CHAPTER XV NEW TROOPS-AND A MENTAL CHANGE INJune and July, 1915, there arrived in Egypt from reinforcements of special Importance. For some time after the departure of the Gallipoli expedition the only Australian troops regularly arriving had been the n~onthlydrafts to maintain the strength of units already at the front. These came forward with absolute regularity, the quotas being whatever was laid down for the British . For example, when in December, 1914,the British War Office, after experience of the heavy losses in France, decided to send forward monthly 15 per cent. of the full strength of each infantry unit and IO per cent. for each unit of cavalry, Australia adopted the same scale. At that time the force consisted of- One (1st) infantry division, One additional (4th) infantry brigade, Three (Ist, 2nd, and 3rd) light horse brigades, and Certain base or L.-of-C. units. For these the increased monthly reinforcement would be 3,227 officers and men. This number was therefore regularly despatched from Australia. But the recruits who continued to offer were more numerous than could be absorbed in these drafts. The great tide of enlistment which set in after the Landing had not, indeed, yet commenced, but since the sailing of the early contingents there had been steadily enrolled a somewhat different class of men from that which had first rushed to the recruiting offices. They were men who perceived that the war was likely to be longer and more difficult than had at first appeared; men who waited to settle their family or business affairs before considering themselves free to enlist ; men who had begun to realise that, if the war was to be won, each individual citizen must put his shoulder to the wheel. A high proportion voltinteered not so much from impetuosity of spirit as because of a reasoned patriotism. The newspapers, in the effort to encourage enlistment, pointed out that these men were perhaps more truly representative of Australia

419 420 THE STORY OF ANZAC [Jan.-Apr., 1915

than the adventurous 1st ’ Division, and that they were impressing all beholders as the finest troops yet raised in the Commonwealth. Men of the , reduced, war-worn, sickening in their trenches at Anzac, read such eulogies with sardonic comments, and at once christened these future arrivals the “ Dinkum ” (that is, “ the genuine ”) Australians. When this class began to maintain the flood of enrolment and the camps in Australia were found to be receiving far larger numbers than would he required for mere reinforce- ments, the Commonwealth Government cabled to Great Britain offering to organise, despatch, and maintain fresh units of a strength of 10,000. This proposal was accepted, the British Government asking that as large a percentage as possible should be infantry. On February aid, therefore, the Common- wealth notified London that the new force would comprise- Two (5th and 6th) infantry brigades. One (4th) light horse brigade. On April 1st this was increased I)y the additional offer of- One (7th) infantry brigade. The three infantry brigades were raised as follows :- In - 5th (17th, ISth, Igth, and 20th Battalions). In Victoria- 6th (21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Battalions). Tn other States- 7th Brigadel- 25th Battalion () . 26th Battalion (half Queensland, half ). 27th Battalion (South Australia). 28th Battalion [Western Australia), It happened that at the time when these troops were being raised the military portion of the force which in the early days of the war had captured German New Guinea’ was released from service in that territory. Of these troops, who had been raised in New South Wales, a very large number re-enlisted in the 5th BriEade, of which their commander,

