rather to immigrants’ ethnicity, cultural background or religion. As Ellie Vasta puts it, “institutional racism occurs when the power of the dominant group is sustained through its structures and institutions, such as laws, policies and program deliveries. If language courses and vocational programs are still failing after so many years then we would have to look at how racist practices and attitudes, usually not perceived as racist, are embedded in a society’s institutions and practices, hidden in everyday common-sense structures” (Vasta 2002: 729-730).
Apart from immigration policies and measures, public debate and the media also play a significant role in reproducing negative stereotypes, with respect to ethnic minorities. In 2000, the Dutch scholar Paul Scheffer implied that immigrants fail to integrate, due to the fact that the Dutch government had been excessively lavish. He stressed the need for a more restrictive institutional framework and he claimed that it was about time for immigrants to take their responsibilities. With his arguments, Scheffer influenced integration debates to a great extent. In 2002, Pim Fortuyn, a populist politician, called Islam a backward religion and he argued that the borders in the Netherlands should close. His murder in the same year resulted in even more inflammatory discourses. Migrants were now depicted as disloyal enemies, who did not respect the principles of liberal democracy. Matters escalated even further, when film-maker Theo van Gogh was shot and stabbed to death in 2004. He had recently completed a film about Muslim women and their experiences of domestic violence. His intention was to stress the incompatibility of the Koran with western democratic
7 Schinkel 2013: 1145-1146
23 values. The latter incident resulted in the passage of a new integration bill – the “Bill for a new Integration Act” – which was introduced in 2005, and established the coercive nature of the policies. Immigrants who did not comply with the relevant rules were now represented as a threat to social cohesion and public order, while their potentials for a successful integration appeared to depend solely on their own choice. In 2006, a new definition of integration was introduced, which juxtaposed the socio- cultural to the structural aspect of the latter. It described the process as “participation, which requires that all migrants learn the Dutch language and adopt the norms, values and forms of social conduct prevailing in our country” (SPC 2006:5). The fact that the content of this vague and abstract definition remained intact in later reports reveals the legislator’s intention to keep pace with swings in public perceptions, rather that facilitate incorporation.
In conclusion, the very same state, once renowned for its radical, tolerant stance towards immigrants and their communities, has now adopted a tough, exclusionary rhetoric, implemented conservative policies and institutionalized racial discrimination. The sudden turn from multicultural to assimilation policies in the second half of the 1990’s signaled a substantial ideological shift, i.e. the social reconstruct of migration-related conceptualizations and, consequently, the reinvention of the social representations, in regard to ostensibly antithetical cultures. A significant aspect of this shift was the prevalence and establishment of individualism. If we do not account for the crisis of the post-war, regulated capitalism, which was related to the Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies, and the subsequent spread of neo- liberalism during the 1980’s, we cannot comprehend the rationale behind this change. Because of this crisis, the migrant is now depicted as a passive welfare state client, while the government’s incentives, in disclaiming any responsibility, are mainly economic. They are not related to culture or ethnicity per se, but rather to social class.
2.4 THE GREEK CONTEXT
By reading the latter section, one could deduce that assimilation policies and discourses only apply to Muslim immigrants. However, as long as policies’ underlying objectives in the receiving country are primarily economic and public
24 opinions are shaped accordingly, any foreigner with a low socio-economic background would be affected. We would expect therefore Greek immigrants, especially those who settled in the Netherlands after the financial crisis of 2008, to be exposed to the same exclusionary rhetoric and thus more interested in keeping up with Greek politics. As already said though, immigrants’ motivations largely depend on the responses of their home-country as well. It would be quite of an important omission thus not to take into account the Greek government’s stance towards its emigrants.
During the post-war period and up to the mid-‘70s most western European states encouraged immigration and regulated recruitment practices, in order to counter the shortage of cheap labor. Greece was amongst the countries that prompted organized emigration and signed bilateral agreements with several states. Increasing unemployment after the end of the civil war in 1949, limited job opportunities, especially in the rural areas, as well as an ineffective welfare state resulted in shifted governmental policies towards emigrants. Up until then, the Greek authorities had adopted a strictly territorial conception of political community, which considered territorial residence as a prerequisite for participation and regarded expatriates as outsiders. The 1923 population exchange treaty between Greece and Turkey, which brought about the uprooting of millions of refugees after the defeat in Asia Minor, had imposed other priorities on Greek authorities, which undermined their efforts to engage in diaspora-related issues.
After World War II, the Greek government considered the labor demand in Western Europe as an opportunity to relieve pressure on domestic labor market and started encouraging outward migration, believing that this would be of a temporary character. During this period and up to 1977, the number of emigrants was approximately 1.300.000, almost as massive as that of the beginning of the century (Kasimis et al. 2012: 6). This emigration trend had several implications on Greek labor market. Alongside economic growth, an increase of labor wages occurred, especially in the secondary sector, but also labor shortage in agriculture and industry. In particular, “during the period 1963-1973, wages increased annually by 11.26%, which meant, that, considering that the increase in the cost of living was 3,85%, the real increase in wages was 7,41% annually” (Kasimis et al. 2012:12). As to remittances, which were mainly invested in the construction sector, it is estimated that they represented 4,9% of the Gross National Income in 1972 and 3,4% of the GDP in 1974 (Kassimati 1984:
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36). Apart from the reconstruction, especially in remote, rural regions, remittances also provided existing employment schemes with financial resources and influenced consumption patterns as well. Overall, from 1955 to 1982 Greek remittances amounted to a total of 12.6 billion dollars. After 1982, they stopped playing such a significant role in the Greek economy.8
As long as the number of emigrants increased and the Greek authorities realized that they did not intend to return, they attempted to develop and sustain close ties with them. In order to establish control over their communities and their associations, they introduced several measures, in regard to their activities and organizational structure. 9 They founded a series of organizations, such as “Greek Houses” and Orthodox churches, funded and organized cultural events, regulated posts for labor attaches, appointed teachers and provided language courses for the children of emigrants. In order to secure the continuous flow of remittances, they offered tax reductions and relatively attractive interest rates on long-term currency deposits (Glytsos, Katseli 2005:354). Apart from labor contracts, the Greek government signed bilateral social security agreements, in order to safeguard expatriates’ social rights and to ensure that they would be treated equally with the native labor force.10 The main provisions, with regard to employment and insurance, included pension entitlements, compensation for work illness and work accident, family benefits and healthcare coverage. Yet, the Greek state did not manage to systematize these measures within a consistent institutional framework, while their often contradictory nature could not guarantee effective outcomes.
After the oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent economic insecurity in the Western European countries, official recruitment practices stopped and many Greek emigrants either settled permanently in the destination countries or returned home. The Greek government attempted to improve their living and working conditions or facilitate their repatriation respectively. The political changeover in 1974, as well as Greece’s accession to EEC – European Economic Committee – in 1981 contributed to a shift in emigration policies. In regard to expatriates, the government was more interested in
8 Papagalani, Kalafatis 2004: 333-336 9 The Greek state sought to monitor its communities abroad, since most of them were opposed to the then, Greek political regime – the military junta - during the 1967-1973period and constituted a significant political force, that could subvert the existing power relations. 10 Greece signed this agreement with the Netherlands in 1969 (Kasimis et al.2012:15).
26 engaging with their problems due to their successful role in the overthrow of the military coup and the restoration of democracy. From 1981 onwards and up to the mid-‘90’s both PASOK and New Democracy governments focused on Greek language education for the children of emigrants. They founded Greek schools in several Western European countries, financed language classes and organized cultural events. Despite the fact that their objective was to familiarize children with the Greek culture, these initiatives were also criticized, since they were considered to hinder their integration into the host society and the local education system. As to the returnees, all bilateral agreements were replaced by the relevant regulations of the EEC, while special arrangements applied to those who were not eligible for pension in Greece, such as medical care coverage and social insurance. Moreover, special maximum age limits for employees in the public sector were established and mortgages with favorable terms for the purchase of houses were provided. With respect to education of the returnees’ children, vocational training programs and special seminars were performed, special schools were created and measures were implemented to expedite entry into tertiary education. Nevertheless, these projects did not have the anticipated results. Dearth of information, limited coordination, cumbersome and complex bureaucratic procedures, ill-equipped classrooms, lack of qualified teachers, as well as uninformed public sector agencies, had all impeded smooth reintegration and led to a rather insufficient support of returnees’ needs11.
A decisive moment, with regard to government policy on emigrants and returnees, was the setting up in 1982 of a special official agency – the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad - which constituted a system of representation for Greek migrants. The main goal was the creation of a government’s coordinating body for the implementation of state policy and the support of interests of the Greeks abroad. According to the official site, some of the primary objectives include “the preservation of national and cultural identity in conjunction with the fostering of the Greek language, history and culture, the support of initiatives in the field of education and the support of national interests by way of strengthening the networks of Greeks
11 Kasimis et al. 2012:15-29
27 abroad which act as bridges of friendship and cooperation between Greece and the countries of residence”12.
Despite the fact that the GSGA managed to register a large number of first- and second-stage organizations and associations13, difficulties arose due to “the existence of many regional or cultural associations which frequently had more members than the communities themselves” (Tziovas 2009: 128). State’s incompetence to develop a strategy towards successfully overcoming these barriers led to the creation of the World Council of Hellenism Abroad in 1989 (SAE), whose main goal was to “bring together the Greeks of the Diaspora creating a global network aimed at planning and materializing programs for the benefit of the Omogeneia14 to be subsequently conveyed to the Greek state thus fulfilling its role as an advisory and consultative body”15. SAE, as opposed to GSGA, put in effect the initial goals, i.e. formalized emigrants’ representation, and enjoyed broad political consent.
However, SAE did not manage to develop a democratic character, despite its strengthening role through the 2001 Greek Constitution. The fact that it entirely depended on the Greek state for funding, as well as the latter’s exclusionary practices, with respect to specific communities, resulted in quite ambiguous and contradictory outcomes. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the arrival of thousands of immigrants and refugees from the former socialist countries coincided with a period of ideological and political crisis in Greece, which resulted in heightened nationalism and a new perception of inclusion in the nation-state. “Certain political circles and some leaders of diaspora communities, still influenced by the nationalism and insecurity of earlier years, discovered “Greek populations” in the former socialist countries which, according to them, wanted to be linked with Greece. So the SAE was to function as the institutionalized link between these populations and the “national center” (Tziovas 2009:132).
The Greek state’s objectives in invoking “omogeneia”, which literally means common descent and heritage, was to incorporate diaspora in the national community,
12 http://www.ggae.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=16&clang=1 13 According to GSGA, first stage is related to national-local associations, second stage refers to federations of communities and organizations that operate at state or national level of a country, and third stage is associated with confederations that operate internationally. 14 Non-citizen migrants of Greek descent 15 http://en.sae.gr/?id=12378&tag=SAE+at+a+glance
28 develop networks, so as to attract investments, gain international support, enhance its status in the European Union, and mobilize communities abroad in support of the “national interest”. The changing meaning of belonging to the nation-state, the restructuring of the citizenship law, as well as the generous granting of Greek citizenship to certain groups required “re-activating ethnicising processes”16 and represented the desire to control emigrants’ political activities and re-engage those who had been neglected for decades. The re-conceptualization of the nation, which extends beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the state and transcends borders, is reflected in several terms, such as “worldwide Hellenism”, “ecumenical” and “diaspora”17 and is now deeply rooted in the Greek political culture, as well as in public perceptions.
