Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1938-1939
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Chicago-Kent Law Review Volume 18 Issue 1 Article 2 December 1939 Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1938-1939 Chicago-Kent Law Review Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Chicago-Kent Law Review, Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1938-1939, 18 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1 (1939). Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol18/iss1/2 This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 DECEMBER, 1939 NUMBER 1 SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1938-1939' PERSONS MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS L EGISLATIVE and judicial activity in the field of muni- cipal corporations during the past year has produced a considerable amount of material of importance to those per- sons having direct dealings with public agencies. In the leg- islative field further inroads have been made upon the stat- utory debt limitations of various political subdivisions. The 21/2 per cent limitation was removed in the case of school districts constructing or improving and equipping school buildings; 2 and in the case of cities, villages, and incorpor- ated towns, constructing or improving bridges and airport hangars of landing fields.3 A law has also been enacted requiring municipalities to ascertain the prevailing wage rates for all workmen em- ployed upon public construction projects and to specify in the contract documents that such rates must be paid by the contractors to whom public work is awarded." Another act passed by the legislature requires preference to be given on public works projects to resident Illinois laborers who are citizens of the United States or have received their first naturalization papers. The latter statute reflects a growing 1 The present survey is not intended in any sense as a complete commentary upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past year but is published rather for the purpose merely of calling attention to cases and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that of the judicial year, October to October, embracing from 369 Il. 232 to 371 Ill. 630; from 269 Ill. App. 541 to 301 Ill. App. 216; and from 98 F. (2d) 833 to 105 F(2d) 1023. 2 I. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 113, § 44.2; Laws 1939, p. 845. 8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 113, §§ 44.8 and 44.12; Laws 1939, p. 844. 4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, §§ 39n-39s; Laws 1939, p. 568. 5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, HI 269-275; Laws 1939, p. 567. 1 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW antagonism toward aliens which is fostered and encouraged by the "disclosures" of various bodies investigating so-call- ed un-American activities and by war and unemployment hysteria. Powers and Immunities During the past year, the Illinois Supreme Court was again confronted with the difficult task of applying the lim- itations suggested in the concept of "corporate purposes" as a term fixing the bounds of constitutional municipal activ- ity. In People v. Kelly,6 the court decided that land donated for the site of a state armory was used for a corporate purpose-a corporate purpose being defined rather vaguely, and probably necessarily so, as "some purpose which is ger- mane to the objects for which the corporation was created, or such as has a legitimate connection with that object and a manifest relation thereto." A definition of this sort will obviously never embarrass the court and should allow that flexibility of construction which the court regarded as desir- able in testing the validity of municipal acts, although at what sacrifice of certainty in the law remains to be seen. In Burr v. City of Carbondale,7 the court held that bonds issued as a donation to secure the location of the Southern Illinois Normal University at Carbondale were issued for a public purpose, but in Livingston County v. Weider,' the court decided that bonds issued for the purpose of inducing the establishment of a state reformatory at Pontiac were not issued for a corporate purpose and were void. In a later case, Norman School v. City of Charleston,9 however, the court held in effect that a contract by the city of Charleston which obligated it to furnish water to the Eastern State Nor- mal School for a period of fifty years for a nominal consid- eration of five dollars was not binding upon the city as it did not serve a corporate purpose. The Burr case was ex- plained on the ground that special statute had been enacted by the general assembly expressly authorizing donations by municipalities desiring to bid for the benefits supposed to accrue from the presence of a state institution of learning within the corporate boundaries of the successful bidder. In 6 369 1I1. 280, 16 N.E. (2d) 693 (1938). 7 76 IU. 455 (1875). 8 64 IIl. 427 (1872). 9 271 IlM. 602, 111 N.E. 573, L.R.A. 1916D 991 (1916). SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1938-1939 the Weider case, the court declared emphatically that the construction of a reform school was a state and not a cor- porate purpose and that no one would want to live near such an institution with its "poisonous influence." The objections of the court were summed up in the following words: "It was the duty of the general assembly to determine, for the whole people of the State, the necessity of a State Reform School. Deciding it was necessary, the enterprise should be promoted by the resources of the State. An offer to receive a donation from a particular locality to secure its location seems inconsistent and degrading to a state boasting of its sovereignty, its wealth and its unbounded resources. If a public institution is needed, the whole State should be re- garded, and it should be established where it will best pro- mote the interests and well being of the whole people." A state armory, by contrast, the court argued in the Kelly case, would be an asset to a community since the presence of the militia might tend to prevent destruction of property by riots for which the municipality would be liable. Whether the presence of a large number of soldiers in a city is an unmitigated blessing might seem to be open to some ques- tion, just as it might be questioned whether the Board of Supervisors in the Weider case committed a grievous er- ror of judgment in deciding that the county would benefit by the location of a reformatory at its county seat. The primary purpose in bidding for these state institutions, it is submitted, is not that the bidders may share more largely in the activities of the institutions, but rather the expecta- tion that incidental profits will be realized from the flow of business which will inevitably follow the institution with its necessary personnel. Since the municipal authorities are normally in the best position to determine what public func- tions should be promoted by the municipality, the decision in the Kelly Case, while perhaps not resting on the strong- est grounds, is believed to be sound, though not altogether consistent with previous judicial expressions. The validity of the Illinois Housing Authorities Act was upheld in Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority. ° This act 1 provides for the creation of municipal corporations to be 10 370 I1. 356, 19 N.E. (2d) 193 (1939). 11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 67%. CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW known as housing authorities. 12 Municipalities are author- ized by the Illinois Housing Authorities Act to enter into con- tracts with housing authorities providing for cooperation, loaning of employees, furnishing of municipal service to the authority, and granting tax exemption. In return for these services the municipality may make a service charge of 5 per cent of the amount of the rentals derived from the hous- ing project during the first ten years and 3 per cent of the rentals thereafter. The Illinois Supreme Court cited the ap- proving opinions of courts in a number of other jurisdictions in support of its conclusion that such projects serve a public purpose by reducing blighted areas, crime, immorality, dis- ease, and fire hazards. Although the Illinois Housing Author- ity Act did not expressly provide for tax exemption of hous- ing projects, the court held that such immunity was clearly intended, and that in any event the authorities would be exempt from taxation as charitable institutions under the general revenue act. The payment of special legal fees to a regularly em- ployed attorney for a municipal corporation for work con- sidered to be outside the scope of such attorney's official duties is illegal, the court held in Woods v. Village of La Grange Park,"5 if such work is in fact within the scope of the duties incident to the office of municipal attorney. It would appear that the only instance in which a salaried municipal attorney could legally be paid fees in addition to his regular compensation would be in the case of an appoint- ment on a purely nominal retainer basis with express pro- vision for additional compensation for services not of a speci- 12 Cities, villages, and incorporated towns having a population in excess of 25,000, and counties are authorized to determine the need for low cost housing and slum clearance projects in their respective communities and to petition the State Housing Board for a certificate verifying this need and empowering the petitioning municipality to create a housing authority.