THE (DE)SECULARIZING IMPACT OF POLITICS ON IRAN’S THEOCRACY A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Mohammad Bagher Ayatollahi Tabaar, M.A. Washington, DC April 30, 2012 Copyright 2012 by Mohammad B. Ayatollahi Tabaar All Rights Reserved ii THE (DE)SECULARIZING IMPACT OF POLITICS ON IRAN’S THEOCRACY Mohammad B. Ayatollahi Tabaar, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Charles Kupchan, Ph.D. ABSTRACT It has been three decades since religion has gone “public.” The Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Nicaraguan Revolution, and the establishment of the Moral Majority in the United States, all of which occurred in 1979, signified the “return of religion from exile.” The return of religion called into question the foundation of international relations theories, in particular realism, for ignoring non-material factors. Indeed, social scientists often refer to the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath, including the Hostage Crisis, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Rushdie Affair, as the ultimate example of the increasing role of religion in world politics. However, these scholars frequently fail to take into account the impact that these very incidents have had on Islamism itself. This dissertation combines comparative politics and international relations theories to examine the evolution of the concept of Velayat-e Faqih (the Rule of the Jurisprudent) in post-revolutionary Iran. Against the background of domestic and international politics, it process-traces the way in which democratic and authoritarian interpretations of Islam have emerged in the country. Using a realist framework, it argues that a weak state may reduce the ideological fervor of its foreign policy and then adjust and institutionalize its official religious narrative to bless its pragmatism. However, if it iii perceives itself as strong, the state will return to its core ideology, weaken its pragmatic institutions, and develop religious narratives corresponding to its rising position. The discursive consequences of critical junctures (i.e. war and other major foreign policy related events) become part of the domestic mechanism, which has its own similar logic. This dissertation demonstrates how religion, as a set of competing meanings and contested doctrines that alternatively emerge in various institutions, offers theological latitudes for political actions. The state as well as Islamic parties and factions benefit tremendously from this repertoire in their quest to challenge or strengthen the status quo. iv To My parents and Caitlin v Acknowledgements This dissertation is indebted to many individuals and institutions. I shall first express gratitude to my advisor, Professor Charles Kupchan, and my other committee members, Professor Thomas Banchoff, Professor Jose Casanova, and Professor Abdolkarim Soroush. I am grateful for all the advice and trust that Dr. Kupchan has kindly granted me since 2004, when I took his course on International Security. I shall pass this spirit on to my students. Dr. Banchoff’s succinct comments and sharp observations helped me, critically, to stay focused at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations. Dr. Casanova, who first welcomed me at the New School for Social Research in 1997, remained a source of intellectual inspiration throughout. My relationship with Dr. Soroush, a close mentor for more than two decades, has been one of the greatest blessings of my life. I am thankful to Professors Jeffrey Anderson, Daniel Brumberg, Andrew Bennett, Cathy Cohen, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and John Mearsheimer, whose thoughts and teachings deeply touched and influenced me. My classmates, particularly Ariel Ahram, Greg Baldi, Sara Wallace Goodman, and Shervin Malekzadeh provided me with their incredible support. vi I conducted a significant portion of my research during my fellowship at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University in 2010-2011 and later at the Centre of Islamic Studies at the University of Cambridge in 2012. I am particularly grateful to Professors Marc Lynch, Nathan Brown, and Ambassador Edward (Skip) Gnehm of the Elliott School of International Affairs. My teaching experiences at Georgetown University, George Mason University, George Washington University, and the University of Maryland helped me tremendously to articulate many of the ideas presented in the following pages. I have been blessed by wonderful students whose intellectual curiosity keeps me on my toes. My years at the BBC Persian Service in Washington, D.C. provided me with an unparalleled opportunity to examine the micro-foundations of media politics. Those never-ending late night shifts eventually morphed into fruitful lab experiments, whose results are partly reflected