During the 2000’s decade, the Greek right-wing governments of PASOK and New Democracy did not attempt to change the relevant institutional framework, regarding citizenship and migration, while they largely contributed to the reproduction of negative stereotypes and xenophobia. This may seem irrelevant to Greek emigrants and their ties’ potential transnationalization. However, it is not; the Greek state’s reluctance to move towards a more liberal definition of nationality, as well as its tendency to strictly adhere to jus sanguinis law, could also explain the neutral or indifferent stance towards Greek communities, which were not as well-established as their predecessors. To the extent that they sought to extend their political power beyond the territorial ambit, the governments needed to take advantage of the well- integrated “omogeneis” and utilize their lobbying potentials to their benefit. This means that they were more interested in channeling the wealth of the diaspora elites, rather than engaging with emigrants’ real problems. Inefficient, incoherent and short- term policies, as well as lack of active initiatives, such as the granting of external voting rights18, suggests that the Greek state never intended to place expatriates among top priorities.
During the last eight years of continuous recession, the Greek government remains dormant, despite the fact that at least 300.000 Greeks have abandoned the country. In
16 Βεντούρα:7 17 Besides the term “diaspora” is an Ancient Greek work and means dispersion or scattering. Literally “dia” means “across” and “spora” comes from the verb “speiro”, which means “I sow”. 18 During the previous years, the Greek parties used to charter airplanes, in order to secure expatriate citizens’ vote.
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2015, the left-wing party of Syriza won the elections and replaced the right-wing party of New Democracy in the Greek Parliament. Syriza attempted to implement a new citizenship policy of mixed jus sanguinis and jus soli elements and made considerable efforts towards the reinstatement of the SAE. Nevertheless, these were undermined by the main opposition party, which retained a conservative ideology, in regard to migrants, and was more concerned to keep pace with the European Union’s neoliberal objectives. What is more, the new governments’ priorities were more related to high unemployment rates and poverty, rather than emigrants’ needs, despite the detrimental effects of their departure on the Greek economy. In 2016, the new leader of New Democracy submitted a draft bill regarding the right of expatriate Greek citizens to vote in the national elections of their country from abroad. However, it has still not been implemented.
In conclusion, from the late 1960’s to the early 2010’s Greek migration policies have been characterized by inconsistency and oriented towards fulfilling particular interests, a fact that explains the Greek governments’ indifferent stance towards Greek expatriates. The Greek state has traditionally defined nation as an imagined community of shared language, culture and history, in which all ethno-nationals – resident and external citizens – are included. Historically, subsuming even more categories of populations of “Greek descent” into the nation was not related to the improvement of their position in the receiving countries, but rather to deterritorialising practices of sovereignty and the dominance of nationalist discourses. Insofar as emigrants are treated as outsiders, the state acts, as if it embraced a territorial definition of citizenship. However, priority to economic objectives, the exclusion of immigrants, as well as the neutral attitude towards non-resident citizens suggest otherwise.
2.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Theory suggests that engagement with transnational politics is related to both exit and reception conditions, as well as migrants’ individual characteristics. Since we are more interested in the distinction between “old” and “new” immigrants in the Netherlands, i.e. those who settled before and during the financial crisis of 2008
30 respectively, we first need to reveal their specific traits and the way in which these are differentiated. Taking as a frame of reference the Greek economic recession, contributed to explaining their determinants, motivations, tendencies and expectations in both sending and destination countries. The latter sections showed that those who left Greece before the economic downturn of 2008 were mostly of a low socio- economic and educational background, while “new” immigrants are mainly highly- skilled and well-educated. We first need to show if they are interested in developing and maintaining political ties with their country of origin and, second, if and how the likelihood to engage in transnational political participation is related to the abovementioned differences. Having in mind the joint impact of sending and receiving contextual factors the main research question is formed as follows:
In what ways differences –determinants of emigration, socio-economic background and integration into the host society- between “old” and “new” immigrants in the Netherlands affect their motives to participate in Greek transnational politics?
In regard to the sending context, theory suggests that the sending country’s position in the global context, as well as the state’s motivations in affecting the potential transnationalization of emigrants’ ties, influence a great deal the latter’s stance towards expatriates and, consequently, their desire to create transnational political linkages. Schiller, Basch and Szanton imply that it is the very same construct of the modern nation-state and its insertion in the international context that inevitably leads to the gradual transnationalization of migrants’ connectedness. Their proletarization in both home and host societies forces them to develop and sustain multiple networks, the transformational potential of which challenge the dominant status quo and do not depend on territorial boundaries. What is more, since they develop and maintain multiple identities and loyalties, they are more likely to embrace multiple membership statuses, i.e. dual citizenship. We would thus expect that the low-skilled – those with poorly-paid job positions - and the most marginalized in the Netherlands to be more eager to engage with transnational politics.
On the other hand, we also need to account for the opposite arguments, those that emphasize the resilience of the nation-state and the flexibility of its sovereignty. The use, form and mobilization of the connections linking ‘here’ and ‘there’ “are
31 contingent outcomes subject to multiple political constraints”, while it is not the poor and marginalized that resort to transnational political participation, but rather well- educated and longer residents of the host society, as well as those who are endowed with time and resources. Moreover, their relation to politics prior to migration also plays a significant role. According to Waldinger, lack of political involvement in the country of origin results in diminished interest, with regard to transnational political participation, while the political environment in the receiving country also affects their incentives. From this standpoint, we would expect the well-integrated Greeks and those endowed with time and capital to be more likely to develop and sustain regular transnational political linkages19. Additionally, we expect Greek immigrants who actively participated in Greek politics, prior to settlement in the Netherlands, to be more interested in transnational politics. As to citizenship, Soysal maintains that, due to the global spread of human rights, immigrants, especially those who come from established liberal democracies, are aware of the fact that membership no longer depends on bounded polities but rather on personhood. They are thus less likely to naturalize for socio-economic benefits, i.e. more “post-national”. Since Greek immigrants come from a European Union’s member state and are cognizant of their rights, we would expect them to be less interested in acquiring the Dutch citizenship. On the other hand, since the Dutch state is characterized by a tolerant stance towards dual citizenship, with respect to the Greek nationality, Greek immigrants could also be interested in naturalizing and express thus their multiple affiliations20.
Accounting for the theoretical framework, we will be able to answer to the following research questions in the next sections:
- Will differences in the socio-economic and educational background affect the two sub-groups’ motivations to engage in regular transnational politics? - Do poorly-paid and less educated immigrants mobilize only at special junctures? - Does long-term residence in the host-society suppress their interests in developing enduring political ties with their country of origin?
19 According to this approach, it is not the intermittent activities that we should account for, but rather regular trans-border engagement. Only a small proportion of migrants participate regularly in transnational politics; those who are endowed with several forms of capital. The rest of them mobilize only at special junctures (p.6) 20 The transnational argument about formal citizenship (p.11).
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- Does lack of political involvement prior to migration reduce participation rates in transnational politics? - Will immigrants with limited economic resources and educational background be less eager to acquire the Dutch citizenship?
In the following sections, we will report the findings of this research and we hope to find an answer to the relevant questions.
3) DATA, METHODS, LIMITATIONS
3.1 DATA AND METHODS
In order to collect data on Greek immigrants’ engagement with transnational politics, I conducted qualitative research and, particularly, semi-structured, in-depth interviews. Since I was more interested in exploring their perceptions, feelings or insights about the topic, I considered this qualitative technique as the most suitable towards the realization of my objectives. Open-ended questions resulted in expansive and detailed replies, which revealed unexpected aspects of the issue and enabled the connection to the theoretical framework. The multi-dimensional aspect of political transnationalism, as well as the contradictions that characterize the literature, required involvement with multiple actors and intensive efforts to capture the current trend, with regard to immigrants’ incentives.
First, I detected the Greek home-town associations, as well as immigrants’ cultural, linguistic and political organizations. Despite the fact that religion is still strongly related to the Greeks’ cultural background, I did not include religious institutions in my research, since I was more interested in the political facet of their collective identity. In order to find these organizations, I searched on the internet, on both Greek and English websites, while I also placed advertisements on facebook groups, most of which represent the Greek communities. I was particularly interested in these social networking tools, since the majority of them attempt to succeed higher levels of communication and to foster civic participation, which is largely related to my research. Moreover, by contacting them via internet, I would be able to explain
33 several perspectives of the relevant theoretical approaches, such as the fact that the advance of technology plays a significant role at the transnationalization of migrants’ ties. Given that this study’s frame of reference is associated with differentiated group characteristics, the current modes of communication could also influence immigrants’ incentives and activities.
I managed to contact 13 groups, only 3 of which constitute lively offline networks. The rest of them have developed online platforms, on which newcomers could express their concerns and thoughts, regarding jobs, houses, language or legal issues, such as bureaucratic obligations. I also contacted the Greek Embassy21, as well as several municipalities throughout the Netherlands. However, they had no available data, as far as the Greek community is concerned. Specifically, I was looking information, with respect to the number of Greek immigrants, who voted both in municipal and European elections. I was told though, that, due to the fact that Greeks in the Netherlands constitute a relatively small ethnic minority, the data is limited. I also attempted to contact the Greek Statistical Institute, as well as Greek political parties, such as Syriza, PASOK and New Democracy, in order to find information about their local branches in the Netherlands. Because of the fact that there are no longer branches of Greek political parties in the Netherlands, I hoped to find data about the previous decades. However, they never answered. As to their current stance towards Greek expatriates, the only information I could get was via their official websites22, despite the fact that there was no explicit reference to Greek communities. My efforts, on the other hand, to contact CBS (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), OIS (Onderzoek, Informatie en Statistiek), and DBI (Dienst Basisinformatie in Amsterdam) were quite successful, since I managed to retrieve a little information about naturalization rates and citizenship. With regard to the numbers of immigrants that settled in the Netherlands23 during the Greek financial crisis, I consulted OECD24.
21 http://greekconsulate.tk/ 22 http://www.syriza.gr/page/theseis.html http://nd.gr/ http://www.pasok.gr/
23 see p.15 24 http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/data/oecd-international- migration-statistics/international-migration-database_data-00342-en
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Next, I had to find a sample that would best represent the diverse stakeholders and their beliefs, opinions and incentives. As long as I was interested in both “old” immigrants and newcomers, there was no age limit. However, I did not interview second-generation immigrants, since empirical studies have shown that interest towards the country of origin attenuates among the children of immigrants, regardless of their parents’ attachments. The sample thus is comprised of 17 Greek immigrants in total, 10 of which settled in the Netherlands during the economic recession of 2008, while the rest of them left Greece before the crisis. However, whereas there is no divergence in terms of time for those who settled afterwards, I noticed a higher level of diversity, regarding those immigrants who reached their residence country before the economic downturn that is, some of them settled during the early ‘80s, while others during the 2000’s. This is quite important since it could also denote socio- economic or educational differentiation. Five out of those 25 respondents represent the home-town associations in the Netherlands, i.e. Federation of the Greek Communities in the Netherlands, the Greek Community of Amsterdam and Reinform. The rest of the interviewees either do not participate in the Greek organizations, or contact them only via internet, as members of the facebook groups.
In order to find the sample, I was entirely based on facebook groups. Although many people were eager to participate, most of those who replied positively had been in the Netherlands for less than five years. It was essential therefore to find longer residents and well-integrated Greek immigrants, if I was to conduct a fruitful research. Since it was harder to locate them, I had to use snowball sampling; I asked for assistance from the rest of the participants and, eventually, I managed to contact 7 of them. The interviews were conducted face-to-face with five of the respondents, via telephone with two of them and via skype with the rest. The conversations lasted 40 minutes on average.
