Elite Capture of Community Based Natural Resources Management Projects in Southern Africa

ELITE CAPTURE OF COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

SHYLOCK MUYENGWA

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2018

To my family, friends, colleagues and academic advisers for making this possible

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank my family for this long process. This PhD would not have been possible without the support of Joyce Muyengwa who has endured the 10 years of getting this done. The work started in 2007 in Namibia and Botswana when I met Dr.

Brian Child and other University of Florida Professors working on a governance research project. The following year, 2008, I received generous four-year funding through the UK Department for International Development (DFID) Africa Power and

Politics (APPP) program, UF Tropical Conservation and Development (TCD) predissertation research grant, Program for Studies in Tropical Conservation (PSTC)

Compton Research Fellowship in Environment and Sustainability grant and the Wildlife

Conservation Society Research Fellowship. To Dr. Child, I am grateful for the other research funds through USAID and logistical support in the form of vehicles that I used to collect data in Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

I am indebted to my committee chair, Dr. Child, for encouraging me through this process and making sure I kept my eyes on my academic work amid consulting deadlines and family pressures. I also thank my committee members Dr. Grenville

Barnes, Dr. Mickie Swisher, and Dr. Thomas K Frazer. I also acknowledge the support of Dr. Mark Brennan and Dr. Staffan Lindberg during the period 2009-2012.

I also wish to acknowledge communities in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe for committing their time by answering my many questions and requests to access their records. The following people contributed in different ways and I am forever grateful:

Rodgers Lubilo, Patricia Mupeta, Dzingai and Miriam Rukuni, Dr. Simon Anstey, Olekae

Thakadu, Bothepa Kgabung, and all my research assistants.

4 TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 4

LIST OF TABLES ...... 7

LIST OF FIGURES ...... 8

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 9

ABSTRACT ...... 11

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 13

Theoretical Frameworks ...... 14 History of the Elite Theory ...... 14 Participatory Democracy Approach ...... 17 Collective Action Approach ...... 18 Social Capital Approach ...... 19 Definition of Key Concepts ...... 20 Who are the Elite? ...... 20 Elite Capture ...... 21 Evolution of the Research ...... 23

2 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MESO-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA, ZAMBIA, AND ZIMBABWE ...... 28

CBNRM Reforms in Southern Africa ...... 32 CBNRM in Zimbabwe ...... 35 CBNRM in Namibia ...... 38 CBNRM in Botswana ...... 44 CBNRM in Zambia ...... 48 Discussion ...... 51

3 RE-ASSERTION OF ELITE CONTROL IN MASOKA’S WILDLIFE PROGRAM IN ZIMBABWE ...... 59

Analytical Framework...... 62 History of the CAMPFIRE Program ...... 64 Development of CAMPFIRE in Masoka Community ...... 67 Ethnic Characteristics of the People of Masoka ...... 67 Post-2000 Dynamics in Masoka ...... 68 Main Findings ...... 69 Masoka’s CAMPFIRE Program pre-2009 ...... 69

5 Masoka’s CAMPFIRE Program 2009-2011 ...... 70 Non–transparent management of funds and indirect impacts of the direct payment system ...... 71 Personal benefits and shifting ethos ...... 73 Weak property rights and lack of protection of democratic processes ...... 74 Information distortion ...... 76 Discussion ...... 77

4 DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SATISFACTION WITH COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: A CASE OF FIVE COMMUNITIES IN NAMIBIA ...... 83

The Development of CBNRM in the Caprivi Region ...... 87 Quantitative Approach ...... 89 Description of the Survey ...... 89 Outcome Variable ...... 91 Characteristics of the Respondents ...... 91 Statistical Analysis ...... 91 Results and Discussion...... 92 Logistic Regression Models ...... 92 Logistic Regression Results ...... 93 Meat ...... 94 Cash ...... 95 Jobs ...... 95 Livestock loss, grain loss, and injury to humans ...... 96

5 CONCLUSION ...... 104

The Role of Informal Norms in Shaping Elite Capture Outcomes ...... 107 Matching Governance Scale to Reduce Elite Capture ...... 109

APPENDIX: SURVEY INSTRUMENT ...... 111

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 118

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 136

6 LIST OF TABLES

Table page

2-1 Number of meetings between February 2010 and June 2011 in Wuparo ...... 56

2-2 Ranking use of community vehicles and costs by Wuparo Conservancy ...... 56

2-3 List of community projects in Wuparo conservancy ...... 56

2-4 Missing funds from Botswana Trusts ...... 57

2-5 Allocation of revenue in community resource boards (2000–2004) near Kafue National Park ...... 58

2-6 Elite vs. non-elite shares (2003–2008) ...... 58

2-7 Elite capture mechanisms across four CBNRM programs ...... 58

3-1 CAMPFIRE projects in Masoka community ...... 81

3-2 Important events in Masoka community ...... 81

3-3 Key factors for successful devolution vs. elite capture in Masoka ...... 82

4-1 Demographic characteristics of the study area (Namibia) ...... 99

4-2 Description and coding of explanatory variables ...... 100

4-3 Summary of sample sizes by gender ...... 101

4-4 Distribution of outcome variable ...... 101

4-5 Mean age of respondents by Conservancy ...... 101

4-6 Mean household size ...... 101

4-7 Summary statistics for binary predictor variables ...... 101

4-8 Logistic regression results ...... 102

4-9 Overall model comparisons ...... 103

7 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

3-1 Map of Masoka community ...... 82

4-1 Map of Eastern Caprivi, Namibia ...... 99

8 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADMADE Administrative Management and Design for Game Management Areas

AGM Annual General Meeting

CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources

CASS Center for Applied Social Sciences

CBNRM Community Based Natural Resources Management

CBO Community Based Organizations

CDD Community Driven Development

CECT Chobe Enclave Community Trust

CHAs Community Hunting Areas

DNPWLM Department of Parks and Wildlife Management

DWNP Department of Wildlife and National Parks

GMAs Game Management Areas

HACCS Human and Animal Conflict Compensation Scheme

ICDPs Integrated Conversation and Development Plans

LIRDP Luangwa Integrated Resources and Development Project

MOMS Management Orientated Monitoring System

NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations

NRMP Natural Resources Management Program

RDC Rural District Council

REDD Reduced Emission from Deforestation and Degradation

SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

USAID United States Agency for International Development

VIDCOs Village Development Committees

9 WADCO’s Ward Development Committees

WCS Wildlife Conservation Society

WINDFALL Wildlife Industries New Development for All

WWF World Wide Fund for Nature

ZAWA Zambia Wildlife Authority

CBNRM Community Based Natural Resources Management

10 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

ELITE CAPTURE OF COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Shylock Muyengwa

August 2018

Chair: Brian Child Major: Interdisciplinary Ecology

Community based natural resource management programs are important tools in both the conservation of wildlife resources and development of communities in marginal areas in most of southern Africa. While the economics of conserving wildlife are well understood, institutional factors affect the conservation and development outcomes are least understood because of their complexity. The purpose of this study was to examine the role of the elite in the allocation of incomes earned from local wildlife and tourism enterprises. It explored the role of traditional leaders and elected community members in the allocation of funds. The study relied on quantitative surveys, secondary information, focus group discussion and key informant interviews. The results show that both individual and institutional factors affect the allocation of benefits in different communities. The findings illustrate that while individuals are motivated by financial incentives, participation, revenue sharing, and information sharing are important in shaping successful CBNRM projects. Second, the results suggest that locally elected committees when left at the peril of strong and unchecked powers of traditional leaders are bound to collapse. Third, the findings also indicate that in the absence of strong land tenure rights, locals have no “teeth” to challenge tradition-based authorities to demand

11 accountable governance. Fourth, the findings indicate that elite capture undermines the stated CBNRM goals of participatory governance and equitable benefit sharing. In short, the elite can consistently empower themselves in programs that strive for egalitarian and democratic resource governance. The study also points out the importance of meso level governance and national policies to support and protect local democratic governance and to prevent the emergence of the personal rule of traditional leaders and elected leaders.

The study contributes theoretically toward understanding the role of the elite in local level governance and how they interface with formal governance structures, rules and regulation in CBNRM communities. The study recommends that government and civil society organizations improve the communal tenure, enhance local level democratic participation to reduce elite capture of benefits at local level.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of elite capture has gained attention among social scientists, economists, political scientists and community development experts- particularly those working in Community-Driven Development (CDD). Elite capture in CDD is broadly understood as the mechanism through which the elite privately allocate communal resources for personal gain. Researchers are interested in why and under what conditions this occurs. Literature can be categorized in three dominant categories - failure of collective action (Gibson & Marks, 1995; Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, &

Policansky, 1999) decentralization (Rondinelli, 1980) and democratization (Murphree,

1993; Ribot, 2003)

This chapter defines the different approaches to elite capture in CDD literature and seeks to develop a conceptual framework for understanding elite capture, and to contribute to the debate on elite capture in community based natural resources management. The chapter reviews the classical elite theories and empirical studies on the elite. Decentralization centers on power relationships and focusing on the role of the elite will enhance our understanding of group decisions and resource allocation mechanisms in CDD. The current study seeks to answer how inter-group relations affect local development outcomes and to uncover the different mechanisms that the elite use in different contexts. The approach of this study is eclectic and draws on both qualitative and quantitative approaches to understand the national, community level and individual level factors that influence elite decisions.

Theoretical Frameworks

History of the Elite Theory

Elite theory has its roots in the work of Pareto and Mosca (Nye, 1977). Elite theory argues that a few individuals control political processes Elite theory is a direct response to Karl Marx’s idea of class relations (Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2017). It also refutes the notion of democratic rule; arguing that a small wealthy class controls political institutions and ‘democratic processes’. Even in mature democracies, they argue, small groups of individuals dictate main goals, policy making processes, and control major organizations in society (Beth, 1942; Kolegar, 1967; Ross, 1952).

Classical elite theory is credited to Pareto, Mosca, and Michels (Michels, 1915;

Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1991) and it argues that society is divided into those who rule and those who are ruled, and the rulers constitute the minority (Kolegar, 1967; Zuckerman,

1977). The elite therefore, are a universal feature of any government, monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy (Bennett, 1978) and historically, societies have been dominated by a few elite. Michel on the other hand, was concerned with the emergence of large corporate organizations and the possibility of minority rule (Michels, 1915).

Michels envisioned an outcome where decisions in bureaucracies would end up centralized on a few individuals (Law of Oligarchy). Oligarchies are the eventual outcome of democratic or autocratic organizations because it is simply difficult to have many people making decisions (Beetham, 1981; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Lipset,

1960; Michels, 1915)

Floyd Hunter pioneered a new set of studies on the elite in Atlanta seeking to answer the pluralist and Marxist view of class and power in society (Hunter, 1953).

Abzug (2007) summarizes key literature on the elite since 1941 and summary informs the selected elite theorists presented in this chapter.

In the 1950s, Hunter and Mills work had significant impacts within and outside sociology. In Community Power Structure, Hunter ranked community leaders in Atlanta and he was able to identify an “upper echelon of economic elites.... who formed first rate tier of power pyramid and reputational method of identifying them” (Abzug, 2007, p.

90). His work had a greater impact in sociology, “but upset political scientists to no end”

(Domhoff, 2007, p. 1). Hunter concluded that a few of the business elite dominated national politics in a direct way, for example as most policy decisions are acted upon without public participation. He also analyzed power relationships at the sub-community level and concluded that a few individuals make important community decisions.

Additionally, his work contributed to the development of the reputational method-a technique for interviewing people about the “…who and why of power in a given city, issue area, or country,” (Domhoff, 1990, p. 1).

Mills on the other hand, argued that the military elite, corporate elite, and government officers dominate local and national politics. Mills also demonstrates that power structures can vary widely in society. In his later work, The Structure of Power in

American Society, Mills points out that

…the means of power which now prevail is the power to manage and to manipulate consent of men, without the sanction of the reason or the conscience of the obedient (C. W. Mills, 1958, p. 29)

According to Mills, coercion in modern times is the last resort compared to the authoritative forms of the medieval times. Mills also saw a middle level of power between the national elite and unorganized masses composed of opinion leaders and interest groups (Ross, 1952).

Both Hunter and Mills’ work encountered resistance. Hunters work was dismissed on methodological grounds while Mill was attacked for not testing his theory with specific cases. This resistance came from pluralists. For example, (Hirsch, 1975) argues that the elite hypothesis is a misunderstanding of the political processes by which political and economic power is diffused and the extent to which economic benefits are shared in a capitalist society.

A historical analysis of the sociology of the elite, Domhoff (1990) found that the upper class dominates society by holding key institutional positions that allow them to gain privileged access to jobs and positions of influence. Domhoff further tackles the question of power from the perspective of who benefits, who shapes the political agenda, and who has more to say on big decisions (Domhoff, 1990, 2007). Other scholars also provide different classification of the elite falling within either the business or cabinet elite class (Mintz, Freitag, Hendricks, & Schwartz, 1976). Importantly,

Domhoff and Freitag and Mintz’s work attempts to address some contemporary challenges that researchers face of defining the elite.

Structural functionalism is an important theoretical lens for analysis the elite and it focuses on the relationships among social institutions and seeks to explain why society functions the way it does. It is primarily concerned with explaining how social institutions work together as a set of interconnected parts. (Parsons, 2017; Talcott,

2013). Other theorist however, do not view social institutions as interconnected and are concerned with how society meets its needs and functions are the social processes for achieving these (such as religious practices and handshakes)(Kingsbury &

Scanzoni, 2009). All these are social functions that are allow society to operate as a

whole and society is organized in the most efficient way in order for it to function(Parsons, 2017). Homeostasis or equilibrium is key concepts used to explain how social system are works. The concept of equilibrium suggest that structural features of social system tend to remain the same or few changes are bound to occur.

For example, this means the elite and non-elite relations tend to be stable over time and if any change occurs (Talcott, 2013) . Structural functional does not provide an analysis of the individual actors in institutions.

Functionalists perceive elites as central to the functioning and organization of society (Parsons, 2017). The lack of competitive and visionary elites is likely to result in collapse of society. For example, the condition of Spain after the First World War was attributed to lack of “meritorious virtuous persons” (Kovacs, 1999, p. 310). In general, the functionalists that the elite will control political processes and outcomes even in mature democracies. The elites thus, guide societies and civilization and lack of visionary elite will result in social crisis. The study applied three contemporary frameworks of participatory action approach, collective action, and the social capital approach which are discussed below.

Participatory Democracy Approach

At more local level, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) adopt three frameworks to explain elite capture but do not specify how these are theoretically linked. They argue that the elite can control decision making processes to influence project outcomes. One mechanism is to disrupt the democratic elections thereby reducing the level of accountability. The elite are aware that if competitive elections prevail, community members will be able to replace non-performing or non-accountable leadership. Lack of free and fair elections provides evidentiary support that the non-elite will find it difficult to

influence decision making processes. Furthermore, leaders might be appointed by local chiefs, which makes them highly susceptible to elite influence. At a more specific level, if the constitution provides a term limit, once people begin to break these regulations and get re-elected for third or fourth terms, this is strong evidence of elite capture

(Rusca, Schwartz, Hadzovic, & Ahlers, 2015). Another indicator is how constitutions are amended to protect the interests of specific groups which assumes that elections are the key mechanisms of accountability which is not always the case (Dahl, 1958; Rigon,

2014).

Collective Action Approach

The collective action theorists focus on decentralization processes and how they stimulate local level participation, community empowerment, and increased role by individuals in decision making (Olson & Olson, 1965). Indeed, Ostrom suggests that all people affected by the rules should participate in making them (Poteete & Ostrom,

2008). Dasgupta and Beard (2007) argue that decentralization reforms create institutions that are prone to local elite capture. With new institutions failing to target beneficiaries and creating limited opportunities for local participation (Kita, 2018). They focus on whether other community members attend meetings or not, whether they participate at these meetings, and if they feel their participation is taken seriously.

Collective action theory has established that larger groups will not act for the common good (Olson & Olson, 1965). Based on this hypothesis, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) identify the following determinants of collective action: group size, heterogeneity, non- linear relationships, and reciprocity. High degrees of inequality impact collective action.

Ostrom’s design principles for common property regimes influenced the design of fisheries schemes and wildlife management(Ostrom, 1998). Murphree’s (1993) work on

jurisdictional parsimony also focuses on matching resource boundaries with cost associated with living alongside wildlife. Groups are less likely to cooperate and there is tendency for self-maximizing behavior in heterogenous communities. Elite capture within this framework is a failure of collective action and a sign of poor program design that fails to meet Ostrom’s design principles.

Social Capital Approach

Substantial work has assessed how social capital impacts elite capture outcomes

(Abe, 2009; Bardhan, 2002; Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Saito-Jensen, Nathan, & Treue,

2010). The social capital approach is concerned with the initial conditions that prevailed before the introduction of CDD projects in terms of history of cooperation and willingness to work for the common good. Post project period, they focus on levels of trust in leadership and information flow. Lower class members are usually excluded from accessing program benefits in highly structured societies. Saito-Jensen et al.,

(2010, p. 2) note:

Elite capture is not necessarily created by participatory approaches, but it is rather an unintended result of the inequality of and hierarchies that existed prior to the introduction of these approaches.

Researchers also focus on the quality of leadership, social norms like belief in equality, and social participation at the village level- and the nature of community participation. The lack of cooperation and a culture of working together is treated as causal or explanatory factors for the unequal outcomes in CDD projects. This is often the case in communities that have experienced systematic social oppression (such as slavery, colonialism, and apartheid) (Hwang & Stewart, 2017; Musavengane &

Simatele, 2016; Neal, 2015). For example, Abe (2009) notes that the systematic process of marginalizing other groups dampens their interests in participating in projects

and contributing towards project identification. High levels of social capital however, do not often reduce the potential of elite capture. It might create “receptive” rather than

“active” community members, which makes it difficult to separate elite vs. non-elite preferences. This means it will be difficult to distinguish the preferences of the elite and those of the non-elite.

Definition of Key Concepts

Who are the Elite?