1 Certain portions of N S W. were included in the Q’land and S. Aust. military districts (sce foot-notes in Vol I bb 22 and 40). 2 The Australian Naval and hlllitary Expeditionary Force (see 6’01 X and Vol I P 36). Mar.-Apr., 19151 A MENTAL CHANGE 42 1 Colonel Holmes,' was appointed brigadier. Most of them were young and of particularly. fine physical standard. They included many from the University of , and all belonged to that eager class which had rushed to arms within the first fortnight of the war. Following the arrangements suggested before the war: each brigade was accompanied by its proportion of signallers, a , a company of transport, and-according to sound British rule-the first monthly quota of reinforce- ments. The new contingent therefore amounted to 17,183 officers and men, for whose raising, organising, and equipment the staffs of the Commonwealth headquarters in Melbourne and those of the six military districts were responsible, the Chief of the General Staff being Colonel Legge, and the Adjutant-General Colonel Dodds.6 Some of the Australian training-camps had by this time been removed to more suitahle areas, farther from the great cities, and several were now developing into the large permanent camps-military cities of wood and galvanised iron-which continued to be the Aus- tralian training-dc5p;ts during the war.e In these the new brigades received a preliminary instruction, which, however, differed in one important respect from that given to the first force. A reaction had set in against the plan of allowing brigade and battalion commanders to choose the oficers for their infantry regiments.' This duty was now entrusted to selection boards, appointed by the Minister for Defence, which sat in the various capitals and tended to make choice of a rather senior and academic type of officer from the citizen forces. Battalion commanders were consequently forced to contrive as best they could by " compromise and adjustment "* to secure the best " team '' of officers possible in the circum- stances. Even Colonel Holmes, returning with his force from New Guinea, failed to obtain in the a selection which entirely satisfied him. Many of his former officers, 'Maj.-Cen W. Holmes, CMC, D S.O.. V.D Commanded A.N & M.E.F, iprq/rg; 5th Inf. Bde., r915/16; 4th Div, 1916/17 Secretary, Water and Sewerage Board, Sydney; b. Sydney, 12 Sept , 1862 Killed in action, 2 July, 1917. 4 Scr-.. Vnl.. .. . I. r,bb --2R-9. -- 'Maj.-Gen. T. H. Dodds, C.M.G.. CV.0, DSO., D.AG., A.I.F., 1917/18. Officer of Aust Permanent Forces; of and Melbourne, b. Ncwcastlc-on- Tyne, Eng.. 11 Nov., 1873. See 1'01 XI-Aurtmlra During the War; and Vol. XII, plate 704 7 Vol. I, pp. 51-4 a The 28th (history of 28th Bn., A.I.F.). Vol. I. 422 THE STORY OF ANZAC [Mar.-June, 19x5 however, secured commands. Lieutenant-Colonel Russell Watson,B a citizen officer with. a good South African record, who had led the infantry in New Guinea, became colonel of the 24th Battalion in the , with Captain Manning'O (previously Judge-Advocate General in New Guinea) as his adjutant ; Colonel Paton,l' second-in-command of the New Guinea infantry, was appointed to the 25th Battalion of the ; other members of Holmes' former staff were scattered through the 5th Brigade. The command of the 6th Brigade was given to Colonel Linton,'a then a brigadier in the Citizen Forces, and that of the 7th to Colonel Burston,l' formerly Lord Mayor of Melbourne, a keen citizen officer but one whose age seemed likely to tell against him on service. At the time of these appointments Australian brigadiers still held only the rank of colonel, it being the policy in Australia, as in America, to have few officers of high title in time of peace. In Jdy, 1915,however, this policy was changed, since by reason of it the Australian brigadiers in the field were finding themselves always junior to their British, Canadian, and other colleagues. In July, therefore, all commanders of infantry and light horse brigades at the front were raised to " temporary brigadier-generals." The new brigades began to sail from Australia in May, their last units leaving in June. The Indian Ocean now being entirely safe, the transports made their journey singly, sailing at various dates, without escort. As the units arrived in Egypt, they were moved to the camping-grounds of their respective brigades outside Cairo," where they contintied their training under their own officers and the staff of Major- General Spens.

* Col. W W. R Watson, C B, C M.G , V.D Commanded 24th Bn, i915/17; Overseas Training Bde., igii/i9 Company director, of Balmain, N S.W.. b Sydney, 19 May. 1875. Died 30 June. 1924 10 Ma). C E. Manning: 24th Bn. Barrister-at-law: of Hunter's Hill, N.S W.; b Hunter's Hill, 24 Oct , 1879. Killed in action, 7 Aug , 1916. "Maj.-Gen. J. Paton. C.B. CMG, V.D. Commanded 7th Inf. Bde.. 19i5/17: 6th Inf. Bde., i9iy/i8. Merchant; of Waratah, N S W; b. Newcastle, N S W.. 18 Nov., 1867 "Col R Linton. Commanded 6th Inf. Rde.. 1915 Hardware merchant. of Melbourne: b. Dalton, Lockerhie, Scotland, 3 Nov., 1861. Died at sea, 2 Sept , i915 (Seep SDO). "hfaj -Gen J. Burston. V D Commanded 7th Inf. Bde, 1915 lfalster; of Hawthorn. Vic , b Kilmore, Vic , I May. 1856. Died 4 March. 1920. "The 5th and 6th Bdes went into the Aerodrome Camp on the N E. outskirts of Heliopolis with the 4th L H. Bde. The 7th was quartered at Ahbassia. S W. of Heliopolis These were each about five miles from the centre of Cairo June-July, 19151 A MENTAL CHANGE 423 In the middle of June General Legge, on his way to assume command of the 1st Division, reached Egypt, and at Birdwood's request stayed there a few days in order to inform himself of the state of affairs at the base.I6 At that time the new brigades which he had raised in Australia were beginning their Egyptian training, and he carried to Anzac the latest news of this important reinforcement. Legge's impending arrival to take over the 1st Division from Walker had raised much feeling among a few senior Australian officers. It was not the troops who objected, though they had become attached to Walker as a brave and considerate commander. Nor did Walker hiinself harbour the least resentment ; it was typical of his loyal nature that, dearly though he loved his division, he affirmed that it was natural and proper for the Commonwealth to desire its command to be in the hands of an Australian. But several seniors, including M'Cay"' and Monnsh, objected to being passed over in favour of a commander who, though a professional soldier, was their junior in the service and without experience of the front. Some even spoke of resigning, until Birdwood urged that resignation was not to be thought of in war, and that, if they suspected their new commander of being unequal to the task, their part was as far as possible to stand by him and help him through. 'This point of view was accepted loyally enough. Upon Legge reaching Anzac with the news of the three new infantry brigades in Egypt, the suggestion was made that these should be combined to form, with certain additional units, a 2nd Australian Division. M'Cay, the senior Aus- tralian brigadier, having shown himself brave in battle and of marked capacity in training, was chosen by Legge and Birdwood for the command. The consent of Lord Kitchener was received on July Ioth, and, the Australian Government concurring, the formation of the division was authorised. On July x~th,the day before he was to leave Anzac, M'Cay was descending a steep and dangerous corner of the