Last, in order for this research to be meaningful, I need to clarify the definition of the term transnational political participation. On the one hand, “transnational” refers to regular and sustained ties and relations with the country of origin. I take thus Guarnizo’s definition25 as a point of reference, in describing the “transnationalization of immigrants’ ties, i.e. the manner, in which they extend beyond territorial
25 See p.6
35 jurisdictions and contribute to the creation of encompassing social and political fields. Intermittent political activities cannot be related to transnationalism, since it is less likely for actors who mobilize only at crucial junctures to influence the bounded nature of the nation-state and its derivatives. On the other hand, “political participation” includes both electoral and non-electoral activities. There is a wide range of practices and behaviors that could account for political engagement or civic participation, such as involvement in community organizations, joining political groups or parties, contributing financially to candidates’ campaigns, marching in support of or in opposition to political regimes, taking part in demonstrations and protests, engaging with political conversations, getting informed about political developments, signing petitions, sending letters to officials and attending political meetings. Although external voting rights are of a paramount importance, they are mostly related to conventional political participation, which takes place within the norms and traditions of a particular country and for most people occurs only every few years at election time. Electoral behavior therefore does not suffice in revealing and explaining the potential transnationalization of immigrants’ political linkages.
To sum up, the interviews follow the logic of the theoretical framework. From this perspective, they are divided into three parts, i.e. individual characteristics, feelings and perceptions, contextual factors in the sending country and position in the receiving country. In the first part, the questions are related to the respondents’ socio- economic and educational background, their political behavior prior to migration and the reasons that shaped their decision to flee their country of origin. In the second part, I attempted to reveal their emotions, regarding the political and economic plight in Greece. Resentment or disappointment might influence to a large extent their motives to engage with transnational politics. Last, I asked them about their position in the Netherlands and their political behavior within their new settings. Questions about their jobs, friends and acquaintances, as well as natives’ attitudes towards them would help me reveal their beliefs and perceptions, with respect to the host-society. Moreover, information about their political activities, both home-oriented and domestic, would lead to the final conclusion.
3.2 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
36
One of the main disadvantages of qualitative research is that, due to the small size of the samples, the findings cannot be reduced to numbers and consequently cannot be generalized. In regard to this research, Greeks in the Netherlands constitute a small ethnic minority, despite the fact that during the last six years the numbers of the newcomers have increased. Moreover, qualitative-data collection is extremely time- consuming and expensive. Although there are not as many Greeks in the Netherlands as in other European countries, one could gather large amounts of data, had they the time and resources to travel throughout the country. The small size of the sample also reduces governmental and unofficial organizations’ likelihood to save the relevant data and archives. In this case, most of data was missing, while the available information was not adequate. Since the Netherlands is not a traditional immigration country for the Greeks, such as Germany for example, the state may have held a more indifferent stance towards them, comparing to Moroccan or Polish communities. From this standpoint, I had to rely solely upon respondents, in order to gain insight into their legal position in the host society. Additionally, the fact that I could not detect large numbers of Greek immigrants, who settled in the Netherlands during 1970’s and 1980’s, could also affect the quality of the research. As long as I am interested in differentiation in terms of socio-economic status, those who settled before the financial crisis of 2008, but during the 2000’s, may not differ to a large extent from the newcomers.
On the other hand, this research is characterized by strengths as well. Despite the small size of the sample, interviews largely contributed to providing details about immigrants’ perceptions, emotions, ideas and personality characteristics that a quantitative study would not be able to match. In this regard, I was able to follow the respondents’ mode of thought and reorder the questions, if it better suited the flow of the discussion. I managed thus to reveal aspects of their lives, that I would not be able to capture, if I had decided to carry out quantitative research. The behavioral patterns that emerged, during the study, offered an in-depth understanding and helped me to interpret the theoretical assumptions in a useful way. Although one could argue that the topic of this research is quite broad, I would counter-argue that this constitutes the most significant strength. Since political transnationalism is related to both migrant and non-migrant actors - such as the nation-state - accounting only for immigrants and their networks would not explain the interaction between powerful and non-powerful
37 players. It may seem that by seeking to reveal the differentiation in transnational engagement, according to individual traits, I also seek to ignore the significant role of the nation-state at the development of this phenomenon. However, socio-cultural or educational differentiation can only be explained with regard to national states and their policies. It is this interplay, between exit, reception and immigrants’ characteristics that determine the creation of transnational public fields. From this perspective, this study illustrates the decisive role that states continue to play that is, provides a multi-layered point of view, one that could be useful to future researches.
4) FINDINGS26
4.1 HOME-TOWN ASSOCIATIONS
The Greek community in the Netherlands was established in 1974. It was first founded in Utrecht, where most Greek expatriates were concentrated and it expanded in several cities in the next years, such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Groningen. Its main activities were mainly of a traditional and cultural character, while it also provided Greek language courses for the children of immigrants. Since it was not possible for most people to make use of the internet, the majority of the Greek migrants had to join the community, in order to find information, with regard to the host-country, but also to socialize with co-ethnics and keep in touch with the Greek culture. The Greek, as well as the Dutch state, was responsible for the funding of the community’s clubs and organizations. The Greek government organized cultural events and appointed teachers for migrants’ linguistic institutions, while it founded Orthodox churches and “Greek Houses”, in order to contribute to the expansion of “Hellenism”. The Dutch government - the local municipalities particularly - financed Dutch language courses but also offered financial resources for Greeks’ home- oriented activities. In some cases, municipalities were entirely responsible for the coordination and performance of the community’s main tasks27.
26 According to the respondents.
38
During the 1990’s, due to the turn to more restrictive migration policies, the Dutch government stopped the funding of immigrants’ organizations. Moreover, the Greek government’s efforts to provide Greek communities with both economic and human capital were constrained, since the Greek state was now largely engaged with refugees and returnees. Many branches of the Greek community closed, while expatriates’ participation rate was reduced. The members, who remained involved, had to entirely rely upon their own contributions, in order to continue organizing their most important activities, such as Greek language courses.
Nowadays, there are three braches left in the Netherlands28. Despite the fact that the Greek community remained dormant, during the 2000’s, the arrival of many Greek immigrants after the economic recession of 2008 resulted in the reconstruction of Greeks’ main organizations and the replacement of older members by younger well- educated people, whose activities are oriented towards providing assistance and information to the newcomers. In Amsterdam, the Youth of the Greek Community “Greeks in the Netherlands” or “Griekse gemeenschap van Amsterdam” attempted to move towards a more professional and organized effort towards the building of an encompassing social network. Financing is based entirely on crowd-funding, i.e. members’ donations or administration’s resources that is, the members of the council, such as the chairman, the secretary and the consultants. Lawyers, psychologists, teachers and nutritionists work voluntarily while it is the first time that emphasis is placed on integration into the Dutch society, rather than recreation. The main activities are related to Greek and Dutch language courses, psychological support to new immigrants, with regard to the “cultural shock” for example, legal advice about duties and rights in the Netherlands, seminars and programs about freelancing but also cultural projects, such as traditional dancing courses, and exhibitions with Greek products. The Greek school of Amsterdam is comprised of one kindergarten, 5 primary schools and 2 high-schools. Teachers in these schools get paid by the Greek state, while any other expenses are covered by children’s parents. Children attend Greek language courses every Saturday29.
29 www.griekseschoolamsterdam.n
39
As to the branches of Utrecht and Rotterdam, these are not as much organized as Amsterdam’s community. Rotterdam’s organization provides only Greek dancing courses, while participation rate in Utrecht’s branch has decreased dramatically and is now comprised of a very few members. It is more considered as a symbol of Greeks’ rootedness in the Netherlands, rather as an active home-town association.
Despite the recent remarkable development of the community of Amsterdam, newcomers do not tend to join the organization and do not engage actively with its activities. Most of them contact the members, only to get useful information about the housing and labor market in the Netherlands, while they prefer to socialize with international or Dutch people, rather than their co-ethnics. The advent of the internet and the expansion of the on-line groups have significantly contributed to this shift. Whereas lively offline associations constitute only three branches, on-line groups, especially on facebook, are countless and represent almost every Dutch city. People rather prefer to share their beliefs, ideas and concerns about the host society via internet, instead of meeting other Greek immigrants face-to-face.
Petros posted:
Good evening. I have already referred to the problems that Greek newcomers in the Netherlands have to deal with. A month ago I was looking for a job and a room. A Greek woman, who has been living in the Netherlands for more than ten years contacted me and told me that she wanted to help Greek newcomers. She told me that I could stay to her apartment for a while and she asked me to share the house’s expenses. When she asked for 250 euro and a copy of my identity card, I realized that her intention was to take advantage of me. She receives an unemployment benefit and at the same time she rents rooms of her apartment illegally. After two days, she started blackmailing me and threatened to kick me out. She yells and she breaks things. I told her that I wanted my money back, or else I wouldn’t go. Please, tell me what I should do. Should I report her to the police?
And Giannis replied to Petros:
You should report her to the Municipality. They will give you every kind of information you need. But don’t start grumbling! You should forget everything about the Greek attitude. You don’t have to get angry or upset. Don’t get carried away!
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Many well-integrated Greeks in the Netherlands also attempt to inform newcomers about the challenges they are going to face or provide them with useful tips. Panos posted on “Greeks in Amsterdam”:
Good morning! Since I know how difficult it gets to find a house in the Netherlands, I would like to inform you that there is an apartment to rent close to the region, where I stay. It will cost you 1000 euro per month. There are lots of schools in the area, two malls, and foremost no criminality. It is 20 minutes away from Hoofddorp by bike and 15 minutes away from the airport. If you are interested, feel free to contact me.
And Anna:
We are looking for personnel for the restaurant we run. If you need any information, you can refer to our website! Thank you!
They also provide information about several cultural events. Panos V. on “Greeks in Utrecht” wrote:
This is the last show of the Greek band “Tsipuro and the Potes” in “Rhodos”. Greek traditional and folk music and plenty of tsipuro! Like an old-school tavern! Be there!
And Takis:
Get ready for a Greek summer party in Delft! We are waiting for you!
Others place advertisements about their businesses. Theodoros wrote:
Ouzo and Spirits – Soft and Alcoholic Drinks: YAMAS contains the basic values of life: the friendship, the joy, the smile, the sun, the sea and the whole tradition of Greece just in a bottle! Join us on greekfoodtales.com. Lekker!
Many of them engage with charity, in regard to vulnerable social groups in Greece, or inform the groups of the members about the political and economic developments in Greece. The new-founded organization “Help Children in Greece” posts:
HCIG is here in de Hallen in Amsterdam! Come at the festival Ellada Pantou! And don’t forget we’re collecting clothes for children 4-11.
While Pavlos Kerasavopoulos, the leader of the Federation of the Greek Communities, informs the members of the group about the imminent arrival of Prokopis Pavlopoulos, the seventh President of Greece. He writes:
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After a formal invitation of the King William-Alexander, the President of Greece, Prokopis Pavlopoulos, will come to the Netherlands on the 4th of July of 2016. Upon his arrival, he will meet the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, as well as the Presidents of the Parliament and the Senate. On the 4th of July he will also meet the leader of the Federation of the Greek Communities, as well as their representatives.
Despite the fact that members of the off-line organizations and communities claim that they do not engage with political matters, many of them attempt to provide members of the on-line communities with information about political and economic problems in Greece. However, none of them refers to specific political parties, while the majority of the posts are related to cultural events or integration issues.
While Greek Communities, engage with everyday immigrants’ matters, “Reinform”30 constitutes a Greek political organization, which was established in 2011.
Reinform is a political group of Greeks living in the Netherlands. We met in the summer of 2011 at the squares of Europe to protest against the policies and the practices that facilitate a vast transfer of wealth from the unprivileged many to the privileged few. We follow the spirit of struggle and solidarity that was born in Tunisia and Egypt, crossed the Mediterranean to Puerta del Sol and Syntagma Square and is spreading all around the world. We came together to fight on the same side with the workers, the unemployed, the young people – all those that are forced to live in poverty for the sake of the economic and political elites’ interests.
