Commi ee on Transporta on and the Environment Chairperson Mary Cheh Agency Performance Oversight Hearing (Fiscal Year 2020-2021) DC Water and Washington Aqueduct
March 15, 2021
Yanna Lambrinidou, PhD and Paul Schwartz Campaign for Lead Free Water
We appreciate the opportunity to share with the DC City Council the following informa on, concerns, and recommenda ons:
1. Background
Like many buildings in major ci es across the US, thousands of District homes and commercial proper es get their drinking water through lead service lines (LSLs)—pipes that bring water to each individual building from the water mains that run underneath the streets. LSLs are typically one hundred percent lead and are usually so durable that they have never required replacement since their installa on many decades ago. The lead from these lines (like the lead from other plumbing materials in the building) can leach into the water, poten ally exposing consumers to anything from chronic low amounts to sporadic very high concentra ons of lead.
Lead is a neurotoxin so potent that scien sts cannot iden fy any concentra on at which it is safe for human consump on. It has been linked to miscarriage, s llbirth, decreased IQ, ADHD, delinquent behavior, and increased rates of arrests for violent offenses. In addi on, it is associated with hematological, cardiovascular, immunological, and endocrine system harm (Hanna-A sha 2016, Feigenbaum and Muller 2016). Since 1991, the federal Environmental Protec on Agency (EPA) has had a regula on in place – the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) – requiring water u li es to add corrosion control treatment (CCT) to their water to reduce the risk of lead leaching. CCT, however, is more of an imperfect art than a precise science. Although it can help reduce lead-in-water levels across a water distribu on system, it can never completely eliminate lead’s release from plumbing. Ul mately, as long as lead is in contact with water it will pose a significant health risk, especially to fetuses, infants, and young children.
Washington, DC has been grappling with lead-in-water contamina on and documented health harm since at least the 1980s (e.g., Engel 1986, a ached). In 2001-2004, the District experienced the na on’s most severe lead-in-water crisis to date, which involved a two-and-a-half year cover up by our water u lity (then named DC WASA), the DC Department of Health (DOH), and our water u lity’s oversight agency (EPA Region 3). The unprecedented severity and extent of the contamina on was made public to all DC residents on January 31, 2004 through a historic front-page ar cle in the Washington Post (Nakamura 2004, a ached). Since then, peer-reviewed scien fic research has shown that DC’s lead crisis resulted in over 800—and possibly up to 42,000—cases of elevated blood lead levels in young children, and that the city’s fetal death rate rose by 37 percent (Edwards, Triantafyllidou, and Best 2009, a ached; Edwards 2014, a ached).
Lambrinidou-Schwartz, Campaign for Lead Free Water - 1 In contrast to the Flint, Michigan water crisis, which:
1. Was measurably less severe than the District’s in terms of the dura on of residents’ exposure, the levels of lead dispensed at city taps, and the resul ng health harm, and 2. Prompted the development of the na on’s most health-protec ve, state-specific LCR that requires all Michigan water u li es to conduct publicly funded, proac ve, and systema c full LSL replacement (in the words of the state of Michigan, “Water supplies are required to replace an average of 5 percent of their lead service lines every year for the next 20 years unless an alternate schedule is approved…”),
Washington DC has, to date, failed to a) acknowledge the harm done, b) provide assistance to affected families, and c) implement a proac ve and systema c program to fully replace all LSLs in the District with the use of public funds.
Addi onally, in 2004-2008, Washington, DC conducted the na on’s most extensive to date par al LSL replacement program: at the cost of over $100 million in ratepayer money, the city par ally replaced over 14,000 LSLs. There was never any evidence, however, to suggest that this prac ce provides increased health protec on over leaving LSLs intact. In fact, we now know that the physical disturbance of the por on of the LSL that is le in place can actually cause significant lead release in the short- and long-term, and that the point of contact between the old LSL and the new (usually) copper line can create a “ba ery effect” that under certain circumstances can accelerate lead corrosion and can cause significant lead-in-water contamina on (Leonnig 2008, a ached; Del Toral, Porter, and Schock 2013, a ached; Triantafyllidou and Edwards 2011, a ached).
Indeed, in 2011, the Centers for Disease Control and Preven on (CDC) published a study showing that District children in homes with a par ally replaced LSL were over three mes as likely to have levels of lead above 10 mcg/dL (the blood lead level that was considered “elevated” at the me) as children who never had a LSL (Brown et al. 2011, a ached). Based on this finding, the American Academy of Pediatrics issued a call for an immediate moratorium on par al LSL replacement in a policy recommenda on to EPA.
In summary, since 2001, the District’s water u lity has subjected DC residents to two waves of large-scale health harm: the first, during the cover-up of 2001-2004 and the second, during the city’s 2004-2008 accelerated LSL replacement program that was presented to residents as a health protec ve gi that went above and beyond federal requirements.
2. Current state of LSL replacement in the District
In March 2020, DC Water confirmed in an email exchange with Yanna Lambrinidou that, as of December 2019 (almost 20 years following the District’s historic lead-in-water crisis of 2001-2004), the number of LSLs s ll in the ground was the following:
Lambrinidou-Schwartz, Campaign for Lead Free Water - 2 • In public space
a. 10,770 known LSLs, b. 15,886 service lines of unknown material.
This means that in a worst-case scenario wherein all unknown service lines in public space turned out to be lead, the District would have a maximum of 26,656 LSLs in public space.
• In private space
a. 21,952 known LSLs (of these, 11,182 are known par ally replaced LSLs) b. 17,465 service lines of unknown material.
This means that in a worst-case scenario wherein all unknown service lines in private space turned out to be lead, the District would have a maximum of 39,417 LSLs in private space.
DC Water’s Table