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16 Upon making this inspection Legge reported direct to the Australian Government that Cairo was a totally unsuitable centre for the training of Australian troops Presumably Legge made this report as commander of the A.I.F., but the ignoring of Sir John Maxwell, who considered that it should have been sent through him, gave rise temporarily to a difficult situation. Io Recently returned to the front, and apparently recovered from hi3 leg-wound received at Helles. 424 THE STORY OF ANZAC [July-Aug., 191s communication trench in rear of Scott’s Point when his leg, previously wounded at Helles, snapped at the point where the bullet had injured the bone. He was invalided to Australia. The officer most suitable for the task of organising the new division appeared to be Legge, whose capacity as an adminis- trator was well known. and under whom its three infantry brigades had been raised in Australia. His short tenure of his actual appointment had not been unaccompanied by difficulties. He had expressed strong tactical objections to the plan of the Lone Pine assault which the 1st Division was about to undertake. Moreover, his temporary withdrawal from Anzac rendered easier tlie retransfer to Birdwood of the supreme administrative command of the A.I.F. Legge’s appointment to the was approved by Kitchener, and on July 26th he handed over the 1st to Walker and left Anzac for Egypt, taking with him some of the elements of a strong and experienced staff. To the remaining steps in tlie formation of the 2nd Division reference will he made in their place. In addition to this reinforcement, the Australian Govern- ment had at the end of May despatched to Egypt a “bridging train,” composed mainly of ratings drawn from the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, together with pontoons, trestles, and technical eq11ipnient.l~ Further, partly in order to afford war experience to the regular troops of the Royal Australian Artillery, a brigade of siege artillery, including the personnel -but not guns-for two heavy batteries, was sent from Aus- tralia in mid-July. These batteries proceeded direct to England. Beyond those enumerated no additional Australian units reached Egypt until after Arrgust. Moreover, in con- sequence of the great numbers of horses which were being maintained, apparently to no good purpose, in Egypt, Sir Ian Hamilton, at Birdwood’s request, had asked of the War Office that no more mounted troops should be sent from Australia. The was already on its way; but after this no other light horse brigades were formed in AM- tralia, and the sending of horses for remounts was temporarily stopped. Before leaving the story of the base it is necessary to mention one further developnient which occurred during the

17 A detailed account of the R.A N B.T is given in 1’01 IX of this history July, 19151 A MENTAL CHANGE 425 critical months of the . During the first half of that campaign the keen desire not merely of the reinforcements but of the majority of wounded Australians from Anzac was to get clear of hospital and Egypt, and hasten hack to the front. Colonel Maudsley,la a leading physician of No. I General Hospital in Cairo, has recorded that at this early stage it was noticeable that “there were none of the effects of war weariness. . . . The wounded had done their work well and would soon he back. They were well satisfied.” Some of the first wounded, even while suffering the extreme discomfort of the hospital carriers, were consumed by anger against the enemy who had injured them, and were eager to get back for another blow at the “bastards.”1B Many more chafed to be at Anzac beside their mates. As the summer drew on, this high, keen spirit became less noticeable in the hospital wards. Many were more listless; in a few cases there was discovered the trouble common in every war-malingering, that is to say, feigning illness in order to avoid fighting, work, or discipline.*O Other patients, who would not have dreamed of shirking duty, nevertheless appeared to be no longer inspired with the same high enthusiasm. “ Many cases,” noted Colonel Manifold in his diary for July zoth, I‘. . . though not malingering, . . . required some moral stimulus probably, and pulling themselves together to overcome simply morbid symptoms or disinclina- tion to make an effort.” A medical officer at Luna Park also remarked “the difference in tone between those who had been admitted at first and those admitted now,” and thought the cause might be the herding of men “in large wards with enormous masses of beds.” It is possible that this overcrowding, and also the disillusionment caused by defective organisation at Lemnos and the base, were in part responsible. But the main cause lay far away in the dusty fly-infested bivouacs and trenches