Reinform’s activities are related to political matters that concern both Greece and the European Union and orient towards providing information about the later developments, with regard to economy, such as the Greek fiscal debt, labor relations, laws, policies, and institutional responses to several social phenomena, such as the refugee crisis. It mostly criticizes the current political regime of the European Union and the implementation of austerity measures about their implications on European nations:
We consider this crisis to be global and more profound than the previous crises of market economy. To preserve the profits of the share- and bondholders, the economic and political elites apply the same neoliberal recipes that were used in Latin America, Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the previous decades: Fiscal austerity, privatization of public assets, tax breaks
30 http://www.reinform.nl/?page_id=1053
42 for companies and the rich, while slashing any remnants of social welfare and working class rights. European Union has an active role in the imposition of the above policies.
Apart from providing information about political issues, Reinform also supports newcomers, by offering necessary advice about Dutch rules and regulations, regarding labor market, as well as their rights and duties, working and living conditions, universities, job-searching and potential problems that would have to deal with as expatriates:
There is an abundance of websites, on which you can find instructions and advice, regarding practical matters that you will have to deal with in the Netherlands. This article offers a different perspective, from which you can consider yourself as an immigrant or an expat. We believe that, regardless the reasons that led you to settling in the Netherlands, you will have to consider yourself as an active citizen with not only duties, but also rights. Employment, studies, residence and job-searching are characterized by laws and regulations, which derived from enduring protests and negotiations (mainly in the past). You should not consider yourself to be a “gastarbeider” and do not think that they do you a favor, when they offer a job position.
Reinform also organizes demonstrations, rallies and protests and often invites scholars, authors, intellectuals and other stakeholders, the activities of whom are related to politics or several social phenomena:
Solidarity with the Greek people! No to the blackmail of the EU! The crisis will not be paid by the European citizens! On Sunday February 15th there will be demonstrations all over Greece and Europe since on that day crucial negotiations between the Greek government and the Eurogroup will take place. We invite everybody to join us on Sunday in solidarity with the citizens of Greece against Eurogroup’s persistence to continue with the regime of austerity policies in Europe. And:
Around 50 people attended REINFORM’s info event that took place yesterday in Nieuwland (East Amsterdam) in solidarity with the self-managed factory Vio.Me. (Thessaloniki, Greece).31
31 “In July 2011, a few months after being abandoned by its owners, Vio.Me. was occupied by its workers. Since February 2013, Vio.Me. managed by the general assembly of its workers, has been producing organic soaps and cleaning products” (http://www.reinform.nl/?p=8176).
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Despite the 2.393 followers on facebook, there are only a small number of Greek immigrants that actively participate in Reinform. Kleoniki, one of the members told me:
Very few people choose to join Reinform, that’s why they didn’t answer to you on time (laughs)! Typically there are 20 members but actually only 10 of us engage with everyday activities. And, despite the fact that there are 100 persons registered on our main lists and around 2000 followers on facebook, those who get involved are 10 people, including me. So, it is difficult to organize everything on time. If you don’t have acquaintances or friends that are aware of such initiatives in the Netherlands, it is difficult to find them. Also, the majority of people are not interested in joining a group like this. Even people, who were active citizens in Greece, stop being interested, as soon as they come here, mainly because of their job or studies. On the other hand, it is also not easy for us to inform them. Due to the fact that we do not constitute a political party with the relevant organizational structure, brochures, etc, it is not that simple to find those people, who are interested in participating.
Although Reinform is the only Greek political group in the Netherlands, other attempts have also been oriented towards mobilizing Greek immigrants. “New Diaspora” was created by Nikos Stamboulopoulos, who settled in Amsterdam in 2009, due to the Greece’s economic downturn:
The way things were done there was depriving me of the chance to be creative and live my life as I wanted…I chose to move to Amsterdam, a place that looks like toothpaste commercial in comparison to the misery in the center of Athens.32
Stamboulopoulos’s idea about the creation of “New Diaspora” was based on the fact that nowadays more and more people use the internet to maintain ties with their countries of origin. According to the website, Greeks’ collective identity can only be revealed and redefined within the context of an all-embracing community:
New Diaspora started out as a digital story-telling platform, focusing on the new generation of Greeks living abroad during the crisis in their homeland. Since then, New Diaspora has been gradually evolving into a participatory media channel that records a migration wave as it happens. Its goal is to engage, connect and inspire democratic dialogue and cross-fertilization of ideas, eventually crystallizing the collective pulse of a border-less nation. And:
32 http://www.newdiaspora.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/press-screenshots-01.jpg
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New Diaspora aims to tell the complex story of a migration wave in real time. Users turn into participants, eventually becoming co-authors of their collective narrative. Not only do we tell our story together, but we are also writing the script of the story we want to tell together. We become the story. By making it a story worth told, we can also become the change.
New Diaspora thus clearly aims at developing identities, loyalties, representations and activities that transcend national borders and do not depend on bounded political communities. By invoking common experiences, it seeks to bring together Greeks, those who fled their country because of the financial crisis, reinforce their sense of belonging and mobilize them towards contributing to the change of the current adverse social, political and economic plight in Greece. Apart from the efforts to give voice to young Greek citizens, New Diaspora has attempted to a great extent to lobby the Greek government, regarding Greek expatriates’ enfranchisement. It has organized a remarkable campaign for the granting of external voting rights and organized thousands of Greek immigrants to this purpose:
We are Greek citizens, we live abroad and we are entitled to vote in the parliamentary elections of our country. Unfortunately, we are not allowed to do so from our place of residence. Our restricted access to the electoral process is a form of discrimination, even more embarrassing if one considers that Greece is the birthplace of democracy. Since we are not ready to give away one of our fundamental democratic rights, we decide to take action. “I Cannot Vote” is a campaign aiming to raise awareness for our cause, in order to apply pressure to the Members of the Greek Parliament. Our initiative is spontaneous and completely independent from political parties or groups.
Nikos Stamboulopoulos is also the film-maker of the relevant video, as well as the creator of the on-line petition. Despite the fact that thousands of people around the world have largely supported this initiative, the Greek state is still reluctant to grant the franchise to its emigrants.
Last, Hellas Pindakaas is a Greek radio-show, whose creators follow the same logic:
Our goal, along with information, entertainment and the blending of cultures, is to give the opportunity to the thousands of Greek expats and other interested friends to stay in touch with the Greek culture and the expat community. In our effort to strengthen the Greek element in the Netherlands, we have interviewed numerous Greek expats and second generation Greeks. Those interviews help us understand their needs and worries.
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Hellas Pindakaas, apart from the radio show, has also developed an on-line website, on which information is provided, regarding Dutch and Greek political matters, cultural events and Greek communities in the Netherlands, advertisements are placed, with respect to Greek business projects in several Dutch cities and advice is offered to the newcomers for their integration into the Dutch society. Its founders are actively engaged with politics in both Greece and the Netherlands33.
One of their main goals is to keep the Greek ethnic community informed, but also to provide Dutch with important information about the Greek economic crisis. Since the media in the Netherlands have largely contributed to the reproduction of negative stereotypes, Nikos Koulousios, one of the founders, seeks to water down their influence, by talking about Greece on Dutch TV shows or inviting key-stakeholders to express their opinions:
Is Holland the paradise newspapers are telling us about? And if so, is Greece really the living hell that the media describe it to be? Our philosophy is based on the idea that to bring different cultures together, there has to be done some mutual understanding, and to do so, some myths must be debunked and the stereotypes must be recognized and explained…It was becoming all the more evident that the Dutch society was evolving and was wholeheartedly embracing notions of racism, ultra conservatism, neo-liberalism and individualism. I saw the country that I admired being transformed into its worse self.
To sum up, although most Greek communities do not exist anymore and Greek immigrants hesitate to engage with their activities, there have been considerable efforts towards their mobilizing and bringing together. However, we cannot have a clear enough picture, unless we discover immigrants’ perceptions.
4.2 SENDING CONTEXT
4.2A. DETERMINANTS, EMOTIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR – NEWCOMERS
33 http://www.nieuwgrieksestudies.nl/thema/n-koulousios-schuim-en-as-buitenhof-7-juni- 2015/
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Kleoniki, 31, settled in the Netherlands 6 years ago, in 2010. She left Greece, in order to do her master studies in economic history. Now, she does her PHD studies at Wageningen University.
Either way, I wanted to leave Greece, in order to do master studies abroad. However, the truth is that, if things were better in Greece, I would return and I would try to find a job.
Yiannis, 31, told me:
I settled in the Netherlands in 2014, 2 years ago. I wanted to do master studies abroad and I pondered over it for a long time, before making up my mind. From 2010 onwards, things got much worse in Greece and I realized that they wouldn’t get any better. That’s why I decided to leave.
When I asked Yiannis if Greece’ situation affected him, he answered:
Despite the fact that I had managed to gain some working experience, most of the time I was unemployed. As to the nature of the jobs…they were awful.
Lydia, 28, was less disappointed, regarding employment in Greece.
I came to the Netherlands 3.5 years ago, not necessarily because I couldn’t find a job in Greece. After graduating university, I managed to find several jobs and, from this perspective, I could gain some working experience. However, I was employed mostly on short fixed-term contracts of 4- 6 months, without any prospect of transition to standard agreements. I was trapped in insecure jobs. Nevertheless, my motivation for leaving Greece was clearly related to gaining the experience of living abroad.
Dimitra, 28, did he master studies in Haag and now she works at the ING bank.
I came to the Netherlands 5 years ago, in 2011. As soon as I received my bachelor degree, I tried to find a job…but I didn’t. I wanted to do master studies, but I knew that it would still be difficult to enter the labor market, after graduation. So, I decided to leave. Yet, I am sure that, if it wasn’t for the financial crisis, I would not have thought about it.
Kostas, 28, settled in the Netherlands 4 years ago, in order to do his master studies. The determinants of emigration were related to the particular characteristics of the Dutch society.
I wanted to come to the Netherlands, mostly because it is the most liberal and tolerant country in the world! Foreigners are welcome here.
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Yiannis, 36 and Nadia, 30 came to the Netherlands 4 years ago, in 2012. Nadia finished her master studies and Yiannis, her boyfriend, works as a chef.
The black hole of dept kicked us out of Greece! It was impossible for us to find a decent job…We decided to come here, because we knew that we would be able to find a job, without speaking the language.
Vaggelis, 37, has a PHD in political philosophy and now he works for a small company.
When I was in Greece, I used to work as a teacher in a private school, but this job wasn’t a good fit…I decided to come to the Netherlands because people here are much more open- minded and liberal in every regard. What is more, it would be much easier to find a job, without speaking Dutch.
Nikos, 34 and Nadia, 36 settled in the Netherlands 4.5 years ago. They own an advertising company, which is engaged in web-designing and developing.
Nikos: We left Greece, because our former employer stopped paying us. I told Nadia: “If we don’t leave, we won’t survive”!
Yet, their job was not the only reason.
Nikos: Many other things were also very annoying…racism, xenophobia, misery, petty politics, labeling, grumbling…We booked two tickets and we left!
They were eager to leave Greece.
Nadia: We didn’t make a research…We were completely unorganized! Someone told us that the Netherlands is super and we decided to come here…Nikos’s best friend had been living here for a while and we stayed at his place in the beginning.
Georgia, 39 settled in the Netherlands 4 years ago, in 2012. She graduated high school and she has been working ever since. Now she works in a factory. Emigration was the only option for her.
I left Greece because it was extremely difficult for me to find a decent job…and I didn’t want to live with my parents; it felt like charity.
Georgia did not conduct a research, because she did not have access to the internet.
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I didn’t even have money to go to an internet café. When I visited my friends, I preferred talking with them rather than searching for information…Either way, I was determined to leave.