The increased number of community-based projects in Africa has led to a significant rejuvenation of the local-level elite. The elite are defined as ‘those who enjoy privileged status and exercise decisive control over the organization of society’

(Sindzingre, 2010, p. 352).The focus on the elite is beginning to elicit scholarly attention in the field of community development, specifically, the question of how the elite affect the ability of programs to deliver pro-poor outcomes(Angeles & Neanidis, 2009). The two major findings are that (a) the elite can facilitate the process of community development, and (b) the elite capture community benefits and dominate decision- making processes (Wong, 2010). Based on these two observations, community development programs are designed in ways that seek to either ‘counter’ or ‘coopt’ the elite. The ‘counter-elite’ model views the local elite as problematic and maintains that they should be excluded from community-based programs (Wong, 2010). On the other hand, some scholars argue that the participation of the local elite leads to improved project outcomes since they provide leadership and organizational capacity that improves the efficiency of management and can even induce local participation

(Overdevest, 2000; Schou, 2009; Takasaki, 2011)

Elite theory is the view that society is governed by a few individuals or a group of people usually called the elite (Edwards, 2014). The elite are usually drawn from higher echelons but sources of elite power include wealth, tradition, religion and lineage

(Shucksmith, 2011). Elite theorists seek to explain elitism in relation to social, political, social, economic, psychological factors. The other researchers only seek to contrast elitist perspective to more pluralistic or democratic forms of government (Edwards,

2014; Pakulski, 2018).

Elite Capture

Elite capture occurs when the elite:

control, shape, or manipulate decision making processes or institutions in ways that serve their interests and priorities, typically resulting in personal gain at the expense of non-elites and local communities (Labonte, 2011, p. 12).

Elite capture has recently been reported as a major threat to community-level donor-funded projects (Kita, 2018; Mattingly, 2016; Platteau, 2004; Platteau & Gaspart,

2003; Rusca et al., 2015; Saito-Jensen et al., 2010). It is also emerging as a threat to decentralized wildlife and natural resources management programs within communities and where local leaders are coopted by and accountable to higher authorities and not to their constituencies. Elite capture is also closely related to long-standing patrimonial relations of power and exchange (Kita, 2018). In projects that decentralize or devolve power to local communities, the elite often use a combination of social and political authority to expropriate resources from communities(Mattingly, 2016)

Traditionally, ‘big men’ controlled access to resources which they further distributed through ‘informal networks’ (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Richards, 2007; Roth,

1986). The informal networks of exchange lead to a personalized form of governance

whereby the elite and those close to them became the prime beneficiaries (Kalu, Yacob-

Haliso, & Falola, 2018; C. Wright Mills, 2018). Decentralization reforms and the adoption of pro-community programs in Africa have consistently emphasized issues of equity, poverty reduction and novel forms of resource distribution. They have invariably underestimated the power and persistence of elitism, and the emergence of governance as the new buzzword is no doubt a reaction to these deficiencies (Sheely, 2015).

While humans evolved in relatively egalitarian small groups, bigger societies have inevitably exhibited the characteristics of the elite or state capture (Fukuyama,

2004). The wealthy elite included chiefs, kings, and emperors who led relatively impoverished masses locked in a cycle of subsistence living, famine, and disease.

Human populations only rose slowly until after the Glorious Revolution in England, including the industrial revolution and the age of prosperity (Douglas C. North &

Thomas, 1973). Locke further note that prosperity was built on inclusive, impersonal institutions in which the majority were safe and could keep the fruits of their labor and could protect the rules that safeguarded them through some form of deliberative process (Locke, 2014). The implication for CBNRM is that it seeks to recreate these conditions of inclusive rule-based governance at local level. Recent evidence in Africa shows that neither co-opting or countering the elite works in reducing elite capture but the need to focus on cultural and political dimensions of rural life (Kita, 2018).

Despite the proposal to eliminate the term elite from the political science vocabulary, and the or scholars note that the study of the elite need to “clarified and resurrected” as most studies do not apply robust frameworks to analyze the concept

(Pakulski, 2018). Studies of the elite are concerned with the analysis of power. As

Abzug notes:

If we define elites as those with power, should it surprise us to find elites where power is wielded (even if we don't, then, call them by name)? Once there, should we be no less surprised to find that selfsame power is used to benefit mostly those who wield it? (Abzug, 2007, p. 98).

To summarize, the debate among the elite theorists falls into five categories: (1) defining the elite, (2) composition of an elite group and elite mobility, (3) how the elite exercise power, (4) the relation between the elite and society, and (5) the implications for the elite hypothesis on the liberal democratic processes. The CDD literature, focuses on the elite-society relationship and how they facilitate or impede state or non-state actors’ ability to reach communities. The elite hypothesis remains appealing but there is need to provide a framework for rigorous testing and conceptualization of elite capture.

The next section defines the key concept of the elite and elite capture.

Evolution of the Research

The study utilizes an inductive inquiry approach that relies on observations to derive some theoretical conclusions. Inductive methods seek to generate theory or hypotheses based on data (Eisenhardt, Graebner, & Sonenshein, 2016; Yom, 2015).

The study evolved over several years and started with field visits from 2009-2011 during which qualitative and quantitative data were collected

The study adopts a social constructivist approach which views the world from the perspective of the actors. Social meaning is varied and complex and is often defined from the views of the participant. Social constructivism has been applied in the analysis of actors and the environment and broadly views institutions as social and distinct from natural factors (Hay, 2016). Social constructivism thus deals with the evolution of social

constructs such as rights, duties, entitlements hence the need to focus on the ideas and the voices of the people with the context of research (Haas, 2015; Vuori, 2016). The approach also emphasizes that humans rationalize their experience and that members of a group invent properties of the group (Amineh & Asl, 2015). The study sought to understand how these realities are created and sustained in CBNRM communities of southern Africa. Chapters 2 and 3 assess the various CBNRM projects concept of elite capture using multiple methods that included interviews and secondary information collected from minutes at local level. Secondary information was also gathered from published and unpublished gray literature on CBNRM to select cases for analysis, identify decision making processes and the allocation of resources, and to understand which social group influences the distribution of resources at local level.

A case study design was used to understand how and why elite capture occurs.

Case studies are suited to answering the how and why question (A. L. George &

Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2006) and exploring casual mechanisms in contexts where the researcher cannot exercise control over independent variables. It provides a good compliment to other research designs-experiments, longitudinal and cross-sectional designs. Case studies have high conceptual validity, useful for deriving new hypothesis, uncovering causal mechanisms, and explaining complex causal relationships (George & Bennett, 2005). The process of building theories using cases studies involves several tasks which are discussed further in the subsequent chapters which include selecting cases, crafting protocols, analyzing data, reshaping the hypotheses, enfolding literature, and reaching closure (Eisenhardt, 1989; A. L. George

& Bennett, 2005)

Mixed methods approach was used to collect data. The use of mixed methods is rooted in four conceptual frameworks: (a) triangulation, (b) multiplism, (c) mixing methods and paradigms, and (d) mixed methods design (Ahram, 2009; Andrew &

Halcomb, 2006; Creswell & Clark, 2010). Primary and secondary data were collected from archival documents, interviews, surveys, and secondary sources. Methodological eclecticism provides a useful tool in conducting case study research (Yanchar &

Williams, 2006). In addition, mixed methods are essential in addressing research problem that cannot be confined to either quantitative or qualitative approaches as it can address the broad range of variables that case studies deal with (Wolf, 2010).

Chapter 2 reviews the role of the local-level elite (including traditional leaders and elected committee members) in four CBNRM programs in Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe to better understand the various mechanisms of elite capture and elite control. The chapter focuses at the local level where CBNRM programs interact with traditional leaders (chiefs, village heads and indunas) and locally selected or elected committee members. Through this, we seek to understand the mechanisms of elite capture from an incentive theory approach. We argue that the devolved benefits associated with CBNRM programs have motivated the local elite to manipulate the rules of the game to suit their needs. We use this analysis to develop a conceptual understanding of the different mechanisms through which elite capture occurs in wildlife- and tourism-based CBNRM programs and follow this with a specific case study of Masoka in Chapter 3

Chapter 3 is where we discuss the governance shifts that occurred in Masoka in

Zimbabwe to understand the nature and shape of the mechanisms the elite use to

capture the local level benefits. Elite capture thus undermines the stated CBNRM goals of participatory governance and equitable benefit sharing and highlights the division between personalized and extractive governance (rule by man) and impersonal and inclusive governance (rule of law). In this chapter, we seek to understand more fully the nature of elite capture and the mechanisms by which the elite can empower themselves in programs that strive for egalitarian and democratic resource governance.

Chapter 4 examines key factors that influence individual support for communal conservancies in Namibia and seeks to uncover some of the individual level factors to explain the elite capture outcomes discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. It tests the hypothesis that if individuals are compensated for their wildlife related losses, they are more likely to support community-based wildlife management projects. This chapter relies on survey data collected from 472 randomly sampled conservancy members from five conservancies in the Caprivi Region of Namibia.

Chapter 5 conclude and discusses future research in the study of the elite in

CDD. We observe that the reforms of governance are important, but governments avoid tenure reforms which are critical in addressing the challenges of elite capture in community wildlife programs across southern Africa because of the need to maintain redistributive control over local and national resources. Future research needs to understand who informal norms and traditional value systems can be applied in various contexts to curb elite capture. We suggest that while formal democratic governance is an ideal approach, there is need to develop alternative forms of accountability such as education, information, and civic education to reduce the capture of community benefits.

Second, we suggest the need to understand whether group tenure also requires

adherence to inclusive governance so that it does not take the characteristics of the feudal lords and serfs.

CHAPTER 2 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MESO-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA, ZAMBIA, AND ZIMBABWE

Starting in the 1980s, southern Africa emerged as an important crucible for devolved wildlife and natural resource governance. The community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programs sought to devolve the authority to use, benefit from, sell and manage wildlife to local communities, based on the hypothesis that ‘people seek to manage the environment when the benefits of management are perceived to exceed its costs’ (Murphree, 1993, p. 12). The primary challenge was perceived as convincing central wildlife agencies to let go of their control over wildlife and its benefits, and to transfer these rights and responsibilities to local people. CBNRM programs in Zimbabwe and Namibia, where devolution was established in the primary wildlife legislation in 1982 and 1996 respectively, did achieve some success. However, in Botswana, where communities were granted land leases, and in Zambia, where contestation over who gets the benefits from wildlife has been an ongoing issue, devolution has been less successful than in communities with fully devolved rights.

Initially, the far-sighted administrators who initiated the privatization of wildlife to individual landholders in the 1960s and to communities in the 1980s assumed, perhaps somewhat naively, that devolving benefits to the district (e.g. Zimbabwe’s WINDFALL program) would be sufficient in dealing with wildlife depletion in communal areas.

However, once they learned that this approach failed to link benefits to production incentives (Martin, 1986) they advocated for further devolution to the community level.

This was partially achieved in Zimbabwe where the rights to wildlife were decentralized

 Contents of the chapter were published as a book chapter (Muyengwa, Child, & Lubilo, 2014).

to rural district councils and the wildlife agency committed to channeling at least 50 percent of wildlife benefits to the community level (Murphree, 2005). Following concerns that Zimbabwe’s district councils were extracting too high a percentage of wildlife revenues, and undercutting wildlife’s viability and impact on poverty reduction, both

Namibia, through enabling legislation, and Botswana, via 15-year administrative leases, devolved 100 percent of revenues to producer communities.

In CAMPFIRE, a significant effort was made to develop local participatory arrangements for revenue sharing in the small communities of Mahenye, Masoka, and

Beitbridge (B. Child & Peterson, 1991). Although many communities were defined as being too large for such face-to-face arrangements, careful oversight by CBNRM support agencies and the wildlife agency ensured that at least 60 percent of revenues were used for community projects or cash benefits. Nonetheless, there were exceptions and even early warnings about recentralization at the local level (Murombedzi, 1992).

Namibia’s 1996 Nature Conservation Amendment Act allowed communities to legally obtain benefits from wildlife by constituting themselves as ‘Conservancies’, provided they met five legal requirements: a defined membership and register of members, a defined area with agreed boundaries, a legal constitution that provided for a game management and utilization plan, an equitable benefits distribution plan and a representative management committee. Botswana focused more on generating benefits than on defining how they should be managed and shared, while Zambia’s ADMADE project earmarked 35 percent of a partial share of wildlife income to community projects with 40 percent going to cover wildlife management costs. With the exception of

Zimbabwe, which monitored how wildlife money was spent as an indicator of

governance(B. Child, 1993; Frost & Bond, 2008), most countries focused primarily on how much money was earned. The assumption was that, once communities received money, informal and internal checks-and-balances, including the election of committees, would ensure equitable benefit sharing.

By the mid-2000s, widespread evidence of elite capture and even corruption began to emerge. Indeed, one of the key motivations for the recentralization proposed in Botswana is that some communities were not receiving benefits. Both the communities and the tourism operators who paid this money were increasingly resentful, and felt it was better for the government than their committees to handle this money. This tendency was reported in large multi-village communities but was certainly not the case in the single-village communities like Khwai, Mababe and particularly

Sankuyu, where benefits were being shared and most households were benefiting from community projects, meat or jobs. Audits of eight communities around Kafue National

Park in Zambia revealed significant failures to account for funds and negligible benefits

(Malenga, 2004). Recentralization was occurring in Zimbabwe, largely because of the personalization of the Zimbabwe economy and the replacement of accountability by a culture of impunity (Mapedza & Bond, 2006; Rihoy, Chirozva, & Anstey, 2007).

Moreover, even in the well-administered CBNRM program in Namibia, with proven benefits in terms of wildlife recovery and income growth, levels of participation and benefit sharing by ordinary people were remarkably low.1

The evidence suggests that, even at the smallest local level, equitable benefit sharing does not spontaneously emerge through collective action, apart from a partial

1 This information was gathered from unpublished dashboard surveys collected from 2007 to 2011

degree of equity in the tightly knit single villages of Khwai, Mababe and Sankuyu in

Botswana. Elite capture occurs and persists (in the absence of specific outside intervention) even where people have been exposed to the advantages of democratic decision-making and equitable benefit sharing, as we describe later in Chapter 3.

This chapter reviews the role of the local-level elite (including traditional leaders and elected committee members) in four CBNRM programs in Botswana, Namibia,

Zambia and Zimbabwe to better understand the various mechanisms of elite capture and elite control. The chapter focuses at the local level where CBNRM programs interact with traditional leaders (chiefs, village heads and indunas) and locally selected or elected committee members. We seek to understand the mechanisms of elite capture from an incentive theory approach. We argue that the devolved benefits associated with

CBNRM programs have motivated the local elite to manipulate the rules of the game to suit their needs. We use this analysis to develop a conceptual understanding of the different mechanisms through which elite capture occurs in wildlife- and tourism-based

CBNRM programs and follow this with a specific case study of Masoka in Chapter 3.

We briefly describe the historical reforms that led to the adoption of CBNRM as a rural development approach in southern Africa. We summarize country-level CBNRM policies and reported incidences of elite capture, and then describe and discuss the different mechanisms of elite capture across the four case studies as well as the strategic choices that the elite make to benefit disproportionately from CBNRM. Finally, we present key lessons for CBNRM related to the role of the elite and the phenomenon of elite capture.

Methods, Hypothesis and Data Analysis The chapter is based on a qualitative deductive inquiry approach to understand the different mechanisms of elite capture across four countries and it seeks to classify the different forms of elite capture we observed across the different countries. The chapter relies on both published, unpublished and primary data collected from 2007-

2011 from various communities. The primary aim of the chapter is to describe the cases of elite capture across southern Africa’s four countries of Botswana, Namibia,

Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Primary data was collected in three countries except Zambia where secondary data was used. In each of the cases, we seek to identify the local elite who allocate resources and the mechanisms of elite capture if any observed in each of the cases based on the information gathered.

Thematic analysis was used to group the narratives and the secondary literature.

A theme refers to an important event or process that is crucial to the subject of interest

(Braun & Clarke, 2006; Braun, Clarke, & Terry, 2014). The aim of the analysis was to develop meaningful themes (Vaismoradi, Jones, Turunen, & Snelgrove, 2016) to measure the different mechanism of elite capture and informed by a reading to the relevant literature. The reported events were grouped using a typology of mechanisms gleaned from literature such as information distortion (Platteau, 2009), misappropriation of funds (Rihoy & Maguranyanga, 2007), informal demands and entitlements (Balint &

Mashinya, 2006a; Rihoy et al., 2007) and formal entitlements (Ade, 2011; J. J.

Andersen & Aslaksen, 2008)

CBNRM Reforms in Southern Africa

CBNRM programs emerged in the past three decades to allow communities to participate in the management of local resources and to also derive benefits from these

resources. The upsurge in community conservation followed marked resource declines often attributed to the ‘fines and fences’ approach and the criminalization of traditional livelihood options in favor of wildlife preservationist approaches (Adams & Hulme, 2001;

Hoole & Berkes, 2010; Spierenburg, Steenkamp, & Wels, 2008). This top–down and coercive approach to conservation resulted in extensive resource decline within and outside protected areas (Muchapondwa et al., 2012) by creating ‘adversarial relationships’ between park authorities and local communities without the central authorities having the capacity to enforce their statutes. The intention of CBNRM was to reshape existing institutions to provide local communities with positive rather than negative incentives for local resource conservation by devolving to them both managerial rights and responsibilities and the right to retain benefits.

CBNRM thus radically revises conservation norms by decentralizing functions previously controlled by the state to local communities. However, CBNRM also has significant influence on local governance by devolving economic benefits and therefore economic power to this level. Although micro-governance is now emerging as a priority issue to promote social wellbeing, in the early days most CBNRM implementing agencies were staffed by conservationists who prioritized natural resource management and benefit generation rather than public goods like participation and equitable benefit sharing. In both Namibia and Zambia, CBNRM emerged through a process to use local scouts to protect rapidly depleting wildlife, and both programs worked through the traditional leadership to get this done, largely because traditional leaders in many areas were powerful and the primary form of local governance. Namibia then moved beyond this model when made democratic representation a requirement for conservancy

formation. Like Namibia, Botswana set up local trusts as the fulcrum of their CBNRM program. However, at this stage, the priority was to generate income, and the focus was on developing business deals with tourism and hunting operators rather on establishing effective structures of local governance.

The emergence of CBNRM in Zimbabwe was more politically astute than in

Namibia and Botswana, but also more constrained by the political order, which did not allow the enfranchisement of local communities as occurred in Botswana and in

Namibia. Unlike those countries, the leading Zimbabwean agencies employed more political scientists and institutional capacity builders than wildlife managers, and the program was much as a vehicle for improved rural democratization as it was for wildlife management. The documentation of CAMPFIRE (B. Child & Peterson, 1991), for example, focuses on how much money gets to villages and how this is spent, in contrast to the other programs that emphasize wildlife protection and recovery and tourism income (B. Child & Weaver, 2006). Thus, Zimbabwe’s examples of CBNRM programs are based on high levels of local participation and benefit sharing. These provide ideal case studies for studying elite capture. The Zimbabwe case enables us to understand not only on the mechanisms for precipitating local democratic management, but also how the elite were later able to recentralize power against the wishes of communities that had experienced participatory revenue sharing and liked it. We explore this Chapter

Local people in Africa have lost their rights to land and wildlife resources (Boone,

2014; Gilbert, 2016). These resources are either managed by the state or devolved to districts or sub-district levels and managed on behalf of the communities. In most

cases, people live on land at the convenience of the chief and regarded as subjects and not citizens (Mamdani, 1996). Only 13% of the land in sub-Saharan Africa is owned and controlled by indigenous communities and local people. Sixty percent of the national land area is however held under customary or traditional forms of tenure (Rights and

Resources Initiative, 2015). Communities have also generally lost traditional rights to utilization of wildlife. but what is changing is that rights to wildlife are being returned, in different ways in different places. For example, Zimbabwe granted rights to district councils, but emphasized participatory governance and benefit sharing at local level (G.