~ ”Col. Sir H. C. Maudsley. K.C.M.G., C.B.E. Consulting Physician. A1.F. 1916/19 Of Melbourne; b. Stainforth Hall, near Settle, Yorks , Eng , 2; Apr , 1859. 19 Yol. I, fir. 570-1. PAlmost simultaneously there began to happen at Anzac a very few cases of an occurrence inseparable from war-the infliction of wounds by men upon them. selves in order to escape from service. The instances seem to have occurred (as afterwards in France) mainly amon comparatively new arrivals who felt unable to face the overwhelming strain of {ghting Such actlon. of course, constituted a serious military crime. It was noted about this time that Turkish soldiers also occasionally held their bands above the parapet to he shot at 426 THE STORY OF ANZAC [June-July, 1915 at Anzac. About that time there began to occur in the veteran portion of the force-the “ originals,” as they were called, who had fought at the Landing-the first signs of a psychological change. This may, in the narration, appear vague and shadowy, but it was nevertheless quite clear to any close observer ; and so concrete was it in its results that, in the end. it completely determined the response of the troops to various methods of leadership. Disillusionment, more or less acute, had undoubtedly followed the heavy and futile fighting at Quinn’s early in Jutit and the expensive demonstration on June 28th. But the mental change which began to affect the veterans of the force during the summer of 1915 was not mere disillusionment. About the middle of July some of those most intimately in touch with the troops began first to observe a subtle, yet fully palpable, alteration in the mental attitude of the original officers and men. At that time there had begun to spread through the force the first whispers of an impending attack by the troops at Anzac. As it became certain that this second tremendous fight, probably no less bloody than the Landing, was ahead of them, there was brought home for the first time to a great part of the infantry a realisation of the part which in the fine enthusiasm or excitement of enlistment they had undertaken to play. The first Australians who enlisted in this war had undoubtedly in their minds the story of previous Australian contingents, or at any rate of British expeditions oversea. They had pictured themselves fighting for perhaps a year or more, and had imagined the majority then returning, as they had done from South Africa, marching through the well-known streets and cheering crowds of their home city, and arriving back among their families with strange tales, interesting (I souvenirs,” and thrilling experience. Now for the first time the perception came to many-not in any startling form but in their few moments of quiet reflection, as they lay endeavouring to cheat the flies in their “pozzies,” or watched the bacorr frizzling in their mess-tins-that the prospect of marching home did not belong to the infantry who enlisted earliest in this war : that they had engaged themselves in a service which was not to end when they had borne their share of hardship, Juw-Ju~Y,19151 A MENTAL CHANGE 427 experience, and excitement. A man could lightly accept the chances if the fighting were to be over in a twelvemonth, or if there lay against him only the risks of one great engagement such as the Landing. But they now knew that for them the prospect was one of battle after battle, in which, in the long run, there must almost certainly be one of two endings. They felt themselves penned between two long blank walls reaching perpetually ahead of them, from which there was no turning and no escape, save that of death or of such wounds as would render them useless for further service. This realisation-which must have been brought home at an early stage to the men of the British Regular Army, and indeed to the officers and men of any infantry on those fronts where the war was fiercest-came almost visibly to a large proportion of the “original” officers and men of the Aus- tralian Imperial Force before the second offensive in Gallipoli. The first adventurous eagerness for battle, and the itching desire to get at the enemy, had in their case disappeared. Many observers failed to perceive this truth. Some writers on the press, either misled by the false literature of other wars or bent on sustaining the national determination in this one, invariably assumed that the men in hospital were thirsting to engage in further battles. The truth was that, while a few hot spirits undoubtedly remained restless and impatient unless they were in liolts with the enemy, the great majority of those who had once been subjected to the stress of a heavy fight had no wish to hurry into another. Rather they faced each fresh battle grimly, sometimes bitterly, with a full knowledge of the ugly chances lying before theni-chances which in a greater or less degree every man dreaded, and which only their ideal of duty or of manhood forced the majority of them to accept. The self-respect of most officers and men led them, as far as the matter rested with them, to return to duty among their mates in the firing line as soon as they were fit for it. No man who had enjoyed the frank fellowship and true good- comradeship of the regimental messes or bivouacs at the front could hear with an easy conscience of his fellow-officers or his old platoon in the thick of some heavy fight, if he was aware within himself that he could be there. None who knew the manner in which men and officers at the front regarded a 428 THE STORY OF ANZAC [I915 certain few, who were suspected of shirking service by clingmg to duties at the base, could have any doubt as to the course of conduct to which they themselves would adhere. There could be no question which were the comrades with whom they desired to be reckoned. Except in a few great crises, it was these reasons, and not any especial eagerness to deal with the enemy, which in later years caused men to press for return to the front, or at least cheerfully to accept that contingency when it became due. From July, 1915, onwards, as far as the A.I.F. was con- cerned, there lay more and more upon the base authorities the onus of providing the machinery for returning convalescents to the front. The rending strain of battle might, twenty times in one day, lay bare feelings which these men would not normally exhibit in a lifetime, and it left no man quite as elastic as it found him. They became content to give up their individual wills to the military machine, waiting for its move- ments, and, when these came, accepting them without question. In 1915 the well-meant sympathy of medical officers at the base often, in effect, imposed upon convalescents the necessity for volunteering a second time, and even of finding their own means to reach the front. Later in the war the machinery for such return became automatic. Of this mental change there were at the front few spoken signs, except some very rare and chance remark of an arresting bitterness For example, after the brilliant assault by the I Ith (Western Australian) Battalion on Leane’s Trench, a stranger remarked to a man of that unit: “They will be pleased in Western Australia when they hear of it.” “ This !” was the instant reply; “the 28th Battalion will get the cheering for this !” The 28th was the latest-raised battalion of that State, and the most recent mail had brought news of its arrival in Egypt.31 With each individual officer and man the tussle was an internal one; it is probable that even Birdwood, though he visited his trenches daily and personally knew many of his men, did not realise that there was any change in the outlook of his troops. When he assumed, as he invariably did in addressing them, that their keenest ambition was to have another opportunity of chasing the enemy with