Waldinger contends that political involvement prior to migration is closely related to the development of recurrent and enduring political ties. Emotions about the political plight in the country of origin also matter a great deal. In order to examine if and how emigrants’ feelings influence their motivations, we need to explore their perceptions about the predicaments in their home-country.
Kleoniki attempted to make a distinction between the current and the former government.
I think that no one is contented with Syriza. Personally speaking, I have a real problem with austerity and memoranda. On the other hand, I also have to recognize the government’s efforts to do their best. I prefer them above the former right-wing government.
As far as humanitarian issues are concerned, such as the refugee crisis or the LGBT community, I am sure that the right-wingers would not have performed in favor of these vulnerable groups.
As to her political involvement:
When I was back in Greece, I always voted for Syriza and I was also a member of the Youth. After the referendum, many members decided to withdraw.
Yiannis has a different opinion.
I firmly believe that the ruling party is mainly comprised of crooks and dangerous liars, who managed to turn the whole Europe against Greece. It is one of the worst governments ever, even worse than the previous one!
Yet he is not sure if he wants to stay in the Netherlands permanently.
There are some days when I terribly miss Greece. Sometimes I feel that Dutch people are driving me crazy! On the other hand, there is no future in Greece. I am afraid that, if I returned, I would still be unemployed into my fifties!
Despite the fact that he does not trust the current government, he claims that he was politically engaged, when he was in Greece.
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I was an active citizen and I always voted. I had also participated in the “Indignant Movement”34. However, I never joined a political party; neither did I attend any demonstrations. I always thought that, since everything is contrived, demonstrating is silly. I believe that voting is enough.
Lydia told me that she misses Greece, but hesitated to discuss politics with me. Yet she expressed her opinion about external voting rights.
The fact that I cannot vote from abroad is very annoying. This feeling upsets me, especially when I see that everyone else –expats from other countries- enjoys this privilege.
She told me that she did not engage with conventional political activities.
I haven’t voted in every election and I never joined a political party. Despite that, I was a member of a student organization, which engaged with particular political issues, such as human rights and education. We organized public meetings and we contacted several institutions, as well as officeholders. If you ask me, getting involved in such activities means you are an active citizen.
Dimitra would return to Greece conditionally.
I do not intend to stay here, since I terribly miss my family, my friends and the sun! Yet, you never know…Working conditions in Greece are awful and I’ve become a bit “spoiled” here, as far as my job is concerned. So it depends on the nature of the job; I wouldn’t return, if it was for a poor-quality or minimum-wage job.
Regarding Greece’s political instability, she answered:
I am very contented with the Greek government. It is the greatest government ever; the Golden Age of Tsipras!35 (Sarcastic laugh) Well…I don’t think they are doing well and I am a bit disappointed. Tsipras is absolutely unqualified for this position; he doesn’t have the ability to negotiate…he doesn’t even speak English! He has to realize that he is the Prime Minister, not a desk clerk!
She was not interested in politics, when she was in Greece.
34 The Indignant Movement was created in 2011 by anti-austerity activists, who organized a series of demonstrations and general strikes in major cities across Greece. The events were provoked by plans to implement harsh austerity measures in exchange for a 110 euro billion bail- out. 35 Paraphrase of the “Golden Age of Pericles” in the Greek city-state of Athens (449 BC – 404 BC). During this period of time, significant advances were made in a number of fields, including government, art, philosophy, drama and literature. The notorious Golden Age flourished under the leadership of Pericles.
50
As long as I was living in Greece, I never got involved in politics. Since indulging in pettiness is a common practice among Greek politicians, I had no interest, none whatsoever! I didn’t even read the newspapers. I used to vote, but not in every election. As to political rallies, I participated only once.
Kostas blames both the government and the Greek citizens.
I don’t believe in the rhetorical strategy of blaming others. In my opinion, the primary culprit is not the European Union, but rather the electorate. Poorly-educated, self-interested and narrow-minded people will inevitably vote for politicians, who resemble them. In other words, there is a political culture of a very low quality and fundamental problems in the Greek society, which are closely related to the current situation.
Regarding the way Syriza handled things:
Once more, Greeks voted for incompetent candidates, who have never worked in their lives! People of this kind are not trustworthy; they are incapable of leading, let alone helping a country beset by a multi-level crisis.
Kostas told me that he was highly politically engaged. His opinion about political demonstrations is in line with Yiannis’s view.
I always voted and I was highly politically engaged. I always kept myself informed and I sought to socialize with people who held different political views than mine. Because of the fact that my family was actively involved, I had also participated in pre-election campaigns, both at a local and a national level, and I had joined a political party. Yet, I was never absolutely contended with their manifestos and the way they handled key issues.
As to political rallies, I avoided participating in protests or strikes. It was pointless…I only attended two anti-war demonstrations.
Yiannis and Nadia were very pessimistic.
Yiannis: After 6 years of memoranda, it’s not how you feel about the predicaments, but how you perceive the reality…and the reality is dark and dismal. There is no turning back now. Politicians are just puppets of the troika, the whole political system is manipulated and people’s dreams and hopes have to be sacrificed in the name of the fiscal debt!
Nadia: I think that voters are responsible too…they still support MP’s, who are willing to ratify hideous EU treaties and laws. It makes no sense! On the other hand, I have to make
51 myself clear…Pangalos claimed that “we all ate together”! No, we didn’t! Not all of us are corrupt!36
Yiannis and Nadia think that Tispras had planned everything in advance, with respect to the Greek referendum.
Yiannis: Tsipras had the power to change things, but he didn’t! I have no doubt that he had a consistent line from the outset. He knew very well that the EU would never accept a break with the memorandum and he duped everyone into thinking that he would restore democracy and national sovereignty.
Nadia: He thought that Greeks would be really afraid and affected by the media’s continuous propaganda and that they wouldn’t take the risk of voting No…but he was wrong!
Both of them think that Tsipras betrayed Greeks.
Nadia: Syriza stabbed the Greek people in the back! Every time they signed up to harsher austerity, they encouraged people to protest against blackmail and ultimatums. Greeks believed in him…They took to the streets and they gave them a clear mandate to end this humiliation. Yet, Tsipras betrayed them!
Yiannis: In my opinion, it was a very well-planned manipulation, because he knew that people, who once supported him, would not have the courage to rally against him.
Despite the fact that they never joined a political party, they were highly politically engaged.
Yiannis: Nowadays, it is common knowledge that the interests of companies and their stakeholders are prioritized over the interests of the public. Hence, joining mainstream political parties is pointless. On the other hand, united, farmers and workers would be able to achieve much more than they would individually. It’s us and them!
Nadia: Despite the fact that we never joined a political party, we were both actively engaged. We used to take to the streets regularly and we attended several demonstrations, organized by Antarsya, PAME and the Anarchist Movement37. We were also members of the “Deport
36 Theodoros Pangalos is a Greek politician and former Deputy Prime Minister. In 2010, a few months after Greece’s bailout package, he claimed, on television, that everyone, not just politicians, are responsible for the squandering of public money. “We all ate together”, he said at the time. 37 ANTARSYA (Anti-capitalist Left Cooperation for the Overthrow) is a coalition of left-wing political organizations. The Greek word antarsia means mutiny. PAME (the All-Workers Militant Front) “represents the class trade union movement of Greece” (pamehellas.gr).
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Racism Organization”, which is primarily involved with the rights of immigrants and refugees in Greece.38
As far as voting is concerned:
Yiannis: I voted only twice…but this was a conscious decision of mine. I strongly believe that collective action happens in the streets, not the ballot box.
Nadia: I always voted. I don’t think that abstention constitutes a viable alternative.
Vaggelis has mixed feelings about the Greek government.
Money matters in politics and when you don’t have money, you can’t do anything. The current government of Syriza doesn’t have the resources to finance recovery. On the other hand, I feel very angry and disappointed. Tsipras promised that a Syriza-led government would, after cancelling the memorandum, raise minimum salary to the pre-cut level and suspend any cuts to pensions and social spending. However, he changed his mind…He capitulated to the creditors’ demands…He decided to disregard the resounding “No” of the referendum.
Regarding his political involvement:
I was politically active in Greece, but not institutionally involved. I always voted but I never joined a political party. I was a member of the Greek Teachers’ Union and I attended many demonstrations.
Yiannis and Nadia attribute the current social and political plight to the corrupt political system. According to them, corruption is a fundamental trait of the Greek society, which affects to a great extent people’s convictions and behaviors.
Nadia: Greek people are unreasonably obstinate. They refuse to understand that you can’t blame Europe for everything. Alleging that we never make mistakes is ridiculous; it means that we are either stupid or infallible! For example, most people my age adopted their parents’ political views inadvertently and they voted under their influence. Whose fault is this? Theirs! If you don’t have a critical way of thinking, it’s not Europe’s fault!
She said that the abovementioned way of thinking had affected her too.
38 The Deport Racism Organization is a group of immigrants and Greek citizens against racism and neo-fascism and was founded in 2007.
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When I came to the Netherlands, it was very difficult for me to change. My parents instilled in me a sense of pride for our country, which is why I was incapable of thinking objectively. When I realized that I did everything wrong, because of this emotional attachment, I managed to see things as they are. Now, I’ve let go of past experiences and backgrounds.
Nikos blames the Greek political culture.
There are specific Greek mentalities, which unfortunately are too strong to root out. Everything is based on corruption and bribery. Greek voters are clients and this reciprocal dispensation of favors has remained the norm. When corruption starts at the top and permeates the whole society, it becomes incorporated into a country’s culture.
Nadia thinks that, despite the fact that she voted in every election, she was not politically engaged. Nikos blames the political system for his indifference.
Nadia: When I was younger, my political choices were largely influenced by my parents. They were both highly politically engaged; my father was a member of the PASOK and my mother was a high-ranking civil servant. So, I always voted for their friends. When I grew up, I realized that this was wrong! (Laughter)
Nikos: Since I didn’t feel aligned to any of the political parties, I decided to abstain from voting. Besides, you didn’t have any choice in Greece; you should support either PASOK or New Democracy, both of which were involved in several political scandals.
Georgia said that she misses Greece, but she would never return.
“As soon as I stepped off the plane, I vowed that I would never return to Greece! I said: “This is it”! I was 36 and I knew that I didn’t have the prospects of a young girl.
Despite the fact that she was not politically engaged, she feels very disappointed by the Syriza government, as well as Greek voters.
To be honest, I believed in Tsipras. I thought he was the savior…the right man…but he wasn’t! Sometimes, I think that it wasn’t up to him. Maybe he was threatened…On the other hand, I know how Greeks think; they are not going to act, unless it gets too cold!
She thinks that Greece should leave the European Union.
Either we leave the European Union and we start over, or we remain and we pay forever! We will hit rock bottom…so what? We’ve hit bottom in the past, during the Asia Minor Catastrophe, the WWII, the civil war, the dictatorship…but we made it! Greek people have to
54 realize that our country is capable of everything. We have to stop recalling the ancient Greeks and their accomplishments. What are we going to eat? The Parthenon Marbles?
4.2B. DETERMINANTS, EMOTIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR – IMMIGRANTS WHO SETTLED IN THE NETHERLANDS BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008.
Christos, 49, settled in the Netherlands in 1991, 25 years ago. He has worked in the customer-service industry and, specifically, in several multinational companies, such as Apple and Nokia. Now, he works as a freelancer and he has, also created an on-line store with Greek food products.
When I was back in Greece, I used to work in the jewelry-making business, but I didn’t like it…I wanted to gain the experience of living abroad…I wanted to see something else! I didn’t come here to make money; I just didn’t like Greece anymore.
It was not easy for him to find information.
We didn’t have access to internet back then, so I visited the Dutch Embassy in Thessaloniki, in order to find the relevant information.