Child, 1996). Namibia devolved full rights to Conservancies, including 100% of benefits, but tended to strengthen wildlife administration rather than emphasize participatory governance (Vette, Kashululu, & Hebinck, 2012). Botswana devolved temporary (15 year) rights to Trusts, and emphasized income generation, with less focus on wildlife management (Namibia) and participation (Zimbabwe). On the other hand, Zambia was highly variable at site level. Generally, benefits were decentralized partially with a focus on supporting village scouts and (for a short time) community projects (Dalal-Clayton,

Dalal-Clayton, & Child, 2003).

CBNRM in Zimbabwe

The successful devolution of wildlife rights to private landowners in 1975 enabled extension of this strategy to communal areas in 1989. Through a revision of the Parks and Wildlife Act in1982, Rural District Councils became the right-holders for wildlife by applying for ‘appropriate authority’ status (Hill, 1996). The Parks and Wildlife Authority had wanted to devolve rights directly to ‘village companies’, but there was no legal basis for legal institutions or land rights below the RDC and a strategic compromise was made (Murphree, 2005) Appropriate Authority status was granted to RDCs with the

understanding that most revenues would be devolved to what were termed ‘producer communities’. A significant effort was made to capacitate RDCs to manage and support their CAMPFIRE communities. A few RDCs cynically extracted resources from communities, but many promoted genuine devolution because they saw that the wildlife resource, and therefore their revenue base, would be rapidly depleted unless local people participated in decisions and benefited directly from the wildlife. Thus,

CAMPFIRE placed a strong emphasis on local democratization and revenue sharing.

Where there were a high number of people, this often took the form of representational governance, but with training and strong oversight from RDCs and the wildlife agency,

60 percent or more of the income from wildlife was used to benefit ordinary people through cash distributions but especially through community projects. CAMPFIRE’s flagship communities were Chikwarakwara, Mahenye and Masoka where direct democracy was instituted, and levels of participation and revenue sharing exceeded 80 percent. At the local level, CAMPFIRE prioritized democratic leadership and, although traditional leaders played a key facilitating role in some cases, they were generally side- lined from direct positions of authority within these structures (and in Zimbabwe in general following Mugabe’s Presidential Directive of 1984 that local government comprise Village Development Committees, Ward Development Committees and

RDCs) (B. Child, 1993; Frost & Bond, 2008; Murombedzi, 1997). Following Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown, the nature of the ruling state changed rapidly. Impersonal institutions including land rights, courts, government agencies and local democratic structures were rapidly personalized and rural traditional leaders were re-empowered.

As Mapedza and Bond (2006) show, this led to a culture of impunity whereby political

and traditional leaders in representational systems of governance in CAMPFIRE areas were able to plunder benefits and democratic attempts to resist this were crushed.

Interestingly, we see the same thing happening in well-established participatory communities, including the Mahenye community (Rihoy et al., 2007) and Masoka community, our case study.

During the halcyon days of CAMPFIRE, Masoka was a near model community.

Through the leadership of headman Kanyurira, most decisions were made democratically face-to-face, elected committees were accountable to the community, and a lot was achieved. An electric fence protected the people from wildlife, schools and clinics were built, people received cash payments, money was accounted for and community members were employed for jobs like fence maintenance. However, ethnographic research and a perusal of records like community accounts and minute books in 2010 and 2011 showed that most of these gains had been lost. Interviews showed that people clearly remembered and harked back to this time. Although they resented the almost complete control and privatization of benefits by a small number of the elite, they felt powerless to change the system (Chapter 3). In brief, a new traditional leadership, working within the changing nature of the Zimbabwean state and the dissipation of oversight of the CAMPFIRE program, appointed and coopted the

CAMPFIRE committee to obtain most of the benefits for themselves.

While the CAMPFIRE constitution did not specify entitlements for traditional leaders the Masoka committee would make payments to the elite on a regular basis.

The interviews with local people and the records of minutes showed a shift in attitudes away from collective action to personal gains.

The flow of information is crucial in ensuring that community funds are managed transparently (Platteau, 2009) and the early CAMPFIRE program placed significant emphasis on the democratization of information, and especially financial records. It also placed considerable emphasis on collective decision-making. However, the macro- political environment in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008 created an environment that enabled the elite to control the flow of information to communities. The inflationary environment meant CAMPFIRE funds received in the local currency lost value if they were not spent quickly. Previously, the community received its money as a lump sum and would plan the use of this money collectively at an Annual General Meeting.

However, the changes from an annual lump sum allocation to a monthly payment to account for the income only after it had been spent; even after the dollarization of the

Zimbabwean economy deposits made monthly into the community account were not accompanied by mechanisms to ensure that community members approved the budgets before they were implemented.

CBNRM in Namibia

The Namibia conservancy program was developed through a collaboration between traditional leaders and local NGOs ( Jones, 2009; Murphree, 2009). Its first iteration was a highly successful community game guard project in the north-western region (Kunene) where the empowerment of locally trained game scouts to patrol and protect community areas rapidly reversed the depletion of wildlife that occurred when wildlife was controlled by the South African Defense Force. The success of the pilot project led to a rapid maturation of CBNRM and the expansion of similar projects across the country with 50 communal conservancies established between 2000 and 2007

(Jones, 2009).

Conservancies are legal entities with clearly defined boundaries, roles and membership that retain 100 percent of wildlife benefits (Jones, 2009). Each conservancy is required to adopt a constitution. Elected conservancy committees and their employees handle wildlife management and tourism revenue on behalf of the communities. The conservancy program has become a model for CBNRM in Africa because of its successful growth and demonstrable success in the conservation of valuable wildlife and the generation of community incomes.

Namibia has developed an exceptional ‘Management Orientated Monitoring

System’ or MOMS (Stuart-Hill, Diggle, Munali, Tagg, & Ward, 2005) through which communities collect and organize data to improve the management of their natural resources. With growing evidence in the region of the need to better understand micro- governance, the Namibian CBNRM support agencies assisted us with both financing and field partnerships to develop the ‘governance dashboard’ in the Caprivi region. The governance dashboard is an applied research tool that seeks to diagnose and solve governance challenges using locally collected survey data. The data is collected and presented back to the community and they are required to focus on the information at hand to solve identified governance challenges (Collomb et al., 2008).

In Namibia wildlife populations are low but recovering, and CBNRM uses a governance model based on multi-village communities and representational leadership.

The governance dashboard, which ‘digs’ below community leadership to assess how ordinary people evaluate their CBNRM programs and governance, showed that the level of participation and benefit by ordinary people in CBNRM was much lower than anticipated. These results quantified the intuitive concerns of several of Namibia’s

CBNRM support agencies and were used in partnership with communities and NGOs to test potential governance solutions. These generally took two forms. In most of the

Caprivi conservancies, we worked with CBNRM support agencies to replace outdated and internally contradictory constitutions with a new one intended to be much clearer about the rights of community members to participate in decision-making. These conservancies retained a representational character in which committees continued to make decisions on behalf of communities. Only in Wuparo community were we able to test a more transformative governance model, aimed at splitting the community into seven sub-communities at a scale that made face-to-face participation possible, with each of the sub-committees having its own committee, a share of half the conservancy’s income, and participatory budgeting processes.

The experience with the new constitutions has not been positive. In the absence of regular monitoring and re-enforcement from above, these have tended to be misused or simply ignored to maintain a status quo in which committees and employees selectively enforced regulations to serve their interests. For example, section 17.5.5 of the new constitutions stipulates that all allowances shall be set at a general meeting. In one incident that exemplifies lack of regard for the constitution, Wuparo’s management committee increased their sitting allowances (payment for attending meetings) without community approval.

The constitutions specify that:

both the Patron and Vice Patrons [i.e. traditional leaders] shall be entitled to an honorarium for these prescribed responsibilities as determined at a General meeting but not to exceed 5 percent of income generated by the Conservancy. [Constitution of Wuparo Conservancy]

This recognized the need to buy the support of the traditional leaders, and to discourage the habit of accessing funds through a variety of means that can greatly distort decision-making and undermine the democratic character of such institutions. As a result, in 2010 one of the chiefs earned US$5,000 per year from three conservancies under his jurisdiction, as compared to an average dividend of US$1 per household. The existing evidence does not give enough evidence to conclude whether formal entitlements encourage traditional leaders to support the democratic process or reducing elite capture of funds earmarked for community development (e.g. Zambia).

Democratically elected committees are often weak relative to the strength of traditional leaders. Traditional leaders can exert control over community projects through informal norms and their control over land. Their power is enhanced because indunas (aides and advisers to the chief) and chiefs are usually invited to arbitrate conservancy-related cases. Moreover, traditional leaders decide on the most senior appointments and decisions to dismiss employees. This power is often exerted in subtle ways and is difficult to measure. However, we use one of the more easily measured cases to illustrate this power and to show that elected committees are often unable to hold traditional leaders accountable for CBNRM incomes. In cases funds set aside for the traditional leaders are depleted, the lower level committees then contributed toward funding the activities of the traditional leaders. This is despite that these requests were outside the budgets agreed by the central management committee and the seven zonal committees, indicating the difficulties that democratic organizations have in adhering even to budgets made through democratic and participatory processes.

Wuparo is an interesting case because a governance dashboard process that led to a transformation from a single committee to a federation headed by a conservancy committee but with half of the finances being devolved to the seven zonal sub- committees at village level. One of the major issues with CBNRM committees throughout the region is that committee members enrich themselves by holding meetings for which they claim per diem. In Wuparo, management committees claim allowances for attending management meetings. As Table 2-1 shows, management meetings were prevalent in the first year of adopting the new constitution, despite a constitutional limit on the number of management meetings.

We also used vehicle records to quantify the priorities of the Wuparo conservancy committee, which, incidentally, is more egalitarian than many. Community members are usually motivated to acquire vehicles to ease transport problems in remote areas and to assist them during times of need, such as funerals. In Caprivi, local

NGOs also encourage conservancies to buy their own vehicles. In the case of Wuparo, we analyzed vehicle costs and use for a six-month period to measure whether vehicles serve the needs of the membership or those of the elite. As Table 2-2 shows, 12 percent of vehicle use can be attributed to direct community benefits (community pick- ups, death and illness) and 6 percent for wildlife management. Obviously, some of the remaining 81 percent (meetings, conservancy chair, chiefs) is legitimate, value-adding business, but nevertheless vehicles are expensive to operate, and this cost can be measured in terms of household dividends forgone, as household dividends are normally given at the end of the year using any money that remains in the account. In addition, following the acquisition of its new vehicle, the Wuparo committee drove 190

kilometers to the town of Katima Mulilo to submit monthly reports to the supporting

NGO, which previously used its own vehicles to collect these monthly reports at the conservancy office.

In the more devolved system, funds were distributed to the seven zones twice a year, at the beginning of each year when the hunting concession was paid and at the end of the year when the final payment is made for all trophies. More than 80 percent of survey respondents got cash benefits between 2009 and 2011 as compared to less than 10 percent in the previous system and individual members received between N$50

($3.93) to N$400 ($31.46) per annum compared to the pre-devolution period between

2000 to 2008 where only a few people received cash benefits that averaged N$5

($0.39) to N$10 ($0.78). In 2010, the year devolution occurred, 1,386 members received a cash dividend as compared to the early years of the conservancy where only employees and a few committee members received cash. An area treasurer remarked that:

We ensure that we allocate benefits equally according to the number of areas so that we can all benefit in the same way. Though we sometimes face difficulties, we feel in this way we can encourage our members to participate in conservation of our resources. [Interview with Samudono area treasurer, June 2011]

In addition to cash dividends, the pre-devolution Wuparo conservancy did not invest any funds in community projects between 2000 and 2007. By 2011, each area was able to implement several community projects, donating N$2,500 ($196.67) to a local school in 2008, although some areas were struggling with proper project implementation (Table 2-3). The overall impression from the members is that devolution was greatly improving all key aspect of conservancy management.

These data illustrate the rapid gains that can be made by devolving governance from a central representative committee to the level of participatory governance by splitting a community up into sub-zones. Indeed, they are in many ways a measure of the opportunity costs of the elite capture often associated with representational community governance. However, it is important to note that the researchers, together with NGOs and especially Namibia’s Legal Assistance Centre, played an important role in creating these changes and in protecting them for at least three years. This again illustrates the importance of the meso level in creating and protecting space for local democratic processes, and in protecting the rights of ordinary people and marginalized groups to benefit from the revenue pie.

CBNRM in Botswana

Before the CBNRM program, communities in Botswana did not have formal rights to manage and benefit from wildlife. Most communities engaged in subsistence hunting, especially among the bushmen communities (Hitchcock, Yellen, Gelburd, Osborn, &

Crowell, 1996), while many Batswana hunted wildlife using citizen licenses. The revenues from the sale of wildlife accrued to the state with little trickle-back to the communities, but licensing was not well controlled, and the wildlife was heavily overused. In 1989, USAID and the Government of Botswana established the Natural

Resources Management Program (NRMP) through which the Government of Botswana empowered communities to manage Community Hunting Areas (CHAs) The express goal of this move was to improve rural welfare (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). The

Chobe Enclave Community Trust was the first Community Based Organization (CBO) to register in 1993. The Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) granted 15- year leases to respective communities to manage and benefit from the CHAs. By the

end of 2005, 67 Trusts had formally registered (Arntzen, 2003). Initially, the primary focus was on enabling trusts to negotiate joint venture arrangements with tourism and hunting companies. While this was very successful, little attention was paid to establishing sound systems for financial governance and revenue sharing. In 2003 progress was summarized as follows:

Since its inception in 1989 CBNRM in Botswana has made remarkable progress in some communities the elected representatives find it hard to account for their decisions, turning development into a non-transparent, non-democratic and non-sustainable venture (Masego, 2004, p. 8).

Johnson (2009, p. 15) noted that this was still the situation in 2009:

As indicated in numerous reports the governance of the CBNRM CBOs in Botswana has been a major challenge … [community, local government and national government level]. At the community level persistent poor governance has resulted in very few benefits being made available to the household … [and] although the statistics showing the growth of the CBOs over the past two decades may appear to portray some level of progress, the high incidents of corruption and maladministration reported by many CBO Boards of Trustees does not correlate with … improvement in CBNRM performance.

Local Trust Committees are elected every three years, but elections alone clearly do not generate financial accountability. The audit report of the Chobe Enclave

Community Trust (CECT) and its five villages sheds light on how benefits are captured by people elected to head village or multi-village trust organizations:

There is rampant theft of project funds in the villages. This is achieved by poor record keeping, use of funds before they are deposited, unauthorized expenditure. There was no single village which managed to account for project income as they failed to account for all income collected. The funds which they deposited were very little while what they claimed to be expenditure was not supported by any documents. (Unpublished CECT audit report, 2008, p.25)

In other words, elected representatives simply spent money with little reference to budgets and without reliable financial record-keeping. Our own dashboard surveys in

two multi-village communities, namely CECT and Okavango Community Trust, revealed that ordinary people had little to no involvement in financial decision-making and control, seldom if ever received an accounting of the benefits that were supposedly theirs and, despite high incomes in these trusts, received few or no benefits.

The participants at the 2005 CBNRM stakeholder conference agreed that financial mismanagement was major problem in several trusts, and that the scale of mismanagement threatened CBNRM’s ability to deliver its goals. The audit report produced by the DWNP at the same meeting also highlighted that committees did not manage funds in transparent ways. Rihoy and Maguranyanga (2007) also reported that

CBNRM in Botswana faced challenges of poor financial management or an investment of community funds into projects that did not benefit community members. Table 2-4 shows select cases of financial mismanagement and, while this list is far from complete, it does indicate the magnitude of the problem.

The Minister of Environment and Tourism used financial maladministration at the local level as a reason for proposing a new policy for CBNRM in Botswana in which government would retain 70 percent of wildlife revenues in a trust fund. We were informed that in some communities, villagers preferred government oversight of this money to continued misuse by their leaders. However, in the small villages of Sankuyu,

Khwai and Mababe, the benefit retention and the loss of wildlife income through the proposed hunting ban were hotly disputed. Dashboard data for these three small villages showed a much higher level of participation and benefit sharing than in the larger multi-villages, and people thought that they were being unfairly punished for the misdeeds of others. In Sankuyu, people were satisfied with the trust’s financial

management. On a quarterly basis they received an accounting of finances by the manager employed by the trust, and some 56 percent of revenues were returned to them through various projects, including employment of many of the youth and cash payments for the elderly. Despite this, very few people interviewed were able to recall the magnitude of expenditures.

The choice of community projects can be used to assess elite control over community-based projects. A review of six communities in Botswana found that all communities bought land-cruisers to support local level operations (Suich, 2013). While transport is important in most remote areas, community leaders often appropriate these vehicles. From observation travelling through these communities for five years, the only communities in which projects (in the form of houses for the elderly, toilets and water supplies) are at all obvious are in the three small communities mentioned above.

Thus, in Botswana, elite capture acts through a mechanism whereby elected committees fail to keep financial records and fail to report on finances to their communities. The ultimate cause is that government and support agencies provide almost no persistent guidance over financial management and checks on this expenditure are especially weak in larger communities. Money is wasted or misappropriated both through poorly planned and conceived expenditures, including travel where leaders stay in costly hotels, excessive meetings and allowances and the employment of people who have little to do. In the larger communities, the managers and key elected officials are ‘living well’ while the communities are almost completely excluded from participation and benefit sharing.

CBNRM in Zambia

In the 1990s, two CBNRM programs emerged in Zambia, the Norwegian-funded

Luangwa Integrated Resources and Development Project (LIRDP) in six chiefdoms near

South Luangwa National Park and the Administrative Management and Design for

Game Management Areas (ADMADE) implemented by the National Parks and Wildlife

Service in the remaining Game Management Areas in the Luangwa Valley.