in this dissertation. As I am leaving the media world for academia, I will deeply miss my warm colleagues, particularly Kambiz Fattahi and Sina Alinejad. Kelly Gigante, Dr. Ahmad Sheikhzadeh, Dr. Ali Sheikhzadeh, Dr. Ahmad Sadri, and Dr. Mahmoud Sadri were my first friends when I arrived in New York City in September 1997. Their boundless kindheartedness shall never be forgotten. vii I would like to thank Ilona Vinogradova, who has brought infinite spark, speed, and laughter into my life: “Push Zero!” In an era in which the tense relationship between Iran and the U.S. has split many families, my parents, Mohammad Taghi Ayatollahi Tabaar and Iran Ayatollahi Hedeshi, mobilized all they had to morally, intellectually, and financially support me. Together with my sisters, Minoo, Mojgan, and Maryam, they have allowed and encouraged me to pursue my dreams and carried me through difficulties at critical junctures. This dissertation is dedicated to my parents as well as Caitlin Elizabeth Browne, who has blessed me with her decade-long love and friendship. This dissertation deeply benefitted from her intellectual mind as well as her sharp eyes. In remembrance of my brother-in-law, Mohammad Sepehr, who left us so suddenly, and who we miss dearly every day. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..….1 Chapter One- The “Return” of Religion: Theoretical Debates………………………….6 Chapter Two- The Secularizing Impact of the International Politics: The Islamic Revolution and the Iran- Iraq War (1979-1989)…………………..................................34 Chapter Three- The (De)Secularizing Impact of Factional Politics……………………66 Chapter Four- The Mosque and Media Politics………………………………………..98 Chapter Five- The De-Secularizing Impact of Post-9/11 Era………………………...154 Conclusion- Theoretical Implications and Other Cases………………….…………...208 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..232 ix Introduction The Islamists are coming! Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers overthrew the pro- Western Shah of Iran in the 1979 Revolution. Across the Arab world in countries like Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan, Islamist parties gained popularity and influence throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) defeated Kemal Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) in the Turkish elections of 2002. Then suddenly it appeared as though a cluster of Islamists may ascend to power as the “Arab Spring” of 2010 - 2012 removed a number of the secular pro-Western regimes in the region: Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda Party won more than 41 percent of the vote in the first election of the post-President Ben Ali era in October 2011.1 In post-Hosni Mubarak Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won a third of the vote in the first round of parliamentary elections in November 20112 and 40 percent in the second round in December 2011.3 Morocco’s “moderate” Islamists, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) took 107 out of 395 parliamentary seats in November 2011.4 At the same time, other Islamists battled to come to power in Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Libya, Algeria, and much of the rest of the Islamic world. 1 “Tunisia's Islamist Ennahda party wins historic poll,” BBC News, 27 October 2011; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- africa-15487647 (Accessed 5 March 2012). 2 “Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood claims wins in run-off votes,” BBC News, 7 December 2011; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16065999 (Accessed March 2012). 3 “Egypt's Brotherhood says gets 40 pct in latest vote,” Reuters, 18 December 2011; http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/18/egypt-election-islamist-idINDEE7BH08820111218 (Accessed 5 March 2012). 4 “Islamist PJD party wins Morocco poll,” BBC News, 27 November 2011; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 15902703 (Accessed 5 March 2012). 1 Most of these Islamic parties claim to be moderate5 and respectful of religious pluralism6, individual liberty, and international norms. They pledge to remain loyal to the democratic rules of the game. Critics, however, warn of the Islamists’ “hidden agenda,” namely changing the constitution once in power and strictly implementing shari’a law against the popular will. Iran is their case study. Iranian revolutionaries removed a pro-Western despot in 1979 only to replace him with a religious dictatorship. Those critics conclude that bringing religion into politics will lead to little respect for human rights, democracy, and the secular international order, just as it did in post- revolutionary Iran. These critiques, however, fail to take into account what happens to religion itself once it marries politics. True, the Iranian