Vivian, 31, settled in the Netherlands 10 years ago, in order to do her master studies in psychology. Now, she works as a professional psychologist at the British Council and she owns an on-line counseling company, as well.
I came here, in order to do master studies, but I didn’t intend to stay. However, I received several job offers, after graduating university, so I decided to seize the opportunity.
Sofia, 34, left Greece in 2006, as soon as she received her bachelor degree. She has one PHD and two master degrees, in the field of technology. Now, she works at the Booking Company.
Before I left Greece, I fell in love with a Dutch guy, but we didn’t want to have a long- distance relationship. Since I also wanted to study abroad, I decided to come here with him. Two birds with one stone!
Luiza, 35, left Greece for the same reason. She settled in the Netherlands 9 years ago, in 2007. Now she works as an accountant.
In Greece, I studied at a Technological Educational Institute and, as soon as I graduated, I worked as a shoe-designer for almost 10 years. I liked my job and the money was good, but
55 there were no future prospects and I didn’t want to settle for fewer things. As soon as I decided to leave, I met my husband…He was Dutch! So, I went for it!
Pavlos Kerasavopoulos, the president of the Federation of the Greek Communities, settled in the Netherlands in 1980, almost 35 years ago.
I decided to leave Greece because of love! I met a beautiful Dutch girl and I came to the Netherlands with her. Now we are married and we have 3 children.
Dimitris, 52, settled in the Netherlands in 1972, when he was 8 years old. He works as an engineer and he has also been a volunteer fireman for 20 years.
My father left Greece in 1970, because of the junta. He did have a job; He was working in the drilling sector…but he had to leave. As soon as he came here and he found a job, he told us to come with him. So, we left Greece in 1972.
The dominance of a two-party political system and a period of relative prosperity, prior to their migration, may have resulted in differentiated political involvement and perceptions about the current social and political conditions in Greece.
Christos voted only once, when he was in Greece. Yet, he claims that he was actively engaged.
I was always interested in politics and I kept myself informed on a daily basis. Yet, I was never intolerant to different views, unlike most Greeks. The fact that I voted only once doesn’t mean that I wasn’t politically engaged. I just couldn’t identify with any of the then political parties. I was more of a socialist and PASOK didn’t meet the requirements.
Christos, not only blames Syriza for the current situation in Greece, but the whole political system.
I think that Syriza is the worst government ever! The Constitution does not allow for referendums on fiscal matters, so I think that it was illegal. It was just a cunning plan to create strife…reminiscent of the old days! Yet, I don’t feel aligned to any of the political parties. The whole political system is dysfunctional.
Vivian said that, despite the fact that she never joined a political party, she used to engage with other forms of political action.
I never joined a political party, but I used to vote and I was trying to keep myself informed. I also did voluntary work with vulnerable people, such as homeless and drug-addicts. I don’t
56 know if this is considered to be political engagement, but in my opinion street working is an essential political activity.
Regarding her opinion about the current government:
I think that the condition in Greece is a lot worse than it looks. Most people expected that a Syriza-led government would find a different way to handle the situation. However, it wouldn’t be easy for them, after 6 years of memoranda. Tsipras –after the 7-hour meeting with the committee members- said that we had lost our national sovereignty and I think I agree with him. It is very sad, when the Prime Minister of a country makes such a statement.
Sofia was highly politically engaged.
When I was in Greece, I was a left-wing supporter. I never voted for PASOK and New Democracy. I always voted for KKE (the Communist Party of Greece) or Syriza. I never joined a political party, but I was always well-informed about politics.
Like most of the respondents, she thinks that Syriza ignored the Greek people.
Last summer, when the referendum was held, I felt really bad, because of the growing division among Greeks. People, who until recently were friends, ended up hating each other! Why so much hate? We turned against each other for nothing…they utterly disregarded the result and I blame the government for that.
She attempted to explain why the Greek government failed.
I wasn’t sure he was going to make it through this, because there were many different and even opposing components within Syriza…and I think this was the most worrying problem. And I was right, because they did everything wrong, especially during negotiations; Varoufakis thought that table thumping would convince them…but it wasn’t an effective strategy. I’ve been living abroad for so many years and I know that people abroad don’t think like us.
Luiza, on the other hand, has a different opinion.
I am quite optimistic about the current government. We’ve been through worse and survived, so I don’t have anything negative to say about Syriza. Besides, they are much better that the former ones. I know that most Greeks blame Tsipras, but I think they exaggerate.
As to the level of her political engagement:
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When I was young, I was highly engaged with politics. I always voted for KKE and I was also a member of the party. I’ve never voted for anything else. I also participated in KKE’s radio shows. I still support KKE.
Pavlos Kerasavopoulos did not want to express his opinion about the current political conditions in Greece. The only thing he said was that he did not believe in the referendum.
Dimitris said:
I already knew that nothing was going to change! They are all the same! Politicians, civil servants, journalists… I am sick of them!
4.3 RECEIVING CONTEXT
4.3A. EMOTIONS ABOUT THE HOST-SOCIETY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR – NEWCOMERS
In order to look into Greek immigrants’ motives and perceptions about the host- country, I asked them about their social network, their interaction with the natives and their position in the Dutch society.
Kleoniki said that she has never felt discriminated against. All the same, she thinks that there are important cultural differences between Dutch and Greek people.
They had always been kind and helpful…However, when it comes to more difficult tasks, such as showing solidarity, they only care about themselves…their own family and their own job. I have no trust in them… none whatsoever!
Yet, she does not overlook their positive characteristics.
Their professionalism is one of their advantages. For instance, visiting civil services is much less frustrating in the Netherlands, than in Greece. Employees are always polite and helpful. Another advantage is automation. However, like I said, they lack consideration and solicitude…it’s like everything and everyone fits in little boxes!
Yiannis found it very difficult to adapt to the new setting.
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During the first year, I suffered great hardship, which is why I learned to do everything on my own. Due to these difficulties, I sought to socialize only with Greeks. Many of them went up to me at school and told me that they couldn’t deal with the cultural shock. It was very comforting, because I felt the same way.
He has mixed feelings about the natives as well.
I think that they are friendly but also cold. They speak English, they behave nicely and they smile. However, it is not real; it is something they have learned…a rule they have to conform to. In general, they promise a lot but deliver very little.
He says that the natives tend to reproduce the negative stereotypes about Greeks, because of the media’s propaganda.
I can’t say I have been discriminated against. Every time they make racist comments, I always reply and I leave them speechless. Besides, most of these comments are utterly foolish. They just rehash what they read in the newspapers, without questioning their credibility.
Lydia thinks that the natives’ behavior is largely related to immigrants’ position in the host-country. When they occupy high-paid prestigious jobs, Dutch are reluctant to express racist ideas. However, sometimes it is difficult for her to avoid racist comments.
I had a conversation with my landlord the other day and suddenly she went ballistic! She started speaking Dutch and she told me: “This is the Netherlands and we are going to speak Dutch”! I was shocked, because I have been living in the apartment for more than a year now and she has never behaved like this before. Now, I am looking for another apartment.
Dimitra says that the positive characteristics of the Dutch society outnumber the negatives ones.
The difference from Greece is huge. For example, superiors in Greece look down on you, sabotage your personal development, treat you like you are a useless idiot…Such arrogant and boorish workplace behavior does not exist in the Netherlands. If you are efficient and worthy of the position, they respect you and they help you ascend.
She thinks that institutional racism is not the case in the Netherlands.
They do make “racist” comments, but they are just joking. For example, is it considered racist when you make a joke about the Spanish siesta? I don’t think so… In general, it depends on
59 the way you see it. If you ask me, Dutch make jokes about everyone, not just Greeks. When it comes to essential issues – such as renting an apartment or working with you- they judge you by the content of your character, not by your nationality.
Kostas agrees with Dimitra.
Dutch people are very friendly, in spite of their peculiarities. It may seem difficult to fit into the local culture and make friends, but they are quite open-minded and kind.
Regarding the labor market, the difference from Greece is huge. If you qualify for a job and you meet the requirements, it is not difficult to get ahead. Because of their internationalized economy, there are plenty of large-scale enterprises and corporations, which are open to foreign employees, even if they don’t speak the language.
Likewise, he does not pay attention to racist comments.
I have never experienced hostility. Sometimes, they make stupid jokes about Greece but it is just bad sense of humor. For example, they told me once that we owe them money and they behaved like it was up to me! Yet, I don’t take them seriously, because people who make such comments are mostly young, narrow-minded students, who have never travelled abroad and are not used to interacting with foreigners. So, I don’t really care.
Yiannis and Nadia think otherwise.
Nadia: Personally, I have a very bad impression of them. For example, Dutch students at the university didn’t want to socialize with foreigners; they had made a different website on the internet and they never joined us for a coffee or a drink. In general, they had “built” a huge wall between us and them, which had resulted in a very intense segregation.
Yiannis: I try not to be affected by such occasional incidents. They are quite different from us but, at the same time, you can’t put a judgment stamp on an entire population.
As to the working environment:
Nadia: Working with them didn’t really change my opinion. There is no such thing as solidarity. They only care about themselves…they do not hesitate to sell you down the river.
Yiannis: Yes, I agree. If you are not Dutch, it is difficult to move up the hierarchy. On the other hand, you can’t complain, if you haven’t made an effort to learn the language. Greeks demand fluency from –let’s say- Albanians and they laugh at them when they make mistakes. Yet, when they come here, they don’t even know how to say “hello”.
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Yiannis justifies the natives, with regard to the working opportunities. However, he could not hide his disappointment about the way some of them behave towards Greek immigrants.
There was an incident, which really ticked me off! A friend of mine sent me some money and I went to a western-union agency to receive it. They employee looked at my identity card with contempt and he refused to accept it. I told him: “I come from Greece and I am a European citizen…you are obliged to accept it”. Yet, he insisted and he didn’t give me the money eventually.
Vaggelis admits that there are many opportunities for immigrants in the Netherlands.
There is no such thing as cumbersome bureaucracy in the Netherlands; you go to the bank and they offer you coffee, there are no queues, you don’t have to wait for the train, employees are always friendly and accommodating and so on…Yet, there are drawbacks as well. Life in Amsterdam is extremely fast-paced and you have to squeeze more activities into your day…and I can’t get used to it.
Personally, I have faced racism, but I try not to pay attention. Once, two guys walked up and told me: “You are Greek, right? Come on! Take some money!”…and they started laughing.
Nikos and Nadia say that integrating into the host-society was a difficult process, but they would not like to return to Greece.
Nadia: We faced racism from the very first day. First, we went to a housing agency and we were told that we had to pay three months’ rent in advance, because we were Greeks! Then, I tried to open a bank-account; they took an interview from me –which lasted 3 hours- and then they told me that they couldn’t trust me, because of Greece’s political instability!
Nikos: Their racism is not based on the colour of your skin…it is based on the colour of your money! If you have much money, they are helpful and accommodating. If you don’t, they dig into everything.
Nikos thinks that the Netherlands is entirely different from Greece.
It didn’t take me long to adjust, because I was sort of prepared. I knew it was going to be difficult in the beginning and that I would have to live differently for a while. In this regard, it wasn’t difficult to fit in. I liked almost everything here…the fact that you can pay for your rent on-line, the way they talk to you and mostly the fact that I could be myself!
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Georgia thinks that immigrants are obliged to learn the language of the country, in which they reside.
I was interested in learning the language from the very beginning. Sometimes, I speak fluent Dutch, but most of the time I don’t even know how to say “hello”! (Laughter) Nevertheless, I believe that immigrants should respect the language obligations of the host-country. If you want to achieve equality, you can’t avoid this.
