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Defining an Approach for Future Close Air Support Capability ARROYO CENTER Defining an Approach for Future Close Air Support Capability John Matsumura, John Gordon IV, Randall Steeb Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1233 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The Army Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Office asked the RAND Arroyo Center to conduct research on the close-support capabilities available in recent conflicts to help inform future planning decisions. Initially, the research the office requested was to include a broad set of close-support capabilities; however, this research subsequently refocused specifically on close air support (CAS) capabilities in recent conflict and the possible implications for the future. The research provides an overview of the requirements process that led to existing CAS capabilities, contains information from warfighters, and includes the results of an assessment using state-of-the-art machine learning methods for coding to extract information on CAS capabilities that were provided to the Army over the past decade or so. This work should be of interest to a broad range of technologists, concept developers, materiel developers, and many others in the defense acquisition community. The research on which this report was based was completed in July 2015, when the A-10 was still under debate. This research was sponsored by the Army G-8, specifically the Army QDR Office, and was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Forces and Logistics Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD136504. iii Contents Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iii Figures and Table ............................................................................................................................ v Summary ......................................................................................................................................... vi Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... viii Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. ix 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 Definition of Close Air Support ................................................................................................................ 1 Differing Perspectives on Close Air Support ............................................................................................ 2 Organization of This Report ...................................................................................................................... 4 2. Past Requirements for Close Air Support ................................................................................... 5 3. Close Air Support in Recent Conflicts ........................................................................................ 7 Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm), 1991 .................................................................................................... 7 Operation Allied Force, 1999 .................................................................................................................... 8 Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, 2001–2013 ................................................................ 8 Combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in Iraq, 2014–Present .................................................... 13 Examining Survivability in These Conflicts ........................................................................................... 14 4. Alternatives for Future Close Air Support ................................................................................ 16 The Status Quo: The A-10 Program ........................................................................................................ 16 Using the F-35A for Future Close Air Support ....................................................................................... 17 Relying on Other Manned Aircraft for Close Air Support ...................................................................... 17 Converting the A-10 to a Remotely Piloted Aircraft .............................................................................. 18 Developing a New Specialized Unmanned Platform for Close Air Support .......................................... 18 5. Conclusions: Implications for the Army of Decommissioning the A-10 .................................. 20 Recommendations ................................................................................................................................... 21 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 23 iv Figures and Table Figures 3.1. Steady Increase in SIGACTS Involving A-10s Through the Course of OEF ....................... 10 3.2. Normalized Comparison of A-10 Activity with That of Other Fixed-Wing Platforms (Afghanistan 2002–2012) ...................................................................................................... 10 3.3. A-10 CAS Events Early in OEF (2003–2004). ..................................................................... 11 3.4. A-10 Events in Afghanistan Increased in Both Number and Coverage Area over Time ....................................................................................................................................... 12 3.5. Location of Reports for A-10 (red), F-16, and B-1 During 2011 in Afghanistan ................. 12 Table 2.1. Summary of Key Requirements for CAS ................................................................................ 5 v Summary The Air Force recently proposed retiring the A-10 close air support (CAS) aircraft fleet, including canceling the service-life extension program that started in 2007, which was meant to extend the life of the aircraft by 20 years.1 The Air Force has raised concerns about the A-10’s survivability for many years. It asserts that the A-10 is no longer survivable on modern battlefields that include increasingly sophisticated and lethal air defenses and that multirole aircraft can perform the CAS mission effectively.2 The Air Force plan for providing CAS after the A-10’s retirement is to use current multirole aircraft, such as the F-16, and integrate the future multirole F-35A into the CAS role as it becomes available. By ending the program now, the Air Force leadership also expects to save the service approximately $3.7 billion.3 Given the expected budget reductions, consolidation of Air Force CAS capabilities to save scarce defense dollars could be warranted if all the necessary capabilities remain available. Cancellation of the A-10 program could, however, affect the Air Force’s ability to provide a sufficient CAS for future operations. This could have a significant effect on the U.S. Army because it relies on the Air Force to provide most of its fixed-wing CAS. Since its fielding in the mid-1970s, the A-10 has been instrumental in providing CAS to ground forces in every major combat operation in which ground forces were deployed. And while other existing aircraft in the Air Force inventory can provide CAS, the kind of CAS that the A-10 provides involves desirable attributes that other multirole aircraft do not provide. Specifically, two characteristics that Army units highlighted in various after action reports from recent conflicts include the direct fire capability of the A-10’s large cannon (GAU-8 30mm) and the morale and deterrent “show of force” effect that the presence of the aircraft over the battlefield creates. Relatively low-altitude, low-speed flight, for which the A-10 was specifically designed, enhances both characteristics. It should be noted that the Army’s recent experience with CAS was in relatively low-threat air defense environments—Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 through 2015. The Army
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