ADMADE was mainly a village scout program working in community areas that were earning revenues from hunting concessions. Central government retained 50 percent of this money, and the remaining 50 percent was split as follows: 35 percent for community projects, 40 percent for wildlife management unit operations (i.e. the village scouts), and 25 percent for administration and other fees, presumably retained by the wildlife agency. The recruitment of community scouts and the development of community projects was managed by the Wildlife Management Sub-Authority, an elected body chaired by the chief. Our field observations suggest that, while the village scout operation was quite successful, most projects were aligned with the interest of the chiefs and very few were constructed in the latter years of the project, leading to questions of where the money was going. Indeed, the structure of the program greatly reinforces the power of the chiefs over resource access.

LIRDP started in a similar way, with 40 percent of money from hunting in the

GMAs and tourism receipts in South Luangwa National Park being shared with the six

Area Development Committees chaired by the six chiefs. Very few projects were executed with this income and money was generally not accounted for. A wildlife meat cropping project, led by the chiefs, was initiated in the area, but because people in the valley could not pay for the meat it was transported and sold elsewhere in Zambia,

without ever accounting for the finances. A bus transport project met a similar fate, with no accounting of income nor of the money when the bus was finally sold.

In response to these problems, a technical adviser was appointed to transform the community project. A policy to devolve the project to village level was rapidly approved at senior government level, and systems were set in place whereby communities would meet face-to-face to allocate, budget and review their income.

Initially the chiefs were given an honorarium of nearly 10 percent of the total income, with the implicit understanding that, instead of chairing and managing the day-to-day affairs and finances of communities, they would become patrons of the program (Dalal-

Clayton et al., 2003). The chiefs initially resisted this change, but gradually the new system took hold. Chiefs persistently tried to force the communities to allocate money to repair their vehicles, clean their palaces or fund ceremonies. The project combated this by insisting that all financial decisions were made at village level and that all community finances, including those passed up to the chiefs, were formally audited (the chief ’s official shares were not auditable). Under this system, fully 99 percent of village income was accounted for, with 21,000 people receiving cash each year, and the communities constructing over 200 projects in five years compared to 10 in a similar period when community projects were presided over by the chiefs. In a final effort to re-exert their control, the chiefs approached senior politicians with their concerns that the people were not happy with the new systems. The politicians were astute and recommended that a vote be held in each village to decide if people preferred the old system

(controlled by the chiefs) or the new system (controlled by themselves). A vote was organized in one village, and the outcome was some 130 votes for the new system with

only seven for the old system. The chiefs responded by stopping the processes and the devolved system was retained.

We would like to say that this story had a happy and democratic ending but, unfortunately, it did not. In 2002, the newly formed but bankrupt Zambia Wildlife

Authority (ZAWA) ‘standardized’ CBNRM in the country. This meant that ZAWA now retained 50 percent of trophy fees and 80 percent of concession fees, all of which had previously been paid to these communities. Moreover, instead of earmarking wildlife income to the 43 Village Action Groups, finance was recentralized to six Community

Resource Boards (Lubilo & Child, 2010). Our records show that the share of benefits reaching ordinary people through cash and projects immediately dropped from over 80 percent to less than 9 percent of a much smaller amount.

The audited statements for eight CRBs around Kafue National Park between

2000 and 2004 again indicated that community wishes were given a very low priority, with projects accounting for only 6 percent of total expenditure. A further 19 percent was used to employ village scouts, a useful investment. However, 23 percent was used for administration and, given that most communities were doing little, this can safely be assumed to be largely comprised of sitting allowances and other fees for the committee and any employees. Some 40 percent of income was not accounted for, while 16 percent remained in the bank or had been used for assets like buildings, vehicles and so on.

The audited statements for eight CRBs around Kafue National Park between

2000 and 2004 again indicate that community wishes were given a very low priority, with projects accounting for only 6 percent of total expenditure (Table 2-5).

The low share of chiefs’ entitlements (2 percent) is somewhat surprising. ZAWA initiated new constitutions for CRBs starting in 2002, which set chiefs’ entitlements at 5 percent of community revenues. ZAWA’s own records show, however, that the chiefs have been effective in gaining benefits from the CBNRM program, while other evidence suggests that little if any benefits have reached the ordinary people (Table 2-6).

Discussion

The degree and level of elite capture differs among the countries discussed in this chapter. We considered five mechanisms that are commonly used by the elite to capture community projects and control the allocation of resources. Table 2-7 summarizes the different elite capture mechanisms across the four countries. These mechanisms are not exclusive to each country and are influenced by the information available.

Traditional leaders maintain many practices that enhance their customary power and respect and have long been used by the state to exert indirect rule over their subjects. This power can be traced back to their authority over the allocation of land. In our examples, it is only in Botswana that the chiefs are not central to governance decisions in CBNRM communities. Botswana chiefs function as paid government functionaries at the local level, and their role in program varies according to personality, from prominent in a few cases to marginal in most cases. Their original rights to allocate land have been transferred to local land boards and this affects the nature of elite capture in these programs.

In Namibia and Zambia, where traditional rulers remain strong, formal entitlements account for significant cash transfers to the elite. Local-level constitutions in Botswana and Zimbabwe do not set aside entitlements for traditional leaders, but in

the Zimbabwe (Masoka community detailed in Chapter 3) example, the local headman receives set allowances despite the lack of a constitution that authorizes traditional leaders to receive cash benefits. Except for Botswana, traditional leaders in all the other countries use a few pretexts to leverage additional personal finance from CBNRM committees. They may obtain funds to clean and maintain the traditional court, for travel allowances or to cover the costs of attending meetings. In Zimbabwe, for instance, minutes from CAMPFIRE meetings reflect constant requests and pressure by the local headmen and chiefs for funds from the CAMPFIRE committee. In cases where committees give out these funds, traditional leaders do not properly account for them, nor do they appear to expect to account for them.

It is often difficult to separate out the power relationships that lie behind ‘elected’ committees. There is strong evidence that chiefs influence the composition of ‘elected’ committees and budget decisions, apart from Botswana and the early democratic phase of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe. Across all four countries, the elite influence the selection of projects. Vehicles are a preferred investment in communities with sufficient money but are expensive to operate and difficult to control. In a few situations, vehicles are clearly used to benefit everyone in the community, as in Sankuyo, which transports people to the nearby town (Maun) daily. However, one is clearly left with the impression that vehicles are often a status item used for the prestige and personal use of the elite, be this a chief or a chairman. Data from Namibia show that it is costly to maintain vehicles, that these running costs often consume most of the CBNRM budget, and that most costs are incurred during private use. Indeed, in the early case of centralization in

Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE program in Nyaminyami, where donors provided several

vehicles to the district, these consumed most of wildlife income intended as community benefits. Traditional leaders or committee members often control the use of these vehicles and incur running shift to the community the costs for drivers, fuel and maintenance, which reduces the amount available for individual dividends or community projects.

The ability of the local elite to control the information and decision-making processes obviously influences the choice of projects but appears even more to result in money being used for overhead costs and allowances to the exclusion of projects; much money is spent with little to show for it. The elite also tend to control who get jobs in the community, and often this can absorb much of the budget with little concrete to show for it. Again, an exception is Sankuyu, which was small enough to have a policy of spreading its employment of over 60 people equally across the 45 households. Finally, elite capture is facilitated by weak financial procedures, which leads to the mismanagement of community funds. Without proper documentation, the leakage of funds is difficult to track, but a more serious consequence may well be the inefficient and dishonest use of funds. In some communities, ‘loans’ are given, often to people within the committee, and these are seldom repaid. This happens even when there are clauses in the constitution that specifically forbid personal loans.

While elite capture and financial mismanagement is the norm, there are also lessons in how to prevent it. An obvious first step is proper book keeping, noting however that accounts do not lead to accountability as invoices are easily doctored and having proper books does not ensure that financial allocations follow the wishes of the people. Accountability is a social process. In our cases, the most successful approach

has used systems of face-to-face financial allocation and control in small villages, together with formal accounts and decision-making procedures. We see local checks- and-balances working quite well in the small village of Sankuyo and partially in the nearby villages of Khwai and Mababe, but where these are combined with formal accounts and mechanisms, they work very well as exemplified by early Masoka and the devolved phase of LIRDP. Thus, in Masoka and LIRDP, the internal checks-and- balances that occurred within small communities were enhanced by defining procedures for setting and reporting budgets by the people, and were supported by regular, light- touch oversight from government-mandated agencies that were specifically promoting financial democratization and accountability. However, in both Masoka and LIRDP, equitable revenue sharing was quickly reversed once central authorities no longer imposed the requisite conditions, much against the will of most of the community.

Without clear rights and effective external oversight, it appears that local people accept elite capture even if they do not like it.

The CBNRM programs in Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe are all characterized by some degree of elite capture. Elite capture is condition born of centuries of traditional elitism entrenched in no small degree by colonialism and post- colonial regimes that strengthened chiefs. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that extractive institutions are so common in history because they have the powerful logic of generating limited prosperity for an elite, but that they seldom if ever lead to widespread prosperity. Prosperity depends on a transformation to a more adaptive methodology that involves inclusive institutions (such as democratic resources management committees in Wuparo and Masoka community) that allow ordinary people to retain what is rightfully

theirs and to hold elite predation in check. Therefore, we should not be surprised in

CBNRM that elite capture is so prevalent. But we should also not expect CBNRM to sustain itself unless we can put in place adaptive conditions that promote a virtuous cycle at the center of which inclusive institutions in which ordinary people as citizens, have the right to control collective decision-making and benefit streams.

CBNRM represents an in-depth policy experiment in devolved governance that has been running for three decades, served by a highly experienced community of practice across several southern African countries. The principles of micro-governance are widely transferable (Ostrom, 1998); it is the political and technical processes for supporting micro-governance that are context-specific. Thus, it is not surprising that the problems and mechanisms of elite capture documented here are also prevalent in the governance of forests, REDD, rangelands and land in drylands and forests in Africa and

Latin America, and presumably Asia. The ubiquity of elite capture suggests that it is a common condition in most natural resource managing communities. Nonetheless, it is a condition that needs to be overcome. It is based on the logic of centralized and extractive local governance for the few. Unless it is challenged, natural resource governance is highly unlikely to address poverty reduction or fulfil its potential to empower and democratize the citizenry. CBNRM in southern Africa offers several lessons for making the transition from extractive to inclusive governance. It emphasizes the importance of face-to-face governance, of establishing simple rules and processes that ensure face-to-face governance and of monitoring and enforcing conformance with these rules and processes.

Table 2-1. Number of meetings between February 2010 and June 2011 in Wuparo Meeting Type Number of meetings

Management 63 Annual General Meeting 1 CMC and Staff Meetings 3 General Meetings 4 Staff Meetings 4 Scheduled meetings not held 7 Total 79

Source: Compiled from Wuparo conservancy minutes (2011)

Table 2-2. Ranking use of community vehicles and costs by Wuparo Conservancy

Item 6 months cost in (USD) % Rank

Meetings 1,553 53 1 Conservancy chair 708 24 2 Death and illness 206 7 3 Patrols 182 6 4 Community pick-ups 138 5 5 Traditional authorities 126 4 6 Total 2,913 100

Source: Compiled from Wuparo conservancy minutes (2011)

Table 2-3. List of community projects in Wuparo conservancy Area Project name Year started Status

Kanzwili Quarantine (buying cattle & 2010 completed reselling) Hammer mill (grinding meal) 2011 in progress Samalabi Grocery/shop for the area 2010 abandoned Cash loans to members for 2011 ongoing Business Masasa Vegetable garden for the area 2010 abandoned Bought celebration cooking utensils 2010 completed Kindergarten 2011 ongoing Water tapping & distribution in 2011 ongoing the area Kamunu Vegetable garden for area 2010 abandoned Water tapping & distribution in 2011 ongoing the area

Table 2-3 continued Area Project name Year started Status

Bought water pump for gardening 2010 Ongoing Samudono1 Vegetable garden 2010 ongoing Hammer mill (grinding meal) 2010 broken down (sent for repairs) Cultural village (tourist attraction) 2010 ongoing for area Brick making for reselling 2011 ongoing Bought chairs for meetings in the 2010 completed Area Samudono2 Office construction 2010 completed Hammer mill (grinding meal) 2010 ongoing Baking bread and scones business 2011 ongoing for area Quarantine (buying cattle & 2010 completed reselling) Sheshe Construction of poultry house 2010 completed Purchase of solar panels 2010 completed Bought chairs for meetings in the 2010 completed Area Water tapping & distribution in in progress the area Poultry layers 2010 abandoned

Source: Compiled by Rodgers Lubilo and Shylock Muyengwa, May-June 2011.

Table 2-4. Missing funds from Botswana Trusts

Item 6 months cost in (USD Year Khwai Trust quota suspended for misappropriation of community fund 2001 PS/MLG Savinggram to shift financial management from the Trusts to 2001 RDCs due to mismanagement of community funds Mismanagement of funds reported at national level 2005 CBNRM Forum proposes that CBOs hire professional accountants; also 2005 calls for the involvement of chiefs OKMCT (case over $1,800) 2000 Khwai Development Trust (case over $57,000) 2005

Source: Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007, which also includes a comprehensive list of missing funds in the Okavango

Table 2-5. Allocation of revenue in community resource boards (2000–2004) near Kafue National Park Expenditure Zambian Kwacha (%)

Village scouts 52,180,000 19 Community projects 15,789,000 6 Administration 63,312,896 23 Chiefs 4,281,700 2 Unaccounted for 111,702,640 40 Assets 45,002,982 16 276,480,218

Source: Zambia Wildlife Authority Table 2-6. Elite vs. non-elite shares (2003–2008) Year Chief’s share (USD) Community Share Chief’s % of Total (USD) 2003 33,469 301,307 10 2004 77,065 693,587 11 2005 167,026 1,068,725 14 2006 113,789 792,283 13 2007 146,907 1,098,794 12 2008 165,233 1,276,615 11 Total 703,489 5,231,311 12 Source: Zambia Wildlife Authority Table 2-7. Elite capture mechanisms across four CBNRM programs Country Mechanisms Formal Demand Allocation Elite Misappropriatio Entitlements s Decisions Preferences n Botswana No Yes Yes Yes Yes Namibia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Zambia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Zimbabwe No Yes Yes Yes Yes

CHAPTER 3 RE-ASSERTION OF ELITE CONTROL IN MASOKA’S WILDLIFE PROGRAM IN ZIMBABWE

Local level governance is crucial in delivering benefits of conservation to communities. This chapter tests the observations in Chapter 2 through a historical review of the evolution of governance and the emergence of elite capture in Masoka’s wildlife to test the observations in Chapter 2. Fifty-four key informant interviews and reviews of numerous secondary data sources were analyzed to understand accountability mechanisms, collective decision-making, and the allocation of wildlife revenues into various local initiatives. The local narratives and secondary data suggested that the governance had flipped from one of impersonal and democratic rule to one based on personal rule of traditional leaders. These outcomes were in part a result of the shift in meso level structures that previously supported the program structures at community level, the shifting national politics that led to increased sense of enfranchisement and impunity among traditional leaders, and non-merit-based system of appointing committee members. The results suggest that locally elected committees when left at the peril of strong and unchecked powers of traditional leaders are bound to collapse. Second, the findings also indicate that in the absence of weak land tenure rights, locals have no “teeth” to challenge tradition-based authorities to demand accountable governance. We conclude that given such condition of weak tenure and access to resource rights, local democratic institutions do not emerge naturally even if most people want them and if not protected from outside, they are bound to fail and superseded by personalized ones.

 A version of the chapter is published as a journal paper (Muyengwa & Child, 2017).

Masoka’s Wildlife Management program was considered a robust and successful case of a local wildlife managing community in Zimbabwe judged by data (e.g. high wildlife populations, increased income to community, and relatively high number of community funded projects) (Matzke & Nabane, 1996; Nabane & Matzke, 1997). The retrospective opinions of people interviewed between 2007 and 2009 (Taylor, 2009;

Taylor & Murphree, 2007) also indicated that Masoka was a successful Communal

Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) project managed through an impersonal and institutionalized governance system that delivered development and cash benefits to its members (Murombedzi, 1997; Taylor, 2009).

However, between 2009 and 2011 it lost its impersonal and institutionalized rule as the elite centralized the governance of CAMPFIRE benefits. The exertion of elite control that occurred in Masoka is a common feature of nascent local level democratic CBNRM institutions. This chapter explores how and why these changes took place in Masoka between 2009 and 2011 to understand the complex interactions among the elite and the non-elite in the allocation of resources.

The changes in Masoka can be best described with the concept of personal rule, as well as informal and formal rules (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Verdier, 2003; Bretton,

1966; Jackson & Rosberg, 1984; Williamson, 2000). Personal rule fosters trust in individuals rather than institutions. Within a personalized system, big-men allocate resources based on their will and personal procedures (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Bretton,

1966; Jackson & Rosberg, 1984). The later years of CAMPFIRE show that rules shifted to serve the needs of gatekeepers. On the other hand, the relative success of the first phase of the program demonstrates how formal rules build more inclusive and efficient

governance. CAMPFIRE reforms in the initial years devolved rights to wildlife to communities and created highly participatory arenas for important collective functions such as quota setting and revenue distribution. The highly impersonal system improved the flow of public goods in CAMPFIRE communities including equitable benefit sharing and participation. Institutional reforms consist of improved local rules for managing wildlife resources and incomes, the protection of these reforms through higher level political institutions, and the monitoring and enforcement of these rules (Douglas C.

North, 2003). In this case, it refers formal and informal monitoring of adherence to the

“CAMPFIRE Principles”.

This chapter shows how institutional reforms increased the flow of public benefits, but the elite later reversed these reforms into a personalized system. In addition, we view institutions as

…consisting of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Scott (2008, p. 55).

The cognitive and normative view of institutions provides a framework for interpreting local perceptions of the local governance processes. While macro level changes affected the performance of the CAMPFIRE, local narratives focused on micro explanations of institutional failure.

This chapter further seeks to answer the question whether the case of Masoka provides empirical evidence that inclusive local regimes of participatory governance (as designed by CAMPFIRE) promote multi-dimensional development (i.e. income and voice) compared to a personalized system (controlled the elite) using the case study of

Masoka. The second undertaking is to interrogate why Masoka ‘declined’ in the latter period of CAMPFIRE. Local narratives are used to interrogate people’s perceptions and

the lack of collective action (Olson & Olson, 1965) aimed at replacing a personalized system with a more inclusive and democratic institution. In what follows, we discuss briefly the origins of the CAMPFIRE program in Masoka and immediately focus on the social and political processes in CAMPFIRE governance and then focus on the local narratives gathered between 2009 and 2011in order to explore local governance processes.

