Industrial Restructuring and Innovation Policy in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1990.Pdf
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TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 23 the other canon foundation, Norway Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn CONTACT: Rainer Kattel, [email protected]; Wolfgang Drechsler, [email protected]; Erik S. Reinert, [email protected] Industrial Restructuring and Innovation Policy in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990 1 Rainer Kattel , Erik S. Reinert and Margit Suurna, Tallinn University of Technology May 2009 1 Corresponding author, email: [email protected]. Research for this study was partially supported by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research (targeted financing grant no SF0140094s08), the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication (I-PUP grant) and the Estonian Science Foundation (grants no 7577, 6703 and 8097). 1. Introduction Until very recently, economic development in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries2 has been seen by most analysts in both academic and pol- icy circles as a largely positive if not a very positive story. For example, at the end of 2005, Business Week ran a cover story titled “Central Europe – Rise of a Powerhouse”. It has become commonplace to argue that the suc- cess of CEE development is mainly due to neoliberal economic policies (lib- eralized markets, balanced public budget, price stability, low tax burden, and strongly market oriented reforms in all socio-economic sectors) pursued by these countries since the early 1990s. In other words, CEE countries have been poster countries for Washington Consensus policies. Indeed, as we show below, during the entire decade of the1990s, industrial restruc- turing and embryonic innovation policies in CEE were largely dominated by Washington Consensus thinking. We aim to show that, first, these policies have been a double-edged sword: on the one hand enabling fast and furi- ous industrial restructuring while, on the other hand, locking CEE economies into economic activities with low value added/productivity growth and thus undermining future sustainable growth. However, the impact of accession into the European Union (EU) has been equally pivotal for industrial restruc- turing and innovation policy making in CEE countries in the 2000s and this process can be summed up as a strong Europeanization of innovation poli- cy in CEE. We aim to show, second, that also Europeanization has been largely a double-edged sword for CEE countries. Since joining the EU in 2004 or 2007, and already during the accession process, there is a strong change in innovation policies in many CEE countries towards a much more active role of the state. In this change there is a clear and strong role of EU’s structural funding, particularly the negotiations and planning that comes with it. However, these changes come with specific problems: first, there is an over-emphasis in emerging CEE innovation policies on a linear understanding of innovation (from lab to market) that is based on the assumption that there is a growing demand from industry for R&D (which is not the case because of the structural changes that took place in the 1990s via the Washington Consensus policies); and, second, increasing usage of independent implementation agencies in an already weak admin- istrative capacity environment lacking policy skills for networking and long- term planning. We argue that such Europeanization of innovation policy in CEE, while highly positive in directing CEE to reorient economic and inno- vation policies towards more sustainable growth, is in its implementation often only deepening and exasperating the existing problems of networking 2 In the context of this article, Central and Eastern European countries are the following ten most recent member states of the European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 2 and coordination. However, both Washington Consensus policies and the process of Europeanization created fertile ground for significant financial fragility to develop in CEE countries during the second half of the 2000s which contributed to the financial woes these countries experience in the current global recession. Underlying both Washington Consensus policies and the impact of the EU on CEE is the assumption that the best intellec- tual and policy framework to integrate CEE countries into the world econo- my and secure sustainable growth is a Ricardian comparative advantage framework that assumes that all economic integration are more or less sym- metrical and integrative. We show that this is deeply misleading and that this misunderstanding led to deep-rooted cognitive dissonance between policies employed for industrial restructuring and innovation in CEE and actual developments taking place in the private sectors of these countries. This cognitive dissonance is also one of the key reasons why financial fragility was not recognized early enough to counteract it. 2. Methodological note Following a broadly Neo-Schumpeterian approach, we assume that compa- nies innovate in order to hedge their balance sheets; that is, companies innovate in order to generate revenues and outcompete their competitors, and they do so in a number of ways, e.g. by developing new or improved products, services or by introducing organizational or marketing changes, etc. (See also OECD and Eurostat 2005). In trying to hedge their balance sheets through innovations companies rely on skills and routines they have developed, or as Alfred Chandler called this, companies rely on “learned organizational capabilities” that include technical know-how, management and marketing skill, established networks etc. (Chandler 2005; also Nelson and Winter 1982). These capabilities, however, develop and evolve in a wider context that can be called a national system of innovation that can have a huge variety of features from the legal system to particularities of education and R&D. (See in particular Freeman 1974 and 1987) We use innovation policies to denote a set of public sector efforts that aims to enable private sector upgrading in terms of technology and skills, but also in terms of a wider set of activities, such as organizational change and capabilities. In other words, innovation policies aim at changing and upgrad- ing patterns and features of private sector learned organizational capa- bilities. In what follows, we try to track the evolution of main features of CEE com- pany-level organizational capabilities and of national innovation systems since the 1990s. These concepts serve as rough approximations and heuristic devices to organize actual historical events. We do so largely by 3 using stylized facts, and we are fully aware that such an approach abstracts diverse actual developments. (See also footnote 14 below) However, we hope to show that – particularly in comparison with East Asian develop- ment – CEE countries followed a similar path since 1990 and look surpris- ingly alike. The following is divided into 4 parts: in the first three sections we depict the stylized facts of industrial upgrading, changes in the R&D system, and corresponding innovation policies in CEE since 1990. The final part of the essay summarizes the previous sections and draws conclusions about evo- lution of the main features of organizational capabilities and national sys- tems of innovations in CEE since 1990. 3. Stylized facts of CEE industrial restructuring in 1990s Perhaps the key assumption behind how Central and Eastern European countries should go about reforming their economies in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the belief that, as Martin Wolf argues, “new opportunities were at last opening up for developing countries to export manufactures and a range of relatively sophisticated services competitively” (Wolf 2007). Indeed, it can be argued that economists of almost all persuasions seemed to share one common view: globalization in the form of global financial mar- kets and trade liberalization would greatly benefit CEE countries. Globalization was seen as the main factor in delivering fast economic restructuring spurred by global capital in form of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. This enthusiasm was largely based on the classical Ricardian assumption of comparative advantage defined, in a classic textbook for- mulation, as follows: “trade between two countries can benefit both coun- tries if each country exports the goods in which it has a comparative advan- tage.” (Krugman and Obstfeld 2005:26) Krugman’s work in the 1990s that included economies of scale into the Ricardian framework, assumed that the mutually beneficial trade takes place between countries possessing increasing returns activities. (See Krugman and Obstfeld 2005:110-146; and Krugman 1996) Thus, as CEE countries exhibited high levels of indus- trialization at the end of the 1980s (comparable to East Asia), it seemed correct to assume that globalization would indeed greatly help these economies to restructure the industry and to become vastly more efficient in production through trade and increased competition. (See also Radosevic 1998 and Guerrieri 1998 for discussion). However, the augmented Ricardian framework failed to take into account two phenomena: first, the 1990s saw the onslaught of what has been termed a new techno-economic paradigm that completely changed the nature of industrialization and essentially stripped many maturing and 4 increasingly foot-loose industrial activities of significant (dynamic) scale economies; second, the Ricardian framework assumes that