Orthodox assimilation theory suggests that longer residents of the host-society gradually sever ties with the country of origin. Waldinger, from a different perspective argues that integrated immigrants become susceptible to the political messages of the receiving country. Thus, they are less likely to maintain political relations with the country of origin. Regarding citizenship, Schiller et al. argue that immigrants with multiple affiliations are more interested in naturalizing. On the other hand, Soyzal suggests that they are less likely to acquire a double citizenship, due to the global establishment of the human rights. In order to investigate Greek immigrants’ likelihood to engage with transnational politics, we need to explore their political behavior in the Netherlands.
Kleoniki says that she is not interested in Dutch politics, since she does not intend to live in the Netherlands permanently.
I was eligible to vote in the municipal election, but I didn’t. Since I do not plan to stay, it would be pointless...As to the Dutch citizenship, I would not be interested in acquiring it. That’s why I didn’t want to learn the language as well, which I regret however.
Yiannis thinks otherwise, despite the fact that he also wants to return to Greece.
I think it is necessary to keep yourself informed. For example, when Dutch make imbecile comments about immigrants you need irrefutable arguments to make them shut up! You need to have a strong opinion. On the other hand, you also need to know how the state operates, when it comes to labor rights. This is absolutely necessary, when your position is at stake.
Yiannis implies that fully-integrated immigrants are more likely to engage with domestic politics.
Yes, I would be interested in acquiring the Dutch citizenship, because it brings extra privileges. However, I need to find a job first. If I achieve this goal, I will then be able to think about it.
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I didn’t vote in the municipal election. As I already said, I need to solve my own problems first.
Lydia, on the other hand, believes that non-citizens should also participate in the public affairs of the host-country.
I have voted in municipal elections. I didn’t examine the ballot papers or the manifestos in detail, but I read some articles and I asked my Dutch colleagues. At the moment, I consider myself as a Dutch citizen and the Dutch society treats me, as if I were a part of it…I have to respect that.
Yet, she is not eager to become a Dutch citizen.
I am not interested in the Dutch citizenship…I would not renounce the Greek one. On the other hand, I may be absolutely sure about that, because my citizenship is quite powerful; I am a European citizen after all…If this wasn’t the case, I may have held a different opinion.
As far as citizenship is concerned, Dimitra agrees with Lydia. Yet, she holds a different opinion, with respect to political involvement.
If I had to renounce the Greek citizenship, I would never apply for the Dutch one.
Regarding Dutch politics, I would say that I am rather ignorant…I only know a few, basic things about their government. Besides, everything functions pretty well, so there is nothing to complain about.
Kostas says that, despite the language barrier, he tries to actively participate in the public sphere of the host-country.
I try to keep myself abreast of current events, but it is not very easy when you don’t speak the language. Yet, I am not completely ignorant; I am aware of the Dutch political system and the parties of the Parliament, but I get to learn more when I discuss with my Dutch friends. Media doesn’t help that much.
I had the right to vote in the municipal election and I did. I am very interested in participating, because –unlike Greece- majors in the Netherlands always take into account the distinct needs of urban areas, as well as citizen well-being.
He contends that citizenship is more than a legal bond between the citizen and the state.
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I am not interested in acquiring the Dutch citizenship, mostly because I am not familiar enough with the Dutch culture. I believe that, even after many years of residence, it is very difficult for someone to essentially become a citizen of a host-country. I don’t feel ready yet.
Yiannis and Nadia are less politically engaged.
Yiannis: I try to keep myself informed about Dutch politics. Sometimes, I watch the news and I read the papers. I also voted in the local election.
Nadia: I don’t care. I just want to return to Greece. I don’t like this country.
We are not interested in the Dutch citizenship. Nothing would change.
In accordance with other respondents’ views, Vaggelis argues that lack of time, as well as limited language skills prevent him from actively engaging with Dutch politics.
I am quite interested in Dutch politics, but I don’t have the time to learn the language. I try to watch the news, but I don’t understand everything. That’s why I didn’t vote in the municipal election…I couldn’t find relevant information in English, so I wouldn’t be useful to them.
He would apply for the Dutch citizenship, if he decided to live in the Netherlands permanently.
I would love to return to Greece, but it depends on the future prospects. If I decided to live here permanently, I would be interested in acquiring the Dutch citizenship. I would like to have equal rights with the natives.
Nikos and Nadia do not intend to return to Greece. Thus, they are eager to participate in the Dutch civil society.
We try to keep up with Dutch politics on a regular basis. We don’t want to be ignorant, because we are sort of citizens now; we work and we pay for our taxes. We are affected by decisions and laws, so we have to comply with them.
We are very interested in acquiring the Dutch citizenship. The Dutch passport is very powerful; you can travel anywhere, find a job in a different country, gain access to rights and benefits…It is our main concern. Yet, we don’t care about the extra political rights.
And Georgia:
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If I was allowed to have a double citizenship, then I would apply for the Dutch one. Maybe I will try next year, if I have the money and if I manage to learn the language.
4.3B. EMOTIONS ABOUT THE HOST-SOCIETY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR – IMMIGRANTS, WHO SETTLED IN THE NETHERLANDS BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
Christos says that it was not difficult for an immigrant to integrate into the Dutch society, during the 1990’s.
In 1991, they didn’t even look at your degrees. You could find a job at once, if you visited a recruitment agency. Now, it is very difficult, if you are not specialized.
Public perceptions about Greeks were different.
Personally, I’ve never felt discriminated against. Nevertheless, the way Dutch people treat foreigners has changed since 2011. Don’t forget that the financial crisis hits the Netherlands too…the percentage of the unemployment rate has gradually increased since 2008 and the natives have to blame someone.
Vivian says:
It is more difficult to find a job now, than ten years before. On the other hand, it was not easy to find information, regarding available job-positions. For example, every year I give lectures at Leiden University about working opportunities in the Netherlands. Such initiatives did not exist, when I first came here.
I’ve never felt discriminated against. The only thing that bothers me is access to the health- care system. Sometimes, I feel that they cannot understand me.
Sofia agrees with Vivian.
It was more difficult to find information back then. You had to collect too many documents and run from department to department. It was very confusing…the community’s presence wasn’t so widespread and the facebook groups had not been created yet. You had to search for everything on your own.
Likewise, she never faced racism.
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I was very lucky, because I came to the Netherlands in 2006, before the financial crisis, and public opinion on Greece was entirely different.
Despite the fact that she has never felt discriminated against, Luiza’s view of the natives is entirely different.
It took me nine years to adapt to the Netherlands! (Laughter) It was very painful in the beginning. I felt that Dutch people were completely different from me! The fact that Greece is 3000 km. away from this country is not irrelevant…the larger the distance, the fewer the similarities! … You can’t invest emotionally on them. They always go from one extreme to the other in their moods…and they always judge you by your pocket, not by your character! In general, I don’t have and I don’t want to make Dutch friends.
Yet, she also mentioned some of the advantages.
When I first came here, it was way easier to get a job. You could find 2 or 3 jobs within a month! …One of the advantages is bureaucracy. They’ve made some rules and they live according to these rules, without deviating.
Likewise, Pavlos Kerasavopoulos said that he found a job at once.
In the beginning, I worked as a waiter for a few years. Then, I decided to open my own restaurant.
With respect to the interaction with natives:
I’ve never faced racism. On the contrary! Dutch love Greeks and they love our culture! Yet, after the financial crisis media started to influence them … but we didn’t sit on our hands! We (the community) launched a campaign to inform them about the crisis. We invited journalists and scholars from Athens to talk about the situation in Greece. We wrote several articles on local newspapers and we asked Dutch scholars to join us.
And:
Yes, I have a double citizenship. I wanted to acquire the Dutch nationality for bureaucratic reasons. I also participate in several initiatives of the local authorities. The Netherlands taught me what voluntarism means and I am very glad for that.
Dimitris said that there were communities in every city back then.
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When I was young I used to socialize only with Greek people. There were communities everywhere. There were so many Greeks in 1974… Then, in 1982, the law changed and many of them returned to Greece. Dutch people loved Greeks more than Moroccan and Turkish!
Christos does not have a double citizenship, despite the fact that he has been living in the Netherlands for 25years.
I was never interested in the Dutch citizenship…Everything works in the right way, so nothing would change. What is more, I don’t think that voting at a national level is necessary.
And Vivian:
It is not very easy to get informed about Dutch political issues, if you don’t speak fluent Dutch…I have a double citizenship, but it doesn’t make any difference.
Sofia has a different opinion:
I am well-aware of Dutch politics and I am very interested in participating in the public sphere of the country. That’s why I am really glad I managed to acquire the Dutch citizenship; if I couldn’t vote in the national elections here, then I wouldn’t have a voice. Neither here, nor in Greece would I be able to participate in decision-making processes.
Luiza is also politically engaged. Yet, she never applied for the Dutch citizenship.
I know a lot of things about their political system. I keep myself informed and I like reading articles and watching the news. … No, I am not interested in acquiring the Dutch citizenship. I don’t think that a Dutch passport would be useful. Besides, it is too expensive. 850 euro! Bite me!
And Dimitris says:
No, I don’t want the citizenship. I don’t want to vote in the Netherlands…and it is too expensive!
4.4 POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM
4.4A. NEWCOMERS
Kleoniki is highly politically engaged in transnational politics. She used to be a member of the Youth of Syriza in Amsterdam and now she has become a member of the Greek politica group “Reinform”.
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I do not get informed about Greece on a regular basis. That’s why I needed to join “Reinform”, especially when I didn’t have a facebook page…Since I settled in the Netherlands, I returned to Greece every single time an election was held, except for last September, because I didn’t know how to vote!
On the other hand Yiannis says:
I have never travelled home to vote, because it was not easy for me to spend so much money on tickets. However, I get informed on a daily basis. … I don’t like to discuss politics with my friends. I was quite skeptical of Tsipras and they didn’t like it. They showed an obstinate refusal to think objectively! For instance, every time I tried to have a political conversation on facebook, their reaction was absurd; they called me names and they were cursing!
Regarding communities and demonstrations:
I would not be interested in joining a political group…It would be pointless. I recall some demonstrations in Amsterdam and they were awful! All they did was quarrel with each other. As far as communities are concerned, I don’t like their members’ attitude. Due to the fact that they belong to a different social class, it is quite difficult for them to sympathize with the new immigrants. They didn’t leave Greece because of unemployment or poverty, like us…they just wanted to explore new places.
Likewise, Lydia never travelled to Greece to vote.
I wanted to, but the latest development didn’t allow me. The election was held ten days after I left Greece and I could neither afford to go back again, nor extend my vacation. … I wouldn’t become a member of the Greek community; I wanted to get to know other cultures; joining them would be a hindrance to this objective. I would not join a political group either and I’ve never participated in political rallies. I do not like the fact that they represent a specific political ideology.
Dimitra says:
The experience of living abroad sparked my interest in politics. Since you are no longer affected by collectively binding decisions, you develop a different kind of love for your country. … So now I spend much more time following the news, than when I was back in Greece.
Yet, she is not actively engaged.
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I’ve never travelled to Greece to vote. If the Greek state decided to grant its expatriates the voting right, then I would consider it. …I never visited the Greek communities; I knew that I wouldn’t blend in. I always had the impression that their members cling to outdated traditions and beliefs, which prevent them from integrating into the Dutch society. …I was never interested in joining a political group and I never attended a political party. As I see it, a demonstration involving some 100 or 150 Greeks is very unlikely to contribute to significant shifts.
Kostas says that he watches the news on a regular basis; yet, he is not actively politically engaged.
I’ve never travelled back to Greece to vote. I only voted I the last election, but I was on vacation then. … I never attended a demonstration, regarding Greek politics. I don’t like people who participate in such activities.
Yiannis and Nadia on the other hand are highly involved in transnational politics,
despite the fact they never returned to Greece to vote.
Yiannis: We didn’t have the money to travel to Greece. Besides, it doesn’t matter anymore… I feel disappointed… defeated.