The chapter applies historical process tracing and a deductive inquiry case- design approach to understand the governance changes that occurred in Masoka

(Beck, 2006; Bryman, Becker, & Sempik, 2008; A. L. George & Bennett, 2005). We conducted fifty-four open-ended interviews with committee members, Masoka employees, traditional and religious leaders and interacted extensively with local community members. We complemented our discussions with trace data- (minutes and documents kept at the Masoka offices) and conducted informal group discussions.

Analytical Framework

Good governance of local community projects has been a major theme among development practitioners and the concept of elite capture has attracted attention and debate over how it both affects the performance of projects and how to design projects in ways that minimize the negative impact of the elite on social investments (Dasgupta

& Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007). The concept of elite capture is defined as

… the capture of the distribution of resources, project implementation and decision making which negatively impacts the non-elite or the target population or is deemed to be corrupt under the law (Musgrave & Wong, 2016, p. 92).

This broadly represents the phenomenon that took place in Masoka. In order to find ways of working with elite within community driven develop projects, the two main

perspectives are that either the elite are co-opted or countered (Wong, 2010) to shape the project outcomes. The story is rather complex as empirical evidence suggests that both the elite, and non-elite rely on multiple factors to bargain for power and control.

Community based natural resources management (CBNRM) entails that (a) communities are empowered to manage and benefit from natural resources through leasing of concessions, (b) the revenues that accrue are deposited in a local account, and (c) communities make choices over how this money is allocated through elected decision-making bodies. In most cases, both the elected and the non-elected local elite decide how money is spent on a yearly basis or specific time. CBNRM thus, is about the devolution of power and ensuring that communities benefit (Araujo, Ferreira,

Lanjouw, & Özler, 2008; Iversen et al., 2006; Saito-Jensen et al., 2010). Several

CBNRM programs were crafted in southern Africa’s wildlife sector; in Botswana,

Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In Botswana for example, small communities manage funds up to USD 300,000 per year (Rihoy & Maguranyanga,

2007) and decide how this money is spent annually. There are local level decision- making frameworks that include quarterly meetings and a premier annual general meeting. The same structure exists in other countries. These cases provide a routine decision-making framework that can be used to evaluate whether a small group usually controls decisions and benefit more from these programs. They also eliminate NGO and State interference. The elite in these communities include elected board members, employees to some extent, and non-elected traditional authorities such as chiefs and religious leaders.

Our case study demonstrates the complex interactions among the elite and non- elite and the various mechanisms used by the elite to control the flow of resources in their favor within a CBNRM project. The primary goal of this chapter is to illustrate how the changing macro and meso levels can serve as cues for the elite to capture community projects. Previous studies show how national political processes contribute to the decline in local level governance but do not provide specific mechanisms that enabled the local elite to destroy local level participatory processes (Balint & Mashinya,

2006b; Mapedza & Bond, 2006; Rihoy et al., 2007). We seek to explore this power dynamic in a more nuanced way. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: a) we provide an historical perspective of the Communal Areas Management Program for

Indigenous Resources, b) the development of CAMPFIRE in Masoka, c) and discuss the main findings.

History of the CAMPFIRE Program

Zimbabwe is one of the places where CBNRM originated through the Wildlife

Industries New Development for All (WINDFALL- 1978) and CAMPFIRE (1982) programs that sought to reverse the loss of wildlife on private and communal lands.

Zimbabwe introduced new legislation in 1960, and boldly the 1975 Parks and Wildlife

Act that devolved the rights to use and benefit from wildlife to private landholders and encouraged the diversification of profitable commercial uses of wildlife. Once the country stabilized in 1980, wildlife rapidly became an important form of land use as terms of trade and economic incentives increasingly favored tourism and hunting relative to livestock and agriculture commodities. In 1982, the government modified the

Parks and Wildlife Act and devolved user rights to communal communities. However, legally, the lowest formal institution in communal lands was the Rural District Council

(RDC), formed through the Local Government Act. To bridge this gap between policy, intent of wildlife officials, and the existing organizational structure of the Ministry of Local

Government and Rural Development, a strategic compromise was reached and

Appropriate Authority was devolved to District Councils with a gentleman’s agreement that this be further devolved to wildlife “producer communities” (Campbell et al., 2001;

B. Child, 1996; Taylor, 2009). The CAMPFIRE document then set out a policy of replicating the successes of private conservation in communal lands by devolving proprietorship of wildlife to small communities formed on a voluntary basis (Martin,

1986).

The CAMPFIRE program partially decentralized the power to manage natural resources to local authorities, which then passed it locally elected committees.

CAMPFIRE democratized wildlife governance by moving the authority from central state and traditional leaders to formalized constituted institutions. In seeking to avoid creating parallel local institutions, the government vested these rights in the Village

Development Committees (VIDCO’s) and Ward Development Committees (WADCO’s) as substructures of the Rural District Council (RDC). CAMPFIRE empowered VIDCOs and WADCO’s relative to the traditional systems of chiefs, headmen and village heads.

However, the development committees remained sub-structures of the RDC instead of community jurisdictions in their own right as DNPWLM hoped (Murphree, 1996). These changes often led to challenges as the newly created democratic institutions often struggled against the informal and norm-based traditions, especially when communities have weak rights over land and natural resources (Ribot, 2007). The partial devolution

resulted in communities with weak rights and limited power in managing the wildlife but they only retained the rights to manage funds and not the wildlife (Songorwa, 1999).

CAMPFIRE required that the RDC and communities collectively manage wildlife resources. The first step was to generate revenues. The primary mechanism for achieving this was to sub-contract hunting and tourism concession to private outfitters in arrangements called joint ventures. DNPWLM passed the authority for negotiating these to the RDCs and producer communities. This helped drive up their value by building the capacity of communities to sell them through open, competitive and transparent arrangements which quadrupled the value of wildlife (B. Child & Weaver, 2006) but also led to communities getting roughly 33-40% of the gross turnover that safari outfitters received. Policy makers considered the rest a ‘fair’ return on the costs of marketing, outfitting, and the capital investment of running high-end safaris. Transparency was enhanced by having the outfitters pay trophy fees or a percentage of gross turnover in

US$ so the communities could share the rapid exchange rate gains associated with the weakening Zimbabwe dollar. The second stage was to organize communities to

“spend” money in ways that entrenched participatory face-to-face democracy and accountability to maximize the public goods, equitable benefit sharing, and informed participation.

In 1989, the Parks and Wildlife Authority granted Appropriate Authority (AA) to two districts (Nyaminyami and Guruve) and thereafter to ten districts with a potential for wildlife businesses. The work in Nyaminyami provided much of the initial drive to the

CAMPFIRE program, but over-capitalization and over-centralization meant that

Nyaminyami did not perform well and paradoxically failed to conform to the CAMPFIRE

principles (Murombedzi, 1992). The proponents of Nyaminyami were Department of

Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) which was seeking to encourage wildlife conservation in the face of rapid in-migration and land clearance and Save-the-Children who saw the income from wildlife as a means of combatting poverty (Murphree &

Metcalfe, 1997). These local level initiatives led to the development of other CAMPFIRE programs such as the one that emerged in Masoka.

Development of CAMPFIRE in Masoka Community

During the early days of CAMPFIRE, Marshall Murphree and the Center for

Applied Social Studies at the University of Zimbabwe were working in the mid-Zambezi

Valley and became concerned that a top-down donor-funded project to settle the

Zambezi Valley (the Mid-Zambezi Valley Resettlement Project) (Derman, 1987, 1993) was doing local people harm. The plans ignored the fact that people already lived there and seemed naïve of the ecological realities of this hot, dry, and infertile region. They began to work closely with the wildlife agency and advocated the devolution of

CAMPFIRE revenues to producer communities as a means of promoting local economic and political empowerment and combatting top-down blueprint land use planning with bottom-up participatory development. This argument gained considerable traction with the wildlife agency, which promoted ideals that included local self-determination and preferred adaptive management to blueprint planning in stochastic and non-linear social ecological systems.

Ethnic Characteristics of the People of Masoka

Masoka refers to the people of Dande Area, that settled in the area under chief

Chisunga (Murombedzi, 1997). Masoka lies in Mbire District (Lower Guruve) in the

Zambezi valley in Zimbabwe (Figure 3-1). It is inhabited by different ethnic groups:

Korekore (majority), Karanga (immigrants) and Tembomvura (minority) with a total population of approximately 2,348 (Sicilia, n.d.). Masoka is rich in wildlife but is underdeveloped. Local farmers practice small scale agriculture and lack draught power due to tsetse (Taylor & Murphree, 2007). Cotton and maize are major crops in the area.

Low rainfall (~600mm) and lack of draught power limit extensive agriculture and this provided an impetus for adopting CAMPFIRE as alternate land use model. Locally, an important catalyst in Masoka was an emerging partnership with World Wide Fund for

Nature (WW F). The first important activity combined land use planning with a new electric fence so that the people of Masoka centralized themselves to protect their crops from elephants and other animals. Revenues began to flow to the community from its abundant wildlife, especially after they replaced their hunter by outsourcing hunting competitively to a joint venture partner. While the process for revenue allocation was not as formally structured as the ‘revenue distribution processes’ developed in Beitbridge and Mahenye (B. Child, 1996) it was nonetheless highly participatory.

Post-2000 Dynamics in Masoka

Despite the post 2000 turmoil in Zimbabwe, reports on Masoka remained positive, because it managed to implement projects and negotiate for increased revenue share with RDC (B. Child, 1996; Murombedzi, 1999; Taylor & Murphree, 2007).

In 2006, Masoka, alarmed at its loss of revenue to the RDC, allied with the CAMPFIRE

Association to renegotiate this position with the council. Masoka claimed that since the wildlife lived on their land they were entitled to a fair share of the revenue, and if they were not they would no longer conserve it. The result was a countrywide agreement that hunters automatically and immediately pay half of their fees to producer communities

(Jonga, 2006).

Despite these positive stories, there were indications that all was not well in

Masoka. Several events had occurred that ran counter to the initial principles. These included: the collapse of the electric fence, the loss of careful honest leadership provided by headman Kanyurira with his death, and there were other signs of decline, both in local attitudes but also in the retention of more revenue by the Rural District

Council (RDC). The value of hunting was further depreciating due to the collapse of the

Zimbabwe dollar.

Main Findings

In this section, we present the study findings, which illustrate how the first phase of the Masoka program was highly participatory, with clearly defined rules and delivered benefits to community members. In the later years, the elite captured most of the program benefits. The last section presents an analysis of some of the factors that led to the changes reported in this study.

Masoka’s CAMPFIRE Program pre-2009

As discussed above, Marshall Murphree and the Center for Applied Social

Studies (CASS) were instrumental in the founding of the Masoka CAMPFIRE program.

The adoption of CAMPFIRE not only redefined natural resources governance, but also created new opportunities for Masoka residents, including hitherto marginalized women

(Nabane & Matzke, 1997). For example, the community used CAMPFIRE revenues to build infrastructure and purchase supplementary food during times of drought (Table 3-1 for a list of projects). In addition, it also provided jobs (game guards, fence minders, hunting industry) and paid committee positions. CAMPFIRE also introduced an open and highly participatory system that allowed women to participate in village affairs.

Compared to other communities in many ways Masoka was an ideal CAMPFIRE site

that was not perfect but met all prerequisite conditions for a successful CAMPFIRE community: participatory governance, benefit sharing, and responsible wildlife and asset management (B. Child, 1996).

With the adoption of CAMPFIRE in Masoka, the benefits began to flow. The community vastly upgraded the school in an investment considered important by the community and employed fence minders to maintain the electric fence. WWF played an important role in building this technical capacity, as well as institutional capacity in the committee to manage the fence and other issues. The community began to manage its wildlife with increasing capacity. With training from WWF, it monitored hunting off-takes, set quotas, counted its wildlife and managed fire. Masoka community performed relatively well compared to other communities. All the incomes that reached Masoka was spent largely on community benefits. These included cash, drought food relief, several key projects (school, clinic), and the employment of fence minders and wildlife monitors (Taylor, 2009). Masoka was doing well.

Masoka’s CAMPFIRE Program 2009-2011

While the voluntary relocation of people to move inside the fence in 1990 to pave the way for wildlife had signaled strong community support for the CAMPFIRE program

(Hughes, 2001), by 2003 all was not well. The respected, influential, and modest headman Kanyurira had died. The community was no longer maintaining the fence. In- migration to the area was obvious along the access road to Masoka, and even in

Masoka itself, there were now higher numbers of people living outside the previously fenced area. People expressed unhappiness with the program and asked light-touch facilitators like WWF and Murphree to help them again.

This section describes the situation between 2009 and 2011 based on field interviews and a review of minutes of meetings held during the period. We interviewed fifty-four people that include the chief, headmen, former CAMPFIRE committee members, ordinary villagers, religious leaders and employees. The results showed respondents were concerned with the following: (a) the committee no longer handled finances transparently; (b) CAMPFIRE assets were personalized (c) the committee was allocating CAMPFIRE revenues to the chief, headmen, and less to community projects, and (d) there was poor regarding the management of community funds (collapse of the participatory planning process). We discuss these concerns in detail below.

Non–transparent management of funds and indirect impacts of the direct payment system

The mismanagement of CAMPFIRE funds dominated the local narrative as it deviated from the relatively well function system established around 1989. In the initial phases, Masoka community planned collectively with the support of WWF who capacitated committees to manage finance and collective formulation of budgets.

Collective planning and budgeting was possible because at the time, the outfitter would pay the RDC large sums of money on an annual basis. The RDC would bank this and in the New Year, the community would be informed of its share and would sit together to plan how they wanted to allocate it. The RDC then released money to the community.

As we noted above, with the meltdown of Zimbabwe’s fiscal circumstances, the value of payments depreciated under the forces of rampant inflation and the financially stretched

RDCs appropriated an increasing share of the money. Instigated by Masoka,

CAMPFIRE Association negotiated a nation-wide change whereby the hunter would immediately pay half of the required payment for each hunt to the producer community

directly (i.e. its minimum share), rather than through the RDC. Therefore, instead of communities getting a lump sum payment annually, they now received regular payments throughout the hunting season.

Interviews around 2011 showed that was no longer the case. The changes from an indirect to direct payment system were not followed by a shift in governance. The direct payment required that community members meet regularly to decide how income would be spent. However, interviewed community members indicated that there was little to no consultation regarding how committees were spending incomes. Most interviewed community members indicated that they received reports of how committees had spent income, but they rarely participated in the budgeting process.

With the introduction of the direct payment system communities needed to meet regularly to decide how to spend their wildlife income but this did not occur. As one committee member remarked:

We are getting our money monthly. We cannot make long-term plans. Council is making these decisions without consulting us. The RDC only informs us after it has made its decisions… If we get small amounts, we cannot implement anything meaningful. [Interview with SF committee member, June 2009]

The statement above shows that the respective committee member did not understand how the direct payment system works and used this as a basis for justifying the lack of projects. Most committee members felt that spending money as it comes limits their ability to implement projects.

Ordinary community members attributed the failure to implement projects to a collapse of participatory democratic processes. As indicated earlier, collective decision- making correlated with significant social and infrastructural investments in Masoka.

Planning meetings were important because they allowed community members to

understand and vote for important projects. Immediately after the community selected projects, each project received funds for the entire year. Between 2009 and 2011, the committee implemented projects in an ad hoc manner and the state of local infrastructure showed a dearth of funding for repairs and maintenance. For example, the schools, office, and the clinic were dilapidated, and the previously maintained roads were in a bad state. In addition, the secretariat did not keep proper records of meetings. When asked why committees no longer held these planning meetings, ordinary members reported that they had no knowledge that such meetings were called.

Personal benefits and shifting ethos

Between 2009 and 2011, committees consistently allocated funds for allowances, travel, and per-diems. The culture of allowances contrasts with the “old” system that was largely accountable to community members. In 2009 for example, the committee members paid themselves sitting allowance for 12 meetings, which achieved little except to gobble up money that could have been allocated to buying books and chalk for the school. This prompted a member of the School Development Committee to comment: “We should not prioritize allowances; we need to develop the school.”

The opinions of Masoka’s political and traditional leaders had also shifted with the popular narrative placing them over and above ordinary community members. They perceived the CAMPFIRE project as a personal project. The local headmen for example, modified community wishes list so that the Safari Operator builds him a house and buys him a car. One of the community members raised an objection noting that

CAMPFIRE was a community and not a private project. In response, the local councilor felt those personal benefits were deserved. The headman remarked:

The wish list includes my vehicle. You should not be astonished because we “should not be same” -traditional leaders and local people are not equal and the program needs to treat us differently. [Extracted from Masoka minutes]

While locals recollected the initial principles of CAMPFIRE that emphasize equity in distribution of income, the local elite had shifted their focus toward personal enrichment plus total disregard for community views.

It is important to understand how and why the elite dominate local projects despite dissent by local community members. That the chief and the councilor chose to ignore community voices in Masoka is a broader phenomenon that relates to traditional power relations between chiefs and their subjects in rural Africa (Eggen, 2011; Ncube,

2011; Russell & Dobson, 2011). In our case study, the chief dismissed committee members who refused to honor his requests because that challenged “his authority.” – for example asking him to submit receipts to support his expenditure constituted insubordination. The chief also dismissed village heads for non-apparent reasons.

These village heads, in most cases can assist in regulating the power of the chief. The power plays entrenched patron-client relationships that eventually usurped bottom up systems of accountability developed through CAMPFIRE. Thus, during this period, committee members served the needs of traditional leaders to safeguard their positions.

Weak property rights and lack of protection of democratic processes

The inability to overcome elite domination between 2009 and 2011 is a result of weak property rights and the alignment of traditional leaders with the ruling elite. The following transcript illustrates that it is difficult to establish local level democracy where individuals within communities have weak property rights to both land and the share of the wildlife collective. While most of the community members wanted to revert to the

original CAMPFIRE principles as espoused by Marshall Murphree, weak tenure and politicization of CAMPFIRE were a major hindrance. Regarding the community’s failure to reinstate the CAMPFIRE principles, one respondent noted:

Member A: We need to go back to what we used to do. We need meetings like in the old days with Professor [referring to Prof. Marshall Murphree] …

Interviewer: Why do you not challenge these things?