n Long before the 28th returned to receive any ovation, that veteran battalion had iuffcred in battle after battle a5 heavily as the 11th itself. 19151 A MENTAL CHANGE 429 the bayonet, he always elicited a smile from the majority of the grim faces surrounding him. Nevertheless they were no longer in tune, as of old, with that time-honoured joke. So the internal revolution came and passed, with a mete quietness among some of the older men. The new prospect was faced. The fond dream of the return home had been silently surrendered by many without a word or a sign in their letters, such as might afford a hint of it to their families. The passionate love of home, marked in Australians, became stronger; but thenceforth it began to be taken for granted, in the infantry, that life was uncertain and probably short, and this assumption made the bonds of their comradeship very firm. Instant though most of them had been to use their fists in civil life, at the front these virile infantrymen seldom quarrelled, and a fight between them was rarely known. At least in the generous life of their messes and platoons selfish aims and personal strivings had no place. They lived from day to day. neir ambitions were for their regiment, their squadron, their company-for the brigade and the division and the A.I.F. Many outsiders went among them with deep, if unspoken, reverence, as among men devoted to die. The pure quality of their fellowship was perhaps seldom equalled in time of peace. It was a sign of the native mettle of this infantry that, when the time for the impending movement approached, the men, sick and weak though they were, became animated by the excitement and by the prospect of a change from the dull monotony of trench life. Colonel Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, visiting Anzac on July 27th, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener : “ Australians are superbly dug in and spoiling for a fight.”22 While this reference to the men’s eagerness probably applied most accurately to the light horse or mounted rifles, which had not yet been engaged in any general offensive, yet, as the day fixed for the attack approached, it became almost equally true of the most battle- worn amongst the troops at Anzac. Within measurable distance of the conflict they began to chafe for it, like racehorses approaching the starting-gate.

=Sir Ian Hamilton. in Collipoli Diary, T’ol ZZ, #. 37, gives the wording of this telegram as: Australians are superbly confident and spoiling for a fight.”