Nadia: I disagree. Voting is very important, even if you don’t feel aligned to any of the political parties. Apathy doesn’t change anything.
They describe Greeks’ emotional experiences, during 2015.
The first demonstration we attended last year took place in February of 2015 and there were lots of Greek people. It was held right after Syriza won the election. There were also many Dutch people who stood on the same side with us. After the referendum, Greeks were very disappointed. Only a few people –literally 5 or 6- decided to show up. The difference from the previous one was huge. … We wanted to join “Reinform” and we tried to contact them, but they didn’t show any interest … We were not interested in joining the community; these people are completely different from us. They have no class consciousness.
Likewise, Vaggelis:
No, I didn’t go to Greece to vote. In my opinion, the Greek state should extend voting rights to its emigrants. … Yet, I follow the new on a daily basis. I watch TV shows and I read articles on both English and Greek websites. During the last two years, I have attended almost every demonstration.
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He holds a different opinion about the communities.
I have visited the off-line branches of the Greek community and I have become a member of their facebook groups. I think that they are really friendly and helpful, despite the fact that most of them are entirely different form us.
Nikos and Nadia are highly engaged with the Greek communities. Yet they claim that the latter’s character is not political.
When we decide to join the community, everything was completely unorganized, especially the websites. Very few people were involved and available information was contradictory and confusing…so, we had to figure everything out on our own. Every time we did something I the right way, we wrote an article and we posted it on the internet…We put a lot of effort into building a wide and useful social network.
They are not otherwise politically involved.
We never travelled back to Greece and we are not going to. Every single politician is corrupted, so it’s pointless! … We don’t want to get involved with Greek politics; we don’t even discuss with our friends about Greece! … We have only attended two demonstrations here in the Netherlands, but they were not political rallies. We were not interested in attending protests, because most of them are organized by “Reinform”, whose members are extremely obstinate. Everything is politics to them!
Georgia says that she has neither money nor time to get involved with politics.
I never travelled to Greece to vote. I didn’t have the money. … I used to keep up with Greek politics, but now I work too many hours and I don’t have the time. Besides, you get really depressed…so the less you know the better!
4.4B. IMMIGRANTS, WHO SETTLED IN THE NETHERLANDS BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008.
Christos does not engage in transnational politics, despite the fact the he discuss Greek politics with his friends on a daily basis.
I never travelled to Greece to vote. I don’t support any of the political parties. … I’ve never attended a demonstration here in the Netherlands; I don’t believe in protests … I was never interested in joining the Greek community. I didn’t want to stick to the Greek way of living.
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Vivian, on the other hand, engages with transnational political activities to a great extent.
I recall a newspaper front-page, which was published in 2009 and featured fake pictures of a Greek Orthodox Church of Santorini …They had replaced the cross with a Turkish flag! … Let me make myself clear; in no case do I support nationalistic views. Yet, I thought it was extremely offensive! I couldn’t just sit on my hands. Me and my ex-boyfriend called the then President of the Federation of the Greek Communities and they Greek Embassy…they both replied at once! The incident somehow came to the attention of Evangelatos (Greek journalist) and went viral on the internet. Even the Greek Deputy Minister of Defense interfered and expressed his resentment.
And:
…Another action…was related to the translation of specific educational textbooks…The books were to be translated voluntarily and distributed for free. When the first book was published, I contacted the Ministry of Education in Greece and they told me that it had not been approved by the Educational Institute. In other words, the book had been approved by the European Council, but not the Educational Institute! Their main problem was that they couldn’t claim publicity and they were also afraid that they would not be able to afford it. However, when we told them that it was an entirely voluntary project, we managed to organize the first meeting and we did very well!
Regarding Greek elections:
I would probably participate in the election, if I had the chance to vote from here, but on the other hand, I don’t trust them. I am quite sure, that they would find a way to distort the election results.
Sofia says:
I never travelled to Greece to vote. It was very difficult and expensive…and most of the time I couldn’t take off from work … I’ve never attended a demonstration here in the Netherlands and I never contacted the communities. I used to be a member of the on-line groups on facebook, but – when I noticed that they never replied when someone had a problem – I stopped following them. Gradually, I managed to integrate into the Dutch society and I didn’t need them.
Luiza says that she does not trust the Greek media:
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I try to follow the news, when I am not too busy … but even if I had the time, it’s pointless. There is no such thing as independent media. Every time I read the papers or watch a TV political show, I get overwhelmingly disappointed.
Regarding elections and engagement with the Greek communities:
I’ve never travelled to Greece to vote, because it is both expensive and time-consuming. … I don’t visit the community’s lively branches, because I live in Hilversum and they are quite far. However, I have many friends there.
Pavlos Kerasavopoulos pointed to the differences, with respect to the community’s activities.
Back then, we used to invite scholars, intellectuals, authors, politicians … We organized demonstrations and protests – for the Macedonian issue for example – and and many people joined … I remember when Melina Merkouri came; she stayed for 2.5 years! … We never got involved with politics. We never supported specific political parties or ideologies … We represented Hellenism, we were united …
We had spaces with televisions and radios and we also provided Greek expiates with newspapers. … Now things are very different. They only care about themselves. They contact the communities only to ask about jobs and houses and they disappear
Regarding his personal engagement with transnational politics:
I go to Greece every 3 months! Yet, I only voted twice. In my opinion, voting doesn’t make a difference.
5. DISCUSSION
As already expected, Greek immigrants who settled in the Netherlands before the financial crisis of 2008 but during the 2000’s, are not largely differentiated from the newcomers. Respondents, who left Greece during the 2000’s, are high-skilled and well-educated university graduates, who occupy prestigious and well-paid job- positions in the host-country. By contrary, those who settled in the Netherlands during
72 the 1970’s and late-1980’s, are poorly-educated, yet high-skilled and well-integrated immigrants. Thus, there are three sub-groups emerging, in terms of socio-economic status; a) well-educated newcomers, b) well-educated and fully-integrated immigrants and c) poorly-educated and fully-integrated immigrants. Since theory suggests that level of education affects to a large extent immigrants’ incentives, making this distinction is necessary.
Unlike similarities in their socio-economic characteristics, determinants of emigration vary a great deal. The majority of the newcomers – 7 out of 10 – left Greece, due to unemployment or poor working conditions. By contrary, of all respondents who settled in the Netherlands before 2008, only one was forced to leave Greece, because of economic or political reasons. The rest of them decided to emigrate, in order to gain the experience of living abroad, or because of their Dutch spouses.
Regarding the homeland political regime, feelings of disappointment and pessimism are widespread among the newcomers. The vast majority feels that voting is redundant and that most Greek political parties and organizations are corrupt. Only 2 respondents believe that important shifts -with respect to the social and political situation in Greece- do not depend on the current government. “Old” immigrants’ emotions do no diverge from this pattern. All of them demonstrate lack of trust towards the Greek political system and argue that voting is pointless.
As far as political involvement prior to migration is concerned, only a small minority of the respondents were highly politically engaged. The rest of them were never interested in engaging with political activities, or only occasionally mobilized. In particular, 4 out of 10 voted on an irregular basis, never joined a political party or group and rarely discussed politics. Two of the newcomers voted in every election and attended one or two demonstrations, but there was no further involvement.
Likewise, only a small number of “old” immigrants – 2 out of 7 – were highly politically engaged prior to migration. Three of them were moderately involved and the rest never participated in Greek politics.
Political engagement in the receiving country is also limited. A significant proportion of the newcomers – 6 out of 10 – do not get involved with Dutch public affairs. Lack of time and resources, as well as limited language skills, are the main reasons behind
73 low participation rate. By contrary, half of the “old” immigrants are actively engaged with Dutch politics. Two of them believe that, since the Greek state does not grant them with external voting rights, civic participation in the country of settlement is very important. The results in this case confirm Waldinger’s hypotheses, i.e. “the bounded nature of the national political unit prevents migrants from engaging in regular and sustained transnational political linkages”.
The findings, regarding citizenship, are very interesting. Only a small minority of the respondents are interested in acquiring the Dutch citizenship, while those, who have already become Dutch citizens, believe that it is not necessary. In particular, of the ten newcomers only three would apply for naturalization, while the rest of them, either believe that they already have equal access to rights with the natives, or are not interested in the extra political rights. What is more, three of them, who claim they follow the Dutch news, were the least informed, i.e. they were not aware of the fact that they do not have to renounce the Greek citizenship. As to the “old” immigrants, three of them never applied for naturalization, while the rest of them –those who have double nationality- think that there are not extra advantages. Only one thinks of the political rights as a privilege.
Eventually, do Greek immigrants engage with transnational politics? We expected that there would be a considerable differentiation between the two sub-groups, but the results suggest otherwise. As far as the sub-group of the newcomers is concerned, only 3 out of 10 involve with regular trans-border political activities, while the rest of them, either mobilize only at special junctures, or never participate in transnational politics. The main reasons behind their political detachment are limited resources and feelings of resentment or contempt about the Greek political system. In particular, 3 of them would be interested in engaging with transnational political activism, but challenges within their new settings, as well as lack of capital (time and financial resources), prevent them from developing enduring political ties with their country of origin. On the other hand, half of them refuse to participate, out of dissatisfaction with the homeland political regime. They contend that the Greek state ignores its expatriates and that in no case is there any transformational potential in transnational activities.
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The results are even more striking, when it comes to immigrants, who settled in the Netherlands, before the financial crisis of 2008. Although most of them have created and sustained recurrent social relations with Greece, only 1 engages with political transnationalism on a regular basis. Yet, unlike the newcomers, the main reason behind this limited participation is disenchantment about the Greek social and political situation. Only one attributes the lack of involvement to limited resources (time, specifically).
6. CONCLUSION
As we can see, differentiation between the two sub-groups does not seem to affect immigrants’ potential for transnational political engagement to a great extent. Regarding their socio-economic status, well-educated and fully-integrated immigrants are more likely to participate in transnational politics, according to our hypotheses. Moreover, we expected poorly-paid and less educated immigrants to mobilize only at special junctures. Since there are not major differences, with respect to their job- positions and income, we take educational background as a frame of reference.
The findings are contradictory; while low-educated immigrants are less likely to engage with political transnationalism, they are more interested in acquiring the Dutch citizenship. Respectively, well-educated immigrants are more reluctant to apply for naturalization. This is partly in line with Soysal’s theoretical approach, i.e. immigrants - who come from Western liberal democracies and are cognizant of their human rights - are less eager to naturalize; they become more post-national. However, the main reason behind Greek immigrants’ limited interest is not their desire to hold multiple political affiliations, but rather widespread dissatisfaction with the Greek political regime.
Our hypotheses also suggest that longer residents of the host-society are more likely to participate in transnational politics. Yet, this assumption cannot be confirmed, since the vast majority of them only occasionally get into the act. The resources argument seems to apply to them, since half of them attribute their detachment to limited time. Yet, it is not significant. The hypothesis about the political involvement prior to migration is partly confirmed. All of the respondents, who were highly politically
75 engaged in Greece, sustain regular political ties with their country of origin. The assumption though is not confirmed for the “old” immigrants. Additionally, Waldinger’s argument about the political environment of the host-country seems to apply to the Greek case. “Old immigrants”, who are interested in participating in Dutch politics, are less likely to maintain political relations with their country of origin.
Eventually, it seems that newcomers are more likely to engage with political transnationalism. Yet, what differentiates them from the fully-integrated immigrants is not education or income, but rather feelings of disappointment and contempt about the Greek political plight.
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52)ΙΝΣΤΙΤΟΥΤΟ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ ΓΣΕΕ-ΑΔΕΔΥ. «ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΩΝ.» ΜΕΛΕΤΕΣ (2005).
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