Member A: It is the leadership. Some have been in the committee for seven years and they refuse to step down. We are scared because this involves political leaders. People are too clever these days and we need to change ... especially the councilor. [Interview with Masoka resident]

The transcript illustrates two important issues: a) locals’ benchmark CAMPFIRE’s performance against the principles developed during the time of Marshall Murphree and b) the politicization of CAMPFIRE requires different mechanisms to hold leaders accountable. The headman for example, threatens to evict local voices of dissent. One responded noted the following regarding village heads:

They are not doing anything. The headman suppresses their voices. If they complain they are threatened with eviction or are asked to leave the area. [Interview with Masoka resident]

These high levels of intimidation have led to cooption of other community elite, especially committee members who then account upward to political leaders such as the chief and councilor and not to the community to safeguard their position in the committee. The transcript goes further to identify the councilor as the source of the problem in Masoka. In 2007, the Environmental Management Act stipulated that local councilors become de-facto chairpersons for all environmental committees. Masoka community initially opposed this decision as it tied local wildlife management issues to political party lines and it represented top-down planning. Post 2007, CAMPFIRE’s political role became highly visible in the country and more so in Masoka where the

wildlife revenues paid ZANU-PF sitting allowances. In addition, it was a period where politicians acted with impunity. As one participant noted:

The leaders steal CAMPFIRE revenue. Committees label community members as uneducated and troublesome and they should not be involved in CAMPFIRE decisions. [Extract from Masoka Minutes]

The collapse of democratic processes elevated traditional and religious leaders to manage the affairs of the CAMPFIRE, compared to the period before where they sat as ex-officio members. In 2009 for example, the headman was involved in the day-to- day running of the program, parked the community truck at his house regardless of a by-law that prohibited this, and often used the truck for his private business. It was only when some community members threatened to burn the truck that he relinquished control. Despite these small victories toward reinstating CAMPFIRE principles, little had changed by 2011 toward restoring collective decision-making.

Information distortion

In the initial years, the Masoka program meticulously recorded its finances and these records fed into the participatory planning and project implementation (Taylor and

Murphree, 2007). This robust system had collapsed by 2009, as most members were not aware of the exact incomes that the community received from safari hunting operations. One community member noted:

If we look at what happened last year, they spent $97000 [2010] without building anything. Even the workers are not getting their salaries. The new committees are only tasked with clearing debts from the old committee. [Masoka committee member]

The quote above represents a common perception among most of the community members, that the CAMPFIRE program is generating a lot of income but there is little to show for it due to mismanagement. In general, community members

reported higher income figures compared to committee members and did not understand the finances well. As indicated earlier, this is partly due to changes in financial payments from an annual payout to monthly deposits that had not been accompanied by governance changes. By 2009, the committee kept most of the important financial records such as salaries and other expenses on loose pieces of paper. Without proper documentation, tracking expenditure is difficult but from the existing records, we could establish that a planned conference center had not been built. Breaking down these systems allows the elite to personalize the benefits (Chabal

& Daloz, 1999)

Discussion

Between 2009 and 2011, the Masoka CAMPFIRE program shifted from highly participatory to a personalized program controlled by the elite, mainly the chief, headman, councilor, and the committee. As a result, Masoka’s CAMPFIRE program failed to deliver communal benefits compared to the previous years. Most community members are aware of the collective benefits of the impersonal governance system and felt they could not challenge the status quo. The narratives presented in this chapter contrasts with people’s sentiments before 2009. Prior to 2009 for example, the chief, headman, and spirit mediums “exercised functional responsibilities.” (Matzke & Nabane,

1996) and decisions were based on collective consensus (Cutshall, 1989; Jonga, 2006;

Matzke & Nabane, 1996; Taylor & Murphree, 2007). From speaking with community members and reviewing archival sources, evidence suggests the dictatorial tendencies of the headman and the subtle imposition by the chief, affected local’s perception of the

CAMPFIRE program. In addition, the personalization of CAMPFIRE benefits has been a commonly observed trend in other CAMPFIRE programs (Mapedza & Bond, 2006;

Rihoy et al., 2007). The collapse in governance in Masoka was due to the loss of external protection plus, the culture of impunity, and re-exertion of personalized rule at national and local levels in Zimbabwe post 2000 trumped what the people liked and wanted and allowed the re-exertion of personalized rule to play out at local level. Table

3-3 below summarizes these explanatory factors.

Institutions are key in regulating human interactions and also define incentives that shape societies over time (Douglas C. North, 1993) In order to ensure that

CAMPFIRE functioned properly, the CAMPFIRE guiding principles were drawn and adopted as a constitution. The study observed that committees no longer adhered to these principles or the constitution. Some of the reason as members noted include the absence light touch facilitation from the Center for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) on issues of good leadership, participation, and financial management and the direct oversight from the Mbire Rural District Council. The locals frequently requested the assistance of Marshall Murphree to restore the guiding principles – an appeal and trust in externals to fix local issues. This case of Masoka also illustrates that local leaders did not have alternative means for demanding for accountability and reigning on their errant chief.

The findings presented in this chapter indicate that local democratic institutions do not emerge naturally even if most people want them and if not protected from outside, they are bound to fail and be superseded by personalized ones. Following the withdrawal of external support to Masoka’s program, the elite were able to capture the

Masoka wildlife program. Masoka has consistently generated revenue but due to lack of participatory meetings to ensure that all members benefit, it has failed to fund

communal projects and repair existing infrastructure. Whilst community members are fully aware of the collapse in CAMPFIRE, they feel disempowered to challenge the traditional leaders, who often threaten to evict them from their land or dismiss them from the CAMPFIRE committee.

Traditional leaders assumed a more active political role in post 2000 Zimbabwe.

More importantly, the ZANU PF led government-introduced benefits for the chiefs that included cars and electrified houses. This led to an increased sense of entitlement; hence, we see the headmen and other traditional leaders demanding similar benefits from CAMPFIRE. At the time, this ideology was popular within ZANU PF, and was reflected by how the elected councilor saw CAMPFIRE as an opportunity to enrich the elite rather than provide for the greater good. These consequently led to some changes on Masoka’s budget, which was required to provide: (a) allowances for the ruling party members (mostly at the ward meetings), (b) allowances for the chief, (c) headman’s allowances, and (d) the councilors’ vote.

The changes in Masoka also need to be seen within the context of Masoka’s exponentially increasing population, which has grown more than 10-fold within two decades due to immigration. By 2000, the total number of households had increased to

380 (Murphree & Mazambani, 2002) leading to increased ethnic diversity with 64 percent of the people in the area now characterized as migrants (Baudron, Corbeels,

Andersson, Sibanda, & Giller, 2011). Without participatory governance and collective planning, it will be difficult to satisfy a diverse community with potentially competing land use options.

CAMPFIRE communities lack clear rights over wildlife and this weakens the ability of communities to deal with corruption and elite capture when it occurs (Balint &

Mashinya, 2006b; Mashinya, 2007; Mutandwa & Gadzirayi, 2007). In Zimbabwe, traditional leaders remain relatively more empowered compared to community and more specifically because they authority over communal lands. In some cases, it is also interpreted to mean de facto ownership of all-natural resources in communal areas including wildlife. In the context of CAMPFIRE, we highlighted that the headman threatened to evict village heads who complained about the management of CAMPFIRE revenues. Therefore, a weak policy that disempowers communities will allow elite capture to persist.

The collapse of local democratic governance in Masoka has led to some unintended outcomes. Some locals have resorted to extensive agriculture. Migrants farm expansively compared to original settlers (3.2 hectares compared to 2.2 hectares)

(Baudron et al., 2011). The expansion of cropping areas will lead to increased land clearance and human wildlife conflict. Some farmers have introduced cattle in this fragile ecosystem. The human wildlife conflict in Masoka has also increased reflecting the underlying social conflicts and people’s dissatisfaction with elite capture of

CAMPFIRE (Matema & Andersson, 2015).

The chapter has demonstrated that in the absence of external monitoring, strong civil society and clearly defined tenure, the elite can capture easily well-intentioned programs such as CAMPFIRE. The chapter has also demonstrated how the shift in governance from an impersonalized system to a personalized one (between 2009 and

2011) led to significant decline in the quality of governance and the ability of CAMPFIRE

to deliver communal benefits. The future of CAMPFIRE and community-based conservation programs lie in significant shifts in policy that clearly define the rights of local communities and then create mechanisms to protect such institutions from the predatory elite. The chapter also demonstrated that the initial work in supporting democratic governance helped community members understand and challenge, within the means available, the non-consultative processes that prevailed since 2009. Masoka community exuded local agency and recollected clearly the positive benefits of democracy and collective participation. Given a supportive macro and meso political context, community members will be able to dislodge the elite monopolizing communal benefits and reinstate the pre-2009 CAMPFIRE.

Table 3-1. CAMPFIRE projects in Masoka community Project Year Primary School (4 Blocks) 1989 Secondary School (2 Blocks) 1990-1995 Dividends 1996 Clinic 1996 Secondary school 1998 Tractor 2005 Truck 2007 Employment 6 Game scouts, 6 Guards, 2 teachers, 1 nurse aid, 1 pump minder, 2 drivers, 3 clerks Source: (Taylor & Murphree, 2007)

Table 3-2. Important events in Masoka community Important Events Year

First Income 1989 Electric fence constructed 1990 First settlements outside the fence 1997 Death of headman Kanyurira 2001 Fence collapses 2003 Confrontation with RDC (Get 50% income) 2006 New headman 2006 Direct payment system from Safari Operators 2007 Source: (Taylor & Murphree, 2007)

Figure 3-1 also adapted from : (Taylor & Murphree, 2007)

Figure 3-1. Map of Masoka community

Table 3-3. Key factors for successful devolution vs. elite capture in Masoka Successful Elite Capture Devolution 2009-2011 1989 -2008 CAMPFIRE Principles Community adopted a constitution that guided implementation of CAMPFIRE Conformance Monitoring × Light touch facilitation × Good leadership – Leaders that bring people × together to make decisions Clearly defined financial systems (book × keeping and financial statements) Participatory meetings × Income Quota setting × Size of community (Number of people) Small Large Right to income × Rules around management of income × Compiled by author

CHAPTER 4 DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SATISFACTION WITH COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: A CASE OF FIVE COMMUNITIES IN NAMIBIA

The chapter examines key factors that influence individual support for communal conservancies in Namibia and seeks to uncover some of the individual level factors to explain the elite capture outcomes discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. It tests the hypothesis that if individuals are compensated for their wildlife related losses, they are more likely to support community-based wildlife management projects. Data for his study were collected from 472 randomly sampled conservancy members from five conservancies in the Caprivi Region of Namibia

That biodiversity conservation depends on the participation of local communities is a common perspective among community based natural resources management proponents (Berkes, 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend, Banuri, Farvar, Miller, & Phillips, 2002;

Shahabuddin & Rao, 2010). The most compelling evidence to support the role of community participation in conservation is that globally locals manage about 11 percent of the conserved forest areas (420 million hectares). The ideological basis for lobbying for increased community participation in conservation is that the “fines and fences” approach often criminalized local consumption in favor of a preservationist approaches(Adams & Hulme, 2001; Hoole & Berkes, 2010; Spierenburg & Wels, 2006).

While the fences and fines approach excluded some communities from extracting essential livelihood resources and in some cases led to “adversarial relationships” between park authorities and local communities (Muchapondwa et al., 2009), it was an

 A version of this chapter appears a journal paper (Muyengwa, 2015).

effective means for conserving some forest resources in other areas (Brockington,

2004).

In southern Africa, natural resource management evolved from “fortress conservation” to CBNRM in response to political, social, and economic factors. Colonial governments in Africa relied on the fortress conservation approach to manage wildlife whereby use of game for commercial and non-commercial use was highly restricted.

Pre and post-independence governments slowly replaced fortress approaches with

Integrated Conservation and Development Plans (ICDPs) that emphasized the linkages between conservation and development (Alpert, 1997; Neumann, 1997). Nuemann’s review of ICDPs found that they constituted coercive practices and expanded state authority into rural areas rather than emphasizing benefit sharing and participation

(Alpert, 1997) CBNRM approaches also emerged around the early 1980s in order to increase the flow of benefits from the natural resources to communities and also to expand opportunities for communities to participate in local governance–termed democratization and empowerment (B. Child, 2003).

CBNRM is premised on giving financial value to local resources and then giving the proceeds as incentives to locals in order for them to participate in conservation activities (B. Child, 2003). The underlying hypothesis is that if the benefits of participating in conservation activities outweigh the costs, individuals will participate in conservation activities. Based on this assumption, CBRNM initiatives among others seek to compensate locals with meat, cash dividends, jobs, and infrastructure in order to offset the negative costs of living with wildlife such as crop damage, livestock loss,

human injury and death (Jones, 2009). In addition, CBNRM seeks to enhance local level democracy and self-governance.

CBNRM thus, seeks among its goals to meet basic survival needs of local communities (Thakadu, 2003). For example, ADMADE in Zambia was organized around tourism and channeling the revenues into community development. CAMPFIRE in

Zimbabwe utilized hunting revenue to build schools and clinics and to supplement household incomes – especially during drought, these goals further developed to encompass community participation (Twyman, 2000) empowerment, decision making

(Brown, 2002), and attitudes (Kellert, Mehta, Ebbin, & Lichtenfeld, 2000).This chapter focuses on assessing the hypothesis that incentives motivate behavior.

Incentive theory postulates that individuals can be induced to participate or undertake a certain activity (Killeen, 1982). The theory is an extension of the behavioral approach whereby an individual’s behavior and attitudes can be shaped through reinforcement. Reinforcement is applied based on a specified schedule until the desired behavior or attitudes are acquired. CBNRM thus seeks among other things to transform individuals’ attitudes to increase local support for conservation, and it targets reducing such behaviors as poaching by providing incentives such as meat, cash, jobs, and community infrastructure. While the evidence of the relationship between behavior and attitude is not conclusive, Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) demonstrate that any given behavior is linked to an intention and this intention is linked to behavior. In their later work, Ajzen (1991) concludes that behavioral intent can be predicted with high accuracy from attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control.

On the other hand, Brooks et al. (2006) notes that while positive attitudes are essential

for the success of conservation projects, behavioral changes are required to reduce the threat to natural resources but the link between the two is not straight forward(Holmes,

2003).

Literature is divided on whether incentives influence individual attitudes toward conservation and whether positive or negative attitudes are a result of presence or absence of incentives? On one hand, researchers report a positive correlation between benefits and individual support for conservation (Lepp & Holland, 2006).Udaya Sekhar for example notes:

There appears to be correlation between benefits obtained by local people from wildlife tourism and other sources, and support for protected area existence, suggesting that benefits impact people's attitudes towards conservation (Udaya Sekhar, 2003, p. 339)

On the other hand an individual’s level of education and employment in the park significantly influenced conservation attitudes (Chidakel, 2011). Mehta and Kellert used logistic regression analysis to understand people’s attitudes toward a CBNRM project and found that people held ambivalent attitudes toward different components of the project such as interactions with wildlife staff, management of projects, and interactions with wildlife (Mehta & Kellert, 1998).

Other researchers emphasize the role of social relations in shaping local people’s attitudes toward community conservation. Some researchers also report positive individual attitudes toward the park and wildlife, and negative attitudes toward the park personnel (Weladji, Moe, & Vedeld, 2003). Some researchers have found no link between incentives and attitudes and report an escalation of poaching and negative attitudes after the inception of CBNRM programs (Infield & Namara, 2001). Systematic reviews of the link between conservation and positive incentive conclude that the link

between the two is influenced by several contextual factors, and program managers should combine several strategies to ensure incentives translate to positive attitudes

(Salafsky et al., 2001; Waylen, Fischer, McGowan, Thirgood, & Milner-Gulland, 2010).

This chapter uses a survey approach to examine whether incentives motivate people to support and consequently participate in community conservation programs that seek to conserve wildlife in five communal conservancies in Namibia. At present, a limited number of studies have systematically tested the relationship between incentives and individual support for community conservation. This chapter applies logistic regression to test key factors that affect individual support for CBNRM using data from five communal conservancies in Namibia. Additionally, the chapter assesses whether support for CBNRM varies by location, gender, age, and general participation in conservancy related activities. Based on the results, the chapter seeks to contribute toward understanding factors that determine whether an individual supports local conservation initiatives and whether this creates incentives for the elite to capture

CBNRM programs.

The chapter first discusses pertinent literature then describes the methods and the study site. Finally, it presents the results and discusses the findings.

The Development of CBNRM in the Caprivi Region

CBNRM is a community centered approach aimed at sustainable utilization of local resources. It supersedes protectionist approaches of the 1960 that excluded locals from benefitting from local resources. The fines and fences approach for example, criminalized local use of resources in protected areas (Adams & Hulme, 2001). The

CBNRM approach brings communities to the fore in managing and benefiting from locally available resources. With the introduction of CBNRM, communities gained

resource use rights – and varying levels of decision making over the utilization and allocation of these resources (Beebe, 2003).

In southern Africa, CBNRM emerged out of local experimentation with wildlife policies. The results of such local experiments were various community-based conservation initiatives such as CAMPFIRE (Zimbabwe), ADMADE/LIRDP (Zambia),

CBO/Trusts (Botswana), Chuma Chatu (Mozambique), and Communal Conservancies

(Namibia). These programs were characterized by the following: (a) moving away from the state to “local society,” with possibilities of transferring all management and allocation decisions to these localities or partial rights (co-management) (Rihoy &

Maguranyanga, 2007) (b) embracing sustainable use in order to allow communities to benefit from natural resources, and (c) allowing markets to influence people choices and land use options by removing subsidies that distort natural resources values (G. Child,

1996) (especially in marginal rural landscapes where local communities preferred agriculture over natural resources).

The Namibia’s CBNRM program was developed through collaboration between traditional leaders and local NGOs (Murphree, 2009). The first communal conservancy to be registered was Torra Conservancy in 1997 following the pilot project in northwestern region (Kunene) of Namibia that trained local game scouts to patrol community areas to deter poachers (Boudreaux & Nelson, 2011). This pilot project was followed by similar projects across the country and fifty communal conservancies were established between 2000 and 2007.

Communal conservancies are legal entities with clearly defined boundaries, roles, and membership that allow them to derive conservation benefits (Naidoo,

Weaver, Stuart-Hill, & Tagg, 2011). Each conservancy has clearly defined boundaries, which specify the wildlife management areas for a given community. In addition, the community is required to adopt a constitution that clearly specifies the role of its members and elected conservancy committee. The elected members will then manage wildlife and tourism revenue on behalf of the communities.

Namibia's CBNRM program is guided by the following principles: (a) incentivizing households through meat shares from safari hunting, cash dividends to households from joint venture agreements between communities and professional hunters (b) providing communal projects such as schools, clinics, and boreholes; (c) employment and training as conservancy guards, lodge staff, tour guides and professional hunters; and (d) compensating farmers for livestock and crop losses (Vette et al., 2012).

Quantitative Approach

A quantitative survey approach was utilized to test whether incentives motivate individuals to participate in conservancy affairs. The survey methodology is described in detail below.

Description of the Survey

The survey data was collected from five conservancies in the North-eastern part of the Caprivi Strip, Namibia. These are Balyerwa, Kwandu, Mashi, Sobbe, and

Wuparo. These five communities were conveniently selected since they participated in a governance “dashboard” project implemented jointly by the University of Florida and a local Non-Governmental Organizational called Integrated Rural Development and

Nature Conservation (Collomb et al., 2008). Second, all the five conservancies derive most of their incomes from tourism and hunting. Kwandu, Mashi, and Sobbe are part of the north complex and Wuparo and Balyerwa-the south complex. Kwandu conservancy

is the oldest and it was founded in 1999, followed by Mashi in 2003 and Sobbe in 2006

(Table 4-1). Wuparo, at the time of the study was also beginning to earn significant income from tourism, and Balyerwa are on the southern side of Mudumu National Park.

Figure 4-1 shows the geographic location of the study sites and table one summarizes the key characteristics of each conservancy.

The questionnaire covered following: demographics, participation in conservancy meetings, whether they voted in the election of leaders, perception of their rights, knowledge of the conservancy finances, rating of community projects and level of satisfaction with the community-based conservation program (i.e. the conservancy).

Locally trained enumerators were closely supervised to ensure survey quality and completeness. In conducting the survey, the participants were first read a consent statement that specified their rights as respondents and the researchers then sought the consent of the participants to proceed with the interview. Once consent was acquired, the questions were then asked in vernacular and the responses were captured on a copy written in English.

A sample of 472 conservancy members was drawn from the five conservancies between June and July 2011. Survey respondents were identified in an ad hoc manner based on random walks. At each household either the head of household or the eldest household member was interviewed. Locally trained research assistants conducted the survey in local languages. The completed and verified questionnaires were entered and cleaned using SPSS. The analysis presented in this chapter was performed using R statistics.

Outcome Variable

The dependent variable in this research, satisfaction, is a dichotomous type that assesses whether individuals support the conservancy or not. Multiple factors were assessed to determine their effect on individual support for the conservancy. Table 4-2 summarizes all explanatory variables used in this study. Since the response variable is a binary outcome, a logistic regression model is appropriate (Tay, Rifaat, & Chin, 2008).

The response variable is satisfaction =1 and non-satisfied = 0. Explanatory variables in the model include gender (two levels), location -5 levels, AGM attendance-2 levels costs and benefits -2 levels.

Characteristics of the Respondents

Table 4-3 shows the number of males and females interviewed in each conservancy. Overall, 56 percent of the respondents were female while 46 percent were males. The mean age for respondents was 38.64 years in the five areas. Most people identified themselves as either Siyeyi or Mbukushu. Each household had an average of

4.75 family members.

Statistical Analysis

Logistic regression analysis was used to compute the odds rations for whether community members were satisfied with the conservancy or not based on the predictor variables listed in Table 4-1. Table 4-1 provides three columns showing the survey questions, variable code and the response scale. The following variables solicited for a binary yes/no response: AGM, Cash, Meat, Grain Loss, Livestock loss, and Injury. The variable sex was dichotomized to 0 and 1 (Male), while natural breaks were applied to individual ages with the first age group as the reference group. Individual satisfaction

was measured on a five-point scale and later dichotomized to 0 (not satisfied) and

1(satisfied)

Logistic regression is a multivariate procedure for analyzing bivariate data.

Logistic regression assumes non-linearity and is often used to predict a binary dependent variable from a set of independent variables (Alexopoulos, 2010; Mehta &

Kellert, 1998). A core model is run first to test the role of the incentives and disincentives in determining whether people are satisfied with the Conservancy. The core model is then extended by adding variables to test specific hypotheses.

Results and Discussion

Of respondents who were interviewed, 62.5 percent reported they were satisfied with the conservancy while 37.5 percent were dissatisfied. Table 4-4 below shows the level of support for conservancies. Tables 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 provide conservancy disaggregated statistics for numeric and binary variables.

Logistic Regression Models

Three models were run to test the main effects of demographic characteristic against incentives and disincentives. Additional models were run to test additional hypothesis with variables such as participation, conservancy, and age of conservancy.

Variable to include in the models were informed by CBNRM theory of change that links support of conservation initiatives to financial benefits. The three generalized linear models that were run are summarized in Table 4-8. Model 1 is the core model that tests the effects of incentives and disincentives. Model 2 tests the hypothesis whether participation at the AGM and the gender of the responded affect support for the conservancy. Model 3 tests an additional hypothesis of whether membership satisfaction varies by conservancy and age. The aim of the logistic regression models is

to see whether the predictor variables improve upon the null model. In this case, the model must correctly classify more that 62.5 percent of the respondents as indicated in table 4 above. The test of significance for individual coefficients in the model is assessed using the Wald Statistic (Menard, 2000; Tay, Rifaat, & Chin, 2008).

Logistic Regression Results

From model 1, receiving meat is a significant predictor of satisfaction (alpha 0.01) while the rest of the variables are not. Model 2 fits gender, AGM attendance, and age, to six variables in Model 1 to explore their contribution toward member satisfaction.

First, we are interested in knowing whether males or females rate CBNRM differently.

Second, we are interested in knowing whether people that attend the Annual General

Meeting (AGM) rate the conservancy differently. Third, we are interested in whether different age groups rate the conservancy positively or negatively. Meat and AGM attendance significantly influence the rating of the conservancy. People that attend

AGMs and those that receive meat are more likely to rate the conservancy positively.

Gender and age do not significantly affect the rating of the conservancy. Model 3 tests the hypothesis whether being in a specific conservancy affects member satisfaction. We are interested in knowing whether people in conservancy X perceive the conservancy differently compared to conservancy Y. The results indicate that community members’ support for the conservancy also varies by location. Community members in Wuparo are more satisfied with their conservancy than community members in Kwandu. For residents in Balyerwa, Mashi, and Sobbe, their level of satisfaction is statistically the same as that of Kwandu conservancy.

Three explanatory variables (meat, location, and AGM attendance) were found to be significant predictors of community satisfaction. Receiving meat increases the odds

of attending the AGM by a factor of 0.61- 0.70 and attending meeting by a factor of between 0.50 and 0.52. These findings suggest that those participants that received meat and attended the Annual General Meeting are more likely to support the conservancy. The findings indicate that some of the often-perceived incentives did not statistically influence support for CBNRM in the context of the five communities discussed above. These results seem to suggest that local communities support the conservancy program because of broader social and political factors other than incentives. Next, we discuss some of the factors that account for the observed effects.

Meat

Table 4-7 shows the distribution of responses for the survey respondents that reported that they received meat. The proportion of respondents who received meat was very high in Wuparo (94.04 %), Sobbe (91.66%), Mashi (83.33%), Balyerwa

(78.65%) and lastly Kwandu (59.40 %). The logistic regression model shows that meat is a reliable predictor of individual satisfaction with CBNRM. Previous studies,

(Lendelvo, Munyebvu, & Suich, 2012), reported that most household members identified game meat as the major CBNRM benefit. In Namibia, and elsewhere in southern Africa, meat allocations are conducted regularly and transparently during the hunting season.

The study showed that per year, each household reported to have received an average of 3 kilograms (SD, 4.649, mode 2kg/year). Meat is often reported as a major benefit because it benefits members at the household level. Therefore, the chances are that most of the people that were interviewed would have received the meat. Therefore, household level benefits are likely to be better at predicting individual level satisfaction compared to those that can be easily privatized such as cash and jobs.

Cash

The summary statistics (Table 4-7) show that at least 40 percent of the respondents in each community had received cash benefits. The highest percentage of cash benefits was reported in Sobbe where 97.22 percent of the respondents reported having received cash. The three models discussed above show that cash is not a significant predictor of individual level satisfaction with the communal conservancy.

Cash benefits across the conservancies are still marginal. Based on the survey data, mean annual cash dividends were N$ 60 (7.6 N$ = 1 USD, SD = N$51, mode = N$33).

In addition, interviews with some of the local members indicated that most of cash benefits do not reach the households especially in cases where males receive the dividends. Compared to the CBNRM program in Botswana where no cash dividends have been paid out to communities (Rozemeijer, 2009), the communal conservancies have attempted to provide these cash dividends, albeit too low.

Jobs

Regarding access to jobs, the respondents indicated the following: Wuparo

(50%), Sobbe (34.72%), Mashi (31.72%), Balyerwa (22.47%) and Mashi (18.81%). The three logistic regression models show that jobs do not significantly predict whether individuals will rate the conservancy either negatively or positively. The survey findings regarding few job opportunities from CBNRM programs have also been reported by similar initiatives in southern Africa. For example, previous research also notes the lack of new job opportunities in local CBNRM initiatives (Sebele, 2006). In Namibian conservancies, most people are employed in lodges, craft shops, and as community game guards. However, these jobs are few and most positions are occupied on a permanent basis limiting the circulation of opportunities within communities. Limited job

opportunities with the CBNRM industry deprives other community members the opportunity to diversity their livelihoods. In short, for the few job opportunities that are available, locals complain that the elite award these opportunities to their friends and relatives (Muyengwa, Child, & Lubilo, 2014).

Livestock loss, grain loss, and injury to humans

Few people reported having lost livestock within the past 12 months and with the highest percentage recorded in Wuparo (36.90%). Regarding loss of grain and damage to crops, most individuals reported having lost crops to problem animals (47.19% -

77.77%). The reported cases of human related injury were low in all communities and ranged from 2.77% (Sobbe) to 15.47 % (Wuparo). Both Model 2 and Model 3 show that livestock loss, grain loss, and injury to humans are not significant predictors of the individual satisfaction with the conservancy. In Namibia, individuals are compensated for such losses through a program called the Human and Animal Conflict Compensation

Scheme (HACCS) whereby community members report the incurred damages. Once reported, the damages will be assessed and assigned a financial value for which they will be compensated. Some researchers report that while the process appears simple on paper, it often marginalizes locals since filing these compensation claims involves additional costs (DeMotts & Hoon, 2012). In Kwandu Conservancy for example, the

HACCS scheme pays N$ 5000 (~USD 490) to cover funeral costs for wildlife-induced losses. The government often sets the compensation figure and community members complained that these rates are often below the market rates. At the time of this research, the HACCS schemes were not fully functional and depended on additional revenue from the government.

The findings of this study indicate that local people that received meat, attended the AGM, and are from a specific conservancy are more likely to rate their level of satisfaction with the conservancy differently. For example, the three models show that positive rating the communal conservancy is associated with having received meat and attended an AGM. Communal conservancy members in Wuparo also indicated being satisfied with their conservancy compared to Kwandu (reference group).

The positive effects of meat on communal conservancies have been reported in earlier studies (Lendelvo et al., 2012). As discussed in their work, most individual household reported having received meat. In addition to be the most reported benefit, the meat often supplements household consumption hence, it can be shared by members of the household compared to cash which can be easily privatized and might never reach other household members. In communities where opportunities for meat distribution exist, enhanced transparency in the allocation of meat shares will enhance people’s satisfaction with the conservancy. In general most, conservancies in Namibia have not developed robust benefit sharing models (Mosimane & Silva, 2015) and developing these guidelines can start around meat distribution. If done properly sharing meat can enforce equity, transparency and accountability, which can in turn increase people’s confidence and support for their communal conservancies

AGM attendance is also a significant predictor on individual satisfaction.

Participatory processes have a transformational effect within communities and foster a greater sense of rights and ownership (Stoll-Kleemann, De La Vega-Leinert, & Schultz,

2010). Individuals who participate in governance processes are more informed about the communal conservancies. Since AGMs represent a premier decision-making

platform in the governance of communal conservancies where financial matters, annual plans, and strategic are presented and discussed (B. Child, Mupeta, Muyengwa, &

Lubilo, 2014; Collomb et al., 2008). In addition, since participation is voluntary, there are chances that broader social and political factors could influence collective action processes in different communities. For example, leaders of some conservancies refused to participate in the survey while the leaders in Balyerwa community for example threated people during feedback meetings.

The conservancy variable was also significant and showed that community members in Wuparo are more likely to rate the conservancy positively compared to

Kwando, and the three conservancies are not statistically different from Kwandu. This reported effect requires further research but qualitative data gathered during the project showed that all five communities had governance challenges but only Wuparo community leaders agreed to experiment with new governance structures in order to solve these challenges (Muyengwa & Kangueehi, 2013). The available data shows that satisfaction with the conservancy is multifaceted and broader community level factors are important in ensuring that people eventually express their support for the communal conservancies.

The findings in this chapter are useful in the implementation and design of

CBNRM programs. The findings show that positive incentives motivate individuals to change their attitudes toward communal conservancies. However, in doing so, there is need to pay attention to the types of incentives, participation mechanisms and community level factors. In conclusion, individual support for conservation activities is multi-faceted and the design of incentive led conservation approaches should avoid

focusing on material incentives while negating participation and governance issues. The data shows that benefit matter such as meat and increasing cash benefits will likely improve the perceptions of the conservancy

Table 4-1. Demographic characteristics of the study area (Namibia) Name Population Year Size Income Activities (Ethnic Diversity) Established (km2) Mashi 3900 (3) 2003 297 Hunting, Lodge, Crafts Kwandu 4300 (2) 1999 190 Timber, Hunting, Campsite Sobbe 2000 (1) 2006 404 Hunting, Crafts

Wuparo 2100 (1) 1999 148 Hunting, Craft

Balyerwa 1500 2006 223 Hunting, Lodge (1)

Source: NASCO, (2008). State of the conservancy report www.nasco.org.na

Figure 4-1. Map of Eastern Caprivi, Namibia

Table 4-2. Description and coding of explanatory variables Survey Questions Variables Description of variables Indicate sex of Sex Females=0 Male=1 respondent How old are you, Age -22 years please record exact -29 years= 1 age) -55 years= 2 + =3 Indicate the name of Conservancy Kwandu the Conservancy Mashi= 1 Balyerwa =2 Wuparo =3 Sobbe= 4 Did you attend the last AGM Not attend= 0 Attend= 1 Annual General Meeting (AGM) Did you receive cash Cash No =0 Yes= 1 in the last 12 months Are you or any Jobs No =0 Yes= 1 member of your household employed in the conservancy Did you receive meat Meat No =0 Yes= 1 in the last 12 months Did you suffer any Crop damage/Grain loss No =0 Yes= 1 crop loss or damages due to wildlife in the last 12 months?

Did you suffer any Livestock loss No =0 Yes= 1 livestock loss or damages due to wildlife in the last 12 months Has any person in Injury No =0 Yes= 1 your household, including your self been injured or killed by wildlife? Overall how do you 1 = Strongly support rate the conservancy 2= Support 3 = Neutral 4= Do not support 5 = Strongly dislike Computed value 1:2 = Satisfaction No =0 Yes= 1 Satisfied, 3:5 Not satisfied

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Table 4-3. Summary of sample sizes by gender Female Male Total Kwandu 52 49 101 Mashi 69 57 126 Balyerwa 56 33 89 Wuparo 48 36 84 Sobbe 39 33 72 Table 4-4. Distribution of outcome variable

Level of Satisfaction Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative Percent Percent Dissatisfied 177 37.5 37.5 37.5 Satisfied 295 62.5 62.5 100.0 Total 472 100.0 100.0 Table 4-5. Mean age of respondents by Conservancy CONSERVANCY MEAN SD MIN MAX Kwandu 38.20 16.28 16 89 Mashi 37.89 16.61 17 83 Balyerwa 42.05 17.96 19 80 Wuparo 40.65 15.10 19 74 Sobbe 34.01 15.07 16 86

Table 4-6. Mean household size CONSERVANCY MEAN SD MIN MAX Kwandu 4.69 2.80 1 20 Mashi 4.94 2.57 1 15 Balyerwa 4.44 2.231 1 10 Wuparo 5.057 2.436 1 14 Sobbe 4.20 2.30 1 12

Table 4-7. Summary statistics for binary predictor variables Predictors Values Kwandu Mashi Balyerwa Wuparo Sobbe N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) AGM No 55(54.45) 40 (31.74) 38(42.69) 28(33.33) 17(23.61)

Yes 46(45.54) 86(68.25) 51(57.30) 56(66.66) 55(76.38) CASH No 39(38.61) 71(56.34) 4(4.49) 5(5.95) 2(2.77) Yes 62(61.38) 55(43.65) 85(95.50) 79(94.04) 70(97.22) JOBS No 82(81.18) 86(68.25) 69(77.52) 42(50.00) 47(65.27) Yes 19(18.81) 40(31.74) 20(22.47) 42(50.00) 25(34.72) MEAT No 41(40.59) 21(16.66) 19(21.34) 5(5.95) 6(8.33)

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Table 4-7. continued

Predictors Values Kwandu Mashi Balyerwa Wuparo Sobbe N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) Yes 60(59.40) 105(83.33) 70(78.65) 79(94.04) 66(91.66) GRAIN No 37(36.63) 28(22.22) 47(52.80) 39(46.42) 32(44.44) Yes 64(63.36) 98(77.77) 42(47.19) 45(53.57) 40(55.55) LIVESTOCKLOSS No 76(75.24) 92(73.01) 58(65.16) 53(63.09) 50(69.44) Yes 25(24.75) 34(26.98) 31(34.83) 31(36.90) 22(30.55) INJURY No 89(88.11) 118(93.65) 85(95.50) 71(84.52) 70(97.22) Yes 12(11.88) 8(6.34) 4(4.49) 13(15.47) 2(2.77) SATISFACTION Dissatisfied 48(47.52) 44(34.92) 40(44.94) 20(23.80) 25(34.72) Satisfied 53(52.47) 82(65.07) 49(55.05) 64(76.19) 47(65.27) Table 4-8. Logistic regression results PREDICTOR VARIABLES Model 1 (SD) Model 2 (SD) Model 3(SD) (INTERCEPT) -0.0039 -0.3519 -0.3649 (0.2462) (0.3955) (0.4131) MEAT[T.YES] 0.8064 ** 0.7108** 0.6117* (0.2663) (0.2716) (0.2819) LIVESTOCKLOSS[T.YES] 0.1810 0.1725 0.1884 (0.2235) (0.2265) (0.2297) JOBS[T.YES] 0.1196 0.0824 -0.0357 (0.2246) (0.2305) (0.2366) INJURY[T.YES] -0.1845 -0.1855 -0.2549 (0.3571) (0.3612) (0.3714) GRAIN[T.YES] -0.0456 -0.0884 -0.0984 (0.2009) (0.2045) (0.2125) CASH[T.YES] -0.2512 -0.2269 -0.2783 (0.2322) (0.2349) (0.2644) AGECAT [T.23-39 YEARS] 0.2417 0.2409 (0.3349) (0.3409) AGECAT [T.40-55 YEARS] -0.1072 -0.1538 (0.3720) (0.3779) AGECAT[T.55+] 0.0718 0.0347 (0.3849) (0.3964) AGM[T.YES] 0.5261** 0.5057* (0.2024) (0.2073) SEX [T. MALE] 0.0394 0.0411 (0.1991) (0.2018) CONSERVANCY [T. MASHI] 0.1939 (0.2983) CONSERVANCY[T.BALYERWA] -0.1026 (0.3157) CONSERVANCY [T. WUPARO] 0.8439 * (0.3535) CONSERVANCY [T. SOBBE] 0.2002 (0.3504)

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Table 4-9. Overall model comparisons AIC X2 DF P(>X2) Model 1 625.45 12.9 6 0.045 Model 2 626.45 12.1 10 0.28 Model 3 625.65 28.5 15 0.019 Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 for Table 4-8

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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

The concept of elite capture continually receives significant attention in the development and public sectors. The study illustrates how social processes and power dynamics influence resource allocation decisions at the local level. Chapter 2 demonstrates that while countries have to some extent instituted formal legislation to address capture of community projects, the local elite have “agency” and have created ways of securing benefits, even in cases where it is prohibited by law. The findings show that the linkages of the local elite to the national politics and control over land provides them with power to undermine local level democracy. Chapter 3 on the other hand looks at a highly devolved system at the right scale and following the right principles but is prone to elite capture if the oversight regime changes from inclusive to personalized. These cases presented in this chapter show that for local level democracy to thrive, the meso level needs to protect these conditions. Chapter 4 shows that both participation and benefits matter in CBNRM and the case of Masoka (earlier phase and

Wuparo Conservancy) hints that both benefits and participation are key attributes of a successful CBNRM program.

In 2016, the Government of Zimbabwe commissioned a review of the CAMPFIRE program to address several bottlenecks around the economic model (to increase and diversity incomes to communities), institutional model (to address linkages among key institutions, and legislation (to update existing legislation around wildlife and nature- based enterprises). The author participated in the review process and passes an opinion that even such reviews and proposed reforms are subject to elite manipulation as they avoid the core issues to address the governance challenges in wildlife

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management. Land tenure and resource rights are key to addressing the domination of the elite in such programs. Future reforms will thus run the risk of further strengthening the traditional leaders and the existing elite.

Zambia’s conservation program can also not divorce itself from the extreme control of chiefs on land – which serves as the basis of negotiations for the establishment of conservancies. The program remains top-down, and the Department of

Wildlife is not devolving funds to the CRBs. The country has seen the emergence of conservancies supported by the NGOs that will operate alongside the community resource boards. These conservancies offer any opportunity to design robust programs that take into consideration issues of informal rules and scale of governance to address the challenges of elite capture.

While Namibia’s programs perform well on many areas (land protection, wildlife recovery, and incomes) the cases of elite capture are increasing particularly among the conservancies in the Caprivi region. Informal interviews and conversations with

CBNRM experts indicate that some committees are abusing funds in smaller communities. This is even though the government of Namibia has devolved rights to conservancies. These developments provide justification for the need to understand how the local elite can be co-opted for the greater community good.

Botswana on the other hand illustrates the impact of centralization of decisions at national level. In 2013 the government banned hunting, which was a major source of income for most of the Trusts and three years down the line there were significant negative livelihood impacts and also increased poaching in most of the communities

(Mbaiwa, 2018). The case of Botswana also illustrates the need to link communities to

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high value tourism enterprises to substitute for hunting while simultaneously addressing the local governance challenges.

We conclude that CBNRM is a well-intentioned program, but over the years, significant resources have been spent on meetings (sitting allowances), and rents

(demanded by chiefs and other local authorities). The findings indicate that the problem of elite capture is complex and due to several factors, that include (a) the design of

CBNRM that accommodates and provides ‘special privileges’ to traditional authority structures; (b) elite discretion over choice of projects; and (c) community boundedness- i.e. localizing investments and recruitment within the community, and (d) weak community rights over land. While the elite are historically indispensable as literature suggests, there is more work to be done to increase benefits that trickle down to local level. As one of one my respondents rightly noted: “CBNRM is a good idea, but it needs to catch up with what has been happening in the past

In conclusion, the structural-functional approaches highlight the positive roles of the elite in keeping social order, but the social constructivist approach adapted in this study collected voices that show elite capture is not a state of equilibrium. It is a condition that local communities look to replace with inclusive governance (at least in the case of Masoka and Wuparo) and fair benefit sharing (meat in Namibia and a range of community benefits in Masoka). The challenge however, is that the local elite exert control over land and wildlife resources (which results in the imposition of demands and entitlements – tax on CBNRM incomes), and if locals oppose them they face eviction.

The future of participatory and inclusive democracy in Africa thus, lies in the reform of tenure on communal lands in ways that enable local people to protect their rights

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through the political system. Communal tenure or collective title is not enough as it is prone to elite capture but also a system of checks and balances to build strong local democracy accountable to the local needs. CBNRM gives such an opportunity to develop this form of accountable governance not only for wildlife communities but for

Africa’s vast natural resources (water and forests).

We suggest the need to conduct more work in elite capture in community development projects. The current project has existing data that can help answer some pertinent questions on the subject matter. The interrelationships among institutional, individual and meso-macro factors are critical in the area and we outline some of the immediate theoretical questions that had to be addressed.

The Role of Informal Norms in Shaping Elite Capture Outcomes

Whether social and institutional change originates from local communities or is an external imposition remains contested within CBNRM literature. Recent approaches reflect the idea that development needs to be demand driven which means that communities need to invite or demand assistance from external actors in order to solve their challenges (Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1999; Schou, 2007; Schou & Tsoka,

2010). The main hypothesis is that if communities invite external actors, they will also contribute to solving problems at hand. Some theorists view CBNRM as an external program that seeks to transform rural landscapes into a form palatable for national, regional, and international capitalist interests (Dzingirai, 2003; Hill, 1996; Murombedzi,

2010; Vette et al., 2012). Others view CBNRM as a genuine local level movement driven fully by local communities (Mufune, 2015). Despite these two contesting views, it is apparent that CBNRM emphasizes the creation of formal institutions and in some cases melds them with traditional authority structures. Governance failures in CBNRM

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are often attributed to the fact that external rules are imposed on local communities in the form of externally drafted constitutions that are passed onto communities for adoption and use. However, most of them lack inclusive participation as stipulated in

Ostrom’s design principles. Inclusive participation is not normal in quasi-feudal systems with low social capital.

In most of southern Africa, local communities are mandated to adopt formal institution before the government delegates, the rights to benefit and this is also recommended by most implementing organizations. In Namibia for example it is a legal requirement that communities adopt a constitution before their conservancy can be formally demarcated. The emphasis on the creation of participatory and democratic institutions in managing wildlife resources is seen been by others as an alternative to the protected areas approach that often excluded locals (Brandon, 1992) and imposed rules from outside. CBNRM thus, brings communities to the center of decision making and broadens community participation into hitherto preserved arenas such as natural resource monitoring, wildlife monitoring, and revenue distribution, attending meetings, and negotiating contracts with safari and joint venture operators. Participation in these local processes is expected to result in empowered citizens (Shackelton & Campbell,

2000). Other researchers however, perceive these institutional reforms as exacting on communities thereby making CBNRM implementation and design complex for communities to work without the support of external agencies (Nelson & Agrawal, 2008)

Thus, there is a need to test one of the major assumptions that if communities participate in rule making, they are likely to understand and enforce these rules. Unlike state or externally written constitutions, locally written constitutions are likely to

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incorporate the local needs and values. Circumventing community participation can set a weak foundation for community projects such as embezzlement of funds (Rihoy &

Maguranyanga, 2007).

Matching Governance Scale to Reduce Elite Capture

Mancur Olson’s thesis states that smaller groups are effective at solving collective action problems associated with collective property resources. Olson’s observations and those put forward by the proposition that smaller groups are more effective at problem solving than larger groups. Olson’s conclusion is that institutions that devolved to the “doing level” are more likely to be effective at solving problems than larger institutions (Olson & Olson, 1965). In contrast, Blaikie (2006) criticizes this commonly assumed notion that small communities manage better because they are homogenous and share value and norm systems that enable them to hold their leaders to account. These diverging views offer an opportunity to review the nature of devolved governance in CBNRM with the view to understanding how institutions can be designed in ways that can minimize elite capture.

Democratic decentralization has been a common tool for creating smaller units for effective management of common pool resources and ensuring equitable redistribution of local resources. In most cases, decentralization has led to improved efficiency and improved equity, improved governance, and helped overcome corruption often associated with third world governments (Andersson & Gibson, 2004). Recent scholarship indicates that at the community level, the local elite tend to capture a significant proportion of benefits intended for the poor. The response to local elite capture in the natural resources management sector has been to recentralize control of wildlife management and the benefits (Smoke, 2003).

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While significant research has evaluated the performance of decentralized natural resources management institutions, little research has provided empirical data to support what appropriate CBNRM should be implemented. The current work has illustrated how the local elite circumvent these democratic processes for self-benefit.

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APPENDIX SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Dashboard Questionnaire:

Tracking Satisfaction with Community Based Organizations

EVALUATOR (asking questions) Name:……………... Position: …………………………...…… Organization:…………………………. Date of questions: ……/……/……

STATEMENT ABOUT INFORMED CONSENT: 1. This survey should take less than one hour 2. You do not have to answer any question you do not feel comfortable with 3. All information is confidential and anonymous 4. You can stop the interview process at any time 5. You can ask for clarification on any question at any time

RESPONDENT DETAILS Name: ……….……………….………… (only if willing) Only fill in name at end of interview Age: …………. Sex: Male / Female Education grade: …………… Year settled in area: ………….. Name of CONSERVANCY: …………………. Name of Village: ……………………...

Employment: nil / describe…………… Are you a registered member of the CONSERVANCY/AREA? Yes/No Position in CONSERVANCY/AREA:  Manager / Management Employee  Employee (Game Guard, CRM)  Executive Committee  Elected Representative (Management Committee)  Village Development Committee(VDC)  Ordinary Member / Person / Villager  Other ………… ………... How many people are there in your household? ……… How many hectares did you plough in the last 12 months? …………. How many bags of grain did you harvest in the last season? ………. How many cattle do you own? …………

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1. General Understanding of CONSERVANCY Structure or Function

CONSERVANCY Annual General Meetings

1.2 Did you attend the last AGM Yes / No (Turnout research shows that participants tend to over report. Even the Dashboard surveys compared against records of minutes show the same result.

1.3 On a scale of 1-5, how satisfactory was the last AGM to you: ☺☺ ☺     I did not attend

CONSERVANCY General Meetings 1.4 Have you attended Conservancy General Meetings in the last12 months? Yes / No

1.5 How many general meetings have you attended in the last 12 months? ……….

1.6 How satisfactory was the last(needs to reference a specific date) Maybe we can ask which issues are not/handled properly at General Meetings? List …...

1.7 General Meeting to you: ☺☺ It was well run, I could easily participate, and I got all the information I wanted ☺ It gave me some of the information I wanted, and I could participate a bit  Neutral  The GM was unsatisfactory, with little useful information and participation  The GM was highly unsatisfactory

2. Rights and Understanding of CONSERVANCY Constitution

2.1 Do you have the following rights (tick the box if yes)? Merge with the previous section (this should be a test) to gauge whether or not people understand their constitution. Also add false questions Yes No (a)   To stand in an election (b)   To make decisions on the use of wildlife/Conservancy money (c)   To check how Conservancy money was spent (d)   To remove incompetent/corrupt officers (Reps, Chair, Treasurer, etc.) (e)   To remove incompetent/corrupt employees (f)   To vote / choose Conservancy leaders (g)   To amend the constitution (h)   To demand for a meeting and/or explanation (i)   To set animal quotas for hunting (j)   To choose your safari operator (k)   To choose your tourism partners (Joint Venture)

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CONSTITUTION We can change this to list items (the list experiments- considering that most committees rarely read the constitution. This needs to change based on each community. The example below is based on Sankuyo Constitution

2.2 Has your constitution been explained to you in the last 12 months? YES/NO [Which of the following statement is true about your constitution? 1.

2.3 Do you think your constitution works well? Add three questions under the management plan

Test item: Trust affairs are controlled by powerful people from the outside We often override the constitution/ Deeed of Trustees ☺☺ The constitution is very good. ☺ The constitution is fair  Neutral  The constitution is difficult to use  The constitution is bad. It is unfair / too complex / difficult to understand ??? Don’t know what it says

2.4 Does your community follow the constitution? ☺☺ We know what the constitution says, and we always follow it. ☺ We mostly follow the constitution  Neutral  We usual ignore the constitution or don’t know what it says  The constitution is never used. ??? Don’t know what it says

2.5 Were you consulted during the constitution building process YES/NO

2.6 Who owns the CONSERVANCY?  Members  Conservancy Management Committee  Neutral  Executive Committee  Traditional Authority  Don’t know

2. 6.1 If the answer to questions 2.5 (d) and (e) is NO. Answer the following questions, why don’t you have those rights in (d) and (e)  Prevented to remove erring officers or committee members  Lack of information on ownership of the conservancy  Fear  Don’t Know.

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2.7 In CONSERVANCY Decisions (such as deciding the use of money or choosing True / False projects) which applies to you best: Convert this to a list experiment (item e, should be a treatment item) Tell me how many statements are true. Just tell me how many and not which ones. (a) I am fully informed and involved in making key decisions  /  (b) Leaders make the suggestions, but I have the right to change these decisions  /  (c) I am often told what is happening, but I have few rights or opportunities to change  /  these decisions (d) The chief imposes decisions on community members  /   / 

2.8 Who Makes the Financial Decisions on how CONSERVANCYs money will be True / False used (e.g. the budget) (tick one)? (a) Ordinary Members at General Meetings at Village Action Group Level  /  (b) People we elected at Village Area level (Area Committee Leaders)  /  (c) Ordinary people at General Meetings at Conservancy Level (e.g. AGM)  /  (d) People we elected at Conservancy level (Executive Committee)  /  (e) Conservancy Employees  /  (f) Don’t know

2.9 Which statement is true: True / False (a) Ordinary people in the community make decisions, which are then implemented  /  by the committee (b) Ordinary people elect the Committee, which then makes all the decisions on  /  our behalf. These decisions are good and, in our interest, (c) Ordinary people elect the Committee, which then makes all the decisions on  /  our behalf. These decisions are selfish and not in our interest

3. Attitudes

3.1 Wildlife and Natural Resources are Important to our Future: ☺☺ Strongly Agree ☺ Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

3.2 My attitude towards wildlife is: ☺☺ Strongly Positive ☺ Positive  Neutral  I do not support Wildlife  I strongly dislike Wildlife

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3.4 Overall, what do you think of the Park? (Needs to be specific) ☺☺ Strongly Support the Park ☺ Support the Park  Neutral / Not sure  I do not support the Park  I strongly dislike the Park

3.5 Overall, what do you think of the Poaching (change to list Item…) Indicate the number of items that you are with. Indicate the total and not the specific items. 1. Crops have failed 2. Drinking water has been difficult to find 3. Youth a 4. Poaching is still present but usually not reported e  It has gone up  It has really gone very high

4. CONSERVANCY Performance

4.1 What do you think of how well the CONSERVANCY Committee manages your affairs?

☺☺ The CONSERVANCY is very well managed

☺ The CONSERVANCY is managed reasonably well

 Neutral

 The management of the CONSERVANCY is poor

  The management of the CONSERVANCY is very bad

4 .2 Did CONSERVANCY give you a financial report in the last year? YES / NO / DONT KNOW

4 .3 Are the CONSERVANCY finances properly accounted for and presented to you ☺ ☺ Yes, well presented and we understand and believe these figures ☺ Yes, presented reasonably and reasonable accurate  Neutral  No, Badly presented and we do not trust the figures   Not presented at all. We have no idea what is happening

4.4 Do you trust the CONSERVANCY leadership to manage and account for your finances? ☺☺ Yes, I trust them a lot ☺ Yes, I trust them  Neutral  No, I don’t trust them  No, I strongly Distrust them

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5. INFORMATION GIVEN TO YOU BY CONSERVANCY COMMITTEE

5. In the last year, the CONSERAVCNY gave me the following information (tick as applicable)

☺☺ ☺  Don’t Did you get: All the Some Nothing Know information information The annual budget was properly described to us

They told us the source and amount of income (INCOME)

They told us how the money was spent (EXPENDITURE)

We were given a list of our hunting quota

We were told how many animals were shot last year

We were told the price of animals that we sold to the safari hunter

We were told the income we got from our campsites

We were told the income we got from lodges and joint ventures in our area

We were shown the trends in Problem Animals

We were shown trends in the population of our animals

We were shown trends in rare and endangered species

We were shown trends in rainfall We were shown trends in how hard our game guards are working Forestry (clarify) Fisheries (clarify) Other ….

5.2 Overall, on a scale of 0-10 how do you rate the CONSERVANCY Programme

No support Strongly Support

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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Type of Benefit Did you benefit Did you / How much money was or Expenditure through household spent on this? community benefit?

Cash Y / N N$

Money

Other Benefits

Other .e.g scholarshop Y / N

Jobs Y / N kg

Meat

7.2 List any other (non-cash) benefits you got from the CONSERVANCY last year? (a) (d) (b) (e) (c) (f)

CONCLUSIONS 8.1 What are the best three things about the CONSERVANCY Programme? 8.2 What are the worst three things about the CONSERVANCY Programme? 8.3 What three changes / improvements would you make to the CONSERVANCY Programme?

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Shylock Muyengwa was born in Seke, Zimbabwe. He attended Mabvuku

Primary School (1986-1992), Tafara High II (1993-6), Mabvuku High School (1997-8) and the University of Zimbabwe (1999-2005). He graduated with a BSc Honors degree in psychology and a Master of Science in social ecology from the University of

Zimbabwe (1999-2005). In 2008, he was admitted at the University of Florida in the

School of Natural Resources and Environment. At the time, he also worked as a

Managing Editor for the African Studies Quarterly Journal Online (2008-2012). In 2012, he joined the consulting field to undertake an experimental study on governance reforms with Social Impact Inc. He also participated in several research in Southern

African with Dr. Brian Child in wildlife managing communities of Botswana, Namibia,

Zambia, and Zimbabwe. He currently runs an independent research and evaluation company that provides training and consultancy services in Zimbabwe. He is also serving as the President of the Zimbabwe Evaluation Association and assisting in developing the capacity of young and emerging evaluators in the country. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Florida on summer of 2018.

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